IR 05000263/1996010
| ML20134N097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1996 |
| From: | Glinski R, Kozak T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134N009 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-96-10, NUDOCS 9611260163 | |
| Download: ML20134N097 (10) | |
Text
.
... _.. _
. _.
_.. _...... _., _.......... _ _ _...........__ _._ _.___..... _.._...... _..
>.
.
,
i.
.
.
)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
i REGION ll1
.
i Docket No:
50-263'
i License No:
DPR-22 i
i
Report No:
50-263/96010(DRS)
.
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company i
i Facility:
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant i
!
l Location:
2807 W. County Rd. 75
Monticello, MN 55362 i;
'
Dates:
October 28 through November 1,1996
!
}
inspector:
R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist i
t i
i
Approve,d by:
T. Kozak, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Re6ctor Safety
i I-
'
!
1..
.
1.
T
)
!
i
l
+
i I
'
.
"
i 9611260163 961118
'
PDR ADOCK 05000263 G
,a
,
>r
.
-
n.
n
-
-
- m
. _.
_.
.
..
_..
_. _ -_
.
__ _
.. _. _ _ _. _ _ _. _.
.
a Report Details I
R1 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls i
R 1.1 ALARA Practices for Loadina a Hiah Intearity Container (HIC) into a Transoortation Cask a.
Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspector reviewed the pertinent Radiation Work Permit (RWP), attended the
pre-job briefing, interviewed personnel, and observed the transfer of a HIC
containing condensate resin to a shielded transportation cask.
I b.
Observations and Findinos
,
The dose rates on the HIC ranged to about 8 rem /h [80 millisieverts/ hour (mSv/h)].
)
The pre-job briefing thoroughly covered the procedure and the RWP restrictions for
.
the HIC transfer, and included a description of the ALARA and safety
considerations for this tasi.
The inspector observed the transfer of the rilC from the storage cask to the
shielded transportation cask. The licensee conducted this work outside the l
radwaste building. RP staff evacuated station personnel from the immediate area and staged several radiation protection specialists (RPS) around the area to prevent
inadvertent access and to monitor dose rates. RP provided paper coveralls and an i
electronic dosimeter (ED) on the head of the rigger who worked nearest the HIC
before and after the transfer. ED data indicated the rigger's dose for this task was
0.023 rem (0.23 mSv). The collective dose for this RWP,0.129 person-rem (1.29 l
mSv), was low considering that the RWP covered the transfer of three HICs.
c.
Conclusion
!
The implementation of radiological controls during the transfer of a HIC containing i
condensate resin was characterized by an effective pre-job briefing and efficient job l
management.
R1.2 Imolementation of the Unborn Child Protection Prooram
.
!
The inspector reviewed the Radiation Protection Group Procedure, RPGP-02.08,
"Monticello Unborn Child Protection Program", and interviewed station personnel i
who were trained on the program. The procedural requirements of RPGP-02.08 met applicable regulations and established conservative administrative dose limits.
The individuals trained on the program indicated that the inforrnation they received was thorough, and that plant staff tracked their job assignments and radiation dose
'!
closely. Personnelin this program were prohibited from entering high radiation and contaminated areas. RP records indicated that the radiation dose received by individuals in the program was well below both the regulatory and administrative
i
i
- -
-
.
.
.
limits. The inspector concluded that the licensee effectively implemented their unborn child protection program.
R1.3 Walkdowns Within the Radioloaically Controlled Area (RCA)
a.
Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspector conducted walkdowns of various areas within the RCA. Add tionally, the inspector reviewed records and interviewed RP staff regarding the control of radiological conditions within the plant.
b.
Observations and Findinas During the plant walkdowns, the inspector independently verified selected survey data and noted that survey maps properly reflected plant conditions. Although the entire reactor and radwaste buildings were posted as radiation areas, the inspector identified several discrete areas within these buildings which met the criteria for a radiation area, however these discrete areas were not conspicuously posted as such. The inspector discussed with RP management the NRC guidance which states that the practice of posting the entrances of buildings does not provide personnel with sufficient information to minimize their exposure and that discrete radiation areas within a large area should be reasonably posted. In response, the RP staff posted one area and indicated that the issue of posting discrete radiation areas within these buildings would be reviewed.
In general, housekeeping was good and no significant radiological impediments to routine work activities existed. The RP staff indicated that areas within the radwaste building were recently decontaminated and that decontamination of the A RHR room is planned after completion of the pump seal replacement. There were no areas which were rendered inaccessible due to high contamination levels.
Control of contamination was excellent as evidenced by the fact that there have been only twelve non-outage personnel contaminations, each of which involved discrete particles.
The inspector noted that postings and control of contaminated areas, hot spots, and special status areas were appropriate. The licensee closely tracked the location of all hot spots and special status areas, with quarterly surveys to verify postings.
There were only twelve hot spots in the plant. The licensee has continued its program to reduce the source term, as low pressure turbine components which contained cobalt were recently replaced and four control rod blades with cobalt are scheduled for removalin the next outage, c.
Conclusion The RP staff has continued to exercise excellent control of radiological conditions within the plant, as evidenced by decontamination activities, housekeeping, the tracking of special status areas, the low number of personnel contaminations, and source term reduction activities. However, the inspector identified that the RP
.
--
-. - ~. - -. -
.
. -. _. - _. -. -. -.
. - -. _
. -. - -
..
,
- /
!
'
f practice of posting the entire reactor and radwaste buildings as radiation areas was
inconsistent with NRC guidance. This issue will be reviewed as an Inspection j-Follow-up Item (IFl 50-263/96010-W
!'
R1.4 ALARA Plannina and imolementation for the "A" Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pumo #11 Seal Raolacement Task l-J a.
Insoection Scoos (83750)
l The inspector reviewed the ALARA planning and the RWP package for the RHR.
l pump #11 seal replacement job. The inspector also interviewed RP staff regarding ALARA planning for this task and observed work in progress.
'
i
b.
Observation and Findinas
.
-
The inspector noted that RP staff' conducted the ALARA planning for this task in j'
accordance with station procedures. The job planning worksheets addressed j
ALARA and job efficiency measures. The job planning was conducted by RP and maintenance staff, and the RWP package received the appropriate supervisory
'
review. The ALARA and contamination control measures for the job included the following: (1) use of blower face shields and full protective clothing (PC) for the workers, (2) extensive RP job coverage, (3) control and removal of contamination with strippable paint, (4) double step-off-pads, (5) staging a high efficiency -
particulate air filter (HEPA) at the RHR bowl, (6) constructing a platform over the RHR piping for lead shielding, and (7) spray bottles to keep surfaces damp and prevent airborne radioactivity.
Pre-job survey results showed that the contamination levels on the floor and RHR equipment were very high. The contamination / airborne controls were effective as demonstrated by the fact that the highest airborne concentration detected dunng j
this job was 0.13 DAC (Derived Air Concentration), which was very low considering the loose contamination levels in the work area, i
The inspector observed that the planned ALARA measures were implemented effectively by station personnel. However, the inspector identified one instance of an inappropriate RP practice. As a worker was removing contamination from the RHR bowl with a gloved hand, he would then wipe the glove on the PC. When the inspector notified RP staff, the RPS covering the job provided the worker with a wipe to remove contamination from his gloves. This worker later alarmed the friskall at access control and RP determined that the underall was slightly contaminated. The ALARA measures were successfulin limiting the total dose to 1.56 person-rem (15.6 mSv), which was reasonable for the work accomplished.
c.
Conclusion The radiological planning and implementation for the F-
' pump seal replacement was effective as evidenced by the low dose accumulated and minimal contamination control problems during the job.
-
.
R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R 2.1 Calibration and Function Checks of Radiation Detection Instrumentation a.
Insoection Sci ce (83750)
The inspector reviewed calibration and function check procedures, records, and activitias for the EDs, portable survey meters, friskers, friskalls, portal monitors, tool monitors, and the whole body counter (WBC). The inspector also interviewed
,
calibration personnel.
'
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspector observed that the available radiation detection meters were in compliance with the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.5.4, Health Physics and Laboratory Radiation Measurino Instruments. A review of calibration records for 1996 indicated that instrument calibrations have been conducted in accordance I
l with station procedures with regard to frequency and radiation range and the inspector did not identify any material condition concerns. The inspector noted that the RPS primarily responsible for calibrations was knowledgeable and that the i
calibration facility was well maintained. Out-of-service meters were physically segregated to prohibit their use. Throughout this inspection, all the instruments observed in the plant were within calibration.
'
The inspector identified one issue regarding the calibration of the gas-flow proportional smear counters. When plateaus were generated to determine the operating voltage, the station practice has been to choose the operating voltage at the " top of the knee" as indicated on the plateau. However, standard industry practice and the technicalinstruction of the vendor indicate that the operating
,
voltage should be chosen "50-75 volts above the knee" of the plateau. Following the vendor recommendation would ensure that a change in the instrument voltage would result in a minimal change in detector efficiency, whereas a change in voltage from the " top of the knee" could result in a significant decrease in detector efficiency with the potential for an inadequate assessment of radiological j
conditions. RP management indicated that this issue would be reviewed. The
<
licensee's operation of the smear counters will be reviewed during a future i
inspection (Inspection Follow-up item 50-263/96010-02).
'
The inspector observed that the functional checks of the radiation detection instruments were performed at the frequency prescribed in station procedures. The inspector also noted that functional checks for most of the fixed monitors were conducted with sources having activity comparable to the alarm set points, ensuring that the instrument would alarm as required.
The WBC was calibrated with a radionuclide mix traceable to the National institute for Science and Technology (NIST). The inspector noted that the WBC functional checks were performed as specified and that both the peak location and source activities for two radionuclides were tracked.
)
,
_
_
__
_
__
_ _ _ _
_
_ - _.. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _.
.
-Interviews with the RP staff indicated that there have been very few operability problems with the radiatica detection instrumentation.
c.
Conclusion
Observation of activities and the performance history for regular function checks
indicated that calibration and operability of the radiation detection instruments has
i remained excellent.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C
,
R4.1 Unconditional Release of Bulk Material
a.
Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspector reviewed the station procedure and data for the unconditional release of bulk material. The inspector also discussed the current practice with RP management.
b.
Observations and Findinas
.
1 The inspector noted that the station procedure provided the staff with adequate guidance for the collection and counting of bulk material samples. RP/ Chemistry
data indicated that the current detection capability was consistent with the Lower
,
i Limits of Detection (LLD) specified in NUREG-0473, Standard Radiological Effluent
'
Technical Specifications (RETS), for sediment samples. The capability to achieve sediment LLDs is considered sufficient for dry solid material. However, to ensure
,
that no radioactive material (RAM) is released from the site in bulk liquids, the industry accepted LLDs are the LLDs specified in the RETS for water. RP management acknowledged that the current station procedure did not meet this J
,
standard. To date, there has been no indication that RAM in bulk liquid material has been released from the site.
,4 l
c.
Conclusion
The RP procedure for the unconditional release of bulk material was adequate to i
prevent the release of RAM in dry solid material. However, the procedure did not require the industry accepted detection limit capabilities for the unconditional release of bulk liquid material. This lack of a procedural requirement to achieve industry accepted detection limits is considered a program weakness and will be j
monitored as an Inspection Follow-up Item (IFl 50-263/96010-03).
}
.
l
,
_
.-
R4.2 RP&C Resoonso to a Discharae Canal Radiation Monitor Alarm a.
Insoection Scoce (84750)
The inspector interviewed RP personnel and reviewed documentation regarding the alarm of the discharge canal radiation monitor which led to a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE).
b.
Observetions and FindiD.Q1 At 0300 on October 17,1996, the licensee declared an NUE in response to the alarm of the discharge canal radiation monitor (DCRM) at a radiation level of 20 counts per second (cps). The purpose of the DCRMs is to monitor and alert station -
staff to a possible release of radioactive matorial from the plant. At about midnight there was a heavy rainstorm and chemistry personnel had observed that the DCRM was trending upward. This has been a common phenomenon at the plant, and i
previous data indicated that precipitation " washed" radon daughters from the atmosphere and deposited them in surface waters.
At 0200 the radiation level had reached 10 cps, which is the chemistry department alarm point, and a chemistry technician collected a grab sample. Gamma spectrometry analysis demonstrated levels of radon daughters which were several times above normallevels. In addition to the discharge canal, the service water radiation monitor indicated that radiation levels in the service water had nearly doubled during this same time. Therefore, the licensee determined that DCRM alarm was caused by an increase in natural radionuclides.
c.
Conclusion The inspector reviewed the response and assessment of the RP&C staff to the i
DCRM alarm on October 17,1996, and determined that the actions were appropriate.
j R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities R7.1 Quality Assurance for Personnel Dosimetry a.
Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspector reviewed quality control (OC) records for personnel dosimetry and interviewed the Senior Health Physicist (SHP) regarding the overall quality of the dosimetry analyses.
b.
Observations and Findinas The SHP indicated that the TLDs used for personnel dosimetry were processed by a vendor laboratory. The inspector verified that the vendor has maintained its National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditation for TLD
_7
.
___ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
-
. _ _ _...-.._...
~.. - - -
,
)
i:
dosimetry for Categories I-IX through September 1997. A review of the vendor's Quality Assurance and Status reports indicated that the overall quality'of the vendor's dosimetry capabilities for a variety of dosimeters has remained excellent.
!
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's TLD quality control (OC) data. The licensee's TLD OC program consisted of the vendor's analysis of TLD badges which o
had been exposed to known quantities of radiation at the site or by an independent'
i
. third-party laboratory. The results of the onsite exposed badges for the first quarter -
of 1996 were 22% below the known value, in accordance with plant procedures, the RP staff investigated this discrepancy and concluded that a personnel error _in the radiation exposure to the test badges was a possible cause. _The results from all the other OC tests were excellent.
c.
' Conclusion The licensee continued to ensure that the capability of their dosimetry vendor h'as remained excellent.
'R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R8.1 -(Discussed) Insoection Follow-un item 50-263/96005-07: Steam from the manifold vent of a turbine flow element / indicator entered and contaminated the turbine building normal drain sump. On May 29,1996, steam from the manifold vent condensed against a wall and a portion of the water stream entered a non-radioactive drain which leads to the turbine building normal drain sump (TBNDS),
The TBNDS radiation monitor reading increased and a grab sample showed 3.2E-8
,
microcurie per milliliter of flourine-18. Thus far, the licensee has requested that the
training department develop material addressing the need to notify chemistry d
personnel when there is a potential radiation effluent discharge. In addition, plant staff are evaluating the adequacy of the TBNDS radiation monitoring capability.
This item remains open.
'
X1 Exit Meeting Summary -
)
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during an exit meeting on November 1,1996. The licensee did not indicate that
~
,
any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
i
.
-
..
.-
_. _,
_.
.
_
_
. _ -
.
-
-
.
. _. _.
_
_.
. _ _
-
.
.
.
.
.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED LiOEifa
-
J. M indschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Services
-
G. Mathiasen, Senior Health Physicist t Yurczyck, Radiation Protection Supervisor
R. Latham, Radiation Protection Cocidinator W. Shamla, Quality Assurance Supervisor a
MfLC
'
A. Stone, Senior Resident inspector, Monticello l
J. Lara, Resident inspector, Monticello
INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED iP 83750, " Occupational Exposure"
'
i ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
,
Ooened
50-263/96010-01 IFl Posting entire reactor and radwaste buildings as a radiation area.
50-263/96010-02 IFl Operation of smear counters inconsistent with vendor instructions.
50-263/96010-03 IFl Survey procedure does not require industry accepted LLDs for the unconditional release of bulk liquid material.
Discussed
,
.
50-263/96005-07 IFl.
Steam from the manifold vent of a turbine flow
.
element / indicator entered and contaminated the turbine building normal drain sump.
I
.
.
.-
_ _
__.
-.
..
.-
LISTING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Updated Safety Analysis Report Sections 7.5,12.3, and 12.5.
Monticello Radiation Protection Group Procedure RPGP-02.08, Revision 1, "Monticello -
Unborn Child Protection Program".
Monticello Radiation Protection Procedure (RPP) R.09.23, Revision 4, "TLD Spiking Test".
RPP R.14.06, Revision 2, " Routine TLD Data Entry".
RPP R.01.06, Revision 1, "RWP ALARA Reviews".
RPP R.02.02, Revision 10, " Dose Rate Surveys".
RPP R.02.02, Revision 13, " Surface Contamination Surveys".
RPP R.09.01, Revision 8, "Fastscan OA Calibration Check".
RPP R.09.04, Revision 16, " Smear Counter Function Checks".
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 267, " Transfer Resin Liner to Shipping Cask".