ML20134M628
| ML20134M628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Cutter A CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134M632 | List: |
| References | |
| NLS-85-318, NUDOCS 8509040198 | |
| Download: ML20134M628 (2) | |
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CD&L Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-85-318 AUG 2 01985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attentiom Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-324 / LICENSE NO. DPR-62 SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT HPCI STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE
Dear Mr. Vassallo:
On August 28, 1985, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) requested an emergency license amendment to increase the isolation time limit of the inboard HPCI steam line isolation valve (E41-F002) from 50 to 35 seconds. This would allow the valve to be backseated, thus reducing leakage through the valve packing and avoiding an unnecessary shutdown due to exceeding the 5 gpm Technical Specification (TS) limit for unidentified i
l reactor coolant system leakage in the drywell. As CP&L could not have anticipated development of the leak, the need for prompt action on this request could not have been avoided. Compensatory measures imposed include the analysis conducted to show that I
the increase from 50 to 55 seconds is acceptable and that the 5 gpm limit for unidentified leakage in the drywell will remain in effect. In addition, the leaking valve will be repaired at the next refueling outage.
Early on the morning of August 28,1985, unidentified leakage in the Brunswick-2 drywell increased to 4.46 gpm. At that time, three possible courses of action existed.
1.
The leakage could be ignored, thereby risking a forced shutdown by exceeding the TS limit of 5 gpm.
2.
The E41-F002 valve, earlier identified as a major contributor to drywell leakage, could be backseated, declared inoperable, and the 8-hour Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) requiring plant shutdown with an inoperable primary containment isolation valve entered. Previous isolation time testing revealed that the valve could not be isolated within the required 50 seconds from the backseated position, thus requiring it to be declared inoperable when backseated.
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Rather than enter the 8-hour LCO, the outboard HPCI steam isolation line valve could be isolated, the HPCI system declared inoperable, and a 14-day LCO for an inoperable HPCI system entered.
The Company had determined that the most prudent course of action would be to temporarily isolate the HPCI system while filing an emergency license amendment request which would allow the backseated E41-F002 valve to be declared operable and the HPCI system returned to service. An analysis had previously been performed and the determination made that this amendment would not involve 'a significant hazards consideration.
8509040198 850829
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PDR ADOCK 05000324 go\\
P PDR 411 Fayetteydle Street = P. O. Box 1551
- Raleigh. N. C. 27002 1k
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Mr. D. B.' Vassallo NLS-85-318 / Page 2 Upon further review, CP&L has determined that the plant would be maintained in a safer condition if the HPCI system were returned to service. This determination is based on the fact that the analysis performed indicates that the additional 5 seconds closure time resulting from the backseating of the valve is acceptable and it places the plant in a safer condition to have the HPCI system available in the event of an accident. This determination has been reviewed and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee.
Therefore, we have opened the outboard HPCI steam line isolation valve and declared the HPCI system to be operable. This has placed Brunswick-2 in an 8-hour LCO. As required by TS 3.6.3.a.1, the inoperable valve must either be restored to operable status within eight hours or the affected penetration line isolated within eight hours, or the unit must be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Therefore, the Company requests that our August 28,1985 submittal be processed as an emergency request and issued by 3 p.m. on August 29, 1985. The proposed TS page has been suitably modified to indicate a temporary change to the TS limit. The significant hazards analysis included in our August 28,1985 submittal will remain valid. A copy of the revised page is attached.
1 Please refer questions regarding this matter to Mr. Sherwood R. Zimmerman at (919) 836-6242.
Yours very trul b
A. B. Cutter - Vice Presi ent Nuclear Engineering & Licensing ABC/JSD/mf (1887 MAT)
Attachment cc:
Mr. W. H. Rutand (NRC-BNP)
Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. M. Grotenhuis (NRC)
Mr. Dayne H. Brown j
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i A. B. Cutter, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief; and the sources of his information are officers, employees, contractors, and agents of 1
Carolina Power & Light Company.
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Notary (Seal) d My commission expires:
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