ML20134L601
| ML20134L601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Mcneil C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509030345 | |
| Download: ML20134L601 (2) | |
Text
a
.n.
gf
..g AUG 2 91985 Docket Nos. 50-272; 50-311 Public Service Electric & Gas Company l
ATTN: Mr. Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear P. O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEMA REPORT FOR THE SALEM /H0PE CREEK APRIL 23, 1985 REMEDIAL EXERCISE This letter transmits the Federal Emergency Management Agency report of the Salem / Hope Creek remedial exercise conducted on April 23, 1985. The exercise was conducted to resolve Category A deficiencies resulting from the October 1984 full scale exercise at the Salem / Hope Creek site.
FEMA's report specifies that the deficiency concerning the Salem congre-gate care center was resolved at the April 1985 remedial exercise and that the other three Category A deficiencies concerning the Salem County emergency operations center were reduced to a Category B level.
FEMA states that:
"In view of the improved performance in connection with the previous Category A deficiencies, and the aggressive corrective actions being taken by the State, FEMA has reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public living in New Jersey in the vicinity of the Salem / Hope Creek site can be protected."
If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact me at (215)337-5208.
Sincerely, k
Tdry L j arpster, Chief Emergencf Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Attachments: As Stated cc w/ encl:
l R. L. Mitti, General Manager - Nuclear Assurance and Regulation J. M. Zupko, Jr., General Manager - Salem Operations E. A. Liden, Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation C. P. Johnson, Manager - Quality Assurance Nuclear Operations P. M. Krishna, Manager - Nuclear Review Board A. J. Pietrofitta, General Manager, Power Production Engineering, Atlantic Electric
(
1 i
8509030345 B50829
/
f
^" 0
[
fhi i t i
Ppblic Service Electric & Gas Company 2
bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
C. Amato, NRC RAC Region II Representative P. Gaul f
b(L W kh DRSS lI:iDRSS Harps er Iellamy 3/IT U f/2.5 YI j
0FFICI AL RECORD COPY
~
l
., %m f xp: 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency
~
h d
Washington, D.C. 20472 JUL 3 1 1985 MBiORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Of fice of Inspec, tion and Enforcenent Nuclear Regulatpry Commission FROM:
c r r Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Post-Exercise Assessment For The Salen/ Hope Creek April 23,1985 Remedial Exercise This is to transmit the post-exercise assessment for the April 23, 1985, renedial exercise for the Salen/ Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants, in Salen County, New Jersey.
The assessment was prepared by Region II, Federal Emergency Managment Agency (FEMA).
The exercise was conducted to resolve 4 Category A deficiencies (i.e.,
deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding) resulting from the October 1984 full-scale exercise at' the Salen/ Hope Creek site.
The first three concerned the Sal en County emergency operations center (E0C).
The fourth concerned the Sal en County congregate care center. To resolve the deficiencies, it was necessary to activate fully the Salen County E0C.
There was only partial activation and limited evaluation of the State energency response organization and municipalities.
In brief, the deficiencies were:
- Weak overall managenent and coordination of infonnation in the Salen County E0C;
- Significant delays at the Salen County E0C in notifying some of the municipalities of the stated decision to evacuate certain areas;
- Significant delays at the Salen County E0C in notifying some of the municipalities of the State decision to administer KI;
- There were no radiological monitoring teans or equipment at the congregate care shelter to monitor evacuees for possible contamination.
The deficiencies concerning the Salen County congregate care center were resolved at the April exercise. The other three Category A deficiencies were reduced to a Category B l evel.
Improvenent is primarily attributed to the Deputy Director of the new Jersey Of fice of Emergency Managenent (OEM), who participated in the exercise as State liaison to Salen County and was instrumental in facilitating operations managenent at the Salen County and successful denonstration of the exercise objectives.
FEM A h as Lus %
,n QY 7
/
- l detennined that New Jersey must develop an interim pl an (pl an suppl enent) to provide managenent by the State in the. Sal en County E0C until the County is able to be in full control of the overall energency response.
The State of New Jersey has taken immediate measures to rectify this situation.
The State Of fice of Emergency Managemen_t fully recognized the inability of Salem County energency managment officials to coordinate the activities necessary to provide for the safety of Salen County residents in the event of a radiol ogical energency.
Attached are two letters fram Major Harold Spedding, Deputy Di rector of' the New Jersey OEM.
The letters, dated May 17, 1985, and June 18, 1985, describe corrective actions being taken by the State to resolve conpl etely the deficient areas concerning the Sal en County E0C. The procedures described in the letters are now being incorporated in the pl ans.
It is FD4A's view that the corrective actions schedule proposed by the State of New Jersey is adequate to resolve the deficiencies still remaining in connection with the Salen County EOC. The State is addressing the problen aggressively and is keeping to its schedule.
Some training has already taken pl ace.
In addition, although not mentioned in the two letters fran the State, a drill has been scheduled for October 1,1985, to test the new, conpensatory management strategy proposed for the Salem County E0C. The objectives for this drill have already been received and reviewed by FEMA's l
Region II office.
In view of the improved perfonnance in connection with the previous Category A defic.iencies, and the aggressive corrective actions being taken by the State, FEMA has reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the pub,lic living in New Jersey in the vicinity of the Salen/ Hope Creek site can be protected.
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call me.
Attachments As Stated e
4
_ _, _ _, _ _.. _ ~ _ _
,y..
\\.f4 p/s,b%
- ?
W State of Netu 31erary
)
DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF ST ATE POLICE i ui Itc.tst % urs.u.i un si si cuos l'D>l Gl l it L llO\\ 70(.$
WISIIRINll8%.NIh II DIi UP62' COLONil C. L. PAG ANO lgggN 3 Kl%1MLL%1 AN IbWs.42 2X0 Super 19tendent Att0'ntg C,ntral s
P.ay 17, 1985
- x. Frank Petrone F
Regional Director FEMA, Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278
Dear Fr. Petrone:
The State Office of Emergency Management fully recognizes the inability of Salem County Emergency Management officials to coordinate the activities necessary to provide for the safety of Salem County residents
)
during an actual nucle.ar emergency at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
Therefore, the State Office of Emergency Management will actively participate in all operational functions at the Salem County Emergency Operating Center during future drills and/or actual emergencies until it is satisfied Salem County can adequately fulfill its responsibilities.
Si erely, s
<JL,
Harold E. Speddi g, Deputy State Director Office of Emergency Management 8h 8
6 6
)
\\_
g
-;; g *,4
-d
?
, '. ' ' i,"
6 tate of Netti.1criicy
\\
DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE LMERGLNO MAN AGE \\it NI St.CTION POST Or i K E 80\\ '068 t RWIN 1. KittMELtl AN wts r 1 R EN10N, NEW IL RSE Y 08625 COLONE L C. L. PAGANO Attorney Genera (t>09) Sh2 2000 Superintendent June 18, 1985 Mr., Roger Kowieski Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278
Dear Mr. Kowieski:
The State office of Emergency Management functions as the Governors representative unde,r the Civil Defense and Disaster Control Act as amended.
Under said act the Governor is authorized to utilize and employ all available resources of the state and of each and every political subdivision of the state. This authority extends to equipment, facilities and personnel services. An extract of this Act is provided for your review.
The OEM has assessed the situation at Salem County and concluded that the problem stems from a need for stronger command and control and the development of an operations staff similar than at the State Emergency Operations Center.
Our intent is to provide the staffing for the command and control function and the operations staff until such time as Salem County has demonstrated an ability to operate without state assistance.
We envision a staff of four from the state at this time. A brief description of the staff positions is attached.
The state OEM will modify the Artificial Island Plan, Salem County Appendix to provide for the expanded role of the state in the Salem EOC. The following plan elements will require changes; B. Emergency Facilities,' Emergency Operations Center, F. Plan Implementation, Notification and Com=unications, Command and coordination, Protective Actions and Parallel Actions.
The modified plan elements will be developed according to the attached time line.
If you have questions please feel free to call this
.ri e.
\\
~
Sincere h
arold /Sp ing, Major Deputy 4 t Director
,/
Office Emergency agement
}
Attachment New Jerscy is An Equdl Opportunity Employer Rev 0, 6/18185
. y
's i
e e
STATE STAFFING AT SALEM COUNTY EOC Positions 1
State Directors Representative - The State Directors Representative (SDR) will be the State Directors personal liaison at the County EOC. The SDR will insure that messages are transnitted and received in a cimaly manner and that Emergency Action Levels and Protective Action Recommendations and relayed to the af f ected municipalities and general population in accordance with Federal guidelines.
The SDR will insure that all elements of the Salem County Government are utilized to the protection of the County residents.
The SDR will act under the authority of the Governor as captioned in the Civil, Defense and Disaster Control Act, Chapter 438, P.L. 1953.
2 Operations Officer - The Operations Officer will follow the course of an emergency or exercise monitoring communications from the State and municipalities.
The Operations Of ficer will insure that messages are relayed and responded to by the appropriate government agency in a timely manner.
The operations officers will monitor the progress of all protective and parallel actions as directed.
1 Message Controller - The message controller will insure that messages are directed to the appropriate government agency in a timely manner. The controller will also insure that responses from the County are made in a timely manner.
The controller will insure hat all pertinent messages are brought to the attention of the SDR and County Coordinator.
On O
. b$
I e
G
,t. '. 7...
- s-
,, \\.*
SALEM INTERIM PLAN DEVELOPMENT t
~ Development of Interim Plan - June 17 - July 29
.g 1-Staff review - July 29,, August 5 Print,ing - August 12i,16 i
Submit to Agencies - August 19 training - August 12 - September 16 g j t
g a
m e-O
=
4 E
f I
'{
i
/
rh l I r.
l i
(
i if s
4
~
- i k,
- /
2,*
G:
igq),
pgap, Gy;.:99
. q...v,
.+ q ( p g.rp.
(-a;.,
3 ~.,s p,p 4 o< -V s
+m
.-a.
n-
. Q,< :% :
.9.~..
- u{f
- T' g.; "'y%
..h.%.p[$,,,
7}
- 4. ;,1 '..,
s e
a.
.. % % Y.. Te.. :y.
'+ W
.'~m.
. Q'.h(*
t",,
7 5.,
'l l e.
-.'%..a..
- c. om..s-s wa...-.. m..;;<.... - y
- 1,
+
' w,sg: f;:,..
, -;.- q.y'.
, ' } q...h[ e '.
r v.,*
~
. Q;.;o.; M'r
-?! E.;s Q,%f is~ ~ -
r's%.
vs e.
.s e
- n -
W h b
~h
- k-
.]
l p. e,
.s. 4.,'.
- m J.A%ESSEENT M J y -r > %
.-d
- ? R L.,
4 Jph s;. N. G&*
> g, ' 1,' ' f.., y - Q*,. -.
't,
- i i.J.
pv,
...o 4
- r,C.qff,.. l *
~
^' ' : ;;1 &s?,,,*4M D'.
Y.
., '. <.. W). %;
5
^^
c
.Q7h..
. f^ 2; fy '. *.YM s.
-~,
~**'.i'..
C?
", );- k a y 3<
' v* '.
g,
,,tm.
r v
^
g f
..'k*;., w,,
r~
' 4.r.
k
.c.
-2 2 c n,[.<;&
~ ?. :'. %,4)l
~<...
- . ** W!r.;;W p-
.. i-; <, -.- * %%. -., g *::L 7,.
, m.a. +.
w p,, J. 3,.
-;:.,a, wgg-
..'ys..,;.s l
w.e
._' ~,
- m.,
7. :,,, ~
Y#,..
. g l W hWN !.
A f,,
5
'E t.
(,
O
- w. ' '. w,,. -
' ~
L;o $s =.,w,,.,.m v w..
m.,.. m.a
.n.
... a. ~ w n.. n. _; w.... s.
+
.=.
r
. 9y%~o.
v. r..
m,m w..,
u
.,u
.9.,3 %.. p; q
. ::iQ.1 s,:
.g?
w..
,:; 4':
W Q.f ~ & :4 x%,..::p :.
x
~.w...~
r m.,.,
n; a-r..
.g.
,, m, 3ll [ },q g' 'i';' N i,;j;e}...
'Q" q,
.w..
Y ',r
- s
) y,
- .% i d j.Qy? R. s*.lpfy,$s
_r -
XTl4,.
- y y g-y ;h
^
.y 5
- u.; r:
.;,p,.mv.c;
.... " p+ ; g '%
v)s, - ? ;-
n.
2~
- a L.,,... z s.=, :: -._
' :y.;,3.,y;.' ;p;C.'; y; }tfQ.,Q;!,.q c,j.%^.9 y
.'s
, 4.<4p y..r y -.
.y,g <a y
.n u
--h*
'c 1
April :23, 1.98.5 r+R e m e d i a l,E x.e r c.i s e o f i t h e a,-
c w
o xr\\.
.[....n. n. t e N S'
. 'Al s
. -.s n, e.-.' */
.-,y&
r 6 -
w..
is Radiological Emergen'cy R:espons,e~ Plans of' theLS' tate?'y;.U l
e, tw,.,
~ of N e.w Je.rsey, ',S,alem1 County and _S..ixLo.ecalit s.ies '
i -
am-. -
.s
.. e u..,mw. g. - ~ g.c.
for PUblic-ServidsVEIs6tiiFaridEGas' C~omp'any's
+w I
SALEM NUCLEAR 2 GENERATING STATION ~
- Hancocks Bridge, S.alem County, New Jersey
..u
- p. p.~:
. s.
, J u n.e 4. 9.k. :19 8 5 -
i m
c s :.
=. w 2
..~
~.,
F e d e r al E m e r g e'n cy'M a_$ 'snagement Age'ncy!
. y-I h.
,-y.. ' w-
,o
,,,r,.c
.;x.c-jc;g, y
.c,
~._m m.
.s
,,.. ~
a
...,~..ic
- a. s:,.x,
- A 's ? R 5 gib n1II s: t
- ? ~ ^ '12 '
. :, n o > :
i/, w :, P :(
- x
~
.1..
s..
- Q y y>
a.
c.
.... c. '
.?...,,,. -
26 FEDER AL Pl^AZA.
.a FR A'NK 'PT PETRONE E ' v..,., mi, t g e
p3 gE
..u w.
m New York, N.Y.- 10278 Regional Director
@ e.
a. m .
3...
m
- 6X i...
"J./'
-. '. ~..O... h,i ' '.
my"y : 3 k / ; A,, - ;.
- o 9, j.. '. j,,.;
m,.p.,-
. iJ '
3."
6
,- s w
.g.,
-r b-. s4.e
...w
... ; 3
.,r o
a.
>;,~..
g
.. ~
i
POSTEXERCISE ASSESSMENT e
April 23,1985, Remedial Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Salem County, and Six Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey June 19,1985 Federal Emestency Management Agency Region II l
i l
l-i-
r I
l Frank P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza l
Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278 l
l 1
e
t 4
e s S. --
I Participating Governments The State of New Jersey Salem County Elsinboro Lower Alloways Creek Mannington Pennsville Quinton Salem City Cumberland County Nonparticipating Governments Cumberland County Municipalities Greenwich Stow Creek The State of Delaware e
(
,o CONTENTS
SUMMARY
lx 1 I NT R O D U CTIO N........................................................
1 1.1 Exe rc ise Background.................................................,
1 1.2 Fe de r al Obs e rv e rs...................................................
3 1.3 Evaluation C ri teria..................................................
4 1.4 Ex erc ise Obj ec tives.................................................
4 1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (NJEOC)........
.5 1.4.2 B R P-EO F (B R P/EO F)..........................................
5 1.4.3 BRP - Forward Command Post (BRP/FCP)........................
6 1.4.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams (RFMT).....................
6 1.4.5 Sale m County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC)..............
6 1.4.6 Salem County /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public (FIE LD)............................................
7 1.4.7 Salem County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (S C M E O C )...................................................
8
- 1. 5 Exe rc ise Sc e nario...................................................
8 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events On Site...............................
8 1.5.2 Description of State and County Resources....................... 11 2 EX E R CIS E EV AL U ATIO N................................................ 12 2.1 New Jersey State Operations......................................... 12 2.1.1 StateEOC...................................................
12 2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection................................. 12 2.1.2.1 State of Ne w Jersey B R P............................... 13 2.1.2.2 BRP Forward Co m mand Post........................... 13 2.1.2.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams..................... 14 2.2 Sale m County Operations............................................. 15 2.2.1 Sale m C o u n ty EO C............................................ 15 2.2.2 Salem County Municipal EOCs.................................. 18 2.2.3 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public............. 19 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: APRIL 23,1985, EXERCISE... 21 4 SU M M A RY O F D EFICIE NCIES............................................ 50 TABLES 3.1 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions April 23,1985 and Previous Exercises.................................... 22 4.1 Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station on April 23,1985, October 23,1984 October 26,1983, October 13, 1982, and April 8, 19 81...................... 51 V
- g s
c.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory BRP New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection CCEOC Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center DOE U.S. Department of Energy EAL Emergency Action Level EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD Emergency Management Radio - A New Jersey State Police emergency radio system EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Licensee Near-Site Emergency Operations Facility EPA Emergency Planning Area EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FCP Forward Command Post FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory KI Potassium Iodide LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident NJSP New Jersey State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1) vii
OEM Office of Emergency Management, NJSP l
PAG Protective Action Guides l
PSE&G Public Service Electric and Gas Company RAC Regional Assistance Committee RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SCAT Salem County Area Transit J
SCEOC Salem County Emergency Operations Center SNGS Salem Nuclear Generating Station SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRAO State Radiological Assessment Officer i
I viii
m
SUMMARY
There have been four joint full-scale exercises for the SNGS: April 8,1981, October 13, 1982, October 26, 1983, and October 23, 1984. These previous, full-scale exercises differed from this latest, remedial exercise in several respects. During this remedial exercise, FEMA required only partial activation of state and some county and municipal organizations. The focus was on those components related to deficiencies that, in FEMA's opinion, could lead to a negative finding.
During the October 23, 1984, exeicise, FEMA identified four deficiencies in Salem County.that fell into this category. Briefly, these deficiencies were:
1)
Messages from the Salem County EOC (SCEOC) to some munici-palities concerning the decision to shelter certain sectors were delayed or not received at all by at least one municipality, 2)
Messages with the decision to evacuate certain sectors were delayed to some municipalities for up to li hours, 3)
Messages with the decision to distribute and administer potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers were delayed for up to it hours, and 4)
There were no radiological monitoring personnel or equipment at the Salem County Congregate Care Center to monitor evacuees for contamination.
The remedial exercise was designed primarily to determine whether these four deficiencies had been corrected.
To accomplish this, it was necessary to activate command and control in West Trenton, State Police Headquarters, effect full activation of Salem County EOC, and partial activation of the Salem County municipal EOCs.
FEMA did not observe the Cumberland County EOC.
There was also limited demonstration of field activities including simulation of school evacuation, congregate care shelters, decontamination center and the New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protecti,n (BRP) functions related to communication with field monitoring team.
The remedial exercise was evaluated by a 13-member federal observer team comprised of FEMA, Agency representatives to the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), and contractors. A preliminary briefing for exercise participants and the general public was conducted by the RAC Chairman at the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) Salem Training Center in Salem, New Jersey on April 25, 1985.
Subsequently, detailed evaluations have been reviewed by FEMA and compiled in this document.
Section 1 of this report presents background information on the 1985 exercise, describes the evaluation criteria and exercise objectives, and presents a description of the exercise scenario.
l l
IX l
Each exercise deficiency and the corresponding recommendation is described by jurisdiction in Sec. 2 of this report. Section 3 provides a form for developing a schedule for correcting deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and other deficiencies based on the April 23, 1985, remedial exercise.
Section 4 tabulates the status of deficiencies observed at all the radiological emergency preparedness exercises held in conjunction with the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
New Jersey State EOC (West Trenton)
The staff participating in the exercise displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities. Maps were equipped with new, colored, transparent overlays indicating the' direction of the plume and sectors where protective actions were implemented. Also, communication between the BRP staffs stationed at the EOF and State EOC staff was prompt and effective. This corrects a deficiency from the October 23, 1984, exercise. A number of other deficiencies pertaining to BRP operations were addressed and resolved adequately by BRP staff members in the EOF, Forward Command Post, and in the field. Back-up communication capability between the BRP Forward Post, the field teams, and the EOF was successfully demonstrated. Direction and control of off-site radiological monitoring teams was adequate.
However, environmental monitoring, and the contamination control (cartridge handling) technique for handling air samples utilized by the off-site field teams should be improved.
Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC)
Alerting and notification of SCEOC personnel occurred promptly and the SCEOC was staffed in a timely manner.
Activation of each municipal EOC was properly verified. Internal and external communications were improved since the October,1984, exercise by internal message handlers, periodic staff briefings, and logging all incoming and outgoing calls. State protective action recommendations were received by telephone and confirmed by the telefax machine, thus correcting a deficiency from the previous exercise.
Salem County Freeholders and legislators were present and carefully monitored the entire exercise.
Although several improvements at the SCEOC were noted, emergency operations management needs to be strengthened. The continued preoccupation of the County
~
Emergency Management Director with message initiation, review and telephone interruptions impaired his ability to be in control of the overall emergency response.
Relaying messages to the municipal EOCs regarding the state's recommendation to administer K1 to emergency workers and clarifying the state's evacuation recommendation were not timely. A procedure should be developed for handling priority messages.
The Deputy Director, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management participated in the exercise as the State liaison to Salem County and was instrumental in facilitating operations management at the SCEOC.
For example, the state liaison officer encouraged operations room staff to take a more active role in coordinating and discussing their agency's actions. This was not being done early in the exercise. The X
1
state's presence in the SCEOC is essential to assure an effective emergency response and an interim plan should be developed to deal with the issue of weak management at the SCEOC.
Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the.Public The bus evacuation demonstration was handled in a manner consistent with the e
plan. However, improvements in disseminating information from the SCEOC to the American Red Cross shelter managers are necessary. Especially needed is information concerning number of expected evacuees and their arrival time. Properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation was available, but additional training is necessary to assure that all monitoring personnel are aware of the decontamination action levels.
Emergency workers at the Quinton emergency worker decontamination center had proper dosimetry.
Sufficient quantitles of properly calibrated monitoring instruments were available and decontamination personnel were aware of the decontamination action levels.
Salem County Municipals Six municipalities participated in this remedial exercise. These municipalities resolved a group of deficiencies noted during the October,1984, exercise.
1 Ki
=.. - -.
6 8
q e
5 4
5 e
e a
6 f
O 1
I l
l I
i e
e i
l l
l l
4 I
I e G X1L I
W
=w
-~w m,-es y
awww,,
Ne-w-'y
-qw-yw-.-9.ee-r.-
gw
1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,
1979,. the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review e
and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments.
Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of e
observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.
Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities e
in the radiological emergency planning process:
4
- U.S. Department of Commerce
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- U.S. Department of Energy
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration
- U.S. Department of Transportation
- U.S. Department of Agriculture
- U.S. Department of Interior.
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submission of the radiological emergency response plans for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS) to the RAC by the state and involved local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and an ongoing evaluation of these plans. A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions for changes in these plans.
A first joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted for SNGS on April 8,
1981, and post-exercise assessments for that exercise were subsequently issued. A second joint exercise on October 13,1982, was also followed with j
post-exercise assessments issued by FEMA Regions II and III. A third joint exercise, conducted on October 26, 1983, was also followed with a post-exercise assessment. A fourth joint exercise was conducted on October 23, 1984, to assess the capability of state, county, and municipal emergency preparedness organizations to implement their L
~
2 e
' radiological emergency preparedness plans and procedures, and to protect the public during a radiological emergency at Public Service Electric and Gas Company's (PSE&G's)
SNGS. A medical drill at the Salem County Memorial Hospital was also conducted on I
September 27, 1984, in order to evaluate the adequacy of hospital and ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals. This drill 3
was evaluated by a federal observer.
l During the October - 23, 1984, exercise, four deficiencies in emergency preparedness response were identified which, in FEMA's opinion, required immediate attention. These deficiencies were 1)
Messages from the Salem County EOC (SCEOC) to some munici-palities concerning.the decision to shelter certain sectors were delayed or not received at all by at least one municipality, 2)
Messages with the decision to evacuate certain sectors were delayed to some municipalities for up to li hours, e
3)
Messages with the decision to distribute and administer potassium t
lodide (KI) for emergency workers were delayed for up to 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, lI and 4)
There were no radiological monitoring personnel or equipment at the Salem County Congregate Care Center to monitor evacuees for contamination.
On April 23, 1985, a remedial exercise was held, the primary purpose of which was to determine whether these four deficiencies had been corrected.
This determination required activation of command and control in West Trenton, State Police Headquarters, full activation of the Salem County EOC, and partial activation of the Salem County municipal EOCs. FEMA did not observe the Cumberland County EOC.
There was also limited demonstration of field activities including simulation of school evacuation, congregate care shelters, decontamination center and the New Jersey Bureau
'of Radiation Protection (BRP) functions related to communication with one field monitoring team.
An observer team consisting of personnel from FEMA Region II, the RAC, j
FEMA's contractors, and federal and state agencies evaluated the April 23, 1985, exercise. Thirteen federal observers were assigned to evaluate the activities of state
[
and local jurisdictions.
Observers were trained in radiological emergency planning concepts and given an evaluation kit, which included information on exercise objectives, i
the exercise scenario, and other issues relating to the exercise.
Team leaders i
coordinated team operations.
i Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations.
j Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated i
the evaluations of individual team members. Based on these preliminary assessments, a i
l
}
_ ~ - - - - _ _ _ _ ~.
.,_.___.l.____-.___
. = -
3 public critique of the exercise was held by the RAC Chairman for exercise participants and the general public at 1000 on Thursday, April 25,1985, at the PSE&G Salem Training Center in Salem, N.J.
The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of the federal observers and have been reviewed by FEMA Region II. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to e
the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all deficiencies observed during_the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate.
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS i
l Thirteen federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions.
These Individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.
Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Kowleski FEMA General Observation /RAC Chairman R. Acerno FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)/ Team Leader C. Gordon NRC PSE&G Off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ State State Bureau of Radiation Protection A. Hull BNL State Bureau of Radiation Protection - Forward Command Post / Accident Assessment B. 'Salmonson INEL Forward Command Post / Radiological monitoring teams T. Baldwin ANL Salem County EOC/ Team Leader H. Fish DOE Salem County EOC/ Communications L. Poch ANL Salem County EOC/ Operations
~
i L. Slagle INEL Salem County / School bus evacuation; congregate care shelter l
(Woodstown High School)
J.
Keller INEL Salem County / Decontamination Center (Centerton Fire House) and Emergency worker Decontamination Center 1
(Quinton Fire Station) j R. Reynolds FEMA Elsinboro and Lower Alloways Creek municipal EOCs/ Team Leader i
. - ~
.m
4 Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Bernacki FEMA Pennsville and Salem City municipal EOCs J. Nagle ANL Quinton and Mannington municipal EOCs f
1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented.In Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deficiencies and accompanying recommendations are presented. Deficiencies are pre-sented in two categories. The first category includes those deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding, that is, a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to pro-tect the health and safety of the public living near the site in the event of a radiological emergency. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency of this type.
The second category includes all other deficiencies where, although demon-strated (and observed) performance during the exercise was substandard and corrective actions are necessary, other factors gave FEMA reasonable assurance that, in a real radiological emergency, the health and safety of the public could be protected. These other deficiencies also include all other problem areas. where performance was considered adequate but where a correctable weakness was observed. Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to respond to radiological emergencies.
1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee (Public Service Electric and Gas Company), FEMA, NRC, the State of New Jersey, and a municipal representative planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the on-site and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of l
SNGS as well as emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the State of New
, Jersey, Salem County, and the six Salem County municipalities.
The exercise was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the SNGS capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario was designed to activate the radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) for SNGS and PSE&G's corporate radiological emergency response plan through their various levels.
Although the scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operator's ability to respond to events and that resulted in exercising both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to Interfere with the safe operations of SNGS, and the plant management at its discretion could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to
5 ensure this goal. Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator or player action would have prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule.
Federal agencies were notified during the exercise according to existing emergency response procedures.
Federal agencies with radiological emergency prepe. redness responsibility did not actively participate in the play of this exercise.
Federal representatives, however, did act as exercise evaluators.
e To provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteorology was used. Actual m6teorology might have led to projected radio-logical doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of interest.
The following objectives were developed for this exercise based upon deficiencies noted in the previous exercise and have been referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation section in Sec. 2 of this report by organizational abbreviation and by number, for example, NJEOC 2.
1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (NJEOC) 1.
Demonstrate that overlays indicating sectors in which protective actions have been implemented are available in State, County, and Municipal Emergency Operating Centers.
2.
Demonstrate that communications between the BRP liaison in the State EOC and the decision making executive can be accomplished promptly.
1.4.2 BRP-EOF (BRP/ EOF) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit dose projections, plant status, and protective actions between the EOF and the Forward Command Post (FCP) in a timely manner.
2.
The BRP Lead Assessment Officer at the EOF will demonstrate transmission of final protective action recommendations to the BRP liaison at the State EOC.
3.
Demonstrate the effectiveness of back-up communications systems.
h e
e 1.4.3 BRP - Forward Command Post (BRP/FCP) 1.
Demonstrate more efficient use of field monitoring capability by accurately positioning teams both in and out of the plume based upon timely information transmission from the EOF.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to communicate with field teams.
f 3.
Demonstrate its ability to transmit emergency status and/or pro-tective action recommendations.to field teams in a timely manner.
1.4.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams (RFMT) 1.
Demonstrate that monitoring equipment has been properly calibrated and will function properly.
1.4.5 Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to activate, staff, and mobilize agency representatives at the SCEOC in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted and logged accurately and in a timely manner and that there is adequate communication within the EOC.
3.
Demonstrate effective information management in coordinating protective and parallel actions with the municipalities.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit plant status, personnel protection information, parallel actions and protective actions to the municipalities in a timely manner.
5.
Demonstrate sound management and coordination of information in the SCEOC as well as improved flow of information to the municipalities.
6.
Demonstrate that the communications center is adequate to the l
message flow.
7.
Demonstrate the transmission of hard copy between the County and State EOCs.
8.
Demonstrate that the County Freeholders will provide executive authority at the SCEOC.
9.
Demonstrate a procedure for the efficient response by the SCEOC to requests for Information and assistance from the local EOCs.
7 la4.6 Salem County /Fleld Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public (FIELD) 1.
Demonstrate that emergency workers at the congregate care shelter (at the Pittsgrove Fire Station) know the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination.
2.
Demonstrate that radiological monitoring equipment at the congregate care shelter (at the Pittsgrove Fire Station) is properly calibrated.
3.
Demonstrate there are sufficient radiological monitoring personnel and equipment at the congregate care shelter in Woodstown and that these personnel have the ability to monitor evacuees and vehicles.
4.
Demonstrate that sufficient monitoring equipment is available to insure the optimum efficiency of the decontamination center.
5.
Demonstrate that sufficient personnel dosimetry are available for emergency workers at the decontamination center.
6.
Demonstrate sufficient knowledge of decontamination levels to conduct operation of the decontamination center in an efficient manner.
7.
Demonstrate that forms can be used to identify locations on the
~
body where contamination is monitored.
8.
Demonstrate that emergency workers at congregate care shelters are informed of pertinent Information in a timely manner.
9.
Demonstrate that security and traffic control can be provided at congregate care shelters.
- 10. Demonstrate that emergency workers at the Salem County Area Transit (SCAT) are familiar with evacuation routes and locations of congregate care shelters.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to direct the SCAT drivers during the evacuation in a manner consistent with the plan.
- 12. Demonstrate that all SCAT drivers involved in evacuation busing are provided with dosimeters.
The listing on distribution of dosimetry should also be provided to FEMA.
- 13. Demonstrate that all SCAT drivers are fully trained in radio-logical exposure control including the use of dosimeters and KI.
1 8
1.4.7 Salem County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (SCMEOC) 1.
Demonstrate that sufficient personnel dosimetry is available at the Elsinboro EOC for emergency workers.
2.
Demonstrate that callout lists at the Mannington EOC are current.
3.
Demonstrate that the Salem City EOC dispatcher can notify the j
Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) in a timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate that the Pennsville Office of Emergency Management (OEM) has route alerting maps and written messages for emergency workers.
5.
Demonstrate that emergency power is available at the Elsinboro Township and Salem City EOCs.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario, and the actual times that they occurred (as reported to the EOF).
Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event 1600 1605 Salem Operations Manager receives a telephoned bomb threat. After assessing the situation with Security Force, it is determined that the threat is credible.
Security implements Contingency Procedure (SCP 5). An Unusual Event is declared per ECG Section 13B, threat agsinst the station.
1715 1715 Protected area alarm. Intruders observed on closed circuit.
TV apparently unarmed.
Reconnaissance Team reports sighting intruders in the area of the Sewage Treatment Plant. Security implements SCP 6, discovery of Intruders.
An Alert is declared per ECG Section 13D.
1800 1805 Security Force Reconnalsance Team discovers bomb by Unit 2 BIT,78 ft. Elevation Auxillary Building, Mechanical Penetration Area. Security Lieutenant implements SCP 10,
9 Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event discovery of sabotage device. A Site Area Emergency is declared per ECG Section 13 E.
Unit 2 commences controlled shutdown.
1830 NRa Unit 2 in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
Unit 1 commences controlled shutdown.
1900 NR Unit 1 in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
1915 1923 Unit 2 large break LOCA in progress. General Emergency declared per ECG Section SA (SSS/EDO judgment of probable failed fuel before completion of RCS analysis) and SB, Loss of Primary Coolant. Predetermined Protective Action Recommendation Case B is provided to the States.
Based on Core degradation and LOCA with no immediate potential for Containment Boundary Failure, 0-5 mile evacuation in downwind quadrant and 0-5 mile sheltering in unaffected quadrants is recommended.
C Actuation of Safety Injection, Accumulator dump and Containment Spray.
RWST level decreasing rapidly, Containment Sump level increasing. Loss of 2A Vital 4K bus during power transfer (diff. on bus).
The following are unavailable:
21 CCW Pump 21 AFW Pump 21 Containment Spray Pump 21 & 22 Service Water Pump 21 Safety injection Pump 21 B. A. Pump 21 Containment Fan Coil Unit 23 Charging Pump (PDP) 21 RHR Pump 1945 NR Failure of 22 RHR Pump
10 Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event 1950 NR RWST level decreasing rapidly. Containment pressure >15 psig. No ability to recirculate containment sump water. SI pump'(22), 22 Spray pump, 21 & 22 CCP still using RWST water.
2015 NR Containment pressure relief isolation valves fall and vent the containment to the plant vent. Release is in progress, estimated to last 4 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Projected peak dose rate at LPZ Centerline:
Whole Body 20 mR/hr Thyroid 2.7 rem /hr Integrated Dose Whole Body 50 mR Thyroid 8 rem 2030 NR RWST depleted. Core exit thermocouples exceed 1200*F.
2100 NR 22 RHR pump returned to service.
2115 NR Unit 2 on cold leg recirculation (containment sump) 2120 NR Cool down (very slowly) initiated.
2215 NR Plume arrives at LPZ.
2300 2220 Consideration to terminate the exercise upon consent of FEMA and OEM.
2400 NR Release terminated due to containment pressure equalizing to atmospheric pressure and/or isolation of leak path.
0015 NR EPZ peak dose rate:
Whole Body
<5 mR/hr Thyroid 900 mrem /hr PAG exceeded at 6 miles for Thyroid and at 7 miles exceeded on dose rate but not integrated dose.
aNR = not reported.
11 1.5.2 Description of State and County Resources All State exercise participants were to be pre-positioned in accordance with the exercise time line. Initial notification was to be provided by EOF referees to the State EOC Operations Room and to Salem County. Verification calls were to be made to the EOF. The State EOC Operations Staff and State referees in the EOF and Salem County EOC were to serve as the Exercise Control Team in conjunction with the PSE&G referees in the EOF.
Initiating events were provided to the Salem County municipalities by the Salem County EOC. Salem County Municipal EOC's and the Cumberland County EOC was to be operational only for the receipt and transmission of radio and telephone communications; and for the correction of site-specific exercise objectives as shown in Sec.1.4.7. All county-level requests for resource support, exclusive of standard mutual aid requests, from out-of-county sources were to be directed to the state EOC using normal message procedures.
One State Monitoring Team was to be dispatched from the FCP for actual field assignment by a BRP participant.
The team was to be supplied with one referee / observer.
The referee was to provide simulated survey instrument readings which would be used to determine dose rates.
Several demonstrations of emergency response capability were to be made outside of the State EOC, EOF, FCP, and the Salem County EOC. First, notification of the Salem City EMC was to be accomplished by standard contact from the SCEOC to the Salem City Police located on the first floor of the Administration Building at 94 Market Street. The Salem Police were to then contact the EMC by phone. This was to occur at the Alert Level. The municipal EMC's were also to be notified by radio pager.
Second, the Salem County Area Transit (SCAT) was to be notified by radio from the SCEOC to the depot in Deepwater. Dispatch was to occur upon instruction from the SCEOC as dictated by exercise conditions.
Third, the Quinton Decontamination Center was to be set up at the Site Area Emergency Level. Decontamination personnel were to be put on standby at the Alert Level from the County Dispatch Center.
Fourth, the Woodstown Congregate Care Shelter was to be activated at the Site Area Emergency Level with appropriate staffing, communications, security, monitoring, decontamination capability, and traffic control. Personnel were to be put on standby at the Alert Level.
Fifth, the Pittsgrove (Shalick H.S.) decontamination capability was to be l
demonstrated at the Centerton Fire House.
The exercise was to be terminated upon mutual consent of New Jersey and FEMA Region !! that participants had sufficiently demonstrated their capabilities.
i
la 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section provides a narrative overview of the observer evaluations from the April 23,1985, radiological emergency preparedness remedial for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS).
These evaluations are referenced by organizational abbreviation and number to the exercise objectives listed in Sec.1.4.
e 2.1 NEW JERSEY STATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC This remedial exercise did not require full activation of State EOC in West Trenton, New Jersey. Approximately 28 individuals participated in the exercise, staffing the command room, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), communications room, and the message center. The staff present displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities.
Maps in the State EOC were equipped with new, colored,.
transparent overlays Indicating the direction of the plume and sectors where protective actions were implemented. This satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1). The BRP Liaison Officer was stationed near the Command and Control center, which eliminated any delay in the presentation of protective action recommendations to the designated State Director. This successfully demonstrated another exercise objective (NJEOC 2).
The role of the Bureau of Radiation Protection Liaison Officer was also clarified. His responsibility was to pass information from the BRP staff at EOF directly to the designated State Director. Also, communication between BRP staffs stationed at EOF and State EOC staff was prompt and effective. This corrects a deficiency from the October,1984, exercise.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State l
EOC during this remedial exercise.
Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed at the State EOC during this remedial exercise.
i I
2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection l
l A number of other defielencies pertaining to Bureau of Radiation Protection i
operation were addressed and resolved adequately by BRP staff members in the Emergency Operation Facility, Forward Command Post, and in the field.
t t
i i
-.,,--.--r
, -.. - -,n,_ _,. _ _ _,,
,,_.._,n_,
,n_,-,-.,_,,...
13 2.1.2.1 State of of New Jersey BRP The BRP team at the EOF was comprised of a full complement of staff including the State Radiological Assessment Officer (SRAO) and Assistant SRAO. The SRAO was clearly in charge and effectively demonstrated transmission of final protective action recommendations to the BRP liaison at the State EOC, thus satisfying an exercise objective (BRP/ EOF 2).
A new " EOF Transmission Sheet" was developed which provided the following information for transmission from BRP staff in the EOF to their counterparts at the FCP: Emergency Action Level (EAL), meteorological conditions, status of radioactive release, dose projection data at the site boundary, 5 miles, and 10 miles, and protective measures recommended to the public. Transmission of information was observed at 30 minute Intervals or when there were significant changes in data or information. The above measures satisfied an exercise objective (BRP/ EOF 1). After interfacing with the utility liaison in the EOF, transmission sheets were prepared by team members and reviewed by the BRP team leader. Information flow appeared adequate in that such messages were communicated to the FCP immediately following the leader's review. It is recommended that the team leader sign or initial transmission sheets after review to indicate that he/she concurs that the information is accurate. In addition to the EOF Transmission Sheet, another form, the "FCP Transmission Sheet to BRP" was used to provide EOF staff with a permanent record of information and data obtained by field monitoring teams.
Finally, the BRP met an exercise objective by demonstrating the effectiveness of back-up communications systems (BRP/ EOF 3).
A portable radio was available and observed for transmission of information between the EOF, FCP, and field monitoring teams. BRP staff indicated that training on radio use was provided during practice drills.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State of New Jersey BRP during this remedial exercise.
Other Deilciencies No other deficiencies were observed at the State of New Jersey BRP during the remedial exercise.
2.1.2.2 BRP Forward Command Post All of the staff at the Bureau of Radiation Protection Forward Command Post (BRP-FCP) demonstrated a high level of competence in the performance of their duties.
The lead field assessment officer made decisions in conference with the appropriate members of his staff.
14 The staff at the BRP-FCP effectively deployed the field monitoring teams (one team was actually deployed, the remaining two were simulated) to the projected and actual location of the plume throughout the exercise. This action satisfied an exercise objective (BRP/FCP 1). Communication capability between the BRP-FCP and the field monitoring teams had also been improved, thus meeting an exercise objective (BRP/FCP 2). Clear, two-way communications were maintained throughout the exercise. A field transmitter malfunction was quickly remedied. Also, the plant status and protective action recommendations were regularly and promptly transmitted to the field tea'ms.
This demonstration satisfied another exercise objective (BRP/FCP 3).
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State of New Jersey BRP-FCP during this remedial exercise.
Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed at the BRP-FCP during the remedial exercise.
2.1.2.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams t
Only one radiological field monitoring team was deployed during this remedial exercise. As noted in Sec. 2.1.2.2, radio communications between the BRP-FCP and the field team were very good in all routes traveled. No " dead spots" In communications were noted. The radio in the original field team vehicle was found to be defective while the team was in the field, but this was quickly remedied by providing the team with another vehicle equipped with a functional radio. However, it is recommended that radios be thoroughly tested before they are dispatched into the field. Plant status and protective action recommendations were also effectively communicated to the field team from the BRP-FCP.
Radiological monitoring instruments were properly calibrated, but the air 3
sampling pump was not calibrated and could not draw the required 3 ft / min flow rate with the particulate filter in place. Hence, the exercise objective for the field teams was only partially met (RFMT 1). Also, environmental monitoring and the contamination control (cartridge handling) technique for handling air samples utilized by the field teams should be improved. Specifically, counting of air samples should have been performed outside the plume as specified in the State plan.
Furthermore, the high range ion chamber remained in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the bbserver.
The field monitoring team SOPS requiring preoperational check of calibration and battery installation should be followed for all Instrumentation.
15 l
Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding I
No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for the radiological field monitoring team during this remedial exercise.
Other Deficiencies f
i 1.
Defielency: The air sampler of the Vanguard A field team was not i
properly calibrated (NUREG-0654, II, H.10, I.8).
1 Recommendatiom The air sampler should be properly calibrated.
I 2.
Deficiency: The air sampler of the Vanguard A field monitoring team could not draw th2 required 3 ft / min flowrate with the particulate filter in place (NUREG-0654, II, H.10, I.8).
i Recommendattom The air sampler should be adjusted so that the required flowrate can be achieved.
3.
Deficiency:
The field monitoring team did not take the air sampler cartridge out of the plume into a low background area for l
counting (NUREG-0654, II,1.8).
Recommendatiom The counting of air samples should be ll performed outside the plume as specified in the state plan.
4.
Deficiency: The high range ion chamber remained in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the i
observer (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).
l Recommendattom The field monitoring team SOPS requiring l
preoperational check of calibration and battery installation should be followed for all instrumentation.
i 2.2 SALEM COUNTY OPERATIONS i
2.2.1 Salem County EOC The exercise objective relating to initial notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel was satisfied (SCEOC 1). Staffing of the Salem County EOC was completed in a timely manner and activation of each municipal EOC was properly verified.
External and internal communications were improved since the October,1984, exercise. The communications room has been relocated since the last exercise and now
i 16 4
l l
has adequate space and a reduced noise level which satisfied an exercise objective (SCEOC 6) concerning improved message flow. All external communica. ions including incoming and outgoing calls were handled expeditiously and records of each 2
communication were maintained. The Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD) link to i
municipalities located within the 10-mile EPZ was used effectively. State protective I
action recommendations were received by telephone and confirmed by hard copy received on the telefax machine, thus correcting a deficiency from the previous exercise l
as well as satisfying an exercise objective (SCEOC 7).
i The operations room had sufficient space and each agency had a separate l
telephone. A public address system was periodically used by the Emergency Management Director to provide updates on the status of the emergency to the operaticas room staff. Internal communication throughout the EOC was expedited by message handlers.
These improvements in internal and external communications satisfied an exercise j
objective (SCEOC 2).
i i
Maps showing protective actions implemented within the 10-mile EPZ, access l
control points, and shelters were posted in the operations. room. This satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1).
j t
Although several improvements at the SCEOC were noted, there is a continuing need to strengthen emergency operations management.
The County Emergency i
Management Director is to be recognized for improvements that have been made since the October,1984, exercise with regard to the coordination of internal communications and the dissemination of information to municipal EOCs.
However, the continued l
preoccupation of the County Director with message initiation, review and telephone interruptions impaired his ability to be in control of the overall emergency response.
jl There was a lag of approximately thirty (30) minute between receipt of the state l
recommendation to administer potassium lodide (KI) to emergency workers and transmission of these Instructions to the municipal EOCs.
However, based on the j
exercise scenario (wind speed and direction) no one would have been exposed to radiation i
i due to the delay. Also, a reply to a request for clarification from the Pennsville EOC regarding the state's evacuation recommendation was not timely. Similar delays in l
responding to requests for information from Salem City, Quinton, and Mannington were also noted.
Although message control has been improved since the last exercise, i
procedures should be developed for the handling of priority messages. As a result of these observed deficiencies, the three SCEOC objectives that dealt with the coordination of protective and parallel actions with the municipalities, transmitting this information l
In a timely manner to the municipalities, and responding in a timely manner to requests for information and assistance from the municipalities have been only partially met (SCEOC 3, SCEOC 4, and SCEOC 9).
l It is important to note that the Deputy Director, New Jersey Office of l
Emergency Management, participated in the exercise as the State Liaison to Salem l
County. The Deputy Director was instrumentalin facilitating operations management of the SCEOC.
Throughout the exercise there was little interaction among agency representatives regarding the actions taken by their agencies to deal with the State l
protective action recommendations. The State Liaison Officer noticed this problem and
{
encouraged the EOC staff to take a more active role in coordinating and discussing their d
v,,,-,
wwwnnw---- -,
..-.-.,,.e.-n,--,--.vnn,--.
w n,w
-.,.,..~nn.._.
17 agency actions. It is imperative that each agency carefully analyze the protective action recommendations with respect to their agency's role and the resources to deal with an emergency. The instructional experience afforded by this exericse should be reinforced by continued training to insure the improvement of Salem County's radiological g
emergency management capabilities. Due to this deficiency, the objective dealing with demonstration of sound management and coordination of information in the SCEOC was only partially met (SCEOC 5).
At the present time, it is evident that the State's presence in the SCEOC is essential to assure an effective response to radiological emergency. The State should
~
develop an interim plan to deal with the issue of weak management of the SCEOC.
Finally, it was encouraging that the Salem County Freeholders and legislators were present and carefully monitored the entire exercise. This satisfied an objective of the exercise (SCEOC 8).
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the SCEOC during this remedial exercise.
o Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficiency: There were some delays at the Salem County EOC in notifying some of the municipalities of the message to administer K! to emergency workers (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e).
Recommendation Staffing, procedures, and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how better overall management and more timely information flow from Salem County to the municipalities need further improvement.
2.
Deficiency:
Pennsville, Salem City, Quinton, and Mannington reported that requests for information and other assistance from the SCEOC did not always receive a prompt response (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d).
Recommendation:
Implement a procedure for more prompt responses by the SCEOC to requests for information and assistance from local EOCs.
3.
Deficiency: The SCEOC emergency activities were not always well integrated and appropriate organizations did not always coordinate their agency's actions (NUREG-0654, !!, A.1.d, A.2.a).
--c,-, -,,J
18 Recommendation:
A more effective management system for Salem County, including better information dissemination among the staff and better use of staff resources is required. Salem County staffing, procedures, and training should be reviewed to determine how improvements will be implemented.
The State must develop an interim plan (plan supplement) to provide manage-ment by the State, in the SCEOC until Salem County is able to be in full control of the overall emergency response. This plan should specify the scale of assistance and personnel involved.
2.2.2 Salem County Municipal EOCs Federal observers evaluated activities at the following municipal EOCs in Salem County during the exercise:
e Salem City e Mannington 1
e Pennsville o Quinton
~
e Elsinboro e Lower Alloways Creek An excellent degree of participation was observed in each of the six municipal EOCr. In each Instance the local Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) as well as a group of volunteers used the remedial exercise as another opportunity for training and practice.
In addition, the various municipalities successfully resolved a group of deficiencies noted ~at the October 23, 1984, exercise. All exercise objectives for the Salem County municipal EOCs were satisfied.
Emergency power is now available at all local Salem County EOC's (SCMEOC 5). Quinton Township has improved its response capabilities by establishing a new EOC.
The callout lists at the Mannington EOC are current (SCMEOC 2) and route alerting maps and written messages for emergency workers are available at Pennsville (SCMEOC 4).
Elsincoro displayed a complete set of dosimeters for emergency workers (SCMEOC 1) and the Salem City EOC dispatcher notified the EMC in a timely manner (SCMEOC 3).
'Ine capability to maintain current displays in each EOC was further improved by the addition of overlays which satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1).
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Salem County municipal EOCs during this remedial exercise.
I Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed at the Salem County municipal EOCs during the remedial exercise.
l.
V
.c 3
.,. t 19 h
2.2.3 Field' Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public There was a limited demonstration of field activities during this remedial exercise. These activities included simulation of a school evacuation and activation of congregate care shelters and one decontamination center.
Security and traffic control for the congregate care shelters was provided by fire police at both the Woodstown High School and Centerton Fire House. This satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 9).
Properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation was available.
This corrected a deficiency from the previous exercise and satisfied an exe'rcise objective (FIELD 2).
At the =Centerton Fire House, the standard forms were correctly used to record the location of any contamination. However, personnel were not fully familiar with decontamination limits. Additional training is necessary to assure that all monitoring personnel are aware of the predetermined contamination level for determining the need for decontamination. Hence, this exercise objective was only partly met (FIELD 1). At the Woodstown congregate care shelter there were sufficient numbers of trained personnel to provide radiological monitoring capability for evacuees and vehicles.
Emergency clothing was available and ' monitoring procedures were adequate.
This satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 3).
Improvements are still needed in the dissemination of information to the American Red Cross (ARC) shelter managers. Little information concerning the number evacuees to be expected or their anticipated arrival time was passed from the Salem County EOC to the shelter managers. Hence, this exercise objective was only partly met (FIELD 8).
Proper personnel dosimeters (both self-reading and permanent record devices) were used by all emergency workers at the Quinton emergency worker decontamination center. This satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 5). Standard forms for recording the location of contamination were properly used, thus satisfying an exercise objective (FIELD 7). Sufficient quantitles of properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation were available to monitor both personnel and vehicles.
This also satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 4). Finally, the decontamination personnel were aware of the levels of contamination that would require decontamination. This corrects a deficiency from the previous axercise and satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 6).
The Salem County Area Transit (SCAT) bus driver, who participated in the school evacuation, had a list of congregate care centers, with addresses, and a map showing approved evacuation routes. Upon direction from the Salem County EOC, the bus driver j
went to Mannington School to simulate picking up students and then proceeded to 'the Woodstown congregate care shelter, which is the shelter identified for this school in the plan. This corrected two deficiencies from the previous exercise as well as satisfying two exercise objectives (FIELD 10 and and FIELD 11). The SCAT driver was equipped with a self-reading dosimeter but had no permanent record dosimeter.
Also, more training is needed in the use of dosimetry and in the use and availability of KI. This repeats previous defic!encies and only partly satisfied two exercise objectives (FIELD 12 i
and FIELD 13).
= _ _ -
20 Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed during the i
field implementation of actions to protect the public at this remedial exercise.
Other Deficiencies t
1.
Deficiency: Emergency workers at the Salem County congregate care shelter (Centerton Fire Station) did not know the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination (NUREG-0654, II, K.5.a).
Recommendation:
Emergency workers should receive additional training on the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination.
2.
Deficiency:
The Salem County Congregate Care Shelter (Woodstown High School) was not apprised of when and how many evacuees to expect (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.h).
Recommendation: The ARC representative at the SCEOC should inform representatives at the Congregate Care Shelters of the number of evacuees and their expected time of arrival.
3.
Deficiency: The SCAT driver was not provided with a permanent record dosimeter (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
Recommendation:
Permanent record dosimeters should be provided to all drivers involved in evacuation busing. A dosimeter distribution list should be provided to FEMA.
4.
Defielency:
The bus driver for the school evacuation was not trained in the use of dosimeters or KI (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
Recommendation: All emergency workers, including bus drivers, should be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimeters and KI.
The training schedule for all emergency workers should be furnished to FEMA.
21 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: APRIL 23,1985, EXERCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recommendations of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness remedial exercise for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station held on April 23, 1985.
These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.
~'
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies.
FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels of government to improve intergovernmental coordination in all aspects of the emergency planning process.
A meeting between state, county, local, and FEMA officials is advisable.
No defielencies were observed that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
The deficiencies observed at the April 23, 1985, remedial exercise for the SNGS, as well as outstanding deficiencies from previous exercises, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies are summarized in the following Table 3.1. Cross-referencing is provided in Table 3.1 to the corresponding deficiency and corrective action in Table 4.1.
The cross-referencing appears at the end of the corrective action description on Table 3.1 and Indicates the number of the item as it eppears in Table 4.1.
t 4
i i
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDUI.E 6/19/85 April 23, 1985 se.d Previous Exercises Page 1 of 28 e
a d
Li et A
5.
S.
g s: ::
1
- s hd ss: g:e of H.. d.
ers en na.
n$
i RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
USS FEMA Evaluation cf Atate/Cointy Response $}f $$
1.
State of New Jersey w
J.10.a 1.
New Jersey uses compass sectors to I
N define protective action areas, whereas PSE&C designates Emergency Planning Areas (EPAs).
State and utility representatives should agree on a single method for areas where protective actions may be j
impl emented.
1his deficiency regarding the designation of areas to be evacuated has been opera-i tionally addressed during the 1984 esercise.
The use of EPAs has been replaced at the State EOC by the use of compass sectors which are then converted to narrative I
descriptions of the affected areas for E85 messages.
Although tt is system works well, the use of EPAs
]
is still referenced in the New Jersey Radiological Emergency i
Response Plan (RERP). Practice is not consistent with the plan. The New Jersey RERP should be revised l
to remove the EPA concept, and i
e 9
Table 3.1 sal.EH NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDI AL ACTION SCllEDULE 6/19/85 April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises Page 2 of 23 e
~
"i at J
a 5.
S.
g IO O
U s na n
un r.
I U $URS o S **
N" g*
gg NN RAC Reconnendation Corrective Action
- n. e a
< s.a State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MOS FEMA Eva'.uation of State /Cosmty Response 2%4gy3S re pl ac e it with the procedure presently in use based on compass N
sectors (Table 4.13 26).
w J.ll 2.
No messages were posted in the X
accident assessment area or the State EOC regarding protective actions impl emen ted for the ingestiori pathway.
Protective actions implemented should be clearly posted on the status boards and maps (Table 4.11 44).
J.10.r 3.
Assurance should be given that X
A.)
buses are available for evacuating the public in a timely fashion.
(NJOEM and HJ Transit should finalize a memo ra ndure of under-standing) (Table 4.11 31).
J.10 3 4.
Although evacuation procedures X
were generally clearly stated in the EBS messages, there were no clear instructions given for the evacuation of school children.
The EBS evacuation messages should make it clear whether eschool children are to be ev'acuated or nut (Table 4.13 32).
1 Table 3.1 SALEM NUCl. EAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDUI.E April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 3 of 2d C
O N
y y
wg 3*
A*
i n 23 23 at U
E **
831 0" R-4 a
oy 50 d
&R3 t il 2[r3
- L w
NN RAC Recommendation corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
Ud5 FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response El/ MOS F.1.d 5.
Some problems with determining 1
where to locate field monitoring g
teams were caused by the lack of sufficient referees.
There were four teams and only three referees.
The state BRP should insure that a sufficient number of trained referees are provided for exercises (Table 4.11 12).
F.I.d 6.
Duplicate ex planat ions of plant 1
0.4.j events, current meteorology, and dose projection checks to BRP were delayed.
Procedures for the prompt receipt of such data by BRP headquarters should be improved (Table 4.13 42).
F.1.e 7.
The BRP was not notified of the X
escalation of the plant emergency action level (EAL) from unusual event to alert.
The BRP was un-aware of the change until it con-Lacted the utility approximately 30 minutes af ter the ' change.
The plan provisions for notifying each response organization of the plant (T' ble 4.11 EAL must be followed a
41).
4 L
Table 3.1 sal.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDI AL ACTION SCliEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 4 of28 e
e ki
~C A
D da Se a
3" 0:
1$
- 3 0d e
a U
E4 83l iMR oS
.0 C0 d
0 ft "
&D nig3 Nll! 8 9
N RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action sU M
$ 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) sD O S FEHA Evaluation of State /Cosmty Response 524 M84 II.10 8.
1he air sampler of the Vanguard A X
X N
I.8 field monitoring team could not draw the required flowrate with the particulate filter in place.
The air sampler should be adjusted so that the required flowrote can be achieved (Table 4.11 17).
41.10 9.
The air sampler of the Vanguard A X
l.8 field monitoring team was not properly calibrated.
The air sampler should be properly cali-brated (Table 4.1; 18).
1.6
- 10. The high range ion chamber re-X mained in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the observer.
The field monitoring team SOPS requir-ing preoperational check of cali-bration and battery installation should be followed for all instru-mentation (Table 4.18 19).
1 Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 5 of 23
~
Ti e
et 5
6.
8.
a 9'
N 1$
233 1:3 a
o2 at dt EA 831 ;;M &
$5 50 60
&&3
&n 3::g3 EN RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action Ud E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MOS FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response Old M84 I.8
- 11. The field monitoring team did not X
take the air sampl er cartridge w
out of the plume into a low back-o ground area for counting.
The counting of air samples should be performed outside the plume as specified in the state plan (Table 4.13 20).
I.10 12.
Calculation of cumulative popu-I lation dose should be performed periodically (Table 4.13 34).
J.Il 13.
BRP should better coordinate the X
responsible agencies in ingestion pathway sampling and measurements (Table 4.13 35).
J.10.,i 14.
Some problems were observed in X
J.10,r following the proper evacuation 0.1 routes. This was because the bus drivers and police escorts were unfamiliar with the area, road-ways were poorl y marked, and route maps were segmented.
Consideration should be given to installing additional road name signs and/or route enumber
=
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 6 of 28 e
m ki nC n0 d.
S.
g 9" N*
10 1331 :3 a
1t 8 3 1 0 J" &
8j U.. :a en e n ma e s.
MN RAC Recomunendation Corrective Action
$5 E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICH)
MOS FEHA Evaluation of State /Cotmty Response 5 %A *Q3S
- markers, and providing better maps and written descriptions of y
the routes.
Existing small maps N
could be improved by placing an
- m" or a match line at the point where the previous map ends.
A larger map showing the entire evacuation route should also be included for reference in each bus driver's packet of maps (Table 4.13 28).
II.10
- 15. The bus drivers had no training X
0.4 in rediation record keeping r,r knowledge of exposure control procedures.
.No dosimeter chargers were available at the mustering point. The bus drivers should receive further training in radiological exposure control (Table 4.18 47).
K.J.a
- 16. The bus drivers' knouledge of X
0.1 radiation protection and dosim-etry varied greatly between the two drivers involved in the
- t e
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCllEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 7 of 23
'ei e
m S
nt 2
5.
S.
a 3:
N:
1$
"3f gd u
t II "'
E3l ilM &
oj "0
Ef.2 C
d
&R*
2n it:It3 u
NN RAC Recomunendation Corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
UO$
FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response ElA 2$0 "
general population ' bus evacu-g ation.
Additional training CD should be provided to ensure that all bus drivers are knowledgeable about appropriate radiation protection including the use of dosimeters, allowable dose limits, and procedures for being authorized to receive additional exposure.
The training schedule should be submitted to FEMA (Table 4.18 37).
J.10.t
- 17. The message to simulate the use 1
J.10.1 of KI was,not received by one of the bus drivers involved in the general population bus evacu-stion.
Communica tions should be improved to ensure that messages concerning radiation esposure protective measures are received by all bus drivers (Table 4.13 30).
O 9
e e
9 4
=
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 8 of 24 C
O N
Q' G"
~.
ve wm a
M N$
$?
Y*
t SA 83Fagg o!
30 El A
?t d
&it*
2 lil g;;ga w
IIN RAC Recommendation Corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MOS FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response El[ QOS K.3.a
- 18. The permanent record, dosimeters X
i K.3.b utilized by the bus drivers in-y volved in the general population bus evacustica were not iden-tified by a visible identifi-cation number or code.
All permanent record dosimeters must specific identification have a number so as to be traceable to the individual who used the device (Table 4.13 38).
II. Emergency Operations Facility A.I.b
- 19. With the dose assessment func-X If. 2 tions of the BRP. transferred to the EOF, the allocated space in the EOF was insufficient for the additional staff and equipment, and the arrangement of allocated space hindered interaction between dose assessment and man-agement personnel for the BRP and those of the utility.
If it is decided to transfer the dose assessment functions of the BRP to the EOF permanently, thetBRP
=
m um A
Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SQlEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/35 Page 9 of 28 e
m Gi at J
de 8e g
!! 03
!?
- 3isd m
od EIe 4 E*. I "2
yg dg RR3 21il li::23 d4
- 3 R
- H RAC Recosasendation Corrective Action
- p. w
< sa State (S)/Coimty (C) Response (ACTION) 50$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Consity Response E 4 Md should negotiate with the utility l
and obtain additional space as w
well as rearrangement of space o
throughout the EOF to allow grouping of dose assessment per-sonnel in one area and key utility and BRP/0EM management representatives in another (Table 4.11 48).
I'. )
20.
The transfer of the BRP dose I
l'. 4 assessment function from the l'. 5 State EOC to the EOF was experi-mental and is not in accord with the current New Jersey RERP.
If it is decided to permanently transfer the dose assessment functions of the BRP to the EOF, the necessary procedures to implement the new arrangement should be prepared and the current RERP revised to reflect the changes (Table 4.11 57).
S o
9 g
9 9
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATIllC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCllEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 10 of 28 e
~
ki at r0 5.
S.
a 3"
N" TS 333; d a
Y E "4 fi 3 I U"J R 30
[pl 50 d
&lr*
2 n,t:23 a
- N RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action U d E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
M05 FEMA Evaluation of State /Comty Response S Q 4 M4 o
D.3
- 21. A status board was not present in X
I the NJSP-FCP and th'ere was no u
posting of the emergency classi-w fication level.
A status board displaying the emergency classi-fication level should be dis-played and maintained in the NJSP-FCP (Table 4.11 51).
J.9
- 22. The NJSP-FCP room was not 1
J.10.m shielded like the nearby EOP room in the same building.
When the PCP personnel were advised to move to the sealed EOF room for radiation esposure protection they could not do.so since there were no cosumunications hookups available in the EOP room.
It is recommended that the FCP room in the Nuclear Training Facility building be protected similar to that in the EOR room, or that the FCP be relocated to the NJSP Woodstown station (Table 4.11 55).
e eh
--,au-.-w-m-,,,
1
i 8
ehRy y y
aJS$Mcy 2
O m
tiy fo e
9 Usij lj 1
5 8
et s i!A 1
/e e5
- 3?l 9
g
/a IE2$
1 P
6 esnop se R
y t
is to C
/e ta t
S fo no l
i tau lav E
AM E
E F
LUDE H
C S
a ARd N
TE&M O
I s Te C s
)
Ai N
c O
Lr I
A e T
I x C
DE A
E
(
M s E u e
R o s
i n
1 - v o
e p
3N r s
OP e
eI R
l Td bA n
)
aT a C
TS
(
5 G8 y
N9 t
I1 n
T u
A,
o R3 C
E2
/
N
)
El S
Ci
(
r R p e
AA t
E a
L t
C S
UN M
IUt5 EL E$,N daE A
S
.IM2d 1
I CU ye-
. eet - nenns
,A1 l h nehh amebi os r61 t t ost t oe ai e a #
h mi cw t t cl 4
gf ec e et eb ac u t
iod r ne c r e cocac e
s n
l eevi bi o/i l
ob 9
o sesxh el s l
ll t nt e wi oi n o o or pa i
p pt era T
tc a on l
o e
t st pf (
i i
A ro t r I
in o
e k
t r co d
o op n
e al e n
e t f h e e
n a ec e
d I
r.i c r
nm v
t ro i
l r
at C td o p
or t
d n o o
i i c
eor p
s rl c
p oo ei tf e
ti t g
. an r
rt nn ad s po nhf s co r
oa oi ey cdi t oc tf o
pc c r t ad n
a C
eo u epwe a
nrinl t
e rl sd mmot d ot o b
a ael a e
pt n
s t t c
t ctl chP o
P e
et Ai S nn t
o n
e a
i S
c db a d
J ee l x t
e h
t J
c r
e ndN mm o e a
N a
rie ee r
s t
d e
t n
f a eP e d
l e t
d.
e ef oriS wenepr nee) n hi wt hJ oh eh m gf oh e6 s
Tdt sTNLt mti aoct n5 s
oce R
3 2
CAR 3I
- a. j uS2N 00 1 1 o!2Ef JJ
Table 3.1 sat.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Exercisea 6/19/85 Page 12 of 23 N
O O
q-y g
3 3*
0 10 337 0 33 u
o2 30 at EX 8itg:[r s! B C"
w:
8&3 20 3::33
!$N RAC Reconsnendation Corrective Action
$5 E E State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MO$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Cotmty Response $ld MOS III. Joint News Center and Public Education La La C.I 24.
Public information materials have X
C.2 been developed indicating evacua-tion routes and the location of congregate care centers.
These materials have not been distri-buted by PSE&C due to printing problems. Distribution of public information informing residents of protective actions should be continued. In addition, informa-tion should be disseminated to those locations where transients might be:
e.g., Salem Colf and Country Club, and the Salem P8otor Lod ge.
Although the results of the formal survey conducted by the State and utility regarling public awareness are not yet available, a spot check of EPZ residents during the 1984 eser-cise indicated that, even though O
e
i l
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 13 of 28 a
k'C
^C A
6.
S.
a 3"
N:
T$
Si td st EX 83 ent oj jE.
- w t R&3 2 Ti g::g3 No
!$ N RAC Recosasendation Corrective Action UM E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
U0$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Cotsty Response EA4 MOS PSE6C has mailed,information concerning emergency planning to l
EPZ residents, public awareness y
A of protective actions was some-what weak.
This is a continuing deficiency that was observed at previous exercises.
The public education program must be intensified so the residents of Sales and Cumberland Counties be more aware of protective actions to be taken during a radiological emergency (Table 4.11 63, 128).
C.5
- 25. Media kits containing background X
information were not available at the media center.
Media kits should be prepared and be made available to the press at the media center (Table 4.11 62).
e S
O g
I
V
~.
Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDI AL ACTION SCllEDULE j
April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/n Page 14 of 28 0
O N
q-g-
~
- [
a 3
N*
10 33* O 34 o2 30 dII E"
eel i;&% R u
'B C
at
&&S 2n it;:&8 d
U5 E 5 State (S)/ County (C)' Response (ACTION)
$05 FEMA Evaluation of State /Cotaity Response $%4 *g,S
- c U RAC Recommendation Corrective Action IV.
Salem County u
A.I.d
- 26. The SCEOC emergency activities 1
1 A.2.s were not always well integrated and appropriate organizations d'd not always coordinate their agency's actions.
A more ef fec-tive management system for Salem County, including better informa-tion dissemination among the staff and better use of staff resources is required.
Salem County staffing, procedures, and training should be reviewed to determine how improvements will be impl emented.
The State must develop an interim pl an (plan supplement) to provide management by the State, in the SCEOC until Salem County is able to be in full control of the overall emergency response.
This plan should specify the scale of assistance and personnel involved (Table 4.11 65).
I
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCl. EAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCllEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 15 of 28 k
0 0
q-gw p
w we a
3*
A*
in
- i23 a
n2 yt dU 8"
EI! UUW
.0 ut
&R*
20
.t:R3 TJ !!
NN RAC 5.ecossnendation Corrective Action UM EE State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MO$
FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response 5 %.! 2Q0,$
P.I.d 27.
Elsinboro, Salem
- City, Penns-X X
ville, Hannington, and Quinton w
reported that requests for infor-o mation and other assistance from the SCEOC did not always receive a prompt response.
Implement a procedure for more prompt responses by the SCEOC to re-quests for information and assistance from eiunicipal EOCs (Table 4.13 81).
J.10.i 28.
The 1982 Post Exercise Assessment I
stated " Salem County must demon-strate the capability to innle-ment protective measures.
The county should demonstrate its capability to relocate the popu-lace, evacuate residents from the EPZ, and control access." At the 1983 exercise, the county demon-strated the ability to evacuate residents from the EPZ. Access control was not an objective for the county for this exercise and should be demonstrated in a future exercise (Tab.e 4.13 67).
e e
=
d Table 3.1 sal.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 16 of 28 a
g q:-
y s
s n:
- s n 3:
=!
S.E.c E.
F.
1.H..et me-anew gU
$ 5 E 5 State (S)/Co mty (C) Response (ACTION)
Md$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Cointy Response 41/ JMS RAC Recommsendation Corrective Action 4
J.10.e
- 29. There were some delays in the EOC X
X
' l notifying some of the'aunicipali-w" ties of the message to administer K1 to emergency workers.
Staff-ing, procedures and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how better overall management and more timely infor-mation flow from Salem County to the municipalities need further improvements (Table 4.13 69).
A.)
- 30. Although 24-hour staffing cap-X A.4 ability of the SCEOC was demon-strated by presentation of a roster, the SCEOC staf f indicated that supplemental personnel from the State OEM or from other coun-ties might be required for pro-longed operations. 1he potential need for supplemental resources from other counties and/or the State should be identified in the
- Plan, and written agreements reached with these other jurls-dictions for providing these resources.
Appropriate tsalaing c
should al so be provide & (Table 4.13 71).
e
s i
I t
j l
i Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/35 Page 17 of 28 i'
O at J
da Sm.
a 3:
N:
1$
333 0 33 m
a u,3 yt :;tt 34 811 ;;aat 223 2 t'l g::gg m
a RAC Recommendation Corrective Action UUs EE:
State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
USS FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response El/ M4 K.S.a
- 31. Emergency workers at the Salem X
X County congregate care shelter l
u (Centerton Fire Station) did not Lnow the contamination level for i
determining the need for decon-tamination.
Emergency workers should receive additional train-j ing on the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination (Table 4.11 119).
J.10.li
- 32. The Salem County congregate care X
X center (Woodstown High School) was not apprised of when and how many evacuees to espect. The ARC representative at the SCEOC should inform representatives at the congregate care shelters of the number of evacuees and their espected time of arrival (Table 4.18 95).
i I
e 9
e e
ji eip 4
e
~
.~
Ta'>le 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCliEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 18 of 28 N
0 Q
Qs g-g 3
3: 0:
10
- M ed aV at dU
" 4' EII UMR F S te we
&&S O T'J nNR3 f$ U RAC Recossnendation Corrective Action
$ 5 E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
MOU FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response 5%4 Md K.S.b
- 33. At the Salem County decontamina-X l
tion center only one shower stall u
was available for decontamine-tion, which would be insufficient during emergency worker shift changes or peak processing of people at the center. Additional shower facilities should be available at the decontamination center.
Separate showers should be available for men and women (Table 4.18 105).
K. ).a 34.
At the SA traffic control point, X
dosimetry equipment was not ob-served. Police officers assigned to traf fic control points should be equipped with personal dosim-eters and should be trained in their use (Table 4.13 111).
K.3.a
- 35. Radiological exposure control X
dosimeters were not issued by the County for the bus driver in-volved in the evacuation of transit dependent individusts.
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 19 of 28 i
E O
E Q-gv v3 e
3: 0:
10 23; ; 34
&&3 On m3 NN RAC Recossendation Corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
Ud$
FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response ElJ M4 Moreover, the driver appeared to
}
t raining " in the use have had no d
of dosimeters. Radiological en-O posure control dosimeters and training in their use is required for personnel involved in evacua-tion busing (Table 4.18 109).
J.10.d
- 36. The ability to evacuate mobility X
impaired individuals in Salem County was not demonstrated. The ability to evacuate mobility impaired individuals should be tested in a future esercise (Table 4.18 91).
K.3.s 37.
In the 1984 exercise, the bus X
X driver for the school evacuation in Salem County did not have a dosimeter.
In the 1985 remedial exercise, the bus driver had a self-reading dosimeter but no permanent record dosimeter.
Appropriate dosimetry should be provided to all drivers in evacu-ation busing.
The listing on distribution of dosimetry e should be provided to FEMA (Table 4.11 101).
em 4
9
Table 3.1 SAI.EM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDUI.E April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/C*i Page 20 of 28 e
n k'
at 5
S 5.
S.
a 3' N*
1$
3330 33 N d3 E.d e
$ $.3 @MQ[u hw
- e onu aen I$ N RAC Recomunendation Corrective Action U d E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
U0$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Cotsity Response 2 % / aq3,a, K.3.a
- 38. The bus driver for the school X
X I
evacuation in Sales' County was s-not trained in the use of dosin-eters or KI.
All emergency workers, including bus drivers, should be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimeters and Kl.
'!he training schedule for all emergency workers should be furnished to FFEA (Table 4.13 92).
F.2
- 39. During the September 27, 1984 X
N.2.c medical drill, the ambulance crew membe r who called in to Salem County Hemorial llospital over the radio neglected to say "This is a drill".
All radio transmissions made as part of future medical drills should be clearly iden-tified as such (Table 4.13 116).
1 i
1 1
l Table 3.1 SA1.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/35 Page 21 of 28 N
C G
7' G*
d 88 ve we
+
EN AE 2
$$$ 2 *h u
Y EA 8E145:B' oS yt d
&&3 2M 3::28 E!S w
!$ U RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action
$5 E5 State (S)/Cosmity (C) Response (ACTION)
UU$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Cotetty Response $ $,4 22,$
V.
Salem County Municipalities p
I F.3 40.
Elsinboro, Mannington, and Salem X
N City should participate in com-munication training and drills t
(Table 4.18 82).
A.2.a
- 41. Although a letter was sent to all X
Mayors and Boards of Chosen Free-holders as a result of the 1981 J
exercise, the level of participa-tion of emergency personnel in
]
the esercise was disappointing.
Every effort should be made by the Mayors and Board of Free-holders to educate their emer-gency personnel of the importance of the esercise esperience.
On the basis of the 1984 eser-cise, this remains incomplete for
{
the Elsinboro and Mannington 1
EOCs. The Elsinboro and Manning-ton EOCs need to improve their
{
participation levels. The inter-j action and coordination oE their l
l
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCllEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/35 Page 22 ofi8 N
O O
q-g-
E
- 7 e
35 NI TU
$*E j**
u li U
EA 83EUfd&
p yt d
&R*
2 Ti ng8 4S
.2 a
dN RAC Recossmendation Corrective Action Ud E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
U 0 [a FEMA Evaluation of State /Cosmty Response $ld EQ8f, staff could not be fully evalu-ated.
A system should be imple-e mented to increase the participa-W tion levels of volunteer staff at the Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs.
The timing of the exercise should be given greater consider-ation in the scenario development (Table 4.13 72).
K.4
- 42. The radiological officer at the X
Lower Alloways Creek EOC was not aware of the exposure thre. hold for recalling field staff.
Emergency staff should be trained to be knowledgable in the maximum allowable dose for field staff (Table 4.13 142).
H.3
- 43. The Pennsville ECC is too small X
for effective operation.
Con-sideration should be given to re-locating the Penneville EOC to a larger facility (Table 4.13 158).
4
Table 3.1 sal.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL. ACTION SCllEDUI.E April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 23 of 28 N
0 0
q-7 8
v3 m
3* N*
10
- 3rt s:
o 30 dt 83I ;;"d k p"
tu at O R'
- 2G n:R3
'N RAC Recossnendation Corrective Action UN I5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
UU$
FEMA Evaluation of State /Coimty Response $14 MOS 2
J. I O.s 44.
The lower Alloways Creek police I
K.3.b officer at one access control a
point was not completely familiar A
with the use of dosimeters and Kl.
Police should receive KI and additional training on the use of dosimeters and KI (Table 4.1; 153).
K.3.a 45.
Personnel of the Lower Alloways X
Creek rescue squad had no dosimeters (Table 4.1; 143).
K.3.a 46.
Most emergency workers responding X
K.3.b to an impediment to evacuation left their dosimeters in their vehicles.
All emergency workers should be instructed to carry dosimeters with them at all times in the field (Table 4.13 141).
J.10..
- 47. Not all emergency workers X
responding to the impediment to evacuation were aware of pro-cedures for use and authorization of KI.
All emergency workers
,~
should be fully trained ein, the use of K1 (Table 4.1; 148).
e y
e
.~
=,
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 24 of 28 A
El.
y y
g 3: 0:
it
- 33 1:3 U
U3 83t i!" R 4
oj ja d:
2R:
2M 8::28
, Na g
^ l$ N RAC Recommendation Corrective Action
$5
<5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
U0$
FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response ;jg ga
,J.12
- 48. All municipal EOCs should perfore I
l reentry procedires to' the estent possible in the time frame of the 3
vi esercise (Table 4.18 150).
VI.
Cumberland County A4
- 49. The facilities at the Cumberland X
i H.3 County E9" were marginal.
Space and furniture were limited.
Cumberland County should investi-sate the possibility of providing additional space and facilities for extended operations at the EOC (Table 4.13 126).
A.2.s
- 50. The Cumberland County EOC oc-1 11. 3 casionally became overcrowded and noisy because of the presence of non-essential personnel who were not identified in the county's t
RERP staffing list.
A means should be developed to limit the nualn r of personnel in the CCEOC.
For es emple, only those indivi-duals with a pre-established EOC or field assignment shouldt be l
1
\\
t 8
3cn 2
RvCsQud t
f g* S d8t4u,$
t a
4 55 82 D
/e 0 2i1C/
1 g q* S 3 Q 9
/a
- @2E 6P esnop se R
y tnuo C
/e ta t
S fo no l
i tau lav E
AM E
E L
F UDE t
O 3S I
S E0.WO NO 1E?M I s Te C s Ai
)
c N
Lr O
A e I
I x T
DE C
E A
M s
(
E u R o e
i s
1 - v n
e o
3N r p
OP s
eI e
l Td R
bA n aT a
)
TS C
5
(
C8 N9 y
I 1 t
T n
u AR3 o
E2 C
N
/
El
)
Ci S
r
(
R p AA e
E t
L a
C t
U S
N M
N.N[t5 E
uE LA S
I X
e :U".5 3j $
e
- n1 r s e w esc ee
,sl hh ro1 eth oob nOrrsna t t ai h nt t r oE uaC oc i
pt4 t e S pdiC s Oio w
a omy l tC s Etla f
c pbd s ua a s e
d o nn oc e
c n
Co d nl nl aohi eoganh i
li e o
O d
snht a ub ae l
i E
e i
cut n
u m a v
t uT s
t o
o mT s e yh s n on a
a s
ns l i
c e
h o(
ud c cC n s
i o h ).
a e A
h s
l iOo s
c t
i l m t
s.
e w nE c c
3 t
e a
r p
e i e
i) l t e ns h
u3 v
o m4 y
eanl
.d n
1 l
ss set i
t r2 ye ma e
i t
i i
t n e1 n
r t c ocd n s1 l r t t c
i i a t C C oni o el 1 p
und nr e
3 p
i t l oi ae l aa m
wrt ai4 r
s 1
C l x e
r r
s c o
ep pr d
pe rh
.h o
t o
ei4 n
t did e i
C cf a
n pt si,
vr e c l
ep cie d
C wdl rp i
b t
n acl n
it o
eb aeg nt oO ee t t ga a
otE si n i r nT d pa l t n s a i
esT r ai et n ef nd mai(
ta w
(
epn gr Ck ri ol s pn d
o bii.
noeOeur s ut n i s l tC mca) a pre ed ar oaad aC n
l uH uir2 h meC r el ehh rnrO e
s aoE Ctt8 Ci wCC ccpst t at E m
soc e
1 2
R 5
5 CAR
- b. e.
E8N 3
I. 1 3 o $ 2' P
PFF l
l
x
_ =
~..
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDI AL ACTION SCllEDUI.E April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 26 of 28 0
0 N
q-y S
3*
0:
70 23; q3 EII II" R J
a
- d:
E A's m as
.t U
dj a
en lif N RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action Ud E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
$ 8 s*2 FEMA Evaluation of State /Cosmty Response EIA M8,$
A.2.s
- 53. Some minor problems with message 1
handling and documentation were A"
observed at the CCEOC, including incorrectly idenLifying the source of a mes. age, not includ-ing the times that somc of the messages were received, and not knowing with certainty how to identify messages to the state as exercise messages.
Additional training of communications per-sonnel should be conduct.e3 to a
ensure accurate documentation of messages (Table 4.13 125).
P.I.d
- 54. The Cumberland. County radio-1 logical ifeld team's radio was not adequate for contacting the i
CCEOC and the PCP from all field monitoring locations. Cumberland County should investigate the need for a more powerful radio system for use by their radio-logical field teams for com-munications with the EOC and FCI' (Table 4.li 127).
I
=
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTIOli SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 27 of 28 N
7 O
q-7 E
- 7 we m
3" 0:
10 q:
u at -Jt 531 00:2 p! j n:
eas en un p..
!$ N RAC Recossmendation Corrective Action Ud E5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
$0$
FEHA Evaluation of State / County Response Eid "$$$
J.10.s
- 55. Some of the volunteer staff at X
O.1 the Cumberland County 'EOC as well 3
as the health department repre-00 sentative seemed to have a limited knowledge of the dis-tribution and use of KI.
Addi-tional training should be impl e-mented to familiarire selected staf f members with the use of KI (Table 4.13 131).
Vll. Cumberland County Municipalities H.3 56.
Emergency backup power supplies X
were either inadequate or lacking at the Creenwich and Stow Creek municipal EOCs.
Emergracy generators of appropriate ccpac-ity should be procured to assure uninterrupted operation of these local EOCs (Table 4.1; 152).
V.3 57.
Creenwich should participate in X
communication training and drills (Table 4.1; 82).
e,.
O 9
e e
g e
8 ggj d*
2 JSn$g?j f
a 0UgM 58 82
,t.3i! 4
/
a633r2 9e 1 g
/a 2S2$
4 6P es O
nopse R
y tss to C
/e t
m am a
t S
fo n
o i
tau lav E
A M
E EF LUDE l
Q
- S a$M' RO S
1 o0M NO I s Te C s
)
Ai N
c Lr O
I A e I x T
DE C
E A(
M s E u R o e
i s
1 - v n
e op 3N rOP se eI l Td R
bA n aT a
)C TS
(
5 G8 N9 y
t I1 t
T e
A,
t R3 o
E2 C
N
/
El
)
Ci S
(
r R p AA e
E t
L a
C t
U S
N M
- Y O E
E*,,N gaE LAS
," U d I
3OCU s
l -
t e
aois pr i
iper c
l r yb e i
n n ri x o
ut se i
m n s
t e o c
pe A
ye h
t r t
e n
t v
um n i
or ef t o t
Co x
c f
e
)
r e
d e0 r
n e e m5 r
aph a1 o
l t r C
rd f
el o n
b ut 1
o mo em4 i
uh si t
C s a
et e d
r l
n hs u b
e t Cd ea n
oOehT s
BE ct(
soc e
R 8
5 CAR 2
a0" U 1
o!2' f
J
50 4
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies noted during the April 23,1985, exercise.
Table 4.1 summarizes recommendations to correct those deficiencies.
For purposes of verification, the table compares these recommendations with ' the recommendations based upon the previous exercises.
The current status of all recommendations is indicated.
Cross-referencing is provided for the 1985 exercise deficiency recommendations appearing in Table 4.1 The cross-referencing appears at the end of the corrective action description and consists of the section number of this report in which the deficiency is described, and the number of the deficiency as listed in the section.
e
%--r-
-,pp--
g
. a Table 4.1 Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in off-Site Radiological Energency Response Freparednese at Exercises for the Salen Nuclear Generating Station on April 23, 1985, October 23, 1984, October 26, 1983, October 13, 1982, and April 8, 1981 6/19/85 Deftetene, Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1, Frevious Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Cctractive Action Reference" Exercisee 20/26/83 10/13/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status b
The Bureau of Radiation Protection A.I.b z
State C
(SEP) liaison officer and his staff are located on the second floor of the State EOC, hampertag communicatione sad protective action decision making ich the Command and Control center which te located on the first floos of the EOC. Communications between the Bureau of Radiation Protection Office and the Command and Control Center should be strengthened to facilitate and expedite protective action decision making at the State E0C. Consideration should be given to moving the SEP liaison of fice to the first floor-of the EOC and defining the role of this liaison office as one of relaying and interpreting, as necessary, technical information from the EOF (Section 2.1.1; 3).
c State C
a 2.
Procedures fer communication with A.3 x
federal agencies should be improved.
The state procedures should be modified concerning calls to Brookhaven Nat*.onal Laboratory for federal assistance.
State C
3.
There is a need for procedures for A.3 x
requesting monitoring assistance and coordinating such assistance with the State.
State C
4.
Based on the previous exercise there A.3 x
was a general agreement that federal agencies should be involved in exer-cises.
gowever. /EMA was the only federal agency involved in this exercise.
State C
5.
Checklists, which were to be developed D.4 x
as a result of the 1981 exercise, were not observed.
b w
e, 52 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deffefency Identified ICREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial e
Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Escossended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status h
6.
la response to a criticise regarding E.1 "x
x State C
motification procedures at the 1981 F.1 Sales C
Cumber 1 dad C
exercise, a unified " Initial Contact u
Eleinboro C
Message Fora
- has' been developed. Its a
lower Alloways C
- use, however, was sporadic.
Some a
aunicipalities have not yet received x
Mannington C
Feonsville C
the forms.
Procedures for their use z
should be developed.
These forms a
Quinton C
should be utilised by all levele of a
Sales City C
Creenwich C
x government.
Stow Creek C
a State C
7.
All agencies should respond promptly to E.2 x
notification as required by the plan.
State C
8.
Care should be taken to have the stren E.5 s
a sound before the EBS is activated.
A procedural change requiring that, prior to EBS activation. the county energency management coordinator notify the state that the sirens had sounded would en-sure the timely sequencing of alerting and notification.
State C
9.
The StF-FCF ehould improve its internal F
a communications, especially its message board.
State C
- 10. The radio communications link between F.1 x
the FCF and the EOC should be maintained throughout the accident.
II. The individual in charge at the SRF-FCF F.1.4 x
State C
did not obtain maximum use of the field monitoring teams due to inefficient positioning of the teams. The BAF-FCF should improve its coordination with the E0F with regard to the projected loestion of the plume and the need for data at specific locations (Section 2.1.2.2; 1).
- 12. Some problems with determining where to F.1.d a
State N/Obj(85) locate field moattoring teams were caused 1,
the lack of sufficient referees.
There were four teams and only three referees.
The State BF.F ehould insure that e aufficient number of trained referees are provided for exercises (Section 2.1.2.2; 2).
e
~
53 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defielency Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial 1, s Frevious Esercise Exercise Esercise Preseng Rev.
g b
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
-13.
Radio commaications between the FCF F.1.d a
a State C
and all of the field monitoring tease
~~
should be assured.
Radio equipment should be evaluated and improved to eliminate difficulties in asiataining
-contact with the field tease.
Radio communications between the field moni-toring teams and the FCF continued to be a probles during the 1984 exercise.
Radio contact was intermittently lost
- throughout the esercise by both field teams observed. The adequacy of the esisting commnications system utilised between the FCF and the field monitoring teams should be reviewed and taprovemente implemented in order to sesure the capability for uninterrupted comunications between the FCF and the field teens. Installation of the radio tower planned for the FCF can improve the communications (section 2.1.2.2:
3).
14 Notifications regarding the status of F.1.d 3
a State C
emergency or protective actions in 0.4.j effect were not relayed to the field monitoring teams with the exception of the recommendation to take K1 during the 1984 exercise. The TCP should keep field tease better informed with respect to the statue of emergency or protective actica recommendations (Section 2.1.2.23 4).
- 15. The receiver in the state EOC C.4.s x
x State C
apparently was not sensitive enough to a
State-JMC C
pick up the first En$ test message. At the Media Center there are now radios in the state FIO work area.
- 16. Both teams did not have documentation E.10 x
State C
of the last calibration for all of the radiation detection instruments. Indi-vidual instrumente either did not have calibraftoo labels or the labele indicated dates that were over one year old.
Instrument calibration documentation procedures should be strengthened to ensure that calibra-tiene are performed according to plan and that evidence of the calibratione is present (section 2.1.2.3; 2).
e e,
54 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency identified NUREC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Ramedial Rev. 1, Frevious Exercise Exercise Esercise Presenj No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Esercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction ** Status b
- 17. The air sampler of the Vanguard A field 5.10 x
x State I
monitoring team could not draw the 1.8 required flowrate with the particulate filter in place.
The air sampler should be adjusted, so that the required flowrote can be achieved.
(Section 2.1.2.3; 1 and Section 2.1.2.3; 2)
- 18. The air sampler of the vanguard A field E.10 m
State 1 (N) team was not proparty calibrated. The 1.8 att sampler should be properly calibrated (Sectico 2.1.2.3; l).
- 19. The high range ton chamber remained in 1.8 x
State 1 (N) the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the observer.
The field monitoring team SOPS requiring preoperational check of calibration and battery installation should be followed f or all instrumen-tation (Section 2.1.2.3; 4).
- 10. The field monitoring tese did not take 1.8 s
State 1 (N) a the air saspler cartridge out of the plume into a low background area for counting.
The counting of air samples F
should be performed outside the plume as specified in the state plan (Section 2.1.2.3; 3).
- 21. The power converter for thz air sampler 1.8 x
State C
of the Vanguard A team failed.
The cause of the f ailure of the Vanguard A team power converted should be deter,
mined and corrected (section 2.1.2.3; 3).
State C
- 22. The field monitoring agolpeent is kept 1.8 x
la the EAP-TCF. rather than with field units.
The equipment used for this Sales exercise is the very same equip-ment that was used at Oyster Creek.
Distributiftg the equipment according to where the next esercise will be leaves one of the two New Jersey sites without equipment.
This deficiency should be corrected by providing each site with its own field monitoring equipment, the equipment would be available for use by backup personnel even if the monitoring teams were delaytd by unexpected problems such as bad weather.
If the equipment were stored with the field tease, set-up and calibration could be performed during transit.
9
e l
e
.s 55 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deftetency identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Freseng -
po.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises
- 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 23. Communications between the REF-FCF and 1.8
_x State C
monitoring tease should be improved by using a standardised format for trans-mittal of the data.
24 Thyroid dose data should always be 1.9 x
State C
taken and transmitted.
- 25. The thyroid dose rate monitoring equip-I.9 x
State C
ment (Sam 11) should use silver seolite cartridges and should be operated at the proper air flow rate.
The silver seolite cartridges were availables charcoal cartridges were used due to cost of silver zoolite.
- 26. New Jersey uses compasa sectors to J.10.a x
x State N/0bj(85) define protection action areas, whereas PSE&G designates Energency Flanning l
Areas (EFAs).
State and utility representatives should agree on a single method for areas ubere j
protective actione may be implemented.
This deficiency regarding the desig-nation of areas to be evacuated has been operationally addressed during the 1984 exercise.
The use of EFAs has been replaced at the State EOC by the use of compass sectore which are then converted to narrative descriptions of the affected areas for EBS messages.
Although this system works well, the use of EFAs is still referenced in the New Je rsey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP).
Practice is not consistent with the plan.
The New Jersey RIRF should be revised to remove the EFA concept, and replace it with the procedure presently to use based on compass sectors (Section 2.1.13 1).
- 27. Maps in the State EOC did not indicate J.10.a a
State C
the sectors in which protective actions had been implemented.
Maps to the State EOC should be equipped with overlays t'at todicate sectors where protective actions have been taple-meated (Section 2.1.1; 2).
e 56 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency identified NUREC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise b
- Preseng i
to.
Recoemended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 28. Some prubleme were observed in follow-J.10.a x
State N/obj(85) ing the proper evacuation routas. This J.10 3 was because the bue drivers and state 0.1 police escorts were unfamiliar with the ares, roadways were poorly marked, and route asps were segmented. Considera-tion should be given to installing additional road name signs and/or route numbe r markers, and providing better maps and written descriptions of the routes. Existing small maps could be improved by placing an *x* or a match line at the point where the previous map ende. A larger map showing the entire evacuation route should also be included for reference in each bus driver's packet of maps (Section 2.1.3;
!).
- 29. The protective hits for the field non-J.10.e u
State C
itoring teams should contain 11 as called for in the plan.
K1 was avail-able at the BEF-FCP and would have been distributed is a real emergency.
- 10. The message to staulate the use of El J.10.e a
State N/0bj(85) was not received by one of the bus J.10.f drivers involved in the general population bue evacuation. Communica-tions should be improved to ensure that messages concerning radiation exposure protective measures are received by all bus drivers (Section 2.1.3; 3).
it. Assurance should % given that buses J.10.g a
z State N/Obj(85) are available for evacuating the public A.3 in a timely faehton.
(NJ0Di and NJ Transit should finalise a memorandum of understanding.)
12.
Although evacuation procedures were J.10.g a
State N/0bj(85) generally clearly stated in the EBS messagee, there were no instructione given for the evacuation of echool children.
ERS evacuation messages should make it clear whether echool children are to be evaucated or not (Section 2.1.11 4).
- 13. Very little dose projection, plant 1.8 x
State C
condition, or protective action Laformation vae transmitted back to the BRF-FCF from 3RP headquarters.
More open exchange of data and information should be maintaines between 327 headquarters and the any.FCF.
e e,
,e e
57 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defielene, Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-RZp-1 Remedial Rev. 1, Previous Esercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recousanded Corrective Action Referenca*
Exercieee 10/16/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction *' Statue f
b State N/0bs(83) 34 Calculation of cumalative population I.10 s
dose should be performed periodically.
N/0bj(84, 85)
State N/0bj(83)
- 35. SEF should better coordinate the re-J.11 x
N/Obe(84) sponettle agencies in ingestion pathway N/Obj(85) sampling and measuremente.
state C
- 36. Maps or displays identifyind daire J.11 x
farne or food processing plante were not posted or available.
! tape or displays indicating key land-use data (e.g., farming), dairies food process-ing plants, water supply, intakes, water treatment plants, and reservoirs should be developed.
- 37. The bus drivers' knowledge of radiation K.3.a.
x State N/0bj(85) protection and dosimetry varied greatly 0.1 between the two drivers involved in the general population bus evacuation.
Additional training should be provided to ensure that all bus drivers are
(
knowledgeable about appropriate radia-tion protection including the use of dosiaaters, allowable dose limite, and procedures for being authorised to receive additional esposure.
The training schedule should be submitted to TDtA (Section 2.1.33 2).
- 38. The permanent record dosisaters K.3.s x
State N/obj(85) utill ed by the bus drivers involved in K.3.b the general population bue evacuation were not identified by a visible identification number or code.
All permanent record dosteeters mast have a specific identification number so as to be traceable to the individual who used the device (section 2.1.3 4).
State C
- 39. simulated release of radiation should p.9 x
be large enough to allow for signif-icant activity in the eres of field monitoring and dose assessment cape-bility.
State.
C
, 40. There is a need for improved coordia-J.10.g a
ation between the NJSP and NJ Tranett during esercises la executing evacua-tion of the general pubite. Procedures need to be clarified between NJSP and NJ Transit designating lead and dio-patch responsibilities for evacuation buses.
e, e
a 58 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-12P-1 Remedial e
Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Prectr.g h
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/13/83 Jurisdiction" Status
- 41. The BRF was not notified of the escala-F.1.e z
State N/Obj(85) tion of the plant emergency action level (EAL) free unusual event to alert.
The BEF was unaware of the change untti it contacted the utility approximately 30 minutes after the -
change.
The plan provisions for noti-f ring each response organisattom of the plant EAL aust be followed.
42.
Duplicate explanations of plant events.
F.1.d a
State N/0bj(85) current meteorology, and dose projec-tion checks to BRF were delayed.
Frocedures for the prompt receipt of such data by BEF headquarters should be improved.
- 41. Improper instructions and training have J.10.e z
State C
been given regarding the authorizatico E.3.b and administration of K1 to emergency bus drivers have been made. Improved provisions and training are required for the use of radioprotective drugs by energency workers.
44 No sessages were posted in the accidens J.11 x
State N/0bj(85) assessment area or the State E0C re-garding protective actions implemented f or the ingestion pathvey.
Frotective actions implemented should be clearly posted on the status boards and maps.
45.
Ne FCF radio operator did not always E.1 x
State C
indicate that the transmissions were part of the esercise.
The FCF radio operator should always include "this is a drill..." in the transmissions. Fer-haps rubber stamping the information on the sessage fore will enhance the transsission of this information.
46.
Communications capability between the F.1.a x
State C
NJ transit dispatcher and evacuation buses is lacktog.
NJ transit buses should be equipped with radios.
The interie use of state police escort vehicles should continue until the radios are installed.
- 47. The bue drivers had no training in R.10 State N/0bj(85) radiation record keeping or knowledge 0.4 of exposare control procedures.
No dosimeter chargers were availaba et the sustering point.
The bus drivere should receive further training is radiological exposure control.
I
i
,e 59 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defteteney Ifeetfied NUREC-0654 FEMA-REF-!
Remedial r
Rev. 1, Frevious Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng D
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 48. With the dose saaessment functions of A.1.b x
State-EOF N/Obj(85) the BRF transferred to the EOF, the R.2 allocated space in the EOF was Insuffletent for the additional staff and equipment, and the arrangement of allocated space hindered interaction' between does assessment and management personnel for the 3RF and those of the utility. If it to decided to transfer the dose assessment functions of the BRF to the EOF permanently, the BRF should negotiate with the utility and obt.in additional space as well as re.rungement of space throughout the EOF t6 ellow grouping of dose assees-east pesa %nel in one area and key utility
.ed BRF/0Dt management representatiws in another (Section 2.2.1; 2).
49.
The designated 3RF official at the EOF A.I.d a
State-EOF C
a was not unequivocally in control and his authority for decision-making was not. clear. Recommendatione for protec-tive actions had to receive support I
froe the 3RF staff at the State EOC prior to being sent to OEM.
If it to decided to transfer dose assessment functions of the BRF to the E0F j
permanently. the functional roles of I
the BRF representatives in the EOF versue those in the State EOC should be redefined. Thie is needed in order to clearly identify one individual to l
unequivocally carry out SRP responsi-bilittee (Section 2.2.13 !).
- 50. Before the EOF opene, the utility tech-B.6 x
State-E0F C
nical support center should have the correct telephone numbers to make contact with appropriate state repre-sentatives.
St. A status board was not present to the D.3 m
State-EOF N/0bj(85)
[
NJ5F-TCP and there was no posting of the. emergency classification level.
A status board displaying the emergency classification level should be displayed and maintained in the NJ5F-FCF (Section 2.2.23 1).
?
4 m_
.__--.c
a, e.
60 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deftetency Identified NUREG-0654 FDLA-REF-1 Remedial i
Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng po.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises
- 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 52. The 1982 Foot Exercise Assessment F.1.b
~~
state-EOF C
s stated:
since the phone to Lower Alloways Creek at the EOF is not to be converted to state use, other measures should be taken so that there are more telephones for state agencies at the' EOF.
At the 1983 exercise, it was observed that the phone to Lower A110 ways Creek had been disconnected.
Dedicated and commercial phone lines had been added.
There are now euf ficient tele-phones for state agencies at the EOF.
- 53. The 3RF-FCF was hampered by a lack of F.1.4 s
State-EOF C
communications from the EOF regarding 1.11 emergency action
- levels, dose projection data, and protective action measures.
Action should be takes to improve coordination and ensure a timely flow of taformation from the EOF to the FCF.
Future training should stress the importance of en open exchange of information from the EOF r
regarding protective action measures and dose projection data (Section 2.2.1 4).
- 54. An ettempt by the SSf-FCF to contact F.1.d a
Store-E0F C
the EOF using the backup radio method was unsuccessful during the exercise because the EOF staff did not have adequate training in the operattoa of the equipment.
Future training should stress the need to have the teckup radio operational during an emergency response la case problema develop with use of the primary systes. The use of the backup radio syntes should be demonstrated in a future exercise (Section 2.2.13 5).
- 55. The sJsF-FCF room was not shielded like J.9 s
State-EOF N/Obj(85) the nee-by EOF room la the same J.10.a building. When the FCF personnel were sivised to move to the sealed E0F room e
for radiation exposure protection they could not do so since there were no communications hookups available in the EOF roce.
It le recommended that the FCF toon in the Nuclear Traintag Facility butiding be protected stallar to that la the EOF room, or that the FCF be relocated to the NJSP Woodstown station (Section 2.2.23 2).
,e o
e 61 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deftetene, Identified NUREG-0654 FMA-REF-1 Remedial i
Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" statue h
- 56. The NJSP reported to a s11ghtly J.10.a State-EOF N/0bj(85) x different location for one of the two J.10.j access control
- points demonstrated during the exercies.
This became apparent when the NJSP attempted to retteve the Lower Alloways Creek police at the indicated post.
It is recom-sended that coordination between the NJSP and local police be implemented in order to obtain agreement on the precise location of the traffic control / access control points.
In particular, the exact location of post
- 6A needs to be confirmed (Section 2.2.2s 3).
- 57. The transfer of the 3RF dose assessment F.3 x
State-EOF N/0bj(85) function from the State EOC to the EOF F.4 was experimental and is not in accord F.5 with the current New Jersey RERF.
If it is decided to permanently transfer the dose assessment functions of the 3RF to the
- EOF, the necessary procedures to implement the new arrangement should be prepared and the current RERP revised to reflect the changes (Section 2.2.13 3).
- 58. Satellite Ess stations should be better E.5 State-JMC C
briefed in proper procedures concerning transmittal of information from the state regarding radiological emergencies.
State-JMC C
- 59. Bard coptee of the Ess messages should E.5 m
be available for the state F10s.
State-JMC C'
- 60. Additional training of the rumor C.4.c z
control staf f is necessary if they are to convey informattoo properly regarding an unfolding emergency.
State-JMC C
- 61. It was not observed whether the C.4.b a
masthead used by the media center F10 had the,elephone number of the state F10 in the governor's of fice.
State-JMC N/0bj(85)
- 62. Media kits containing background C.5 x
taformation were not systlable et the media center.
Media kits should be prepared and be made available to the press at the media center (Section 2.33 1).
e s,
, i i
62 Table 4.1 (Coot'd) 6/19/85 Deftetene, Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 tenedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recoemended Corrective Action taference*
Esercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status b
- 63. Public information materials have been C.1
-a a
a State-JMC N/Obj(85) developed Ladicating evacuattoo routes C.2 (1961) and the location of congregate care centers. These materials have not been distributed by PSE&G due to printing problees.
Distributloo of public -
information informing reefdente of protective actions should be con-tinued.
In addittoa, information should be disseminated to those locations where transients might bei e.g., Sales Golf and Country Club, and the Sales Motor lodge.
Although the results of the formal survey conducted by the State and utility regarding public awarenese are not yet ava11able, a spot check of EFZ residents during the 1984 exercise indicated that, even though PSE&G has mailed taformation concerning energency planning to EFZ residents, public awareness of protective actions was somewhat weak.
This le a continuing deficiacey that was observed at previous esercises. The public educa-tion progran must be intensified so the residents of Sales and Cumberland counties be more aware of protective actions to be taken during a radio-logical emergency (Sectica 2.3; 2).
I Sales C
64 County should in subsequent esercisee, A.I.b x
demoretrate a capability in fire and
- rescue, transportation and public taformation.
- 65. The SCE0C esercency activittee were not A.I.d a
a a
a Sales I
alveys well integrated and appropriate A.2.s organisations did not always coordinate their agency's actions. A more effec-tive management system for Sales County, taciuding better information dissemination among the staff and better noe of staff resources to required.
Salee County staffing, procedures, and training should be reviewed to determine how improvements will be implemented.
The State eust develop ao laterie plan (plan supple-ment) to provide management by the State. in the SCE0C untti Sales County is able to be to full control of the overall emergency response. This plan should specify the scale of assistance and personnel tavolved (Section 2.4.13 1 and Section 2.2.l; 3).
IMedical drill on 9/27/84 adequately demonstrated that so injured, contaminated person could be handled and treated.
1 o
,e
. e 63 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deftetenev Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" status h
- 66. At the Sales County EOC the A.1.4 "a
s a
gales C
transat ssion of timely protective A.1.s action messages to all the manici-palities within Sales County continued to be a problem during the 1984 exercise. This was also identified in previous exercises. Some official State doctelone to implement protective actions were substantially delayed in being received by the municipalities from the SCE0C.
In one case a protective action message was not received from the county.
These connunications problema appear to be the result of lack of adequate management and a lack of an adequate numbe r of trained persosnel to the SCEOC.
Better overall management and coordination of information, as well se taproved flow of information from Sales County to the manicipalittee are required. Staffing. procedures, and trataing at the SEOC should be reviewed to determine how taprovemente can be implemented (Section 2.4.13 1).
67 The 1981 Post Exercise Assessment J.10.j x
x x
Sales N/obj(85) stated " Sales County suet demonstrate the capability to Leptement protective esasures.
The county should demon-strate its capability to participate in relocating the
- populace, evacuate residents from the EF3 and coattel access.
At the 1983 exercise. the county demonstrated the ability to evacuate residents from the EF1. Access control was not an objective for the county for this exercise and should be demonstrated in a future exercise.
- 68. There were significant delays in the J.9 x
Sales C
Sales County EOC notifying some of the J.10.g municipalttfee of the evacuation message.
Salem County's ability to manage an orderly evacuation was.
En resure, not e..uastrated.
5.tter overall management and more timely information flow from Sales County to the suaicipalities are required.
Staffing, procedures and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to deter-mined how taprovement can be imple-mented (Section 2.4.13 2).
e i
64 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/83 Defielenew Ydentified WUREC-06S4 FCAA-REP-1 Eamedial Rev. 1, Frevious Esercise Exercise Exercise Presenj No.
Recommended Corrective Actico Reference
- Exercises" 10/16/83 10/13/84 4/23/85 Justodiction*
Status
- 69. There were some delays in the Salen J.10.e
~~
z s
sales 1
County EOC notifying some of the municipalittee of - the message to administer El to emergency workers.
Staffing, procedures, and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to -
determine how better overall management and more timely information flow free Sales County to the municipalities need further improvemente (section 2.4.13 3 and section 2.2.13 1).
7G, Even though there was acceptable enor-A.2.a a
a x
Sales C
dinattoo of protective or parallel I
z a
Cumberland N/Obj(85) actions from the state pe r s pective.
u Mar.nington C
directives were not effectively acted z
z Sales City C
uson at the county and local level.
x a
a Elsinboro N/obj(SS)
Information management was week and x
Lower Alloways C
coordination of protective actions Creek Pennsv111e C
toefficient.
a x
Quinton C
a a
Creenwich C
Stow Creek C
x x
- 71. Although 24-hour staffing capability of A.3 x
Sales N/0hj(83) the SCEOC was demonstrated by presente-A.4 tion of a rester, the SCEOC staff indicated that supplemental personnel free the State OEM or free other countiae might be required for pro-longed operations. The potential need for supplemental resources f ree other counties and/or the state should be identified in the Plan, and written agreements reached with these other jurisdictions for providing these resources. Appropriate training should also be provided (sectico 2.4.13 6).
Sales C
- 72. Although a letter was sent to all A.4 s
Cumberland C
Mayors and Soards of Chosee Freeholders x
Lower Alloways C
se a result of the 1981 esercies, the a
level of participation of emergency a
s Nannington N/0bj(85)
Sales City C
I personnel in the esercise was x
disappoin'ing.
Every effort should be a
a z
Elsinboro N/0bj(85)
Penneville C
made by the Nayors and Board of Free-a Quinton C
holders to educate their emergency z
Greenwich C
personnel of the importance of the Stow Creek C
etarcise experience.
e e l
e e
/
65 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 Fate-REP-1 Remedial i
Rev. 1 Previous Isarcise Exercise Exercise Freaang No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference" Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" Statue b
On the bests of the 1984 exercise, this remaine tacomplete for the Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs. The Elsinboro and Mannington EDCa' need to improve their participating levels.
The interaction end coordination of their staf f could not be fully evaluated.
A system should be implemented to increase the participation levels of volunteer staff at the Elsinboro and Managington EOCs.
The timing of the esercise should be given greater consideration la the scenario development (Section 2.4.2; 3).
- 73. The check 11st of actions to be taken at D.4 x
Sales C
l different emergency classification levels contained to the state plan l
ehould be used.
74 The county should investigate an in-E.1 x
Sales C
provement in the electing system for z
Cumberland C
emergency response staff in order to reduce response time.
- 75. The radiological officer and the Red E.2 Sales C
I Crose representative were late in l
reporting to the SCEOC.
Mobilisation procedures should be reviewed to ensure that all personnel can be actified and mobilised to the SCEDC in a timely manner in t he event of an actual radiological emergency (Section 2.4.13 4).
Sales C
- 76. Communications between congregate care F.!
u
'and decontamination centere should be improved.
Salem C
- 77. More than one person should be used to F.1.s a
j handle EOC radio traffic.
l Sales C
- 78. A hot line system should be installed F.1.b a
in Sales County, to allow simultaasous l
calla te all local governmente.
l
- 79. Communications within the SCEDC were F.1.b x
Sales C
l l
limited and telephone traf f te did not flow smoothly.
Sales County should consider more space to accomodate en efficient placement of telephonee in the SCEDC. The county should also con-sider implementing a more effective telephone message control systes to facilitate the flow and use of emergency information.
q 66 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency identified NUREC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Easedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercisea 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Statua
- 80. The hard-copy communication device was F.1.b x
Sales C
est moved to the new SCEOC and was not s.3 utillsed during the exercise.
It la suggested that the hard copy device be saved to the new EOC and that it be used during future exercises to' expedite the flow of key sessages (section 2.4.13 7).
- 81. Elsinboro. Sales City.
Fenasv111e.
F.I.d a
x x
Sales 1
Mannington, and Quintos reported that requests for information and other assistance from the SCEOC did not alwaye receive a prompt response.
Implement a procedure for more prompt responses by the SCEOC to requests for information and eseistance from local EOCs (Section 2.2.1; 2).
- 42. All counties and municipalities shmid F.3 x
sales C
participate to communication training a
x Cumberland N/Obj(85) and drille.
x x
Elsinboro N/Obj(85) x Lower Alloways C
a Mannington N/Obj(85) x Pennsville C
x Quinton C
x Salem City N/Obj(85) x Creenwich N/Obj(85) x Stow Creek C
- 83. Stiefing procedures at the SCE0C were E.3 x
x Sales C
not sufficient or timely and the public address system was not consistently used to notify staf f of the emergency situettoa. Sales County should review internal consunicattoos with the latent of improving briefing procedures and consistent use of the public address syntes to notify the staff of changes in the energency classification level.
84.
The Sales EOC was crowded on the day of B.3 x
Sales C
the exercise. Consideration should be given to relocattoo of the ROC to a larger fa-111ty.
- 85. The county EOC should have an emergency R.3 x
x sales C
log, and the accident classificatico and the protective action in effect should be listed on the EOC etstus board.
All messages should be posted.
Maps should be used to plot inf o rmation.
4
r
, e f
f e
67 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defielency Identified WUREC-0654 FEMA-rep =1 Ramedial i
Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Ixercise Exercise Preseng h
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" 5tatus 86.
Radges should be issued to EOC staff B.3 Sales C
x and visitors.
Creater care should be taken to determine whether individuals should be admitted to the EOC.
- 87. The cotusunications room at the new 8.3 x
Sales C
Salem Ccunty EOC is small and the noise level was high. making it difficult to hear when using the telephone. Consid-eration should be given to relocating the communications equipment to a larger room at the SCEOC (Section 2.4.1; 5).
- 88. The re are no maps indicating the R
x Sales C
location of schools and institutions.
J.10 This detail should be included, either on an overlay to be used with existing sector sape, or on a separate map.
- 89. The bus driver for school evacuation in J.10.a a
Sales C
Sales County did not know which reception center eshool evacuees were to be taken to.
All boa drivers for school evacuation should be trained to know the reception center (s) to which school evacuees should be taken.
(Section 2.4.3; 15).
- 90. The Sales County EOC instructed the J.10.a x
Sales C
school bus driver to take evacuees to a location not designated in the plan for that specifie school. The Sales County EOC should give instructione consistent with their plan (section 2.4.3; 14).
- 91. The ability to evacuate mobility J.10.d a
Salen N/0bj(85) impaired individuals in Sales County was not demonstrated.
The ability to evacuate mobility impaired individuals should be tested in future exercise (section 2.4.3; 13).
- 92. The bus driver for the echool evacua-J.10.e z
x Salen I
tion in *tles County was not trained in K.3.b the use of dostaeters of KI.
All energency workers.
including bus drivers. should be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimeters and KI.
The ttaining schedule for all emergency workers should be furnished to FDtA (Section 2.4.3; 17 and section 2.2.3;4).
4
\\
e s
68 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 De ficienev Identified NUREC-0654 8
FEKA-REP-1 Lenedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Freseng No.
Recommended corrective Action Reference
- Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 93. There were no police of ficere or other J.10.h a
Sales C
personnel available to provide traffic control or security at the Sales County congregate care shelter.
Police officers or other uniformed personnel should be assigned to the congregate care shelter to provide traf fic control and security (Section 2.4.3; 3).
94.
Energency vehicles should be located at J.10.h a
Sales C
the congregate care center.
Security abould be established at the facility.
It should be staffed with radiological monitoring and decontaa-ination personnel who are proficient in their assignments.
- 95. The Salem County congregate care shel-F.1.e x
x x
Sales I
ter (Woods town High School) was not apprised of when and how many evacuees to expect. The AAC representative at the SCEDC should inform representatives at the congregate care shelters of the number of evacuees and their expected time of arrival (section 2.4.3: 2 and Section 2.2.3; 2).
- 94. At congregate care centers, separate J.12 x
Sales C
rooms for individuals with special needs should be provided.
- 97. The capability of Sales County to J.12 x
Sales C
provide congregate care centers was not tested.
- 98. At the Sales County congregate care J.12 x
Sales C
c'e n t e r, there were no radiological monitoring personnel or equipment to monitor evacuees for radiological contamination.
The congregate care center should de mons trat e the ability to monitor evacuees and vehicles la future exercises (sectico 2.4.3s !).
- 99. At the f les County energency worker J.12 x
Sales C
decontamination center, only about 15 people per hour could be monitored due to the limited number of low-range radiation detectore observed during the exercise.
During shift changes there could be lines of potentially cont aminated workers waiting to be monitored.
AJditional low-range radiation detectors should be available at the decontasination center (Section 2.4.3; 4).
F e
e-
. i f
e a
69 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defielene, Identified Nt! REC-0654 FDIA-REF-1 Ramadial Rev. 1, Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Eserciaee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/13/85 Jurisdiction" Status 100. At the Sales County decontamination J.12 Sales C
- center, the forms available for recording emergency worker's exposures do not include a place for recording the locattoo of body contamination for, monitored workere.
Emergency worker esposure record forme should be revised to include a place for recording the location of body contamination (Section 2.4.31 7).
101. la the 1984 exercise, the bue driver E.3.a a
Sales i
for the echool evacuation to Sales County did not have a dosimeter.
In the 1985 remedial exercise, the bus driver had a self-reading dosimeter but no permanent record dosimeter.
Appropriate destaetry should be provided to all drivere favolved la evacuation busing.
The listing of dosimetry should be provided to FEMA e
(Section 2.4.3; 16 and Section 2.2.33 3).
102. The procedures for initial screentag E.5.a x
Sales C
of poteatially contaminated persons were not performed rapidly enough.
103. Personnel et the Salem County E.5.s x
x x
Sales C
energency worker decontaaleation center were not aware of the sediation levele above which decontamination should be performed.
Additional training should be provided for decontamination center pereoanel who are responsible for determining whether emergency workers need to be decontaminated (Section 2.4.33 8).
104 The layout of the decantanisation E.5.b Salem C
center should be changed la order to eliminate the possibility of contaa-ination of clean ares.
There should r
be more than one shower, enough to allow fa-the enticipated number of evacueen.
There should be more com-sannications between county and state i
personnel.
Moottoring technicians seed more training.
I A
g 70 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency Identified WREG-0654 8
FEMA-REP-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Exercise Esercise Preseng No.
Reconnended Corrective Action Referenes*
Esercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" Status b
105. At the Sales County decontamination K.5.b u
Sales N/0bj(85) center only one shower stall was available for decontamination, which would be insuffielent ductag emergency worker shif t changes or peak proces-sing of people at the center.
Addi-tional shower facilities should be available at the decontaminetton center.
Separate showers should be available for een and womes (Section 2.4.3; 5).
106. In 1982. It was not observed whether L.1 s
a Sales C
the staf f of the Sales County Bospital had been trained la radiological matters as had been recommended af ter the 1981 esercise.
$ ales N/Obj(83 107. The county should demonstrate reentry N
z 84.85) capability.
Cumberland N/chj(83 z
84.85)
Sales C
108. An tacreased level of participation by W.1.b u
Cumberland C
response esencies in future eseretees a
le required.
Esercise objectives should be esecuted to the greatest degree practicable.
109. Radiological exposure control dost-E.3.a z
Sales N/Obj(85) meters were not issued by the County for the bus driver lavolved in the evacuation of transient dependent individuals.
Moreover the driver appeared to have had no training to the use of desteeters.
Radiological exposure control doetmeters and trata=
leg in their use le required for per-sonnel involved to evacuation busing.
110. Activation of the 45 traf fic control E.2 Salem C
point was neither stuulated nor demonstrated. The ability to activate traffic control pointe should be tested in future exercises.
til. At the 5A traffic control potat.
E.3.a a
Sales N/obj(85) doetmetry equipment use not observed.
Police officers assigned to traffic control potate should be equipped with personal dostaeters and should be trained la their use.
+r b
r
. e o
. s t
e 4, e 71 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defielenev identified WUREC-0654 yEMA-rey-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise guercise Preseng b
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference" Exercises 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- statua
!!!. Rescue squad personnel need additional E.3.s x
Sales C
self reading dostmeters. An adequate supply of self reading dosimeters is required for the rescue squad.
113. A health physicist use not available L.1 x
Sales C
to hospital staff during the exercise for consultation. Because this vaa en off-site accident, an health physicist would have to be acquired from Philadelphia, approximately 30 minutes away.
Salem County should review the availability of health physics exper-tise for medical su- **rt and consider the see of utilf9 assistance with off-site accidents.
114 The hospital had one instrument avail-E.5.a x
Sales C
able for radiological monitoring and L.1 the available staff did not demoe-strate adequate knouledge of contamin-ation levels.
Available writtee pro-cedures were not referenced. Bospital staff seabe rs require additional radiological monitoring equipment.
Further, the staff requires additional training for determining the need for decontamisation.
115. The hospital staf f did not demonstrate E.5.s a
Sales C
monitoring and decontamination of the L.!
ambulance and its staff.
The mont-toring and decontamination of the ambulance and crew should be demon-strated in a future emergency drill.
116. During the September 27, 1984 medical F.2 x
Sales N/obj(85) drill, the ambulance crew menbar who N.2.c called to to Sales County Memorial Hospital over the radio neglected to say "This is a drill."
All radio transmissions made as part of future medical drills should be clearly identified as such (Section 2.4.38 18).
117 The Sales County congregate care A.4 x
sales C
shelter should be able to demonstrate managesent capability over a prolonged period.
An assistant or standby shelter manager should be destgaated and trained.
l
- 0.
g 72 h
Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deffetenev Identified NUREG-0654 FD4A-REF-1 Remedial e
Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Eecommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exereteea 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Juttadiction" Status b
!!8. The radiological maattoring equipment 5.10
^
z Sales C
at the Sales County congregate care shelter had not been calibrated withia the past year.
gquipment should be calibrated at the tie.
Latervale recommended by the supplier.
119. Emergency workers at the Salem County K. 5. s a
a Salen I
congregate care shelter (Centerton Fire Station) did not know the contam-ination level for determining the need for decontamination.
Emergency workere should receive additicsal training on the contamination level for determining the need for decon-tamination (Section 2.2.3; 1).
120. Personnel at the Salem County decon-E.3.a x
x Sales C
tamination center were not provided with personal dosimeters. Workere at the decontamination center should be supplied with personal dosimeters. Ia the 1984 exercise the workers had pocket dosimeters but no pe rmanent record doetmeters (Section 2.4.31 6).
121. The appropriate equipment for R.7 m
Sales C
moeitoring vehicles was not available et the decontamination center.
The decontamination center should be equipped with all necessary radio-logical moottoring devices to ef fectively perform their function.
Cumberland C
122. Cumberland County must demonstrate the A.1.a a
establishment of specific organita=
-tione e+ part of the overall energerey All crganisations listed tr.
retpoo the plan should participate in the esercise.
The determination of whether organtastional functices and re s pons ibilk'.t es have been properly assigned csn only be done with greater participatico in radiological eme r-gency preparedness exercises.
Cumbe rland C
.123. There should be more than one person A.I.b a
assisting the county emergency manage-ment coordinator.
e
~
e an e
. a
(
73
.., a Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficienev Identified WURIC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise presenj b
No.
Recommended Corrective Actica Reference" Exerctaea 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" Status 124. The Cumberland County EOC (CCEOC)
A.2.a x
Cumberland N/0bj(85) occasionally became overcrowded and 8.3 noisy because of the presence of non-essential personnel who were not identified la the county's RERF staffing list.
A seans should be developed to limit the number of personnel to the CCEOC. For example, only those individuals with a pre-established EOC or field assignment should be allowed access into the EOC without specific permission of the Dtc (section 2.5.1 1).
125. Some minor problems with message A.2.a x
Cumberland N/0bj(85) handling and documentation were observed at the CCE0C, including ta=
correctly identifying the source of a message, not including the times that some of the messages were received, and not knowing with certainty how to identify messages to the state se exercise messages.
Additional training of communications personnel b
should be conducted to ensure accurate documentation of messages (Section 2.5.1; 3).
126. The facilities at the Cumberland A.4 x
Cumberland N/obj(85)
County EOC were marginal.
Space and E.3 furniture were limited.
Cumberland County should investigate the possibility of providing additional space and facilittes for extended operations at the EOC (Section 2.5.13 2).
127. The Cumberland County radiological F.I.d a
Cumberland N/obj(85) field team's radio was not adequate for contacting the CCEOC and the FCF from all field monitoring locations.
Cumberland County should tovestigate the need for a more powerful radio i
system for see by their radiological field teams for communications with the EOC and FCF (Section 2.5.18 4).
128. Residents of Cumberland and Salem C.!
x x
x Cumberland N/Obj(85) l Counties nuet be made aware of C.2 x
x Sales N/Obj(85) protective actions to be taken during a radiological emergency.
129. The county E0C required more space.
E.3 x
Cumberlan3 C
Fossibly, an additional trailer could be used.
7 s
e.
74 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficionee Identtfled NUREC-0654 Remedial FEMA-REF-1 Rev. 1.
Previous Exercise Exercise Esercise
- Preseng a
No.
secommended Corrective Action Reference
- Esercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/13/85 Jurisdiction
- Status b
Cumberland C
J.10.6
.x 130. Mape could be larger and show greater detail.
Cumberlan'd N/0bj(85) a 131. Some of the volunteer staff at the J.10.e Cumberland County EOC as well as the 0.1
~
health department representestive seemed to have a limited knowledge of the distribution and use of KI.
Additional training should be implemented to familiarise selected staff members with the use of K1 (Section 2.5.11 5).
Cumberland C
132. The use of dostaetere needs improve-K.3.s a
meat.
Emergency workers within E.3.b Cumberland County require more training.
Detailed planning and training of individuals in the area of radiological health needs to be improved.
Fernanent radiological record devices should be made available.
Cumberland N/0bj(85) 133. Changes in plant status and other F.1.b x
important exercise developments were not promptly relayed by the CCEOC to the Creenwich and Stow Creek EOCs.
Conounications procedures with local EOCa should be clarifled, and communi-catione personnel trained. The CCE0C should review its plan to assure that appropriate messages are transmitted to the local EOCa. and participate in coimunications training drills with the local E0Co.
Cumbe rland C
134. The Dtc held briefings of the staff A.I.b a
only infrequently.
The EOC staff A.2.a would benefit from periodic briefings and status updates.
Stow Creek C
135. Stow Creek firefighters were not K.3.b x
adequately trained in radiological exposure control procedures. including the use of personal dosimeters and does reco.d keeping.
Also, they did not have Rt.
Firefighters should receive periodic training ta radio-logical exposure control procedures.
They should also have KI.
Stow Creek C
136. A status board ladicating the D.3.
a x
emergency claselfication level and important messages should be utillied at Stow Creek. The status board indi-cating the emergency classification -
level and taportant messagee should be used at the Stow Creek EOC.
e.* 8 a
=
a., e 75 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Defleience Identified NUREC-0654 FDA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercieee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction" Status b
137. As a result of the 1981 exercise.
D.3 s
a Elsinboro C
posters displaying the current emergency class were prominently displayed in most.EOCs. The Elsimboro EOC did not display or use the re-quired emergency preparedness posters.
This f.0C should post and use the required posters including erstus boards, the plume
- EPZ, population distribution, evacuation
- routes, accese control points and relocation centers.
138. At Sales City there was over a one E.2 x.
Sales City C
hour delay in the EOC dispatcher notifying the Dtc of the alert declaration.
Alerting procedures at Sales City should be improved to ensure that the DtC is notified of the 4
alert declaration in a more timely manner (Sectica 2.4.23 !).
L 139. Not all of the telephone sunbers on 5.2 x
Mannington C
the Mannington call Aist. used for alerting emergency staff, had been updated.
Telephone numbers listed on the Mannington staffing call list should be periodically reviewed and updated as needed (Section 2.4.2; 2).
140. As la the previous year, in general A.4 Mannington C
there was little participation in the a
Penneville C
esercise by elected and appotated a
Greenwich C
Stow Creek C
of ficials.
141. Most emergency workers responding to E.3.s x
Sales City N/0bj(85) an impediment to evacuation left their E.3.b a
Elsinboro N/Obj(85) destaeters la their vehicles.
All energency workers should be tastructed to carry desinators with them at ett times in the field (Sectica 2.4.3; 11).
142. The radiological of ficer et the Lower E.4 Lower Allowaye N/obj(65)
Alloways Creek EOC was not svare of the expos.re threshold for recalling tield starr.
amergency stait ehwle be trained to be knowledgeable in the maalaus allowable dose for field staf f (Section 2.4.23 8).
143. Personnel of the Lower Allowaye Creek E.3.s a
lower A11oveys N/0bj(85) rescue squad had no destanters.
E T
en.. e e
76 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev identified NUREC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1, Previous Exercise Esercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Actico Reference
- Esercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Statue b
144. EOCs should check for coordination of F.1.b a
Elsinboro C
strens and ESS and notify the county a
1.over A11oveys C
if there is a.probles with either a
Mannington N/Chj(83, Se,85) strena or ESS.
Penneville C
a z
Quinton C
z Sales City C
Greeevica C
z x
Stow Creek C
145. Security was informal at the local E.3 Mannington C
EOC. Security should be provided.
x Quinton C
Creenwich C
z Stow Creek C
146. A security program was not in place at E.3 m
x Elsinboro C
the Elsinboro EOC. A security system should be developed at the Elsinboro EOC.
147. Emergency backup power was not avail-E.3 x
Elsinboro C
able and functioning at the Elsinboro a
Sales City C
and Sales City EOCs.
Emergency generators should be made available and natatained at the Sales City and Elsinboro EOCs to assure uninterrupted operation of these local E0Cs (Section 2.4.2s 5).
148. Not all Elsinboro and Sales City J.10.e a
Elstaboro N/0bj(85) emergency workers responding to the Sales City N/0bj(85) tapediments to evacuation were aware of procedures for use and authoriza-tion of E1.
All emergency workers should be fully trained in the use of E1 (Sectica 2.4.38 12).
Eletaboro C
149. Population distribution maps are J.10.b a
Quinton C
needed for Quintos. Stow Creek, and a
Stov Creek C
s Elsinboro.
Elstaboro W/obj (83, 150. Reentry procedures by aunteipal EOCs J.12 a
84,85) must be performed to the entent Lower Alloweys N/0bj(83, poselble in the time frame of the a
84,85) esercise.
Manalagten N/Obj(83.
a 84,85)
Penneville N/0bj(83, 84,85)
Quinton N/0bj(q3 s
84.85) s Sales City N/Obj(83, 84,85)
Creenwich N/0bj(83, a
84.85)
Stow Creek N/0bj(83, s
84,85)
[
y
..o
. 4
- p e,
r
~
77 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Def tetency Identitled NUREG-0634
+
FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Isercise b
Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Raference*
Exercisea 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Statue 151. With the exception of Sales City.
E.3.e x
x a
Elstaboro C
desteeters were not generally die-E.3.b n
Lower Alloways C
tributed (1981 and 1982).
Inadequate a
Mannington C
supplies of dosimeters were observed N Obs a
Fenneville C
at Eleinboro and Pennsville (1983).
x Quinton.
C Self-reading dosiseters of both low-N Oba Creenwich C
range (0-200 mR) and intermediate =
a Stow Creek C
range (either 0-5 t or 0-20 R) sensitivity and a permanent record device should be provided to all emergency workers. The Elsinboro EOC had an insufficisat number (only 2) of doe tmete r sets available during the 1984 esercise.
This deficiency was corrected at Penneville (Section 2.4.2s 6.7).
151. Emergency back up power supplies were 5.3 m
a creenwich N/Obj(85) either inadequate or lacking at the a
a Stow Creek N/0bj(85)
Creenwich and $ tow Creek suaicipal Eoca. Emergency generators of appro-r priate capacity should be procured to escure unteterrupted operation of these local EOCs (section 2.5.23 1).
153. The lower Alloways Creek police J.10.e Lower Allowaye N/Cbj(85) officer at one access control potat E.3.b creet was not completely f amiliar with the use of doetseters and EI.
Fo!!ce should receive El and additional training on the use of doetmeters and E1.
El should be distributed as appropriate (tection 2.4.38 10).
154. The Elsinbore Eoc staff lacked some of F.3 i
Elstaboro C
the necessary training to perform all of the correct communicatione pro-cedures.
Elsinboro E0C staf f members who are responsible for tuplementing the required communication procedures should attend trataing seestone.
155. Procedural checklists were not used at D.4 x
s Elstaboro C
the 21stekoro EOC.
Procedural check-lists should be designed and used.
156. A 24-hour call list for EOC staffing A.I.e s
a Manategten C
was not available in the Mannington A.4 20C.
A 24-hout call list should be prepared and used.
Sufficient energency reopease personnet should be recrutted and trained to provide 24-hour continuous emergency response operations.
2
g--
e e.
4%
I e,
e ie
- 78 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev identified NUREC-0654 FERA-LEF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previeve Esercise Esercise Exercise Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- Esercieee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status b
157. The route alerting teams la Feonsville E.6
~~
s Fenneville C
are not supplied with maps or written messages.
The toute alerting tease s hould be supplied with maps and written messages to assure the effective route alerting. if needed (Section 2.4.33 9).
158. The Penneville EOC to too small for B.3 x
x Pennaville N/obj(85)
Quinton C
effective operation.
Consideration x
should be given to relocation of the Penneville EOC to a larger f acility (section 2.4.2; 4).
Mannington C
159. Training in emergency res ponse 0.1.b x
procedures and use of emergency equipment le necessary for Mannington.
- agfg, y, ygggg.pn34 g g.,,,c bFrevious eseretees were held on October 13, 1982 and April 8. 1981.
- $ tate Frimarily or wholly related to state of $EOC (West Trenton) functione.
State-20F Frimarily or wholly related to Energency Operatione f acility functione.
State-JMCs Primarily or wholly related to Joint Media Center functions.
Sales: Primarily or wholly related to Sales County functions.
Cumberland Primarily or wholly related to Cumberland County functions.
Elsinbore Greenwich Lower Alloways Creek
"*** 88'**
Primarily er wholly related to the respective munteipality's function Quinton Sales City 5tou Creek dCs Corrective action complete is Corrective action tacomplete N/0bs(83): Not observed during the 1983 esercise N/0bj(83): Not en objective of the 1983 exercies N/0bs(84): Not observed during 1984 exercise N/Obj(84): Not en objective of the 1984 enereise N/obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 remedial exercise (1): New defir'ency observed at the 1985 exercise a
S 1
LL 0 e s
a f
J