ML20134E075
| ML20134E075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1996 |
| From: | Blanch P AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Zwolinski J NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134D719 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9610310256 | |
| Download: ML20134E075 (2) | |
Text
From:
PAUL M. BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
l To:
JZ <JAZWOL0aol.com>
l Date:
9/15/96 5:28pm l
Subject:
CV-29 John:
l The following is a draft and a final copy will follow shortly by - snail mail.
This is absolutly incredible that this was knowingly - allowed to happen and that you allowed another dedicated engineer - ruin his career due to your intentional inactions.
Paul l
9/15/96 John A. Zwolinski, Deputy Director Division of Reactc? Frojects -1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555-0001 John:
I read with interest the most recent 0IG report on the Millstone Unit -
I containment isolation valve CU-29.
Just from reading this report - it has l
the appearance of extensive collusion between the NRC and ND, - again. Not at all dissimilar to the Millstone Spent Fuel Pool. The -
NRC knew about the problem for at least 20 years and conveniently - just looked the other way.
When the NRC was forced to take some - action, Mr.
l Lieberman of your Office of Enforcement, imposed only tne - smallest level of violation possible. The collusion appears to be - all the way from the Resident Inspectors up to and possibly above the -
Director level of NRR.
Why is it that NRR failed to acknowledge the fact that not only was -
CU-29 defective, but its back-up valve CU-28 would have also failed - during a i
seismic event? Why is it that it takes a non-technical - organization such as OIG to point out such obvious issues such as the - fact that CU-28 was not environmentally qualified and had a break - occurred in any of the defective welds in the Reactor Water Clean-up =
System, MP-1 would have had a LOCA outside the containment.
I know - this is l
outside your =B3 Design Basis,-B2 but I would like to know the - consequences of this event. Would the doses be within the limits - specified by 10 CFR l
Part 100 and has this been formally reported to - the NRC? Why did NRR allow MP-1 to restart after RF0 13 knowing the - plant was in violation of its l
license?
l The next question is a bit more difficult. As I understand the - issue, it was identified to the Region, NRR and your own Office of -
l Investigation. All of these divisions chose to =B31ook the other - way,-B2 stick their head in the sand and somehow hope the issue would - go away. How i
many other issues similar to this have been suppressed - by the NRC-B9s intimidation by inaction?
Some high level positions from Region 1 were discussed in this most - recent report. While names are not mentioned, I suspect that some of - these very same people are involved in the restart decisions for -
Millstone Unit 3.
How can we have any faith that these very same - people will now -B3see the light-82 and cease to cover-up major - safety issues such as this and the Spent Fuel Pool? Are these the - same people and organization that will make the final decision on the =
-B3 independence-B2 of the Millstone assessment team?
I am sending a = copy of this note to Mr. Hub Miller (and others) and am asking to - respond to me directly on this issue.
9610310256 961024 l
PDR ORG NRRA
- = -. -
~ _..
John, the public has lost all confidence in your agency and it will - be a very long time before this confidence is restored.
It is going - to take much more than just =B3 retiring-B2 Bill Russell as the - problem and giving NU a hard time with the restart.
You need to look = closely at your agency and i
somehow change the culture as NU is about = to do.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 860-236-0326 l
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant l
135 Hyde Rd.
l l
West Hartford CT 06117 l
Voice 860-236-0326 l
Fax 860-232-9350 l
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