ML20134D948
| ML20134D948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/28/1984 |
| From: | Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132C621 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-427 NUDOCS 8508190482 | |
| Download: ML20134D948 (4) | |
Text
"
, nj
. ##""%'e,
/ q ,
UNITED STATES #
! %, s. I j .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
h 3- -
a msmNGTON, D. C. 20555 QdA
+ +
,,,,. June 28, 1984
@? 9 au+ 4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chaiman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM: ; Carlton Kamerer, Director ffice of Congressional Af irs
SUBJECT:
FY85 APPROPRIATIONS Both the Senate and the House completed final floor action on appropriation legislation (H.R. 5653) affecting the NRC's FY85 Budget request for $468.2 million dollars. The Comittee of Conference met on June 26th to resolve differences, and reported out the attached Conference Report. The Conference allowance provides $448.2 million, a ceneral 120 million reduction to the NRC ,
budget. It is to be 'eouitably distributed amnno all orocrams." The Report also CCntains a number of additional provisions.
~
It should also be noted that report language included by the House (House Report 98-755) which is not changed by the report of the Senate, and Senate .
report language (Senate Report 98-502) which is not changed by the Conference -
is approved by the Comittee of Conference. The statement of the Conferees, while repeating some report language for emphasis, does not intend to negate the language referred to above unless expressly provided.
Attachment:
Conference Report cc: EDO ELD RES OGC IP SDBU/CR OPE NMSS SEC SECY NRR SP ACRS O! WM ADM OIA REGION I 4 MtTJ OIE REGION II ASLAP EPLB/0IE REGION III ASLBP OPA REGION IV ORM REGION Y 8508190482 850730 PDR FOIA ADATOB5-427 PDR D
I e
ijdh9 Jurse W. JSW CONGRESSIONALRECORD THDIM5 A Sweset C onf e rence B estatste allowenee IV. Electric power resu1stion........................
20eef6:000 2Ge0fe.000 General Reduction................................ -.
.Se000 000
$USTCTAle FEPERAL ENERET RECULA10tf COMMI$$!0N........ 100e&77s000 75 477,000 AdJustmentst
- Less offsettins revenues.............................. -40e000s000 -60 000,000 l
TOTAle FERC AFTER LEVENUES............................ 40,677,000 33edy7e000 I NUCLEAR llASTE DISPOSAL FUND
- 1. Nuclear meste disposal fund...........'..........
101 AL NUCLE AR W A S T E BI SPO S AL F UN8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
327e64fs000 327e64fe000 327e449.000 327 e44f e 000 p$,e p
Q p OE0fMERMAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT FUND II. Prosree direction............................. 121:000 121:000 h #+ %
TOT AL SECTNERMAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT FUND........... 121 000 121:000 g b*
g A m E IV-INDEPENDENT AGDICII:5 EamDton County Riverp'o rt in Chattanoo. %dmg the types of events for which -
Art., em a. Racronar. Conam ios 32. Tennessee. Funds previously appropri. an er. -* Maa would be responsible. (2) al.
se asa Exrtzsrs ated for the Goodman Road project shall ternaute approaches to the compositloo of Amendment No.
F a onyfu a pro Sa; Appropriatas each as semantuuon and the funcuans it 12.300.000 for salaries and expenses of the czaan RacrLarca7 Comm2ssion adshi perform. (3) the various powers and Appt.la.chian Regiosa! Commission instead "" aam ano cryswsts authortues. to:!uding m~tMstrative ad.
of 82.700.000 as proposed by the House and Amendment No. 61: Appropriates Mes. Mt be exercised by such 51.700.0o0 as proposed by the A**.9 5448.200.000 instead of $438.200.000 as pro, an wgn an m W the nlauonaMD of suc4 ruwDs arrnorR1aTED TO TEE PaE3 DEFT b the and $454.200.000 as pro-ing '
se *
- pc!cc mmt! denlopw.!
8 N 8 The conference allowance providas for a Oh o! Innsugauons. W Omee of in.
8:0,000.000 general reducuan to the NRC spect$on and Enforcement, and the Office Amendment No. 59: Apptspriates budget to be ecultably distributed among all for Ana?rsts med Evalustaan of Operational 3149.000.000 for Appalachian Regional De- programs. From within the allown. net. NRC Data. Mer includhg a disemason of the velopment Programs instead of $151.300.000 should assure that sumcient funding to pro. functio:s that such an o*geMration alght as proposed by tne House and $118.000.000 vided for compleuon of phase I acuvtues at perforin beyond those currectly carried out -
as proposed by the Senate. the Power Burst Fac!!!ty (PBF), and for das. W any such ernsting c%.= (5) the cost of Amendment No. 00: Earmarks mantlement and dia.2=.mbly of the PBF fa. setting up and operating such an organiza.
8100.000.000 for the AppaMMan Develop. cility. following completion of a!! future an. 16on. (g) the need for addluonal legislauve
, ment Elchway System as proposed by the ucipated experimentauon within this facils. authority to establish such an orrarjaanon.
House instead of $80.000.000 as proposed by ty. The carn!erence allowance also provides (7) the adflambflity of separating determina.
the Senate. . for a High Temperature Oes Reactor r,. tions with respect to nuclear amiety from m21 The conferees agree with the Senate search program at the PT 1985 budget level other imoes to be considered by the Com- ,
report lans.zase designating 815.000.000 of pf 31.800.000. . mision in issuing or rettestng 11r-a= and area development funds to be spent on ' Amendment No. 82 Deletes language pro. the a2temattve pr%* dural approaches both projects in distressed counces as previously ' posed by the m neta yoguaring a study of the formal and inrormal, to include non-adjudi.
proposed by the region's Governors. The reed for an hadependent stymaammaamma go, entory procuemen, that amight be employed con 2erees also ocncur in the State report spanathis for
==aa===* tat invemigataeas 4 Ser the soliaajon of facts and the resolucon {
language cauuoning the States that prefi. I ~ * - . m of safety issnes and (8) the advantages and
- nancing of h!ghway projects is undertaken ~ ' .- thelluelear Reg. ? esadvamaeas of the prueent organtuanon of with no formal commitment of future reim, ulatory Co==i==taa sha32 coeduct a study to the t'annntadon for the determination of bursement. . he outualtsed to the Congram wtthin atz naatters of salery, includmg an analsms of The conferees also agree to prodde an ad, amonths of the date of enestment et this eB Ms-*v procedural exrnstraints on the d!tional 84.500.000 for highway projects Act, of the need ler and feedbGity of as in. Co==t==an's, ab!!!tles.to carry out tbone specified in the House report. 8500.000 is dar=ad=at orgaatsetien respeedble for sea, funcuoes effect.tvely and effAciently to tn.
prodded for projects and acudtles which docung tavastigations et algoNlsomt safety - elude, tat nos 11m ted to, the Commissaon's can be reviewed and aculerated to achieve events, lachselas algatnennt operatismal la. et parte and separatJon of funcuens ruJes early delivery of bene!!st 'the conferees eldents, et som Bseased hp the Ossemis. ' and the Comrtission's etannory responstbu.
agree that $1,000.000 ts avaDable for con. slon and for ==MM reports of such invesu. ft$es tmder the Governme=t in the Sunshine i struction of a nurses / medical technician sations, and that such study aball lac 3ude a "
training iacDJty in the Appe.lachian region f
^^
^ _ ef.(1) the need see sad sensib00ty a bere a need exists and abortares of trained Df an adapaadent n crymas=nes== to hvasts. Tzwwrasts Vaz.t.rT'Actuonrrr
- medica 3 personnel are preva. lent. Up to rate alanificant safety eventa, including sig. { TEK3MEE Mart aF3os!TT FWD i 1300.000 is to be avaDable for the Berry nifiennt oportuomal teeldensa, at fesgues 18 Amendment No. g2: Appropriates Dam and 81.00C.000 is provided for the p by the Co==lantaa and further in.) 8129.547.000 as proposed by the Senate in.
r 4
a.
\ . .
(
Congressional Record (House) H6979, June 26,1984 The conferees agree that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall conduct a study to be submitted to the Congress within six months of the date of enactment of this Act, of the need for and feasibility of an independent organization responsible for conducting investigations of significant safety events, including significant operational incidents, at facilities licensed by the Commission and for making reports of such investigations, and that such study shall include a discussion of, (1) the need for and feasibility of an independent organization to investigate significant safety events, including significant operational incidents, at facilities licensed by the Commi ssion and further including the types of events for which such an organization would be responsible, (2) al-ternative approaches to the composition of such an organization and the functions it might perform (3) the various powers and authorities, including administrative authorities, that might be exercised by such an organization, (4) the relationship of such an organization to the Commission's existing offices, including, but not limited to, the Office of Investigations, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, further including a discussion of the functions that such an organization might perform beyond those currently carried out by any such existing offices, (5) the cost of setting up and operating such an organization, (6) the need for additional legislative authority to establish such an organization, (7) the advisability of separat-ing determinations with respect to nuclear safety from all other
. . ...... ,n
,~./t' , ,
.s
. s I issues to be considered by the Commission in issuing or reviewing licenses and the alternative procedural approaches both formal and informal, to include non-adjudicatory processes, that might be employed for the collection of facts and (8) the advantages and disadvantages of the present organization of the Commission for the determination of matters of safety, including an analysis of all existing procedural constraints on the Commission's abilities to carry out those fu.nctions effectively and efficiently, to include, but not limited to, the Commission's ex parte and separation of functions rules and the Commission's statutory responsibilities under the Government in the Sunshine Act.
9 3
- s i
n j s 5
5
. 'i
. . . . . . . . J l
s I
\
_ _ _ _ _ __ o
i'q k , psaMC e ,'o, UNITED STATES E(g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- p e.
V'+y(((j; G
wasmscron. o. c. 2esss APR E 01984 l
\
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS T0 ELEVATE AECD TO A COMMISSION-LEVEL OFFICE In a memorandum dated April 11, 1984, to the Chairman, the ACRS recommended that the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) report directly to the Commission. In making this recommendation, the ACRS observed that there is much to be gained and little to be lost by such a realignment.
Unfortunately, I believe the ACRS focused only on the aspect of independence and failed to consider some of the other aspects and implications associated with such a change.
Further, I might note that while the ACRS indicated that the time has come for such a shift, the basis was one of prudence, and not need, since no evidence was seen that the independence of AE0D had been infringed. Thus, in the ab.sence of a problem, it becomes even more important to assure that the benefits from such a realignment, whether real or perceived, do in fact outweigh the cost and disruption such a move will cause.
At the specific direction and urging of the Co=nission, a coordinated program on operational data involving many staff offices was established and is now in routine operation. The heart and focal point for this program is AE00.
However, th'e role and responsibilities of AEOD go well beyond its role to perform independent operational data event assessment and precursor identification. As noted in the enclosure.fAE00 responsibilities also encompass a number of essential staff functions. These staff responsibilities and their importance to other ongoing activities are so tightly coupled that the separation of AEOD. and the re-creation of the same functions elsewhere in the staff will cause? serious disru effectiveness, and a need for greater overall'res.ources. ption, a lessening of Thus,I-if,more independent or additional review of operating events is considered necessary at the Commission level, I would suggest that the creation q uk 4p/ e, \c &r -
'D $ \
t CU
r:- .
, .~ .
aP I' '
_2_
of a new organizational element be pursued other than considering a major realignment-involving AE00.
I would be pleased to provide any additional information or clarification that you may desire.
(Sipes William J.Dircks William J. Dircks
-Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Current AEOD Staff Responsibilities cc: Chairman, ACRS -
OPE OGC SECY
-A r
T 9
e Current AEOD Staff Resoonsibilities Formulate and implement new operational data reporting requirements such as the LER rule (50.73).
Monitor the rate of progress of and provide staff representation and input to the INPO-managed Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System.
- Develop andIinanage operational data bases covering LERs, Part 21, and 50.55e reports, foreign event information, and nonreactor operational experience.
Direct the Abnormal Occurrence program and prepare necessary reports and related direction and guidance documents.
Feed back the lessons of experience of operational data identified by AEOD and other NRC offices through publication of the bimonthly, Power Reactor Events.
Provide reporting of significant U.S. events to the incident Reporting System (IRS) of the Nuclear Energy Agency and serve as the U.S. representa-
. tive tc Principal Working Group 1.
Conduct trend and pattern analyses of U.S. operational experience in order to identify and assess situations where the frequency, type, or location of events and failures may pose a potential safety concern.
Provide input to the SALP process based upon licensee reports of operating events and failures.
- , Coordinate operational data activities and the related Memorandum of Agreement'with,1NPO, including sharing of data and assessment results which may indicate potential safety problems.
Serve as a technical advisor to the EDO and perforgspecial reviews and l studies as requested.
' ~ . .- %= ;,; -
t c -
2.
. ' . ,' s
, y.4 DISTRIBUTION:
. DCS J. Roe AE00 C/F T. Rehm APR 3 01985 AE0D S/F W. Dircks EDO R/F C. Heltemes .
T. Ippolito ,
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine .
Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech .
FROM: William J. Dircks -
Executive Director for Operations ,
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE STUDY CONCERNING THE HEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION The purpose of this memorandum is to transmit the attached letter from Mr. C. O. Miller, former Director of NTSB, Bureau of Aviation Safety.
Mr. Miller's letter provides his views of the Brookhaven National I.aboratory Report, "An Independent Safety Organization" NUREG/CR-4152 dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Miller's letter is a reference to the ACRS letter dated March 13, _
1985 and is provided for your information.
(stgesWilliam!.$ln:ks.
/ William.J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Attachment:
As stated cc: OPE OGC SECY ACRS 9z my 7 2 ys u 1
[p.
cma> . .b.E,0,D, ,: D9 . . ....AG,D.,,..., .....ED9..,,,,,,,,.. .....,,,,..........., ..................... ..................... ................
~ = " * " >T.I p.e.D. . . . . ..... ;..C.a. g u.me.s.. ..m.Dh.@.t..... ..................... ..................... .....................
^"> . mass...... .... 4M/.as..... . 41...za.s........ ..................... ..................... ....................
l A ..
. unc recu s.e no,soi nncu ano OFFICIAL RECORD COPY , , ,, . . . . . , . .
~ ~ **
. puscuq'o UNITF*i STATES
+ g
.! c. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 ,I ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
[ WASHINGT ON. D. C. 20555 g
% o o g.
January 8, 1985 ,
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Harold W. Lewis, ACRS Member FROM: Dr. John H. Flack, ACRS Fellow
SUBJECT:
SYSTEM SAFETY, INC. RESPONSE TO THE BROOKHAVEN (NTSB)
REPORT I sent a copy of the Brookhaven (NTSB) report to Charles 0. Miller (fomer Director of NTSB, Bureau of Aviat-ion Safety) for coment. Mr. Hiller has impressive accident investigations and system safety engineering / management experience; he is. currently President and Principal Consultant of System Safety, Inc.
In his reply (letter atta,ched), Mr. Miller generally agrees with Brookhaven's recommendations that an independent " Office of Nuclear Safety reporting to the Comissioners," would provide (for now) the best approach. However, he warns than certain (o.ucstionable) information obtained and relied upon by Brookhaven might require add,itional followup for more appropriate objectivi-ty. Mr. Miller comments on. problems plaguing the NTSB,that were not con-tained in the Brookhaven report although he'strongly endorses the Board's basic concept and the Board's contributions to air safety.
I have listed below some of the key points in Hr,. Miller's letter that.you might find of interest.
- Inspectors, engineers, program managers, et al, are not good investigators by definition. Investigation for safety purposes is an art as much as a science; thus special education, training and indoc-trination is necessary for success. e
- Statutory protection for any " Office of Nuclear Safety" is required to allow for independent critical review of the NRC Staff when necessary.
- In accident / safety investigations, it is very important to downplay causation - especially singular cause ~- in favor of identifying ..
reasonable preventive or remedial actions.
- Hr. Miller stresses the need for a definitive safety investigation manual and special instrumentation to enhance information available at the time of freezing.the accident.
- Hr. Hiller notes the need for carefully plan budgeting and task allocation. This has not been done adequately in civil aviation.
2,'S M M
c 2 Attac'h'ments:
"'~*A V -,. - _' __ _ - _ -
c
~
=
+p G Eg 4 t SYSTEM SAFETY,1NC.
4 ,
MAK h 7722 Bridle Path lane M' McLean, Virginia 22102
[ '
Telephone: (703) 356-5065
- December 27, 1984 ,
yggg ,hk,Eamu t
e,*4 --
s Dr. John R. Flack Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Commission (H/S H-1016),
1717 H Street NW Wsshington, D.C. 20555
Dear John:
Many thanks for the opportunity to review the Brookhaven It was a very draft report, "An Independent Safety Organization".
good, thought-provoking job, especially considering the time constraints imposed upon the authors. ,
I found myself in general agreemt:nt with the main thrust of the report which recommended ,an . independent Office of Nuclear (pp.Safety (ONS) reporting to the Commissioners at least for now.
171-172). Similarly, the authors identified many investigation deficiencies which apparently are still present although I, among others, identified most of them in the immediate post TMI-2 accident period. Their. interpretation of. corrective measures based heavily upon NTSB experience also has merit; however, it in this area that I might make some observations. As the authors implied in their " Acknowledgements" (p.11) , they had to work from interviews and written information In this regard, withI believe little time to saw they followup questionable areas.
only the blooming side of the rose and probably didLet notme spot many explain.
of the thorns that exist within the NTSB system.
The Board arrangement does indeed work well (p. 152) if one were to concentrate only on the major air carrier cases thatfew make the years *
.ago.
headlines, and examine history only up to at least aUnfortunately, NTS -
ways, especially in the general aviation field. They have neither the leadership nor backing by the Administration to function as effectively as the public and many Congressmen think they are. The reasons for this are not easy to describe in a letter, but let me mention a few key points.
j Despite congressional rhetoric, personnel positions and funds have not kept up with the increased complexity and numbers of aviation accident investigations that arise. This (Keep has occurred in mind, over a. period of 1-2 decades, not.just recently.
R ;p,iation accident function in principle as used at the s the av
~LQfe% y, Q (P
- 4 2_
Board goes back to 1938. It didn't start in 1975 as people looking only at the Independent safety Board Act of 1974 seem '
think.) " Delegation" of these cases to the '
i of FAA theforless factvisible findingcases.
purposes has not helped appreciably since the FAA also has had budget crunches and, in some cases, Administrators who simply would Whatnot allocate this meansmanhours to you-alltoisthe the safety investigative task.
need to plan budgeting and task allocation carefully over the . ,
entire range of investigations, something that simply is not now being done in civil aviation'.
The above point plus the political atmosphere I'll get to more in a moment has resulted in severe conflicts b6 tween the senior investigatory staff at NTSB Theand the Board escrit de Members together withcorps m J
their Managing the aviation Director.(p. xi), but morale is at a horrendous low faction
~
The last two .
at the NTSB's Washington headquarters today. investigation their positions over these problems.
in litigation with the Board over. treatment he has received.
l This internal adversarial atmosphere problem has ati.e., its origin the much of what affects all government agencies today; nearly-declared war between the Administration and the civil service.
But in NTSB's c'ase, it's much more fundamental.
Several cdministrations,'not just President Reagan's, have treated NTSB as merely a dumping ground for people It has beento the whom political spoils were to be allocated. exception, not the rule, when the Board. Vacancie,s were allowed to persist to the point one wonders if t'he intent was to let the Board's activities As of fivecome days to a halt because a a quor.um couldn't be obtained.from now, only 1 i
sitting in terms of office per the basic provisions of the NTSBAn enabling statute.
changes to the reports once before them, let alone exertGiven ;
j influence in the background during the investigations. reaso Some very severe philosophical J
- expected but also desirable.
l conflicts occur, however, when safety-motivated experi ..,
political types, whether the latter are at Board level or at senior administrative levels.
The Board concept is an excellent one provided the Administration provides Members with reasonabletechnical/ managerial / intellectua Professional staff is given its due regard.at NTSB today and r nuclear safety board (NSB) concept is pursued.
Some other quick thoughts ab'out NTSB and Brookhaven's analysis
__ _ -- _ _. _ - _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i_
[4 1
!~ thereof:
o The NTSB's " oversight" role was there from the beginning in 1966-67. I really do not believe it ,'
has increased in recent years. It is a natural i
result'of investigations that go beyond the Asobvious long as
- " probable cause". (More'on that later.) l resources are allocated, special studies, special hearings, etc. can be conducted. We had many of
. l these when I headed the aviation activity from 1968 i to 1974.
o The NTSB's pronouncements limiting investigations to non-litigants (p. 89) is somewhat of a sham or at least theoretical. Attend any public hearing and you will see what I mean. Also, some manufacturers' field vestigators have even testified under oath that they report to their general counsel at the home office.
The secret is to keep the non-adversary image down as much as possible or at least have enough " Parties" to The NTSB does this well in keep the big thecases.
biases balanced.Theyve failed terribly in the small ones. (This balancing of adversarial interests during the investigation, I might add, is why an
- investigatingiagency must maintain and assign enough technical talent in sufficient numbers themselves It also to-
' keep from being " snowed" by the Parties.
explains why the head of the' agency must be someone of acknowledged stature in the business at hand. l He/she will have to compete on. occasion with some '
1.ndustry/ heavyweights.)
o The NTSB " reports" that cannot be used in litigation (Ref. p. 92 and A-45) are limited only to the " blue ,
cover" reports of the major cases and the computer Every- >
printout reports that have "cause(s)" listed. thing els
'their way into courtroom testimony.
! I hasten to point out that the problems cited above are in the ,
implementation aspect of a safety board approach; not to be -
construed as negating the importance of the basic concep f
operates. It all just goes to show that upper level management support (in this case, the Administration and/or the congress) l and the selection of the right people can make or break any .
' endeavor.
Finally, let me cite three areas that I think merit special
~ attention regarding whatever First isdirection the matter is taken in followup to of investigation the Brookhaven study. I do not believe ;
Protocol and how you best make it effective.
l4 \
I
)
i . .
l little said on how to fulfillthem. (Reference the material i
beginning on p. 71 and again on p. 124.) .
i The solution be' gins by acknowledging that inspectors, engineers, program managers et al are not good investigators by definition of those jobs or qualifications therefor. Investigation for safety purposes is an art ~as much as a science; thus special education, training and indoctrination is needed to make it effective. This includes not only for those people assigned to the permanent investigative , staff but also key people among the potential " Parties". NTSB, and the CAB Bureau of Safety before l
it, had aviation accident investigation training schools j
(sometimes in coordination with the FAA) wh$ch were largely responsible for the esprit de corps and general autual respect that existed for many years among parties to later invest _igations. Industry and numerous other groups sent people to these schools,'let alone it being a requirement for all new l hires in the aviation bureau. (As an economy measure several years ago, that effort was largely abandoned, and diminished cooperation and investigation efficiency soon followed.)
Closely allied to the training.is the need for a definitive safety investigation manual so that everyone plays the same tune.
If this exists for NRC, it was not mentioned in the Brookhaven.
study. ,
l j
Still another integral part of an effective investigation protocol is the use of special instrumentation to enhance i
information available at the time of " freezing" the accident, as the report called it. I'd be surprised if the data recording In systems in the control rooms were designed with this in mind.
j l
aviation, of course, there are not only flight data recorders providing survivable flight and hardware system data but also cockpit voice recorders. The latter is invaluable inThe concept understanding human performance during emergencies.
would apply to nuclear plant operations as well,as I recall the
! problems we had investigating THI-2.
l A second area for special attention is the matter of the report The Brookhaven objective of the accident investigations.(e.g., top of p. 125), no doubt places "cause" as that objective, .
influenced by lay persons' understanding of accident (See.
l f
investigations
- p. 125) and/or the duties given to NTSB by statute.The fac
' safety thinking is to downplay causation - especially singular cause - in favor of emphasizing the need to investigate to the i
Point of identifying reasonable preventive or remedial ac l
i reach to that objective (the cognitive process) but by writing i* reports which emphasize cause, the culpability image prevails (NTSB is w
.over the report's safety significance. -
this problem now after years.of needling by many of us in theA
_ _ _ . _ _ safety profession.)_ ___, _ ._
I 1 '.*
l l
) 6390 is pretty go'od in this respect. It defines duties of the i Nuclear Safety Board in terms of findings, analysis andThat leaves the pre recommendations. (p. A-67) -
the report more open than is found in the NTSB duties, and is really the way to go.
is stautory protection for l The third area needing highlighting's Thi is not only vital to selling any Office of Nuclear Safety.
the program in the eyes of outsiders Having the but also, done right, ca legislation
' have plagued NTSB since about 1971. carefully define the qualificatio i
having th,e position at a high enough level'to merit respectb authority including' control of the release of information (all 1
factual info as soon as possible the matterbutof not to inhibit immunity and the investigative process);
l confidentiality of witness. statements (these are two diffiernt -
things) ...these are some of the issues that need to be settled toThey sh give the new office a fighting chance.
i in the proposed legislation.
In conclusion, let me ag'ain say. how impressed I was with the Brookhaven study and certainly the thrust of their findings and recommendations.
Some day I hope the report can be made public.
l It will b~e a valuable aid in teaching safety management in ~
addition to its publication providing credit to the authors where credit is due.
Please give me a call if I you have any questions relative to in the repor.t.
t Sincerely, t
(
C. O. Miller
\
~
l
- l
- i l .
t I
{
4
. . - . . , - - , _ _ . _ , , .r_, , _ _ - . . . _,._.,,m._. . - . . ,s-,,. _ . _ . . . -. , . _ .. . _ . , _ _~- _. . . . . _ . -_,_
.( ' ",[,
_,\a UNITED STATES I
,.{g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION waswmcTow, c. c.2osss t
g6 ;/ '
L
,- Enclosure 1 APR P,01984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky .
i Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asseistine l Comissioner Bernthal FROM: William J., Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
l ACRS OFFICE RECOMMENDATIONS TO ELEVATE AEOD TO A C0iFilSS i
In a memorandum dated April 11, 1984, to the Chairman, the ACRS recommanded.
j that the to directly Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) report the Commission.-
In. making this recommendation, the ACRS observed that there is much to be gained and little to be lost by such a realignment.
1 Unfortunately, I 'believe the ACRS focused only on the aspect of independence and failed to consider some of the other aspects and implications associated j with such'a change.
l' Further, I might note that while the ACRS indicated that the time has come for
'such a shift, the basis was one of prudence, and not need, since no evidence was seen that'.the independence of AEOD had been infringed. Thus, in the i "
absence of a problem, it becomes even more important to assure that the i
benefits from such a realignment, whether real or perceived, do in fact cutweigh,the cost and disruption such a move will cause. .
At the specific direction and urging of the Commission, a' coordinatid program on operational data involving many staff offices was established and is now
!* in routine operation. The heart and focal point for this program is AE00'.
i However, the role and responsibilities of AEOD go well beyond its role to
! . perform independent operational data event assessment and precursor identification. As noted in the enclosure, AEOD responsibilities also
,' encompass a number of essential staff functions. ,
These staff .
,. l responsibilities and their importance to other ongoing activities are so -
l tightly coupled that the separation.of AE00 and the re-creation of the same '
functions elsewhere in the staff wi'11 cause serious disru j effectiveness, and a need for greater overall resources. ption, a lessening of l
Thus, if more independent or additional review of operating events is
- consjdered ,necessary at the Comission level, I would suggest that the creation
! u i,y, n r/wm 4 .
o 7m g s-j _. .. . .r : . 1 h ,
of'a new organizational element be pursued other than considering a major realignment involving AE00.
I would be pleased to provide any additional information or clarification that :
you may desire.
T t (SignedYlilliam J.Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Current AEOD Staff -
Responsibilities cc: Chairman, ACRS OPE OGC SECY Distribution: .
. WJDircks JRoe TRehm ..
.VStello
. CHeltemes
- EDO r/f 4
m . .
__ . _. . __ ~_. .._. - _. .
Current AEOD Staff Responsibilities
- Fcrmulate and implement new operational data reporting
- requirements suc
.. as the LER rule (50.73).
Monitor the rate of progress of and provide staff representation and input to the IRPO-managed Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System.
~
Develop and manage operational data bases covering LERs, Part 21, and 50.55e reports, foreign event information, and nonreactor operational l experience.
Direct the Abnormal Occurrence program and prepare necessary reports and i
i related direction and guidance documents.
Feed back the lessons of experience of operational data identified by AEOD and other NRC offices through publication of the bimonthly, Po ter Reactor Events.
Provide reporting of significant U.S. events to the Incident.Reporti'ng .
System (1RS) of the Nuclear Enargy Agency and serve as the U.S. representa-I -
tive to Frincipal Working Group 3.
1 Conduct. trend and pattern analyses of U.S. operational experience.in
! order to identify and assess situations where the frequency, type, or
, location of events and failures may pose a potential safety concerne Provide input to the SALP process based upon licensee reports of operating events and failures.
1' : ,
Coordinate operational data activities and the related Memorandum of Agreement with INPO, including sharing of data and assessment results j whichmayindicatepotentiaisafetyproblems.
1 -
' Serve 'as a technical advisor to the EDO and perform special reviews and i
studie's as reques.ted. !
i : ;
l
', - .. .-m..,, - , - r
- .,- . - - . , , . _ , . , . , , . , , . . - , . . , . e,--,- ---.~-,. &y,-., ,-,..- , . , -.----.-
-.+1a se Jw-*.*4 d,4 4hJ -+w,ab - %-- L---4 --. q= m --& 4 4--+els -e e-- -
- um.~--eh---La.- w w "M-+* MM me.a i
- r j
- Enclosure 2
! +
i 4
?
i
' i f
6 l
NRC COP 9 TENTS ON THE BNL STUDY -
. AN INDEPENDENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION f
1 i
7-I I
)
i i I
.]
k e k
e 1
J n
i ,
1 I i 4
1 1
1, l
)
e 4
t t
a i
i i s
- . - . . . m.,, ,,_, ,-__. .-,m~,,. 4. ey-_-.__ -__.7,-,__,.m..y.,_,,..-my., ,, __,.m-,-y7.._.y.- ,,_ , - -.-- . , , . , , r-~,-
{
i 7 '
F% -
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i j r$ ADvlSoRY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
- - 9 wasenwatow. o. e.nosse
- March 13, 1985 i
i i The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino I Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 f
Dear Dr. Palladino:
1
}
SUBJECT:
ACRS COMMENTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ORGANIZATION LIKE THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB) FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY The ACRS has been following with interest the deliberations about the need for a formal institutional structure for the investigation of nuclear events, patterned after the National Transportation Safety ' Board (NTSB). We have
, written two letters on the subject, one on June 8, 1978 in which we saw no need
! for such an organization, and another on April 11, 1984 in which we recommended l that the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) be
- elevated to the status of a Comission Office. In the interim, the 1984 NRC i the NRC to reexamine the NTSB concept,
{ Authorization contained and the Brookhaveh language National Laboratorytasking (BNL) was asked to carry out the stud
' . on behalf of NRC. We understand that the BNL report on this study has been made pubite and transmitted to the Congress ~, and that Comission comments on
! the report will follow. ,
We have studied the BNL report and have discussed it during the 299th meeting, I March 7-9,1985. We have also had the benefit of a briefing by BNL during a j subcommittee meeting on March 6, 1985. We are pleased to transmit herewith our j comments. -
l Overall, we believe that the BNL group has done an excellent job of laying out ,
! the issues that are relevant to the- need (or lack thereof) for an independent l board or agency for the investigation.of significant events. There are argu- ;
,. ments for and against such a board or agency, and the BNL group interviewed
! approximately 40 people in formulating its recommendation, sampling as nearly j as we can tell, most of the diversity of views on the subject. (A number of I ACRSmemberswereamongthoseinterviewed.) l In the end, BNL recomends formation of a " quasi-independent" event-investigation office, within NRC but reporting directly to the Comission, and i recommends giving it statutory standing, like several other NRC offices. They
! recomend calling it the Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS), though other names may j be more appropriate, and also recommend -- and this is important -- giving it j the broad investigatory authority typified by NTSB. Obviously there are many details of the potential new office's relations with other elements of the community, which are not addressed, but would have to be if the recomendation
{ were implemented. Some of them are mat'ters of great delicacy. We recomend
'that investigations conducted by ONS exploit the same cooperative " party" i systert used successfully by NTSB, with parties chosen for their expertise
- rather than their institutional affiliation. '
i _ , .[ ,p . I j {g N M. OM N s M
Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino '
March 13,1985 We support the Brookhaven recomendation for the formation of a new statutory office, while recognizing that the precise organizational structure of the office requires much more work, and that the interoffice relations within NRC require attention. We must further note that statutory status for ONS need not delay its formation, since we believe that NRC now has the requisite authority to establish such an office while seeking its statutory recognition. We also note that the success or failure of the office will depend heavily on the quality of people attracted to serve in it, and this will, in turn, be depend-ent upon the perceived commitment of the Commission to the change. A mediocre ONS would be worse than no ONS at all. The good reputation of NTSB depends in no small measure on the respect it attr. acts from both within and without the aviation comunity.
We support the creation of ONS as an alternative to the recomendation in our letter of April 11, 1984. We are also specifically not recomending that AEOD be renamed ONS and elevated to Commission level. The investigatory authority and responsibility are the key points.
We recomend that NRC now embark on the second stage by comitting itself to the formation of the new office and by initiating an effort to produce a detailed plan. Since the new office would necessarily dilute some, of the authority of existing offices, we think that the planning effort is best per-formed outside NRC.
.We maintain active interest in the sub,iect, wish to be consulted as' the drama unfolds, and would like to be kept informed. We will have many detailed
, suggnLions as the planning progresses.
Additional coments by ACRS members Robert C. Axtmann; Jesse C. Ebersole; Hax W. Carbon, William Kerr, and David A. Ward; and Harold W. Lewis are presented below.
Sincerely.
'. Ah j 4.%,.
Harold W. Lewis Acting Chairman Additional Comments by ACRS Member Robert C. Axtmann The concept of an in-house, NTSB-like investigatory entity is a contradiction in terms. The essential characteristic of the NTSB concept is independence of a regulatory agency that may share ' culpability in the events that are investi- .
gated. The ACRS' proposal, stripped to its essentials, is the creation of a l new office' within the agency. The virtues, if any, of that arrangement would be lost on the general public and could become a matter of derision for the Comission's critics.
I
c . .
3 l March 13,1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Additional Coments by ACRS Member Jesse C. Ebersole While I agree with the general direction of this letter. I believe the new ,
organization will still be so constrained by bureaucratic traditions and pressures that it will be unable to carry out a truly independent overview function in evaluating accidents and extrapolating the findings to appropriate levels of significance. I also see a problem in the perpetuation of a disease
-- "patchitis" -- a treatment of the immediate symptom but not the root prob-lem. One aspect of this might be the inability to permit new and better safety concepts to displace outmoded, complicated, and unreliable patchwork which has grown in over the years.
I believe the new organization should be outside the NRC. ,
Additional Comments by ACRS Members Max W. Carbon, William Kerr, and David A.
Ward We do not join in the recommendation that a new office for investigation of reactor events be created at this time. We believe that the present system of event investigation is inadequate and needs improvement, but we believe such improvement can and should be made without formation of a new office. There !
. are many other issues facing the NRC. Allocating resources to these' issues could make better use of the financial and management resources which would be -i
. devoted to creation of the ONS. Furthermore, creation of a new office would introduce another perturbation in regulatory practice. At present,* there is grtat need for predictability and stability. We also question whether the u fety record of the aviation and ground transportation industries suggest the NTSB should be a model for safety regulation of nuclear power.
Additional Comments by ACRS Member Harold W. Lewis I confess' to long-standing views on this subject, which predate y appointment to ACRS, and support a truly independent safety board with broader responsi-
. bility. NTSB itself evolved through various stages of " quasi-independence" before experience revealed the need for real independence, and I believe .that history is likely to repeat itself 'in this case. Therefore, I support the recomendation.
References:
- 1. Brookhaven National Laboratory, "An Independent Safety Organization," NRC ,.-
Report NUREG/CR-4152, dated February 15, 1985
- 2. Letter dated December 27,1984 from C. 0. Miller, System Safety, Inc., to J. R. Flack, ACRS Fellow, comenting on the draft version of the BNL report m 8 4
s
, f lb o l a t.
I !
- ""% UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g *g WAsHINoTON, D. C. 20555 g g
%, * . . . * # NOV 2 01984 1 2 M
j MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech
.[ FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
]
SUBJECT:
STUDY OF THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY TO INVESTIGATE INCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS In the recent NRC Appropriations Act, Congress required that the NRC conduct a study, to be submitted to the Congress, of the need for and feasibility of an independent organization responsible for conducting investigations of significant safety events, including significant operational incidents, at i facilities licensed by the Commission. Subsequently, responsibility for the i study was assigned to AE00. AE00 contracted with the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to conduct the study.
! BNL has completed a draft report (enclosed) of the results of this study.
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with a copy of the report for your information. The report is currently being reviewed by the staff with regard to its completeness and technical accuracy. Based on this review, changes may be made by BHL in'the report if the underlying information is in
, error. A copy of the final BNL report will be forwarded to the Commission after BNL has had an opportunity to review the staff's comments.
We have placed a copy of this draft report in the Public Document Room.
+ Please call me or Jack Heltemes (x24484) if you have any questions concerning this matter.
Eignet) William J.Direks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As Stated
- 1
\ [- '_,
, L.
4 Ap(3 C1
~ - -
, :~ ._)
"Multiplo Addresse;s 2
)
cc w/ enclosure:
J. Zerbe OPE C. Kammerer CA J. Fouchard, PA H. Plaine OGC S. Chilk, SECY S. Connelly, DIA
- 8. Hayes 01 R. Lazo, ASLBP
~
A. Rosenthal, ASALP Distribution:
w/o enclosure PDR EDO RF PTB SF PTB CF AE00 SF AEOD CF FHebdon /.
TIppolito CHeltenes WDircks i
i _ _ _ _ . _ _
a"'a t . .C/,e,gg ,..... .pD E o.0 ,.. . 0/grgp.......... .gp9....,,,........, .........,,,......... .... ,,,,.....,,,,,.. ................,
- "*"*> .EHebdon:ec. . .I . a ..... ..Cg).teme s.... .W0.t r.cks. .. . . . . . . ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................
- ^"> . U /. 8 /.8.4.... .11/.@/a A........u /1't/.8.4. ..... .112. . . / a4.. . . . .. ..................... .................... .................
u;cronu m no,soinacua 4o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- u 5 *' ' ' * * - * * * -
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ -____ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . __ _ _ __ _ _ _ - _