ML20134D837
| ML20134D837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/06/1985 |
| From: | Cotter B Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132C621 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-427 NUDOCS 8508190404 | |
| Download: ML20134D837 (5) | |
Text
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June 6, 1985 JUL // t%lf C'.,'::p;37 f.5 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech b
B. Paul Cotter, Jr.'
FROM:
Chief Administrativt Judge ISO BOARD OF INQUIRY LIMITED TO INVESTIGATING SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EVENTS AN
SUBJECT:
I.
SYNOPSIS The Licensing Panel can perform the core function of significant safety event investigation and reporting addressed by Congress in connection with the F This paper addresses that thesis.
to the 8 to 27 significant safety events each year and does not address any other ongoing investigative, screening, or evaluation responsibilities of AE00 or any other Staff l
office.
II.
INTRODUCTION
- commissioned in The Brookhaven Report (the BNL Report),
recommends, 1985 Appropriations Act, response to the FYinter alia, an Independent Safety Organization toTh investigate significant safety events. recommended that the Among other National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
things, the ISO would require:
J
- "AnIndependentSafetyOrganization,"W.Y.Katoetal.$5.j Brookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4152 (February 1985).
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6/6/85
. ' Chairman Palladino Independence (to avoid even the appearance of 1.
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conflict of interest);
A structured investigation process;
.2.
A "go-team" of trained investigators; 3.
Plant "f reeze" procedures; 4.
Separation of fact finding from regulatory 5.
compliance; Public hearings to determine cause and make 6.
recommendations; Power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths; and 7.
Written published reports.
8.
The BNL Report estimated the need for additional staff of 25 to 30 (for a total of 80) and assumed investigation of 8-12 The NRC Staff disagreed with both (noting 27 abnormal occurrences or alerts events per year.
estimates as lowin ger.eral, opposed the recommendation.
in 1984) and, The Licensing Panel believes that the significant event function can be investigation, fact finding and report and accomplished by the Panel carved out of the BNL Reportat no significant cost other than a max Our reasons follow.
year.
III.
GENERAL Most of the capabilities needed for a significant safetyin event investigation and reporting function are already(1) independenc It has:
place in the Licensing Panel.
(2) experience in under the Administrative Procedure Act; structured processes, (3) broad technical expertise; (4) administrative expertise in using and administering (5) extensive part-time special government employees; experience in fact finding and hearings; (6) extensive experience in written reports; (7) the power to issu and (9) direct regulatory compliance work; Commission.
's 6/6/85 Chairman Palladino The Panel has been used for special investigati digests an extensive body of material to enable theThat is the Panel's
~
Commission to make its decisions.The Indian Point and Waste Con proceedings are the most recent examples of specialized use.
essential function.
IV.
THE PANEL'S PROPOSAL A.
Board of Inquiry Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards could be used to conduct safety events Boards of Inquiry into the 8 to 27 significantThe Board would be appoint Panel Chairman who would also appoint the Investigator inThe Panel C that occur each year.
Charge from a preestablished register.
or the Investigator in Charge would then pick members of the An Investigator in "go-team" from that same register.
Charge and his team would then go to the site (which had to established procedures) and The Investigator in Charge would been " frozen" pursuant conduct the investigation.
be given a fixed but flexible period of time in which After his initial visit to the site, he would formally notify the Board of Inquiry Chairman of the precise days.
date the investigation would be completed.
B.
The Go-Team It The go-team would be structured as in the BNL Report.
would consist of Commission employees and special government employees whose names would be listed on a go-team register.
The special government employees would be drawn from INPO, utilities, nuclear steam supply companies, constructionThey contractors, architects and engineers, and the like.w The part-time government of the Licensing Panel are.
employees would necessitate an additional 2-4 FT proposal.
A Non-Adjudicatory Hearing C.
As soon as the investigator in charge notified the board chairman of the completion date of the investiga The Board of Inquiry hearing would be days thereafter.
6/6/85 ' Chairman Palladino That process is described modeled after the NTSB process.
in the BNL Report at page 87 as follows:
i is
_At the conclusion of this process a public hear ng held, to place all the facts on record throughtestim The factual material gathered in the previous phase.
hearing, which is non-adjudicatory, is presided over by Parties, possibly the same a Board of Inquiry...
ones who participated in the field investigation, are the hearing.
Witnesses are designated to testify at questioned first by members of the technical panel and the Board of Inquiry, and then by the parties to the Witnesses, who testify under oath, may be accompanied, represented, or advised by coun hearing.
The hearing officer has the power to issue subpoenas both to compel attendance and testimony of however.
witnesses and the production of documents....
Although the stated purpose of the hearing is torecord as a basis develop a complete factual analysis, another purpose is to give each party "itsAt t encouraged to submit to the NTSB its analysis of the day in court."
and its views as to the cause and what it thinks the findings and recommendations of the NTSB
- accident, should be.
Substantial portions of this process duplicate that presently used by Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards except that pleadings, discovery, prehearing conferences, motions, But the and cross-examination would be eliminated.an examination by experts principal substance is similar:
with subpoena and oath powers, consideration of (decision) by the Board.
D.
Board of Inquiry Report The board would prepare from the record of the hearing a report of the causes of the incident together withThe report would be recommendations for corrective action.
Time limit forwarded directly to the Commission for action.
goals for forwarding reports to the Commission, such as 60 days,'could be established, but provision for extension should be made for the more complicated or significant I
L incidents.
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6/6/85 '
" Chairman Palladino V.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
~
Only-a few steps would have to be taken to implement such a system:
Establish a go-team roster; 1.
Establish investigation procedures including
" freezing" the site and defining a "significant 2.
safety event";
Train the go-team investigators; 3.
Establish non-adjudicatory hearing procedures presumably as a separate subpart of Part 2.
4.
The Panel has experience in and could perform items 1 and 4.
VI.
CONCLUSION Clearly, the existing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel would require only modest changes to its marching orders to function as such a limited Independent Safety position, composition, experience and its name itself, make Organization.
it readily (and uniquely) adaptable to this purpos The variations in procedures, BNL Report are to be heeded.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board composition, and logistics could be developed in cooperation with other NRC The NRC could have a more could be readily established. sharply focused ISO sufficiently in appearance of Staff influence without necessity fo another independent agency, Herzel H. E. Plaine, OGC cc:
William J. Dircks, EDO David A. Ward, ACRS Clemens J. Heltemes,fdr., AEOD t
i Raymond F. Fraley, ACRSV L