NUREG/CR-4152, Summary of ACRS Regulatory Policies & Practices Subcommittee 850306 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Review of Final BNL Rept, NUREG/CR-4152, Independent Safety Organization. Viewgraphs Encl

Summary of ACRS Regulatory Policies & Practices Subcommittee 850306 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Review of Final BNL Rept, NUREG/CR-4152, Independent Safety Organization. Viewgraphs Encl

ML20127M640
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/19/1985
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
RTR-NUREG-CR-4152 ACRS-2290, NUDOCS 8505230322
Download: ML20127M640 (7)

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SUMMARY

/ MINUTES FOR THE ACRS REGULATORY POLICIES AND PRACTICES SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MARCH 6, 1985 - WASHINGTON, D.C.

Purpose:

The purpose of the meeting was to review the final Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) Report, NUREG/CR-4152, "An Independent Safety Organization," W. Y. Kato, et al, February 15, 1985.

Attendees: Principal meeting attendees included:

ACRS NRC H. Lewir., Chairman J. Heltemes, AE00 J. Ebersole, Member T. Ippolito, AE0D C. Michelson, Member G. Reed, Member BNL F. Remick, Member W. Kato C. Wylie, Member J. Carew P. Boehnert, Staff E. Weinstock A. Cappucci, Staff Meeting Highlights, Agreements, and Requests pg 52 g 2 B50319 ,,

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R gulatory Policies and Practices Sumary/ Minutes March 6, 1985 (1) Dr. W. Kato described the above report and discussed background information concerning the genesis of the concept of an NTSB Like organization for the NRC. It was pointed out that the study focused on the investigation of events at operating facilities, excluded wrong doing or rule infraction investigations, and did not consider an organization to oversee the performance of NRC. The recomendations of the report include:

• The establishment of a quasi-independent, statutory Office of Nuclear Safety directly under the Comission.

• Its primary responsibilities would include significant event investigation at all NRC licensed facilities to establish facts, condition, and circumstances; to determine causes; and to recomend improvements to prevent recurrence.

• An investigatory system patterned after that of NTSB.

• Assume current AE00 responsibilities.

(2) Six significant events were studied to determine how investigations were conducted for cause determination. See Attachment A for the events and suggested improvements to the investigation process. He

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described the confusion created by the influx of NRC Staff

.a Regulatory Policies and Practices Summary / Minutes March 6, 1985 personnel assigned to the Salem ATWS event and the need for focus-ing on the determination of cause. He suggested that one orga-nization needs to take charge of events investigated by NRC.

l (3) Dr. Kato stated that BNL's determination of the size of an indepen-dent safety organization (150) was based primarily upon the total

[ number of events and significant events per year including case studies and trend analysis. Estimates were made that 8-12 significant events per year at 85 plants would require full field investigation and this number will probably increase to 20-25 when all 129 plants are operating. The ISO reporting to the Commis-sioners was estimated to require a staff of about 75-80 at an approximate cost of $5.6 Million per year (manpower costs only).

These estimates were considered to be underestimated by AE0D and some subcommittee members.

(4) Following Dr. Kato's presentation, G. Reed pointed out that any ISO must have technical competence and objectivity for its investiga-tion. He suggested that the NRC Staff would not be objective because of its involvement in plant design. He recommended that investigation teams be made up of 2/3 design types and 1/3 opera-tional types.

(5) Mr. Heltemes discussed the status of the BNL report with the subconinittee. He stated that the Staff comments were requested by March 15, 1985, but expected that some would be later than that.

Regulatory Policies and Practices Summary / Minutes March 6, 1985

,g Following comments from the Staff, a summary would be sent to the EDO. The EDO is expected to make his recommendations to the Commission by late April or early May 1985. Mr. Heltemes also discussed what he considered underestimates of the ISO manpower and budget.

(6) The Subcommittee Chairman requested that members put forth their reconmendations for (1) preparation of a letter for ACRS approval, and (2) agreement of disagreement with the BNL recommendations.

Subcommittee Members agreed that a letter report be written agree-ing with the BNL recommendations providing certain caveats were included. Additional comments from the subcommittee members include:

• Concerns were expressed about the lack of NRC objectivity and the implementation of an ISO organization.

• An ISO should be structured in such a way as to attract qualified people. Shouldn't ram it down the throat of NRC.

• Deficiencies of the report should be pointed out in the ACRS letter.

Regulatory PoliciGs and Practices - Sumary/ Minutes March 6, 1985 N

NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in-the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE - Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, D.C., 20001,(202)347-3700.

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ,

1. THREE MILE ISLAND-2 3/28/79 PWR (880 MWE)

FAILURE OF-PORV CLOSURE ,

2. SALEM-1 2/22/83 PWR (1080 MWE)

FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM 4

3. QUAD CITIES-1 3/10/83 BWR (789 MWE)

IMPROPER CONTROL R0D MANIPULATION 11 . BROWNS FERRY-3 6/28/80 BWR (1067 MWE)

' FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT FULLY UPON SCRAM)

5. HATCH-2 8/25/82 BWR (820 MWE)

UNCONTROLLED LEAKAGE OF REACTOR COOLANT FROM PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

6. NUCLEAR METALS INC.

OVEREXPOSURE OF RADIATION WORKERS' HANDS BROOKHAVI.N NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g)l A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(E(Il

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"- NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN INVESTIGATING EVENTS NEED

1. TO SEPARATE FACT FINDING AND DETERMINATION OF CAUSE i

LICENSING REGULATION, AND COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE:

'A) POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAUSED BY PREVIOUS ACTIONS OR INACT10NS; s) THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ADVERSARIAL ATMOSPHERE IN AN INVESTIGATION.

.2. FOR A MORE STRUCTURED AND COORDINATED INVESTIGATI ON THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSE OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT

3. T0 " FREEZE" THE PLANT CONDITIONS AND PERSONNEL, IF PRACTIC-ABLE FROM THE SAFETY POINT OF VIEW, AS S00N AS POSSIBLE AFTER A SIGNIFICANT EVENT.

4. FOR INVESTIGATORS WITH MORE OPERATING EXPERIENCE, APPRO PRACTICAL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND MORE TRAINING IN CONDU INVESTIGATIONS.

5. TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

-6. TO IMPROVE THE TIMELINESS OF THE ISSUANCE AND OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN INVESTIGATION.

7. TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIPS WITH UTILITIES OUT -

FRAMEWORK TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL DATA BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g)l A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(Itil AWellvestA

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