ML20133K434
| ML20133K434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1957 |
| From: | Belmore F MALLINCKRODT, INC. |
| To: | Johnson L US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133G976 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-343 NUDOCS 9701210224 | |
| Download: ML20133K434 (7) | |
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MALLINCKRODT CHEMICAL Wo s
i MANUFACTURERSOF FINE CHEMICALS FOR MEDICINAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC
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ANALYTICAL AND INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES D E 5^*aig.
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k 21 October 1957 Mr. IJall Johnson Licensing Division U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 1901 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
SUBJECT:
Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-33
Dear Mr. Johnson:
Reference is made to our Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-33 as amended and more particularly to that part of the license dealimg with the operation of our uranium dioxide unit specifically limited to a maennem of 3% enrichment.
4 Since the issuance of this license as amended we have had inquiries
, from time to time regarding the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide at assays between 3 and 5%. We have carsfully examined this facility and find that a mode of operation is available in the equipment as currently installed which, we believe, makes;it possible to operate safely with assays up to 5%.
A description of the proposed method of operation is attached along i
with pertinent criticality calculations.
We are specifically requesting an amendment to SNM-33 which will in-clude this method of operation and permit us to, operate this particu-lar facility at enrichments up to 5%.
We would appreciate your progt considerettien of the enclosed applica-1 tion. If any additional data are requimd we will be glad to ' furnish amendment.
)) [jW same on short notice _in order to expedite the issuance of this y \\s 1/
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Frederick M. Belmore 0g g74 '
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APPLICATION FOR LITNSB AMENDMENT IN HIE IN ENRICEDGDIT FACILITf i
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A.
Pasent licensed procedures for 3% marinna assay.
Briefly, our current license as amended permits us to operate installed equipment using uranium hexafluoride as the feed material up to 3% assay.
%e uranium hexafluoride is received from the Commission in MD type 2
i cylinders measuring approximately 10" in diameter by h0" in length, each cylinder containing a limited safe batch of the particular assay. involved.
he cylinder is heated to cogletely liquify the Wo. The We;is then withdra'wn as a gas and hydro 3ysed as an individual. batch, precipitated
,and filtered. De identity of the batch is.naintained;throughout _the processing to insure critical 11;r control. After filta tion.the entire batch is loaded into a drying oven to accoglish cosplete moisture removal.
4
.The product is then loaded into.a furnace box where the final zoduction to uranium dioxide occurs. After cooling, the product in the box is unloaded, ground, and packaged in an individual container. he containers are stored in suitably designed anxi approved birdcages for storage and shipment.
i These bizdcages maintain a spacing of two feet between edges of individual containers to prevent a critical accident.
B.
Proposed mode of operation for 3% to $$ assay.
he experience gained in opersting this plant over the past year has indi-cated to us that modification of our method of opezution should permit oogpletely safe operation using uranium with up to 5% Unas content. Se proposed method of operation would be as follows:
1.
Se receipt of Wo.
For assays from 3.to about 3 9% the We would be requested in.the standard MD oylinder currently.used, with each erlindar costalaing a limited safe batch for the assay involved.. his would cover the zsage of from 88 down to approximately 52 pounds of U oontained per cylindar.
For assays from 3 9. to 5% the maall (approximately 68 diameter. *always safe #) eylinder would be.the requested shipping container far the We, saoh. cylinder,to contain not man than the limited safe hatch. Since this cylinder will only hold 60 lbs. of We, leiss than-a limited _ safe, batch weald be contained in the cylir.Nr until an assay of approxi-mately k.6% was obtsimed, above whiah assay the cyllador would contain lors than a full charge.'
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2.
Hydrolysis operaties.
he hydrolysis opeastien would be carried'ont in a' manner 11 dead.eal to that used in our normal operation.
Se:.' individual oylinders would be
_ hydrolysed as a coglete bhtch and the batch moved forward to'the next
' operation before the next cylindar would be, placed in the hood to hydrolysis.
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3 Filtrution.
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Following the hydrolysis and precipitation the batch would be filtered J-on the currently installed filter press to receive the entire charge of solids, he filtrate would be handled in a manner identical to that now esployed.under the present tems of.our license.
- h. Drying.
i We curantly have two drying ovens installed in this production area.
he adjacent sides of these ovens are separated by slightly more than 2h inches to insure adequate spacing to prevent nuclear internation 1
between batches. Se ovens contala 16 shelves an'.3.iaoh centers. For i
operation between 3 and 5% enrichment)we are proposing making;e: son-
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.tdally two ovens out of each installed even by blocking off(the center j
eight trays with steel bars.. his would allow us to use the upper and g
lower portion of each oven for individual batches, the two batches be-4 j
ing separated by 214 inches of blank space which is adequate to patent j
nuclear interaction.
a 5.
Reduction Furnace Operation.
The furnace box as currently licensed is loaded with one limited safe j
batch per cycle. We are proposing for operation bqtween 3'and 5% assay 1
to essentially duplicate the technique described for the drying oven.
I These furnace boxes receive a maximum load of 21 trays in three' tiers i
of seven each. For operation in the 3 to 5% range we are proposing i
essentially to load the box in such a manner as to make it two furnace I
areas. Seven trays of product or a limited safe batch, if this is con-I tained in less than seven trays, will be 1caded at the back of the l
reactor. An empty' set of seven inverted trays will be placed in the i
center section of the box and another seven trays.or a limited safe j
batch, if contained in less than sevenjtrays, will;be. placed at, the j
front of the reaction box. Bis will maintain la spacing between the i
two batches of a mini=== of 16".
Se material enters the reaction box following a drying operation which. essentially renevos all moisture.
(Analytical information collected over the past few months has indi-cated that the product at this point has a maximum H:V ratio of hal).'
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j he reduction furnace operates at a, temperature woll in excess of.,;
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2 fib *F at all times and during the course of the ' reaction the H U ratio
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is con +A-11y reduced to essentially sero at the end;ef the1 reaction.
Under these circumstances we feel'that 'a spacing of.168-between i
batches and the law HsU ratio insures soaplete. nucleartsafety. his conclusion, we believe, is further substantiated by calculations,made on the basis of criticality data obtained!from Dr.: 1.% da111han on k.9% enriched Da0. moderated by Steroter. ;these calculations are 4
attached a's Appendix I.
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6.~ Final Packaging..
he furnace b6x following the reduction' eyele and cooling will be
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unloaded as two separate batches. Se first group of seven trays at l
the front of the box will be unloaded,' ground, and packaged as one lot, which lot will then be removed from the packaging station prior i
1 to the unloading of the second batch. Se individual lots will be stored in birdcages of approved design to prevent interaction between batches prior to shipment and during shipment.
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Conclusion.
Based on the above proposed method of operation and data collected dur$mg the past few months of production on material below 3% we believe the plant facilities to be entirely adequate for harviling.UR at enrichments between 3 and 5%. We believe the comparison with Dr. Calldhan's data substantiates these conclusion 3, 4
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APPENDIX I CRITICALITY CALCULATIONS ON '!HE REDUCTION FURNAS OPERATION Basic Facts:
1.
Ammonium diuranate cake from the dryer has been shown npeatedly by analysis to contain h hydrogen for each uranium atom as a mari=== H:U ratio, 2.
Tray capacity in the reduction furnace by actual plant experience has been shown to be between 8 and 12 pounds of UDs product depending upon the type of product being made.
3 Data from Dr. A. D. sallihan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, taken on k.9% enriched
.Us so modented by.Steroter and. taken on a. cubic structure are partially listed below:
H/I Density grams Umag/ liter Critical Nass, kg 1h5 83 8.8 160 73 79 200 65 6.2 2h5 55.5 51 320 hp 39 Assumptions:
For the purpose of our safety calculations on our furnace box operations, we are assuming the following:
1.
Because of the possibility of error in analyses we are using.8:1 H U ratio in the following calculations. This value should not change with assay al-4 though the corresponding H/I ratie will be effected by assay.
i 2.
A maximum tray loading of 15 lbs. 00s will be assumed. Se maximum number l
of trays under the operating conditions described will be lh.
Calculations:
herefore, based on the above facts and assumptions, the H/I ratie in.our furnace box will have the following valussa At'3% enrichment 8x1 I
4. 267 ~
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At k$ enrichment
,8 x 1
= 3)o t i
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At 5% enrichment 8 x l' N. 160:
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~2-Re maximum quantity cf UOs in the furnace will be S x 15 = 210 lbs. 00a 210 x 88% = 18h.8 lbs. of U 1%.8 = 83.81 kg of U 2.205 Therefore, at 3% enrichment the box could contain a maH=um of 83.81 x.03 = 2.5% kg of Unas at h% enrichment 'the box could contain a mmh== of 83.81 x.0h = 3 352 kg of Umse at 5% enrichment the box could contain a maM=um of 83.81 x.05 = h.1905 kg of Unas It should be pointed out that in all cases the furnace box loading anticipated in actual operation will not attain the maximum quantities so calculated and the main purpose of these calculations is to demonstrate the inherent safety of the proposed operation allowing ample safety margins with regard to both moderation and quantity in making the calculations.
Although the uranium is not uniformly distributed in our box, we believe a cal-culation showin'g uranium density is warranted. To simplify this calculation, we are assuming (a) the uranium to be miformly distributed in the box and (b) two sets of trays not separated by a blank tray spacing. Se volume occupied _
by the uranium would be, therefore, Ih"H x 32*L x 21"W = 9,h08 in3 9,608 x 18.387 = 195,169 al or i
15h.2 liters volume he Uaas density at 3% enrichment could be
@gh,, = 16.3 g/l nae===
Re Unas density at h% enrichment could be
= 21 7h d mad unn 2
rs he Unas density at 5% enrichment could be j
igo;5 g:
= 2718 g4 -xi-a.
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Conclusions:
The above calculations based on actual operating experience with this equipment indicate:
1.
'Ihat the quantity of Uase contemplated in the zwaction box at the density and H/X ratio which are to be expected fall well below the critical values obtained by Dr. Callihan8s research on a perfect
- cubic structure by a factor of approximately 2 in every case so calculated.
2.
Since our proposed opel tion con +saplates a division of 'the quantity of U by a =in4=2= of 168 between halves, we feel, therefore, that the proposed operation offers considerable safety factor and that no single mistake 1
could cause a critical accident.
3 Since each batch being processed will be of limited safe quantity, and will maintain its identity tnroughout the process, we believe the proposed mode of operation is adequately protected from a safety consideration by at least two independently controlled factors.
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