ML20133H071
| ML20133H071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1960 |
| From: | Peery W, Sutherland J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133G976 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-343 NUDOCS 9701170037 | |
| Download: ML20133H071 (15) | |
Text
a
'?
'AITED STAft$ ATOMIC EhERGY COMMts510N
( ' %*f, COMPLIANCE INSPECTidN REPORT i
1 Date of inspnuon L Nanw and addicss of hcensee
- Mallinekrodt Nuclear Corteration January 12 thru 1L,1960 Steend & Nallinckrodt Streets T * *I I"'P" TI Reinspection (1)
,. St. Louis 7, Missnuri
- 4. to CFR Part(s) apphabic 20 and 70 f A mense numbr(s), issue and expiranos d.aes. scope and con &tions (inclueng amenenents)
Lhense No.
Date Expiration Scope and Conditions Uranita enriched in the U-235 isotope, SNM-33, as-12-26-59 1-31-6 2 Scope limited to that which may be used in accordance amended with following specified prucedures, for the i(/%d{
preparation of uranism in vrrious chemical and physical forms, and n1sted activities, in-cluding storing and shipping, in accordance with the procedures described in the licensee 8s application of Dec. 10 & 15, 1958 and Jan. 22
& 30, Feb. 2 (Research Lab.), 5 & 9, May 11 &
25, June 29, July 16 and Dec. 23,1959.
1 Conditions:
l Authorised place of use The licensee's plant near Hematite, Missouri, as described in the licensee's application.
a l
t
.I
+
- 6. Inspuuca En&ngs (and ituns of noncompliance) leer material processing pmgram The licensee conducts a source material mid The program is conducted in under License Nos. Slef-33, 810(-230, C47,44 radiological health and safety the licensee 8s plant located at Fousite, Misso programi et the Hematite plant is tander the dimetion of appnpriately trained and quali-fi:d personnel and appears to adequately protect the health and safety of licensee on-p1dyces and the public fmm potential radiation hasards incident to the activity.
Crititality control is the responsibility of the Plant Manager with assistance from personnel idio have had a basic course dealing with criticality at Oak Ridge National Denstmus use is made of consulting services where criticality problems Adequate radiation monitoring equipment is available for use in the Labor: tory.
Material accountability is accomplished with an efficient contal and record em involved.
Persossiel are monitored with a licensee film badge service and bio-assays psogram.
Surveys have been mutinely made of sixterne radio-system.
that are eesswretally furnished.
l activity, general and specif1s radiation levels, ad concentrations of radioactivity Records have been kept of the surveys and a review
. in the licensee's plant effluent.
of the records revealed no levels or concentrations in eteers of the limits soecified t
The plant areas and containers sa posted as required by 10 CPR 20.
in 10 CFR 20 No itema of nonoomplianse uns' observed or otherwise noted during the course of this s
inspoetion.
d
~
i
- 7. Date of last previ.us inspccuan
- s. Is " Company Confidanual' infornunon contained in this reportl Yes q No [}
($peafy page(s) and paragrapb(s))
Ainsest 18 and 19,1958 (initial) 3f
~
omnmumni faseT-
'==
Divisism of laspeetisa
[
i Appnnd by:
6sk T. authesised y Divisism of m===t=v and Rosalation A,kides og.offios.
y l
washiagton, D. c.
-,wtl.
= =s u.c If odduismal space h sequued fee any memberei isen ebeve, she a==*==*ha may be===ad d o the reverse of this fann using foot to 8
t fennet, assving suament margia et esp for lunding, bientifying euk Jese by somber and noting Contiaurd" se the face of foros unde g
appmy ins.'hsme,
g / A..egu.s assummuuness so oie semens er unream essassie unissemesa
.n
.h ShkMhkQ)g
,[* 1
/
d.
FLOYD96-343 PDR
. - ~......
Page 2
.allinckrodt celar :kr-Orc ticc.
at. icuis,.sistri liceu.e 3. a L-33 DETAIIS
.3 CENERAL INFORMATION 9 On Janusry 12 - 1h,1960 announced reinspection (1) was made of the special nuclear material and source material activities conducted by the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works and the Maninckrodt Nuclear Conora-tion, under License Nos. SNM-33, SNM-230 and C-273h at Hematite, Missouri. During the same dates an announced initial inspection was made of the source material program conducted, under License No.
C-Lh95 by the Maninckrodt Nuclear Corporation at Hematite, Missouri.
- 10. ; The inspection web conducted by John Sears, Inspection Division, NT00 and W. W. Peery, Inspection Division, OR00. Mr. Sears inspected the criticality aspects of the Licensee's special nuclear material pro-gram under License Nos. SNM-33 and SNM-230 and his findings are in-cluded as a part of this report. Licensee personnel interviewed and furnishing infomation during the inspection included the followings Dr. O. W. Tompkins, Manager, Ree= arch & Development Special Metals Division Dr. E. D. North, Manager, Hematite Plant Mr. J. W. Miller, Supervisor, Industrial Hygiene Department Mr. Jack Rosser, Process Engineer, Hematite Plant
- n. Dr. W. M. Leaders served as Technical Director of Special Metals Division at the time of the last inspection. Dr. Leaders left the employ of the Licensee in the Swaner of 1959 and accepted a position with the Spencer Chanical Company, Kansas City, Missouri. Dr.
Tompkins is now responsible for those duties being perfomed by Dr.
Imaders at the time he left the uploy of the Licensee particularly with reference to criticality problems involving the Research and Development group. Dr. North is responsible for specific and over-en criticality problems at the Licensee's Hematite plant as well as for material accountab&lity which was also previously a responsibility of Dr. Leaders.
- 12. In a letter dated Dec e ber 15,1958, Mallinckrodt Nuclear Works in-fomed the Division of Licensing and Regulation that au nuclear fuels business was being transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary, the Maninckrodt Nuclear Corporation, and that it was therefore requested that License Nos. 310t-33, SNM-230 and C-273h be issued to the Meninckrodt Nuclear Conoration with an effective date of January 1, 1959. The Division of Licensing and Regulation revoked Slet-33 and M31-230 with a letter to the Licensee dated January 26,1959 and on-elosed reissuances of License Nos. Sgt-33 and 3101-230 in the name of Mallinokrodt Nuclear Corpontion with an effective date of January 1, 1959. License No. C-273h was not chansed and it expired on Novaber 30,1959. The espiration of the license was discussed with Drs.
Tepkins and North both of whom stated that the source material activities at Hematite are supposed to be conducted under License No.
C-273h and that their failure to attend to the matter of renown 1 of the license has been an oversight sich win be corrected immediately.
y yd essaequee ged yg. ge-e
- h 4e g
,e e g.eenpson,4h
+-e
$4 eg -
.eeew-
-m
, -. E g }k 4
e
e Page 3 Mallinekrodt Nuclear Corporation St. kuis, Missouri License No. SNM-33 However, it was understood that source material has not been received under C-273h since its expiration.
- 13. The source material program under License No. C-Lh95 was a limited research program which involved the receipt by the Licensee on October 10,1959 of 1720 lbs. of natural UF6 for studies on the preparation of reactor fuel alments. This program was conducted in the same facilities and subject to the same radiation safety controls as those exployed for the programs conducted under SNM-33 and C-273h at Hematite, Missouri. The program under C-Lh95 is said to have been completed with the shipment of 2h5 lbs. cf UO2 to the Ceneral Electric Campany. The remainder of the material is still on-hand. The program under SNM-230 involved research with a process for the direct conversion of UF6 to UF. One order of 20 lbs. of h
contained U-235 as uranium enriched to about 20% and two orders of ho lbs. of uranitsa of 20% U 235 enrictment were received, used in the research program and have since been processed to Hematite final product and shipped to licensed receivers. The direct conver-sion process is now a part of the over-ell Hematite plant process under SIM-33 and no further work will be done under SNM-230.
The same facilities and radiation safety program described in this re-port for SNM-33 and C-273h apply to the program that was conducted under SNM-230.
II. ORDANIZATION lb. The Mallinckrodt Chemical Works is one of the older chemical companies in this country and has been cammercially processing uranium and uranium capounds since 19h2. The Campany is a prime contractor of the U. S. Atomic EnergF Ccuenission and currently operates the Commission's uranitsa refinery plant at Weldon Springs, Missouri and formerly operated a similar plant for the Comission on Destrehan Street in St. kuis, Missouri.
- 15. The Licensee's program at Hematite is conducted by the Special Metale Division which is under the management of Mr. F. M. Belmore who reports to Mr.* J. Fistere, President of the Campany. Drs. North and Tampkins repot*t to Dr. R. W. Shearer, Assistant Manager of the Special Metals Division who reports to Mr. Belmore. N Hematite process is supervised by two Process Engineers who have one plant foreman and three shift foreman reporting to them. At the time of the last inspection the total plant force consisted of 25 employees, this has increased to a total of 97 personnel. This total plant force includes operations, maintenance, guards and analytical laboratory personnel. A ana11 research and development group is separate and reports to Dr. Steant through Dr. Tompkins. Supervisory and key operating personnel at Hematite have had previous experience in pro-cessing normal uranium in the Licensee's facilities in St. Louis, Missouri.
III. PROCgSS
- 16. At the time of the last inspection the plant process was one in which uranium dioxide (UO ) was produced from normal and enriched grade 2
uranium hesaflouride (UF6) through an intermediate diuranate (ADU) step..
,gIf
'?
4 l
Page L Mallinckrodt Nuclear coe oration st. Imuis, Missouri License No. SeM-33 However, the original process for converting UF6 to UO2 by going through the ADU state has been superseded by a direct conversion process in which the UF6 is reduced by an organic reductant to h which is filtered through a stainless steel filter onto trays UF I
12nch in depth. UO2 powder is produced in batch safe quantities that may also be converted to UF;1 in a furnace into which HF is in-troduced. The UOp is placed on I inch deep trays in this furnace.
is converted to metal by placing it into a 5 inch id. sleeve UFh which is placed in a reduction reactor which is ignited by a reduction
/
coil thus reducing the UFh to uranium metal. Process scrap filter bags, clean-up scrap, rejected pellets, destructive test samples and analytical sample scrap is all re-processed and reclaimed product sent to the customer.
17 The Licensee's Hematite facility is located on a 150 acre tract of land which was fomerly famland. The plant site ism 40 miles south of St. Iouis, Missouri, near the town of Hematite and is bound on the north by Missouri State Highway 21-A and on the south by Joachim Creek, and on the east and west by other private property.
The plant is almost centrally located on the 150 acres and the nearest occupied property is a fam house located several hundred yards to the northwest of the plant.
- 18. The production facilitiss consist of two main buildings, each with several thousand feet of floor space. Iocated between these two buildings is an incoming storage and blanding building as well as an outgoing storage building which is under construction. The out-going storage building currently in use is located to the west of the two main buildings. The above described facilities are fenced with guards on duty 2h hours a day.
- 19. The westerly most of the two main plant buildings contains three separate process areas as follows:
A.
205 U 235 and higher - cermet type fuel elements and metal manufacturing is carried out here.
Auxiliary areas to A ares (1) edivent extraction of enriched uranian fran scrap.
(2) soluble products area for the production of crystals or solutions of uranyl nitrate, uranyle sulfate and uranyl flouride.
(3) process far the direct conversion of UF6 to UFh from which the UFh is further pro-cessed to produce either metal or UO
- 2 This equipment was not present at the time of the last inspection.
B.
14rge scale production of low enrichment materials up to 55 U 235 with the end product being ceramic grade U0 '
2
'h Page 5
. c111.6:r:st 721ur 0:.~ n
- M it. * -tis,..Ls:=1 11:e.sc :. it-33 4
C.
A third process area iniolves two sections as follows:
(1) Solvent extracti:m of low enrichment j
uranium fr a scr o.
'(2) Manufacture of 5 - 205 u 235 ccapounds.
{
The easterly most of the main buildings contains the UO2 pellet
,i production facility which includes emplete preparation and Ihis is the more recently ccupleted build-packaging of pellets.
ing and it also contains the majority of the research and develop-ment activities at the Hematite plant as well as an area used only t
for storese.
i 20.~ The inoaming storage vault is a one-story reinforced concrete build-ing with a concrete floor containing no drain. The vault is about equidistant between the two main buildings. The walls of the vault are equipped with chains and brackets to secure shipping containers i
for adequate and consistent spacing as well as growing of material 2
of same enrichment. Enriched material is said to be moved only with the knowledge and approval of Dr. North. The performance of this con-trol procedure is the responsibility of process engineers and foreman.
- 21. The blending room is constructed of concrete block with dimensions of ed20' x 508 and is located south of and adjacent to the incoming storage vault. Blanding equipment consist of ten equally spaced 15 sellon drums inside a dust control hood. The drums are separated by 1 ft. slabs of concrete.
l The outgoing storage vault is a small building 10' x 20' built of j
22.
reinforced concrete and locatedee50 feet to the west of the two main plant buildings. This vault is equipped with chains and brackets to
. maintain proper spacing of containers.
23 Instrumentation for the Licensee's radiation safety program includes 1
the following:
2-Teobnical Associates Model No. 3 Juno (a,p,y) 3 Tietoreen *Thrace Model 3890 survey meters (p,y) 4 3 Yictoreen Model 356 survey meters (a,p,y) 2 Nuclear Measurenants conoration Model FC - 3A counters (a,p,y) 3 Hudnon air samplers 3 Gast air samplers 1 Gelman portable battery-operated sampler An emergency monitoring station has been established in a building loested about 200 yards fran'the main Hematite plant buildings. Sur-var instruments available aren '(1) Juno (5 r/br max. range);
. (1) Juno (50 r/hr max. range). Both are periodically shocked for operubility. A Euclear Measurements Corporation 80ammalars", model GA-2, system has been installed in the Licensee's Hematite plant as required by 10 CFR 70.2h. The alatu system appears to meet the re-quirements of this section of the regulations and fulfills the Licensee's
~,
obligation to install the system as described in his letter of January
.22,1959 to the Division of Licensing and Regulation and in Licensee i
~ ~
1 A
l i
Page 6 Mallinckrodt Nuclear Corporation St. Inuis, Missouri I
License No. sum-33 l
drawing No. 3383-1 which is identified as having been fomerly filed with the Camission January 26, 1959 The instrment systen is calibrated at sixmonth intervals with an NBS calibrated radium source 1
and is routinely tested at the same time each Monday morning with a 2 5 mr/hr gamma source for renoonse and as a rough check on calibra-l tion. Emergency procedures have been drawn-up and distributed to employees relative to action to be taken in the event of a nuclear incident. The procedures consist of the following parts:
1.
Emergency instructions to all personnel.
2.
Emergency instructions to guard force.
3 Emergency instructions to emergency director.
J L. ' Plan A' (nuclear incident) for emergency director.
5 ' Plan B' (suspected malfunction in nuclear alam system)
)
for the ariorgency director.
The emergency instructions were given to personnel with written in-struct$ons fra Mr. North, plant manager, to study and know the in-structions. The procedures were furnished to the Division of Licensing and Regulation with licensee letter dated June 5,1959 2h. Ocuplete protective clothing is furnished by the licensee to operating personnel. Clothing includes underwear, coveralls, shoes, caps and gloves. Research personnel and visitors are supplied laboratory coats and shoe covers. There are two separate clothing change rows for operating personnel. The two change rooms are separated by a shower rom so that operators can change capay clothing in one room, shower t
and change personal clothing in the other. All compay clothing is pre-laundered before being sent out to a commercial laundry. Mr. Miller stated that pre-laundry wash water has not been monitored but that it is not expected to significantly contribute to t,he radioactivity con-centrations in the, over-all plant effluent.
V.
RADIATION MONITORINO
- 25. Mr. J. W. Miller is responsible for the Licensee's radiation safety Mr. Miller is Head of the Industrial Hygiene Department at program.
the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, St. Iouis, Missouri and has respon-sibility for the over-all radiation safety programs in all of Mallinckrodt's commercial activities being conducted under AEC licenses.
Mr. Miller directly supervises the radiological health and safety pro-gram at the Licensee's Hematite plant and he reports directly to Mr.
Moore, Vice President in charge of Operations. Mr. Miller has his office at the Licensee's Euxenite plant in St. Iouis, however he spends see part of each week at the Hematite plant. It is understood that Mr..
Miller depends on and gets close cooperation from Dr. North, Manager of
. the Hematite plant, in matters pertaining to the radiation safety pro-gram at Hematite. Mr. Miller is a chemical engineer by academic back-ground and he has had several years of experience in the radiation safety problems associated with uranim processing at the Mallinckrodt I
i 9
1 Page ?
Mallinekrodt Nuclear Corporation St. Iouis, Missouri License No. SNM-33 Chmical Works plants in St. Iouis, Missouri. Mr. Miller is assisted at Manatite by one technician. Drs. North and Imaders had responsibility for all critkality problems at the Henatite plant at the time of the last inspection however, since Dr. Leaders left, responsibility for criticality is now shared by Drs. North and Tompkins with Dr. North having primary responsibility.
- 26. Personnel are routinely monitored with a film badge program which is conducted entirely by the Licensee. At the time of the last inspection a film badge service supplied by St. John's I-ray Iaboratory, Califon,
)
New Jersey was being used,however, the service was not considered satis-factory and was,therefore, discontinued. In the present program the Licensee furnishes a stainless steel badge with open window and shielded Film reading capability and empletely processes the badges and film.
processing is done in a dark rom facility in the Medical Department of the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works plant in St. Iouis, Missouri. The pro-cedure for film development, calibration and reading is patterned after The the film badge program in effect at the AEC's Weldon Springs plant.
film is gamma calibrated with a radim source which has been calibrated by the National Bureau of Standards. A natural uranium source is used to calibrate the film for p. The film were processed on a weekly basis i
at the outset of the program but it was found that monthly processing j
of the film gave more nearly correct radiation exposure readings be-cause the higher cumulative radiation darkening of the film increases the accuracy of the method for reading the lower exposures recorded on i
the film. Individual exposure records are maintained. During the period when a weekly film badge program was in effect the records reflect weekly j
Records for the current monthly and quarterly cummulative exposures.
program show an average weekly exposure, monthly and quarterly cummulative The weekly records show exposures to 100 mrep p and the non-exposures.
th17 record shows exposures to 2h0 mrep p with averages of 80 - 90 arep.
f Gamma readings to 15 mran for the monthly program are also recorded.
The above quoted exposures are all for operations personnel tile recorded exposures for pilot plant, IAboratory and maintenance personnel have all been less. The records reflect no personnel exposures that have ex-ceeded the pemissible lindts of 10 CFR 20. Film badges for the Licensee's progra9' at Haastite contain Indium foil as an aid to segrega-tion of personnel exposed as a result of an accidental criticality in-cident.
- 27. Licensee Hematite plant operating personnel submit urinalysis samples on a 3 - 6 months basis depending on job assignment. Records of urinalysis results since 1957 show a high of 329 9 d/m/1 uranium a and a average of 3 - 5 d/m/l a as empared to a 45 d/m/l tolerance for such samples. Mr. Miller stated that in all cases where the count ex-ceeded tolerance the individual involved has been required to re-sample under direct supervision to lessen the probability of sample contamina-tion. The concentration under controlled sampling conditions has al,waye decreased within three emnplings to below the permissible h5 d/m/1 concentration. Urinalysis is perfomed for the Licensee by the Nuclear Service and Engineering Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
. ~ -
l c,
6.
i
' Page 8
.2111rdrat =lar br :ntm 2t.1cuis,..in::1 lianse N. J..-33
- 28. The facilities in the Licensee's Hematite plant were designed and installed with the philosoph7 that the best approach to airborne radioactivity control is the isolation and contaiment of specific parts of the process on equipent that are apt to contribute to and collectively cause airborne activity problems in the general plant processing areas and adjacent areas. The developent of the above philosophy in the Licensee's plant appears to have accomplished an t
t ecceptable degree of control and protection of Licensee personnel and the public from airborne radioactivity incident to use of the licensed
-material. A complete airborne radioactivity study has been made of specific jobs as well as general air concentrations inside and outside the plant area. Based en sample results inside the plant a factor has been derived and assigned the various areas sampled. This factor is j
used to determine personnel over-en exposures to airbe ne activity.
eriod Records of personnel airborne radioactivity exposures forghe p/mi fcr l
frca May 1959 to January 1960 han nat exceeded 5 0 x 10-pe h0 br. weg except ir, e low isolated cases where the wlue was up to j
i 5 6 x 10-pe/ml/h0hr. week. The method of determining personnel exposures would not be expected to be accurate enough to determine fact exceed 5 0 x 10-ge few cases (rvh) that the exposures did in definitely that in th e/ml/h0hr. week. Further, Mr. Miller stated
]
that periodic re-evaluation is made of the exposure factors assigned a given area based on the most recent air sampling data. The more re-cent, and considered more valid factors, when applied to the sans ex-posure ciremstances that resulted in the above light overage bring the personnel egosures to within the 5 0 x 10-1 c/m2/h0 hr. week
. permissible level. During the period fra October 1958 to October plantgaveahi$of3.15x10gietedareasaroundthesenatite 1959,86 samples taken in unres pe/mi e and a lov of none detectable with an average of 0.2 x 10-12 pe/a1a. Mining hood stacks were
.sampigonOctober 11,1958 gth gross a results as fonows: (1) 7 89 i
x 10*
pe/ml)(2)738x10 pe/ml;(3)327x10-H pe/m2. Mr.
Miller stated that these samples were taken to determine uranian pro-cess losses. Although potential airborne radioactivity producing operations are enclosed in filters hoods, masks were observed being worn by personnel when actual entry into walk-in hoods is necessary.
- 29. Routine radiation surveys are made of the Heatite plant area with portable radiation survey instruents. Results of the surveys are recorded on floor plans. These surveys are usually made weekly by the health physics technician but the frequency has varied depending on the work load of the technician. Recortis of the surveys show almost all readings to be 4 2 5 mrAr sessa with an occasional beta plus samma read recorded as 20 4 Mr. Minor stated that instruents with 1
20 nr maxima range have been used for the surveys and that the readings recorded as greater than 20 arhr would not be expected to escoed20mr/hrtoasignificantextent. Mr. Minor stated e. hat no readings in eacees of 2 mrhr have been observed outside the Hematite restricted area.
- 30. Liquid mete frca the Licensee's Heatite plant is primarily contaminated with asumanium diuranste. These solutions have been treated with line to 1
prooipitate the urania and flouride content, then the aburry is broudt to boiling to nunovo the ammonia dias the filtrate is filtered. The filter ooks is stored for reprocessing.. The filtrate, dish is primarily a_
i
4 4
Page 9 Mallinckrodt Nuclear Corporation St.14uis, Missouri License No. SNM-33 pure water is released to the process sewer line. Ninety-nine percent of the ammonium flouride liquors eme from a plant section that handles only up to 5% enriernent materials. All Hanatite process wastes are j
discharged due west through a sewer that empties in a stream which flows south through the Licensee's property. Since the last inspection this stream has been dammed, below the point of entry of the plant effluent; such that the resultant small lake has backwater which extend to the source of water feeding the lake which is a natural spring located within the Licensee's restricted property. Construction of the dam has given the Licensee better control and samplirtg of the liquid effluent. All water flowing over the dam passes through a Weir box type sampling arrangenent which takes a continuous sample of a known volume. The effluent flows several hundred feet from the dam into Joachim Creek which is not on Licensee property. Joachim Creek eracties into the Mississippi River several miles from the confluence of the Licensee's waste stream and the creek. Orab samples taken, during the period fra h-2h-59 to 6-19-59, st the same location as the continuk's sampling station showed alpha activity of h.51 x 10-5' to 3 2 x lo nc/ml. Orab samples prior to that, 1958 showed gross a of 2 96 x 10-6 c/ml and gross p of on August ih,/ml. More recent sampling for the period fra 8-17-59 to 1 5 x 10-5 e 12-31-59, with periods of sampling from 3 to I days, showed 1.26 -
6.25 x 10N pc/mi alpha and 1 33 - 9 37 x 10-7 c/ml beta activities.
Samples have been taken of the spring water which feeds the licensee's effluent stream. Samples are said to have been taken at a point where i
only the natural radioactivity content of the spring water would be Sample resu}ts for the string water showed the followings present.
1 pc/mi alpha and 2 37 x 10-7 betas. Averages:
3 82 x 10-7 15 x 10pc/ml alpha and 3.ho x 10-7 beta. In 1957 the licensee Maxistas:
i established h effluent sampling stations as follows: (1) spring stream several hundred feet south of entry of licensee plant effluent; (2) up-stream on Joachim Creek several miles fra confluence of spring stream and Joachim Creek sample taken at bridge across Joachim Creek near Hematite, Missouri; (3) approximately 100 ft. below the point of entry of spring branch into Joachim Creek; (h) several hundred yards down-stream on Joachim Creek from confluence of the spring stream and Joachim Creek. Sample results (gross alpha) (1) 1.hh x 10-7 c/ml; (2) 1.26 x m-7 c/ml;(3)1.8hx10-7 e/ml;(b)1.89x10-7pc/ml. The licensee's method of analysis is said to be capable of detepnining radioactivity concentrations in the effluent down to 5 0 x 10 7 pe/ml. Mr. Miller stated that the cemissible concentration for uranium in effluent, 7 x 10-6 c/ml as specified in Appendix B of 10 CFR 20, is applied'since the radioactivity con-
)
tained in the affluent is identified.
- 31. Mr. Miller directed the organisation of the radiological health and safety program at the licensee's Hematite phnt. Routine daily functions of the program, such as air sampling, radiation surveys, etc., are carried out by a technician who reports to Mr. Miller. Compliance by Hematite personnel with the over-all program is indirectly supervised by Mr. Millar through Dr. North who prmotes and requires empliance with the program through process engineers and foremen. Mr. Miller indicated that he has always received reasonable cooperation and support from Dr.
North in practing and maintaining the radiation safety program at Hematite.
I 9
I l
Page l')
pamnaireadt Nuclaer Concretion St. Inuis, Missouri j
License No. 306-3)
Dr. North st9ted that enouEh basic facts, concerning the nature of accidental criticality, have been F ven to personnel to nurture a i
respectful understanding of the potential radiation hazani involved.
- 32. The licensee has a problem with storage of outgoing material at pre-sent time due to the inability cf some custcners to accept materials as soon as Mallinckrodt has tnem ready. This has resulted in one large storage room being completely filled with five gallon pails filled with material ready for shipment. The pails are stored on the floor with spacing of 2 feet on centers. Dr. North demonstrated the proposed shipping container which he stated has been licensed by the AEC on a short-tem basis. This shipping container consists of a 5 gallon can with a rubber gasketed lid held in place by an angle iron framework in the center of a 55 ss11on dria, which is also sealed by a rubber gasketed lid. Use of these containers was approved by the Division of Licensing and Regulation for one shipnent and approval was extended for a six-month period and this was then extended to a year.
Dr. North stated that he could not understand why the Division of Licensing and Regulation would not approve his most recent request to further apprme; use of these shipping containers. Dr. North stated that the AEC had expressed concern about the possible double stacking of the centainers. Dr. North stated that double stacking of the con-tainers has not been done and that they do not intend to in the future.
VI. POSTING 33 Shipping containers are monitored by Health Physics to assure ccupliance with 100 Regulations and labeled externally with ICC labels. A color coded card system is used on containers to identify categories of en-richment. In conjunction with this coding systan, one part of each cani is devoted to posting and hbeling as prescribed by 10 CyR 20 j
wnloh assures that proper labeling will be affixed to the containers.
l Plant areas are posted as required by 10 CFR 20.
VII. MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 3h. Effective materia { accountability procedures are directed and carried out by Dr. North. Cylinders of UF6 are weighed upon receipt and the weight recorded in a log book kept in Dr. North's office. The cylinders are assigned a number at this time which identifies the material all the way through the process. Material being processed is weighed after each step in the process and amounts recorded on process flow sheets which serve as a check agafnst other accountability records. Primary respon-sibility for accountability rests with Dr. North who submits periodio accountability reporte to the AEC on Fom #578.
VIII. NUCLEAR SAFETY
- 35. General Dr. North is responsible for the enforcement of criticality procedures at the Hematite Plant. Dr. North said that three engineers fram Mallinckrodt had attended the Criticality School at Oak Ridge last fall. One man was from his Manufacturing Section, one man from the s
.\\
a e
Page 11 Lallir. caro:.t d ear :: m ritic:
A. ".cuis,..ia,c c.ri Lictue "c. f..-33 Research and Development Department under Dr. Tompkins, and one engineer from the Design Section in Mallinckrodt's Chemical Department at St. Louis. Dr. North said that any new prccess will be reviewed indeoendently for criticality hazards by each one of these three men, and also by Dr. Tompkins and by himself. If after this review, outside consultation is felt necessary, Mallinckrodt Nuclear will call upon people at Oak Ridge and/or Rocky Flats, for review of the proposed operation.
I
- 36. Criticality Control Procedures The criticality control procedures vary according to the process and the area in the plant. All of the procedures have been written and published, and Dr. North keep 6 a copy of each procedure in his The procedures have not been combined into a safety manual.
desk.
Some of the procedures have been amended since they were originally fom ulated. They are amended by the issuance of an Amendment Sheet i
which is reviewed by, at least, Dr. North and the engineer on his staff who has attended the Criticality School. The procedures are I
not issued to the workmen on the job for fear of over-burdening them with an avalanche of infomation which may not be related to the
)
particular operation that each man perfoms. Instead, the particular i
written procedure for each individual operation is kept by the Process Engineer who instructs the foreman and the operators under his super-1 vision. Process flow sheets and instruction sheets are issued to the operators but these sheets contain only manufacturing infomation -
f there is no data on the sheeta pert.aining to the safe batch limit or the criticality hazards of the operation. There is a Process Engineer i
in charge of each one of the rooms in Wich various operations are 1
perfomed, and it is his responsibility to see that safe procedures are follmed.
In general, criticality control is obtained by safe gemetry, by limited safe mass batches, or by administrative control, or in see cases, by ccabinations cf ar.y cf these contrcls.
37 Criticality Control in Specific Operations 1.
Storage Uranitsa ccating into Mallinckrodt Nuclear Corporation is re-
. ceived in UT6 cylir.ders from Oak Ridge. These cylinders are held in always safe open framework welded angle-iron bird-cages.
The highly enriched material cylinders are taken immediately out of the bird cages and placed in racks in the storage vault, one cylinder to a rock location. Rack locations are two feet apart.
There are nine such locations. However, they are so made that it could be possible for more than one cylinder to be placed in a particular rack. Dr. North said that this la controlled by the Process Engineer and the Foreman of the highly enriched room, who personally unload new cylinders of highly enriched material when it arrives. When the cylinders are received they are locked into position in their racks by a chain and a lock. The j
key for this lock is then kept by the Process Engineer in the l
highly enriched rocat. Cylinders of low enriched material are i
kept in a separate part of the storage vault in bird cages, until they are needed in the manufacturing procees.
i i
I
[x
O' Page 12 Mallinokrodt Nuclear Corporation St. tou1A, Missouri License No. Seet-33 When a new eylinder of highly enriched material is required, written permission must first be obtained frem Dr. North be-fore this cylinder may be moved frcm the storage vault. Dr.
North keeps a shipping record of each cyliMer received fra Oak Ridge. These cylinders are stamped with an identifying nuber by Oak Ridge. The key to unlock the required cylinder is then gotten fra the Process Engineer resulting in a double check on the procuranent of highly enriched material. Dr.
North said that no attempt is made to assay the enrichments of the UF6 as it is received fra Oak Ridge. They depend solely and empletely upon Oak Ridge records. According to Dr. North he is aware of only two instances in which Oak Ridge had made a mistake in labeling the enrichment of the material in these cyliMers, and these two fiascos occurred quite a few years ago. He said that he had checked with Oak Ridge people during the last two years and that he had been assured by them that there are so margr checks on the enrichment of a particular cylinder that a mistake is impossible.
2.
Highly Enriched Area (Red Rom)
Criticality control in the highly enriched rom is attained and maintained by safe geometry. The only apparatus in this rom, observed during a very thorough inspection, which was not of a safe gemetrical design, was the drying oven which could conceivably hold more than one tray having a limited safe batch. All pipes and cylinders in this room were five inches and under. There were no open beakers of acre than one-gallon capacity.
In addition to safe gemetry as the control in this rom, safe batch limits are also employed. When a cylinder of UF6 is brought into the room, it is weighed and a batch which contains only.7 pound of Up3g is allowed to go through the process. This batch is given an identifying letter and number which follows it all the way through the process until the material is put into a shipping c,ontainer.
- 3. Meditan Enrichments and Iow Dirichments Rom Patch control is employed in these rooms. The batch control starts by the review of a proposed job by Dr. North, who plans the process fra a manufacturing viewpoint. In his planning, he will state a particular safe batch for the stated enrich-ment of material in this job. Dr. North said that he gets all of his safe batches fran the charts in K-1019. When a Process Engineer then gets the instructions to proceed with a particular job, the Process Engineer must write an amendment to the pub-lished procedures for a particular batch for this enrichment.
This means that the Process Engineer must also check the safe batch size for this enrichment. The amendment sheet is countersigned by Dr. North. If a cylinder of UF6, as received, contains more than one safe batch, it is subdivided into ina dividual safe batches in cylinders before they are allowed into the process room.
)
L
'O s
l Page 13 1
Hamnokrodt Nuclear Co@ oration St.14uis, Missouri License No. tam.33 In the process itself, criticality control is achieved by keeping individual batches separate and distinct. Each batch is labeled as it goes through a particular operation.
In the low enrichment rom, Dr. North said that two jobs
)
involving different enrichments may be allowed. In such a case, however, the length of time for each operation is such that there will be a definite division between the two en-richments. The UF6 to ADU process and the drying ovens are an on one side of the plant. The reduction furnaces and the coolers are on the other side of the plant. Materials of riifferent enrichments are kept separated.
- h. Blending In order to get a h mogeneous blend of UO2 powder, the UO2 l
is blended in the Blending Rom. This blending rom is in a separate building. Ten empty 15-gs11on dras are placed in l
each of ten holes in a long stainless steel plate in a hooded dry box. In the rear of this dry box, a single drum containing a limited safe batch of UO2 powder win move on a dolly past each of the dras. An operator transfers a scoopful, by i
volume, fra the drum on the dolly to each of the stationary
)
drums. When the stationary drums are 655 tilled, they are then taken from this dry box, sealed, weighed, and transferred to another hooded dry box where they are tabled. The criticality control in this room depends upon correct procedure by the in-dividual operator during the blending process, and also in storing cans of powder on 2' centers on the floor.
- 5. Pellet Plant Control in the Penet Plant is by a cabination of batch con-trol and procedure. Individual batches of UO2 powder are j
brought into the pellet plant by the operator from the blend-ing rom. By procedure, the pellet rom operator is not per-j mitted to bring pcwder cans into the rocm. They go through I
the whole penetizing process as an individual batch. UO2 l
is in definite batches in the mixer, where the lubricant and the bindidg material are added to the powder. This material is then fed to the granulating equipment, a drying oven and to the penet press in a continuous process b individual batches.
As the pellets discharge from the press, they fan to a moving tray which takes them through a drying oven. The height of the sides of the tray in the oven is one inch. Bere is an electrical interlock between the pellet press and the motor drive on the belt, so that if the belt should fail, the press would stop, and there would be no pile-up of penets after discharge from the press. At the discharge end of this drying oven, the pellets are taken by hand and placed into trays in batch lots. Batches discharging fra the pellet press through the oven are separated by means of a molybdenn strip, which is placed on the moving belt after each batch lot. he penets
. are then fed through a sintering oven and, still in individual batch trays, finally fed to a spiral hopper which feeds than through a grinding machine. They are taken by an operator fra the discharge end of the grinding machine, and placed on a corrugated sheet in a single 1syer for inspection.
s
~
m.
e r
Q Page Z
&1 lim rrt uclear kr-mtic :
it. Icuis,..izaouri I i:c.ca
- c. iT -33
- 6. Criticality Control in Solutiens Analytical samples are taken fra many processes and studies in the laboratery. Any samples which assay at 5%
or more are retumed to the highly enriched red rom in solutions, in one gallen polye2ylene bottles. These bottles are clearly labeled with a red tag which states the assay and the amount of uranium in the bottle. After a particular job is finished in the highly enriched red rom, all of the apparatus is cleaned with nitric acid. The clean-ing solutions, which now contain a small amount of highly en-riched uranium, are stored in five-inch polyethylene cylinders which are placed in racks separated by two feet. In order to recover the uranim in these solutions, they are processed through a solvent liquid-liquid extraction. The medium is tributyl phosphate and kerosene. Three cylinders are em-ployed in the extraction, each of which is less than 5 inches inside diameter. Furthemore, a strict batch control is maintained in this process. 1he volume of solution put through the extraction process is limited to 1-1/2 liters in j
each batch. Dr. North stated that the average concentration
)
in the solution to be reclaimed has been 100 grams per liter, with a maximum of 200 grams per liter. The precipitate is drained off the botte of the extraction cylinders in one gallon stainless steel open beakers. The beakers are moved to another hood where the precipitate is further filtered. No more than three batches are allowed within the hooded area of this filtering process at one time and operators have been in-structed to maintain 2 feet separation of these batches.
i To insure strict a:hinistrative control ovar this procesa, Dr.
North said that three of his best operators had been trained for this job and they alone perfom this particular operation.
This job is done only on the day shif t, so that there can be stricter supervision. Dr. Ncrth said that ha had selected one operator for training in this job, and that another man with more seniority had insisted that the position enould be given to him. North said that the case had finally gone to arbitra-tion, with a decinion rendered that the more highly skilled operator, chosen by Dr. North, would be given this job.
- 7. Waste Recovery Dr. North stated that there is a strict accounting of all material charged to Mallinckrodt all throughout every pro-cess, so that they then are certain that they know the assay of aqy scrap or residue. Thus, they can be sure of the assay when they put it through a solvent extraction process. As far as criticality is concerned, all material which is to be re-claimed in the highly enriched red room is assumed to be fully enriched.
Scrap material which is accepted for uranium recovery fra clients outside of the Hallinckrodt organization is always sampled and analysed for enrichment before the material is in-troduced into the recovery process. One of the reasons for
e A
" age 15 Mallinckrodt Nuclear Corporation St. Louis, Missouri License No. SNM-33 this, according to Ncrth, is that for accountability purposes he wishes to check the custmer's evaluation of the assay. This gives a double check on the assay for criticality control also.
In the low enriched rom, there is a solvent extraction re-covery process for scrap material in which batch control is employed. The batches are calculated by North on the basis of the assay of analytical samples.
l
)
i k
i I
1 e
I i
l r
I I
Y