ML20133H730

Notation Vote Response Sheet,Approving in Part & Disapproving in Part w/comments,SECY-96-128, Policy & Key Tech Issues Pertaining to W AP600 Standardized Passive Reactor Design

ML20133H730
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	12/12/1996
From:	Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20133H573	List: ML20133H571 ML20133H634 ML20133H654 ML20133H666 ML20133H673 ML20133H730
References
SECY-96-128-C, NUDOCS 9701170272
Download: ML20133H730 (2)

Text

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NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN

SUBJECT:

SECY-96-128 -

POLICY AND KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE REACTOR DESIGN Approved Disapproved Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS:

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- 1.1 / 99G Release Vote / v/ i DATE Withhold Vote / /

Entered on "AS" Yes .x No ,

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9701170272 970115 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

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COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN'S COMMENTS ON SECY-96-128 i

Severe Accident Manaaement and Mitication I support the staff's position, as stated in the November 12, 1996 revised clarification paper, on the importance of assuring that the AP-600 design includes adequate means for long-term management and mitigation following a severe accident. I am prepared to support the inclusion of an additional non-safety l

system or systems for this purpose if the staff can be more specific with respect to the design and performance requirements 4 for the system (s) and if these additional requirements are

! consistent with the general concept of a passive design.

j Use of Realistic Fission Product Removal Coefficients I do not approve the staff's proposal to use realistic fission product removal coefficients in desion basis calculations for the j

AP-600 because of the inclusion of an additional non-safety system (s) for severe accident management and mitigation. I agree with Commissioner Rogers that the staff's choice of values in their analyses and reviews of design basis accidents should be arrived at through a process involving expert technical judgments i

and should not be settled by bargaining.

i Post-72 Hour Actions i

j . I approve the staff's position that the site be capable of sustaining all design basis events with onsite equipment and supplies for the long term, with replenishment of consumables (such as diesel fuel oil) from offsite suppliers allowed after seven days.

External Reactor Vessel Coolinq approach, involving reliance on in-vessel retention of the core complemented with limited analytical evaluation of ex-vessel phenomena, to address the adequacy of the AP-600 design for ex-vessel events.

i UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j WASHINGTON, D C. 20555-0001 e

,[ January 15, 1997

..... I OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY l

l MEMORANDUM TO: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr Acting Executive Director for Operations Karen D. Cyr Gene oun e FROM: Joh . Hoyl , Secretary

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-96-128 - POLICY AND KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE REACTOR DESIGN The Commission agrees it is inportant that the AP600 design include adequate means for accident management and long term mitigation. However, the Commission does not support the staff's j request for the inclusion of additional system (s) for accident management and long term mitigation following a severe' accident as presented, not because it may be inappropriate, but because the basic design and performance requirements have not been bounded or specified, and the' requested additional system (s) do not appear to be consistent with the concept of a passive design.

The Commission is open to reconsideration of this issue if the staff can be more specific in terms of what additional system (s) are contemplated, including the design and performance requirements.

The Commission believes fission product removal coefficients for analyzing the consequences of design basis accidents should be based on technical merits, and should not be linked to the availability of one or more non-safety systems.

The Commission approved the staff's position that the site be capable of sustaining design basis events with onsite equipment and supplies for the long term, with replenishment of consumables (such as diesel fuel oil) from offsite suppliers after seven days.

SECY NOTE: THIS SRM, SECY-96-128, AND THE COMMISSION VOTING RECORD CONTAINING THE VOTE SHEETS OF ALL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 5 WO ING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM.

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The Commission approved the staff's position that Westinghouse use a balanced approach, involving reliance on in-vessel retention of the core complemented with limited analytical  :

evaluation of ex-vessel phenomena, to address the adequacy of the AP600 design for ex-vessel events.

l cc: Chairman Jackson Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Dia:

Commissioner McGaffiran OCA OIG Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail) l 4

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