ML20133H666

Notation Vote Response Sheet Approving in Part & Disapproving in Part w/comments,SECY-96-128, Policy Issues & Key Tech Issues Pertaining to W AP600 Standardized Passive Reactor Design

ML20133H666
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	12/02/1996
From:	Dicus G NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20133H573	List: ML20133H571 ML20133H634 ML20133H654 ML20133H666 ML20133H673 ML20133H730
References
SECY-96-128-C, NUDOCS 9701170250
Download: ML20133H666 (2)

Text

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1 NOTATION VOTE t

! RESPONSE SHEET f

4

! TO: John C. Hoyle l Secretary of the Commission j

I FROM: COMMISSIONER DICUS

SUBJECT:

SECY-96-128 - POLICY ISSUES AND KEY

- TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE i:

WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE  ;

REACTOR DESIGN l

l l

I Approved x w/ comment Disapproved x w/ comment  ;

I l

,! Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS: See Attached efm ey e com U IdNATURE Release Vote / X_/

DATE Fithhold Vote / /

Entered on "AS" Yes No 9701170250 970115 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

Commissioner Dicus' Comments to SECY-96-128 1

1 I support giving operators the necessary tools for effective accident management and to provide them with various alternatives with which to accomplish the task. However, I disapprove the staffs request as currently presented, not because it may be inappropriate or unnecessary, but rather because approval would be, in essence, approval of a system for which its basic design and performance requirements have not been bounded or specified.

If staff can be more specific with respect to the design and performance requirements for the system it deems is necessary in order to achieve that balance between preventive and mitigative design features, I would be willing to reconsider this question, if these additional requirements are l consistent with the general concept of a passive design.

It is appropriate for the staff to seek Commission guidance if it feels additional requirements need to be imposed on plant designs that can meet the Commission Safety Goal Objectives and all other regulatory requirements, such as Parts 50 and 100. However, decisions regarding the technical adequacy of the design should be made by the staff.

2. I disapprove staffs proposal for using " realistic" fission product removal coefficients for DBA analyses based on the arguments provided by the staff. \ .1atever coefficients are to be used should be based solely on technical merits of the coefficients proposed, not upon the presumed availability of one or more nonsafety systems. I a'so do not approve of crediting the use of nonsafety related systems to account for uncertainties that may be present as they relate to design basis accident mitigation performance or analyses. Furthermore, I agree with Cmrs. Diaz and Rogers views with respect to this issue.

3. I approve the staff's position that the site be capable of sustaining all DBA events with onsite equipment and supplies for the long term (i.e.,7 days), as proposed in the paper.

4. I approve the staffs position that reliance on in-vessel retention of the core be complemented with limited analytical evaluation of ex-vessel phenomena, to address the adequacy of the AP600 design for ex-vessel events.