ML20133H673
| ML20133H673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1996 |
| From: | Diaz N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133H573 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-96-128-C, NUDOCS 9701170253 | |
| Download: ML20133H673 (2) | |
Text
_.
NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO:
John C.
Hoyle, Secretary FROM:
COMMISSIONER DIAZ 3
i i
SUBJECT:
SECY-96-128 - POLICY AND KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE REACTOR DESIGN Approved I
Disapproved _I N Abstain i
4 4
Not Participating Fequest Discussion i
i COMMENTS:
hMN CDWM4h b0 i
/ gIGNATU Release Vote
/V/
! O-9-94 DATE Withhold Vote
/
/
Entered on "AS" Yes V
No I
9701170253 970115 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
Commissioner Diaz' Comments on SECY-96-128 I approve in part and disapprove in part the staff's recommendations as follow-i I do not agree with the staff recommendation to use "non-safety-related system (s) to address the uncertainties associated with the passive natural fission product removal mechanisms for design basis analysis."
Although there may be merit to having a non-safety-related spray for heat and fission product removal Jollowing a severe accident, it should not be justified based on uncerta.nties in the design basis accident analysis (unless staff proposes to give explicit credit for sprays in the design basis analysis - an approach I also do not favor).
Staff should complete its evaluation of the non-safety-related fan coolers to determine if they provide acceptable capabilities to mitigate the consequences of a severe accident If staff continues to believe a spray system is desirable, it shot.ld revisit the SAMDA analysis to determine if such a system can be justified or alternately, the staff can explicitly request the Commission for approval for requiring a non-safety-related spray system. (Sta) f should continue to give credit for non-safety-related systems in its evaluation of severe accidents.)
l I support the staff recommendatior. that the site be capable of sustaining all design basis events with onsite equipment and supplies for the long term and that after 7 days, replenishment of consumables can be credited.
Regarding the staff's recommendation that Westinghouse performs a limited analytical evaluation of e<-vessel phenomena. Westinghouse. ih its August 20, 1996 letter. has ag,'eed to perform this evaluation.
Therefore, this issue appears moot.
I suggest that the Commission defer action on this issue until such time as the staff determines that the Westinghouse analysis is insufficient.
.