ML20133F324
| ML20133F324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1985 |
| From: | Dance H, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F284 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-85-26, 50-414-85-21, NUDOCS 8508080238 | |
| Download: ML20133F324 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1985026
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/85-26 and 50-414/85-21
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
NPF-35 and CPPR-117
Facility Name: Catawba
Inspection Conducted: M
26 - June 25, 1985
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Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief
Dite 91gned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 161 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of site tours (Units 1 and 2); followup of licensee identified items
(Units 1 and 2); safety-related pipe support and restraint systems (Unit 2);
maintenance observations (Unit 1); surveillance observations (Unit 1), review of
nonroutine events (Unit 1); plant operations review (Unit 1); and followup of
previous identified inspection findings (Unit 1).
Results:
Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified in seven areas; one apparent violation was found in one area (failure
to follow procedures while performing operating evolutions, paragraphs 9 and 10.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
E. M. Couch, Project Manager
W. Allgood, Completion Engineer Electrical
H. L. Atkins, QA Engineering Supervisor
- H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
- S. G. Benesole, QA Engineer Hangers
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
J. W. Cox, Superintendent Technical Services
T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
- L. R. Davison, Project QA Manager
- J. R. Ferguson, Asst. Operating Engineer
- C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
'G. D. Houser, QA Hangers Supervisor
C. S. Kelly, Instrumentation / Electrical Technical Support
- J. A. Kinard, Technical Support Hangers
- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Tower, Operating Engineer
J. E. Whichard, Supervisor Electrical Technical Support
- E. G. Williams, Project QA Technician
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summar'ized on June 25, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The violation and unresolved
item described in paragraphs 9 and 10 were discussed in detail.
The
licensee acknowledged the findings and had no dissenting comments.
The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or
reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
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a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 414/84-45-01:
Separation between 600 Vac
Transformer 2ETXD and Safety-Related Raceway.
The licensee has
thoroughly reviewed areas for situations where the general design
criteria of 1-inch separation has not been met. All instances found
including the one identified in the unresolved item were evaluated to
be not safety significant.
The general clearance criteria has been
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added to the appropriate site specifications.
Licensee actions are
considered satisfactory.
b.
(Closed) Violation 414/84-46-01:
Failure to Control Use of Teflon
Tape. Responses for this item were submitted on January 24, 1985 and
March 14, 1985. The inspector reviewed these responses and verified
implementation of corrective actions described in the responses- and
considers licensee actions to be acceptable.
c.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 413/85-20-01, 414/85-16-01:
Verification of
Adequate
Installation of Instrumentation.
The
inspector held
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discussions with appropriate site and design licensee personnel
relative to whether operability of the instrument loops in question was
attached.
The opinion expressed was that operability was not
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immediately affected.
Further evaluation of this item is required.
4.
Unresolved Items *
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New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 6 and 10.d
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5.
Independent Inspection Effort (92706) (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors conducted tours of various plant areas. During these tours,
various plant. conditions and activities were observed to determine that they
were being performed in accordance with applicable requirements and
procedures.
No significant problems were identified during these tours and
the various evolutions observed were being performed in accordance with
applicable procedures.
6.
Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (50090)(Unit 2)
Supports and ' restraints were observed / reviewed to verify they were being
installed in accordance with various site QA and construction procedures.
The inspector verified that these procedures are being followed for
installation of supports / restraints in the areas of, as applicable,
conformance to applicable drawings, location, welds (size and location),
general physical condition, use of specified materials (size, type, etc.),
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use of appropriate locking devices such as double nuts, concrete anchor
bolts, cold setting, and inspections. The following completed supports were
observed:
2-R-SM-1582 (snubber, saddle), 2-A-NV-3406 (spring can),
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2-E-NW-0001 (equipment support), 2-R-NI-1608 (snubber),
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2-R-NC-0005 (snubber), 2-R-NC-1063 (spring can), 2-R-ND-0075
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-(fixed), 2-R-ND-0450 (spring can), 2-R-ND-473 (valve, fixed),
2-R-ND-0301 (snubber), 2-R-ND-0410 (sway strut, fixed),
2-R-ND-0017 (spring can) and 2-R-NI-1527 (fixed).
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- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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During this inspection, several apparent discrepancies were noted.
These
involve two of the hangers inspected and two additional hangers observed
during the inspection. These discrepancies are as follows:
a.
Angle between sway strut and clamp greater than 4 - support nos.
2-R-NI-1527, 2-A-KC-3351 and 2-A-KC-3898.
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b.
Rod not supporting load - support no. 2-R-ND-473
c.
Misorientation of end bracket support no. 2-R-ND-473
These discrepancies were documented on nonconforming Item Report Nos. 19732,
19742, and 19743.
Design evaluation has shown these discrepancies to be
non-significant.
The inspector reviewed these evaluations and considers
them acceptable. However, since the cause of the angle problems identified
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in a. above appears to be damage done after final inspection is completed,
further review of the controls in this area is needed.
This review is
'necessary to determine if appropriate area walkdowns are planned to detect
these problems and if Nuclear Production Department personnel are appro-
priately trained to recognize these problems and take appropriate corrective
action.
This is Unresolved Item 413/85-26-01, 414/85-21-01:
Verification
of Adequate Control of Hanger Installation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Observation (62703)(Unit 1)
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Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
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the requirements.
The inspector verified licensee conformance to the
requirements in the following areas of inspection: (1) that the activities
were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or
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calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
service; (2) quality control
records were maintained;
(3) that the
activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and (4) parts
and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to
determined status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is
assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system
performance.
Examples of these observations were work performed to clean
coolers for the safety injection (NI) and coolant charging (NV) pump motors,
safety-related batteries, and various minor maintenance to the safety-
related diesels.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance Observation (61726)(Unit 1)
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were
in compliance with various Technical Specifications (TS) requirements.
Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS
for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, residual heat removal,
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control room ventilation, and direct current (DC) electrical power sources.
The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance
with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,
limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and
restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met
requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing
were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
Typical of the surveillance items that were witnessed in part or in full
were various calibrations of portions of the nuclear instrumentation and
radiation monitoring systems, diesel generator operation, and in service
testing of various safety-related valves.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Review Of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (92700)(Unit 1)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with TS and regulatory
requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic
problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety signi-
ficance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant
personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an
asterisk (*).
The following LERs are closed.
- 84-31
12/16/84
Diesel Generator 1B Automatic
Start During 6.9 kV Transfer Test
84-32, R1
12/19/84
Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations
- 85-3
01/09/85
Inadvertent Reactor Trip Breaker
Actuation During Testing
- 85-11
02/07/85
Both Trains of Safety Injection
- 85-15
03/02/85
Several Valve Motor Breakers Not
Locked Off
- 85-26
04/22/85
RN Swapover to Standby Pond
85-29
04/23/85
Installation Clearance Requirements
for the Vital Batteries
During the inspectors' review of LER 413/85-22, a violation of 10 CFR 50
Appendix B was identified. This LER remains open.
LER 85-22 details the
inoperability of diesel generator (D/G) IB from 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br /> on March 7,1985
to 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br /> on March 14, 1985; and the failure of DG 1A from 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> to
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1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on March 14, 1985.
TS 6.8.1 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B
Criterion V, as implemented by the Duke Power Company Quality Assurance
Program Topical Report (Duke-1-A) Section 17.2.5,
requires activities
affecting quality to be prescribed by documented instructions procedures, or
drawings and to be accomplished in accordance with these instructions,
procedures, or drawings.
The inspector identified several examples of
activities where procedures were inadequate or were not followed.
This
violation is combined with the additional example discussed in paragraph
10.e and identified as Violation 413/85-26-02: Failure to Follow Procedures
Associated with LER 85-22 and Safety Injection pump operation.
The
following is a listing of examples where the activities associated with this
LER are violations:
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a.
On March 7, 1985, while performing PT/1/A/4350/02C, Available Power
Source Operability Check, although the PT allows verification by review
of the operating procedure, the operator noted the "DC Control Power
On" light was not lit which is required by the initial conditions for
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this PT. He assumed it was due to a faulty light bulb and continued
with the test without notifying the Shif t Supervisor of this problem.
This is a violation of: PT/1/A/4350/02C Step 8.1 which requires the DG
to be aligned for EC ictuation per OP/1/A/6350/02 (Diesel Generator
Operation) and specifies the "DC Control Power On" light is energized;
Station Directive (SD) 4.2.1, Development, Approval and Use of Station
Procedures, Revision 16, Section 10.0 which requires personnel to
adhere to procedures; and Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 1-4,
Use of Procedures, Section 8.1.D, which states that if the desired or
anticipated results are not achieved, the individual should not
proceed.
The operator's assumption was correct and he completed operation of
DG 18. However, subsequent to this operation, he attempted to replace
the lights.
The lights immediately went out upon insertion of the
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bulbs into the sockets. He then notified the Unit Supervisors of this
problem.
During post test ES lineup verification, the Unit Supervisor
instructed the operator to use an alternate means to verify DC control
power, a method which did not verify DC Control Power at the correct
location, and he did not change the procedure.
This is a second
violaticn of OMP 1-4, Section 8.1.0.
The operator then signed off step
15 of Enclosure 13.3 in PT/1/A/4350/02C which states DG 1B is aligned
for ES Actuation per OP/1/A/6350/02. This was a violation of this step
since the "DC Control Power On" light was not on as the procedure
specified.
A second operator then performed an independent verifi-
cation that DG IB was aligned for ES Actuation per OP/1/A/6350/02.
This was a violation of SD 4.2.2, Independent Verification Require-
ments, Section 9.4.1, which requires personnel signing the documenta-
tion either perform or observe the action required by the procedure
step.
As a result of the action taken by the operator to replace the bulbs,
two circuit breakers supplying DC control power had tripped which
caused the DG to be inoperable at this time without the licensee being
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aware of its condition. It appears that had the appropriate procedtres
been followed, this condition would have been identified earlier,
b.
During the inspector's review of documentation for this LER, several
documents could not be retrieved.
These documents were copies of
operating procedures that were used to determine operability of DGs.
Only the latest copy was retained.
Discussions with operations
personnel stated that OP/1/A/6350/02, Diesel Generator Operation, is
used in some instances to determine that the DG is operable following
work which must be tested but not to the extent that a complete
surveillance test is required by PT/1/A/4350/02.
Since this OP is
being used to determine that the DG meets implied acceptance criteria,
even though no acceptance criteria is identified or recorded in the
operating procedure, the OP is required to be retained as a completed
record when used for this purpose.
The Administrative Policy Manual
(APM) Section 4.2.7 provides the process for completed procedures which
involve documentation of compliance with procedure acceptance criteria.
The failure to maintain records of Operating Procedures that are used
to determine that a system / component is in compliance with acceptance
criteria is an example of a failure to follow procedures specified in
APM Section 4.2.7.
10.
Plant Operations Review (Unit 1) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, TS and
administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, TS Action
Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors also verified by
observation and interviews, that measures taken to assure physical
protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected
included the security organization, the establishment and maintenance
of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that
access control and badging were proper, and procedures followed.
In
addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed
for fire prevention and protection activities.
These included such
things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and
materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance and
construction activities.
b.
USNRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual Temporary Instruction 2500/14
was issued May 8,1985, specifying required inspection of the location
of the manual trip circuit in Westinghouse designed plants with a Solid
State Protection System (SSPS).
The temporary instruction (TI) was
issued to determine if the licensees are using controlled drawings that
depict correctly the actual location of the manual trip circuit and to
confirm that the manual' trip circuits are located downstream of output
transistors Q3 and Q4 in the undervoltage output circuit.
The
inspector reviewed this area for Catawba Unit I and identified that the
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controlled drawings do correctly depict the location of the manual trip
circuit and that the manual trip circuits are located as discussed
above. Based on this review, the TI requirements have been met and are
considered acceptable.
In addition, since Catawba Unit 2 has the same
system, this item is closed for Unit 2 also,
c.
During this reporting period, a situation occurred that caused a
violation of the Action Statement for TS 3.6.5.5.
This Action
Statement is for an equipment hatch between the containment's upper and
lower compartments and allows the hatch to be open for a maximum of 30
hours if in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4.
The utility was in the process of
attempting to locate a leak around the pressurizer impulse lines
utilizing a TV camera while in Mode 4.
It was required to have the
leak pressurized to aid in the leak detection.
When the utility
identified that the hatch would be opened in excess of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, they
contacted the NRC to discuss leaving this hatch open rather than
closing it and reopening it for additional inspection. The plant had
been shutdown from the 111tial startup test program for maintenance
since April 19, 1985, so decay heat and fission inventory were of
minimum concern.
After consultation with Region II management, a
decision was made to exercise discretionary enforcement authority and
not pursue enforcement action regarding the exceeding of TS 3.6.5.5 in
this specific case.
Subsequently, the licensee's inspection detected
and corrected a leaking fitting on a pressurizer instrument line and
the equipment hatch was replaced at 4:45 a.m. on June 4, 1985,
d.
While touring the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) room IB, the inspector
noted that ventilation to this room was secured.
This ventilation
system is a required support system for the ASP and must be in
operation to assure that the ASP remains functional.
The inspector
notified the Shift Supervisor (SS) of this problem. After investiga-
tion the SS declared the ASP IB inoperable and took action to restore
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the ventilation system to an operable status.
Further review of this
area identified that there does not appear to be a mechanism to
identify what support systems are required to be functional or in
operation to insure that the main system will perform its intended
function. This area was discussed with the utility management and they
are reviewing this area. This will be identified as an Unresolved Item
(413/85-26-03:
Identification of Support System Requirements), pending
completion and review by the inspector of the utility review of this
area,
e.
On June 1,1985, Safety Injection (NI) Pump 1A was operated to fill
cold leg accumulators in accordance with operating procedures.
This
pump should have been tagged out-of-service since maintenance was being
performed on the pump motor cooler and the pump oil cooler.
This
resulted in the isolation of cooling water to this component.
The
tagging process that was performed did not adequately tag the pump
switch or breaker.
Station Directive 3.1.1, Safety Tags and Delinea-
tion Tags, Revision 11 Section 4.2.2 states that white safety tags
shall be attached to any component, the operation of which could cause
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material or equipment damage.
The running of this pump without
adequate cooling water caused damage which required extensive repairs.
The failure to properly tag out NI pump 1A is an example of failure to
follow procedures as identified in paragraph 9, Violation 413/85-26-02.
11.
Previously Identified Inspector Findings (92701)(Unit 1)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/85-05-01: Followup of Licensee Action
for Nonroutine Report No. C85-17.
The corrective action taken as a result
of this event appears at this time to be sufficient to prevent a repeat of
this problem.
12.
Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e) (99020)(Unit 2)
(Closed) CDP 414/84-22: Valve Operator Wiring Incompatible With External
Wiring.
Reports for this item were submitted on November 21, 1984;
December 31, 1984; February 1,
1985; and March 1, 1985.
The inspector
' reviewed these reports and verified implementation of corrective actions
identified in the reports and considers licensee actions to be acceptable.
(Closed) CDR 413/414/84-15:
T-Drains Not Installed On Limitorque Motor
Operators.
This item was previously closed in Report 50-413/84-04,
414/84-41.
The licensee submitted an additional response on December 27,
1984, indicating that two additional valves were identified which required
modification. The inspector verified that the Unit i valve was corrected
and adequate controls are in place to assure that the Unit 2 valve is
corrected.
Therefore, this item remains closed.
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(0 pen) CDR 414/85-08: Overpressurization of the Residual Heat Removal (ND)
System. The inspector observed a portion of the liquid penetrant inspection
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of the 28 ND heat exchanger and held discursions with licensee personnel
relative to the status of the heat exchanger evaluations.
No significant
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problems appear to have been identified to date on 28.
The 2A heat
exchanger remains to be inspected.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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