ML20133E419
| ML20133E419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133E398 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8508070687 | |
| Download: ML20133E419 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655 1*e,,,,,/
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1-SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICh DF-thJCi. EAR-REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL.
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302 1.0 Introduction By letters dated May 1,1985, June 14,1985, June 19,1985, and July 8,1985, Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensee) made application to amend the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant to resolve conflicts between the TSs and commitments made to NRC staff with regard to overpressurization protection of the reactor vessel at low temperatures. The amendment request includes revisions to allow the following:
1.
High Pressure Injection (HPi) pumps and valves to be tested during Mode 6, REFUELING, except for the startup for Cycle 6 2.
High Pressure Injection Flow Balance Test to be perfomed during Mode 3, HOT STANDBY 3.
The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Load Test to be perfomed during Mode 3, HOT STANDBY 4.
A one-time waiver of the 18-month frequency requirement for TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.3 and 5 until Mode 3 during startup for Cycle 6, with the subject tests being performed in Mode 3 2.0 Discussion and Evaluation TS-4.5.2.f., regarding the actuation of valves and startup of pumps in the HPI system, required that this testing be accomplished during shutdown. This requirement conflicted with a commitment that HPI discharge valves are closed and " racked out" below 280*F in order to provide low temperature overpressurization protection. However this comitment would not permit HPI actuation testing to be performed since the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature is always below 280*F in Modes 4 and 5.
If the testing were performed in Mode 6 instead of during Modes 4 or 5, low temperature over-pressurization protection could be assured because the RCS cannot be overpressurized when the reactor vessel head is removed. Therefore, the proposed amendment would allow the HPI pumps and valves to be tested only during Mode 6.
This is acceptable because it allows the necessary tests to be performed while still providing protection from overpressurization at low temperatures.
8500070687 850723 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM _5
$URVETLLANCE REOUTREMENTS (Continued) 2.
Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of h 515 kw without tripping.
f. 3.
Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with Reactor Building l
high pressure and Reactor Building high-high pressure tests signals, l
and; a)
Verifying de-energization of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency busses, l
b)
Verifying that the 4160 v. emergency bus tie breakers open, c)
Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads, energizes the auto-connected emergency loads through the load sequencer, and operates for k5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.
4.
Verifying the diesel generator operates for A 60 minutes while loaded to > 3000 kw,
- 5.
Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do I
not exceed the 2000 hout rating of 3000 kw, and 6.
Verifying that the automatic load sequence timers are OPERABLE with each load sequence time interval within : 10%
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- This test shall be performed in MODE 3
- The specified 18 month frequency may be waived for Cycle VI startup 4
f CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 8-5 Amendments Nos. J, f d 79
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
'. 8.1. 2 As a minimum, the folicwing A.C. electrical power sources shall y:e OPERABLE:
a.
One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class lE distribution system, and b.
One diesel generator with:
i 1.
Day fuel tank containinc a minimum volume of 400 gallons of fuel, q
l 2.
A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of j
20,300 gallons of fuel, and 3.
A fuel transfer pump.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
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ACTION:
i! With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources j OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive i reactivity changes until the minimum required A.C. electrical power sources are restored to OPERABLE status.
ll SURVEILLfNCE RECUIREMENTS h
l'4.8.1.2 The above required A.C, electrical, power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by perfonnance of each of the Surveillance Re-quirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2, except requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 8-6
For the startup for Cycle 6 only, one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 4 train will not be available for testing prior to leaving Mode 6.
The licensee has proposed in its letter dated July 8,1985, to test the HPI pumps and valves for one train in Mode 4, as provided by the current TS. The valves (4.5.2.f.1) will be " racked in" and the "A" train pump will be shutdown and pump breaker " racked out".
Double valve isolation between the operating pump and the RCS will be maintained.
For the pump test (4.5.2.f.2), the valves will be " racked out" and the pump breaker " racked in".
The pumps will then be tested in recirculation with double valve isolation between the pump and RCS. The licensee will administratively control the isolated pumps and valves to preclude inadvertent operation.
Because the licensee is taking adequate protective measures to minimize the probability of low temperature overpressurization, and such testing is in accordance with the present TS, this is acceptable.
The HPI Flow Balance test (TS 4.5.2.g) must be performe'd with the vessel head on at a pressure of 600 psig. Low temperature overpressurization requirements prohibit testing in Modes 4 and 5 when the temperature is less than 280*F and the HPI valves are " racked out". Therefore the proposed amendment would change the Technical Specification to allow the test to be performed in Mode 3 in which the RCS temperature is above 280'.
The proposed amendment includes changes to allow two EDG surveillance tests to be performed in Mode 3, rather than during shutdown. These tests are: a) diesel auto-start from ambient conditions under simulated loss of offsite power, energizing emergency loads (TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.3), and b) verification that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of 3000 KW. The licensee has committed not to perform these tests in Modes 4 or 5 due to the possibility of overpressurizing the reactor vessel at l
low temperatures as a result of HPI operation.
In addition, Mode 6 testing would not be representative or desirable due to the potential to overfill the fuel transfer canal and increase the reactor building's airborne contamina-tion. Therefore this amendment would change the TS to specify that these tests (4.8.1.1.2.c.3 and 5) be done during Mode 3.
The proposed changes discussed above are acceptable because they permit
-- performance of the necessary tests while providing protection against low temperature overpressurization.
i It was also proposed to change TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.3 and 5 to allow a one-time waiver of the 18-month requirement for these EDG tests until Mode 3 during the startup for Cycle 6.
The 18-month requirement was exceeded during the i
course of the present outage; the opportunity for testing the EDG in accordance with the TSs was missed when the plant was brought to cold shutdown and subsequently defueled. The NRC staff believes the waiver does not impact the diesel generator reliability since other necessary tests required by TS 4.8.1.1.2 have been successfully completed, and all the necessary testing would be performed to demonstrate the diesel generator operability prior to the unit startup.
In addition, it is noted that because of the refueling and the length of the outage (3 months until Mode 6), the core decay heat is very low.
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~ 3.0 Environmental Consideration This amendment involves a change in the surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
July 23, 1985 Principal contributors:
E. Lantz and J. Emami l
l "o
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