Text

Forwards FEMA Offsite Exercise Rept Resulting from 850424-25 full-scale Exercise.Continued Coordination W/State of AR to Correct Deficiencies Requested
	ML20133B692
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/02/1985
From:	Johnson E; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Jeffery Griffin; ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
	NUDOCS 8508060240
	Download: ML20133B692 (1)
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- s' AUG k 95 Dockets: '60-313 50-368 Arkansas Power & Light Company ATTN:

John M.2 Griffin, Senior Vice President - Energy Supply P. O. Box 551.

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offsite exercise report resulting'from your April 24-25, 1985, full scale exercise.

There were several Category B deficiencies identified and a schedule for corrective action has been provided by the state to FEMA.

It is requested that AP&L continue to coordinate emergency planning efforts with the state to ensure that deficiencies in the offsite preparedness identified by FEMA as a result of the Arkansas Nuclear One exercise are f

corrected in a timely manner.

Sincerely, Original Signed By E. H. Johnson E. H. Johnson, Chief.

Reactor Projects Branch

Enclosure:

FEMA letter dated 6/27/85 w/ report cc w/ enclosure:

'J. M. Levine, General Manager Arkansas Nuclear One-P. O. Box 608 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Arkansas Radiation Control Program Director Vbcc to DMB (A045) w/ enclosure bec distrib. by RIV w/o enclosure:

RPB Resident Inspector R. D. Martin, RA R&SPB Section Chief (RPS/B)

R. L. Bangart, DRS&S R.- Denise, DRS&P bec distrib. by RIV w/ enclosure:

RIV File Docket File (2)

J. Baird C. Hackney gf[.

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m 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 o

O JUN 2 71985 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S Nuclear Re ulatory Commission

,1,w FROM:

ic ard W. Krimm Assistant Associate Director Of fice of Natural and Technologi cal Hazards

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for the April 24-25, 1985, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Plans for Arkansas Nuclear One Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report for the April 24-25, 1985, full-participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for Arkansas Nuclear One. The exercise report dated June 15, 1985, was prepared by the Region VI staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

There were several Category B deficiencies identified during the exercise.

A schedule of corrective actions for these deficiencies has already been provided by the State of Arkansas and is contained in the exercise report.

These deficiencies did not detract from the overall capability demonstrated by the State of Arkansas and Pope, Logan, Johnson, and Yell Counties to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological eme rge ncy. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on January 27, 1982, will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2851.

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'IRADIOLOGICAL EMsR'GENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT

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p 1 Date of Exercise:! April 24-25,1985 1 articipants: _ State of Irkansas; P

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CONTENTS k

A B B R EVI ATIO N S..........................................................

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E X E RC ISE SU M M A R Y......................................................

v 1 i NT a O D U C TiO N........................................................

1 1.1 Exercise Bac kgro und................................................

I 1.2 Fede ral Evalua t o rs.................................................

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1.3 Exercise Obj ec tives................................................

4 1.3.1 Arkansas Power and Light Company Objectives...................

5 1.3.2 Objectives for Participating Off-Site Emergency Response

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Org a n i z a t i o ns................................................

8 1.3.3 State Of f-Site Ac tivities....................................... 11 1.4 Exercise Scenario Su m m ary.......................................... 13 1.5 Evalua tio n C riteria................................................. 17 2 E X E RC ISE EVA L U ATIO N................................................ 19 2.1 Arkansas State Operations........................................... 19 2.1.1 S ta te EO C - Co nw ay.......................................... 19 2.1.2 Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC).................... 24 2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams............................ 31 2.1.4 Do s e Asse ss m e n t............................................. 36 2.1.5 M e di a C e n t e r................................................ 40 2.2 County Government and Local Response Organizations.................... 44 2.2.1 - P o p e C o u n ty E O C............................................ 44 Evacuation of On-Site Personnel............................... 48 Atkins Emergency Worker Center.............................. 49 2.2.2 Jo hnso n Co u n ty EO C......................................... 52 2.2.3 Log a n C o u n t y E O C........................................... 54 2.2.4 Y e ll C o un ty E O C............................................. 57 2.2.5 Con way Coun ty EO C......................................... 59 2.3 Medical Support-St. Mary's Hospital / Pope County A mbulanc e Se rvice................................................. ' 6 4 2.4 U t ili ty Su pp o r t..................................................... 66 3 DEFICIENCY TRACKING AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS...... 70 4 EVALU ATIO N O F OBJECTIVES........................................... 80 4.1 Summary of FEM A Objectives Remaining to Be Met.................... 80 4.2 Objectives Met or Yet to Be Achieved................................ 80 L1 J

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P TABLES 2 1 Deficiency Tracking and Schedule for Corrective Actions.................. 71 2 Objectives Met or Yet to Be Achieved-Arkansas Nuclear One.. J........... 81 I

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3 ABBREVIATIONS ADH Arkansas Department of Health ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANO Arkansas Nuclear One AP&L Arkansas Power and Light Company DEC

. Duty Emergency Coordinator DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of Transportation ECC Emergency Communications Center EMS Emergency Medical Service ENS Early Notification System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Protection Zone ESO Emergency Services Officer FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GERMS Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System HHS Health and Human Services HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection K1 Potassium Iodide NERN National Emergency Response Network NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OES Office of Emergency Services PAG Protective Action Guide PASS Post Accident Sampling System PIT Public Information Team RCS Reactor Coolant System REX '85 Radiological Emergency Response Exercise-1985 RRTC Radiological Response Team Captain SAE Site Area Emergency SDO Staff Duty Officer SPDS Safety Parameter Display System TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TOCC Technical Operations Control Center TOCO Technical Operations Control Officer USDA United States Department of Agriculture USFDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration iv i

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EXERCISE

SUMMARY

The Arkansas Nuclear One Radiologial Emergency Preparedness Exercise held

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on April 24-25, 1985, was the fifth exercise testing emergency response capabilities of off-site organizations in the event of a nuclear accident.

This exercise incorporated problems and objectives designed to test capabilities in addressing ingestion pathway r

activit!es. Previous exercises were held on March 24,1981, May 19,1982, March 16, i

1983, and March 21, 1984, with a remedial on May 31, 1984. The Federal Emergency

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Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated the off-site response capabilities in each of these exercises. Summary discussion of these is found in Section 1.1, Exercise Background.

On April 26, 1985, three post-exercise meetings were held; an 8:00 a.m. meeting with the 17-member Federal evaluation team to develop a preliminary evaluation; a 10:30 a.m. meeting between Arkansas State officials and Federal evaluators to present preliminary findings; and an afternoon critique for local officials and the general public at the Arkansas Nuclear One Training Facility.

f Section 2 of the report provides a narrative summary, deficiencies, areas for improvement and recommendations for each jurisdiction and field activity tested for the exercise. Also provided in Section 2 is a Utility Support discussion of problem areas related to Utility personnel which impacted upon or impaired the performances of the

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off-site personnel. While FEMA cannot designate Category "A" and "B" deficiencies for

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the Utility performances, these problems should be addressed by ANO and/or NRC to ensure their correction.

Section 3 provides a summary listing of Category "A" f

deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and Category "B" defielencies, including those requiring priority attention. The Section 3 summary is in tabular format and provides space for State and Local jurisdiction response to the deficiency. There were no Category "A" deficiencies found during the evaluation of this exercise.

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Additionally, the report contains in tabular format an " Objectives Met or Yet to be Achieved" compilation. This is based upon FEMA objectives developed from NUREG-0654, II, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. Objectives and defielencies of the past four exercises, as well as this 1985 exercise have been considered and matched to the FEMA objectives to develop this compilation of those FEMA objectives which remain to be met. Based upon 1

this compilation, it is determined that Arkansas State and local government response l

agencies have successfully demonstrated each objective during one or more exercises in this five-yea cycle.

The following summarizes the April 24-25, 1985, exercise performances of the

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' State of Arkansas, Office of-Emergency Services, Arkansas Department of Health and the County governments.

IrrATE OF ARKANSAS OPERATIONS The Arkansas Office of Emergency Services in Conway, the Arkansas State Pollee and the Arkansas Department of Health, located the Technical Operations Control Center, Russellville, participated on Day 1 - Plume Exposure Exercise in the Arkansas f

Nuclear One Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise.

During the ingestion pathway exercise on Day 2, however, the scenario did not require participation by the Arkansas State Police. The participating agencies demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency.

The EOC was staffed on a limited basis with staff from the Office of Emergency Services.

In general, the staff displayed adequate training and capabilities for effectively handling a real emergency. The Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) f was located in the Arkansas National Guard Armory, Russellville. As with the State EOC, this operation exhibited capability in all areas demonstrated. Physical aspects of the TOCC were more than adequate to support continuous operations which were demonstrated b shift change during the exercise.

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i LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS Five counties lie within either the 10-mile or 50-mile EPZ and have emergency I

response roles for off-site protection in the event of a nuclear power plant accident.

Those counties - Pope, Logan, Johnson, Conway and Yell - participated in the Plume Exposure exercise although they did not participate on Day 2 - The Ingestion Pathway l

Exercise.

In most respects emergency response capability was sufficiently demonstrated.

Some deficiencies or areas for improvement could have been due to lack of enthusiasm for the exercise or limited local government authority provided by the exercise objectives and the plans. Most decisions are made at the state level and handed down to the local government for implementation. However, in circumstances in which the local governments by county plan do have responsibility, such as notifying reception and care centers, the responsibility for actions was not properly demonstrated or coordinated by the TOCC.

Although they addressed all problems presented them during the exercise, local governments had opportunity to exhibit only abbreviated response capabilities with exception of Pope County which was given more responsibility by the exercise objectives and the scenario. As explained, most decisions are made by the State of Arkansas and passed down to the local government EOCs.

Individual narrative sections provide detailed explanations of individual I

functions which were demonstrated by the exercise.

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 P.XERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all off-site nuclear power facility planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Response Planning include:

e Taking the lead in off-site emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980).

e Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.

e Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies.

Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 1

- U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U. S. Department of Energy (DOE)

- U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

- U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

- U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

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Five annual radiological emergency response exercises have been conducted at Arkansas Nuclear One. Agencies involved in these have been the Arkansas Department of Health, Nuclear Planning and Response Program; Arkansas Office of Emergency Services; local government officials; volunteer organizations and Arkansas Power and f

Light Company. The past exercises were held on March 24,1981; May 19,1982; March 16,1983; March 21,1984, and May 31,1984 (remedial).

The most recent exercise (which included an ingestion pathway) wes conducted April 24-25,1985. A 17-member Federal evaluation team included represe ncives from FEMA Region VI staff, Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and Argonne National Laboratories (ANL).

The exercise was evaluated using the modular format which j

1 provides for a more objective and detailed recording of findings.

l Following the exercise, meetings were held with the FEMA /RAC team to develop a composite preliminary report and with the State and Utility representatives to discuss the 2-part exercise and present a preliminary exercise overview. A formal public critique was also held with State, utility, local government, the public and the press.

The findings in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA, Region VI.

All FEMA objectives of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, must be satisfactorily achieved within the five-year period. Thus, FEMA recommends that the State and-local jurisdictions thoroughly evaluate the report and initiate remedial or corrective actions for each deficiency indicated, as well as for areas of improvement where possible, and submit a schedule for addressing these problems.

The FEMA Regional Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that deficiencies identified during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections, as appropriate, have been incorporated into the State Plan. FEMA has determined that each objective has been tested and satisfactorily met during one or more exercises in the five-year period in

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3 which all FEMA objectives must be satisfactorily demonstrated by State and/or local governments. There were 10 deficiencies identified during this exercise and while it is required that they be corrected by the appropriate response agency, a review of the objectives met or yet to be achieved (Table 2) will show that they have been satis-factorily demonstrated during a previous exercise in this five-year period.

1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Seventeen federal evaluators participated in this fifth year exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and evaluation location (s) are listed below.

EVALUATOR AGENCY LOCATION Al Lookabaugh FEMA Overall Coordination (RAC Chairman)

TOCC Communications St. Mary's Hospital /

Pope County Ambulance Service (Russellville)

Gary Jones FEMA Evaluator Team Leader Pope County EOC (Russellville)

St. Mary's Hospital /

Pope County Ambulance Service TOCC Operations (Ingestion Pathway)

Bill Gasper ANL State OES (Conway)

Maryetta Cunningham FEMA Conway County EOC (Morrillton)

TOCC Operations (Ingestion Pathway)

Bob Nelsius ANL Logan County EOC (Paris)

Kim Suchy ANL Johnson County EOC (Clarksville)

4 Frank Kay ANL Yell County EOC (Danville) t Gary Kaszynski ANL Pope County EOC r

TOCC Operations

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(Ingestion Pathway)

Gary Sanborn NRC Media Center Near-Site

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Training Center (Russellville)

Hank May EPA TOCC-Dose Assessment l

Marcia Thomas DOE TOCC-Dose Assessment

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Cheryl Malina USDA TOCC-Agricultural Al Miller DOT On-Site Evacuation (ANO Plant) Atkins Emergency Worker Center Tom Goertz USFDA Atkins Emergency Worker Center (Atkins)

Field Monitoring Team No. 5 Jim Opelka ANL Field Monitoring Team No.1 Leon Zellner USFDA Field Monitoring Team No. 2 Tony Rhea DOE Field Monitoring Team No. 3 Phil Edington HHS St. Mary's Hospital / Pope County Ambulance Service 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The exercise objectives of the State of Arkansas and local communities were to demonstrate that their off-site emergency capabilities for mobilizing and coordinating necessary response are adequate to cope with a radiological emergency incident at Arkansas Nuclear One Steam Electric Station. The objectives were developed through joint discussion between the Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV (NRC); the Federal Emergency Management Agency

5 Region VI (FEMA); the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services (OES); Arkansas Department of Health (ADH); the County officials of Pope, Logan, Conway, Johnson and Yell Counties; and St. Mary's Hospital.

i 1.3.1 Arkansas Power & Light Objectives 1.

Begin exercise after normal workinghours (between 6:00 p.m.

and midnight).

2.

Classifying and upgrading the emergency through 4tfe General Emergency classifications.

3.

Notification and call-out of the Initial Response Staff (IRS),

Initial Response Organization (IRO), and Emergency Operations Facility Staff (EOFS).

4.

Notification of the Little Rock Corporate Official by Little Rock Control Center personnel.-

5.

Notification of appropriate vendor and consultant support groups.

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Notification of appropriate. Federal, State and local support groups.

7.

Formation of the Emergency Operations Facility Staff response from Little Rock.

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Preparation of an initial news release from the Corporate office.

9.

Activation of the Technical Support Center within one hour following the declaration of an Alert.

10.

Activation of the Operation Support Center within one hour following the declaration of an Alert.

11.

Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility within three to four hours following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

12.

Activation of the Joint Media Center at the EOF.

13.

Activation of the Little Rock Support Center.

14.

Activation and transfer of the Emergency Operations Facility Staff from Little Rock to Russellville.

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15.

Activation and transfer of General Office Technical Analysis laboratory personnel from Little Rock to Russellville.

16.

Demonstrate effective use of communications equipment during transfer of the Emergency Operations Facility Staff from Little Rock to ANO.

17.

Establishment of communications between the Control Room, Technical Support

Center, Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Little Rock Support Center, NRC, and State and local emergency response officials.

18.

Coordination between the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and Little Rock Support Center throughout the exercise.

19.

. Transfer command and control responsibilities (and maintain continuity) from the Initial Response aStaff 'to the Initial

Response

Organization and from the Initial

Response

Organization to the Emergency Operations Facility Staff.

20.

Coordination with State and local officials at the Technical Operations Control

Center, Technical Support

Center, Emergency Operations Facility and the five-county Emergency Operations Centers as requested.

l 21.

Coordination between the ' Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and the Arkansas Department of Health on Protective Action Recommendations.

22.

Production and delivery of information in joint AP&L, State and Federal (if in attendance) news conference from the EOF Joint Media Center.

23.

Activation of the Emergency Medical Team.

24.

Emergency Medical Team response to a simulated injured and radioactively contaminated individual at St. Mary's Hospital.

25.

Transportation of a simulated injured and radioactively contaminated individual (s) to St. Mary's Hospital.

26.

Coordination between AP&L and St. Mary's Hospital staff in the handling of a simulated injured and radioactively contaminated individual.

27.

. Activation of the Emergency Radiation Team.

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Radiation monitoring of plant areas by the onsite section of the k

Emergency Radiation Team.

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Offsite radiological field monitoring by the offsite section of the p

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Emergency Radiation Team.

30.

Coordination of offsite radiological field monitoring with State f

personnel.

1 31.

Demonstrate radiation / contamination monitoring of the Control

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Room, Technical Support Center and EOF.

32.

Coordination between field monitoring teams and dose assessment personnel (i.e.,

between the Health Physics Superintendent /Offsite Monitoring Supervisor and the Technical Analysis Superintendent / Dose Assessment Supervisor).

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33.

Demonstrate effective use of Offsite Dose Projections procedures from the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility (as dictated by the scenario).

34.

Utilize the Post Accident Sampling System to analyze the

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primary system (RCS).

35.

Utilize the Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System and

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the Safety Parameter Display System.

36.

Evacuation of the Plant and/or Exclusion area.

37.

Demonstrate personnel accountability following evacuation.

38.

Demonstrate the ability to control access to the Exclusion Area and the establishment of road blocks.

39.

Demonstrate security at the Emergency Operations Facility.

40.

Demonstrate emergency responce capability during night condi-tions.

41.

Utilization of appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Pro-cedures.

42.

Demonstrate problem solving capabilities of the Emergency Response Organization.

43.

Formation of a Recovery group.

44.

Demonstrate initial recovery and reentry actions.

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45.

Reentry of damaged plant for maintenance activities while L

wearing protective equipment and clothing.

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Coordination with State and Federal (if in attendance) agencies L

to downgrade and terminate the emergency.

f 1.3.2 Objectives for Participating Off-Site Emergency Response Organizations 1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and State & Local activate facilities promptly.

Gov t.

a. Activation of team to occur at

" Notification of Unusual Event".

2.

Demonstrate ability to fully staff facili-State & Local ties and maintain staffing around the clock.

Gov't

a. Staffing will not be demonstrated around the clock, but for a prolonged time during the course of the exercise.

3.

Demonstrate ability to make decisions and State & Local to coordinate emergency activities.

Gov t 4.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and State' & Local displays to support emergency operations.

Gov t 5.

Demonstrate ability to communicate with State' & Local all appropriate locations, organizations Gov t and field personnel.

6.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy State field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

7.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro-State cedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

8.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro-State cedures for measurement of airborne radio iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCl/cc in the presence of noble gases.

9.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro-State cedures for collection, transport, analysis

9 of samples of soll, vegetation, snow, water and milk.

10.

Demonstrate ability to project dosage to State the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

11.

Demonstrate ability to project dosage to State the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appro-priate protective measures based on PAGs, and other relevant factors.

12.

Demonstrate ability to implement protective

' State actions for ingestion pathway hazards.

l 13.

Demonstrate ability to alert the public State & Local within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an Gov't (as initial message within 15 minutes.

required) l-'

a. Will not activate sirens or EBS during night hours during an exercise.

NOTE: This might also apply to FEMA objec-tive #14 which we are not listing as l

one of our objectives.

5 14.

Demonstrate organizational ability and Pope County f

resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

15.

Demonstrate organizational ability and re-Pope County sources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired Individuals within the plume EPZ.

NOTE: This objective was modified to "simu-late only" per verbal agreement between ADH & FEMA at pre-exercise briefing on April 24,1985.

16.

Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor State and Atkins and control emergency worker exposure.

Emergency Worker Shelter

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17.

Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly State and Pope evacuation of on-site personnel.

County 18.

Demonstrate ability to provide timely news State releases and conduct public information pro-gram.

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Demonstrate the ability to establish and State operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

20.

Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for Pope County

[gistration and monitoring of evacuees.

NOTE: This could relate to FEMA objective 23,27,28 and 29. Item #28 is not required; therefore, it is not listed as an objective.

21.

Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro-State and Pope cedures in decontamination of emergency County r

workers, equipment and vehicles.

22.

Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, Pope County personnel, facilities and procedures for handling contaminated Individuals.

23.

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities Pope County and and procedures for handling contaminated St. Mary's Hospital individuals.

24.

Demo strate ability to estimate total popu-State lation exposure.

25.

Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and State and Local effective use of emergency communications Government equipment and the adequacy of communications-procedures and methods.

26.

Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency State and Local Classification levels continuously and Government implement procedures in a timely manner.

27.

Demonstrate that authority exists in acti-State and Local vating a reception center (as necessary)

Government in a timely manner.

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28.

Demonstrate the ability to determine and State t.

implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

1.3.3 State Off-Site Activities l

The exercise will begin at 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months on Wednesday, April 24,1985. Unit 2 is at 100% power and has been on line for 68 days. A 10 gpm Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak at 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months has steadily increased to 15 gpm by 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months . In accordance with Tech Specs, the Shift Operations Supervisor directs the Unit to be shut down and in conjunction with the initiation of plant shut down, a " Notification of Unusual Event" is

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declared.

Upon notification of the Technical Operations Control Officer (TOCO) and after he has considered the current plant status, the TOCO will activate the Emergency Response Team at " Notification of Unusual Event."

As the TOCO and Accident Assessment Officer will be in Russellville, they will arrive at the TOCC shortly after activation of the Emergency Response Team and will direct their respective activities from that location.

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At 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months , an " Alert" will be declared due to RCS leakage being greater than the make-up capacity.

The first members of the Little Rock Emergency Response Team should arrive at the TOCC shortly after 2100 hours0.0243 days 0.583 hours 0.00347 weeks 7.9905e-4 months . The Accident Assessment group should be functional from the TOCC by about 2130 hours0.0247 days 0.592 hours 0.00352 weeks 8.10465e-4 months .

At 2130 hours0.0247 days 0.592 hours 0.00352 weeks 8.10465e-4 months , the Utility will declare a " Site Area Emergency" due to the saturated condition of the RCS.

Plant evacuation (representative sample) will be initiated.

By 2215 hours0.0256 days 0.615 hours 0.00366 weeks 8.428075e-4 months , the first Health Department Field Teams should be deployed.

Shortly after 2300 hours0.0266 days 0.639 hours 0.0038 weeks 8.7515e-4 months containment integrity will be lost, and at 2300 hours0.0266 days 0.639 hours 0.0038 weeks 8.7515e-4 months a General Emergency will be declared and off-site release will begin.

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12 Dose projections will exceed the action limits for protection action recommendations and soon after 2300 hours0.0266 days 0.639 hours 0.0038 weeks 8.7515e-4 months the TOCO will recommend evacuation of downwind sectors to 10 miles and all sectors to 2 miles. In addition, information supplied by the Utility regarding isotopic content of the effluent will indicate the presence of radioactive iodines and emergency workers will be instructed to take KI.

j Radiation levels and the presence of radioactive lodines will be confirmed by field team l

data.

The leak from containment will terminate at 0100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months and County participation and State Agency participation, except for ADH & OES, will terminate.

At 0200, the situation will down grade from " General Emergency" to " Alert".

Health Department Field Teams will continue to monitor the plume until approximately 0230 hours0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months when teams will be recalled to the TOCC.

At 0230 hours0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months , AP&L participation terminates.

At 0300 hours0.00347 days 0.0833 hours 4.960317e-4 weeks 1.1415e-4 months , ADH/OES participation breaks until 1230 hours0.0142 days 0.342 hours 0.00203 weeks 4.68015e-4 months on April 25, 1985.

Lunch will be provided for all observers and players at the TOCC at 1130.

Following lunch, a briefing will be conducted regarding ingestion pathway work.

The exercise will resume at 1230 hours0.0142 days 0.342 hours 0.00203 weeks 4.68015e-4 months with the deployment of field teams to start sampling operations in the ingestion zone.

Sampling operations and analyses of these samples will occur until approximately 1630 hours0.0189 days 0.453 hours 0.0027 weeks 6.20215e-4 months . Protective action recommendations will be formulated based on information obtained from the samples. The exercise will terminate at 1700 hours0.0197 days 0.472 hours 0.00281 weeks 6.4685e-4 months on April 25, 1985.

Critiques will be conducted on April 26 according to Attachment #3.

Simulations 1.

All meter readings, although use of the meters is to be demonstrated.

2.

All air filter analyses, although use of the air samplers, field counting techniques and MCA counting techniques will be demonstrated.

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13 3.

Taking of KI by the emergency workers.

4.

All evacuations except for a representative sample of plant personnel.

5.

Sirens will not be activated.

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6.

- Re-entry of residents.

7.

Collection of milk samples.

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8.

Analyses of samples by radio chemistry laboratory.

9.

Collection of TLD's.

10.

Discarding of milk.

1.4 Exercise Scenario Summary The exercise scenario is based on a series of events which result from a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak through a pressurizer safety valve and subsequent loss of AC power.

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The exercise will begin at 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months on Wednesday, April 24, 1985, with the following initial conditions:

1.

Unit 2 is at 100% power and full load. The unit has been on line for f

68 days.

2.

A 10 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak, which developed through pressurizer safety valve 2PSV-4633, placed Unit 2 in a 4-hour action statement at 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months (Reference Unit 2 Tech. Spec.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.6.2),

3.

"C" Charging Pump is out of service for maintenance.

4.

2 Diesel Generator is out of service for replacement of turbocharger.

Surveillance on #1 Diesel Generator is required once per shift. Two have been performed prior to this shift.

5.

The lesk has been increasing steadily since 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months . By 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months the RCS leak rate is estimated at 15 gpm.

14 o

Upon expiration of the 4-hour action statement, at 1800, the Shift Operations Supervisor directs that the unit be shut down in accordance with Tech. Specs. The unit is to be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

In conjunction with the initiation of plant shutdown, the Shift Operations Supervisor will declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with procedure 1903.10, " Emergency Action Level Response / Notifications", Section 6.1.5.

This section directs a Notification of Unusual Event to be declared whenever a reactor shutdown is

~

required by the Limiting Conditions for Operation of the units Technical Specifications.

By 1945 hours0.0225 days 0.54 hours 0.00322 weeks 7.400725e-4 months reactor power has been reduced to 70% A feedwater control problem develops resulting in a reactor trip on low steam generator level. Actuation of Emergency Feedwater occurs, however, Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P7A falls due to a bearing seizure. Emergency feedwater is then supplied by 2P7B.

The following events occur as a result of the transient:

1.

The RCS leak from the pressurizer safety valve increases ~ rapidly to 168 gpm.

2.

SIAS actuates.

3.

The RCS goes solid.

4.

The quench tank relief is lifted and rupture disc blows The Plant Operator reports to the Shift Operations Supervisor that High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) flow is 80 gpm. The Shift Operations Supervisor is aware that, due to the unavailability of "C" Charging Pump, maximum charging capacity is 88 gpm.

An Alert will be declared at 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months due to RCS leakage greater than normal makeup capacity.

Activation of the Initial Response Organization will begin at this time.

Approximately one hour following the declaration of an Alert, the Emergency Coordinator will accept responsibility for overall response, including offsite Notifications and offsite Protective Action Recommendations.

I Iua su u

15 I

At 2115 hours0.0245 days 0.588 hours 0.0035 weeks 8.047575e-4 months , a ground fault will lock out startup #3 transformer resulting in a loss of offsite power. Subsequently, #1 Diesel Generator falls to energize vital bus 2A3. The cause of the failure of #1 Diesel Generator is a fire in the generator winding.

The fire brigade will respond at this time. Operators atteupt to restore offsite power via startup #2 transformer; however, a faulty protective relay has activated a lockout of the transformer. Upon the loss of all AC power, all active mechanisms for core cooling are lost. The following systems will be powered from Unit One and remain available to monitor plant status:

e Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) e Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (GERMS) e Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)

At 2130 hours0.0247 days 0.592 hours 0.00352 weeks 8.10465e-4 months , with off-site power not yet restored, the Reactor Coolant System becomes saturated with a continuing loss of inventory. A Site Area Emergency will be declared based on the saturated condition of the RCS. This declaration will initiate an evacuation of non-essential personnel from the plant and an activation of the entire Emergency Response Organization.

A representative sample of plant evacuees will be selected and directed to the Atkins Emergency Worker Center for processing.

At 2155 the fire in #1 Diesel Generator room will be extinguished.

Restoration of startup #2 transformer will occur at 2235. With vital busses 2A3 and 2A4 now energized, operators attempt to re-establish core cooling. However, when "A' HPSI pump starts, no discharge pressure or flow indication is observed. Core cooling will be initiated using "B" HPSI pump.

The Waste Control Operator, who is in the auxiliary building, reports that when "A" HPSI pump was started the coupling came apart and sheared a PASS sample line upstream of 2PS-IS9. Area radiation monitors are alarming and he will be unable to seal

16 the watertight door to "A" HPSI room before being forced to exit the area. Operators will attempt to isolate the leak by closing Reactor Building sump valve 2CV-5647-1, however, a burned out control power transformer in breaker 52-51K1 will prevent valve operation.

T'._ following conditions will exist at 2300 hour0.0266 days 0.639 hours 0.0038 weeks 8.7515e-4 months s:

e RCS boundary has been breached.

e Containment integrity has been lost.

e A high probability for fuel cladding failure exists.

e A radiological release pathway to the offsite environment has developed.

A General Emergency will be declared. Assessment of offsite dose consequences will be performed by the Dose Assessment Team and Emergency Radiation Team.

Offsite protective action recommendations will be updated and issued to the Arkansas Department of Health. Site boundary dose rates at 2310 will be projected at 9 mR/hr Whole Body and 2.25 E-1 mR/hr Child Thyroid and increasing.

At 2320 the Shift Maintenance Supervisor will report to the Shift Operations Supervisor that he has been unable to contact one of his mechanics who was working in the Upper South Piping Penetration Room. The Waste Control Operator will be sent to investigate. He will find the mechanic lying unconscious on the floor. It will appear that he has fallen from the' nearby scaffold. The Emergency Medical Team will respond.

additionally, since there is a potential for contamination, an Emergency Radiation Team member will be dispatched.

The victim will be transported, by the Pope County Emergency Medical Service, to St. Mary's Hospital for further treatment.

Turnover of overall responsibility for the emergency response from the Emergency Coordinator to the Emergency Operations Facility Director will occur within 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following declaration of a Site Are Emergency (i.e. 0030-0130 hours).

At 0100 the leak from containment will be terminated when repairs to breaker 52-Slki are completed, which will allow operators to close reactor building sump valve

L1 2CV-5647-1.

Dose assement and Offsite Monitoring activities will continue until approximately 0230. During this time period, decreasing site boundary dose rates will allow descalation of the emergency.

At 0230 hours0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months , AP&L's participation in the exercise will terminate.

1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The Arkansas Nuclear One (1985) exercise evaluations that follow in Section 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Rev.1 (November 1980). Region VI evaluated the exercise utilizing the modular format. Federal Evaluators were instructed to mark those sections of the report "not applicable" which did not correspond to the objectives for the exercise.

Following the narrative for each jurisdiction or off-site response activity, deficiencies and areas of improvement are ' presented with accompanying recom-mendations. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. Category A lists only those deficiencies that caused a finding that the off-site preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. At least one deficiency in this category would necessitate a negative finding.

Category "B" lists all other deficiencies. These include those deficiencies where performances during the exercise were evaluated and considered faulty; corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in the event of a real radiological emergency appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. Deficiencies in this category should be relatively easy to correct in comparison to those deficiencies listed in Category A.

A finding of adequate may include a number of deficiencies in Category "B".

18 I

Areas for improvement are also listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or off-site activity.

These items are not deficiencies but are suggestions for improved performance.

l l

4 4

h 19 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION

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On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980) and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been f

performed of the April 24-25, 1985, exercise of Arkansas Nuclear One Steam Electric Station.

This exercise concludes the first 5-year cycle for testing of all FEWA objectives.

The evaluations, including deficiencies, areas for improvement and recommendations are presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with

[

the State and local governments in determining the corrective actions (including time frame) needed to resolve the deficiencies and areas for improvement in accordance with established criteria and guidelines.

The following includes.the narrative, deficiencies, areas for improvement, and recommendations for each State and local participating response organization.

2.1 ARKANSAS STATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC - Conway Plume Exposure Exercise (Day 1)

The State EOC at the Office of Emergency Services (OES) in Conway was activated promptly upon receipt of the notification of Unusual Event at 6:18 p.m.. A call list was used to notify the Operations Director and his assistant.

The EOC was operational at 6:50 p.m. upon their arrival. The initial notification message was received by the OES communications officer via commercial telephone from the EOF. This system is manned on a 24-hour a day basis. Verification of the initiating notification call is by the " Emergency Action Verification" code system - this system appears to work well.

is -..

J

State EOC

20 Activation of the remaining state agencies to be represented at the EOC occurs at the Alert classification. The Alert was received at 8:17 p.m. and call up of staff resumed. State agencies personnel were placed on standby and requested to remain

~

within calling distance and to report any change in location (i.e., new phone number).

The only staff mobilized for the exercise were the Emergency Operations personnel; all other agencies were placed on alert. Contact was maintained with these agencies throughout the exercise. Agencies notified included: Arkansas State Police; Governor's Office; Arkansas National Guard; American Red Cross; Arkansas Game and Fish; Highway and Transportation Department; Corp of Engineers; Civil Air Patrol; Department of Human Servlees; State Pollution Control and Ecology Commission; FEMA; American Telephone and Telegraph; and Fort Chaffee.

The ability to provide staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis was comonstrated through the presentation of duty roster. Adequate personnel are available to maintain operation for an extended period.

l The EOC director from the Office of Emergency Services effectively directed the EOC operations. As specified in the plan, this position provides the direction and control of the overall emergency operations. Written checklists were used to assure timely and complete response activities. Logging of all incoming messages and pertinent outgoing messages was maintained throughout the exercise. The implementation of the message logging system corrected part of an area for improvement found during the previous exercise. Emergency Action Level transmittal forms were used properly.

An improvement from the last exercise was observed in the transmittal of the upgrade in emergency classification from the Alert to the Site Area Emergency. All state agencies, as required, were notified of this classification change. Elapsed time for call-up procedures at this stage was approximately 15 minutes.

u

=s

State EOC

(

Access to the EOC was controlled by a secured doorway activated from the communications room by the dispatcher on duty. Closed-circuit TVs are used to monitor

(

incoming personnel and traffic.

The EOC was not notified of the activation of the relocation center in Atkins.

The communications system consisted of the OES VHF/UHF radio net with j

commercial telephone as backup. This system is used to contact and communicate with the local EOCs, contiguous states, the utility, the TOCC and FEMA.

In addition, commercial telephone calls were made from the utility corporate headquarters in Little Rock, relaying press releases to the State EOC. The NAWAS (National Warning System) dedicated phone was available and was used to alert the counties in the 50-mile EPZ during ingestion pathway operations.

The EBS is contacted via a dedicated phone line to an EBS radio station in Little Rock. Other EBS stations would be notified by this Little Rock station. EBS messages are drafted at the TOCC and transmitted through the EOC.

EBS notification is requested from the TOCC and implemented at the state EOC.

The ability to receive from, or transmit hard copy messages to, the media center is not available at the State EOC.

Press releases, as made by the utility, were telephoned into' the EOC from the corporate headquarters in Little Rock. These releases were recorded at the State EOC.

The EOC facility at the OES building was adequate in size and space with most required supplies and amenities available. The facility is equipped with provisions to sustain and support extended operations (i.e., bunks, showers, and kitchen).

Backup emergency power is available and was demonstrated during the exercise.

State EOC 22 Emergency classification levels were not posted nor was a status board displayed and maintained. The staff was aware at all times of the level of emergency; however, it f

would be most beneficial if the classifications were posted and a status board used. This problem was noted as an area for improvement during the previous exercise and has not been properly addressed.

Maps were posted displaying the sector designations in the plume EPZ and evacuation routes. Although relocation center locations were known by the players, they were not posted in the operations room. Additionally, maps showing access control points, radiological monitoring points and population distribution by sector were neither f

posted nor available. Staff explained that these displays were not posted or available because activities relating to their use are conducted at the TOCC. However, it is felt that it would be most useful if this information was posted in the emergency operations room.

Public alerting and instructions are implemented at the TOCC. However, the

(

Governor's Proclamation of Emergency is drafted at the EOC and forwarded on to the Governor's office for verification and signatures. This action occurred at the EOC at 11:03 p.m. and notification of it transmitted promptly to the TOCC.

There was a limited amount of activity at the State EOC. The scenario did not provide enough activity to involve all functions which would be required at the EOC.

Future scenario should include adequate activity to allow for testing the full capabilities of the EOC.

Ingestion Pathway Exercise (Day 2)

The EOC was not staffed during the ingestion pathway phase.

Only the communication officer was present to perform t tis duty.

Notification to the affected counties of the implementation of ingestion pathway activities in the 50-mile EPZ occurs at the EOC. The activation of the alerting system is t

i

State EOC

23 received in the EOC (2:00 a.m., day 2). Six state police warning points were notified simultaneously via NAWAS and were requested to alert the counties under their jurisdiction. When all counties had been properly notified, the police called back to the EOC to inform them of these actions. This procedure was completed by 2:09 a.m. (9 minutes).

Recovery and reentry decisions were not made at the EOC; these are discussed and decisions made at the TOCC.

Defielencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None Category "B" Deficiencies -

1.

==

Description:==

All of the required maps were not posted or available i

1 at the EOC. These included: access control points, radiological monitoring points, and population distribution by sector. Also, emergency classification levels were not. posted nor was a status board displayed and maintained (NUREG-0654, J.10.a,b).

Recommendation: All required and related maps should be posted or made available at the EOC for use during an incident or an exercise.

Displays necessary for supporting the emergency response efforts should be available and used during the exercise or an incident.

Area for improvement and Recommendation None.

I.

24 2.1.2 Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC)

Narrative Plume Exposure Pathway The Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) is located in the Arkansas National Guard Armory in Russellvflie. The building is well designed for this purpose. It is a spacious, all weather facility, capable of aro'und-the-clock operations. Ample room

/

was available for all representative organizations, crowding was not a problem. Security measures were not demonstrated or simulated; however, identification badges were worn by all, and a member of the state police was in attendance. The TOCC is not protected against fallout; however, it is located approximately 9 ' miles from the plant site.

Overall, activation and staffing were very good and were accomplished on a timely basis.

The double-shifting procedures for supporting continuous operations were explained although continuous around-the-clock capability was not demonstrated. These procedures for maintaining operations include agreements with neighboring states (Texas, Mississippi, Loulslana) to augment staffing during a real emergency. Members of these states were present at the exercise to act as observers for the State of Arkansas.

Organizations present at the TOCC were Arkansas Office of Emergency Services, Arkansas State Police and Arkansas Department of Health. Mobilization of these staffs was demonstrated.

Initial staffing consists of these representative organizations.

A status board of events was not used; however, frequent briefings were given I

over the PA system which kept the staff up to date on changing emergency conditions.

In addition, the off-site radiological status was posted and updated including dose rates and projections.

Tocc 35 Tracking and distributing incoming and outgoing messages were adequately I

controlled.

Internal messages were distributed and tracked by using the multi-part

" Arkansas Department of Health Emergency Class Notification Forms."

Dosimeters were placed at various locations throughout the TOCC to record any doses that may have been received.

An Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) representative manned the Rumor Control Center; a one-man, two-telephone line operation. The ADH telephone number is published in the ANO brochure. These calls are taken by the ADH then switched to the

+

TOCC rumor control operations. Several rumor control calls were actually observed during this exercise and were handled properly by the player.

Communications were demonstrated between the 'TOCC and State and local EOCs. Primary system for the local EOC contact is the NERN radio with commercial telephone and OES radio as secondary systems. The State EOC is contacted through radio with commercial telephone backup capabilities.

Conferencing capability is available on the Nuclear Response Network and OES radio system. A new, programmable 5-channel radio is used primarily to talk with the county EOCs. All local EOCs as well as k

the Health Department mobiles may be conferenced through this equipment. A hard copy device was available between the TOCC, the media center and the utility. In general, the communications equipment functioned adequately except for some short-term problems in communicating with field teams.

The ADH communications van arrived at the TOCC at approximately 8:45 p.m. This vehicle contains all communication equipment to the State EOC.

Public alerting / notification is handled from the TOCC.

Since this was a nighttime exercise, the sounding of strens, tone alert radio activation and EBS messages were all simulated at 9:45 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. This has been demonstrated successfully at previous exercises and was demonstrated and observed by Federal evaluators when the alert / notification official test was conducted on February 5, 1985.

The players

TOCC

'!6 demonstrated the appropriate activities necessary to accomplish the public alerting and notification portion of this exercise.

f Early in the exercise the TOCC notified the utility that they were fully operational and requested that the utility send all messages to them at the TOCC. One

(

message was still sent to ADH in Little Rock which created some delay in information arriving at the TOCC. This error was corrected; however, once the TOCC becomes operational the utility should send all their messages to the TOCC.

At approximately 8:40 p.m. It was announced by the TOCC that the " Emergency Workers Center at Atkins is now activated." The Pope County Plan, in which the center

-15 located, states that the County is to activate the center at Atkins. After receipt of this announcement, Pope County called Atkins to verify whether they had been activated by the TOCC. They had not been notified, but they then activated in response to Pope County's request to do so. Also, it was noted at the State EOC that the TOCC failed to contact them to advise that the Atkins Emergency Worker Center was activated.

On other occasions it was noted that the TOCC did not transmit requested wind directions to the counties or state. This information is vital for making decis!ons; and had it been transmitted, the following problem might have been prevented.

On one occasion, at 11:23 p.m. the TOCC was transmitting a Protective Action Directive to the counties regarding which sectors were to be evacuated (page 2, ADH PAD-1 (6)). This form is lettered (a) through (1). The decision was made to evacuate Sectors 11,12 and 13 (item' "k") and Sectors 14 and 15 (item "1").

In transmitting this information to the counties they were told to mark item (k) Sectors 11,12 and 13 anu item (i) Sectors 5,6, and 7. Sectors 5,6. and 7 are in the opposite direction from Sectors 14 and 15.

The problem is that the letter (1) looks like it could be an (1) and was transmitted over the radio as an (i) instead of (1). Therefore, Sectors 5, 6. and 7 were evacuated instead of Sectors 14 and 15. During a real incident this would have been a very serious error.

This error could be classified as a Category "A" deficiency.

Tocc

)7 However, it is being considered a Category "B" deficiency because the State of Arkansas has satisfactorily demonstrated this objective in four previous exercises; and, the cor-rective measures to address the deficiency can be easily implemented: (1) the form should be redesigned to prevent any confusion in transmitting the correct information, and (2) the status boards should be used and monitored so that any errors can be noted and corrected immediately.

The Category "B" deficiency #2 identified in the 1914 exercise report was corrected at this exercise. Deficiency #3 had been previously resolved; however, a new Category "B" deficiency relating to Protective Action Recommendations was noted at this exercise. Deficiency #4 was previously resolved; however, we felt that the local plans needed to be updated. To date we have not received an update on thL problem.

Areas for Improvement one and three were corrected during this exercise. The second Area for Improvement was partially correctad; however, some of the status boards were not maintained satisfactorily during this exercise. The fourth Area for Improvement was not corrected and showed up again this year resulting in another possible Category "B" deficiency (failure to transmit wind direction information). Two county EOCs requested wind direction but were not furnished the information.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway The ingestion pathway portion of the exercise was conducted by Arkansas Department of Health personnel at the TOCC in a responsible and knowledgeable manner. The entire 50-mile EPZ !!es within the State of Arkansas. Sampling areas were determined based on radiological monitoring data. Detailed maps were available whicli outlined areas affected, and these were used to plot sampling points.

The utility and affected counties did not participate in the second day of the exercise. However, messages were transmitted from the TOCC to the counties and a communication check was made with all counties in the 50-mile EPZ.

%CC 2g Technical information, including dose commitment consequences, was gathered i

and properly analyzed in making the decisions concernmg ingestion pathway activities.

l Areas where deposition of lodine was present were accurately identified.

Four ingestion pathway sampling teams were properly briefed and dispatched.

(

Samples were to be collected out to 20 miles, both ahead of and behind the plume. The following types of samples were to be collected:

Soll samples (to measure amount of deposition) e e Water samples (measure standing water) e Vegetation (grass-to measure amount of deposition) (broad leaf, edible products from gardens, i.e., cabbage - simulated)

Milk samples (dairies close to sampling sites near plume center e

line - simulated)

Samples would be flown to the State Health Department laboratory in Little Rock for analysis. One flight was actually made to demonstrate this procedure. Results

{

of the sample analysis were used to determine whether additional PAGs should be issued or existing PAGs relaxed.

Soll, water, milk and vegetation samples were analyzed at the laboratory and the results were relayed to the TOCC.

Protective actions and procedures were developed based on the analysis of field sampling.

PAGs were relaxed to allow the public back into evacuated sectors 11,12, and 13 as field team data indicated no deposition in those sectors. Dairy cattle remained on stored feed and water in sectors 14 and 15. Farmers were allowed to reenter the evacuated area to care for their livestock.

Final laboratory results from the samples indicated that the total dose to the population had not reached the action levels set by the Department of Health. Based on these calculations, the population that was intended to be evacuated in sectors 14 and 15

l TOCC 3

)

could return to their homes. Sampling would continue over the next several months. All s

vegetables should be washed before eating.

h Cancer Risk Profile was calculated according to the present dose rate to population. The possible health effects of low-level exposure would be included in press t

releases.

Appropriate information was formulated at the TOCC and transmitted to the Joint Information Center for the development of press releases to be issued to the public

/

p in the 50-mile EPZ. (Messages were not transmitted to EBS stations.)

i Defielencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies -

2.

==

Description:==

Wind direction information was not given to the counties which is needed for meking decisions in the event of a radiological release (NUREG-0654, II, D.4, I.11).

Recommendation: Ensure that all supporting data, such as wind direction, required for making decisions is transmitted by the TOCC to the counties.

3.

==

Description:==

On one occasion an incorrect protective action directive was given from the TOCC which resulted in the improper evacuation of sectors 5, 6, and 7 (NUREG-0654,11, A.2.a. E.1).

Recommendation: Should change the PAD-1, Part (6) lettering so that the (1) and (1) cannot be confused.

Also a system for verification must be set up so that the counties and the TOCC know exactly which sectors are to be evacuated, and the status of the evacuation.

TocC

30 4.

==

Description:==

A Status Board of Events was available at the TOCC but not utilized during the exercise (NUREG-0654, J.10).

Recommendation: The use of a status board, updated with the current emergency status, would be useful to all and could have preventeo Catego.y "B" deficiency No. 3 above.

Areas for Improvament and Recommendations e

==

Description:==

Based on radio communications, Qere was confusion regarding responsibilities for activating the Atkins Emergency Worker Center. County plans show it to be a county responsibility to activate the center and not the TOCC's (NUREG-0654, II, E.1; F.1.e).

Recommendation:

Follow the established written procedures as called for in the plans for activating the Atkins Emergency Worker Center.

e

==

Description:==

Although badges were distributed to players by a TOCC representative and a member of the TOCC staff is a representative of the Arkansas State Police, security measures were not demonstrated at the TOCC.

Recommendation: Security measures should be increased to better control access to the TOCC.

o

==

Description:==

The State EOC was not notified of the activation of the relocation center in Atkins.

Recommendation:

The State EOC should be informed by the TOCC of the status of relocation and congregate care facilities.

i

31 2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Narrative Plume Exposure Pathway l

Three teams were involved during the first day of the two-day exercise. An l

overview summarizing their performance concerning the plume exposure pathway is provided below.

There is an adequate system in place for activating the field monitoring team members 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day. Team mobilization was demonstrated very effectively. The call and decision to mobilize the teams were made at 6:30 p.m. The team members were contacted at home and teams left Little Rock by approximately 7:15 p.m. arriving at the TOCC by approximately 8:30 p.m. Members of the team living in Russellville were also activated in a timely manner. Prior to deployment equipment was checked by all teams; and the field teams' coordinator gave a briefing on current plant conditions and made assignments. All teams had the necessary equipment which was calibrated and in good working condition.

All team leaders were generally knowledgeable in the use and

.' unctions of the radiological equipment. Written SOPS were available for each team.

' Teams deployed from the TOCC around 10:00 p.m. and arrived at the first sampling locations by approximately 10:30 p.m.

Team #2 did not demonstrate the procedure for measuring radioiodine levels in the air. Since the detection and measurement of radioiodine is one of the primary concerns of the monitoring teams, this procedure should have been completed. Also.

Team #2, in demonstration of sample collections for vegetation, took samples from several small areas. There was no way to know if the total sample area equaled at least one square m eter.

In general, sample collection procedures for soil, water and vegetation were adequately performed by all teams with a few suggested areas for improvement.

t-

32 Field Monitoring i

Team #1 did not put a plastic bag over the G-M detector. Also, during the measurements in the plume, the door to the vehicle was left open part of the time.

l Team #1 should have screened the air sample cartridge sooner.

)

(

Overall, communication was adequate for all teams except for a short time during which team #2 could not communicate with the TOCC. No attempt was made to use the backup radio system or commercial telephone.

Radiological exposure control was properly demonstrated. The maximum dose is recorded by each team member on Individual cards used for recording dosimeter

[..

readings. Team #1 demonstrated dressing out in anticontamination clothing, including placement of a respirator with charcoal filter before going into the plume. Proper dress and undress procedures were followed. Sulting up took about 17 minutes which is a reasonable time period. KI (simulated) was taken as directed. Dosimetry readings were read and recorded on a hourly basis.

All exercise objectives for the field teams were demonstrated adequately.

Corrections to deficiencies and areas for improvement from last year's exercise were also demonstrated adequately.

The scenario was realistic and provided enough activity to test the plume tracking and personnel protection.

i Ingestion Exposure Pathway Four teams were activated for participation in the ingestion exposure pathway exercise which followed on the second day. All teams (#1, 2, 3 and 5) were assigned responsibility for collecting samples of soil, water, and vegetation at certain locations.

Two of the teams were required to take milk samples at dairies. All teams were briefed at the TOCC before deploying to the field. Overall, sampling collection techniques by all teams were adequate.

However, several areas of improvement were noted by the evaluators and are listed following this narrative.

For example, team #1 partially l

1

Field Monitoring 33 I

i prepared samples and double bagged them inside the vehicle; water samples were not

{

double bagged and one leaked inside the vehicle. Team #2 was not familiar with the location of any dairies so that a milk sample could be collected. A list of dairies was available but was not consulted.

Field teams also experienced communications difficulties with the TOCC during a short time of the ingestion exposure pathway. Again, none of the teams tried to use

. their backup radio systems to contact the TOCC.

Exercise objectives for the ingestion pathway were demonstrated successfully by the field teams.

Defleieneles and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies - None.

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations Plume (First Exercise Day) e

Description:

Team #2 did not demonstrate a procedure for j.

)

measuring rad:olodine levels in air.

Recommendation:

It is important to measure the levels of radiolodine. If a field team fails to perform this function, then it I

should be requested by the TOCC to do so.

e

Description:

All teams experienced problems with the primary radio system's capability to maintain communications with the TOCC.

No attempt was demonstrated to use the backup radio system.

i Field Monitoring 34 Recommendation: Additional training should be provided in the use of radio and backup system. Prior to deployment, check to ensure

(

that primary radio system is working properly, e

Description:

Team #1 did not put a protected cover over the G-M f

detector.

Recommendation: Detectors should be protected by plastic bags to prevent contamination of equipment.

e

Description:

Team #1 left the door of the vehicle open during measurements taken in the plume.

Recommendation: The vehicle should be closed tightly during time in plume except when entering and exiting.

e

Description:

Team #1 did not quickly screen the air sample cartridges with the G-M to determine if they should be shielded or isolated during transit.

{

Recommendation: A quick scan of the cartridges is recommended to assure that they can be safely stored in the vehicle until they are returned to the TOCC.

If necessary, the cartridges should be shielded.

e

Description:

Team #3 took a 5-minute air sample and removed it inside the vehicle. This could cause a spread of contamination.

(NOTE: This practice was not observed again during the exercise so' It may have been an isolated " slip-up").

Recommendation:

Review health physics contamination control procedures with team members.

l

Field Monitoring

}

35 Ingestion Exposure Pathway (Second Day) e

Description:

Team #1 wore gloves but went in and out of the

{

vehicle without changing gloves.

Recommendation: If a third layer of gloves is worn, these should be replaced each time when entering the vehicle.

e

Description:

Team #1 labeled samples and double bagged inside the vehicle.

Recommendation: Samples should be prepared and double bagged i

outside the vehicle.

e

Description:

. Team #1 did not scan samples with G-M to determine if they should be shielded or isolated before they'are returned to the TOCC.

Recommendation: Samples should be scanned and safely stored in i

the vehicle until they are returned to the TOCC.

e

Description:

Team- #2 was to simulate the collection of milk samples. The team apparently was not familiar with the location of dairies.

Recommendation: Team #2 should receive additional training and become familiar with the manual provided which includes a list of dairies.

e

Description:

All teams experienced problems with the primary radio system in maintaining communications with the TOCC. No attempt was demonstrated to use the backup radio system.

Recommendation: Perform checks to ensure that the primary radio system is working properly. Provide additional training to staff in the use of radio and backup system.

I J

s

36 o

e

Description:

The portable radios in the vans (" PAC-RT") were not compatible with the " scrambler" used for security reasons. Because of this, the field teams could miss a radio message while they are away from the vehicle.

Recommendation: Modify system so that the PAC-RTs can be used with the scrambler.

2.1.4 Dose Assessment Plume Exercise (Day 1)

Facilities provided for dose assessment included space for dispatch of monitoring teams, calculation of dose and plumes and a miniature radiologicallaboratory.

Computations were made by computers. Hand calculations were not needed as the computer worked properly and gave correct results. Hand calculations have been demonstrated in previous exercises.

For plotting monitoring data, a small map was used by the team leader but no map was available for other players. A large wall map display would be helpful with plume sketched based on plant data, e

Doses were projected using both plant release data and field readings.

Calculations were promptly made and checked; and monitoring teams were promptly directed to their locations to define the extent of the plan. The plume was correctly defined and readings reported promptly.

Use of KI for the general population was not appropriate due to the early

' decision to evacuate. Although not observed, it was assumed this decision was made by the Technical Operations Control Officer (TOCO). It was observed that TOCO was consulted routinely on other decisions.

Doss Assessmint 37 Observations of the overall actions of the dose assessment personnel and their interactions with the TOCC support that protective action recommendations were

{

promptly reviewed and updated as conditions changed.

The three deficiencies in dose assessment from the 1984 exercise were corrected either prior to or during this exercise.

f All objectives for this exeicise were addressed and competently demonstrated.

Snow samples were not collected because snow is not available during this season of tne year. Sheltering was not considered due to the i),

policy of evacuation, not sheltering, as a procedure for protecting the public.

Monitoring and control of emergency worker exposure were addressed by the field teams rather than at the TOCC.

Calculation of total population exposure by units of person-rems was not visually observed but the data for such was readily available. Individual dose assessments were estimated; the population density was very low in the defined plume area.

The dose assessment staff continuously monitored the emergency classification levels and developed protective action procedures in a timely manner.

Several general observations were made concerning the overall operation of dose

. assessment. For approximately 20 minutes after the TOCC notified ANO that the TOCC was activated, ANO continued sending messages to Little Rock (8:05-8:28 p.m.).

Communleations problems were noted between 10:15 -and 10:25 p.m. and continued throughout both the plume exercise and the ingestion pathway exercise. The field team leader frequently was out of contact with Team No. 3.

Motor vehicles were left running unnecessarily while in the armory bay - a poor health practice. Motors should not be started until vehicle is ready to leave, and motors should be stopped immediately when entering the bay.

At one point objectionable exhaust odors were detected inside the Accident Assessment room.

Dose Assessmint 3g The scenario was appropriate, realistic and provided enough activity to allow correction of previous deficiencies and testing of the capabilities assigned to dose

{

assessment for this exercise.

Deficiencies and Recommendations l

Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies - None.

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations I

e

Description:

Incorrect methodology was used to calculate thyroid dose (radiolodine radionuclide concentrations summed instead of only lodine-131 used to calculate dose).

This was caught and corrected by the players without apparent prompting.

Recommendation:

Provide additional training for staff in calculating thyroid dose projections.

e

Description:

~ No maps or displays were posted in the accident assessment area. Only one display was in the TOCC control center and its quality was poor.

Recommendation: Install visual displays and keep these updated so observers can see progress and status of field team results, plume locations, etc.

Ingestion Pathway Exercise (Day 2)

During the second day or ingestion pathway exercise, only field measurement screening was available. The laboratory results for radioiodine must come from Little Rock so were not available during the exercise.

Doss Assessmint 39 l

L All assigned objectives associated with the ingestion pathway were capably demonstrated to the satisfaction of the observer. The objective for recovery and reentry activities was addressed by a table-top discussion. More specificity should have been provided such as specific dairies, specific population groups allowed to reenter (e.g.

children and pregnant women held back), locations of actual crops of particular concern, etc. However, the voluntary descriptions and answers to observer's questions showed that recovery and reentry were seriously discussed and could be capably implemented if an emergency occurred.

Generally, health physics procedures at the TOCC were thorough.

Players demonstrated training, but they lack actual hands-on experience in health physics work.

The health physicist saturated the filter paper with water prior to taking smears; this is a non-standard procedure.

The radiation field was measured at 1 meter, following

" procedures", even though entire surface area had been monitored and was t

" background". This was probably due to lack of experience in health physics activities.

Deficiencies and Recommendations

' Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies - None Area for improvement and Recommendation e

Description:

General inexperience in ingestion pathway activities was evident in health physics activities.

Recommendation: Although training is evident, additional practical experience should be provided in health physics activities.

40 l

2.1.5 Media Center L

(

Public Information Activities The public information responsibilities of the Artansas Department of Health during an emergency at Arkansas Nuclear One are hand'ed by members of the Health Department's Nuclear Planning and Response Program staff. Three members of this i

staff - two media representatives and a media center clerk - make up the Health Department's Public Information Team (PIT). Members of the PIT report to and work in the facilities of the Arkansas Power and Light Company. The media center is in the same building and adjacent to the utility EOF, from which utility representatives manage their response to an emergency at ANO.

The facilities for media activities are excellent. The primary component of the media center is the auditorium in which news briefings take place. Large enough to seat about 230 persons, the auditorium is particularly well designed for the electronic media.

Ample working space and telephones for reporters are provided in another area of the building.

Although a number of exercise objectives were applicable to the Health Department's PIT, the most important was to " provide timely news releases and conduct a public information program." There were problems on the first day of the exercise in implementing the public information program. The inaccessibility of the spokespersons (reporters cannot reach them by telephone) resulted in one Category "B" deficiency.

However, all other objectives applicable to the State's public information activities were met.

The PIT's principal means of disseminating news of the state's response activities was its participation in news briefings.

A PIT member represented the Arkansas Department of Health at one briefing on the first day and at two briefings on the second day. Although there were significant delays in the first instance, the PIT generally

Madia Csnter gg I

followed the briefings with written news announcements that summarized the statements l

made at the briefings. There were noticeable improvements in this operation as the exercise continued on Day 2. The briefings conducted on Day 2 were excellent.

Two problems in public information activities were observed. The first is the apparent inaccessibility of the Arkansas Department of Health for an extended period of time in the ccely stages of emergency response. The result is that there is no place for l

k reporters to call to learn of the ADH's activities in response to an emergency at Arkanso Nuclear One.

I

" he fact that this occurs is perplexing. After all, members of the PIT, because "their normal duty station is in the company's training and emergency response facility, usually will arrive and activate their response facilities long before the ADH staff from Little Rock arrives at the Technical Operations Control Center in Russellville.

Therefore, the PIT should be in a position to respond to telephone inquiries (at least to discuss the fact that the state is activating its emergency plan and is on the way with monitoring equipment, etc.) fairly early in the response. The PIT is not in a position to do this, however, because as soon as they arrive at their normal work station, they begin moving communications equipment, etc. and set up operations in another room one floor above. This removes them from their phones, the very phones that reporters in the ANO area are likely to call into to find out what the state is doing. The apparent solution to this problem may be a simple one and is under consideration by the ADH. It is to have the PIT staff work during emergencies in the same offices that they normally work. It has a number of obvious advantages, not the least of which would be to make it 1

possible for the PIT to answer the telephones that reporters would call into during the early stages of an incident.

The second problem observed is related to the roles of the state and the utility at news briefings. Traditionally, the briefings are timed to coincide with important changes in plant conditions. It is also traditional for the utility to take the lead and discuss plant-P r

Media Center 52 related problems.

There are times when this procedure does not work well.

For example, it did not work well at the first news briefing in which the State participated.

Before the briefing began, there was adequate exchange of information. Thus, utility spokespersons were fully aware of the fact that the state had just directed that an evacuation take place out to 10 miles in sonte sectors and to two miles in all sectors.

Despite this, the utility led the briefings, as usual, and proceeded to spend a significant amount of time on plant conditions and problems. Under some circumstances, this is

./

p acceptable; but not when the state has just issued its first PAD and thousands of people l

are evacuating. To make it worse, the utility's spokesperson made a point of saying that the utility had recommended sheltering out to five miles in some sectors. ' Despite knowing that the state had already issued its PAD, he made no reference to it. At best, this was misleading. More importantly, however, it points to the occasional need for the traditional roles to be dropped. In this case, the utility should have quickly summarized plant conditions and, prior to taking any questions, immediately provided the state an' opportunity to explain its PAD.

Despite these problems, the ADH met the other objectives applicable to its public information responsibilities, and its public information representatives carried out their jobs capably and professionally. However, it should be recognized that without significant support from other Arkansas state agencies or support from other states under the terms of the Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan, the ADH could not sustain its public information activities during an actual emergency. We urge the ADH to explore these and other support arrangements. To the extent that the state plans do rely on the Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan, we urge the ADH to continue its practice of involving adjacent states in its annual emergency exercises.

Midia Canter s3 Defleieneles and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies -

5.

==

Description:==

The news media cannot reach by telephone the 1

spokespersons for the Arkansas Department of Health for an extended period of time in the early stages of a response to an emergency at Arkansas Nuclear One (NUREG-0654, G.3.a.).

Recommendation:

The ADH should consider some means of responding to telephone inquiries during the early stages of its emergency response. - One solution >that is apparently -under consideration is that of having ADH's public information representatives work in their normal offices during an e mergency. - This would have the advantage of making them accessible to the news media at the telephone numbers that local media already have for them.

Area for Improvement and Recommendation e

==

Description:==

A public announcement of the state's first Protective Action Directive (PAD) was delayed unnecessarily at the first full news briefing while AP&L discussed and took questions on the condition of the plant.

Recommendation: The utility and the State PIOS should work more c%ely together so that each has a full understanding of the other's activities and the information that each is prepared to deliver.

The utility should recognize that, in some circumstances, the information the State has to disseminate should be assigned s high priority at news briefings. This requires stopping to look at "the big picture" prior to each scheduled briefing.

i

44

)

2.2 COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS L

2.2.1 Pope County EOC f

(

Narrative The Pope County EOC is lccated in the conference room of the Pope County Detention Center.

This building is equipped with kitchen and bathroom facilities l

(including showers) and bunks.

The EOC room has sufficient space, furniture and I

lighting, and telephones are available.

Backup power is also available and is tested weekly. Status boards for protective action data, operations, and notification systems data were clearly displayed and kept current throughout the exercise. In addition to the message boards, a log was kept.

EPZ maps were posted showing plume sectors, evacuation routes and population by evacuation area. Overall, the EOC is a very good facility for conducting emergency response activities.

The Sheriff's office also is located within the facility.

It has a separate communication room that is operational 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day. During normal business hours, access to the EOC is by alternate entrance through the administration offices. Between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m. the communications operator controls access to the facility.

The Pope County Plan designates the Pope County Judge as the individual in charge of the EOC. The authority to manage the EOC has been transferred to the County Emergency Services Officer (ESO).

However, during the exercise a former deputy sheriff who managed the EOC in the previous year's exercise, performed as a volunteer and directed initial EOC start-up activities. Two current officers of the Pope County Sheriff's Department were indicated as being "in charge" of EOC operations. In fact, essential emergency operations management activities were performed by different individuals, with a notable performance by the Pope County Sheriff. Minimal input or direction was provided by the County ESO.

l

Pope County 65 o

At 6:56 p.m. the communications operator received the Notification of Unusual Event, after which time the communications systems in the EOC room were activated.

These systems were the NERN (Nuclear Emergency Response Network), the ENS (Early Notification System), the police band radio, the OES radio network and four separate f

commercial telephone lines. NERN was the principal means of communication during the exercise. All of these systems functioned effectively throughout the exercise. One Sheriff's Police Officer manned the communications systems while the other updated the message boards. This arrangement corrected an Area for Improvement identified in the 1984 exercise.

When the Notification of Unusual Event was received, one of the Pope County SIeriff's Officers telephoned the remaining EOC staff not present and also individuals from 13 other responding agencies; all of the 13 agencies were put on standby. The EOC staff activated for the exercise consisted of eleven persons. They were the County Judge; the Pope County Sheriff and his Chief Deputy; three Sheriff's Police Officers; the ESO; an Ark *.nsas State Trooper, the Police and Fire Chiefs of Russellville; and a volunteer, the former Deputy Sheriff who directed operations during the 1984 exercise.

For this exercise, the ability to activate the EOC staff was listed as an objective and was demonstrated -- correcting an Area for Improvement identified in the 1984 exercise.

Another objective, which was to demonstrate 24-hour staffing, was generally satisfied following discussion with the ESO; the local plans should include staffing requirements

.for 24-hour capability.

Also, the agencies on standby status were not informed of changes in emergency action levels nor were they informed of protective action directives. Furthermore, the radio transmission from the TOCC resulted in confusion in procedures and responsibilities for activating the Atkins Reception Center. The local plans clearly state that it is the Pope County EOC's responsibility to activate the Atkins Reception Center. The TOCC advised everyone over the NERN at 8:40 p.m. that the

" reception center is now activated." Pope County EOC then called Atkins to verify t

L-

Pope County 46 whether it had activated since it was their responsibility. The Atkins Reception Center director advised Pope County EOC that it had not been contacted by the TOCC but would activate immediately.

The Pope County EOC received an incorrect protective action directive indicating evacuation of all residents in sectors 5, 6, and 7 (item "i") and all residents in sectors 11,12, and 13 (item "k").

Even though these sectors were not correct, an effective discussion took place regarding evacuation actions to be taken for the sectors included in Pope County.

The EOC staff described the procedures for effecting an orderly evacuation of

' mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ. An exter:sive list of handicapped citizens was available and procedures appeared to be adequate for handling these Individuals.

Based on the exercise objectives, public alerting and instruction, evacuation and access control, radiological exposure control, media relations, and recovery and reentry were not evaluated for the 1985 exercise. Of the nine objectives that specifically applied to the Pope County EOC activities, six objectives were clearly met based on the predetermined activities assigned and performed for purpose of accomplishing the objectives.

The Areas for Improvement identified during the 1984 exercise were corrected. This year's exercise was improved by the injection of realistic problems which kept the staff members more involved throughout the exercise.

Deficiencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies -

6.

Descriptiom The roles and responsibilities of managing the Pope County EOC are not defined, and no clear chain of command exists for directing emergency response activities.

Several different

__ _ - _ _a

t Popa County

7 Individuals were "in charge" of the emergency operation through-out the exercise with no obvious leader assuming a direction and f

control responsibility (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a; E.2)

Recommendation: Serious consideration needs to be given to

(

designating a specific individual who will be in charge of emergency response activities. This person should be well trained, familiar with local plans and understand all aspects of emergency response including coordination of necessary available resources.

7.

==

Description:==

Agencies placed on standby following the Notification of Unusual Event were not contacted following changes to the emergency action levels or implementation of protective action directives (NUREG-0654, A.2.a; E.2).

Recommendation:

All appropriate emergency response organizations must be contacted following changes in emergency

{

action levels and for implementing protective action directives.

The specific notification sequence for each major status change f^

needs to be defined, included in the plans and procedures, and followed during radiological emergencies and exercises testing emergency response capabilities.

Area for Improvement and Recommendation e

==

Description:==

The local plan does not clearly describe the provisions for use of radio-protective drugs nor does it include the conditions under which such drugs should be used by offsite emergency workers.

Popa County gg I

Recommendation: Even though this item was not an objective for the exercise, the local plan should clarify and describe procedures f

for use of radio-protective drugs.

e

==

Description:==

Staffing for 24-hour operations is not included in the local plan.

Recommendation:

Include 24-hour staffing assignments in the l

local plan.

Evacuation of On-Site Personnel An objective of this exercise was to demonstrate the capability to successfully evacuate on-site personnel.

Selected employees and v'ehicles were designated to evacuate from the plant to the Atkins Emergency Worker Center in Atkins. Once there they would be used to demonstrate the receipt, registration, monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers. The evacuation procedures were conducted successfully with no deficiencies identified in the transportation activities. Two areas of improvement were identified which should be considered in future testing of evacuation capabilities. It is important to ensure that key individuals in the evacuation be able to communicate while en route information such as directions, points of contact, emergency situations which occur, etc.

Signs, flags, arinbands or markers on cars should be considered. In view of the likelihood of road emergencies such as breakdowns, traffic tie-ups, collisions and emotional situations, procedures should be in place and demonstrated or simulated for standby tow trucks, traffic direction personnel, and ambulances.

Deficiencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies -- None.

Pope County Area for improvement and Recommendation e

==

Description:==

No traffic direction personnel; identif! cation markers such as flags, signs, armbands, etc.; nor emergency vehicles such as tow trucks or traffic directors were demonstrated or simulated during the exercise.

Recommendation:

Develop procedures for implementing, and either demonstrate or simulate during exercise, the use of traffic support personnel, emergency vehicles, direction markers.

Atkins Emergency Worker Center The Atkins Emergency Worker Center is designed to provide service (reception, monitoring and decontamination) only to AP&L plant

employees and emergency workers. The center is located in the gymnasium at the high school. it has capabilities for receiving, feeding and housing 500 or more persons during an emergency.

The first members of the emergency response team arrived at the center at 8:59 p.m.

At 9:30 p.m. the center was ready to receive persons and vehicles for monitoring and decontamination.

All staff were knowledgeable of their duties and responded appropriately to the exercise activities.

Activation and staffing activities demonstrated included registration process; zeroing, logging and distribution of dosimeters; issue of survey meters; dressing out of 9 team members in Anti "C" clothing; roping off areas used for monitoring of persons and vehicles; and setting up decontamination stations.

Communications at the center are accomplished by hand-held radio units which I

i work from a repeater center. Contacts can be made using this equipment with: sheriff's office, fire department, St. Mary's Hospital, Pope County EOC, State EOC, and unit-to-unit in-house.

A nursing station was not established but some medical assistance was avail-able.

Pope County So Persons and vehicles are first monitored for contamination.

Contaminated persons are sent to the decontamination station and then are allowed to register.

Persons not contaminated are directed to the registration table located at the front of the building where they are required to complete Disaster Shelter Registration American Red Cross Form 5972.

f Persons and vehicles are monitored with a CDV-700 survey meter and scanned l

for contamination using typical survey procedures. The only area of the vehicle not checked for contamination was the engine air filter.

Contaminated persons were directed to the gym locker rooms located on each

. side of the building. Contaminated clothing is-removed and put into a plastic bag inside a drum. The contaminated individuals are then given soap and directed into the showers.

After showerire they are given a towel and again monitored. If no contamination is 1

found, they are provided fresh clothing and directed to the registration table inside the gym. Contaminated clothing is stored for later dispofal.

The procedures and use of equipment demonstrated by members of the decon-v tamination station eraergency response team were adequate to accomplish their mission.

l The facility used for decontamination has only one doorway which serves both as

=

an entrance to and exit from the shower area. Persons being decontaminated must exit the shower area the same way they entered. It was recommended that sa cloth or paper l

be placed on the floor as an entrance walkway to prevent spread of contamination from persons entering the showers. Persons exiting should not use this paper walkway.

Contaminated water from decontamination showers is discharged into the sewer system. Contaminated water from vehicle washdown is contained in a ditch at the side of the wash down area.

t

l Pope County l

s.

Deficiencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies - None.

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations e

==

Description:==

Persons exiting decontamination shower could 6e contaminated again by walking in the same area used to enter shower.

./

Recommendation: Use a cloth or paper walkway for people entering shower, and require that they not use this papered area when exiting shower. Paper or cloth used for the walkway can be disposed with other contaminated material.

I e

==

Description:==

One CDV-700 survey meter S/N #42761 had a calibration date of December,1975.

Recommendation:

Survey equipment should be calibrated on frequency specified in the Emergency Response Plan.

o

==

Description:==

No signs were used to warn people that monitoring and decontamination areas are controlled areas.

Recommendation:

Place signs around roped off areas stating " Danger-Radiation Area",

o

==

Description:==

Engine air filter was not checked in cars being monitored for contamination (NUREG-0654, K.5.a,b).

Recommendation: Inform monitoring teams to check air cleaners in vehicles I

being monitored for contamination.

5 '.

2.2.2 Johnson County EOC I

Narrative The Johnson County EOC, located in the Johnson County Courthouse in f

Clarksville, is housed within the offices of the Emergency Servic,es officer. The EOC is well equipped to handle a longstanding emergency since adequate space, kitchen facilities, bunking and showers are available. Backup power is available through a 60KW generator. The EOC had the following maps available: plume EPZ maps, designated evacuation routes, population by sector maps, radiological monitoring point locations, access control locations - and maps indicating. traffic flow to and through the decontamination and reception center at the Clarksville High School. A status board was maintained and continually updated as changes in emergency status and problems occurred.

The management and direction of the EOC was effectively administered by the local EOC coordinator.

The deputy coordinatcr was also' on hand to provide any necessary assistance. Periodic briefings were conducted by the coordinator to provide f

his staff with updates on emergency conditions and to notify them of any free play problems as they were dictated by the scenario. The EOC coordinator utilized his staff very well in allowing them to make decisions on certain problems that were presented to the EOC.

Excellent efforts in problem solving were demonstrated in resolving all problems requiring action that were issued to the EOC.

tessage handling was performed very efficiently, and all messages were logged when received; as were the appropriate actions taken to rectify the problems. Access to the EOC was controlled and a sign in/ sign out sheet was maintained.

The call from the TOCC indicsting an unusual event occurred at 6:56 p.m. Upon this notice, the EOC coordinator mobilized a staff of 31 participants. The EOC was fully staffed and activated at 7:11 p.m. (only fifteen minutes after notification). Johnson

L Johnson County County EOC has compiled a 200-member volunteer staff for emergency conditions. A two-way radio system with pager provides continuous availability for notification.

Notification of the exercise events took place as follows: Alert status received 8:33 p.m., Site Area Emergency - 9:36 p.m., General Emergency,11:14 p.m., Evacuation 11:20 p.m. (2 mile radius only), and activation of Clarksville reception center (simulated)

)

at 11:25 p.m.

Excellent communications systems are established and maintained at the EOC.

The communications staff were well trained and very effectively performed their duties on all communications equipment.

Johnson County EOC played-an active role in public alerting to its residents.

Notification came to the EOC to evacuate people only within the 2-mile EPZ; this notification took place at 11:20 p.m.

After the order to evacuate, Johnson County simulated the procedures for alerting the public. EBS, tone alert radios, and vehicles with PA systems would be used to notify the 311 people in the 2-mile EPZ. They would be instructed to go to the Clarksville High School Reception Center. The EOC maintains a special needs handbook of special alerting instructions for mobility-impaired and other handicapped Individuals in the county. This book contains directions for informing and mobilizing these individuals and transporting them out of the evacuated area.

Protective actions were simulated at the EOC. Several problems administered by the state exercise controller allowed for thorough discussion among the EOC staff members on issues concerning evacuation, access control situations and activation of the reception center.

The scenario adequately tested the capabilities of the EOC staff support personnel, facilities and equipment. Overall, Johnson County performed exceptionally well, due primarily to the effective management of the EOC Coordinator and his communications staff.

~1

t..

54 There were 28 problems throughout the course of the exercise and all were solved either through simulation or demonstration. All of last year's deficiencies were corrected, and in most cases these past deficiencies became the strong points of the exercise. In addition, all objectives were met' during the exercise.

(

Deficiencies and Recommendations Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies - None.

' Areas for Improvement and Recommendations None.

I 1

2.2.3 Logan County EOC Notification of an Unusual Event came through the Paris Police Department in response to a call from TOCC to the dispatcher at 6:55 p.m.

The radio dispatcher notified the EOC. director by phone and he in turn began calling his staff by radio or phone.

At 7:40 p.m. the EOC P! ector, Assistant Director, and Communications f.

Director arrived to activate the EOC. Other staff members were then called by phone E

from an up-to-date list in the plan. The EOC was fully staffed by 10:30 p.m. Simulated, around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by sending part of the staff home during the exercise with instructions to return in shifts. Each staff member showed enthusiasm and

~

adequate training in their duties. This was an improvement which corrected a deficiency f

from last year's exercise and also fulfilled an objective for this year.

Response agencies represented at the EOC were:

EOC Director-Emergency Medical Services, Ass't EOC Director-in-Training, Communications Coordinator, Paris-Police Security, Judge-Logan County, Judge's Secretary, Logan County Sheriff's Officer, and the Transportation and Education Coordinator.

l a

Logan County 35 The communications system at the Logan County EOC consists of radio (NERN) contact with the TOCC and other local EOCs, with commercial telephone as backup.

EBS contact, although not required, is by telephone with no backup established. Local schools and support hospitals are contacted primarily by telephone with radio backup capability. Conferencing capabilities are also available with this equipment. Radio and pagers provide communications link with the local radiological monitoring team.

Radios are in use only during an event. However, the sheriff's office (operational during daytime) is located in the same building and the Paris Police and Fire Departments (with 24-hour coverage) are across the street.

The testing of communications was accomplished with notification by the TOCC at 8:13 p.m. of an Alert status and 11:18 p.m. of a General Emergency.

There are 3 sirens in the eastern part of the county; these are activated by the State TOCC. The Logan County volunteer fire departments have loud speakers on their vehicles, which could be used to notify.

The limited furniture and size of the facility are definite drawbacks to the operations of the EOC. It is unlikely that extended operations could be conducted at this present location. There were no bunks, showers, or kitchen facilities available. Although not demonstrated, emergency power (generator) is available.

A status board was posted as were maps of the plume EPZ with sectors labeled, access control points, radiological monitoring points and population by evacuation area.

Also, evacuation routes and relocation centers were posted. Posting of these displays corrected a deficiency from the previous exercise and fulfilled one of the objectives for this exercise. Access to the EOC was controlled by both the Paris police and the county sheriff's deputies. Since both were on duty and subject to call, one or the other was present during the entire exercise. The judge's secretary kept a roster and register for sign-in and out by all participants.

P w.

Logan County 96 The overall management of the EOC was procedurely acceptable and effective.

The EOC di.ector was in charge of the EOC and was training another staff member to take over as the Director.

The present director is also Director of Emergency Medical Services.

I A copy of the Logan County Plan was available and used frequently by the Director. Procedures'and checklists were used and message logs kept.

To address the needs of mobility-impaired residents the Logan County EOC has a

./

red booklet entitled " Logan County Special Needs" which contains the names, addresses, and problems of mobility-impaired. The EOC Director simulated their evacuation by calling the New Blaine Volunteer Fire Department to assist them.

The State provided 22 problems for the Logan County EOC; and these provided sufficient activity during the exercise.

The scenario was realistic and provided opportunity for correcting previous deficiencies and demonstrating this year's objectives.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS Category "A" Deficiencies - None Category "B" Deficiencies - None AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

/

1 e

Description:

The EOC was confined to a small room with one desk,

{

which is very inadequate for conducting full range operation during an exercise or event at ANO.

Recommendation:

Locating the EOC in larger quarters to accommodate all staff would provide for better coordination cf operational activities and create a better working environment.

57 4

2.2.4 Yell County EOC Narrative Plume Err,re re Pathway The Yell County EOC is located in the Yell County Courthouse. It is equipped with bunks and shower facilities to support extended operations. Back-up power was available.

The initial Notification of an Unusual Event was received by the Sheriff's Communication Dispatcher. The information was relayed to the County Judge and the OES Coordinator who have offices in the courthouse. C mmunications were then moved to the courtroom. At 7:10 p.m. the EOC received a radio dispatch to activate the EOC. An updated call list was used to notify staff members, and the EOC was declared operational at 7:22 p.m.

Personnel knowledgeably handled their assigned EOC operations. It was explained that double-shifting procedures would be used for around-the-clock capability.

The county plan designates the Yell County Judge as the individual in charge of the EOC.

He provided effective leadership and management of EOC activities.

Briefings were held as needed on an informal basis. Messages were promptly recorded and distributed to the appropriate staff members. Security measures were enforced, and personnel were required to show identification badges for entry into the EOC. The officials present for staffing represented the Arkansas State Police, Yell County Office of Emergency Services and Yell County Sheriff's Office. The remainder of the key staff I

were placed on standby.

Space was set aside for news briefings. Based on a controller message input, request for information from the media was directed by the County Judge to the TOCC for response.

Communications of an emergency are handled initially from the County Sheriff's communications room which is manned on a 24-hour basis. It is equipped with a radio and 1

I-

\\

Yell County f

58 phone line to the utility.

Communications were demonstrated between the utility, TOCC, and state and local EOCs. The primary system at the local EOC is the radio with commercial telephone as backup capability. No hard copy device was available to or from the media center.

In general, the communication procedures and activities

(

functioned smoothly. The communications operator responsible for operating the system I

and recording messages conducted these assignments exceptionally well.

Public

alerting, instructions, dose assessment and protective action recommendations were not Yell County objectives for demonstration.

Emergency classification levels were promptly posted and the status board kept current as4significant events were reported. ' EPZ maps were posted showing plume sector evacuation routes and relocation centers.

Access control points would be established as necessary and posted on the maps. Population distribution by evacuation area was not displayed as a map; however, an 8"X11" copy was available and used for evacuation actions.

Protective action orders were issued to the Yell County EOC from the State TOCC at 11:21 p.m. requesting evacuation of all sectors out to two miles only. At 11:25 r

p.m. the State TOCC requested that Yell County activate the care center at Danville High School.

The Yell County EOC received an incorrect protective action directive u

indicating evacuation of all residents in sectors 5, 6, & 7 (item "i") and all residents in sectors 11,12, and 13 (item "k").

The TOCC information on wind direction and velocity was provided the local EOC only in the initial ECN message and was not updated. When wind direction was requested by the Yell EOC, it was not provided by the TOCC. Wind direction, velocity and plume path information should be provided to the local EOC and updated immedintely as the status changes.

Upon termination of the plume exercise no information was given on recovery or reentry procedure. Yell County did not participate in the ingestion pathway exercise on day two at which time recovery and reentry were addressed. The scenario provided L

59 adequate situations for testing the Yell County EOC's capability to activate, staff and to handle emergency response activities such as evacuations.

The problems presented to the EOC staff during the exercise kept the initial interest maintained throughout the exercise.

In addressing the problem, the staff demonstrated profielency and capability in handling situations that might oceur in a real event.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS l

Category "A" Deficiencies - None Category "B" Deficiencies - None AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS None 2.2.5 Conway County EOC Narrative

(

The Conway County EOC is located in the basement of the Post Office in Morrillton, Arkansas, within the 50-mile EPZ but approximately 27 miles from ANO.

Througli its radiological emergency response plan, its primary involvement during an incident at ANO is to provide a reception, monitoring and congregate care center for evacuees from the Russellville area should evacuation become necessary. The EOC had ample space, lighting and furnishings but no backup power is presently available. The only maps consisted of an area map for weather and a copy of the EPZ map removed from the Public Information Brochure. Two bunks are in an adjoining room, but there are no shower or kitchen facilities to support 24-hour operations. Coverage of the office on a round-the-clock basis would be handled by rotating the eight volunteer staff on two twelve-hour shif ts.

%nny County 50 Initial notification of an Unusual Event was received at the Morrillton Police Department dispatcher's office at 6:56 p.m. from the ADH via NERN radio. This exercise was the first participation for the dispatcher. Initial information from ADH was garbled and difficult to follow. That, accompanied by the dispatcher's unfamiliarity with the message form, made its completion impossible. The dispatcher was unable to deter-mine whether any action should be taken on the call or whether her call-up list should be initiated. Upon advice from the observer, the dispatcher called the ADH by commercial telephone and requasted a repeat of the message which was provided. Notifications were then made to the following individuals: telephone calls to the county OES coordinator and County Sheriff's office, and personal notification to Morrillton Chief of Police (located in the same building as dispatcher).

The Emergency Operations Coordinator arrived at the EOC at approximately 7:30 p.m. He called the deputy coordinator and three other staff members. The deputy and one other reported to the EOC at approximately 8:45 p.m.

According to the coordinator, this completed his staffing for the exercise. He made two unsuccessful calls to the County Judge during the early stage of the exercise. No other calls were made or simulated to the Judge, Sheriff or Chief of Police to update them on the exercise as the status of the situation was upgraded or as problems were presented by the controller for their response. The plan assigns the responsibility for implementation of the plan to the County Judge whose office will be located in the EOC during an emergency. All three of these county / city officials have direct emergency response roles during an exercise or incident. The Chief of Police and a State Police Officer at:ived at 8:40 p.m. and remained for approximately ten minutes. Neither was involved in decisionmaking during this brief period.

In summary, staffing consisted of the three volunteers. The Coordinator and his assistant were in charge of all communications af ter receipt of the initial call from the Police Department. As problems were presented, they were competently addressed by

Conway County the Coordinator.

Eight of the problems of the exercise were for either the County I

Judge, Chief of Police or County Sheriff. Since these persons were not present, the l

Coordinator made all decisions and responses; he did not simulate or make calls to the appropriate individual for consultation prior to the decisions.

~

l l

Although backup power had been reported as available in the past exercise, the J

coordinator reported that no backup capabilities exist at this time.

One problem required simulation that the power to the EOC was knocked out by lightning. They correctly made contact with the TOCC by commercial telephone. The outage was of short duration (10 minutes) and the next problem reported the power had been restored to the EOC.

\\

No information was recorded en the status board and no written records were made of calls to and from the EOC. Official notification of Emergency Classification and Protective Action Directives were recorded on the preprinted forms provided by ADH. They have no duplicating capabilities at the EOC but such probably would not impede the operational activities since the EOC consists of two small rooms which would I

simplify keeping everyone informed of actions necessary and of the changing status of an f

emergency. A checklist should have been used by the Coordinator to assure that the minimum actions required by the plan at each emergency action level were fully and timely accomplished.

On three occasions the Coordinator contacted the TOCC for permission to conclude Conway County's involvement in the exercise prior to scheduled termination time. These efforts generated from a problem provided the Coordinator at 12:20 a.m.

that "a rumor has been received that the exercise has been terminated." The TOCC cor-rectly responded that such report was a rumcc, but the coordinator made two subsequent calls to request Conway County's termination of involvement. Both later requests were denied by the TOCC.

L Conwty County I

e s2 l

i I

The volunteer coordinator and his two volunteer assistants capably conducted their activities with exception of the problem; mentioned above.

Calls from the coordinator should have been made to the County Judge, Sheriff and Police Chief at the times problems were presented for their handling.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS Category "A" Deficiencies - None.

Category "B" Deficiencies 8.

Description:

Problems were presented during the exercise requiring response or actions by the County Judge, Sheriff and Police Chief. None of these individuals was present at the EOC, although the Sheriff and Police Chief had been notified of the initial Unusual Event notification. Further calls to or contacts with them were neither made nor simulated when specific problems requiring their involvement were presented. (NUREG-0654, A.2.a.)

Recommendation:

Key individuals specified by plan as having response roles should be present during an exercice or at least available and contacted when problems for them occur, and they should be periodically updated on the events of the exercise.

9.

==

Description:==

The dispatcher was not familiar with the notification form, and the poorly transmitted message from the TOCC impeded the dispatcher's knowledge of what action should be taken to the initial notification of an Unusual Event message.

(NUREG-0654, E.2.)

Recommendation:

Provide refresher and periodic training to Morrillton Dispatchers in receipt of and response actions to messages, including instructions in completion of forms.

Conway County a

g3 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION e

Description:

Workable backup power is not available at this EOC in f

the event of an emergency at ANO.

Recommendation:

Equipment for ensuring backup power at the EOC should be repaired or replaced and maintained on a regular

{

I basis to ensure its operability.

e

Description:

No message logs or other recording of messages to and from' the EOC were made with exception of the Official Notifi-

. cation Forms and the Protective Action Directives.

Recommendation:

A system for logging and documenting all messages and calls from and to the EOC should be established and implementec during the next exercise.

e

Description:

The only map of the EPZ and Sectors was a small map i

from the Public Information Brochure.

{

Recommendation: Larger, more readable maps should be obtained and made a permanent part of the displays for this EOC to facilitate their activities and response during an exercise or a real incident at ANO.

e

Description:

'Upon receipt of a problem stating that "a rumor has been received that the exercise is terminated." The EOC correctly contacted the TOCC to confirm the report. Although they were told by TOCC that the report was a rumor, two additional calls were placed to the TOCC to request termination of Conway County's participation in the exercise prior to planned conclusion time.

Recommendation:

Repeated requests to terminate participation should not have been made by Conway County officials after it had

64 been determined that their involvement in the remainder of the exercise was needed.

2.3 Medical Support-St. Mary's Hospital / Pope County Ambulance Service The St. Mary's Hospital provides the primary receiving hospital function of treatment of injured, contaminated persons during a nuclear emergency at ANO. The i

utility company has a contract with the hospital and local ambulance service to provide l

l these radiological emergency services. The hospital has the Emergency Administrative Radio link with hospitals throughout the State and has radio communications with the ambulance both at the scene and in transit.

The initial call to the Emergency Room was received at 12:07 a.m. at which time the Pope County ambulance service was dispatched to the plant. The hospital immediately began preparing for receipt of the injured, contaminated patient. Hospital personnel knew their duties and responsibilities in preparing the Emergency Room for arrival of the patient. Floor covering, chcnge of air filters, etc. was demonstrated; nothing was pre-staged in preparing for the patient. An excellent performance was demonstrated. A utility HP was sent to the hospital to help prepare for the receipt of l

the patient. This HP was very helpful to the ER staff.

The ER staff was directed by a physician who was in charge. Hospital staff were fully dressed out in protective clothing. Dress out in protective clothing was neither demonstrated nor simulated by the utility health physicist at the hospital or the utility health physicist who rode with the patient in the ambulance compartment.

Good radio communication existed between the ambulance and the hospital ER staff, and proper patient information was given prior to patient arrival. Dosimeters were worn by all staff except one Emergency Medical Service individual who did not have one.

The patient arrived at the hospital at 12:50 a.m.

Proper surveying techniques and overall patient care procedures were demonstrated by the ER staff. The utility HP

=

Medical Support 65 a

=

was requested to enter the Radiological Management Room, but he had to go put on shoe covers before entering. He should have been dressed out prior to arrival.

The EMS crew members were surveyed outside the hospital for contamination by the AP&L health physicist who accompanied the patient in the ambulance.

While surveying them, however, the HP touched their feet with the survey probe. The probe did not have protective covering and could have become contaminated. Inside the hospital proper use of survey meters was demonstrated. The hospital had sufficient survey meters and other necessary radiological equipment and supplies.

Excellent procedures were used in demonstrating personnel decontamination and exiting the hot line area. As personnel removed their clothing, the hospital X-ray technician provided very good instructions in proper removal of their protective clothing and in monitoring techniques.

Last year's deficiency was corrected and the two recommended Areas for Improvement were also addressed. The additional HP from the utility was helpful. Evaluation comments concerning performance of the AP&L health physicists are provided in the utility support section of this report.

Overall, both the medical support staff at the hospital and the local ambulance s?rvice personnel performed in an acceptable manner.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDA'210NS Category "A" Deficiencies - None Category "B" Deficiencies 10.

==

Description:==

One of the EMS personnel who attended to the Injured contaminated patient did not wear a dosimeter. (NUREG-0654, II., K.3.a, L.3., L.4)

66 Recommendation:

Provide all ambulance members with appropriate dosimeters. Dosimeters should be in the ambulance vehicle as part of their supplies and equipment.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION e

Description:

The ambulance vehicle was left unattended for some time after the patient was removed from the ambulance. Survey of the vehicle and patient compartment had not been completed. No security was assigned to oversee the possibly contaminated vehicle.

Recommendation: Arrangements should be made to ensure that the vehicle is roped off and security available to ' protect individuals from possible contamination prior to surveying being completed.

2.4 Utility Support A summary is provided below of some of the Arkansas Power and Light Company exercise activities which relate to or impact upon the off-site activities and performance by the various state, local government and other participating response agencies. This is presented because the Federal evaluators determined that several of the problems encountered at the off-site locatious were caused or compounded by problems in the Utility operations during the exercise. FEMA realizes that we cannot designate problems as Category "A" or "B" deficiencies against the Utility. However, these identified i

deficiencies and recommendations need to be addressed by the NRC and/or Utility to prevent their recurrence during future exercises or a real emergency at Arkansas Nuclear One, and to allow for a full demonstration of off-site emergency preparedness capabilities.

Utility Support

=

67 DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS e

Description:

After notification by the TOCC to the Utility that they were fully operational and all messages should be sent to them at the TOCC, the Utility still sent a message to ADH in Little Rock.

This created some delay in information arriving at the j

i TOCC.

(See Section 2.1.2, the TOCC narrative for a full discussion.)

Recommendation:

Upon notification from the TOCC that their office is operational, all messages should be sent directly to them rather than through the Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock.

e

Description:

A public announcement of the state's first Protective Action Directive (PAD) was unnecessarily delayed at the first full news briefing while AP&L discussed and took questions on the condition of the plant.

(See Section 2.1.5, the Media Center narrative for full discussion of problem.)

Recommendation: The roles of the Utility and state during news briefings should be reviewed and modified to prevent the recurrence of the situation which occurred during the joint news briefings to the media. The Utility and state PIOS should work more closely together so~ that each has a full understanding of the other's information activities. The Utility should recognize that in some circumstances the State's dissemination of off-site situations and actions should be assigned a high priority at the news briefings.

e

Description:

The AP&L health physicist did not survey the ambulance vehicle for contamination until after the medical drill was about over.

The vehicle should have been roped'off and

Utility Support security available upon arrival.

(See Section 2.3, the Medical Support narrative for full discussion.)

Recommendation: Ensure during next exercise that measures are taken to correct deficiency noted. The vehicle should be monitored as soon as possible after removal of patient.

e

Description:

When surveying of the EMS personnel was performed by the AP&L health physicist, it was noted that the survey probe touched their feet.

Also, the probe did not have a protective covering and could have become contaminated. (See Section 2.3, Medical Support, for full discussion).

Recommendation: When using the probe to survey for contamina-tion, some type of throw-away protective covering should be used to protect the probe from possible contamination.

Descriptkon:

Upon arrival at the hospital, the ambulance was e

l parked at least 100 feet away from the entrance door through which j

l the contaminated patient would be taken into the emergency roo m.

The patient was rolled on a cot for this unnecessarily long distance to the entrance door.

(See Section 2.3, the Mecical Support narrative for full discussion.)

Recommendation:

Park the ambulance immediately outside the entrance door, rope off the area and station a security person near f

the ambulance to protect other individuals from possible contamina-

tion, e

Description:

The two AP&L health physicists did not dress out in protective clothing as did all the other hospital and EMS personnel.

Nor was simulation of this reported to the Federal evaluators. (See Section 2.3, the Medical Support narrative for full discussion.)

i.

I 69 Utility Support L

[-

Recommendation: Utility health physicists should wear protective L

clothing as do the other emergency workers and either demonstrate or simulate this precaution during future exercises.

l I

F 4-

70 3 DEFICIENCY TRACKING AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of deficiencies with I

recommendations noted by Federal evaluators during the most recent exercise on April 24-25, 1985. The evaluations were based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-1 (November 1980) and exercise objectives.

/

The FEMA Region VI Director is responsible for certifying <to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies noted in the exercise will be corrected and that such corrections will also be incorporated into the emergency response plans.

FEMA Region VI may request that the State of Arkansas and local jurfsdiction participating in the Arkansas Nuclear One exercise submit measures that they will take or intend to take in correcting those deficiencies found by the Federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for completion of scheduling and implementing remedial actions, be provided if remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately.

The following chart provides a consolidated summary of all deficiencies by jurisdiction The chart is designed so that space has been allowed to add (1) the corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual date of completion. The listing has been broken down in the chart by Category A and B defielencies. As noted, there were no category A deficiencies found in the April 24-25, 1985 Arkansas Nuclear One off-site radiological emergency response preparedness exercise.

hari

..iimiiii

.i.. i.i,,,,,

i -

. ~..

TAlli.E I Deficiency Tracking and Schedule for Corrective Actions FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Deficiencies and FEMA /'(AC proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for State (S) and I.ocal (L)

Completion And Determination of Cr.'pletion Corrective Acticas.

Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date CATECORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE l

CATECOkY "B" DEFICIENCIES St at e Emergency Operat ions Center - Conway 1.

Desc ri pt ion:

All of the The Office of Nuclear Plan-9-1-85 Proposed corrective u

required maps were not posted or ning and

Response

Program action is acceptable.

available at the EOC.

These will provide OES an access FEMA will evaluate incl uded :

access control control points map, radio-display use and points, radiological monitoring logical monitoring points maintenance during points, and population distri-map, population distribution next exercise.

bution by sector.

Also, emer-by sector map, an emergency gengy classification levels were classification levels chart not posted nor was a status and a status board.

Dis-board displayed and maintained.

plays will be used and kept (NUREC-0654, J.10),

current during an exercise Recommendation:

All required or an incident, and related maps shuul d be i

posted or made available. at the EOC for use during an incident I

l or an exercise. Displays neces-sary for supporting the emer-l gency response efforts should be

,;vailable and ured during the exercise or an incident.

-m

r----

TABLE I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Deficiencies and FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for State (S) and Local (L)

_ Completion And Determination of Completion j

Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date j

I l

Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) 1 2.

==

Description:==

Wind direction Provisions are being made to 9-1-85 Proposed corrective information was not given to the provide wind speed and dir-action is accept-1 counties.which is needed for ection to local government.

able.

FEMA will l

making decisions in the event of evaluate ac ti vi t y a radiological release. (NUREC-during next scheduled y

0654, II, D.4.,

I.ll) exercise.

Recommendation: Ensure that all supporting data, such as wind di re ct i on, required for making decisions is transmitted by the TOCC.

3.

==

Description:==

On one occasion an The PAD Form is being 9-1-85 Proposed corrective incorrect protective action totally revised and will be action is acceptable.

l directive was given from the issued in its new form no Will evaluate this TOCC which resulted in the later than Septembe r 1,

during next scheduled evacuation of the wrong sectors 1985.

exercise.

5, 6,

and 7.

(NUREC-0654, II, A.2.a, E.1)

Recomunenda t ion:

Should change the PAD-1, Part (6) lettering so that the (1) and (i) cannot Le confused.

.Also a system for verification must be set up so that the counties and the TOCC know exactly which sectors are to be evacuated, and the status I

of the evacuation.

l

1 TAlti.E I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Del i ciencies anni FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendat ions for State (S) and Local (L)

Completion And Determination of Cocpletion Correct ive Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date

~

4.

laesc ri pt ion:

A Status hoard of The Status Board used during 9-1-85 Proposed corrective Events was available at the TOCC the exercise is being action is acceptable.

but not utilizcd during the revised to pro vi de a more Use and maintenance of exercise.

(NUREC-0654, J.10) etlicient system of display-status boards will be Recommendation:

The use at. a ing pe rt i nent data.

Two evaluated during the status board, u pd at es with the persons (a

primary and a next

. scheduled current emergency status, would backup) wilI be assigned the exercise.

be useful to all and could have responsibility of maintain-N prevented

'!a t ego r y "B"

ing the board.

deticiency No. 3 above.

f t. d i a Cent er

'. Desc ri pt ion:

The news media This deficiency has been 8-1-85 Action taken by State cannot reach by telephone the corrected by leaving the to correct problem is spokes pe rsons for the Arkansas Public Information Team acceptable.

Its De pa rt ment of lleal t h for an (PIT) in the same offices implementation during extended period of time in the that they normally work.

In next exercise will be early stages of a response to an the event of an exercise or evaluated.

emergency at Arkansas Nuclear emergency they.will remain One.

(NUREC-0654, C.3.a) in place and assume the role Recommendation:

The ADH should of the Publ ic Information consider some means of respond-Team.

In this mode there requirement for ing to telephone i nqui ri es wi11 be no during the early stages of its displacement of peopl e and emergency response.

One solu-equipment.

This will pro-tion that is appa rent l y under vide the media with a well consideration is that of having published telephone number m

.. m TABLE I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Deficiencies and FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for State (S) and Local (L)

Completion And Determination of

-Completion Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date

~j ADil's public information repre-where they can call to get sentative work in their normal information during the early offices during an emergency.

stages of an incident.

This would have the advantage of making them accessible to the news media by telephone at the telephone numbers that the local media already have for them.

?~

Pope Couny 6.

==

Description:==

The roles and "The Pope County Judge is Next FEMA does not agree responsibilities of managing the the Chief Executive Officer sched.

with Pope County's Pope county EOC are not defined, of the County and he was in exer-response to this iden-and no clear chain of command attendance at the County EOC cise tified problem.

The exists for directing emergency during the Exercise.

Ilis County's position is response activities.

Several authorized designee was inadequate to correct as the deficiency.

different individuals were "in there also as quickly charge" of the emergency opera-possible af ter notification, Coordination of Pope tion throughout the exercise as per the County Plan.

The County emergency with no obvious leader assuming County Judge arrived only response efforts will l

a direction and control minutes later.

The Pope be evaluated during l

responsibility.

(NUREC-0654, County Office of Emergency next exercise.

II, A.2.a)

Services is under the opera-tional control of the County Judge.

The coordinator in this of fice, in the event of an emergency, will maintain l

l l

v--

~

TAul.E I (Cont'd)

FEMA Eval %ation of State and Local I)eficiencies and FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions

. Actual' Recommendations for State (S) and Local (L)-

Completion And Determination of' Completion Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date l

T I

\\

l Recommendation Serious consi-operational control of the de rat ion needs to be given to situation and. assist the designating a

specific indi-Judge with information to vidual who will be in charge of help in the decision-making emergency response activities, process.

The Judge asi/or This person should be well the coordinator may dele

'e n

trained, familiar with local the operations control a.

plans and understand all aspects they see fit in order to y

i l

of emergency response including protect the public and coordination of necessary avail-maintain the safety of the able resources.

County citizens and its health and welfare, at the highest level possible."

i "The coordinator must have a working.. relationship with all city, county and state agencies to best serve and help protect the county populace.

This relationship should develop better com-munication between the county and each agency and develop the utilization of the expertise found in each."

TAlti.E I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local th:liciencies and FEMA /HAC Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for State (S) and Local (L)

Completion And Determination of Completion Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date "If we can better serve the people of Pope County by providing you with an advance chain of command list prior to any exercise, this can be accomplished.

However, the avenue of using people in their area of u*

expertise and experience where they work and are

trained, is exceedingly efficient."

1.

Desc ri pt ion: Agencies placed on "This was evidently a

Next FEMA does not agree standby following the Notifica-failure to communicate.

sched.

with Pope County's Lion of Unusual Event were not This item was accomplished exer-position on this contacted following changes to originally as per the cise issue.

Simulation was the emergency action levels or notification list at the not announced to the impl ementati on of protective unusual event declaration.

three evaluators.

In action directives.

(NUREC-0654, Thereafter, at changes of future

exercise, II, A.2.a, E.2) the EAL this was accom-activity must include Recommendation: All appropriate plished through simulation."

demonstration of the emergency response organizations notification update must be contacted following "I

believe all these points procedures.

Or, if to changes in emergencies action are fully within the County be simulated, such levels and for implementing Plan.

Our objective is to notice must be given protective action directives.

support this plan."

to the evaluator.

The specific no ti fi ca tion 4

.-g o

1Ah!.E I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local facticiencies and FEMA /MAC

. Proposed Corrective Actions.

Actual

.ecommendations for State (S) and Local-(1.)

Completion And Determination of Completion Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date 4

%.-e.-

scepience for each major status change' needs to.be

defined, included in the plans and

{

procedures, and f ot Iowed during radiological emergencies and exercises testing emergency response capabilities.

u N

Conway Count y EOC 8.

Ik sc ri pt ion:

Problems were As

required, the proper 6-1-85 Proposed corrective presented during the exercise local official will be noti-action is acceptable; requiring response or actions by fled and asked to take part FEMA will evaluate the County Judge, She ri t i and in any future exercise or a procedures during next Police Chici.

None of these simulation to the proper scheduled exercise.

individuals was present at the notification will be carried j

EOC, although the Sheriff and out.

Also, it is' well Police Chief had been notified understood by all officials of the initial Unusual Event that they must be present. or No t i fi ca t i on.

Further calls to have a designated represen-or contacts with them were Lative present in-the event neither made nor simulated when of any emergency.

This these specific problems requir-action will be emphasized to ing their involvement were all officials involved, presented.. (NUREC-06$4, A.2.a) l I

r TABLE 1 (Cont'd) a FEMA' Evaluation of State andLLocal Deficiencies and FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions-Actual r.

Recommendations for State (S) and Local-(L)

Completion And Determination of.

. Completion Corrective Actions Proposed Corrective Actions Date-Adequacy or Inadequacy Date.

Recommendation: Key individuals specified by plan as having.

response roles should be present during an exercise or at least available and contacted when problems for them occur, and they should. be periodically updated on the events of the u

exercise.

9.

De sc ri pt ion: The dispatcher was A

meeting with all dis-6-15-85 Proposed corrective not familiar with the notifi-patchers will be held by the action is acceptable; cation

form, and the. poorly county coordinator to FEMA will evaluate transmitted message from the familiarize them with all during next scheduled TOCC impeded knowledge. of what the notification procedures exercise.

action should be taken to the and the procedures for initial notification of an receiving and recording Unusual Event message.

(NUREC-messages.

0654, E.2)

Recommendation:

Provide refresher and periodic training to Morrillton Dispatchers in receipt of and response actions to messages, including instruc-tions in completion of forms.

w

-i-TAhl.E I (Cont'd)

FEMA Evaluation of State and Local 12eliciencies and FEMA /RAC Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Comp'etion Recommendations for State (S) and Local _(L)

CompleLion And Determination of-l Corrective Actions l'roposed Corrective Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date Medical Support-St. Mary's llospital/

Pug,e Count y Ambulance Service 10.

==

Description:==

One of the EMS Per discussion with Arkansas Next.

State proposed correc-personnel who attended the State officials, dosimeter sched.

tive action is accept-injured contaminated patient was inadvertently forgotten exer-able.

FEMA will did not wear a

dosimeter.

by participant; will ensure cise~

observe wearing

~of (NUMEC-0654, I!.,

K.3.a, L.3, that all crew members are dosimeters during next i

I. 4 )

equipped with docimeters in exercise.

N*

Recommendation:

Provide all.

future exercises.

ambulance crew members with appropriate dosimeters.

Dosi-met ers should be in the ambulance vehicle as part of their supplies and equipment.

80 o

o 4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES i

4.1 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met Tbe conducting of the April 24-25, 1985 exercise for Arkansas Nuclear One 1

completed the fifth year of the 5-year cycle in which all FEMA objectives for NUREG-l l

0654 must be tested and satisfactorily demonstrated. Although deficiencies identified during this 1985 exercise must be addressed and corrected, the State of Arkansas and local governments have successfully demonstrated each objective during one or more exercises in this 5-year period.

The State of Arkansas in conducting its next REP exercise will enter the second 5-year cycle (now a 6-year cycle based on FEMA /NRC Agreement) during which all of the FEMA objectives must again be tested and satisfactorily demonstrated.

For an evaluation of when each of the FEMA objectives was met during the current, ending 5-year cycle, reference should be made to the following Table 2,

" Objectives Met or Yet to be Achieved."

4.2 Objectives Met or yet to be Achieved Table 2 provides a comprehensive summary of FEMA objectives, NUREG 0654 reference elements, exercise objectives, jurisdictional responsibility, exercise dates, deficiencies noted, and dates and objectives were met.

.~.

.~

bI '

I TAmaE 2 ObjestIves lent or Yet To De Achieved - Arkansas het ear thee Page'I ut 12 tute Jurisdictional Duticiency Object ive kes ponsibil it y Noted Met NUNLC-Ot 54 Emercise Objective Date of (By Deficiency Ft.MA Object ives Mcference April 24-25, 1985 State Local Esercise

. Tracking slo.)

State Local a.

temunntrate abilit y tu subilise E.I.E.2 Demonstrate ability to subilize X

X 4-24-85 1984 Def.'fl0 3-24-81 3-24-81 st at t armi activate facilities (S&L) statt and activate facilities Johnson County prumpt l y.

promptly. (1) 5-19-82

$-16-8s 1984 Dut. #13 lobjec t a ve f or which capability Logan Count y 3-16-88 3-28-84 should be denunstrated during by Pupe,

Yell, each esercise.)

& Conway Counties 3

1985 Det. #9 4-24-85 4-24-85 Conway County b y Pie pe.

Euc Vell.

Lugan, 6 Johnson Counties J.

Demonstrate ability to fully A.2.s Demonstrate ability to fully staff X

X 4-24-85 1985 Det. #8' 3-24-81 3-24-81 saatt facilities and maintair A.4 facilities and maintain staffing Conway County st alling around the clock.

(S&L) around the clock. (2)

EOC 5-19-82 5-19-82 S-11-84 4-24-85 4-25-85 by Pulie.

Yell, J ohn =.ni,

& t.ogau C.nene ecs a

~

TAtt.E 2 (Cent 'd )

Page 2 el 42 Date Jurisdictional Deficiency object ive Responsibility Noted Net

.I huREC-0654 Esercise Objective Date of (Ry Deficiency

)

FEMA Objectives Reference April 24-25. 1985 State Local Esercise Tracking neo.)

State Local l

s.

Demunstrate abilit y to make A.I.d.e Demonstrate ability to make deci-X X

4-24-85 1984 Def. ft 3-24-81 3-24-81 State 110C decisions and to coordinate A.2.s sions and to Coordinate emergency emergency activities.

(S&L) activities. (3) 3-16-83 5-19-82 1985 Def. #3 TOCC 3-21-84 lObjec tive for which capability should be demonstrated during 1985 Det'. #6 4-24-85 each esercise)

Pope County by Yell, l

EOC

Logan,

Johnson, 1985 Def. f7

& Conway Pope County Counties EOC 4.

Naunstrate adequacy ot facil-C.3.a Demonstrate adequacy of lacilities I

X 4-24-85 1984 Def. #14 1-19-82 5-19-82 is ies and displays to support H.2 and displays to support ema rgency Logan County emergency operations.

N.3 operations. (4)

(resolved by 3-21-84 3-21-84 RAC chairman) by Pupe, J.10.a

Yell, lobjective lor which capability (S&L) 1985 Def. fl

Johnson, should be denunstrated during State EOC --

& Conway each esercisel Conway Counties 1985 Def. f4 4-24-85 TOCC

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a e c

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5 - 5 4 - 3. 5 3

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0 TAmt.E 2 (Cent 'd )

Page 4 ot 12 Date-Jurisdictional Deficiency objective Respres ibil it y Isoted eset IHREC-8654 Esercise Objective Date of (By Deficiency FEleA Objectives Reference April 24-25, 1985 State Local Esercise Tracking Iso.)

St at e Local

8. Demonstrate appropriate equip-1.9 Demonst rat e appropriate equipment I

4-24-85 1984 pef. #7 4-24-85 ment and procedures for maa-(S&L) and procedures for measurement of Dose surement of airborne radio-airborne. radieig' ne concentrations Assessment as low as 18 pCi/cc in the lodgne concentrations as toes as 10~

pCi/cc in the presence of presence of noble gases. (8) noble gases.

c3 S

lOt.jective for which capability shoutd be demonstrated dering each esercisel 9.

Demonst ra te apprepriate equip-1.8 Dessastrate appropriate equipment I

4-24-85 1984 'aef. #5 3-24-81 ment and pcceeJures for coller-(S&L) and procedures for cellection, Field tion, transport, analysis.of transport, analysis of. samples of Isonitoring 5-19-82 samples of soil, vegetation, soil, vegetation, snow, tester, and (resolved by snow, water, and milk.

milk. (9)

SAC chairman) 4-24-85 s

10bjective for which capability should be demonstrated during each esercisel 13.

Demonst rate ability to pro jec t 5.18,J.18 Demonstrate ability to project I

4-24-85 5-19-82 damage to the public via plume

!!.18-5) dosage to the public via plume espo-5-31-84 empusure, based ou plant and

[J.10-sure, based on plant and field data,

\\

field data, and to determine S&Ll and to determine appropriate pro-appropriate protective measures tective measures based on

PACS, 4-24-85 based on PACS, available shel-available shelter, evacuation time ter, evacuation time estimates estiastes and all other appropriate and all other appropriate fac-f actors. (10) tors.

[ Objective for which capability should be demonstrated daring each esercieel

_. _~

y TAbiE 2 (Coat'd)

Page 5 of 42 Date Jurisdictional Deliciency Ob jec t i vu pes pons i bil i t y Not ed Met Nukt.C-06S4 Esercise Objective Date el (By Deficiency I'tMA Ob ject ivem acfcrente April 24-25, 1985 State Lucal Esercise Tracking No.)

St at e Lucal i

11.

laemunma rat e ability to pro jec t 5.10 Demonstrate abil it y to pro jec t 1

4-24-85 1984 Def. #6 4-24-8%

I damage to the put,l ic via in-1.!!

dosage to the public wia ingestion Faeld gent ion pat hway empunure, t.4med J.!!

pathway espusure, lea sed on field Munitoring en f ield det al and to det ermine (S) data, and to determine appropriate (resolved by appropriats prutective measures protective measures based on PACS RAC chairman)

I,ased on PACS and other rete-and uther relevant factors. (II) 1984 Del. #8 vant !act ors.

Duse C3 Assessment V1 17.

th:munst rate abil i t y to impl e-J.9 J.11 Demunmarate ability to implement X

4-24-85 4-24-85 ment protective actions for (J.9-S&L) protective actions for ingestion ingest iun pat hway hasards.

(J.ll-5) pathway hasards. (12)

I s.

Ikeenstrate abil it y to alert E.6 Demonstrate ability to alert the 1

X 4-24-8$

3-24-81

$-19-52 t i.e public wit hi n the 10-a le App. 3 public witt.in the 10-mile IPZ and Logan S-19-82 Count y EPZ and di sseminat e en initial (S&L) disseminate an init sat i ns t ruc t ional inst ructional mensage wit hin 15 message within 15 minutes. (13) 3-16-83 3-16-51 minut es.

Yell, Johnson, l Ots jet t i ve f or which capability

& l.ngau shoul4 1,e denunstrateJ during Countic>

cach caercinel 4-24-5) 4-24-8%

3-24-81

$-19-81 14.

thmunstrate abil a t y tu lormu-E.),E.7 1.usan

~

late and distral,ute appropriate (S&L)

Count y i ns t r uc t i on s t o L t,e public in a samety lashion.

3-16-85

Yell, Logan &

Johnson Count ie s O

TamLE 2 (Cont'd)

Page 6 of 12' Date Jurisdictional Deficiency Ob jective tessensibilit y Noted feet 10MBEC-8654 Esercise Objective Date of (By Deficiency PDeA Objectives Reference April 24-25, 1945 State Local Esercise Tracking als.)

State Local' 1%.

beeunst rate organisational J.9 Demons t rat e organizat ional ability I

1 4-24-85 3-24-81 3-16-83 ability and resources necessary J.10.a.g and resources necessary to manage an Pape to manage an orderly evacuation (S&L) orderly evacuation of all or part of County 3-21-84

.I all or part of the plume the plume EPI. (l4) 4-24-8%

Erz.

a (Objective for.Aich capability s!.outJ be demonstrated dering t

each usercise]

46.

A munstrate organizational J.10.k I

3-16-83 ability and resources necessary (561.)

3-21-54 se deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or trallic obstruc-tions.

1 3-24-81 3-I6-83 47.

Demonstrate orsanisational J.10.)

ability and resources necessary (S&L) 3-21-84 to centrol access to an evacu-Pope ated area.

Count y 13.

Demonst rate organizational J.le.d Demonstrate organizational ubility I

4-24-45 4-24-5%

ability and resources necessary (5&L) and resou.ces necessary to effect an

Pope, to e!!act an orderly evacuation orderly evacuation of achility-

Yell, et mobility-impaired indivi-impaired individuals within the Logan &

Johnsun duals within the plume EP2.

plume EPZ. (15)

Counties v

e

U 1 ABA.E 2 (Cuat'd)

Page I s.I It Date Jurisdictional Deliciency Ob ject i ve Res pons ibil it y Noted Met Nt*LC-0654 Emercise Objett ave Date el (By Deficiency itMA obsectives Reference April 24-25, 198)

State f.uc al Emercise Tracking No.)

State 4.oc al

{

19.

A w ntrate organisataunal J.9 I

I 4-24-85 1984 ski. f4

%-19-81 abi t a t y auJ sesources necessary J.80.g TOCC tu ellect an a.rderl y evacuation (S&L)

(resulwed ley 3-21-84 ut schauts within the plume RAC chaa raass) trZ.

4-24-8) 4-24-US co u

10.

IA1m m.st rate a t.a l. t y to contin-E. 3.4. t.

IAmunstrate ability to continuuusly I

I 4-24-85 195% bet. #10 S-19-82 3-89-52 usu al y munitor and control (S&I.)

auaitur and cuat rut caergency worker Pope Pope County Yell caergency morber espasure.

c a po su re. (36)

County Ambularn e 5-31-84 Count y Atkins Service I tA. scot s we f or ut.itle ta pel.i l i t y 4-24-85 3-16-83 me.uul d t.=

denunstretcJ derisig John =ues t

cash usercisej Count y l

l I

3-21-54 l

4-24-5) l (Atkins-l Pupe l

County) 11.

EAmue.=t rate abs t it y t u make the J.10. 8 I

3-16-83 Jn i siese, ta me d 4.an predeter-($&l.)

mies J t iterna, whet tac t tu ens.u-El tu eme-r gesac y workers

.uJ/ur the general popula-as u.

/

LAmuust rat e at.a l s e y tu supply J.10.c I

S-19-51 44 1.Jannants Et, ee.t e L t.e

($&L) l Ju s si ha= k ess maJe to Ju 3-1b-83 su.

e

Tasts 2 (Cent'd)

- Page 8 ut 12 Date Jurisdictional Deficiency Ot.jec t ive Responsibil it y posed net unatC-9654 Esercise Objective Date of (Sy Deficiency tuta tejectives Reference April 24-25. 1985 State Local Esercise Traching alo.)

St at e Local 43.

Dumuustrate.bilit y to ettect J.2 Despostrate ability to effect an I

I 4-24-85 4-24-85 4-24-85 an orderly evacuation et easite (S&L) orde rl y evacesation of omsite Pope per: - - 1.

personnel.

County JC.

Ocanastrate abilit y to brief C.3.a Deer.astrate ability to provide I

4-24-85 3-24-81 abe media in a clear, accurate.

C.4.a timely news releases and ca.rrent 3-21-84 and timely manner.

(S&L) public inforestion pre 8 ras. (18) 1985 Def. #S 4-24-85 seedia Center 45.

Diasumstrate ability to provide C.4.b I

3-24-81 advance coordination et infor-(S&L) 3-21-84 m.ti.e released.

26.

Demunstrate the ability to C.4.c Buenastrate the ability to establish I

4-24-85 4-24-85 establish and operate remer (S&L) and operate rumor control in a contral in a

coordinated coordinated fashion. (19) fashion.

l J#.

Demuest rate ade w y of prec e-J 12 Deanest rat e adewy of precedeces I

I 4-24-85 S-19-82 S-89-s2

Johnson, deres for regist raties and (S&L) for registration and radiological Pope l

I radiological monisering of maaitering of evacuees. (24)

County 3-21-84 Logan Athias

& Vell evacuees.

Counties iobjective ter which capability 3-21-84 i,

should be 4cenestrated during Pope each esercieel County 4-24-85 i

O

'd

Iass E 2 (Cama 'd )

Page 9 of 12

\\

hte Jurisdictional Dulaciency Ota h-st ive Respons a bil it y Noted Isuht4-C654 Escrcise Ot.) cat ive Ate of (By Deficiency Met t t.u (A. pta iwes hefersw e April 24-21,1985 State local tsercise Tracking No.)

St at e Local fa.

as.es arate adequac y et local-J.lo.h I

I l-24-81 5-19-52 atass ser mass care el evace-(S&L)

Lugan 1-21-84 Count y aes.

3-21-84 Pope c3

'O Count y

.O. k str.ie ad g at e e w ipmens E.S.a.h laraus.st r.t e aJr.g.at e eq.ipment aaJ I

4-24-85 1984 Del. 49 S-19-52 l

A ps med.r==

t=r deses.t am-(54L) preced res ter Jetentamanatica of Pope McJesel Imgan l

as aaams a.t emergem y workers, emergency w ekers, equi g, ment, and County Support Count y eq s ymes.a. and webacles.

wehicles. (21)

Atkins (resolved by l

agreement 1-21-54 lue.psta.e 3.r wa.acan cap 4Lainty w/httC, FEMA Pope ss IJ tw drawasarated

d. iag ao evaluate County w s. saprecuel all pertura-ances where 4-24-85 everlapping utility /

local respun-sibslities esist) o O

_ ~ _ _ _

e Tanta 2 (comt'd)

Page It of 32

' met e Jeriodictiesel Deficiency Object ive Beeseasibility met ed met numeC-4654 Emercise Ghjectswe hate of (Sy Deficiency penne ehjectives aeference april 24-25, 1985 State I.acal Esercise Tracking me.)

state Local w areas adee.ecy of Euss L.4 teasestrate ade, set e egeipamot and E

4-24-85 S-19-82 as, e

trameperaaties, per - 1 and (54L) proceemres le decastaminaties of 1.mgae 4 procee.ses ter headlies see-emergency eser be rs, egnipeset, and pope taoimated indieideals including wenicles. (21)

Cemet y preyer decessamanetian of webicle and e p iperet.

tramestrate adepose of EBES trame-1 4-24-85 3-86-81 o

O portar iae.

persammel, facilities.

Pepe I.egan l Objective ter e&ich capability and precedores for handling contaoi-Comesy Cueet y sheeld be demeestrated eering acted individuals. (22)

Asher-each esercieel lance 4-24-85 Serv.

si. h = strate a %.ecy of bus-L.!

Bummastrate adequac y of heapital I

4-24-85 S-19-82 pital f acilities and precedures (SAL) facilities and precedures for pope Juhasue ter handlies cantaoimated indi-headlies contaoimated indiviab els.

County Cuunt y wid=els.

(23)

St.

mary's 1-21-84

]Gbjective for =&ich capability Neop.

Ss.

Mary's steeld be emesestrated during hos pi tal each esercisel

~

4-24-85 E2.

Watrate ability to identif y C.I.a.b 1

3-24-81 seed fer, re,sest, and obtaie (5) 1-19-82 Federal assistance.

J3.

h= strate ability to erstiente 4.4 Sumnast rat e ability to estimate 1

4-24-85 4-24-85 total pepelatiae esponere.

(5) total papelation esposere. (24)

I e

O

4 saatz 2 (Coma *d )

Page !! et 12 Date J rasdictional Detscaeacy On jec a a ve Res peas ibi t a t y Not ed Met EJBtC-94S4 Esercase Obhst saw Date el (By Duficicany t t?tA Ga. p a t a.

&c t erena s April 24-25, 1985 State Local Esercise Tracking Nu.)

St at e Iw al 34 am emma r ate

.ba l a t y to de t e r-N.!

Imramas.st rat e abslit y te det ername and I

4-24-81 4-24-8) mese

.a.4 amplee=ea appe.praete (S&L) ses.leerst apyrupraate eras.res ter me.s re s f.a cemar.!!cd recew-comatolled re,swery and reentry.

er y eams s esma ry.

(258 sb h asmsarate the abalsey se C.4 1

1 3-24-85 J-24-s!

es t est a vel y call mp== and =til-(i&L) 3 au tsade s.pp es adencies S-19-82 sw.

B u.I cap.halatics are es*=wd.d.

h.

In==.mst rat e the ads pesy.

F.!

tareneest r at e the adege.ac y, opera-X X

4-24-8) 3-16-51 3-86-88 and ' t t ec t a ve use (5&L) lis t a s y, and et tective use of emer-

Fupe,

.perabality, e

t emarr gu ac y ceana mitaties genc y ceasm.aicatien eqespecat and 3-28-54 Yell &

e v aperma ams the ad**4*ac y et abe adeq=sacy of communicataeas gere-Imgan aemm.matatsees precedores and cederes and methods. (25)

S-$1-54 Countses aca ba.ds.

3-24-84 lot.p. tine ter asch cap bality 4-24-85 4-24-Bi sh.=4 4 be drem.ast rat ed durang 4

ra6h esercasel st.

h assate abalssy to a mater D.4.2.!!

Barm.astrat e abilit y to maamster Emer-X X

4-24-8%

1984 Det. d2 3-24-81 3-21-54 ta rgemay Classatecassem leerlo (5&L) genc y Classatasataean Icwels contie-TUCC J

.amaan esty emed sagplement st y and implement preced res em a S-39-82 yewae4.re s aan a t somet y =+-c.

t serly manner. (26) 3-16-83 lot.pret a ve ter a ssa rap belsey 1981 tael. d2 4-24-8) sb I4 be 4.-a ras ed 4.c:as 7t4."C cam b essac a ss !

I l

I 1

e a

n m.

m_

.m_

m m

r f

f tasaz 2 (Cana 'd )

Page 12 et 12 Date Jurisdactieaal Deliciency set. jec t i ve Bessensililiay ht ed Met EastC-0614 Esercise Objective Date of (By Deficiency e tMA ta sea t s wa Esferrace Apral 24-2%, 1%&S State Lacal Esercise Tracking b.)

St at e I.a.c al sa.

a.m a rat e capahalssy se t

X X

J-24-81 3-21-54 e t t es t a.e l y process all am-(5&L)

-+=-

s ee.g

m. 3 3.ge s sa a tamely S-19-82 m e, 3-16-83 n.

t= ama rate that methoraty A.2.a SAmussarate that a s hority esist s an X

X 4-24-83 1984 Det. ft 3-24-81 3-24-81 o

..a ma n as ata ting a resey-A.3

.csivasing a rec ept awa center (as Pope J hass.se 8'

an=a senser (as maesa.ry) is a E.1 mecessary) an a t amely =--r.

(27)

Camaty Co. ant y 5-19-52 aame8y ammasa.

F.1.e Atbias (resulved t.y 1.ug an (S&L)

RAC chat raase)

& Tell 144 3.(t a se ser =Asc h capeta l s t y A-.a se s h ad an W -traard d=rsag 4-24-a5

..t h = aerc a we l 1-21-54 FwPe.

Yell &

Logan Countie.

4-24-5) 6 e

4 9

)

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