ML20132F792
| ML20132F792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1985 |
| From: | Panciera V, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132F777 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-84-33, NUDOCS 8507190042 | |
| Download: ML20132F792 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1984033
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-302/84-33
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No.:
50-302
License No.:
Facility Name:
Crystal River 3
Inspection Dates:
November 10, 1984 - December 20, 1984
Inspection at Crystal River site near Crystal River, Florida
-Inspector: /
W
-
/8
P
T.F.SteTka,SeniorRe[engnspector
Date Signed
'
Accompanying Personne .
J. E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector
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Approved by:
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V. W. Pancitra, Sectibn CTiief
7 Date' Signed
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. Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection involved 63 inspector-hours on site by one
resident. inspector in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological
controls, _ Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, . and
licensee' action: on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were
< conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations
were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
One ' violation was identified; (Failure to isolate waste gas decay tank .
while reducing oxygen concentration, paragraph 5.a.(1)).
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8507190042 850131
ADOCK 05000302
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- C.
Bennett, Nuclear Operations Planning Supervisor
- G.
Boldt, Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
- R. Carbiener, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- R.
Clarke, Radiation Protection Manager
- W. Clemons, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- M.
Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist
- C.
Davis, Health Physics Technician
- D.
Fields, Nuclear Reliability Supervisor
- R.
Fuller, Manager Site Nuclear Services
- D.
Green, Nuclear Licensing Specialist
- E.
Howard, Director, Site Nuclear Operations
- A.
Kazemfar, ALARA Specialist
- J.
Kralker, Nuclear Operations Specialist
- W.
Lagger, Contract Health Physics Technician
D. McCollough, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor
P. McKee, Nuclear Plant Manager
- V.~Roppel, Nuclear Plant Engineering and Technical Services Manager
- W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager
- P. Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent
- D. Smith, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
- W. Thomas, Chief Nuclear Chemistry Technician
- R.
Tyrie, Assistant Nuclear Operator
- J. Wright, Nuclear Support Specialist Chem / Rad Protection Services
Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, main-
tenance, chem / rad and corporate personnel.
" Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at
the conclusion of the inspection on December 20, 1984.
During this meeting,
the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they
are detailed in this report with particular emphasis placed on the viola-
tion, unresolved item, and inspector followup items.
Also during this
meeting the following items were discussed:
a.
During a review of completed 'ata for surveillance procedure SP-317 (RC
System Water Inventory Balance) performed on November 11, December 10,
December 14, and December 17, the inspector identified mathematical
errors in the calculation of the leak rate determination.
While these
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errors were insignificant and did not result in any limit being
exceeded, the possibility of larger errors exist.
These findings
indicate that careful supervisory review of data results are necessary,
b.
During the walkdown of the Emergency Diesel Generator systems, the
inspector determined that the drawing of the diesel water jacket
cooling system (drawing number 302-283) was missing identification
tags.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and
stated that they would review these issues for appropriate corrective
actions.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in
paragraph 5.a.(2)(a) of this report.
5.
Review of Plant Operations
At the beginning of this inspection period the plant was in hot standby
(Mode 3) preparing to return to power operation (Mode 1).
The plant entered
the startup mode (Mode 2) at 10:35 a.m. , and returned to power operation at
12:00 noon on November 10.
The plant continued in power operation for the
remainder of this inspection period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-of-
Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's
Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work
Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STIs); and selected Chemistry /
Radiation Protection Logs.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently
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verified clearance order tagouts.
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As a result of these' reviews, the following items were identified:
(1) During a review of the plant records, the inspector noted con-
tinuing efforts to reduce the oxygen concentration in the waste
gas ' decay tanks (WGDTs) due to high (greater than 4%) hydrogen
(H ) concentrations.
TS 3.7.13.5 requires the oxygen (0 ) con--
2
2
centration to be maintained -less than or equal to 2% when the H
2
concentration is greater .than or equal to 4%.
Action statement
3.7.13.5.a of this fTS requires that _if the H concentration is
2
greater than or equal to 4% and the 0 concentration is greater
.
2
than .or equal to 2%, then .the 0 concentration must be reduced to
2
within specification without delay.
If these limits are exceeded,
i.e., the 0 concentration increases such that the concentration
2
is greater than or equal to 4%, then TS Action Statement
3.7.13.5.b requires that waste gas addition to the affected tank
must be suspended and the 0 concentration must be reduced to
2
'within specification without delay.
The sequence of events (as excerpted from various plant logs) was
as follows:
Date
Time
Description
12/12
1530
WGDT "B" H - 5.6%, 0 - 3.9%; enter TS 3.7.13.5.a.
2
2
12/13
0330
WGDT "B" H - 6.4%, 0 - 4.75%; enter-TS 3.7.13.5.b.
2
2
1430
WGDT "B"
isolated due to 75 psig pressure, placed
'WGDT "C" in service.
12/14.
0030
WGDT "C" H and 0 out of specification, enter TS
2
2
3.7.13.5.a.
0600
WGDTs "C" and "A" H and 0 greater than 4%, enter
2
2
TS 3. 7.13. 5. b.
(WGDT "C" H - 4.4%, 0
4.5%;
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WGDT "A" H - 5.1%, 0 -4.5k).
2
2
2
0735
Placed WGDT "A" in service (WGDT "C" was secured at
this time).
0825
All WGDTs secured from service.
- During the period from 1530 on 12/12 until 1430 on 12/13 for WGDT
"B" and from 1430 on 12/13 until 0735 on 12/14 for WGDT "C"
the
licensee .was attempting to reduce the 0 concentration in these
2
tanks by adding nitrogen (N ).
The N was being added via the
2
2
waste gas header.
As long as the tanks are connected (via open
valves) to the waste gas header, both N and waste gas additions
2
were being made - to the tanks.
The WGDT "B" was secured from the
waste gas header when its pressure limit (75 psig) was reached.
At 0735 on 12/14.when WGDT "A" was placed in service, the tank was
still out of specification.
The licensee was hoping to be able to
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reduce this tank to within specification via the waste gas header
because this tank had the lowest waste gas amount.
The licensee
failed to take any action to develop an alternate means of adding
N to the tanks while they were secured from the waste gas header.
2
After several discussions with the NRC inspector, the licensee
developed a method to reduce the 0 concentration while the tanks
2
were isolated from the waste gas header.
This method was imple-
mented at 2255 on 12/14 and both the "A"
and "C" tank were
released, the residual gas in the tank was brought into specifi-
cation at 2100 on 12/16.
Failure to secure the addition of waste gas into the WGDTs and to
provide a timely reduction of the 0 concentrations is contrary to
2
the requirement of TS 3.7.13.5.b and is considered to be a
violation.
Violation (302/84-33-01):
Failire to secure waste gas addition
and provide a timely reduction of oxygen concentration to the
WGDTs as required by TS 3.7.13.5.b.
(2) STI 84-98 directed operators to ensure that boron additions to the
reactor coolant system be conducted near the requirements of plant
curve 3.20, Boron for Shutdown Margin Versus Cycle Lifetime,
(i.e. , do not add more boron than is necessary) since fuel deple-
tion was greater than predicted and curve 3.20 was excessively
conservative.
Review of this issue identified the following items:
(a) The reactivity worth vs. effective full power days (EFPD)
cuave has the actual fuel depletion rate deviating from the
predicted fuel depletion rate by an amount greater than
expected.
This curve is utilized to determine the overall
core reactivity balance.
TS 4.1.1.1.1.2 requires the overall core reactivity balance
be determined every 31 EFPD by comparing actual values to
predicted values and allows the values to be adjusted
(normalized) to actual core conditions prior to exceeding 60
EFPD.
Discussions with the licensee indicate that no such adjust-
ments were made prior to 60 EFPD, but that some adjustments
may have been made subsequent to 60 EFPD.
Adjustments
subsequent to 60 EFPD are not permitted by the TS.
The
licensee will review records to determine if any overall
reactivity balance adjustments were made for this cycle or
any previous cycles subsequent to 60 EFPD for the operating
cycle.
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Unresolved Item (302/84-33-02):
Review overall reactivity
balance adjustments to determine if any adjustments were made
subsequent to 60 EFPD for this cycle or any previous cycle.
(b) The licensee's nuclear engineering department is re-analyzing
the boron concentrations based on , current fuel worths in an
effort to revise curve 3.20 and remove the approximate 140
ppm' error presently in the curve.
This re-analysis may or
,
may not be completed prior to the end of cycle which is
presently scheduled for March 9.
i .
Inspector Followup Item (302/84-33-03):
Review the results of the
boron concentration re-analysis being performed to revise curve
3.20.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
.Some
operations and maintencnce activity observations were conducted during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings
were ~ attended by the inspector to observe planning and' management
'
Lactivities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
Security Perimeter Fence; Control Room; Emergency Diesel Generator
Room; Auxiliary Building; Intermediate Building; Battery Rooms; and,
Electrical Switchgear Rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) - Monitoring Instrumentation l - The following instrumentation -was
observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance
with the TS for the current operational mode:
Equipment operating status; Area,. atmospheric and liquid radiation
monitors; Electrical' system lineup; Reactor operating parameters;
and Auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted- a walkdown of
the "A"
and "B" Emergency Diesel Generator Systems to verify that
the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system
operability and that . the system drawing and procedure correctly
reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control
room operations were being conducted in an orderly and profes-
sional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turn-
overs on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problers, and other pertinent plant informa-
tion during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) ~ Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components
and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facil-
ity were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to
verify proper identification and implementation.
These observa-
tions included selected licensee conducted surveys, review of
step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and
area ' posting.
Area postings were independently verified for
accuracy through the use of the inspector's own radiation moni-
toring instrument.
The inspector also reviewed selected radiation
work permits and observed personnel use of protective clothing,
respirators, and- personnel monitoring devices to assure that the.
licensee's radiation monitoring policies-were being followed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify that
security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty, and access
to the Protected Area (PA) is controlled in accordance with the
facility security plan. -Personnel within the PA were observed to
verify proper display of badges and that personnel requiring
escort were properly escorted.
Personnel within vital areas were
observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equip-
ment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actua-
ting controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and
fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(8) Surveillance - Surveillance teccs were observed to verify that
approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were
conducting the tests; . tests were adequate to verify equipment
operability; calibrated equipment, as required, were utilized; and
TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
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SP-140, Incore Neutron Detector System Calibration;
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S0-312, Heat Balance Calculations;
SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
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SP-335, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Functional
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Test;
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SP-433, In-core Neutron Detectors Channel Check; and
SP-701, Radiation Monitoring. System Surveillance Program
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(for calibration of RM-All in accordance with
procedure CH-232 Atmospheric Radiation Monitoring
System Calibration).
As a result of these reviews the following item was identified:
Procedure SP-312 requires a quarterly heat balance cross check
with a backup computer (IBM 5100) to ensure that the plant compu-
ter is providing adequate data.
Recent problems with the IBM 5100
prevented the performance of this cross check on two. occasions.
The licensee is developing a hand calculation method to enable the
' cross ' check to be performed if the IBM 5100 is out of service.
This method will be incorporated into a review SP-312 procedure.
Inspector Followup Item (302/84-33-04):
Review revision to
procedure SP-312 to add hand calculation method for computer cross
check.
(9) Maintenance Activities
The inspector observed maintenance
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activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in
effect; Work Requests and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as
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required, were issued and being followed; Quality Control person-
nel were available for inspection activities as required; and TS
requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
Repair of Waste Disposal Flow Recorder WD-19-FR;
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Repair of Fuel Storage Pool Area Criticality Monitor, RM6-14;
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Maintenance performed on - NI-11-NR, Incore Detector No. 2
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Recorder; and
Troubleshooting Security System Vital Door Failure.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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-(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected
liquid and gaseous waste . releases were observed to verify that
approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release
approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and
seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were
observed to ensure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage
was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that
anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6'
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports
.
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
-impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrected actions
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appeared appropriate.
Events, which were reported immediately, were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the-TS were satisfied.
LERs 84-19, 84-20 and 84-21 were reviewed in accordance with current
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
The inspector' reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following:
compliance with the TS, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC enforcement
policy.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Surveillance Program
During a review of the plant surveillance program, the inspector noted the
licensee's practice of performing preventive maintenance (PM) on equipment
at the time the equipment is due for its routine surveillance test.
This
practice has been adopted by the licensee to minimize both out of service
times and testing frequency (due to the requirement to verify operability of
the equipment after a PM has been performed) for plant equipment.
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While there is merit to this method, since it reduces equipment downtime and
minimizes equipment test cycling, the inspector noted that this methodology
could mask the "as found" condition of equipment (e.g., the performance of a
PM could repair a deficient condition that may have prevented the equipment
from operating).
The inspector's observations were discussed with licensee personnel.
The
licensee .will review this practice and make changes as necessary to ensure
that surveillance test results are not altered by the PM program.
Inspector Followup Item (302/84-33-05):
Review the licensee's progress to
ensure that surveillance test results are not altered by the PM program.
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