ML20132D231

Summary of 961113 Meeting W/W in Rockville,Md Re AP600 Itaac.List of Attendees & Handouts Encl

ML20132D231
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	12/17/1996
From:	Joseph Sebrosky NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9612190266
Download: ML20132D231 (37)

Text

. --. .. -. . - . . -- , -- - - - - -_ - - - -

I *

,g l l

I l *,

1 UNITED STATES 2 e 5 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

) f WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006H1001

, k.....,/ December 17, 1996 I

APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: AP600

SUBJECT:

SIM1ARY OF NOVEMBER 13, 1996, MEETING TO DISCUSS THE AP600 IN TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (ITAAC)

! The Nuclear P.egulatory Commission (NRC) staff and representatives of Westin house Electric Corporation held a meeting on November i 13, 1996

! Maryland, to discuss issues associated with the ITAAC for the AP600.inAttach- Rockville, ment 1 is a list of meeting provided by Westinghouse. attendees. Attachment 2 is a copy of handouts l The AP600 Certified Westinghouse Design7,Material, in a November 1996 letter.including the ITAAC was submitted by Westinghouse to describe to the staff the process used to select the Tier 1T material, and for Westinghouse to compare the submittal with the draft Standard Review Plan Section 14.3. Highlights of the discussion are summa-rized as follows:

Westinghouse maintained that their certified design material (CDM), which includes the ITAAC, is significantly different than the evolutionary plants' CDMs.

The key differences, according to Westinghouse, are a fundamentally different many areas. safety approach, and the AP600 certified design is more complete in criteria to determine the equipment that would have ITAAC. Based on The screening criteria used were: equipment that performs a safety function, equipment that performs a defense-in-depth function, non-safety related equipment that performs a function for which credit is taken in the design basis safety analysis, after and equipment postulated needed for in-vessel retention or hydrogen mitigation severe accidents.

The staff had several comments on Westinghouse's approach some of which were detailed in a November 26, 1996, letter to Westinghouse. The following issues were raised by the staff during the presentation and are some of the issues that will be addressed by the staff during their review:

1)

The staff did not agree that the above screening criteria could be used to determine the systems that need to have ITAAC.

The staff stated that all structures and systems need to have an ITAAC with the level of detail contained in the ITAAC commensurate with the system's safety significance.

2) The staff stated that there is no information in Westinghouse's submit-tal that cross references the important design information and parame-ters of the standard safety analysis report to their treatment in the CDM C,

/

{$Aagggggogjg [^ g% ,

,s I

i

, December 17, 1996

3) The term " Basic Configuration" was used in the evolutionary designs and was not used for the AP600. Westinghouse maintains that with their i

' approach the term " Basic Configuration" does not have to be used. The

' staff did not agree. The staff noted that for the evolutionary plants, the basic configuration ITAAC included an ins >ection of the " system i functional arrangement." The inspection in t11s ITAAC verified detailed design, construction, and installation issues that could only be i verified by inspecting the final installed facility. An example was i given of why the staff considered the inspection of the system func-l tional arrangement important because it could be used to identify a problem, and where Westinghouse's current ITAAC would not address the l problem. The example used was that, for one current pressurized water 4

reactor, the Auxiliary Feedwater pump could not supply sufficient water to the steam generators because the installed piping runs were too long i

and created too much head loss.

i i 4) Westinghouse's approach to Human Factors ITAAC was also discussed.

j Westinghouse identified four elements that the staff had not evaluated i

at the complete product level which are: task analysis, integration of i human reliability analysis with human factors engineering (HFE), human

{ system interface design, and HFE program verification and validation.

j Westinghouse's position is that ITAAC are not needed for these areas and i that they can assign responsibility for completion to the combined l license applicant.

i j a) The staff did not agree with this approach and stated that ITAAC

are needed for each of the above elements.

j b) In addition, the staff stated that responsibility for ITAAC within

the scope of the certified design could not be deferred to a COL l applicant.

5) Westinghouse presented their ITAAC on the initial test program (ITP).

The staff stated that the commitment was not the same as for the evolutionary plants, and that there was not an explanation as to how the ITAAC and the ITP relate to each other.

, 6) Westinghouse stated that, unlike evolutionary plants, the AP600 has no i safety-related or defense-in-depth interface requirements. The staff

] questioned this assertion. Specifically, the staff wanted to know how

Westinghouse treated the safety related connections to the plant which

would be used for post-72 hour actions.

3 i

4

7) During the meeting, Westinghouse stated that certain features of the AP600 design were not captured in the ITAAC because Westinghouse i believed that the acceptance criteria would be subjective. The staff i stated that significant design features must be verified regardless of 1

the subjectivity of the acceptance criteria.

)

,, i December 17, 1996 a

8) The staff was also concerned that comments given to Westinghouse during the review of the pilot ITAAC were not incorporated into Westinghouse's l submittal. These comments were provided to Westinghouse in letters i dated June 27, 1996, July 31, 1996, and August 8, 1996. Although the letters transmitting the comments required no written response by Westinghouse it was not clear to the staff how the comments were l

resolved. i i

9) Westinghouse maintained for the AP600 there was no need for design acceptance criteria (DAC) for piping and for the instrumentation and control system. The staff did not agree with this approach. The staff noted that for the evolutionary plants the piping DAC took into account s environmental effects of high energy line breaks inside and outside of

! containment. It did not appear that Westinghouse's approach addressed this issue.

10) The staff also noted that Westinghouse needs to verify that the ITAAC

are consistent with the bases and limiting conditions for operation found in the technical specifications. The staff also noted that severe l accident design features need to be verified in Tier 1. The example i that was given during the meeting was equipment survivability, which is l in addition to equipment qualification.

As a result of the meeting Westinghouse committed to the following action items:

d I) Westinghouse will provide an explanation on how the ITAAC and the ITP relate to each other. (See item number 5 above).

II) Westinghouse will provide an explanation on how the safety related 4

connections are addressed in the ITAAC. (See item number 6 above).

III) Westinghouse will provide a response to the comments provided in the June 27, 1996, July 31, 1996, and August 8, 1996, letters. The response ,

will detail how comments were incorporated into the November 7, 1996,  !

i submittal and the reason for not incorporating some of the comments.

)

original signed by:

Joseph M. Sebrosky, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1

Docket No.52-003 DISTRIBUTION: See next page Attachments: As stated cc w/ attachments:

See next page DOCUMENT NAME: A:NOV 13. SUM /

Ts receive a copy of thle docuenent,in3cate in the boa: *C* = Copy without attachment /endoeur *E* = Copy with attachment / enclosure *N* = No copy 1 0FFICE PM:PDST:DRPM L JPA:PDST:DRPM f D:PDji$DF.PM NAME JMSebrosky:s9/ lad JNWilson% d TRQ@y DATE 12/no/96 l/

12/W /96 / 12/(f/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

i Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager i Mr. Frank A. Ross  !

Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Technology Westinghouse Electric Corporation 19901 Germantown Road P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 i

Mr. Ronald Simard, Director Mr. B. A. McIntyre Advanced Reactor Program Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

7 Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 Box 355 Washington, DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Ms. Lynn Connor Mr. John C. Butler Doc-Search Associates Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818 i i

Energy Systems Business Unit '

Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. James E. Quinn, Projects Manager LMR and SBWR Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 165 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. S. M. Modro PWR Design Certification Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Electric Power P.esearch Institute Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 1625 Palo Alto, CA 94303 j Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification NE-50 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874

3 3 DISTRIBUTION w/ attachments

' Docket File ,

PUBLIC PDST R/F TTMartin DBMatthews

• TRQuay WHuffman '

TKenyon l 4

JSebrosky DTJackson DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments:

FMiraglia/AThadani, 0-12 G18 I RZimmerman, 0-12 G18 BSheron, 0-12 G18 JStrosnider, 0-7 D25 l KWichman, 0-7 D3 ,

RWessman, 0-7 E21 '

JCalvo, 0-7 E2 l GHolahan, 0-8 E2 l LMarsch, 0-8 DI CBerlinger, 0-8 H3

! RJones, 0-10 E7 2

RCaruso, 0-8 F2 BBoger, 0-9 E2 JWermiel, 0-8 H2 2 CThomas, 0-9 HIS )

SRichards, 0-9 D25 SBlack, 0-9 Al CMiller, 0-10 D4 LCunningham, 0-11 E22 EJordan, T-4 D18 ACRS (11)

JMoore, 0-15 B18 WDean, 0-17 G21 JNWilson HBrammer, 0-7 HIS

, DTerao, 0-7 E4 EThrom, 0-8 H7

JMonninger, 0-8 H7 JStewart, 0-8 H3

MGareri, 0-8 H3 JBongarra, 0-9 HIS DThatcher, 0-7 E4

, MPrah, 0-7 E4 MChiramal, 0-8 H3 ECMarinos, 0-8 H3 HLi, 0-8 H3 NTrehan, 0-7 E4 JLyons, 0-8 D1 Alevin, 0-8 E23 NSaltos, 0-10 E4 GThomas, 0-8 E23 GBagchi, 0-7 HIS TBoyce, 0-12 E4

e l

l .

l WESTINGHOUSE AP600 ITAAC MEETING ATTENDEES NOVEMBER 13, 1996 l

EE ORGANIZATIQH i ROGi:R SCHREIBER WESTINGHOUSE EUGENE PIPLICA WESTINGHOUSE BRIAN MCINTYRE (PART TIME) WESTINGHOUSE CHARLES THOMPSON DOE RUSS BELL NEI H. L. BRAMMER NRR/DE/ECGB DAVID TERA 0 NRR/DE/EMCB EDWARD THROM NRR/DSSA/SCSB JOHN MONNINGER NRR/DSSA/SCSB JIM STEWART NRR/DRCH/HICB MARIO GARERI NRR/DRCH/HICB

, JIM BONGARRA NRR/DRCH/HHFB DALE THATCHER NRR/DE/EELB MARK PRAH NRR/DE/EELB MATTHEW CHIRAMAL NRR/DRCH/HICB E. C. MARINOS NRR/DRCH/HICB HULBERT LI NRR/DRCH/HICB NARINDER TREHAN NRR/DE/EELB JIM LYONS NRR/DSSA/SPLB ALAN LEVIN NRR/DSSA/SRXB NICK SALTOS NRR/DSSA/SPSB GEORGE THOMAS NRR/DSSA/SRXB G0UTAM BAGCHI (PART TIME) NRR/DE/ECGB JERRY WILSON NRR/DRPM/PDST TOM BOYCE NRR/ DISP /PIPB J0E SEBROSKY NRR/DRPM/PDST l Attachment I l

i .

AP600 Certified Design Material M AP600 l

l Westinghouse Presentation to NRC Staff November 13,1996 N

E ii

~

1 Meeting Objectives p

,w Review key differences between AP600 and evolutionary plants Review content and organization of AP600 CDM Identify and explain differences from evolutionary plant submittals -l .

-1 AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants d AP600  ?

Key Differences:

- Fundamentally different safety approach

- AP600 Certified Design more complete in many i areas  !

Results in significantly different CDM

t AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants EbAP600 l

Fundamental Differences in. Safety Approach Safety ultimately assured by dedicated passive systems .

- Fewer, simpler systems

- Clearer segregation of safety and non-safety i

- Results in fewer, more concise ITAAC i

AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants b Fundamental Differences in Safety Approach Specific non-safety systems identified as Defense-in-Depth (DID)

- Prevent challenges to passive systems

- Contribute to reduced core damage frequency Implications for ITAAC

- Less detail for non-safety systems

- Clarifies risk significance of non-safety systems

-l t

AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants O ma  ;

Fundamental Differences in Safety Approach Reduced reliance on operator

- No actions required for three days

- Limited actions thereafter

- Implications for ITAAC  ;

- Fewer instrument displays in iTAAC

- Alarms not important to safety

- Less emphasis on habitability outside MCR

AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants A AP600 Fundamental Differences in Safety Approach Severe accidents more benign

- Depressurized primary system Eliminates high pressure core melt phenomena

- In vessel retention of core debris Eliminates core relocation phenomena j t

Results in fewer ITAAC for severe accident functions t

i t

i

AP600 Comparison with Evolutionary Plants M AP600 AP600 Design is More Complete in Many Areas Piping & LBB analysis

- Preliminary analysis done for ASME/H.E. lines

- Piping covered in individual systems No generic piping ITAAC Design Reliability Assurance Program

- D-RAP is complete (SSAR section 16.2)

- No need for DRAP ITAAC

_- - _____-___- __--_______--__ _ __ __n

Content and Organization of AP600 ITAAC  ::b4 AP600

, Basic Screening Criteria (SSAR 14.3)

Equipment that performs a safety function Equipment that performs a defense-in-depth function Non-safety related equipment that performs a function for which credit is taken in the design basis safety analysis (e.g., turbine stop valves)

- Equipment needed for in-vessel retention or hydrogen mitigation after postulated severe accidents

Content and Organization of AP600 ITAAC [

AP600 "Yes" answers require an ITAAC Some systems had only one component in ITAAC

- e.g., turbine stop valves

- usually moved into other systems (SGS)

- Result: 29 System ITAAC

- Each may address safety and non-safety functions -l

- Safety functions addressed in more detail .

- Five Non-System ITAAC i I

i

-i Typical System ITAAC d i

i Introductory Paragraph t

~

i Very brief statement of why system exists i

i Relevant details in numbered design commitments Intention is to avoid information that is

- Repetitive

- Not relevant to screening criteria

- Easily misconstrued .

-l Typical System ITAAC d AP600 l

Figures illustrate " functional arrangement" i

.....the major components, interconnections between major components, and connections to other systems that collectively provide the service for which the system is intended."

i

- Include main process lines needed to perform ITAAC ~

.l functions

- Does not include pump miniflow lines, etc.  :

l I

Typical System ITAAC .

A AP600 Functional Arrangement vs. Basic Configuration Evolutionary plants defined " Basic Configuration" as including:

- Functional arrangment (which they never defined)

PLUS:

- Weld inspection

- Seismic and environmental qualification

- Qualification of MOVs t

- AP600 CDM treats these items in specific systems

_ - - _ - - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - - - - - _ - - _ - O

Typical System ITAAC M O i

Equipment and Piping Tables Explicitly list tag numbers and important features Separate tables provided for:

- Safety related equipment & instruments

- High energy piping to be LBB qualified -!

- Non-safety related equipment

--_-------------------------------------------------_j

.i Typical System ITAAC M AP600 ITAAC for Safety Related Equipment ASME requirements Seismic qualification Separation Environmental qualification Specific safety functions & performance requirements Safety related MCR displays & controls Active valve testing j i

f t

i

Typical System ITAAC MAP600 ASME Requirements Code boundaries identified on figure ITAAC include:

NDE of welds System hydrotest 1

Analysis of as-built piping & supports

-l Typical System ITAAC b4 t

Seismic Qualification \

Seismic classification given on equipment table ITAAC include:

- Verification of equipment / piping location Seismic equipment must be in seismic building (e.g., on Nuclear Island) 1

- Equipment qualification testing and/or analysis

- Seismic analysis of supports I

! I Typical System ITAAC d AP600 t

.i Separation and Environmental Qualification Equipment table identifies 1 E gear and harsh vs. mild environment i

Design commitment requires separation

- Specific inspections and acceptance criteria are in

. the Nuclear Island Buildings ITAAC ..

- Specific division assignments are not identified

- For harsh environments, commits to qualification

testing and/or analysis

Typical System ITAAC  ::NE AP600 Specific Safety Functions / Performance Reg'ts Flow rates, tank volumes, heat transfer capability, etc.

System realignments to accomplish safety function

- Containment isolation usually covered in containment system ITAAC do not identify all modes of system operation

- Only functions relevant to screening cnteria I

9 Typical System ITAAC *

b AP600 Safety Related MCR Displays & Controls Design commitment requires the following

- Class 1E PAMs displays can be retrieved in MCR

- Controls for active equipment in MCR Covered elsewhere in ITAAC:

- Interlocks & logic

- Most non safety grade instrumentation and controls

- Remote shutdown panel displays & controls

.i Typical System ITAAC D AP600 Active Valve Testing Most active, remote operated valves are stroke tested

- Using MCR controls  ;

- Via signal from PMS '

- Squib valves are no-go tested i

Active check valves are exercised t

- MOVs are type tested i

a

~

Typical System ITAAC N- AP600 i ITAAC for Non-Safety Related Equipment ITAAC requires t

- Verificiation of basic function i

(e.g., RHR pump flow rate & Hx UA)

- MCR display of basic performance parameter only

- MCR controls for component providing the function

- MCR controls for equipment actuated by DAS  ;

t Not included  !

- Pump NPSH, on line testing

Other ITAAC Sections d AP600 i

I&C System ITAAC i

i Other Sections

-Human Factors

-Nuclear Island Buildings

-Intitial Test Program

-Radiation Monitoring 1i

-Interface Requirements t

l I

i

l&C System ITAAC =b AP600 Emphasizes important functions / attributes

-System performance

-Bypass, p.remissives, blocks & interlocks

-MCR controls & displays

- Physical and electrical separation

-Electromagnetic compatibility

-Seismic qualification

-Hardware / software development

'l

-Setpoint methodology

- Diverse actuation

- Detailed implementation in tier 2 t

! Human Factors Engineering :M AP600

~

t Staff expects an ITAAC on each HFE program element not yet completed SSAR Chapter 18 identifies 4 incomplete elements:

- Task Analysis

- Integration of human reliability analysis with HFE

- Human system interface design -

- HFE program V&V i

l

~!

Human Factors Engineering M AP600  ;

i i

i -

Westinghouse and industry feel that these elements should not be elevated to tier 1 Approach:

- In the SSAR, assign responsibility for completion to Combined License Applicant

- Submit HFE ITAAC with .;

i Performance based test / analyses Measurable acceptance criteria

Nuclear Island Bulidings MI AP600 Emphasizes functions, not physical details r

I Important functions:

- Structural capability

- Radiation shielding

- Protection from internal / external flooding

- Fire protection

- HELB protection -

- Electrical / Physical separation t

.1

-l Initial Test Program  :[

w ,

Includes:  :

t

- High level commitment to perform an ITP 1

1

- Brief general description on the ITP

- Commitment to complete ITAAC before fuel load

- Tier 2 contains complete description of ITP f

-i '

~

Radiation Monitoring A Includes

- Safety-related monitors

- Nonsafety-related process & effluent monitors Other aspects of radiation protection are elsewhere

- Shielding & dose rates (building ITAAC)

- Ventilation (HVAC systems ITAAC)

9:

Interface Requirements -

=b uwe .

i AP600 Design Certification covers all safety-related and defense-in-depth functions AP600 ultimate heat sink is ambient air i

Unlike evolutionary plants, AP600 has no safety-related or defense-in-depth interface with portions of ..!

the plant outside Design Certification

H Conclusions :d-AP600  ;

AP600 tier 1 covers the most important functions and features, at the appropriate level of detail Differences from previous submittals due to:

- Fundamentally different safety approach

- More complete design in several areas c

e r

_ -- . - - - - - - _ -_ _ - - - _ _ - -