ML20129B004

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Provides Observations Re Low Enriched U Conversion & Physical Protection Upgrading at Nonpower Reactors.Issue Re Safeguards Protection at Nonpower Reactor Adequate
ML20129B004
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/31/1984
From: Zerbe J
NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE)
To: Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20127B589 List:
References
FOIA-84-784, FRN-49FR27769 AB60-2-111, AB61-2-111, NUDOCS 8507150428
Download: ML20129B004 (2)


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  • ** . Ja,nua'ry 31, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino -

Comissioner Gilinsky .' . f i Comissioner Roberts

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Comissioner Asselstine .

. Comissioner Bernthal ' l

.h .g John E 3 be,' irector "

FROM: -

Office of Policy Evaluation . J'

SUBJECT:

REDUCINGFUELENRICHMENTANDUPGRAD[NGPHYSICAL PROTECTION AT NON-POWER REACTORS ,

As requested at the January 26 agenda planning session, we offer for your consideration in preparation for the planned February 6 discussion the ,

following observations concerning LEU conversion and physical protection -

upgrading at non-power reactors (NPRs).

Introduction I In light of thE St' tea Department spokesman's coment at the January 27 briefing that fUrther action by NRC to reduce enrichment of the fuel in licensed U.S. NPRs would have only a " marginal" impact on the U.S., .

Government's effort to encourage foreign countries to reduce their NPR fuel ~

. enrichments, it . appears that further Comission consideration of reducing

. enrichment at U.S.'NPRs should be based primarily .on domestic safeguards considerations, w

As noted by -th'e DOE spokesman at the briefings, it appears that the use of

'l.EU fuel in NPRs is feasible for most NPRs. Moreover, assuming that fundilig is available, there appears to be general agreement that substitution of LEU '

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for HEU in NPR fuel'would largely resolve the issue of the adequacy of NPR safeguards to prevent the theft of weapons-grade material. However, even if funding were available, there are several additional reasons why a conversion process will take some time. For instance, we understand that conversion would require additional case-specific licensing safety analyses, may be limited by the availability of fuel, and is dependent upon DOE's rate of e progress in completing its fuel research program.

Contact:

Cookie Ong, OPE .

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George Eysymontt, OPE 302 eso7150428 850417 '

PDR FOIA HIRSCH84-784 PDR

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The Corr.ission 2 i -

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The issue then, it seems to us, is wheth'er safeguards protection at NPRs is

adequate in the short run. In this regard, the brie'fings on January 27 suggest that the HEU fuel now used in NPRs may involve a significant risk of

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theft in an attempt to produce an explosive. , The ED0's memorandum of Janu'ary 25 suggested further upgrades to Category I and Category II NPR protection that would reduce that risk. In this memorandum, .'we summarize in broad terms present and proposed rules for Categories I and II NPR fuels to provide a .'

. perspective for considering staff's suggested additional requirements. We. .

then offer for your consideration some observations on the requirements and

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possible alternatives. ,

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