ML20129A724
| ML20129A724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/07/1984 |
| From: | Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Pigford J CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, BERKELEY, CA |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127B589 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-784 AB60-2-316, NUDOCS 8507150373 | |
| Download: ML20129A724 (2) | |
Text
. . _ . -- ... . . - - . . . . - . . - . . - - . - - . _ . - - . -
~
UNITED STATES 8 c#%
j j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHIN GTON, D.C. 20555 o e September 7,1984 CFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER Dr. Thomas H. Eigford Reactor Administrator Department of Nuclear Engineering University of California Berieley, Cali ornia 94720 W
Dear Dry [g P ord:
I would like to take this opportunity to th.ank you for a very infoma-tive briefing and tour of the research reactor at Berkeley. I found our discussions to be very helpful for my consideration of the Commission's proposed rule to limit the use of highly enriched uranium in domestic research and test reactors. I have enclosed a copy of the proposed rule for your information. The comment period has been extended until November 2, 1984. The Commission would appreciate any coments you may have on the proposal.
The proposed rule defines HEU as fuel intwhich the weight percent of U-235 in tt.e uranium is 20% or greater. Low enriched uranium is fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20%. I checked on this point when I returned to Washington, and found that the information I had given you on this was incorrect. You may want to comment on this point.
The Commission is presently considering guidance to the staff on upgrad-
.ing physical security requirements at nonpower reactors. As it present-ly stands, concrete barriers are not being considered.
I would also like to thank you for a delightful lunch and tour of the i Berkeley campus. Please let me know the next time you will be in Washington, so I can return the favor.
Sincerely,
. /
James K. Asselstine
Enclosure:
As stated sc --704 a-
, g=3 NUCLEAR REACTOR LABORATOW
- "*k AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL CEfGE2. O:
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE 0: TECHNO.' C:1Y h%#
CXHCLING 138 A!:any Street Ca'n=r::;e. Mass. 02* 25 L.CCA % JR.
34c:tcr (617)253- Directee et Asactor Onerations September.5, 1984
~
The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman l United States Nuclear Regulatory Comnission i Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Improved Security for Non-Power Reactors a
a
Dear Chairman Palladino:
D u Massachuse tts Ins titute of Technology desires to consent on g information regarding physical security at non-power reactors (NPR's) y presented by the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission staff at the annual y mee ting of the National Organiza tion of Test, Research and Training
< Reactors (TRTR) in August 1984. The information presented by the fj staff relates to potential requirements for i= proved physical security S capabilities for NPR's, specifically those reactors possessing high 5
g enriched uranium (MEU) subject to Category II requirements (10 CTR o 73.67(d)).
I The information presented at the meeting censis ted of " Proposed h Improved Capabilities" and listed the followings 8
W Impede unauthorized removal of SSN:'.
Detect both unauthorized penetra tions and activities S
- Protect against theft by a single insider Provide tamper-indica tion on detection sys te=s
- De tect attempts to prevent assessment of alarns G
Improve communications capability to LLIA Arrange for at least one, armed LLP.A respondant Reduce fresh HEU fuel inventory as low as practicable MIT censiders that the proposed improved capabilities constitute l
l acceptable security requirements, if they are reasonably interpreted, reasonably ~ applied, and particularly if they are adopted as an alterna tive to the potential requirement for the conversion of high enrichment uranium (HEU) fuel to low enrichment uraniu= (LEU) fuel.
However, it is believed that they represent only carginal improvement over MIT's present security plan, which meets the requirements of
' 0 CTR 73.67(d), which has been approved by NRC, and which is 1
considered fully adequate to limit the diversien risk to acceptable levels. This is especially true because MIT caintains it's inventory of unirradiated fuel at very much less then the caxinu= of 5 Kg o,- . wa rp a . y -
,y
-.s. . . . :- _ - . . .
. -. : . . . ~ " :- _ ' w. ' '. L ^ X L.... l. - --..
~
., , w mv I
pernissible under 10 CTR 73.67(d) except just prior to refualing; thef t of fuel by a single insider, alone or with external help, is not feasible; and the dose rate from its irradiated fuel exceeds the self-protecting 100 rem / hour at one meter by two orders of =agnitude or more.
With regard to the above proposed improved capabilities, it is not possible to be specific until the precise wording of a propcsed rule
, is published. Until such time, MIT's comments nust be considered tenta tive and, in any event, they apply to MIT only. We cannot speak with regard to the impact of such new rules on other reacters, since we necessarily lack knowledge regarding their security plans, but it appears that the rules would not seriously af fect F.IT if, as mentioned above, they are reasonably interpre ted and applied.
Sincerely, t' N G. Wh John A. Bernard, Jr. !
Reactor Superintendent
( & [d '
Lincoln Clark, Jr.
Director of Reactor Operations '
.a 4
s O
i 4 6 -A 4
,, ,m .---- . ,. ,_ v.,.,.n , - , - - - - - - - , , -