ML20128K778
| ML20128K778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1985 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Nejfelt G, Panciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128K722 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-85-16, 50-366-85-16, NUDOCS 8507110126 | |
| Download: ML20128K778 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1985016
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UNITE 3 STATES
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NUCLEAR RE;ULATCCY COMMis810N
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-321/85-16 and 50-366/85-16
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
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P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name: Hatch I and 2
Inspection Dates: April 28 - May 24, 1985
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Gear ia
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Inspectors: W
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PT Holmes-Ray, Senior ResidpY Tns
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Date Signed
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Approved by: \\ .ll
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V. 'W.' PancfWa', Thftf, Project Section 2B
Dafe Ei@n~cl
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This inspection involved 144 inspector-hours on site in the areas of
Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant opera-
tions, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices,
corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures,
radiation contro! activities, refueling (Unit 2), and surveillance activities.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified in the area of
Technical b +cification compliance (testing of molded case circuit breakers,
paragraph 7).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
T. Greene Deputy Site General Manager
- L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
C. T. Jones, Engineering Manager
R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
P. Fornel, Site QA Manager
S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on May 24,1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
During the reporting period
frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and/or his assis-
tants concerning inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings
and took no exception.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
The following items have been reviewed by the inspectors and are considered
resolved.
(Closed) Violation (366/84-34-01); Failure to follow procedure.
(Closed) Violation (321/84-41-02), (366/84-41-02);
Failure to make timely
reports within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an engineered safety feature actuation.
(Closed) Violation (366/84-48-01);
Improper Work Control Operations.
(Closed) Violation (366/84-48-02); Failure to follow procedure and limiting
condition for operation discrepancy.
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(Closed) Violation (366/84-48-03); Failure to meet reporting time limits.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
PlantTours(Units 1and2)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection
interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
equipment was pro)erly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors
also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly esta-
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blished, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
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procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly ud combustible
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material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours the
inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-
tions, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker
positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy
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of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours
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were conducted on backshifts and/or weekends.
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The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling
Systems.
Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are
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randomly verified both locally and in the control room. During the inspection
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period the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the accessible areas
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of the Unit 1 standby liquid control system to verify that the lineups were
in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment
material conditions were satisfactory,
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift
logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and
records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs
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and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and
equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator
alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During normal events, operator
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performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The inspec-
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tors conducted random off-hours 1nspections during the reporting interval to
assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift
turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance
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with approved licensee procedures.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
TechnicalSpecificationCompliance(Units 1and2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with
selected limiting conditions for operations (LCOs) and results of selected
surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-
vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and
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review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with
selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they
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happened.
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The licensing project manager brought to the attention of the senior resident
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inspector that the licensee was requesting an emergency Technical Specification
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change which seemed to identify an area of non-compliance.
This area was
the method of testing molded case circuit breakers (MCBs).
The Technical
Specification requires that the functional test shall consist of injecting a
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current input at the specified setpoint to the circuit breaker and verifying
that the circuit breaker functions as designed. Hatch procedure HNP-2-3850
calls for injecting 1275 percent or 300 percent of the setpoint value. This
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n.ethod of testing MCBs is in accordance with the National Electrical
Manufacturers Association standards and is technically sound but not as
required by Technical Specification.
This deviation from the required
testing method without proper prior approval is a Violation (366/85-16-01).
8.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
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The ins)ectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
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facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organi-
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ration of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates,
doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and
badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified,
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9.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
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The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were
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also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications
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were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost conside-
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ration. The following LERs are considered closed:
Unit 1:
84-02, 84-19*
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Unit 2:
84-07
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- In-depth review performed.
10.
Refueling
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During the startup of Unit 2 following refueling, the inspectors reviewed
the startup, heatup, and the determination of shutdown margin.
Lineup of
systems distributed during the outage were audited prior to startup.
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On May 24, 1985, when changing from air to nitrogen to the drywell pneu-
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matics, Unit 2 scrammed from a main steam isolation valves (MS!Vs) "not full
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open" trip.
The inboard MSIVs drifted toward the shut direction after the
supply to their pneumatic control system was switched from air to nitrogen,
due to bleed off of the pressure holding them open.
Subsequently, two
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valves in the nitrogen supply path were found shut.
The cause of these
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valves being shut is under review and will be tracked as Inspector Followup
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ltem 50-366/85-16-02.
11. Unusual Event on May 15, 1985
On May 15, 1985, at approximately 10:22 p.m. EST, a manual reactor scram
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from 100 percent reactor power was inserted for Unit 1, because the non-
automatic depressurization system (non-ADS) 'A'
unablu to be closed either from the control room panel or locally.
The
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safety relief valve was actuated by a small amount of water leaking into the
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Analog Transmitter Trip System Panel H11-P926.
The water came from the
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control room emergency ventilation supply line passing above this panel.
Water entered this ventilation line, because the charcoal filter train ' A'
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deluge system initiated - due to a loss of pressure caused from a cracked
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pressure gale fitting - with the filter train drains clogged.
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The On Shif t Operations Supervisor maintained safe control of the reactor
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during the event and subsequent recovery.
A normal reactor shutdown was
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initially attempted.
Reactor fore Isolation Cooling was inoperable due to
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maintenance and a spurious alaim condition for the High Pressure Coolant
Injection turbine exhaust discharge pressure resulted in the unavailability
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of the HPCI system until it was reset.
After attempts to close the safety
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relief valve failed, the reactor was manually scramed prior to the automatic scram set)oint of 850 psig.
In accordance with HNP-1-1907
Failure of
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Safety /Re'ief Valves to Operate, reactor water level was maintained by the
condensate and condensate booster pumps; and notification of an unusual
event was issued.
During the event, minimum reactor water level was approximately 11" with a
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system aressure of approximately 370 psig and the suppression pool was
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availab' e as the heat sink (i.e., maximum suppression pool temperature was
approximately 123' F). Also, no Engineering Safety Features were automatically
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initiated.
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The analysis of this event by the licensee will be tracked as Inspector
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Followup Item 50-321/85-16-03.
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