ML20128K389
| ML20128K389 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1985 |
| From: | Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507240119 | |
| Download: ML20128K389 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1984028
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Docket No.
50-400
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Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN:
Mr. E. E. Utley
Executive Vice President
Power Supply and Engineering
and Construction
P.O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
INTEGRATED DESIGN INSPECTION 50-400/84-48
This refers to your letter dated June 13, 1985 which was in response to our
letter forwarding the subject inspection report dated April 15, 1985.
Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented
in your letter. Certain of the items of your response require additional
information, review, and/or reinspection to assess their acceptability.
In other
areas the NRC inspection team disagrees with statements made concerning the
validity of inspection findings.
However, these matters are not pursued since
you have indicated that appropriate corrective action is being taken.
A close-out inspection by members of the team is planned to examine areas
requiring furtner information. The enclosure to this letter describes areas
that will be inspected by the team. However, the team will not necessarily be
limited to the items in the enclosure, but may also inspect other items discussed
in your response to the Integrated Design Inspection (IDI) report. Although our
report did not require you to respond to observations, we note that your response
did addres,s these items.
During our review of your response to these items, several
questions were identified by the team which will also be examined during the
reinspection.
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Please have the information described in the enclosure to this
letter available for the close-out inspection currently scheduled for July
22-24, 1985.
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8507240119 850712
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ianK.GYimes, Director
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Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor
and Technical Training Center Program
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Shearon Harris IDI Items Requiring
Reinspection and/or Additional
Information
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Carolina Power and Light
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R. A. Watson, Vice President
Harris Nuclear Project
R. M. Parsons
Carolina Power and Light Company
Completion Assurance Manager
P.O. Box 165
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 101
New Hill, NC 27562
New Hill, NC 27562
George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Mr. George Jackson, Secretary
1800 M Street, NW
Environmental Law Project
Washington, DC 20036
School of Law, 064-A
Univeristy of North Carolina
Richard E. Jones, Esq.
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514
Associate General Counsel
Carolina Power & Light Company
Mr. Travis Payne, Esq.
411 Fayetteville' Street Mall
723 W. Johnson Street
Post Office Box 12643
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Raleigh, North Carolina 27605
M. David Gordon, Esq.
Associate Attorney General
Mr. Daniel F. Read
State of North Carolina
Post Office Box 2151
Post Office Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Thomas S. Erwin, Esq.
Bradley W. Jones, Esq.
115 W. Morgan Street
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Region II
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
101 Marietta Street
Mr. George Maxwell
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Resident Inspector / Harris NPS
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Richard D. Wilson, M. D.
725 Hunter Street
Route 1, Box 315B
Apex, North Carolina 27502
New Hill, North Carolina 27562
Charles D. Barham, Jr., Esq.
Vice President & Senior Counsel
Mr. Robert P. Gruber
Carolina ' Power & Light Company
Executive Director
Public Staff - NCUC
Post Office Box 1551
P. O. Box 991
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Raleigh, NC 27602
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Mr. John Runkle, Executive Coordinator
Conservation Council of North Carolina
307 Granville Road
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514
Mr. Wells Eddleman
718-A Iradell Street
Durham, North Carolina 27705
Dr. Linda Little
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Governor's Waste Management Board
513 Albemarle Building
325 North Salisbury Street
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Raleigh, North Carolina 27611
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MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
D2.2-1 (Deficiency) Missing Drawings from Westinghouse Design Interface
DrawingList(DIDL)
The team will review the latest transmittal of Design Interface Drawings from
EBASCO to Westinghouse and the response from Westinghouse indicating no
significant impact on design.
D2.2-2 (Deficiency) Errors in Westinghouse Proof of Design Calculations
The team will review the revised calculation CWS-CQL-025 to ascertain if th
licensee's preliminary conclusion was correct.
D2.3-1(Deficiency)ContainmentRecirculationSumpDesign
The team does not agree with the licensee's conclusions for this item,
therefore this item is being referred to NRR as a licensing issue.
D2.3-3 (Deficiency) Refueling Water Storage Tank Vortexing
The team will reinspect calculations EQS-2 and TANK 13 in order to resolve the
apparent differences between the original finding and the ifcensee's response.
02.3-5 (Deficiency) Containment Spray System Eductor Flow Rate
The team will review the revised calculation CT-27. The team will also review
the effect of these revised eductor flow rates in the sump pH calculation.
U2.4-1 (Unresolved Item) Cable Tray Combustible Load Calculation
The team will review the revision to calculation 46-A0.
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D2.4-2 (Deficiency) Cable Tray Overfill
The team will review the combustible loading calculations following their
revision to reflect the as-built condition.
D2.4-3 (Deficiency) Combustible Load Within Fire Area 1-A-BAL
The team will review the revisions to calculation FP-S-1-A-BAL and the
associated FSAR change request.
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02.4-4 (Deficiency) Use of Minitrim (PVC) in Areas Outside Containment
The team agrees with the need to revise the applicable Engineering Section
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Instructions 3.1 and 3.2 to ensure the Field Change Requests are reviewed for
impact on the Fire Hazard Analysis. The team will review these changes. The
team plans to review the analysis of the impact of the current use of
Minitrim.
02.6-1 (Deficiency) Installation of Charging Pump Room Air Handling Units
Further clarification of the action to be taken to resolve the inconsistencies
identified in the finding is needed. The team is concerned about other
Equipment Installation Packages that are not in compliance with Work Procedure
WP-105 with respect to torqueing of anchor bolts.
D2.7-1 (Deficiency) Non-Seismic Piping Interaction Damage Study
The team needs clarification of action to be taken to resolve the unchecked
calculation issue and subsequent use of the results. The team will review and
evaluate the procedures developed for Seismic II/I walkdown. The results of
the two Phases of the Seismic II/I walkdown will be reviewed by the NRC.
D2.7-2 (Deficiency) Non-Seismic Piping Interaction Damage Study
The team is unclear regarding the action taken to resolve the Seismic II/I
condition identified in the finding. The team will review and evaluate the
procedures developed for the Seismic II/I walkdown. The results of walkdown
will be reviewed by the NRC.
02.8-1 (Deficiency) Field Installation Tolerances for Hangers
The team nseds clarification regarding what action is being taken to correct
the specific problem identified in the finding. The team will review and
evaluate the procedures developed for the walkdown. The results of the
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walkdown will be reviewed by the NRC.
02.9-1 (Deficiency) Pump Vendor Drawing Error
The team will review the corrected vendor drawing and the revised purrp
instruction manual.
02.5-1, D2.5-3, D2.5-4, 02.5-5, 02.5-6, and 02.5-7
The team has not yet reviewed and evaluated the response to these
deficiencies. They will be evaluated during the einspection.
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MECHANICAL COMPONENTS
D3.1-4 (Deficiency) Harris Project Pipe Support Procedures
Carolina Power and Light has merged two separate pipe support design
guidelines that contained inconsistent deflection criteria into a single
document. That document stipulates deflection criteria that are consistent
with a pending amendment to FSAR table 3.9.3-7.
The team will review these
changes.
D3.1-5 (Deficiency) Supplementary Steel
The Carolina Power and Light Harris Plant Engineering Section design
guidelines specified supplementary steel tabular data developed by
Bergen-Paterson for seismic as well as non-seismic applications. However,
Bergen-Paterson had limited the use nf that tabular data to non-seismic
supports. Carolina Power and Light i.as obtained confirmation of the seismic
qualification of that tabular data from Bergen-Paterson for incorporation into
the Harris Plant Engineering Section design guidelines. The team will review
this documentation.
D3.1-6 (Deficiency) Pipe Support Stress Check
Carolina Pcwer and Light has corrected the design guidelines and is reviewing
final calculations which were done while the erroneous equation was in effect.
The team will review these actions and efforts.
U3.1-7 (Unresolved Item) U-Bolt Load Interaction
The team will review Bergen-Paterson confirmation that use of the linear
interaction equation was appropriate, and that qualification of these U-bolts
was by ifnear analysis.
U3.1-8(UnresolvedItem)FrictionAnchorClamps
This unresolved item concerned the evaluation of stress in small-bore pipe
restrained with friction anchor clamps. The team plans review of:
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the Bergen-Paterson analysis for friction anchor clamps which
limits local pipe wall stresses to 12,000 psi;
b)
the work procedures for installation and inspection of friction
anchor clamps; and
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computer analysis stress ratios as a function of allowable stress
at friction anchor clamp node points.
D3.2-1 (Deficiency) DBE Inertia / Functional Capability
The licensee stated that a sample study of ten calculations was performed in
order to confirm the reasonableness of the assurrption that if the OBE load
case meets its stress limits, in turn so will the DBE load case. While in
most cases this is true, the team plans to review a larger sample in order to
assess functional capability.
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03.2-3 (Observation) Evaluation of Valve Accelerations
The response states that a program initiated in 1982 requires that, for all
new or revised calculations, an appropriate valve evaluation sheet be prepared
and included in the calculation package. The team is still of the opinion
that for all previously released calculations where g-loading had not been
performed, as is the case of this observation, evaluations should be conducted
and documented in the stress package. Further inspection of this matter is
planned.
03.2-4 (Deficiency) Westinghouse Active Valve Qualification Program
The Itcensee response stated that previously omitted valve evaluation sheets
are now part of the calculation package 141-2. Additional inspection is
necessary in order to confirm:
(1) that for the three active valves 2CS-V600-SB-1, 2CS-V601, and
2CS-V602-SB-1, g-loading and end loading evaluation meet
appropriate limits and are properly documented;
(2) that for active valves 2CS-V601-SB-1 and 2CS-V602-SB-1, the
sketch included on the valve acceleration calculation sheets is
consistent with the mathematical model and vendor valve drawings;
and,
(3) that the procedure outlined by the response is technically
acceptable, consistent with the procedure used on a majority
of previously calculated valve g-loading evaluations, and if
it follows the same logic as used by the E8ASCO in-house pipe
program in calculating valve g-loading.
03.2-6 (Deficiency) Emergency Condition Stress Ratio
The licensee response stated that several changes were incorporated into the
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reanalysis.resulting in the significant reduction of emergency condition
stress levels. The team plans to inspect the revised calculation to evaluate
the influence of the design changes for all loading conditions.
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03.2-8(Deficiency)ThermalExpansionInput
Calculation 141-1 was rerun and the licensee stated that there was no impact
on the existing design. The team will review the revised calculation.
03.2-9(Deficiency)VolumeControlTankNozzleDisplacement
The licensee stated that calculation 142-3 was rerun with the previously
omitted nozzle displacement and the existing design has been demonstrateo to
be adequate. The team will inspect the revised calculation to evaluate the
influence of the corrected 250F thennal mode on the existing design.
03.2-17 (Deficiency) Regenerating Heat Exchanger Seismic Analysis
The team will review documentation of EBASCO's plans to model the vertical
restraint adjacent to the tube side inlet nozzle of the regenerative heat
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exchanger as a snubber and rerun calculation 3006 with the revised modeling
upon its next revision.
U3.3-1 (Unresolved Item) ITT Grinnell Air Operated Valves
EBASCO and Westinghouse have developed a modeling procedure to address the
analysis of ITT Grinnell diaphragm-operated valves originally procured as
rigid and determined to be flexible. The team will review the procedure for
analysis
of the. valves and plans for implementation of the procedure.
D3.4-1 (Deficiency) Pipe Support Strut Design
The response to this deficiency does not acknowledge that the dynamic stresses
and deflections of slender struts subjected to a seismic event can be
significant, and states that such an evaluation was not performed for the
struts installed in the plant. However, the team will review and evaluate
licensee actions taken to address this concern.
03.4-2 (Deficiency) B-P/CP&L Pipe Support Design
The team will review revised pipe support calculation A-6-236-1-CS-H-2027.
U3.5-1(UnresolvedItem)WestinghouseSuppliedNon-ActiveValves
EBASCO has obtained formal concurrence from Westinghouse that end inads for
Westinghouse-procured non-active valves need not be considered. The team
plans to review this documentation.
_ CIVIL / STRUCTURAL
04.2-4 (Deficiency) Preparation of Calculation
Inspection of the remedial work which has been performed to address this
deficiency is planned.
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D4.2-7 (Deficiency) Shear Area
The licensee indicated that some reanalyses were performed. The team had
reviewed part of the reanalyses during the initial inspection and found that
they were acceptable. The team will review the remainder of the reanalyses
during the reinspection.
D4.4-1 (Deficiency) Loading Combinations
Calculation books CAS -1 and 2168-G-253-502 will be examined during the
reinspection to verify that the licensee's evaluation is properly documented.
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04.5-1(Deficiency)SlabDesignUsingDirectDesignMethod
EBASCO states that they have perfomed confinnatory calculations for the
Reactor Auxiliary Building and Fuel Handling Buf1 ding slab panels to show that
the existing design is adequate. These calculations will be inspected to
determine their acceptability.
D4.5-3 (Deficiency) Load Combination for Slab Design
The team will inspect the latest load combination calculations used for slab
design.
D4.5-4 (Deficiency) Seismic Analysis for Masonry Walls
EBASCO has perfomed analysis to demonstrate that these walls are adequate.
This analysis will be inspected to determine its acceptability.
04.5-5(Deficiency)UseofFloorSpectra
EBASCO has performed analysis using the broadened response spectra. An
inspection of this analysis is planned.
D4.5-6 (Deficiency) Design of Masonry Wall Around Stairway A-4
The team considers the response to be inadequate. The response states that
although the design changes were reviewed, the original calculation was not
revised. Specifically, the team believes that EBASCO should perform an
analysis of the final configuration of the wall to determine its structural
adequacy. This analysis should include a frequency analysis of the wall to
determine the seismic loads. The team will inspect the frequency analysis for
the block wall, if such an analysis has been performed.
04.8-1 (Deficiency) Load Combinations for Main Dam Spillway
EBASCO perfomed additional analyses of the main dam spillway to show that the -
existing design is adequate. The team will inspect the analysis of the main
dam spillway to verify that the existing design is adequate.
D4.8-2 (Deficiency) Main Dam Spillway Abutment Design
EBASCO has performed reanalysis of the abutment wall using the correct weight
to show that the existing design is adequate. This reanalysis will be
inspected.
04.9-1(Deficiency)BoronRecycleHold-upTankSeismicLoads
EBASCO has performed analyses of slabs supporting large tanks in the Fuel
Handling Building, Reactor Auxiliary Building and the Waste Processing
Building. The response states that these analyses show that the existing
designs are adequate. These calculations will be inspected to assess their
adequacy.
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D4.10-1 (Deficiency) Cable Tray Support Frequency
The team will inspect both the calculation for all supports shown on sample
drawings and the frequency analysis for longitudinal bracing.
D4.11-1 (Deficiency) Frequency of HVAC Ducts
EBASCO has identified five cases for which they are in the process of
confirming the support and duct adequacy. These calculations will be reviewed
by the team.
D4.11-2(Deficiency)LoadsonHVACDuctSupports
EBASCO has identified various cases where actual loads are higher than those
used in the support design.
They are still performing confirmatory analyses
on these supports to establish their design adequacy. These calculations will
be inspected.
D4.11-3 (Deficiency) Frequency of HVAC Duct Supports
EBASCO has initiated a program to evaluate the calculations for all supports
shown on sample drawings. This evaluation will be inspected to determine
whether the supports have frequencies above 16 Hz.
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
V5.2-1 (Unresolved Item) Electrical Power Design Procedures & Guidelines
The team is concerned that the guidelines which are still in preparation
apparent 1y'have not been issued to the working unit. The team will revhw the
completed Harris Plant Engineering Section electrical unit's Design Procedures
and Guidelines. Please provide a status of the 13 proposed guidelines.
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US.3-1(UnresolvedItem)IndependenceofElectricSystems
The team will review the design change notices and the revised drawings
associated with this modification.
D5.4-1 (Deficiency) Protection of Safety-Related Buses
The team will review the SLAP computer program and the associated procedure
for controlling loads connected to the affected buses. Additionally, the team
will review the Harris Plant Engineering Section procedure for analyzing bus
loading.
D5.4-2 (Deficiency) Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Settings
The generation of a new procedure for selection of safety-related motor
operated valve thermal overload settings is considered an acceptable solution
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to the procedural error. However, it is still the intent of the licensee to
have the start-up group select the overload heaters.
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The team will review the newly developed Harris Plant Engineering Section
design criteria relating to selection of overload heaters for intermittent
duty motors. The team will also review the start-up organization implementing
procedure.
D5.4-3 (Deficiency) Design Verification of Thermal Overload Settings
Revision of procedure 1/2-9000-E-01 to include an independent review of the
heater selection and verification of those overload heaters previously
selected is considered an acceptable solution. The new procedure
(1/2-9000-E-06) for motor driven valve operators will be reviewed as part of
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the follow-up for deficiency 05.4-2.
05.4-4 (Deficiency) Station Service Transformer Protective Relaying
The team will review the revised relay settings and implementation of the load
control program.
US.4-5 (Unresolved Item) Procurement of Quality Components
The response to the this item does not contain sufficient information to
evaluate the adequacy of the verification process to be used to certify
terminal boxes purchased without a certificate of compliance. Additionally,
no response was provided concerning the substitution of " equivalent" terminal
boxes. The team requests that information be provided regarding how
equive'ency was detemined.
05.5-1 (Deficiency) Battery Sizing Calculations
The team will review calculations 56-JRG and 57-JRG which have superseded
calculation 52-AMM.
In so doing the team will confirm the revised inputs
used in the calculation and verify that the first minute discharge is now the
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critical period for sizing the Shearon Harris batteries.
05.5-2 (Defic.iency) DC Equipment Rated Maximum Voltage
This deficiency identified the fact that the licensee had not confirmed the
qualified operating voltage range for de equipment.
In the response, the
Itcensee stated 3 possibilities that they would pursue to detemine the rated
maximum voltage for the safety-related de equipment. The response stated that
the primary method you planned to be used to verify the capability of the de
equipment to operate at maximum voltage will be a comparison of vendor data
with the requirements of the specification. The team is concerned that many
of the specifications for the equipment in question did not specify the
maximum de voltage range.
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The team also questions how the second and third alternative will address the
over voltage concerns.
The team will review implementation of the resolution to this deficiency,
particularly the details of alternatives 2 and 3.
D5.5-3 (Deficiency) Battery Discharge Voltage Profile
The team will review calculation No. 20-WRE, which has superseded calculation
No. 43-SKD, to evaluate the revised voltage profile.
05.5-4 (Deficiency) DC System Minimum Voltage
The team will review calculation No. 20-WRE, which has also superseded
calculation No. 44-SKD, to evaluate the base voltages used in the close and
trip circuit voltage drop calculations and the resulting circuit restrictions
on cable size and length.
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05.6-1(Deficiency)PenetrationProtectionQualification
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The team will review the revised control wiring diagrams associated with this
change to confim the independence between the primary and backup protection
for these penetrations.
DS.7-1 (Deficiency) Use of Motor Data in Setting Procedure
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The team is concerned that the work has proceeded with the Harris Plant
Engineering Section guideline for relay protection not being completed. The
team will review the revised relay setting calculations and coordination
curves as well as Harris Plant Engineering Section guideline No. 7.5.G for
relay protection. The team will examine how these calculations and curves
will be verified and when the guideline will be completed.
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D5.7-2 (Deficiency) 480 V Bus Undervoltage Alarm
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The team will review the revised relay setting drawings, the supporting
voltage study and relay setting calculations. The team will also review your
justification for setting the bus undervoltage relays below the minimum rated
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motor voltage.
05.8-1 (Deficiency) DC Motor Operated Valve Voltage Drop
The team will review your cable sizing criteria for de motor operated valves
and the resulting voltage drop calculations or analysis supporting the
selection of the revised cable sizes.
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05.9-1 (Deficiency) Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System RCP Input
The team will review the revised control wiring diagram CAR-2166-B-401 sheet
140 and Design Change Notice 251-257 to confirm the degree of independence
added between the RCP status inputs to each RVLIS train.
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05.10-1 (Deficiency) Site Engineering Design Change Control
The team will review the calculation prepared for sizing the new cables for
the auxiliary transfer panels, and the new design guideline for control and
verification of cable and circuit breaker sizing.
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
D6.1-2 (Deficiency) FSAR/ Instrument Index Consistency
The team identified a number of differences between statements in the FSAR and
data provided in the EBASCO Instrument Index.
With regard to the specific
items noted by the team, this deficiency is considered to be closed; however,
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the team will examine the recently revised EBASCO E-65-SH procedure mentioned
in the response with respect to applicable standards and codes used for
equipment procurement.
06.1-6 (Observation) CVCS Design Basis
During the review of an EBASCO Design Basis Document for the chemical and
volume control system, the team observed a classification difference for the
Chiller Surge Tank level transmitter between design documents and the Design
Basis Documents which exist for this system. The response stated that the
particular document reviewed by the team was not the appropriate one for this
transmitter. The team will review Design Basis Document 0B0-108 for the boron
thermal regenerative portion of the chemical and volume control system.
D6.1-9 (Deficiency) EBASCO Procurement Specification
Numerous differences were noted by the team in the specification of industry
standards and codes between EBASCO instrumentation procurement specifications
and the EBASCO E-65-SH procedure used as an input document for procurement
specification preparation, reviei<, and approval. EBASCO has indicated
technical differences of opinion with the team on which standards are
required, and has stated that some procurement specifications reflected
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over-conservative cross-referencing. The team agrees with each of these
EBASCO comments, particularly since EBASCO has not attempted to impose system
level considerations on some vendors.
In the interim, EBASCO has revised
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procedure E-65-SH to reflect those codes, standards, and NRC Regulatory Guides
listed as requirements in the instrumentation specifications. The team plans
to review this revised procedure.
06.1-10(Deficiency)IncompleteandUnissuedDraftingManual
At the Shearon Harris site, the team noted that issued instrumentation and
control drawings were being modified without a Drafting Manual for the
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instrumentation and control discipline as required by ANSI h45.2.11-1974.
Carolina Power and Light has indicated that the manual has been prepared and
issued, and that an internal Quality Assurance audit indicated that only minor
changes were required to correct those drawing discrepancies noted. The team
will inspect review of the Drafting guide and the QA audit report.
D6.3-2 (Deficiency) Conduit Separation
During the inspection of main control room panels at the plant, the team noted
numerous instances of redundant flexible conduits that were in direct contact
with one another. IEEE Std. 384-1974 requires that, where cables are enclosed
within conduit panels, a one inch air gap separation distance be maintained
between the redundant conduits unless lesser distances are supported by an
analysis of the particular installation. At the time of the inspection.
Westinghouse had not perfonned such an analysis for their panels, and EBASCO
had permitted their panel vendor to follow the Westinghouse practice without
requiring an analysis by the vendor.
EBASCO has performed a separate engineering analysis on the basis of wire
size, control circuit fusing, voltage level separation, and control wiring
insulation characteristics. This separation analysis will be reviewed by the
team.
U6.3-3 (Unresolved Item) Instrument Impulse Line Separation Distance
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The team believes that the Carolina Power and Light construction criteria for
instrument impulse lines may be technically acceptable; however,further
discussion and inspection are warranted regarding the basis for selection of a
minor change designation for this change. Review of the justification
analysis for FCR-I-1029, and review of a number of specific instrument tubing
reroute changes is planned.
D6.4-2 (Deficiency) Vendor Conformance to Specification
The team will review the complete analysis provided by the remote sample
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dilution panel vendor to determine the acceptability of the installed hardware
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for worst case environments.
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U6.5-1 (Unresolved Item) Design Basis for Safety-Related Instrument Setpoints
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The team remains concerned that design basis documentation will not be
provided for all safety-related balance-of-plant setpoints. During the
reinspection the team plans: (1) further discussions with Carolina Power and
Light regarding these balance-of-plant setpoints; (2) review of EBASCO
setpoint calculations for HVAC and other temperature measurements; (3) review
of EBASCO setpoint calculation EQS-19 for Emergency Service Water; (4) further
discussion with EBASCO regarding the RAB sump pump setpoint documentation; (5)
review of the Carolina Power and Light calculation for the Spent Fuel Pool;
and (6) review of the new Carolina Power and Light Harris Plant Engineering
Section Instruction 3.8.
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D6.7-1 (Deficiency) Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump Instrumentation
The team noted that variations in instrument ranges existed for bypass flow
switches for the reactor coolant pumps. The response stated that Westinghouse
documentation has been revised, and that EBASCO documentation will be updated.
This deficiency will be followed-up by the team's review of the Westinghouse
specification sheet and the EBASCO Instrument Index.
D6.8-5 (Deficiency) Battery Room Service Sink
This item will be followed-up with the team's review of the change documents
for this particular material change.
D6.8-6 (Deficiency) Calculation Basis for Licensing Amendment
This deficiency will be followed-up with the team's review of this Carolina
Power and Light calculation and the revised Harris Plant Engineering Section
instruction.
Items Common to More Than One Discipline
The licensee's response to the findings which were common to more than one
discipline (IDI report section 7) have not yet been reviewed by the team. The
response to these items will be evaluated during the reinspection.
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