ML20128G459

Forwards List of Attendees & Presentation Summary of 930122 Meeting in Atlanta,Ga Re Operations Enhancement

ML20128G459
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/02/1993
From:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Beard P FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9302160014
Download: ML20128G459 (36)

Text

,.

.;e FEB 2 1993 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Florida Power Corporation Mr. Percy M. Beard, Jr.

Senior Vice President. Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operator Licensing P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 This letter refers to the meeting conducted at your request at the NRC Region 11 offices in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 22, 1993. The purpose of the meeting was a Florida Power Corporation presentation on operations enhancements at Crystal River. A list of the attendees and handouts from the presentation are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and provided a better understanding of your organization's performance and goals.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 1, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please let us know.

Sincerely, Original signed by Ellis W. Mershoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Prosentation Summary 12003G cc w/encls:

Gary L. Boldt Vice President, Nuclear Production Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-SA-2C Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 cc w/encls cout'd:

See page-2 l

9302160014 930202 l l PDR ADOCK 05000302

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Florida Power Corporation 2

FEB-.2 K133 cc w/encls cont'd:

B. J. Hickle, Director Nuclear Plant Operations Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-NA-2C Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 R. C. Widell, Director Nuclear Operations Site Support Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 A. H. Stephens General Counsel Florida Power Corporation MAC - A5D P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317-Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Citrus County 110 N. Apopka Avenue Inverness, FL 36250 cc w/encls cont'd:

See page 3

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Florida Power. Corporation:

-3 FEB

-2 : 1993 -

ec w/encls cont'd:

Robert B. Borsum-

. B&W Nuclear Technologies 1700 Rockville-Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD-20852-1631 bec w/encls:

K. Landis, RII

.A. Long, Ril H. Silver, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6745 N. Tallahassee Road Crystal River, FL 34428 4

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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (Ril)

.. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, RIl A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

J. J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorat,11-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor-Regulation (NRR)

H. Silver, Project Manager, Crystal River, Project Directorate 11-2, NRR T, A. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS H. V. Sinkule, Chief, Branch 2, DRP, RII K. D. Landi:,, Chief, Section 28, DRP, Ril R. P. Schin, Project Engineer, DRP, Ril A. R. Long, Project Engineer, DRP, RIl Florida Power Corooration P. M. Beard, Jr., Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations G. L. Boldt, Vice President, Nuclear Production B. J. Hickle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

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ENCLOSURE 2-HANDOUTS e

Example of STAR e

Example of trends from operator logs e

Example of flow charts from VP-580 e

Example of revised Annunciator Procedures ll-l l

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1 The recent incident involving BSV-3 serves to remind us all of the importance of attention to detail and the necessity of self-checking when manipulating plant equipment. We need to re-emphasize carrying out of all plant evolutions in a thoughtful, deliberate manner, using self-checking techniques.

STOP:

Organize thoughts & concentrate on details of task.

THINK:

Locate the correct components &

procedures. Verify instructions, equipment locations, & time limits.

Anticipate the expected response when the task is performed.

ACT:

Confirm the correct unit, train, and/or component. Perform the task carefully & safely.

REVIEW: Observe & verify that the task was performed correctly, that the actual response is as expected, and that the component / system is in the desired configuration to support-intended plant operations.

In summary: Although it is recognized that plant operations &

procedures must be performed in a timely manner, we must also take time to incorporate self-checking techniques into all our tasks.

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. ENCLOSURE 1 (Page11of85)L.

ESAB-A ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE ESAB-A-01-09 C-01-09 SW SURGE TANK' PRESS' HIGH/ LOW EVENT POINT 1838 INDICATED CONDITION:

o SW SURGE TANK PRESSURE <75 PSIG AS SENSED BY SW-134-PS.

REDUNDANT' INDICATION WHICH WILL VERIFY ALARM:

o LOW INDICATED TANK PRESSURE.

o LOW SW SURGE TANK LEVEL.

o SW SYSTEM PRESS LOW.

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OPERATOR ACTION FOR-A VALID ALARM:

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o. REFER TO AP-330.

o CHECK FOR TANK GAS SPACE. LEAKS.

o CHECK TANKiPRESSURE; CONTROL BYPASS VALVE (SWV-198) CLOSED.

O' CHECK TANK PRESSURE CONTROL-VALVE (SWV-281)-NOT LEAKING BY.-

o IF PRES 5URE ALARM CAUSED BY LOW LEVEL, RESTORE LEVEL:T0' NORMAL 1 BAND.

DISCUSSION:

IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHECK FOR'SWV-281 LEAK BY. CLOSING ~ VALVE SWO 282'AND OBSERVING LFOR TANK PRESSURE TO' RECOVER..

REFERENCES:

-DRAWING 208-056 SHEET SW l SENSING ELEMENT: SW-134-PS b

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KEY ACTIONS TAKEN IN OPERATIONS

• Trained operators on lessons learned from the(December 1991 trips.

• E stablished guidanceLfor bypassing ES systems.

• 1 Reviewed and balanced shift composition.

Increased the number of Chief Nuclear Operators toiassure experienced operators remain ~ed at the controls.

Many of;the-CNO's are SRO. licensed.

• - ProvideDstartupjtraining to operating crews prior

to plant 1 star. tups;from midcycle1or refueling outages.

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[ Shift 1supervisorXSRO1-command and control

Manager on Call:- backup resources / approvals j

' Shift technical advisor - technical advice 1

and eventioversight to assist the shift

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AddedLnew?positionLof Shift Manager Currently L onitwo; shif ts/ day, 5; days / week Department head: level managers, current or 1

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KEY ACTIONS (Continued?

Revised annunciator response procedures (ARP's)

- 4 an'd emphasized their proper use Completed revision to emergency operating

. proc.edures (EOP's) - implementation to o'ccur in11993 Made changesito.the production. organization to:

.A.. Flatten layers.and improve communication B.

Improve 1 maintenance support for operations C. Improve engineering support for operations D. Improve-outage support lfor operations m

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OPERATIONS SALP FindJag

" Operator performance during routine operations was good;

however, 9A_qcjasion, operators failed to require a sufficiently detailed review to properly control maintenance and surveillance evolutions and operator performance during responses to transient conditions was inconsistent."

OPERATIONS ANOMALIES April 1991 to Present November 1991 Reactor Trip: Inadequate deaerator level control December 1991 Reactor Trip: Adjusted overpower trip with failed NI channel December 1991 Reactor Trip: RCS pressure transient; Inaspropriate bypass of ES March 1992 Reactor Trip: Inverter trouble shooting with deficient relay.

design June 1992 Inadvertent isolation of decay heat removal system October 1992 Inadvertent reactor building spray initiation November 1992 Weakness in Requalification Program l

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EVALUATION OF OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE o

Overall performance has been inconsistent and needs improvement e

Root causes and contributing caur.es of operations anomalies vary and have no common theme e

Thorough corrective actions have been identified and taken which should prevent recurrence in each case Most of these anomalies could have been prevented by improved human performance o

Attention to detail o

Questioning attitude / judgment o

Command and control

i FUTURE FOCUS:

IMPROVE OPERATOR PERFORMANCE t

1.

Identify Earlier. Indicators of Deterioratina Performance e

increase management involvement in operator rounds (2/93)

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Assess crew performance on first day of simulator requal training

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e Ltwar threshold for action on performance deficiencies (12/93) i e

Enhance evaluation depth and consistency of human performance problems (6/93) 2.

Enhance Trainina in Selected Areas t

e Good human performance practices (3/93) j e

Specifictrainingtoaddressnoteddeficiencies-(on-going)

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e Increase peer evaluator contact hours with new operators.(3/93) 3.

Review and Clarify Ooeratina Standardi Al-500(3/93) i 4.

Imorove Tools Operators Vse To Do Jobs Procedures:

E0Ps(8/93),-VPs(6/93),ARs_(3/93)'

e Computerized. log taking and trending'(on going):

5.

Imorove Ooerator Sucoort r

e OTA effectiveness and_ availability (on going) i

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Shift Manager full-shift coverage (6/93)

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I REACTOR TRIP December 29,1992

==

Description:==

RCS high pressure trip when feedwater flow rapidly decreased to "B" steam generator Cause:

Dirt and crud buildup in feedwater pump governor actuator lessons Learned:

o Operator response during transient and startup was appropriate o

Overall System performance adequate o

Preventive maintenance routines for control oil and governor require reassessment o

Shif t Managers and 01As added value to recovery efforts o

Trouble shooting could have been better controlled o

System engineers demonstrated comprehensive system knowledge o

Secondary leakage in RB from inspection cover on "A" steam generator

Florida INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Po...w.. e.. o -r NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE NA 2D 240-3375 so office uc Tei.pnon.

susatet: Status of Cortective Actions -

Reactor Trip Events - December 1991 to:

P. H. Beard, Jr.

oATE: December 8, 1992 SNC92 0152 The attached report provides the most recent revision of the status of corrective actions to our previous report, " Generic Implications of Reactor Trip Events in December 1991". This revision includes the most current updates as well as corrections _ to minor discrepancies identified by QPER 92-19

" Corrective Action Program Review - Follow up to December 1991 Reactor Trips".

G. L.

oldt JAf: mag Att.

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R. C. Widell o

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t GHERIC IMPLICATIONS OEEACTOR TRIP EVENTS IN QECMBER 1991 STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - DECEMBER 1992 ITEM STATUS Ilfd OPERATIONS Al Training for shift which Complete.

Training was provided through will restart the plant the Licensed Operator Requalification program using Lesson Plan ROT-9 26.

A2 OSB entries for all three Complete. Operations Study Book (OSB) trips entries 9112.01, 9112.02, and 9112.03 l

addressed the reactor trips on 11/25/91, 12/03/91, and 12/08/91 respectively.

A3 Refresher S/U training Complete. Training was provided through for available operators the Licensed 0)erator Requalification program using.esson Plan ROT-9-26.

This-training included all available operators and 50TAs, specifically including those doing the startup.

This training was also conducted for the crew doing the restart from the April 1992 reactor trip recovery outage and-for operating crews prior to restart from 8R.

B1 Reinforce Man-On-Call Complete. The policy of utilizing the concurrence for required Man-On Call as a resource during any actions (especially work unusual or off-normal occurrence or in systems that can trip plant evolution has been established and the plant) the practice is being reinforced during simulator training. A plant management commitment has been made to make the Man-On-Call available for training purposes.

Additionally, a dedicated telephone line has been installed at the simulator site so that simulator crews can practice communication with the Man-On Call during selected practice sessions.

I

ITEM STATUS IIf3 B2 Reinforce SRO concurrence Comp 1cte. Operations Study Book (OSB) for required actions entry 9112.04 addressed Engineered (especially bypassing Safeguards (ES) Guidance, and the need to notify the 5500 prior to bypassing "ES")

any ES actuation. This guideline further provides details regarding under which conditions bypassing ES is/is not accebable.

Procedure Al 500. Conduct of Operations, has been revised to include a section on bypassing safety systems actuations and approvals required prior to such bypasses (Revision 73, paragraph 4.1.2).

83 Correct any information Complete.

Revision 65 to procedure OP-resource deficiencies 203, " Plant Startup", has been completed. This revision addresses the topics to be discussed by the operators at a pre-job meeting (paragraph 4.1.11);

condensate control operations (paragraph 4.2.9); and turbine generator start-up, including the requirements for auto or manual breaker closure actions (paragraph 4.2.21 and 4.3.28).

B4 Balance shift staffing Complete. Procedure Al-500, Conduct of Operations, includes the requirement for a balance in shift staffing under

" Responsibilities" of the Nuclear Operations Superintendent. This requirement specifically addresses consideration of experience levels, personr.el behavioral compatibility, and overall management styles in achieving a cohesive operating team (Revision 73, paragraph 3.2.1).

B5 Review " Shift Manager" Complete. The Shift Manager concept has been reviewed and appropriate concept recommendations for this position have been made. The Shift Manager will be an additional position on shift and will-currently hold (or have held in the past) an active SRO license. When fully staffed, there will be five Shift Managers working a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift rotation. This program will.be partially implemented by December 1992.

Full staffing will occur following completion of the 1993-SRO license class pending successful results. To date, all five prospective shift managers have l 1

C ITEM STATUS Illd been named, two of which are currently in SRO training.

Cl Additional CN0s on shift Complete.

Six Nuclear Operator positions have been reclassified to Chief Nuclear Operator and filled.-

MAINTENANCE Al Review other 8M work Complete.

A review of work completed during the Midcycle 8 outage was performed to identify potential maintenance items that could cause plant transients. This review was completed prior to start-ua and included a review of AHF 2A/28 wor (, work performed by contractors, M0 VATS work, and work on equipment critical to plant operations which included equipment critical to pressure, temperature, and reactivity control.

Following the review, a list of actions to be completed prior to start-up was developed and these actions completed.

A2 Revise SP-324 Complete.

SP-324, Containment inspection, was revised to require a visual observation to ensure that a three inch gap (xists between the fuel transfer canal seal plate and the fuel transfer canal floor, with a sign-off specific for that observation (Revision 26, Data Sheet I).

B1 Evaluate methods for Complete.

Revision 8 to CP-113A, Work Request Initiation and Work Package review of PMT when WR Control, includes. changes to paragraph scope expands 4.4.2.1 for the work supervisor to-assure the work request is re evaluated for adequacy of post-maintenance testing if work scope must be _ revised.

Paragraph 4.1.1 (of Revision 10) of CP-o 1138, Work Request Evaluation, provides guidance to the planners for.re-evaluation and post-maintenance test review when the work scope changes from -

the original evaluation. Additionally, training has been provided (and documented by attendance sheets) to the First-Line supervisurs;and Senior Shop Supervisors on the need to have work packages reviewed for post maintenance-'

3

ITEM STATUS IIIB test changes when the work scope changes from the original evaluation.

82 Evaluate methods to complete. An evaluation of methods to involve System Engineers involve system engineers more closely more closely in with maintenance and post maintenance testing on their systems has been maintenance completed during the Spring 1992 outage.

The Systems Engineering Manual (Rev. 4) has been revised to address these issues, and its requirements will be applied in appropriate cases.

Revision l

0 of Al-255, System Outage Scheduling and Implementation, has been developed by the Scheduling department incorporating a " System Manager" concept which provides for leadership of the Pre outage (system) Planning team and for technical oversight. The above action completes the intent of this recommendation.

However, further enhancement in this area will be considered as an ongoing activity with additional corrective actions as described in the current revision to the Key Plant and Equipment Problem L.ist under " Control and coordination of system / component maintenance".

Maintenance / Component engineering has become the first. point of contact for dll $ hop questions.

Open. A review and evaluation of work C1 Improve documentation of work performed package documentation was performed and the concern for proper-documentation has been recognized. This review also revealed that this same documentation problem exists in shop logs.

To raise the quality level for work package documentation and shop log keeping, written standards for both will be developed following the review of work packages currently in process Information derived from the Refuel 8 outage-is being factored into these standards, which are expected to be-completed during December 1992.

L Personnel will be trained on the content of the new guidance once developed.-

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ITEM STATUS IIIM C2 Honitor quality of work Open.

(Ongoing periodic reviews of work package completion package documentation have been conducted in the past).- following the issuance, in December 1992, of written I

standards for both work package documentation and shop logs, maintenance department personnel will develop acceptance criteria to be used by Quality Auditing personnel and Work Controls in reviewing a sample of work packages prior to closure. These routine, periodic reviews, will be directed toward adequacy of work packaye descriptive information, proper identification and disposition of identified problems, and adequate control / application of material used in the work activity. The Planning Department is currently monitoring the work package closure documentation by-reviewing selected work packages and the review of closure information on selected work packages on MACS. The results of these reviews will be evaluated and identified deficiencies will be corrected.

Additionally, Quality Programs has committed.to the inclusion of work, package reviews as a standard part of the audit program..The frequency of such audits will be adjusted based on indicated need.

01 Reduce maintenance Complete. The maintenance department overtime in future reviewed the excessive overtime issue and established a policy which limits outages scheduling of personnel to a maximum of 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per week, and does not permit working more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> per week.

TRAINING Al Provide S/U training Complete. Restart training is an on-prior to S/U in future going activity and has been conducted for at least the last. three outages.-

outages FPC intends to apply this practice to other selected outages as follows: FPC management designates the crew (s) to start-the plant and trains them in-the restart. This approach was most 5

i ITEM STA1U5 11 8 recently applied during the restart from the BR outage.

A2 Supplement operating Complete.

Revision 73 to Al-500, crews during S/U's Conduct of Operations, explains the Shift Supervisor's authority to supplement the operating crew with additional personnel during plant startups and other off normal evolutions in paragraphs 3.2.2 and 4.2.1.

The Shift lianager concept and Shift Technical Advisors "on shift" (discussed elsewhere in this report) will prc, vide additional assistance to the operating Crew.

B1 Remedial training for Complete.

The crew manning the control shift on duty during trip room during the 12/8/91 reactor trip was

1. 3 given remedial training in the classroom as well as the simulator.

The classroom training consisted of training on how to distinguish between LOCAs, overcooling, and inadequate heat transfer. This training was completed under t.esson Plan ROT 3 20 Symptom Oriented Procedure Philosophy.

Simulator training consisted of upsets in RCS pressure control under ROT 9 9, Variable Size 1.0CAs, and diagnostic skill development during different plant upsets under ROT 8 24, Instrument Failures.

Additionally, the crew was trained on faulted reactor startups, including a demonstration of ths 12/8/91 trip under ROT 9 100.

To ensure that the crew understood all three reactor trips, saecial training was conducted during tie first requalification cycle of 1992.

This special training was conducted under ROT 5-49, Special Training, which constituted a case study of all three reactor trips.

This training investigated the sequence of events, what went wrong, what actions the operators took, what actions they should have taken, what procedures were revised as a result of these trips, and new guidance on bypassing any safeguards system.

6

1 UI.B ITEM STATUS Cl Develop guideline for Complete.

Paragraph 4.1.2 of Revision bypassing safety 73 of Al 500, Conduct of Operations, functions includes guidance on bypassing of safety system actuations, including ES actuations. The CR 3 policy states that it is contrary to the policy to bypass or prevent automatic safety functions from performing their intended function.

This policy does allow bypassing of automatic safety system actuation provided that such placement is appropriately approved (by the SRO) prior to alacing the system in bypass and, furtier, that such placement is directed by an approved plant procedure.

C2 Train operators on Complete.

In order to ensure that all guideline licensed operators were aware of the 12/8/91 reactor trip, as well as the reactor trips on 11/25/91 and 12/2/91, special training was conducted for all operating crews during the first requalification cycle of 1992.

As part of this training, ROT 5 49, Special Training, was used to conduct a case study of the three reactor _ trips.

This training investigated-the sequence of events, what went wrong, what actions the operators took, what actions they should have taken, and what procedures were revised as a result of these trips.

The procedure changes included new guidance on bypassing any safeguards.

system. This guidance is'specified in Operations Study Book entry #9112.04, and Al-500, Conduct of Operations.

Training on this new guidance on bypassing any safeguards system was also conducted during this Special Training.

l.

7

O ITEM STATUS UJ3 D1 Enhance eparator training Complete.

This action was intended to in " normal operations" create a commitment to expand training in this area in the future. As a result, some sessions have been conducted and others will be as an on-going activity.

In addition to classroom training in normal operations, simulator training will be increased in this area.

To assure a continued balance between normal operations and severe accident interests, management involvement in training has also increased, including more frequent participation by Directors in the observation and evaluation of training in both maintenance and operations.

D2 Review / approval of Complete. This is an ongoing activity by lessons learned means of the continued free flow and feedback of information between operations and training. A review and approval of " lessons learned" by operations personnel from the three reactor trips was conducted by the Training Department and the information derived was used to prepare ROT 5-49 Special Training, addressing the three reactor trips.

El Restructure composition Complete.

Following appropriate of crew on duty during evaluations, the operating crew that was trip #3 on shift during the third trip was restructured.

The Shift Supervisor and Assistant Shift Supervisor were placed

'on different crews and the licensed operate,es were likewise reassigned to take advantage of varied experience levels.

E2 Review shift composition Complete.

The methods utilized in practices determining shift crew composition have been reviewed and a requirement for the Nuclear Operations Superintendent'to consider experience levels, personnel behavioral compatibility and management styles in balancing' shift complements has been included in Revision 71, paragraph 4.2.1 of Al-500, Conduct of Operations.

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IIJ3 ITEM STATUS F1 Develop questioning complete.

Paragraph 4.2.2 of Al-500, attitude Conduct of Operations, was revised to include a general responsibility for all Operations personnel to develop and maintain a questioning attitude. The Al 501, Conduct of Nuclear Operations Proficiency Assessments, process is being utilized to stress a questioning attitude as part of the management overview. Additionally, management continues to stress the need for a

" questioning attitude". At a recent Operations Crew dinner, the Vice President, Nuclear Production presented cards to the members of the Operations Crews, which present a simple six step plant defining the problemt consulting the resourcess deciding on the course of actioni considering the consequences of being wrong; mitigating or eliminating-the consequences; and acting to implement the decision.

The questioning approach was also used during the April 1992 outage and electrical troubleshooting evolution to evaluate and make appropriate changes to available electrical power supplies, f2 Involve MOC/SOTA/ Engineer Cc,mplete. Direct involvement of the on call in simulator MOC/SOTA/ Engineer required no change in exercises the conduct of simulator training other than the installation of a live telephone in the simulator control room.

This phone has been installed.

Simulator requalification training includes full participation by the 50TAs and instructors role playing as the H0C or Engineer, as required.

The plant-staff has comitted to enhance the involvement of the MOC/ Engineer in simulator exercises.by having the actual MOC respond to calls from.the simulator during selected scenarios, reinforcing-policy and practice to keep-senior management informed and involved in-operating decisions.

9

1TJM ITEM STATUS F3 Emphasize use of Complete.

Criteria regarding use of annunciator response annunciator response procedures is procedures included in Al-501, Conduct of Nuclear Operations Proficiency Assessments, Revision 3, paragraph 4.2.2.2.) and in Al-500, Conduct of Operations (Revision 73, paragraph 4.1.3).

Emphasis is placed on the use of these procedures ing the training sessions given to

.. rations personnel.

G1 Define role of the SOTA Complete.

The role of the SOTA has been described to act as an advisor to the i

shift supervisor relative to plant status and to recommend mitigation actions on the strategic leval, as appropriate. As an advisor, the SOTA must remain independent of other members of the shift by maintaining a questioning attitude. After the plant status is either stable or predictably trending, the SOTA may assist the shift supervisor in other activities.

G2 Improve training on SOTA Complete.

SOTA diagnostic skills diagnostic skills improvements has been addressed on a variety of fronts._ SOTAs attend Licensed Operator classroom and simulator requalification trainingt participation in this training serves to improve the 50TAs' knowledge level and allows them to hone their diagnostic skills.

SOTA specific simulator training concentrating on the improvement of diagnostic skills has also been completed.

In addition to the original intent of this recommendation, the_ purchase of an operational "see-through" reactor model in 1993 will further provide a training tool to reinforce thermodynamic theory with visual / physical evidence.

G3 Enhance operational complete.

The 50TAs attended the recent experience and teamwork INP0 Team Training course.

The SOTA-opportunities for 50TAs role has been better defined and-operations personnel have been made more aware of how and where the SOTA fits on the operating-crew-team. -The 50TAs were _l 10

e, IIEB ITEM STATUS also placed "on shift" as opposed to their former "on call" status effective October _19, 1992.

This action is expected to have an additional positive impact on the teamwork between the 50TAs and the operating crew.

G4 Ensure verification Open.

A prior revision to VP-540, procedures do not dilute Runback Verification Procedure, approved OTA ability to "get the on September 9, 1991, was reviewed and big picture" assessed to adequately address this concern in the overall tone of the revision. A revision to VP-580, Plant-Safety Verification Procedure, has been submitted for final review with an expected issuance date of December 1992.

This procedure wil' include flow charts for diagnosing symptoms of inadequate-heat transfer.

An effort to totally reassess the needs of the SOTA in terms of verification procedures has commenced.

This effort is expected to result-in one or more totally new verification procedures. The expected issuance date for these new verification procedures is January 1993.

G5 Develop diagnostic aids Open. Diagnostic aids for the SOTAs have for OTA's seen substantial irgrovement since the three 1991 reactor trips. A revision to VP 580, Plant Safety Verification Procedure, has been submitted for review.

and approval.

This procedure will include a flow chart for diagnosing symptoms of inadequate heat transfer.

The expected issuance date for VP-580 is December 1992.

A temporary recall l

system has been installed on the simulator to linprove the diagnostic aids available to the 50TAs during training.

This system will eventually be replaced by the new PICS (Plant Integrated Computer System).

When installed, the PICS.in combinatior with the safety parameter display system, should )rovide the desired diagnostic' aids for tie SOTA.

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ng{

ITEM STATUS ENGINEERING Al Define Root Cause for Complete.

Failure Analysis 91 RCV 14 01 RCV-14 was performed for the RCV-14 failure, and the root causes for the depressurization of the RCS on 12/8/91, the failure of RCV-14 to close, and the false RCV 14 aosition indication are included in t1e Failure Analysis report.

A2 Evaluate RCV 14 history Complete Failure Analysis 91-RCV 14-Oi was performed for the RCV 14 failure, and the RCV 14 Maintenance History was included as Attachment 3 of this report.

The history included thirty six entries extending.from January 1980 through-November 1991.

A3 Accelerate failure Complete. An improved program for history review for other Failure Analysis, the Maintenance equipment Precursor Program, Root Cause Analysis correction, and the Repetitive Failure and Equipment Reliability Program all act to accelerate the identifdcation process for equipment which may be:

susceptible to repetitive failure.

Examples of the success of the improved program _for Failure Analysis include three recent failure analyses addressing DHP 1A/B, AHF 1A, and SWP-lc.

The maintenance Precursor Program is a pilot program which is intended to-identify minor problems which may then be remedied prior to their development into majordeficiencies.

Root Cause Analysis corrective actions are an integral part of the Failure Analysis program, wherein recommended corrective actions for the root cause and contributing causes_are assigned to the appropriate department for resolution.

The Repetitive Failure and Equipment Reliability Program has_

been developed to include all CR-3' com)onents.

Selected information from bot 1 CMIS (Configuration Management Information System) and MACS-(Maintenance Activity Control System) is being extracted and placed in a database for subsequent data reduction and report preparation.

Additionally, a new procedure CP-143.-Repeat Maintenance 12 l

ITEM STATUS IIIB Program Identification Evaluation and Tracking, provides additional data relative to this issue.

l B1 Time study System Complete.

A time study of the System Engineering activities Engineer's daily activities is necessary for successful implementation of the System Manager conce)t.

Progress is being tracked by bot 1 the Key Plant Problem List and NOTES (Nuclear Operations Tracking and Expediting System).

Nuclear Plant System Engineering provided monthly reJ> orts of tracked manhours through Se)temaer 1992.

A final report addressing tie analysis of this data and providing recommendations to senior management has been developed. The report is being studied for additional realignment of duties of the system engineer.

B2 Take Corrective action on Open. Action for this item follows the recommendations of completion of recomendations of the the time study time study of the System Engineer's daily activities.

The System Manager concept was implemented on a trial basis during the A)ril Mode 5 outage and will continue to se applied to other significant ;ystem projects on a case basis.

Additional actions are being.

considered such as transferring procedure writing duties to a dedicated writers group.

B3 Establish performance Open.

The Systems Engineering Manual indicators for vital (Rev. 4) establishes the mechanism by functions which vital engineering functions are tracked by performance indicators visible to senior management. Data and trending gra)hs are being prepared monthly on t11rteen key items, including: REAs received, processed, and backlog; Problem Report backlog; NOTES items received, processed, backlog, and overdue; Procedure reviews; manhour accounting; and procedure revisions..

Tracking of system walkdowns is currently being accomplished.

Reporting of this indicator will start in the January 1993 monthly report.

13

e R@

ITEM STATUS Cl Establish Root Cause Complete.

Establishment of " root cause criteria threshold" criteria enables personnel to determine when the preparation of a failure analysis and root cause determination is appropriate.

N00 40, Root Cause/ Failure Analysis, in concert with CP-144 Root Cause Analysis, establish the desired criteria.

C2 Establish Complete.

Brainstorming practices are

" brainstorming" addressed in the Systems Engineering practices Manual (Rev. 4).

This manual provides guidance for aggressive failure analysis utilizing a team approach. The team may contain personnel from any department who can prov.ide a needed expertise.

Plant management has endorsed the

concept, The AHF-1A as well as the DHP-1A/B failure analyses were examples of the effectiveness of the program.

Additionally, the FPC PACE (People Achieving Corporate Excellence) program provides excellent training, guidance, and recommendations in " brainstorming" practices as well as a variety of other problem solving tools.

C3 Establish single point of Complete. A new plant procedure, Al-accountability 255, System Outage Scheduling and Implementation establishes a system manager as the single point of accountability for troubleshooting and corrective maintenance practices. A system manager maintains the overall project lead and is accountable for technical direction, root cause determination, and coordination of remaining activities to correct the problem.

The outage implementor (usually the lead shop supervisor) is accountable to the system manager for the implementation of the troubleshooting plan. The lead planner is accountable to the system manager for planning and evaluation of the troubleshooting work package.

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i IIEM ITEM STATUS j

i C4 Establish method to issue Open. HP 531, Troubleshooting Plant troubleshooting /

Equipment, currently controls plant correction action plans troubleshooting evolutions. A written troubleshooting plan must be presared prior to performing _the work.

T11s plan must consider if the troubleshooting may adversely affect equipment whose operation is vital to the plant, (including entry into a Technical Specification action statement),

initiation of a plant transient, or limitation of power production.

Additional planning actions must be taken when.the troubleshooting task willl include more than one crew, more than-.

one discipline,'or expertise beyond that normally available to the shop. MP 531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, is outdated and currently.in the revision review cycle, with an expected issuance date of December'1992.

In the interim, additional emphasis has been placed on control of troubleshooting and_other-(-

system work activities through the-system manager concept described inc Revision 0 of AI-255, System'0utage-Scheduling and implementation.

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