:on 921129,fire Door Between CR & Records Room & Fire Door Between CR & Operators Study Area Blocked Open to Provide Cooling.No Compensatory Measures Taken.Doors Closed & Administrative Procedures Revised| ML20128F205 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Prairie Island  |
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| Issue date: |
02/04/1993 |
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| From: |
Hunstad A NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20128F202 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-93-002, LER-93-2, NUDOCS 9302110297 |
| Download: ML20128F205 (3) |
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a C POAM 3e4 U S. NUCLE AR RE CULATORY COMMI5510N APPROytO OMS NO 3150-0104 ;
i nPIR E S. 4/30/92 ESTIMATED SUROtN PER Rf 8PONSE TO MMPLY WTH THis LICENSEE EVENT HEPORT (LER)
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AND REPORTS MANAGEMF.NT BRANCH (P4.101 U S. NUCLE AR -
REGULATORY COMMISSION. W ASH 1NGTON. DC 20666, AND TO THE TAPERWORK Rf DUCTION PROJECT (31600t04L Of f act 08 MANAQtMENT AND SUDGEY, WASHINGTON. OC 20603.
FACluTV NAME 11}
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On November 29, 1992, both units were at cold shutdown.
The fire door between the Control Room and the Records Room, and the fire door between'the Control Room and the operators' Study Area, had been blocked open to provide some cooling for those rooms while their normal cooling system was out of service due to cooling water header replacement.
No compensatory measures had been j.
taken; it was believed that since the Control Room side of the fire doors is l
continuously occupied, a fire watch was unnecessary, 1
Further discussions with NRC-resulted ir. the conclusion that opening the doors made them inoperable and that a violation of Technical l
Specification 3.14.G.2 had occurred. The doors were closed and the fire barriers considered operable.
Administrative procedures have been revised to include specific instructions on establishing fire watches for the doors.
9302110297 930204 PDR -ADOCK 05000292 S
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f4RC FCRM 366A U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPHOYED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 15 et -
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05000 282 NUMBE9 NUMBER 2 OF 3 Prairie Island Unit 1 93
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rww-ou nwna.a..mm m..,mcw ason EVENT DESCRIPTIQH On November 29, 1992, both units were at cold shutdown.
The fire door.between the Control Room and the Records Room, and the fire door between the Control Room and the operators' Study Area, had been blocked open to provide some cooling for those rooms while their normal cooling system was out of service due to cooling water header replacement. ho compensatory measures had t en taken; it was believed that since the Control Room side of the fire doors is continuously occupied, a fire watch was unnecessary.
On December 2, 1992, the NRC resident inspector observed that the doors were-blocked open and determined that no administrative controls were in place to-control the door.s.
The resident inspector discussed the event with members of plant management, and he believed that plant management understood that a Technical Specification violation had occurred and that an LER was necessary.
Plant management came away from that discussion with a different understanding, that no Technical Specification violation had occurred and that no LER was necessary, based on continuous-staffing of the Control Room.
The event was discussed among p19nt staff over the next few weeks, during which time steps were taken to implement administrative controls for the doors. At the January 5,1993, exit meeting with the resident inspectors, it was stated that one violation-would be cited for not controlling the doors properly, and another would be cited for not reporting the' Technical.
Specification violation as an LER.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
Cause of the event is a difference in interpretation of Technical Specifications regarding operability of a fire barrier, one side of.which is continuously occupied.
The plant position had always been that opening of the doors to the Records Room and to the operators' Study Area room does not make the fire barriers inoperable and, therefore, the Limiting Condition for Operation of Technical Specification 3.14 G.2 need not be entered for the
'following reasons:
- 1) The Control Room is continuously occupied.
- 2) The Records Room and Study Area room are usually occupied.
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- 3) Fire detection systems on both sides of the fire barriers are operable.
- 4) The Records Room is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system.
On January 5,1993, it was determined that opening these fire doors maken tham-inoperable and the Limiting condition for Operation of Technical Specification 3.14,0.2 should be entered when these doors are open.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) because Technical Specification 3.14.G.2 was violated. This violation had low safety significance because the control room is required to be cor.tinuously occupied, the rooms on the other side of the barriers are usually occupied, And fire detectors are available on both sides of the barriers. Also, the Records Room is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system. Health and safety of the public were unaffected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The doors were closed and the fire barriers considered operanle, i
l Administrative procedures have been revised to include specific instructions.
i on establishing fire watches for the doors.
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Signs have been placed on the doors which reference at.plicable Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATIO_H None.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
One other event involving a fire door was reported as Unit 1 LER_92-001, but its cause was not similar.
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a W FCAM 356A (5-4
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| 05000306/LER-1993-001, :on 930104,auto-start of CCW Pump Occurred Due to Inadequate Procedures.Operator Completed Transfer of RHR to Alternate Train Per Procedures.Procedures Revised.W/ |
- on 930104,auto-start of CCW Pump Occurred Due to Inadequate Procedures.Operator Completed Transfer of RHR to Alternate Train Per Procedures.Procedures Revised.W/
| | | 05000282/LER-1993-001-01, On 930105,discovered That Surveillance of Hydrogen Recombiners Did Not Meet TS 4.4.I Requirement That Require Functional Test Every 6 Months.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Surveillance Testing Performed | On 930105,discovered That Surveillance of Hydrogen Recombiners Did Not Meet TS 4.4.I Requirement That Require Functional Test Every 6 Months.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Surveillance Testing Performed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000306/LER-1993-002, Forwards LER 93-002-00 Re Loss of Administrative Control of Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve Due to Personnel Error.Process for Use of Safety Tags Being Reviewed & Revs Will Be Made,Where Needed | Forwards LER 93-002-00 Re Loss of Administrative Control of Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve Due to Personnel Error.Process for Use of Safety Tags Being Reviewed & Revs Will Be Made,Where Needed | | | 05000282/LER-1993-002, :on 921129,fire Door Between CR & Records Room & Fire Door Between CR & Operators Study Area Blocked Open to Provide Cooling.No Compensatory Measures Taken.Doors Closed & Administrative Procedures Revised |
- on 921129,fire Door Between CR & Records Room & Fire Door Between CR & Operators Study Area Blocked Open to Provide Cooling.No Compensatory Measures Taken.Doors Closed & Administrative Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000306/LER-1993-002-02, :on 930403,containment Isolation Valve Which Controls Reactor Makeup Water to Containment Exceeded Max Time for Closure.On 930413,lockwire & Safety Tag Removed. Caused by Communication Errors.Safety Tag Process Reviewed |
- on 930403,containment Isolation Valve Which Controls Reactor Makeup Water to Containment Exceeded Max Time for Closure.On 930413,lockwire & Safety Tag Removed. Caused by Communication Errors.Safety Tag Process Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000306/LER-1993-003-02, :on 930719,both Trains of Ventilation Safeguards Electrical Equipment Secured for Hours Due to Inadequate Administrative Control.Review of DGs D5/D6 Design Repts Will Be Performed |
- on 930719,both Trains of Ventilation Safeguards Electrical Equipment Secured for Hours Due to Inadequate Administrative Control.Review of DGs D5/D6 Design Repts Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000282/LER-1993-003, Forwards LER 93-003-00 Re Nuclear Instrumentation Sys power- Range Channels Miscalibrated Due to Use of Improper Test Leads.New NRC Commitments Listed | Forwards LER 93-003-00 Re Nuclear Instrumentation Sys power- Range Channels Miscalibrated Due to Use of Improper Test Leads.New NRC Commitments Listed | | | 05000282/LER-1993-003-01, :on 930204,discovered That Lower Detector Flux Signal from All Four Nis power-range Channels Outside Acceptance Criterion.Caused by Miscalibration of power-range Channels.Procedures Revised & Test Labeling Improved |
- on 930204,discovered That Lower Detector Flux Signal from All Four Nis power-range Channels Outside Acceptance Criterion.Caused by Miscalibration of power-range Channels.Procedures Revised & Test Labeling Improved
| | | 05000282/LER-1993-004, :on 930209,discovered That ASME Section XI ISI Exams Performed W/Incorrect Calibr Blocks.Caused by Personnel Error.Isi NDE Procedures & Plans Will Be Revised to Assure Acceptable Calibr Block Used |
- on 930209,discovered That ASME Section XI ISI Exams Performed W/Incorrect Calibr Blocks.Caused by Personnel Error.Isi NDE Procedures & Plans Will Be Revised to Assure Acceptable Calibr Block Used
| | | 05000306/LER-1993-004-02, :on 931124,breach Found in Unit 2 Containment Boundary During Fuel Handling Due to Personnel Errors & Procedural Inadequacies.Containment Boundary Control Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 931124,breach Found in Unit 2 Containment Boundary During Fuel Handling Due to Personnel Errors & Procedural Inadequacies.Containment Boundary Control Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000282/LER-1993-005, :on 930218,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Relay Operation,Causing Loss of RCP 12.Caused by Accidental Bumping of Breaker Cubicle by Floor Burnishing Machine.Use of Addl Physical Barriers Being Considered |
- on 930218,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Relay Operation,Causing Loss of RCP 12.Caused by Accidental Bumping of Breaker Cubicle by Floor Burnishing Machine.Use of Addl Physical Barriers Being Considered
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000282/LER-1993-006, :on 930325,cooling Water Pump 121 auto-started on Low Header Pressure While Aligned for Safeguards Operation.Caused by Operator Failing to Open Header Valves a & B.Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 930325,cooling Water Pump 121 auto-started on Low Header Pressure While Aligned for Safeguards Operation.Caused by Operator Failing to Open Header Valves a & B.Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000282/LER-1993-007, :on 930413,feedwater System Revealed That Certain Feedwater Valves Required to Mitigate Consequences of Accident Were Not Included in Insp.Caused by Personnel Error.All Valves Will Be Tested |
- on 930413,feedwater System Revealed That Certain Feedwater Valves Required to Mitigate Consequences of Accident Were Not Included in Insp.Caused by Personnel Error.All Valves Will Be Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000282/LER-1993-008, :on 930624,observed That Valve CV-31740, Instrument Air to Unit 1 Containment Closed Due to Failure of Coil in Solenoid Operated Pilot Valve.Valve Reopened Locally to Restore Instrument Air |
- on 930624,observed That Valve CV-31740, Instrument Air to Unit 1 Containment Closed Due to Failure of Coil in Solenoid Operated Pilot Valve.Valve Reopened Locally to Restore Instrument Air
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000282/LER-1993-009, :on 930715,receipt of Annunciator Charging Pump 12 Overload Trip Observed by CR Operators,Resulting in Unplanned Closure of Containment Isolation Valve.Standby Charging Pump Started Immediately |
- on 930715,receipt of Annunciator Charging Pump 12 Overload Trip Observed by CR Operators,Resulting in Unplanned Closure of Containment Isolation Valve.Standby Charging Pump Started Immediately
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000282/LER-1993-010, :on 930729,control Room Air Handler Was Removed from Svc for Preventive Maint Due to Personnel Error.Revised DG Surveillance Test Procedures |
- on 930729,control Room Air Handler Was Removed from Svc for Preventive Maint Due to Personnel Error.Revised DG Surveillance Test Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000282/LER-1993-012, :on 930908,failed to Perform Offsite Dose & Effluent Monitor Setpoint Calculations Due to Inadequate Procedures & Personnel Error.Added Calculations to Surveillance Program |
- on 930908,failed to Perform Offsite Dose & Effluent Monitor Setpoint Calculations Due to Inadequate Procedures & Personnel Error.Added Calculations to Surveillance Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000282/LER-1993-014, :on 931116,determined Control Cables for Redundant Pressurizer Porvs,Found Touching,Violated Criteria for Physical Separation of Cables.Cables Repositioned & Secured |
- on 931116,determined Control Cables for Redundant Pressurizer Porvs,Found Touching,Violated Criteria for Physical Separation of Cables.Cables Repositioned & Secured
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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