ML20128D937

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation & Logic
ML20128D937
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 03/25/1985
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128D918 List:
References
0770T, 770T, 9913N, NUDOCS 8507050221
Download: ML20128D937 (4)


Text

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ATTACHMENT 1 Proposed Zion Appendix A Technical Specification Changes To To Section 3.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation and Logic PAGES MODIFIED 36 38 1

l 8507050221 850325

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PDR ADOCK 05000295 P

pg 9913N

!=

R: actor Trip Channel Channel Channal Channel Description Check Calibration Functional Test Remarks

17. Low Steam Generator Level in Coincidence with Feed Flow Steam Flow Mismatch S

R Q

18. Low-Low Steam Generator Level S

R Q

19. Safety Injection NA NA Q'
  • Manual SI function check at R only
20. Turbine Trip NA NA Q

I 21. Automatic Reactor Trip Logic NA NA M'

1 i

PERMISSIVES NA NA S/U2' 28 Not required if performed l 22. P-6 within the previous seven days i 23. P-7 NA NA M

I

24. P-8 NA NA M
25. P-10 NA NA M

Table Notation:

S - Once Per Shift EFPM - Once Per Effective Full Power Month 0 - Once Per Day Q - Once Per Quarter M - Once Per Month S/U - Prior to Startup R.Once Per R'efueling Shutdown - calibration of these instruments may be done as much as six months prior to the start of refueling outage and still satisfy this requirement. The time between surveillances shall not exceed 20 months.

NA - Not Applicable Reactor Protection System Testing and Calibration Requirements TABLE 4.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) 0770t 36

l Bases:

t 4.1 The bases for Tables 3.1-1 and 4.1-1 such signals would generally be originated is an analysis of the reactor protection by more than one functional unit. Therefore, and control instrumentation systems.

from the standpoint of accomplishing the Conservative failure rates for the required trip or actuation, far greater individual channels were employed redundancy exists than is credited in based on published data typical for establishing the specification tables.

Individual components in the channels.

The test and calibration frequencies are The Power Range Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) therefore quite conservative.

channel function test is not performed continually above 25% power levels due to I

Considerable added conservatism is in-the possibility of inducing inadvertent i

herent in the analysis since no credit reactor trips. This trip is a redundant l

j was established for the fact that there trip at low power and the test is to be I

exists a wide margin of diversity in performed at startup and as soon as is I

trip signal origin. (1) Should a practical on controlled shutdown if the i

situation develop which would require power is to remain at low levels (below 10%)

l a trip, for any extended periods of time.

(1)

FSAR Section 7.2 4

I l

l l

0770t 38

ATTACHMENT 2 Evaluation of Significant Hazards Consideration Description of Amendment Request An amendment to the Technical Specification is requested adding clarification to the automatic reactor trip logic testing requirements in accordance with Generic Letter 83-28.

The proposed amendment applies to a plant modification scheduled to be installed during the 1985 refueling outages started January 30, 1985 for Unit 1 and scheduled to start September 5, 1985 for Unit 2.

Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided guidance concerning the applica-tion of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870).

The examples of actions involving no significant hazards consideration include ion (,11)or control not presently included in the technical A change that' constitutes an additional limitation restrIcl specifications; for example, a more stringent surveillance require-ment."

The change proposed in the application for amendment is encompassed by this example in that it would clarify an existing surveillance requirement to indicate testing of the reactor trip breaker shunt and undervoltage trip mechanisms is to be performed.

Therefore, since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is similar to an example for which no significant hazards consideration exists, Commonwealth Edison has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

9913N