ML20128C217
| ML20128C217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1992 |
| From: | Wright E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128C205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-92-25, 50-370-92-25, NUDOCS 9212040289 | |
| Download: ML20128C217 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1992025
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09 0% UNITED STATES
- -g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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101 MARIETTA STREE T, N.W.
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Report Nos.: 50-369/92-25 and 50-370/92-25
Licensee: Duke Power Company
d22 South fhurch Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17
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Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 l
Inspection Cond eted: October 13-15,,1992
Inspector: /AntO b,
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. Wright, Team Leader Date Signed
Team Members: A. Belisle
G. Weale g '
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Approved by: 1.Jt . uL. w l( (#1
W hief Date Signed
f3 (.(
E e.gency
Sartor, Act} ss Section
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Preparedn
Rani logical Prot'ac ion and Emergency
Preparedness-Brh h
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and eva'luation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation
! and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response.
Facilities including: the Simulator Control Room; Technical Support Center;
Operational Support Center; and Emergency Operations Facility. The inspectio'n
also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the
licensee's post exercise critique.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. One
exercise weakness, concerning information provided to off-site emergency
agencies, was identified. Exercise strengths included command and control in
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-all emergency response centers and the control of damage control teams. The
licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee
successfully meeting most of their exercise objectives. Overall, the exercise
demonstrated an effective capability to protect the public health and-safety.
-in the event of a radiological emergency.
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REPORT DETAILS
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-Persons Contacted
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1.
Licensee Employees
D. Arndt, Simulator Controller
- D.- Bradshaw, Nuclear Services, Operations
- W. Byrum, Supervising Scientist, Radiation Protection
- M. Cloninger, Technical Support Center (TSC) Lead Controller
- G. Courtney, General Office, Radiation Protection (RP)
J. Dial, Nuclear Control Operator
- G. Gilbert, Safety Assurance Superintender't
- M. Greene, General Office,. Corporate Communications y
B. Hamilton, Operations Superintendent
- B. Hasty, Emergency Planning (EP) Director
C. Jennings, Emergency Operations facility (E0F) Lead Controller
G. Johnson, Scientist, RP
M. Lackey, Nuclear Instructor
J. Lukowski, Simulator Control Room (SCR) Lead Controller
- T. McConnel, Station Manager / Emergency Coordinator
-*T. McHeekin, Site Vice President
G. Mitchell, Operations Support Center (OSC) Lead Controller
J. Pressley, Shift Supervisor
- J. Reavis, EP
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included-
engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,-technicians,
and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. VanDorn, Senior Resident Inspector
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- T. Cooper, Resident inspector
2. Exercise Scenario (82302)-
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions _had-been made to test the integrated capability and a major -
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portion of the basic elements existing within the-licensee's Emergency _
Plan and' organization:as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR_50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,. -
Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and-
was discussed with licensee representatives. The: exercise scenario was
well-organized, detailed,'and adequate to exercise the participants.
The scenario -sequence of events made the emergency classification
activity straight forward, however, the scenario kept the Emergencyl l
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Organization busy and thinking of courses to protect the reactor. The
scenario allowed the staff the opportunity to prevent core damage and-
the players were successful in accomplishing the task. The scenario
utilized the staff in resolving emergency problems until the exercise
was terminated.
One prompt was identified during the exercise by a controller in the
TSC. The prompt was made while the EOF Director (ED) in the EOF and the
Emergency coordinator (EC) in the TSC were discussing whether to go to a
Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency. Each time the TSC team
mentioned a General Emergency classification, the (e croller vehemently
shook his head. The controller in the TSC then toh .he TSC players,
"For scenario purposes, do not classify the event as a General
Emergency." The ED, in the EOF, told the TSC EC that the classification
would be Site Area Emergency, but the TSC should continue checking the
classification. This prompting was unnecessary because the remaining
scenario events would not have been appreciably changed by a General
Emergency classification. The prompting affected play, in that, the TSC
players stopped reviewing events for emergency classification upgrade.
The inspector reported that the proper action would have been to allow
the players the opportunity to make the classification decision. -The
inspector determined that the Controller / Evaluator prompt had not
impacted the players ability to demonstrate proper emergency
classification. The inspector discussed the importance of proper-
controller actions with licensee management and the controller. The
licensee did not identify or commit to any specific proposed corrective
action to prevent recurrence. However, the licensee did agree to
emphasize the importance of controller rules during future drills and
exercises.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and
- that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as raquired
l by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and
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specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The_ inspector observed that the casite and offsite emergency
organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key
organization positions were clearly defi_ned in approved pl_ans and
implementing procedures. ,
No violations or deviations were identified.
-.4. Onsite Emergency Organizction'(81301)
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The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine
that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
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defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility
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acc1 dent response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section ll B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization
was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing
actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that staff
were available to fill key functional positions within the organization;
and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were
clearly defined.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and _
mobilize licensee response personnel. Augmentation of the initial
onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through
activations of the Emergency Psesponse facilities (ERFs). The inspector
observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency
organizations in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and the EOF. The inspector
determined that the licensee was able to staff and activate the
facilities in a timely manner. The required staffing and assignment of
responsibility was effective and consistent with the licensee's approved .
procedures. Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or
continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required.
The inspector observeu good command and control in all emergency
facilities. The operations staff and supervision did an excellent job
of maintaining control of facility. The Shift Supervisor was quick to
recognize that no procedure existed for shifting the switchyard
electrical lineup to power Station Auxiliary Transformer A from the B
train incoming supply for Unit 2. He also recognized that the evolution -
would have to be done with a dead bus method if B Diesel Generator (DG)
was not available, and that an undesirable plant trip might be caused
during the shift. A piant trip would have caused a station blackout,
which would have severely degraded the plant conditions.
The EC used two new good practices in the TSC to maintain effective
command and control. The work / task priority status board had been
recently modified to include the current status of all priority tasks.
This status board was well maintained and provided the EC with useful
information. The TSC system of " timeouts" was also very useful in
getting information out to most TSC players. The preparation period
provided just prior to each timeout prevented excessive disruptions on
individual phone circuits during the timeouts.
Operations Superintendent in the TSC provided the EC excellent support
and was proactive in determining and recommending appropriate operation
directions. He recognized that the only source of electrical power
available to the plant, following a reactor shutdown, would be the B DG.
He recommended starting and operating the B DG prior to shutting down
the reactor. When the DG f ailed to start, the staff knew that they
would need to maintain a low power level until an alternate source of
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power could be arranged, Had they shut the reactor down and then tried
tc start the B DG the threat to the reactor would have been more severe.. ,
The licensee promptly requested NRC guidance for situation', through the
Resident Inspectors, and was told to prepare a 50.54x review. A 50 54x
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was prepared for temporary operation outside Technical Specifications
limits. -
Command and Control in the OSC was excellent. A significant number of
damage control teams were dispatched in a timely manner with appropriate
prioritization and work controls.
No violations or deviations were identified. H
5. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine'that arrangements for requesting:and
effectively using assistance resources have been made, that. arrangements
to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's onsite E0F have l
been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the
planned response have been identified as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)s 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and
specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.C.
The inspector determined that State and local staff could be 1
accommodated at the E0F and arrangements for requesting offsite
assistance resources-were'in place. !
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area:was observed to determine that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear
facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),'10 CFR 50, .
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C and specific cr.iteria in NUREG-0654,
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Section II.D.
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McGuire Nuclear Station RP/0/A/5700/00,- Classification of Emergency,
revision dated January 23, 1992,--provided for~off-normal events to be
classified into one of the four emergency clas'sification categories.
The exercise began with the facility -in a Notification of Unusual Event
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(NOVE) emergency classification. The NOUE had been declared at
06:30 a.m., due to increased radioactivity levels in the reactor coolant.
system that was in excess of Technical Specification limits for more
than 48' hours.
The following classifications were made by the emergency response
organization during the exercise:
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o Alert declared at 08:49 a.m.- by the EC in the SCR for SG tube: leak
greater than 10 gpm.
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o Site Area' Emergency.decland at II:23-_a~.m. by the.ED in the E0F,
due to unisolable secondary steam leak. Primary to secondary SG
1eak rate was 65 gpm.
The designated EC in the SCR promptly and correctly used the procedure
to identify and classify the Alert as did the ED in the EOF to classify-
the Site Area Emergancy.
During-the Alert classif% tion the EC was distracted from his primary -
duty of determining ard announcing the Alert classification. A report
from Chemistry that the primary to secondary leak' rate had increased to.
33 gpm was received by the EC at about 08:44 a.m. The EC started doing
other things and directed another Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) to check
the classification. At about 08:49 a.m. the other SRO informed the EC
that the classification should be upgraded to an' Alert. The EC then got-
distracted by other chores and delayed announcing the c,assification
upgrade until 08:57 a.m. Because the TSC and OSC had already been
activated, as a " precautionary measure," the 13-minute delay in
classification did not materially affect this exercise emergency
response. In a different accident, this delay might- have been more -
detrimental. The delay also did not prevent the licensee from meeting- -
the 15 minute Emergency Notificatinn to State and local agencies. 1The-
message went out-at 08:58-a.m.
All emergency classifications were made in accordance with the
licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for
notification of State and local response organizations and emergency.
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup:
messages to response organizations was established. This area:was
further observed to assure that means .to provide early notification to
the population within the- plume exposure pathway were established
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to
~10 CFR- 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of
NUREG-0654, Rev.1, Criteria for Preparation of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support: of Nuclear.-Power Plants, in .
part, . provides _ guidance Notification Methods and' Procedures. . The
guidance suggests the need-to have procedures-that define'the content of
ini_tial and followup ~ messages to response organizations, and-the means
to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace
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within' the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. The guidance
lists the. contents of Emergency Notifications to include the type of
actual 'or projected release and estimated duration / impact times.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's. implementing procedures for-
notifying offsite authorities and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were
used to provide information concerning the simulated. emergency
conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to
alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
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Exercise Objective B. 3. was " Demonstrate the proper use of message !
format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the
state and counties."
The inspector observed the following problems with offsite notification
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messages generated during the emergency exercise. The problems are 4
grouped by section on the -licensee's Emergency Notification Form. '
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o Section 7, Emergency Description / Remarks: Messages 2 and 3
contained Emergency Description / Remarks which may not have been
clear to the public agencies. For: example:
Message No. 2. Technical Specification 3.4.8 Levels of I-131
greater than limits for more than-48' hours in the Reactor Coolant 1
System. Both units-related main bus lines de-energized in Modes i
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Message No. 3. Steam Generator tube leak greater than-10 gpm. l
Reactor coolant system subcoolina greater than 0 F. Both unit
main bus lines de-energized.
The underlined messages could have been less technical for-the
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offsite distribution. The inspector noted that the first three -
messages were initiated and transmitted by the Operations-staff in
the SCR.
o Section 8, " Plant Condition": Messages 2, 4, and'5-all-indicated -
plant _ conditions were stable versus improving or degrading.
However, the inspector noted the following:
Message No. 2, issued at 08:38 a.m.,-reported that both units
related main bus lines were de-energized. The site had lost
offsite power and plant conditions were degrading.
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Message No. 4, issued at 09:53 a.m., reported that the SG tube-
leak rate was' greater than-33 gpm. The leak rate had. increased -
from 10 gpm,.as recorded in. Message-No 3, and the plant-conditions
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Message No. 5, issued at 10:50 a.m.,_' reported SG tube leak rate-
i was 45 gpm and both Unit _l.0Gs were not available. The. plant
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conditions were degrading with loss of onsite power-capability-
from the Unit 1 DGs and increasing SG tube' leak. rate,
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o Section 13, " Estimate of Projected Offsitel Dose": The inspector
determined that there was some confusion, among players,- ~ l
concerning the release duration value reported on messages 5.
through 9. Following.the exercise the inspector determined that
the licensee had not made an estimate of release duration during-
the exercise. Instead, the licensee reported the duration time of
the existing release. The duration time reported was the time ;
interval from start of the release until the offsite dose
projection calculation was made. :
o Section 16, " Approved By": Licensee procedure RP/0/A/5700/01,
Notification of Unusual Event, Rev. O, dated July 22, 1992, stated
in Section 2.1.1, the EC shall approve Emergency Notification Form
for transmission. However, notification Message 2 was signed by:
the Assistant Shift Supervisor instead of the EC.
Message No. 5, an Alert followup message, was sent at 10:50 a.m.
and the message transmission verification _was not completed until
13:13 a.m. This took 23 minutes to complete.
The numerous problems identified above were minor when considered
individually, however, in aggregate they indicate a general weakness in
the 1icensee's ability to provide clear and accurate-Emergency.
Notification messages to State and local agencies. In the previous
annual graded exercise, a Exercise Weakness (50-369, 370/91-15-01) was
-identified for failure to adequately describe to-offsite agencies the -
changes in emergency conditions onsite. The inspector determined that
the licensee had done a better job of reporting significant onsite
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events than_ in the previous. exercise and the open item would-be closed..
However, the errors made during the 1992 exercise were not limited to
one particular component of the Emergency.-Notification' message and-
indicate declining performance. The inspector stated that failure toy
provide clear and . accurate messages to the. State and local :acencies was
an exercise weakness.
ExerciseWeakness_50-369,370/92-25-01: ' Failure to provide clear and
accurate Emergency Notification messages to the State and' local
agencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed-to determine that provisions existed-for. prompt
communications among-principal response organizations and emergency-
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 rFR 50,' Appendix E,
Paragraph ILE, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F :
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the-
licensee's emergency organizations, and between the-licensee's emergency
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response organization and offsite authorities.
The licensee did experience some minor problems with communication
-equipment. The headsets used in the TSC faded in and out for persons. o
moving about in the TSC. There was also a computer data link problem
between the site and the EOF for plant aarameter information. -The
licensee identified the issues during t1eir critique process.
Players did a good job of transmitting drill messages and identifying
the messages as drill messages.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities
and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and
maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation-of key
ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and E0F.
a. Simulator Control Room
Overall, operations personnel adequately assessed the problems
faced during the exercise and their responses were timely and
appropriate to'the circumstances. The Shift Supervisor
demonstrated good command and control throughout the exercise.
Both reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of-
the normal. abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; and the
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures throughout the exercise.
The operations. staff worked well as. a. team. The inspectors noted
that the turnover briefing from the Shift Super visor to the 'EC--was
effective.
The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon request of the EC-
in the SCR. A Public Address (PA) announ;ement was made.to
activate the' TSC and OSC -at 08:45 a_.m. By ' Plan. and procedure, the
TSC was required.to activate-at. Alert. In this exercise, the TSC-
activated at NOUE as~is permitted. The NRC. inspector l questioned
-the lead TSC controller about premature activation and was
informed that this was.both prudent and customary. The.TSC and.
OSC were activated at._09:19 a.m. and the Station Manager assumed;
the responsibilities of the EC in the TSC at that time. The
emergency organization's response, to staff the TSC, was excellent
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with most of the TSC staff in the facility by 08:58 a.m. The TSC
was fully staffed by 09:03 a.m.
The inspector observed good command and control of the emergency
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organization. Technical assessment and. mitigation activities were -
aggressively and properly pursued by the TSC staff and periodic
briefings regarding the incident status and ongoing mitigating
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actions were frequently given. The support provided by the-
Operations Superintendent was excellent.
The floor plan of the TSC had been modified and opened up,
following the 1991 graded exercise. Some walls had been
eliminated and the changes made the facility look larger. The
floor plan seemed to be more efficient. Although improvements
have-veen made, the TSC facility wsrk space remains small. The
available space was efficiently utilized.
c. Operational Support Center
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The inspector observed the initial activation and personn61
response in the staffing of the OSC. Upon the direction by the EC
in the SCR, the OSC was activated, fully staffed, and functional
in a timely manner. The request for activation of the OSC was
announced at 08:45 a.m. and the OSC was activated at 09:19 a.u.
The OSC Supervisor was well qualified and assumed the
responsibility in a professional, organized manner. -It was
apparent that personnel were prepared to implement the necessary
actions requested by management to assist in the mitigation of
problems incurred during the emergency exercise. Tne OSC Director
informed OSC staff of plant and emergency status through frequent
briefings.
Repair teams coordinated with the TSC and RP before dispatch and
the teams were briefed on potential radiological conditions and
protective measures. RP technicians accompanied the teams.
The exercise scenario generated a lot of work for the OSC,. as
approximately 34 missions were initiated. The OSC was effective
in monitoring and controlling the-teams and-in responding to the.
simulated events.
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d. Emergency Operations Facility
Licensee procedure RP/0A/5700/02, Alert, Revision 0, dated May 21,_
1992, required the _EC to activate the EOF upon declaration of. an
Alert classification. The Alert declaration was made at-
e 08:49 a.m., and EOF activation was requested at about 09:03 a.m.
- The E0F was activated at 10:08 a.m., approximately_65 minutes
after the request'for staffing was made. The licensee's goal wts
to' activate the E0F within 75 minutes of notification. ' The1 E0F
was promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel.
The ED provided timely and accurate status updates to the-EOF-
-staff. Emergency classifications were timely and correct and good
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State interaction was observed in. Protective Action-
Recommendations (PAR) process.
The accident assessment staff was aggressive in their support to
the plant staff in recovering electrical power to the station,
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The EOF facilities were excellent and utilized accordingly. -The
inspector noted, however, that the dose projection status board
did not clearly specify release duration times or times of dose ,
determinations, As the dose status boards were updated the
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previous data was removed, making it difficult to observe trends
in dose information. The inspector discussed the issues with
licensee re)resentatives. The issues were included with others
identified ay the licensee's staff for review and disposition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10 Accident Assessment (82301)
- This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, '
and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Apnendix E, Paragraph IV.B.
and-specific criteria in NUREG-0654,.Section 11.1.
The accident assessment-program included an engineering assessment of
plant status and assessment of radiological hazards to both 'onsite and'
offsite personnel resulting from the-accident. The operations and
engineering staff in the TSC and EOF did an excellent job of mitigating
plant conditions during the scenario-accident. ,
Exercise Objective 14 was " Demonstrate the ability to develop offsite
dose projections in accordance with procedures".
During the exercise the dose assessment staff had some problems -
reporting projected offsite. radiological dose on status boards in the
E0F and on Emergency Notification message forms. The inspector
determined that the licensee had made the- proper dose calculations using
approved procedures. However,-the licensee was' using a computer to make
the dose calculations' and the computer was not sorting the resultsiinto
the. correct position on.-the licensee's printout. .Therefore, some of.the-
-offsite dose projections posting-in.the EOF;were incorrect. The.
-inspector determined that.the licensee had not provided. projected dose
information to offsite agencies. Instead the licensee-provided
cumulativa dose information.
Another problem concerning accident assessment had :to do with -
determining and reporting release duration. . Section' 13- of the
licensee's Emergency Notification Form, " Estimate-of Projected Offsite
Dose", provided a location for recording the " Estimated Duration".- The
inspector determined that the licensee was recording the . interval. from
the start of the release to the time of dose and dose rate calculation
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instead of the estimated release duration. Since the quantity of the-
radioactive release was low and did not pose a significant threat to the
publi.c, the release duration was not of significant consequence to the
public, However, the estimate of expected release duration would have
been important to offsite officials in their protective action decision
processes had the source term been significant. The inspector reported
that the licensee should make some attempt to estimate the duration of
the release and make dose projections based upon that estimate, in
cases where the extent of the release would be unknown the licensee
should make a dose calculation on some default release ti,ne useful for
emergency planning. The licensee planned to evaluate the offsite_ dose
assessment process and improve the procedures so that the nrocess was
clear. The inspector stated that a review of the dose assessment
procedures for reporting offsite dose, for information on Emergency
Notification messages would be reviewed with licensee corrective actions
for the Exercise Weakness 50-369, 370/92-25-01, identified in
Paragraph 7.
No violations or deviations were identified. I
11. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were
developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers,
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in
The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency
procedures for formulating PARS for offsite populations within'the
10-mile emergency planning zone. No PARS were required for the
exercise, which did not progress beyond a Site Area Emergency. However,_
the licensee made recommendations to the State. The recommendations--
were to shelter 'in place four zones (L, M, B, and C) in the plume path.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the
Alert declaration by conducting-a personnel accountability of those
personnel inside the protected area. The site accountability process
was achieved and reported within 30 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Radiological Exposure Control .
This area wa: observed to determine -.that means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with Environmental Protection- Agency
recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
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The TSC did not follow good radiation protection procedures in
attempting to maintain the TSC and the TSC personnel free from ,
radioactive contamination. Some problems identified included: ,
o lhe personnel frisker was not made available until 26 minutes
after the report was received that a safety valve on the steam
generator, having tube leaks, was discharging to the interior- '
doghouse. The report indicated that a radioactive release to the ,
site area was. occurring, ,
o The aersonnel frisker was initially placed well inside the entry-
to tie TSC. Despite an announcement by the EC and the placement
of placards on the doors, two TSC personnel exited the TSC and
returned without frisking themselves.
o After the announcement, "No eating or drinking until further 3
notice," was made, one TSC member was noted to be eating at
12:24 p.m. The above order was not rescinded or modified even
20 minutes later when everyone str.rted eating . lunch. .
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o No portable air samples were taken in the TSC.
The inspector determined that the licensee did not have any
predetermined radiological actions for the facility, such as; the setup :
of a radiation control boundary, limited facility access )oints or
specified monitor locations. The issue was discussed witi licensee
personnel, however, the licensee did not commit to any specific
corrective actions. The inspector stated that a review of_the _
licensee's radiological control activities and procedures shall be made-
during the next graded exercise as an Inspector Follow-up -Item IFI 50-
369,370/92-25-02.
No violations or deviations were identified,--
13. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to-
determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise
wera brought to the attention of management and documented for-
corrective action pursuant to-10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph.IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
- Section II.N.
. The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players- - .
immediately following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers
and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal
critique to management on October 15, 1992 _ The critique. process, - - -
including tne critique to management, was well organized and included =a
review of the objectives that had been established for demonstration '
during tM exercise. Issues identified during thel exercise were
discuswd by licensee representatives-during the critique. Licensee-
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action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC
inspections. The licensee's critique addressed both substantive
deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the critique was
consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above
and considered a program strength.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Action on Previous Inspection findings (92701)
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-369, 370/91 15-01: Lack of information on
emergency notifications concerning status of several emergency events.
The inspector reviewed the licensee response dated September 11, 1991
and observed the licensee making Emergency Notificr* ions during the
exercise. During the 1992 annual graded exercise L i licensee
demonstrated improvement on reporting the changing ( mditions on
Emergency Notification messages. However, the inspector noted that
there were additional problems identified during the 1992 graded
exercise with other areas of message content. This item was closed, but
a new Exercise Weakness identifying other issues concerning Emergency
Notification messages was identified. (See Paragraph 7)
15. Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on October 15, 1992. The inspector
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, including the
exercise weakness. The licensee did not identify any such documents or
processes as proprietary. Dissenting comments were not received from
the licensee. Licensee management was infermed that one previous open
item (listed in Paragraph 14) was reviewed and considered closed,
item Number Descrintion and Reference
50-369,370/92-25-01 Exercise Weakness: Failure to provide
clear and accurate Emergency Notification
messages transmitted to the State and
local agencies (Paragraph 7).
50-369, 370/92-25-02 Inspector Followup Item - Review the
licensee's radiolooical controls,
activities and procedures,
for emergency response facilities during
the next graded exercise.
(Paragraph 12)
Attachments:
x Exercise Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Time Line
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CONFIDENTIAL
INITIAL CONDITIONS
1992 AhNUAL EXERCISE
OCTOBER 14, 1992
0700
0700 Initial conditions
WEATHER FORECAST FOR 10/14/92:
70% CHANCE OF RAIN WITH THE HIGH IN THE MID TO LOW 50's.
AINDS FROM NORTHWEST AT 2-5 MPH. RAIN THROUGHOUT TONIGHT
AND INTO TOMORROW, WITH LOWS IN THE LOW 40's.
Unit 1 EOL
- Notification of Unusual Event made this morning at 0630 due.
to Tech. Spec. 3.4.8, levels of I-131 for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
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"B" S/G tube leak of 60 GPD. Tubo leak has been ongoing
and slowly increased by 10 GPD, exceeded 50 gp'. at 1:10 am-
10/14/92.
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I-131 DE Increased from 0.75 Uci/ml to 1.4 Uci/ml at 0630
on 10-12-92._ Since that time I-131 DE has been calculated
overy 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and remains at 1.4'Uci/ml. Swapped from-120
gpm letdown to 75 gpm letdown-in preparation for shutdown.
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Unit shutdown in progress from 100% power. .Present power
level is 50% and decreasing. Shutdown began at 0110'per
AP/1/A/5500/10 "NC System Leak Within The Capacity of Both
NV Pumps"_now at step 3A (Case 1) and OP/1/A/6100/03
" Controlling Procedure for Unit-Operation" is at step 2.6
of Enclosure 4.2.
- Chemistry continuously monitoring tube leak' viaIEMF33 until
unit is off line.
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"A" D/G tagged due to failure to start within 11 seconds,'
and a jacket water leak that became significantly worse.-
Maintenance is replacing a leaking cylinder (1L) liner and
IAE has recalibrated the speed switch. It-will be available
10-15-92 at about noon. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Tech. Spec.- (3.8.8.1 D)" to
run "B" D/G started at 1000 on 10/13/92.
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"B".D/G PT/1/A/4350/02B_due-before 10:00 AM. Scheduled to
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start at 9:00 AM. Perform manual-local start.
"A" RN. Pump down for oil sample. -Ready to clear tags.-
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of service. Tagged out on 10/14/94 ready to clear tags.-
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CONFIDENTIAL
0800 Exercise begins.
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0815 Loss of o'f site power occurs due to Yellow Bus- Dif ferential
- Generator decreases to inhouse loads.- (AP/1/A/5500/03)
" Load Rejection"
0830 Chemistry notifies the control room that the tube leak is'
now 30 GPM as monitored by EMF 33. ;
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PREDICTED RESPONSE
- ALERT should be declared based on > 10 GPM tube leak,
loss of offsite power, and subcooling greater than
0 degrees Fahrenheit.-
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- Enter AP/1/A/5500/03 " Load Rejection"
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- Conduct site assembly.
- Assemble offsite monitoring teams.
0900 Operations should be preparing to run the operable.D/G.
During the surveillance test the D/G trips on overspeed. 1
Maintenance and I&E dispatched to determine and correct the .
problem.
0902 "1B" D/G trips on overspeed
PREDICTED RESPONSE
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( - Dispatch Mechanical Paintenance and IAE ..
0900 Employee leaving "D-Con room" finds he is contaminated-
- PREDICTED RESPONSE- ,
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- Radiation- Protection will be dispatched to monitor and
ascist in decontamination.
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CONFIDENTIAL
0920 Hydrogen Pone] Alarm sounds due to Hydrogen purity
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- Dispatch a NLO to verify and evaluate alarm-
0930 Valve CF 35 gives a low nitrogen pressure signal alarm
(due to a malfunctioning pressure switch (.PS-4 ))
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- OSC should dispatch Mechanical Maintenance
- Mechanical Maintenance should request IAE assistance *
0950 Ops should be about to put SATB inco service. (Control this
stop to NOT allow in service). .
2000 Fire occurs at the Medical Facility .n the trailer.
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PREDICTED RESPONSE *
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Control room should notify the Offsite Agency _ Fire
Departments (Gilead and Cornelius) to respond to -
, extinguish a fire outside the McGuire -Protected Area
Fence.
1015 "B" centrifugal charging pump trips onLovercurrent relay.-
PREDICTED RESPONSE-
- NLO should request IAE
1020 Chemistry will report that the Waste Water Treatment Pond
is full and the restrooms must be closed.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- Chemistry should post signs on-each restroom indicating
it is closed and request-Port-a-Jons be delivered.-
- EOF should acquire Port-a-Jons and coordinato delivery
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Rod Control Non-Urgent Failure on Logic Cabinet in-alarm.
IAE has been notified.
Unit 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS
1992 ANNUAL EXERCISE
OCTOBER 14, 1992
0700
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No mode. Refueling outage and defueled.
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Busline "2A" is down.
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"A" D/G is down for 18-month PM/PT. Will be available in
one week.
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Busline 2B and "2B" D/r are available.
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28 ND is available
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2B RN, 2B KC, 2B KF are in service
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SATB still out of service f rom being hit by a vehicle 11
couple of weeks ago. New estimate of' availability is in 1
week.
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1030 "B" train VC/YC chillers trip on low oil pressure.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
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NLO should be dispatched to verify and evaluate- i
alarm and request Mechanical Maintenance assistance '
- OSC should dispatch an HVAC crew.
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1100 Increase in S/G tube leak to > 55 GPM 1
1105 Safety valve SV-14 falls 100% open resulting in an onsite
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radiological release.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
- Dispatch NLO to identify source of release
- Dispatch Mechanical Maintenance to evaluate valve
- Dispatch RP for onsite and offsite monitoring
NOTE: On-site radiological data will be available and' '
given as monitoring is completed throughout the
exercise.
1105 Medical Facility request assistance in salvage of medical
equipment and replacement of supplies.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
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- EOF should acquire assistance and _ order necessary-
supplies
1130 Loss of SAMPLE FLOW on 1EMP36L due to motor burned up.
j PREDICTED RESPONSE
- IAE and RP should be dispatched:to evaluate and repair
1140 EOF Director is informed-that 10'NRC personnel will be-
coming to-the EOF
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PREDICTED RESPONSE
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- EOF should make arrangements for transportation from
the airport and hotel / motel accommodations. .
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-1205 Unit 1 Turbine Building Sump Pump 1A fails to start due to
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motor failure.
1206 Unit 1 Turbine Building Sump Pump 1B will not: start
Manually.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- Dispatch NLO to TB Sump to evaluate and correct
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- NLO request assistance from IAE
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- IAE request as- cance from Mechanical Maintenance
- RP dispatched to survey for radiological activity
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1215 Medical emergency in the Auxillary Building-Tool Issue-
Room. Worker suffers a back injury.
PREDICTED RESPONSE
- Dis' patch the MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team)
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- Decontaminate employee
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Escort employee to McGuire Medical Facility for
evaluation ,
NOTE: Recovery will continue during this time. This will
involve a point where.we are required, by Tech Spec to
trip the generator. If the generator is tripped at
this time we would be left with NO power to Unit 1. The-
decision will have to be made to either:-Hold to change
the procedure, trip and loose power,. or invoke 50.54X.
After this decision is made various power sources--
will become available that are being repaired during the
scenario. *
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