ML20127N987
| ML20127N987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1985 |
| From: | Marinos E NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM) |
| To: | Williams N CYGNA ENERGY SERVICES |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8505230668 | |
| Download: ML20127N987 (13) | |
Text
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Distribution 1 (D5ck E File 50-445/4469 NRC'PDR ^ ~
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R. Keimig LPDR J. Calvo PRC System R. Bangart NSIC J. Axelrad gy 3M LB#1 R/F (K. Bauman)J. Liberman CPP R/F (V. Noonan) D. Hunter, Reg. IV CYGNA Energy Services M. Rushbrook D. Eisenhut 101 California Street J. Stefano C. Haughney Suite 1000-S. Burwell Service List San Francisco, CA 94111-5894 0 ELD
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ATTN: Nancy H. Williams, Project Manager o a R. Heischman
Subject:
Request for Information on Phase 4 s
Independent Assessment y
re fha
Dear Ms. Williams:
We have received your submittal of April 29, 1985 with preliminary results of
-your independent assessment of the CCWS, in the areas of Mechanicaland Electrical systems and have performed a limited review of that information.
In order, however to better understand your technical effort we request response to_the enclosed questions.
To best' utilize the information requested we would like receipt of your responses on or before May 7, 1985.
For any clarification regarding this request, please contact me at (301)492-9439.
Sincerely, Evangelos C. Marinos, Deputy Electrical / Operational Group Comanche Peak Project cc: w/ enclosure J. Redding, TUGC0 J.' Ellis, CASE J. Beck, TUGC0 W. Horin (Bishop, Liberman et al.)
___f-___________f._______________________f---_________f_____-__----___
NAME :EMarinos:pf :'
'DATE :5/J/85-0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l,
8505230668 850503 PDR ADOCK 05000445 l
A PDR
MAY 3 1985
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Questions for CYGNA on Mechanical Systems 1)
List the documents used to develop the checklist.
i 2)
In your inspection what is the status of the FSAR? Was it considered a design document by Gibbs & Hill?
. 3).
List the calculations reviewed during the inspection.
4)
List the drawings reviewed during the inspection.
5)
Describe the method used to review calculations.
6)
Breakdown (in percentage) the time spent at Gibbs & Hill, N.Y., site, TUGC0 offices, Westinghouse and home office.
7)
Describe how the Mechanical Systems aspect of the design was inspected for compliance with the design control attributes described in ANSI-N45.2.11.
8Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI-N45.2.11.</br></br>8" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.)
Describe how the correctness of calculational methodology was ascertained, (e.g. runout flow and NPSH )*
R 9)
Describe how the walkdown played a roll in the overall scheme of the inspection.
- 10) Describe how the venting scheme for the CCW Surge Tank was considered to j
satisfy single failure.
- 11) What detailed technical check's were conducted on the calculations reviewed?
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.13) Did Gibbs & Hill have a scheme to identify safety-related calculations and was there a requirement to periodically review / update them?
- 14) ~ Describe how the inspection verified the inclusion of certified vendor infonnation in the design?
j
.15) Explain how the inspection verified the adequacy of the surge tank size to accommodate changes in the system water inventory due to temperature change and system leakage.
- 16) Explain how the inspection verified the adequacy of the 3/4 in, relief valve or the surge tank.
- 17) Explain how the correct sizing of the surge tank vent valve and vaccum breaker was verified by the inspection.
- 18) How was the basis for the 50 gpm system leak rate verified?
(MS-01 sht 10/10).
- 19) How was the basis for the 30 minute leakage period verified? (MS-01 sht10/10).
20)
Describe how from the vendor curve was used to determine a runout flow of 18,000 gpm.
(MS-01sht2/10)
- 21) Did your review of the CCW heat exchanger include all of the requirements of the FSAR comitment to TEMA not just the fouling factor (MS-01 sht2/10)? Explain what was reviewed.
- 22) How was the combination of flow orifices and/or balance valves for the various loads (RHR, CS, etc.) shown to be adequate to prevent flow starvation at any single load?
MAY 3 1985 23) Were the inputs and assumptions used in calculations reviewed to determine the need for subsequent verification? Describe your threshold on use of undocumented engineering judgements?
- 24) How was it ascertained that the break leakage values were conservative?
(MS-06 sht 2/4)
- 25) Describe the conservatism used in arriving at the 583 gpm leak rate (MS-02 sht 3/7).
Explain the conservatism of use crane 410 EQN. 3-21.
- 26) Describe the extent the CCWs heat removal capability was examined.
In particular describe the extent input values to CCWs calculations were verified (i.e., the containment spray heat exchanger heat load, the heat removal capability of the ultimate heat sink through the service water system,etc.)
MAY 3 1925 Question for CYGNA on Electrical Systems EE-01 Electrical CCW Pump Motor 1)
Voltage (a) Was voltage at motor reviewed or at bus (b) Did the G & H calculation include Utility data for system swings (min & max voltage) through both the preferred and alternate sources of offsite power?
Did the calculation include voltage dips caused by loading the D.G. when only the standby source is available.
Did the calculation include distribution equipment as-built data.
Was degraded grid voltage protection reviewed by CYGNA?
2)
(a) Was the transfer circuitry for the preferred, alternate and standby power supplies reviewed?
What source did CYGNA mean by the "back-up power source"?
3)
. Relaying (a) What is the basis for the G & H relaying recommendations?
Was the applicable motor data reviewed (e.g. thermal damage curves, acceleration data at min and max voltage).
(b) Was the Short Circuit Calculation reviewed for correct results and was the input data reviewed by CYGNA?
(c) Was the coordination of the CCW pump motor breaker checked with the three incoming breakers?
(f) Was the basis for the en~vironmental and seismic data in the switchgear spec confirmed by CYGNA and reviewed in the qualification report?
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MAY 3 1985
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Cable
-(d) Did motor spec include electrical data such as minimum starting voltage and minimum accelerating time at minimum and maximum voltage?
(e) Was the routing of the power and control cables reviewed for voltage level separation?
(g) 6.9kV power cable is not limited by percent fill but by spacing, how was this reviewed.
(j) Was the basis for the environmental and seismic input to the motor spec confirmed by CYGNA and reviewed in the qualification report?
5)
Pump Control (a) Were the isolation relays confined to coil to contact isolation or were they qualified also for contact to contact isolation.
(b) Was the pu'np control inoperable circuit reviewed by CYGNA for completeness for such things as control switch position, control voltage availability, breaker in correct position, service water system available etc.?
(c) Where is the single failure of the Loop A/ Loop Isolation valves discussed.
6)
Alternate Shutdown (a) Was the alternate shutdown circuit provided with an alternate power supply?
7)
(b) CCW/SWP pump interface will (a) the CCW pump start the SSW pump or (b) the SSW pump start the CCW pump? If (a) is true, has this been reviewed with the DG Loading.
(c)
If one CCW loop is nonnally shutdown, are the UPS A/C unit and the nuclear chilled water system 100% redundant and share a comon distribution system to provide cooling for the Class IE Switchgear and Class 1E motors.
o MAY 3 1985 EE-02 CCW Electrical Valves General - Entire discussion does not address the containment isolation valves or the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooler isolation valves.
l i
l 1)
(a) Was the MOV voltage confinned at the motor for starting an running condition.
(b) Did CYGNA confirm that ALL de loads would operate at 90 volts.
Why was the non IE panel XD2-3 included in the review?
Was the voltage drop in the de system reviewe< to other equipment such as Inverters and Switchgear?
2)
(a) This item addressed the connection of the battery and battery charger to the de bus but did not address the capability of this equipment to supply the design load or the surveillance required to prove the availability to perform its safety function.
l 3)
(a) Was the short circuit checked by CYGNA or just the results.of the calculation compared with the MCC spec.
(b) Does the referenced spec cover both the de bus and the de power panelboard.
l Did CYGNA review the short circuit calc for the panelboard and confirm that the short circuit rating was a DC rating.
(c) Are the overload contacts used to protect the motor during periodic testing as required by R.G. 1.106?
(d) Was the setting criteria and actual selection of the overload heaters (used for alarm and/or protection) reviewed by CYGNA for accuracy and basis. Were these in agreement with the MOV vendor's recomendation for thermal protection.
l (e) Was the basis for the environmental and seismic requirements for the MCC and DC equipment specs reviewed by CYGNA and included in the Qualification Report?
F-I blay 3 1985 j J
4)
Valve Power and Control Cable (a) Was the basis for the G & H allowable cable length confirmed by CYGNA?
Did G & H include MOV starting current in the voltage analyses?
How does the G & H calculation / analysis handle the loads inside containment where more than one cable is involved such as CCW valve HV4696.
(c) Does the G & H ampacity calculation include deratings for higher ambients (such as inside containment) flame retardents and fire barriers Tray covers on cable tray (d) Was the Limitorque Data reviewed for other electrical data such as locked reactor current and stroke time.
(e) Was the valve specs also reviewed for electrical inputs such as AC l
voltage range, minimum starting voltage, minimum and maximum de voltage, termination requirements including limit switch and operator environmental conduct seals, and contact ratings?
(f) Was tray voltage level confirmed for cable routing in accordance with FSAR 8.3.1.4.3?
-(h) Was the tray fill basis checked by sampling the actual cables in a
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given tray section and hand calculating the percent fill.
Was this done for power control and instrument trays which have different fill restrictions.
Was the basis for the instrument tray fill limit reviewed.
(1) Was the 600 volt power cable specification reviewed?
Did the review include a determination of the required insulation level because the 480 volt system is ungrounded and not tripped on grounds.
Was the cable manufacturer's cable data reviewed and compared to design documents.: a) Cable outside diameter vs. tray fill and ampacity cales. b) maximum pulling tension and side wall pressure vs installation spec. c) cable repair and splice criteria.
MAY 3 1985 (k) Did the power operated valve specification also cover the valves inside containment with its harsh environment.
Did the valve spec provide radiation valves for different plant I
areas.
5)
(a) Was the qualification of the " qualified isolator" reviewed by CYGNA?
(b) Did CYGNA question why valves HV 4512 and HV 4514 were not monitored the same if they perform the same function to isolation the CCW A Loop from the B Loop?
Why are valves HV 4572 and 4574 not included in R.G. 1.47 monitoring to alarm loss of the RHR and containment spray cooling capability?
(c) Valve RV-4508 does not have a Train 8 counterpart as implied by an x in the "yes" column.
6)
(a) Was the basis for the CCW alternate shutdown report input reviewed?
7)
Functional Requirements Was a FMEA performed on the control circuits?
(b) Does a sufficient deadband exist on the CCW pump recirc. valve flow control.
(c) Was the basis for the partially open setpoint of valve HV-4572 reviewed for interdiscipline interface.
Does this agree with the actual setting.
(e) Does an interlock exist to isolate the safeguards loop or. surge tank lo lo level which could be caused by a break in the non-safeguards section of CCW.
(f) Document whose analysis forms the basis for removing the high radiation interlock on valve RV 4508.
MAY 3 1985 t EE-03 Electrical CCW Instrumentation 1)
Was the Post Accident Monitoring equipment included on the EQ list.
(b) Does specification 2323-MS-622 cover all temperature elements inside and outside containment.
are the temperature elements RTD's or thermocomples (T/C) If the TE's inside containment (on the CCW system, etc) are T/C how are they brought out through the electrical penetrations?
4)
Instrument Power Sources review was not completed in the checklist.
Was the correct train associated power used?
Were voltage and current requirements of both the instrument loop and the electronics rack reviewed?
Was Class 1E/non IE isolation in the rack electronics reviewed?
Was the Rack supplied by a UPS and was the capability of the inserter reviewed?
Checklist states that #12 conductors are used for instrument cable but list EE-02, Item 4 i lists shielded twisted pair #16 cables.
IF #12 is in fact used are the cables in a shielded twisted pair form.
3y Other areas not reviewed but that should have been included:
1)
Electrical Containment Penetration required for the CCW system M0V, solenoid power and control and CCW instrumentation inside containment.
Penetration specification inputs for required ampacity, short circuit capability, environmental (incl. radiation) and Seismic l
requirements for normal and DBE conditions, termination requirements etc.
2)
Diesel Generator Capability to accept the CCW Pump What is the basis of the loading tabulation has the input data been reviewed has the Diesel Generator tests proven the capability of the unit to accept the design basis load.
has the actual motor data for large motor (480V and 6.9kV switchgear loads) been reviewed for starting kys and accelerating times and compared to the diesel generator loading calculation. Were differences justified?
3)
Field Design Changes in CCW (and other systems) l Do design changes initiated in the field conform to the project specifications, guidelines and calculations.
4) 480 volt motor protection and coordination (switchgear & MCC) with upstream breakers (not covered by CCW system).
l MAY 3 1985 i
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-Questions for CYGNA Phase 4 Study - Instrumentation & Control 1)
FSAR Table 7.1-2 sheets 1 and 2 list 10 CFR 50 App. A, G.O.C.'s, NRC R.G's, and IEEE standards applicatie to CCWs.
For each safety-related CCWs component, have the following items been addressed:
(a) GDC 24, Separation of protection and control systems?
Where?
(b) GDC 44, Cooling water Where?
(c) GDC 46, Testing of cooling water system Where?
(d) RG1.22, Periodic testing of protection systera actuation functions?
Wher.e?
(e) RG1.62, Manual initiation of protective actions?
Where?
(f) RG1.89, Qualification of class IE equipment for NPPs
'Where?
(g) RG1.100, Seismic qualification of elec. equip. for NPPS?
Where?
(h) RG1.118, Periodic testing of elec. power & protection systems?
Where?
(i)
IEEE279, Criteria for protection systems for NPGS?
Where?
(j)
IEEE338, Periodic testing of fiPGS protection systems?
Where?
2)
In CYGNA analysis EE-01(SA), Class 1E et ays are used as isolation devices.
Is this isolation always achieved by coil to contact isolation; conversely, are any instances contact-to-contact isolation?
Has every isolation device requirement in CCWS been assessed?
3)
What exact signals make up the " tripped and inoperable" system bypass / inoperative indication on SSII for CCWs pump train "A" as mentionedinEE-01(SB)andEE-02(SB)?
4)
What means have been provided"in the detailed CCWs pump control circuit
.to assure that the low pressure pump start interlock cross connections between redundant trains meet the requirements of IEEE 279, IEEE 379, and IEEE 3847 -Identify specific sensors, power sources, channel components and isolation devices, if used. Ref. EE-01(5C) and (78) and EE-03(2C).
MAY 3 ISa5
. 5)
-Describe how the modified normally open surge tank vent valve circuit satisfies IEEE 279 and IEEE 379 if a single power source is provided for this valve. Describe the valve position indications.
6)
For PAM instruments, compare required versus actual ranges and provide power source for the temperature and flow measurements.
Ref. EE-03(1A).
7)
Elaborate on whether all listed instruments in EE-03(3A) are Class IE, their setpoint values, and adequacy of these setpoints.
For items in EE-03(38), elaborate on setpoint values, actual ranges, and required ranges.
8)
In' appears that.the following items are missing from the CYGNA, Phase.4 analysis.
Please discuss their inclusion or exclusion:
(a) ESFAS circuitry for SI and loss-of-offsite-power used to actuate CCWs components.
(b) Supporting systems needed for CCWs operation in an accident situation.
(c)
Instrument rack and cabinet procurement specifications for implementation of design requirements.
(d)
Instrument sensing line physical separation requirements.
(e) Capabilities for periodic test in the design.
(f) Adequacy of protective action interlock setpoints.
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