Text

Proposed Tech Specs Revising Value of Soluble Boron Concentration in Refueling Canal,Rwst & SI Accumulators as Described in STP UFSAR & TSs
	ML20127M020
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	01/14/1993
From:	; HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20127L992	List: ML20127M020; ST-HL-AE-4281, Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80, Respectively,Changing TS to Revise Value of Soluble Boron Concentration in Refueling Canal,Rwst & in SI Accumulators as Described in STP UFSAR & TSs;
References
	NUDOCS 9301280084
	Download: ML20127M020 (38)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _

ATTACHMENT 3 Marked-up Current South Texas Project Technical Specifications-Reflecting the Proposed Revisions to the Refueling Water Storage Tank and SI Accumulators Allowable Boron Concentration Ranges (For Unit 2 Only Implementation) 9301200004 930114 PDR-ADOCK 050004 8 P

TSC\\92-343.001

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEt15 TAC AEN BORATE 0 VATER SOURCES - SINT00VN PAGE l OF 9 UM1 TING CORDJIlDN F0ILOPERAUDN 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, o,ne of the following barated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A Boric Acid Storage System gith:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 2900 gallonsg& b'l i M 3200 gallow fo r (L+.'t 2.,

2)

A minimum boron concentration of 7000, ppm, and 3)

A minicuta solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) withi 1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 122,000 gallons 4

for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons for MODE 6, and 2)

A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 ppqp7ee AYI#

lo dm~ LtOO ym o,J 3000 ppm he ll,a z.

APPLICABILITY: MODES S and 6.

ACTION:

['

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE Al3.R{I0NS o r, po s i ti ve, reacti v i ty; change s.

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SURVE1LlattCE_RE031REMENIS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

a.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water,_

b.

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it c.

is the source of borated water.

500111 T[XAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-13

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ATTACHMEp T 00 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING ST4iL-AE-2-l PAGE { OF '[

7; UMITIRG_CORDIL10N F0lLDPERAUDN 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, th.e following borated water source (s) shall be OPERA 8LE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2 for H00ES 1, 2, and 3 and one of the fol-lowing borated water sources shall be OPERABLE as required by Specifica-tion 3.1.2.1 for H00E 4:

a.

A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 27,000 gallons, 2)

A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65*F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 4S8,000 gallons, and J'

2)

A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 pp g O c M I M belv<e^ 2fco g.- a d 3coog m 4r A P 2..

j APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

4

' one o.the Boric Acid Storage System.inoperabic and being used as With a.

f the'abbUe're' quired borated. water sources, restore the

~

system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least 110T STAN0BY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SliUT00VN. MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200 F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SOUlH ll XA5 - U4115 1 & 7 3/4 1-14

ATTACHMENT REAC1]VITY CONTROL SYSTCitS

- ST-H!. AE. (f l. I PAGE ( OF (j S1!RVEILLMCE_Rf91RD!ENTS 4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

Verifyingtheboroncancentrationinthewater, a.

b.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it c.

is the source of borated water.

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ATTACHMENT D 3/4.5.3-ACCUMULA10RS 23I

. ST.HL $OF%('1 PAGE 4 a

q LIMIIING COBD111DN_EDR OPEfLG10N 3.5.1 Each Safety,7 Injection System accumulator shail be OPERABLE with:

The iso 1'ation valve open and power removed.

a.

b.

A contained borated water volume of between 8800 and 9100 gallons,

, A boron concentration of between 2400 and 2700 ppe and c.

d.

A nitrogen c'over pressure of between 590 and 70 psig.

APPLICABILITY:. MODES 1, 2, and 3^.

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ACTION:

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'b a.

With one accumulato'r inoperable, except as a result of a closed-isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required lim.its, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within I hour or be,in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the follow-ing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either open the isolation valve within I hour or be in at

' (,

least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer ~

pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

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c th tration of one accumulator outside"the required limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required. limits within 72 hou'rs or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer pressure to less.than 1000 psig.within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SilEE111.ANCLREQUJREMEES

$ 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

9 a.

At 1 cast once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by:"

l 1)

Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated:

water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and I.

2)'

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve.is open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the baron concentration'of the accumulator solution;'and

Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig, SOUTH' TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-1 l

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. _ _ _. _. - _ ~., _. _. - ___,.

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ATTACHME O

EMERGEllCY CORE COOLING SYSTElis ST.HL-AE-Yl PAGE ( 0 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

~

lltiLIJEG_COLQIILON FOR OEEIL&IION 3.5.5 The refuelind' Dater storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

A minimum contai,ned boraged water volume of 458,000 gallons, and a.

P b.

A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 ppmg & (14f-1 I

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

2 ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .and in COLD SHUTOOWN with.in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

_S_URVEI.LLANCE RE0_UIREMENTS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and a.

b.

Verifyiag the boron concentration of the water.

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1 500111 TEXAS - UNils 1 1. 2 3/4 5-10 e

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E 3/4.9 REFUEllNG OPERATIONS g)

E o 0F q 3/4.9.1 BORON JONCENTRATION klMITING_CQNQ11L0lLE0ROPERAT10N 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; -

either:

a.

AK f 0.95 or less, or eff 4b N 1 b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2500 ppmo APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.*

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or cqual to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron eff concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2500 ppm,, whichever is the more restrictive.

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,5URVEILLANCE REQVJ1EMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.

Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

t 4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-110B, FCV-111B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or l

electrical power at least once per 31 days.

l

The reactor shall be main' ained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

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l SOUTH TEXA5 - UNIIS 1 & 2 3/4 9-1 l

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i ATTACHMENT 1 i -

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PAGE OF 9 i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DASES -

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The most negative-HTC value, equivalent to the most positive moderator i-density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analysis to nominal operating conditions.

These corrections involved:

(1) a conversion of the MDC used in the FSAR analysis to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with i

temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences-in MTC observed at EOL, all rods withdrawn, i

RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod insertion,' axial power skewing, and i

xenon concentration that can occur in nominal operation and-lead to a significantly more negative EOL MTC at RATED THERMAL POWER.

These corrections transformed the MDC values used in the FSAR analysis into the limiting E0L MTC value specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR). The 300 ppm surveillance MTC value specified in the COLR. represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of.-300 ppm i

equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making these corrections l-to the limiting MTC value.

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning-and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains

~

within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the l

reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

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3/4,J.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATJRE FOR CRITICALITY fhis specification ensures _that the reactor will not be made critical,with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 561*F.

This limitation i

is required to ensure:

(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range,-(2) the-trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of.being.in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT NOT temperature.

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3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS l

The Boron. Injection System ensures-that negative reactivity control'is ava,ilable during each mode of facility operation.

The components required-to j

perform this function include:

(1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps,

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(3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency i

power supply from~0PERABLE diesel generators.

j:

With the RCS average temperature above 350 F, a minimum of two. boron injec-

~

j-tion flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event i

an assumed failure renders one'of the. flow paths incperable.

The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from-expected operating conditions of _1.75% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to

' 200 F.

The maximum expected boration capability requirwnt cccurs _ at EOL #rce full pm aquilib* vomer conJiiew and requires 27,000 gallons of-7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage _ system or 458,000 gallons of.2500 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST)

The RWST volume is an ECCS requi ement and is.more than adequate for the required.boration capability.

Fo r-LM t 1 (2 800PM 'I'* W #

SOUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2

~ B T/4 1-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

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ATTACHMENT RfACilV11Y C0ffiROL SYS1[MS o

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h DORA110N SYSTEMS (Continued)

> -f, I With the RCS temperature below 350"f one boron inicction flow path / source li isacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsIdcrationonthebasisofthestable I

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reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting 9

(M CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path / source becomes inoperable <

v 1he limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the hg Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required ii OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350'F provides ah Jrance that a mass addi-

~

(d tion pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boration capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a variable SHUT 00V4 MARGIN based on the results of a boron dilution accident

~

analysis where the SHUIDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of RCS boron concen-tration af ter xenon decay and cooldown f rom 200 f to 140 f.

This condition reqUtres either 290ITgallons of 7000 ppm borated w dwatgtheboricacid l

v storage system or 122,000 gallons of 2500 ppm bo er from the RWST for l

MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons of 2500 ppm borated wa from the RWST for_It0]LfL tt 3 1 (28vb[td6e y 2 The contained water volume limits include all U T e vater nut a a le because of discharge line locatien and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron conc a tration of the RWST i

also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.0 for the solution recirculated within containment af ter a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components, The OPERABitITY of one Boron injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 M0'"9LE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The s;

'ications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution imits are vaintained (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated acci-dont analyses are limited.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

Verification that the Digital-Rod. Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48,120, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 234, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

Since the Digital Rod position Indication System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 234 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position, 50VIH TEXA5 - UN1151 & 2 B 3/4 1-3

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" A1TACHME}T I

i ST.Ht AE-3/4.9 Rff0ELING OPERA 110NS j pAceC} OF #1 l

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ASIS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING onsure that:

i (1) the reactor will remain subtritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel.

These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumet for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses.

The value of 0.95 or less for K,77 ' includes a 4

i 1% ak/k conservative allowance for uncertainties.

Similarly, the boron concentration value of 2500 ppm or greate includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

The locting c sed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possi lity of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS.

Thi action prevent. flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths rom sources of unborated water._

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OID #

1. 0" 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABIL11Y of the Source Range Neutron flux Monitort snsures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect chan]es in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

(

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of i

I irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-li w d fission products.

This decay time is consistant with the assumptions used in the j

safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on contamment building peretration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioact.,e material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment.

The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a 4

fuel element rupture based u;)on the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status cr core reactivity con /itions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

l SOUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-1

ATTAC!! MENT 4 Marhod-up current South Texas Project Updated Final Safoty Analysis Report Reflecting the Proposed Revisions to the Refueling Water Storage Tank and SI Accumulators Allowable Boron Concentration Ranges (For Unit 2 Only Implomontation)

TSC\\92 343.001 l

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STPr.CS UI'SA11

_ /.TT/IltMENT T o

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9. W /xE y D I i

sumps are provided with safety class leak Ide,t{c'c,Elln0F, _

The S1 pump cubicle instrumentation that alarms in the main control roots such that operator action i

can be taken tg., isolate the Icak.

f A single passive failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3 6.

It j

demonstrates that the ECCS can sustain a singic passive failure during the The intact flow pat.h long term phase and still_. retain an intact flow path.

supplies sufficient flow to assure the core remains covered and effects the removal of decay heat. The procedure followed to estr.blish the alternate fiov d

path also calls for isolation of the failed component.

Figure 6.3 5 is a siinplified illustration of the ECCS..The notes provided with Figure 6.3 5 contain information relative to the operation of the ECCS in its various modes. The modes of operation illustrate <. are full operation of

'Ihe s e all ECCS components, e

?eg recirculation, and hot leg recirculation.

~

are representative of

pts. tion of the CCCS during acci' dent conditions.

1 Las times for initiatisn and operation of the ECCS are dependent upon pump startup time and the sequential loading of these motors onto the safeguard j

bus e s '. Host valves are normally in the position conducive to safety and If there is l

therefore valve opening tiine is not considered for these valves.

no power blackout, all pump inotors and valvo anotors are started sequentially In the I

upon receipt of the' SI signal and a load acquencer start permissive.

event of a loss of offsite power (IDop), a 10 second delay is assumed for DG startup followed by the loading of pumps and valves on the ESF buses according to the sequencer. The HOVs are applied.co the buses inmnediately, the 101S1 4"

These times refer pumps start in 5 seconds, and the IJISI pumps in 10 seconds.

4 to tiine.after the DCs attain rate'd speed. Accumulator inj.cction occurs immediately upon tho' RCS pres'sure decreasing to the operating pressure of t.he j

accumulators regardless of whether a Ihop has occurred.

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I Potentini fioron Pit 3.ipi t a ti on Boron precipitation in the reactor vessel can be prevented by a backflush of cooling water through the core to reduce boil off and the resulting increase tion of boric acid in the water remaining in the reactor vessel.

in concentrghecomplished by initiation of hot Icg recirculation at about /5 This-ac S t #( A 4 M 7.

hours following a LOClyfh v.,.f 3 Al /6 f ko 6Hovh a Six flow paths are available for hot Icg recirculation of sump water.

Three high and three lov head SI pumps can discharge to three hot legs with _ suction i

taken from the contaitunent sump. Normal hot leg recirculation procedures d

(i.e.. with all safety injection pumps availabic) provide for two high head and two low head pumps injec' ting water into the hot Icgs.

Loss of one pump or one flow path will_ not prevent hot leg recirculation since redundant flow paths are available for use. The remaining 1111S1 and LitSI pumps are aligned for cold leg recirculation.

6.3.2.6 Protection Provisions. The provislans taken to protect the systera from damage that inight re:: ult from dynarnic effects are discussed in Sectio,n 3,6.

The provisions taken to protect t.he systeta frorn missiles are discussed in Section 3.5.

The provisiom. to prot ect the - system from scismic d.una ge are discussed in Sections 3.7 3.9 and 3.10.

Therrnal stresses on the RCS are discussed in Section 5.2.

6.3.i5 Pevision O

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i STPEcs UrSAR 41T/ CliMENT f*6I I

TABL.E 6.3 1

' T HLJ E. 4 2,

EMERGEllCY CORE COObil1G SYSTEM 4 E k OF N,.

COMPONEffT PARAMETERS Accumuinters 3

Humber 700 Design pressure, psig

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Design temperature. *P 300 100 150 Operating temperature. *F 630 l

11ortaal operating pressure, psiS

$86 Hinimum operating pressure, psig 2,500 each Total volume, fts 1,200 Nominal water volume, ft8 1,300

]

l N2 volurne, fts 2,400 2,700 (uMi i)

Boron concentration (as boric acid), ppm 700 l

Relief valve setpoint, psig 2,700 - h000 liigh 11 cad Safety Inicetion Pumrq 1

3 Number 1,750 Design pressure, psig i

Design temperature. *r 300 800 Design flow rate *, gal /inin 2,850 l

j Design head, ft 1,600 l

Hax. flow rate, gal /inin 1,000 llead at snax, flow rate, it f' ~ "'"' *'#' ' Dif fer'ential he'iiY at sh'utof f, f E (tnax)'

N 3,700

... ~... ',< t 3

^

1,000 Hotor rating, hp Required HPSil at snax. flow rate, ft (tnax) 15 4

17.9 Availabic NPSil, ft Low licad Snfety Inicetion Pumt-1 3

l Humber 495 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, *r 1.900 Design flow rate. Sal / min 560 D'esign head, ft 2,900 3

Max. flow rate. Cal /inin 400 licad at snax. flow rate, ft 700 Differential head at shutoff, ft 400 Motor rating, hp_

15

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Required NPSil, ft (tnax) 19.0 Available NPSil, ft 4

4 d -Includes miniflow i

1 1:evision 0 6.3 31

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STPECS UrSAR k

ATT/LitMENT,l TABLE 6.3 1 (Continued)

ST.HL AE t/lb PAGE 3 0F J

DiERGEtJCY CORE COOL 1 tic SYSTDi 3..

G11PMENT TAPAtiEILES Residuni llcat Exchancers (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters)

Refueline Unter storage Tank 1

Number 531,000*

Design volume, gal 457.700*

liinimum volume, gal Atmosphmfc Notual pressure, psic Operating temperature, *r Above freezing (37'F min)

Design pressure, psig Atmospheric 120 Design temperature.

r, Boron concentratton 2,500 2,700 ((1 A I) l (as boric acid), ppm 2/oo -3, coo ((4J 2)

Motor Operated Valves Maxiinuta Opening or Closing Time a.

Up to and including 8 inches 15 see 11om. Size (in.)

b.-

Over 8 inches' 49 in./ min Volumes include ununcable volume, s

a eY b Vil

STPECS UFSAR 7

TABLE 6,5 3 o

M i /.CtI M ErjT. U

,T.HL /E t?-

JRPUT PARAMETERS TO DETERMillE 011 TOR off,lfOf l

SUMP SolJfT1011 AllD SPRAY 1,600 liigh head safety injection pump flow, sal / min 2,900 tow-head safety injection pump flow, gaifain 2,800 contaitunent spray pump flow, gal / min 11 umber of pumps in operation 3

liigh head SI pump 3

low head SI pump 3

Containment spray pump 28 UI Eductor suction flow, gal / min Concentration of 11aoll in tpray 30 additive solution, ut. t ul 2

ihtsber of Spray Additive Tanks delivering 486,100 RVST deliverable volume, gal 2,700 (ud d I y,g (ppQ RVST boro.n co. n. cent. ratio. n, t.~,pm p

..n 9,193 Accumulator water volume, each of 3, gal 2,600 (u. 'I d)

Accutnulator boron concentra' n, ppra 3,sco (p,ur2 626,000 Reactor coolant system water mass, Ib 1,550 Reactor coolant boron concentration, ppm is at the beginning of the delivery and is conservatively low.

1.

Flow rate The flow rate decrear.cn as the level in the tank falls.

spray addLLive tank outlet isolation valve 7.

Single failure is that one falls to open.

6.5-16

' Revision 0

STPccs urSAn i

AT T!Lt IMENT TABLE 6,5 4 ST Ht AE-N8 OF i

h 1HPUT PARAMETEllS_ TO DETERHillP MAX 1H1M vil POR M{

Simp S0lJJT1011 AtID SPRAY 600 liigh head safety injection pump flow, Cal / min 1.900 tow. head safety injection pump flow, gal ain 1,510 contaitunent spray pump flow. Cal / min fiumber of pumps in operation 3

itigh head SI pump 3

Low head Si pump 3

Containment spray pump U8 31 Eductor suction flow, gal / min Concentration of !!aoll in spray 32 additive s,olution, we. t 3

liumber of Spray Additivo Tanks delivering")

359,200 RUST deliverable volume,' gal

.4 2,500 (hit 1)

{

n,,RWSTg oron.. concentration.. ppm.

b

..g,*"

2 sce'( u ti2.)

~, *

-o -

f Accumulator water volume, each of 3, gal 8,770 2,400 (bd 0 Accumulator boron concentration, ppm 2,1ae t v--t O Reactor coolant system water mass, Ib 626,000 Reactor coolant boron concentration, ppa 1,550 1,

Flow rate is at the beginning of delivery and is conservatively high.

The flow rate decreases as the level in the tank falls.

2.

Single failure is that one' spray additive tank isolation valve falls to close at the end of the injec tion phase.

6.'s-17 nevision 0

MnfELTW5KK j

overhead crane servicing this area.

One by one, these shipping and the pivotal, fuel support using the containers are unstacked, their covers removed, horizontal to the stracture within the shipping container is elevated f roin the this is accomplished using vertical position.

In the new fuel handling area, In the new fuel inspection laydown the new fuel handling area overhead crane.

11tB overhead

.gA area on the operating floor, this is accomplished using the s

The various clamping devices securing the fuel assembly to the support N

The fuel assembly is lif ted from the shipping g $ u.yO crane.

structure are then removed.

Inspection activi':ies may now be conducted in container support structure;,-Alternatively, inspection activities may be conducted at n,%c;; u

5. ;

later time following transfer of the fuel to the new fuel storage pit.

oither areas.

MZOl Following inspection, unacceptable new fue'l assemulies are set as 4""

~-

handling tool, which is in turn attached to the hook of the riiB overhead dispositioning, the new fuel If the fuel was unloaded in the new fuel handlius area, essembly must be secured beneath the equipment hatch, released from the new crane.

fuel handling area overhead crane, and then engaged by the ritB overhead crane ruel end lif ted through t.he equipment hatch to the operating floor, fuel assemblies are either inserted into the new fuel storage racks in the new placed in the new fuel elevator which is located in the fuel storage pit, Those.

transfer canal, or placed directly into the Srp '(Cycle i fuel only).

assemblies placed in the neu fuel elevator are lowered to the bottorn of.the fuel transfer canal, They are then engaged by the spent fuel handling tool, The fuel handling which is in turn suspended froin the fuel handling machine.

machine either transfers the assembly to the spent fuel storage racks (before initial refueling) or to the FTS upender for transfer to the RCB for refueling The upender pivots the assembly to the horizontal position and operations.

fuel transfer tube to an upender the FTS fuel container carries it through the

[

inside the Containment.

The refueling pperation,follows a Et ueline Procedurer4 f

w9.1'.462.21 refueling operation.

prior to e-detailed procedure to ensure a safe, 'efficientas specified in the Technical initiating refueling, shutdown conditions are including Criticality protection for the refueling operation, Specifications.for checks of boron concentration, is specified in the Technical a requirement Specifications.

Protection against uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) bank' withdrawal f rom a r.uberitical condition is described in Section 15.4.1 and includes source-range, intermediate range, and power range high neutron flux trips.

The transient is assumed to be terutnated by the power range high' neutron flux (low setting) reactor trip.

Protection against uncontrolled boron dilution is described in Section 15.4.6.

The following significant points are assured by the refueling procedure:

1.

The refueling vater and the reactor coolant contain approximately 2.500 ppm boro This concentration is suf ficient to keep the core f

approxima ely 5 percent t4k/k suberitical during the refueling operations with all :ontrol rods removed and the core refueled to provide excess reactivity for operation to the next refueling outage suf ficier t

$ c % [ $ e v d 2,500 <f n I w W U2.

I n m ston o 11 12

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STPEGS UTSAR Y

ATTACllMENT i

ST UL AE y dl TAntI 9.1 4 PAGEfl0Fc)

!!SSS VEf1 DOR RECpfMEllDED SPECIFICATIO!JS_AND CUIDELillES i

FOR SPENT RfEL POOL VATER PllRIIT l

+

1 l

Sveelfiention Pernreeters 22$00 (Ud I)

I Boric Acid, ppm B h 2800 ((W it) j

$150 Chloride, ppb 1

$150 Fluoride, ppb i.

l Guideline Parameters 4.0 - 4.7 pit 0 77'T

$500 Aluminum, ppb l

Calcium + Hagnesium, ppb

$$00,

$250 Magnesium l, ;. f

..m..rr 'e s::.

i*

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1 4

1

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Revision 0 9,3,37 i

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STPECS UTSAR l

AT T,* Cl f MENT TAB 12 9.3 9 STHL/sE. q g l g11HicA1. AND V01EME Coimt0L SYSTEM - 11ESIGLftdMtfLTEM SOF Q,

)

i i

1 i

Generni 32 I

Seal vater supply flow rate, for 4 reactor coolant pumps, nominal, gal / min s

12 Seal water return flow rate, for 4 reactor coolant pumps, nominal, sal / min Letdown flow:

100 Normal, gal / min 250 (Unit 1) 2 M'aximum, gal / min 198 (Unit 2) s Charging flow (excludes seal vater):

80 4

Hormal, gal / min 230 Maximumu, gal / min 570 f

Temperature of letdown reactor coolant entering system, 'F 530 g,,,.

' Tempe'rature of chirging flow directed to

' ~

Reactor Coolant System. *F 115 Temperature of effluent directed to Boron Recycle System, 'F 450 Shutdown purification flow, gal / min 27,000 (modes 1 through 4)

Minimum amount of 44 boric acid solution required 2,900 (modes 5 and 6) (Ni ()

I to meet cold shutdown requirements 3,too ( %)q r a-( G ) UM 4 )

{

shortly af ter full power operation, gal 3,107 Haximum pressurization required for hydrostatic testing of Reactor Coolant System, psig 30 Concentrated boric acid design flow rate, gal / min Revision 2 9,3-89

,v---

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ATTACllMENT 5 Marked-up Current South Texas Project Technical Specifications Reflecting the Proposed Revisions to the Refueling Water Storage Tank and SI Accumulators Allowable Boron Concentration Ranges (Final Implementation) i t

isc\\92 343.001

- - -. _ ~..

MACilVITY C0lliROL SYSTCHS ATT/ItiMENT S GT !!L AE Ll T/

BORATED WATER $00RCES - SHUT 00Vil PAGE l OF 1.lMlll!!G_00H0lIJ0ft F0]LQEERaT.10ff 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, o,nc of the following borated water sources shall be

,j OPERABLE:

a.

A Boric Acid Storage System gith:

l A minimum contained borated wat.cr volume of490E5EHons[hcM3 1) z m t. 3 z o o g I1o 9.# r su et 2,

2)

A minimum boron concentration of 7000, ppm, and t

3)

A minimuta solution temperature of 65*F.

q b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) withi l

1)

A minimum contained borated wate'r volume of 122,000 gallons for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons for H0DE 6, and 2)

A boron concentration betwconh2500~jiph int 2700=pp Itse= Lod 1M i

bdm4 Lioo pf,m o l Toooppm,q:31 APPLICABILITY: H0 DES S and 6.-

ACTI0ft:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTE,RA, IONS or, positive react.iytty: changes..

T c,,.,

..c.,..

u i

SWNElllaf!CEEWIREMENIS t

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

i l

a.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, l

b.

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature.when it c.

i is the source of borated water.

i a

$0011t II.x/6 - UN115 1 & 2 3/4 1-13

1 AIT/ImtENTjh REACTIVITY C0f41ROL SYS1 EMS

~

ST l !'. AE.

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATif4G f' AGE 1.0F 9

7. ;

LililIllM_ Cat 0H101LfflL0ElMUD11 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE 3.1.2.6 as required by Specification 3.1.2.2 for H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 rud one of the fol-lowing borated water sources shall be OPERABLE as required by Specifica-tion 3.1.2.1 for H00E 4:

a.

A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 27,000 gallons, 2)

A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65"F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 458,000 gallons, and 2)

A boron concentration between.2500:ppmuanF2700:pp EM~f'~~

inytsIfan 2too y.- o-< scwg.esmitta f

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACT10th With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as a.

one'of the~abbve~re' quired borated. vater sources, restore the i

system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least liOT STA!4DBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTD0Vil.HARGIf4 equivalent to at 1 cast the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200 F; l

restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUT 00Wlf within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With the RW5T inoperabic, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STAf40BY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

4 I

f a

1 SOUlu IEXAs - unlis ] /. y jf4 3. j e, i

w. -

A1TTLHMENT REACilVITY C0l41ROL SYST[fts c.T-luc /-E-Y l

PAGCJ_OF SURVEJLUljJi[EEQlllBLMDlI5 4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at 1 cast once per 7 days by:

Verifying the 6oron concentration in the water, a.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and b.

Verifying the Doric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it c.

is the source of borated water.

3 4.

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i Soulti ICxAs - utilis 1 t, 7 3/4 1. i s l

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- 4 0-26 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C00 Lit 4G SYSTEMS A1TTLHMENT 5 NCE dOF t'%

ST.i tt. AE. Y 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS Y(

p tillLNG_f DNDIT10 tLIDR_0ff RAU.O N 5.5.1 Each Safety., Injection System accumulator sha11 be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolition valve open and power removed.

b.

A contained borated water volume of between 8800 and 9100 gallons,

c., A boron concentration' of between f400rMd=2706:

and d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 590 and 70 psig.

APPLICABILITY:. MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

.1-L 9

2

, 4hradi Af W% 2700p M 30ClO.fM br fad @,g ACTION:

With one accumulator inoperabic, exce'pt as a result of a closed a.

isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and r

reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the-follow-ing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one accumulator inoperabic due to the isolation valve being closed, either npen the isolation valve within 1-hour or be in at

{

Icast 110T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer ""

pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

. + '%'the: b.4:s:..~WL n*hW'W&V W%W%*'%%# ' *

.v -

With oron concentration of one accumulator outside the required c.

limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required. limits within 72 hou'rs or be in at least 110T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig.vithir) thq following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURYIllL6t!EE_RE09.lREMEt113

$ 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At 1 cast once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by:"

1)

Verifying, by the absence of alarms,-the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and 2)

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within G hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal-to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solutionf and

' Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

-SOUTH TEXA5 - UN]ls.1 1. ?

3/4 S*1

_ _ _. _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - - _. _ -. - _.._ _=_ - _ _ - _ __._ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _.

I d

i ATT/.CHMEf4T

%2 l El1ERGEf1CY CORE C00Lil4G SYST[l15 ST i ? 4 E-I

, !ZdM' Of 3/4.5.5 fttrVEtitiG WATER STORAGE TA!4K 4

f LI B1IlliG_C0HDll10llf0R_0ff R6U 011 3.5.5 The refueling'sater storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a

~

A minimum contai,ned borated water volume of 458,000 gallons, and a.

A boron concentration between E500:ppmuand 270UppyhEEtIGtkf b.

i Fre-brfum 2FooM-ed 3coofi c1GE5EE j

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTI0th With the RWST inoperabic, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least 110T STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SilVT00W within the i

following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

~

EDU3'flLLAUCf_REQulREMERIS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

Verifying the contained Lorated water volume in the tank, and a.

l b.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

. asa r

. :.r,.~ 4.:.v.

,,. W.: : w : ';

i l

a SOUHI T D:h5 01015 1 L ?

3/4 S-10

_~

. _ _. _ _.. ~, _ _.. - _, _

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TSI

--0018

__ AW C! NENT 6(

i ~

3/4.9 REFUElll4G OPERAT10l45 U rd L. AE.

f j

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCEllTRATI0il

_f0EE_h O i

LIMU.lliG_C014DIT10N f0R _0PERADON i

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coo' ant System and the refueling canal shall be maintaineo uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is meti -

cither:

1 A K*II of 0.95 or less, or a.

2500 y.

l b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to4500 ppm, Dhd-*

I APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.*

ACTION:

i With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and -initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm 1

of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K is reduced to less than or equal g 0.95 or the boron eff concentration is restored to greater than or equal to E5DT ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

f f' g g4-s u wep & 5=

SUBYE11LMCEJEQUJfiEMENU 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to; a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.

Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from j

its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

i 4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-1108, FCV-1110, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever-fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure holts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

i 50UlH ILXA5 - UNils 1 & 2 3/4 9-1

A1T/ CiMENT 6.

STrS/I I

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS F/M 7 CF f EU a

~

m--

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The most negative MTC value, equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC j~

used in the fSAR analysis to nominal operating conditions.

These corrections involved:

(1) a conversion of the MDC used in the FSAR analysis to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this J

value the large6t dif ferences in MTC observed at EOL, all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod insertion, axial power skewing, and l

xenon concentration that can occur in nominal operation and lead to a i

significantly more negativa E01 HTC at RATED THERMAL POWER.

These corrections transformed the HDC values t% J in the FSAR analysis into the limiting EOl MTC 3

value specified in the CORE OPEitATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR).

The 300 ppm surveillance MTC value specified in the COLR represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value.

3 The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient.hanges slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

1 3/4.1.1.4 HINIMUM TEMPERATJRE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 561*f, This limitation is required to ensure:

(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT NDT temperature.

I 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

The components required to perform this function include:

(1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 350 f, a minimum of two boron injec-tion flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTOOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.75% Mik after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum expected boration capability require..ient eccur3 e t E0 b -f-rw.

j fuP p ax cwPibrM vem conditivue ad resquires 27,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 458,000 gallons of ESUF ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

The RWST volu:e is an ECCS requi ment and is mcre than adequate for the-required boration

N capability.

p g ---~ -~~~ ~g &-

w1 W ennu

';h SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS I & 2

~

W i-2

~ Unit i - Amendment No.

27, 35 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

17, 26

ATT/LilMENT REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Of 3a JWSES BORA110N SYSTEMS (Continued) i af, '

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one boron injection flow path / source i

is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable W

reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting 9(y CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path / source becomes inoperabic.

W 1

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the q

)

Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required yj OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350 F provides assurance that a mass addi-s l

( 3 tion pres sure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

5 The boration capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a variable SHUTOOWN MARGIN based on the results of a boron dilution accident analysis where the SHVTDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of RCS boron concen-tration af ter xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.

This condition requires c~ither "*+9EM&of 7000 ppm borated wat the boric acid l

storage system or 122,000 gallons of 3 ppm bo ed water from the RWST for l

MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons of=2 Os ppm orated wa r from the RWIT for M@(M, j

p hlO 1@gp:r7/d*F 289ED Roo The contained water volume imits inc Iide allo Trtmvattt n ai a le because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

5(

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7,5 and 10,0 for the solution recirculated within cont ainment af ter a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and ninimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical sp tems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES 1he specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTOOWN MARGIN is main-Lained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated acci-dent analyses are limited.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

Verification that the Digital Rod. Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48, 120, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 234, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

Since the Digital Rod Position Indication System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 234 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

50UTil IEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 1-3 ga

/

A1T/C IMENT

't ST L /E. p f

I 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

~

D!iSEL _

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

(1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel.

These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses.

The value of 0.95 or less for K includes a 1% Ak/k conservative all b b uncertainties.

Simil ly, the boron concentration value of G506 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

The locking ci sed af the required valves during refueling operations precludes the nncei.lity of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS.

Thi action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths rom sources of unborated w h 4

UfY "

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subtriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission

products, lhis decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted f rom leakage to the environment.

The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are suf ficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

'l 50VIH lEXAS - UN1151 & 2 B 3/4 9-1

I I

x l

i 4

i

't ATTACllMENT 6

]

Marked-up current South Texas Project Updated Final Safety Analysis Report l

Reflecting the Proposed Revisions to the Refueling Water Storage Tank and SI Accumulators Allowable Boron Concentration Ranges (Final Implementation) 1 4

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STPECS UrSAR NENT

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'I The Si pump cubicle sumps are provided with safety class leak detection" L'_.

instrumentation that alartas in t.he main control roots such that operato can be taken tq., isolate the leak.

A single passivc failure analysis is presented in Tabic 6.3 6.

It demonstrates that the ECCS can sustain a single passive failure during the The intact flow path long term phase and set 11. retain an ir.act flow path.

supplies sufficient flow to assure the core remains covered and effects the removal of decay heat. The procedure followed to establish t.he alternate flow path also calls for isolation of the failed component.

Figure 6.3 5 is a sitrplified illustrction of the ECCS..The notes provided with Figure 6.3 5 contain inforration relative to the operation of the ECCS in its various modes. The tuodes of operation illustrated are full operation of These all ECCS components, cold les recirculation, and hot leg recirculation.

are representative of die operation of the ECCS during acci' dent conditions.

Las times for initiation and operation of the ECCS are dependent upon pump startup time and the sequential loading of these anotors onto the safeguard bus e s '. Host valves are normally in'the position conducive to safety and therefore valve opening time is not considered for t.hese valves.

If there is

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no power blackout, all pump tuotors and valve motors are started sequentially In the upon receipt of tho' SI signal and a load sequencer r. tart pertnissive.

event of a loss of offsite power (IDop), a 10-second delay is assumed for DC startup followed by the loading of pumps and valves on the ESP buses according to the sequencer. The HOVs are applied to the buses itumediately, the liHSI pumps start in 5 seconds, and the IliSI pumps in 10 seconds. These tienes refer to tiene.af ter the DCs attain rated speed. Accumulator injection occurs itamediately upon the RCS pres'sure decrear.ing to the operating pressure of the accumulators regardless of whether a IDOP has occurred.

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,,n I'.pqtential Boron Precipi tation Boron precipitation in the reactor vessel can be prevented by a backflush of cooling water through the core to reduce boil-of f and the resulting increase in concentr ion of boric acid in t.he water rernaining in the reactor vessel.

This r H ccomplished by initiation of hot leg recirculation at about K/08 hours following a 14Cg,GC~T itr#*n=m m'ay,ewam g Six flow paths are availabic for hot Icg recirculation of sump water.

Three high and three lov head Si pumps can discharge to three hot Icgs with suction taken from the containment sump. Normal hot leg recirculation procedures (i.e.. vith all safety injection p_ umps available) provide for two high head and two lov head pumps injec' ting vater into the hot legs.

l.oss of one pump or flow path vill not prevent hot les recirculation since redundant flow one paths are availabic for use.

The remaining liHS1 and 13151 pumps are aligned for cold leg recirculation.

6.3.2.6 Protection Provisions.

Tne provisions taken to protect the system f rom damage that might result froio dynarnic eff ects are discussed in Section 3.6.

The provisions taken to protect the system from inisslics are discussed in Section 3.5.

The provisions to protect the systew from seismic damage are discussed in Sections 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10.

Thermal stresses on the RCS are discussed in Section 5.7.

6.3-15 nevision O

1-STPECS UrSAR TABLE 6.3-1 A7 T,'LilMENT DfERCENCY CORE COOLIllo SYSTI'M r;T W AE 4 lff g pp q f&ff?O!!2 tit PARAMETERS t

i Accumulatorti s.

=

Number 700 Design pressure, psig 300 l

Design temperature, *F 100 150

r Operating tewporature, 630 Normal operating pressure, psig 586 Minimum operating pressure, psig 2,500 each j

Total volume, Its 1,200 Nominal water volume, ft8 1,300 112 volume, fts z w e,r 6 N Boron concentration (as boric acid), ppm 700 Relief valve setpoint, psig

)

2,700 - 3,000b '

llich itead Safety Iniection Puuns i

3 l

Humber 1,750 l

Design pressure, psig 300

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Design ternperature, *r 800

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Design flow rated, gal /ain 2,850 i

Design head, ft 1,600 Hax flow rate, gal /rnin 1,000 llead at max. flow rate, ft 3,700c Differ'6ntial"hesil'at shutof f, f t" (mair[

t9 +<fm 3,. w.p '

1,000 l

Motor rating, hp Required 11PSH at max. flow rate, ft (max) 15 17.9 i

Available NPSil, ft Low 11ead Sa(ety Inice d.pn_2ugg 3

Number 495 s

Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, *F 1,900 Design flow rate, gal /enin 560 D'esign head, ft 2,900 Max. flow rate, gd/ min 400 licad at max. flow rate, ft 700 Differential head at shutoff, ft 400 Motor rating, hp 15 Required NPSil, ft (max) 19.0 4

Available NPSil, ft

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Includes miniflow nevision n 6.3-31

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STPECA UrSAR 4

TABLE 6.3 1 (Continued) l__ ATT/L IMENT f,tiERCE!1CY CORE COOLIllG SYSTEM SI i;'. /.E-4 [ l T, *. iOF_ h v.

GQtiEQEffT PARAMETEM 4

Rer.idual llent Exchangerg (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters)

Refuelinr_ U ter Storar.c Tank t

1 liumber 531,000*

Design volume, gal 457,700*

Minimum volume, gal Atmospherlo 11ormal pressure, psig Above freezing Operating temperature. *r (37'T inin)

Attnospheric Design pressure, psig 120 Design teroperature.

r.

2 Borcn concentration Yf555E?p001Titur=it_

l 1

(as boric acid), ppm 2foo -4go tuviFF%"

1 1

Motor-opernJ;.ed Vnives Maximum Opening or Closing Titne 15 sec Up to and including 8 inches a.

Rom. Site (in.)

b ;-

Over 8 inches

49 in./ min J

Volumes include unuscable vo l wne,

(* Y b Il Y 6

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STPECS UrSAR

)"s TAB M 6.5-3 ATT/4:! MENT E

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OF If1PUT PARAMETERS TO DETERMIt1E nli FOR N-SUMP Sol >JTIOf1 AND SPRAY l.

1,600 liigh-head safet:y injection pump flow, gal / min 2,900 i

Low-head safety injection pump flow, gai'/ min 2,800 Containment spray pump flow, gal / min Humber of pumps in operation 3

High-head SI pump 3

Low-head SI pump 3

Contaitunent spray pump 28 U3 Eductor suction flow, gal / min f

Concentration of 11a0!! in spray 30 additive solution, we.-t 2

Ilumber of Spray Additive Tanks delivering (28 l

486,100 RUST deliverabic volume, gal

~+ mmh'+mii-T,'

RUST boron con.. centr.ation,, ppm g

m.

v v-

,..,u 9,193 Accumulator water volurne, each of 3, gal S

,E Accumulator boron concentration, ppa 3,00o %. --;

i 626,000 Reactor coolant system water mass, Ib

\\

1,550 Reactor coolant boron concentration. ppta the beginning of the delivery and is conservatively lov.

1.

Flow rate is at The flow rate decreases as the level in the tank fallc.

2.

Single failure is that one spray additive tank outlet isolation valve fails to open.

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STI'CCS UPSAR

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TABLE 6.S 4

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L INPUT PARAMET.fM TO DETERMillE MAXIHtm 911 FOR

.StMP S01ETIOt1 A110 SPP>d i

i 600 liigh head safety injection pump flow, gal / min 1,900 l

Low-head safety injection pump flow, gal / min 1,510 i

f containment spray pump flow. Gal / min i

. tlumber of pumps in operation 3

Itigh-head SI pump 3

Low-head SI pump 3

a Containment spray pump 31 m

i Eductor suction flow, gal / min i

I Concentration of Ita0li in spray 32 additive s,olution, vt. t 3

m

!! umber of Spray Additive ' Tanks delivering 359,200 RUST deliverable volume, ~ gal 4

j' W",". p'* "y l

_7 8

c.,

,, RUST.., boron,.c.oncen.tration., ppa...,,

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. e.>.,

8,770 Accumulator water volume, each of 3, gal M

WL* i f

Accumulator boron concentration, ppm 2 77c 0 W 2' l

626,000 i

Reactor coolant system water inass, Ib 4

1,550 Reactor coolant boron concentration, ppro 1

1 4

1.

Flow rate is at the beginning of delivery and -in conservatively high.

The flow rate decreases as the icvel in the tank falls.

1 spray additive tant isolation valve fails to 1

2.

Single failure is that one close at the end of the injection phase Revision 0 6.917

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s 1

using the overhead crane setvicing this area.

One by one, these shipping fuel support containers are unstacked, their covers removed, and the pivotal, l to the structure within the shipping container is elevated from the horizontathis is accomplished using vertical position.

In the new fuel handling area,In t.he new fuel inspection lay:lovn the new fuel han3hng area overhead crane.

area on the operating floor, this is accomplished using the ntB overhead support The various clamping devices securing the fuel assembly to the structure are then removed.,* ne fuel assembly is lif ted from the shipp J @'VN crane.

container support structure >-Alternatively, inspection activities may be conducted at a gh n

Inter time following transfer of the fuel to the new fuel storage pit.

either areas.

H,u-ew aside for

' [~. g Following inspection, unacceptable new fuel assemblies are setAcceptab handling tool, which is in turn accached to the book of the nib overhead dispositioning.

the new fuel If the fus1 was unloaded in the new fuel handling area, assembly must be secured beneath the equipment batch, relea crane.

Fuel and lif ted through the equipment hatch tu the operating iloor.

l assemblies are either inserted into the new fuel storage racks in the new fue placed in the new fuel elevator which is located in the fuel Those.

storage pit.

transfer canal, or placed directly into the SFP'(Cycle 1 fuel only).

assemblies placed in the new fuel ele'vator are 1cuered to the bottom of.the ney are then engaged by the spent fuel handling tool, fuel transfer canal, The fuel handling which is in turn suspended from the fuel handling nachine.

machine either transfers the assembly to the spent fuci storage racks (before initial refueling) or to the ITS upender for transfer to the RCB for refueling The upender pivots the assembly to the horizontal position and fuel transfer tube to an upender operations.

the ITS fuel container carries it through the inside the contaitunent.

Fefuelinc procedure:. The refueling, operation,follows a.

4;9.1~. 4. 2. 2 '

refueling operation.

prior'to

c detailed procedure to ensure a safe, Ifficient o

initiating refueling, shutdo.m conditions are as specified in the Technical Specifications. Criticality protection for the refueling operation, including a requirement for checks of boron concentration, is specified in the Technical Specifications.

Protection against uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) bank' withdrawal from a suberitical condition is described in Section 15.4.1 and intermediate range, and power range high neutron flux includes source-range, trips. The transient is assumed to be terminated by the pover range hi'gh' neutron flux (lov setting) reactor trip. Protection against uncontrolled boron dilution is described in Section 15.4.6.

The following significant points are assured by the refueling procedure: 2 Poo 9

1.

The refueling water and the reactor coolant contain approximately :iEESE ppm boron This concentration is sufficient to keep the core refueling operations approxima cly $ percent Ak/k suberitical during the with all :ontrol rods removed and the core re fueled to provide exce ss reactivity f or operation to the nen refueling outage.

sufficier t

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O STPECS UFSAR

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[ ATTACHME T ST.HL AE-Ll TABLE 9.1-4

' pig 0F %

-a NSSS VEtiDOR RECOMMENDED SPECIFICATIONS AND CUIDELINES FOR SPEffT RIEL POOL VATER PURITY l

Engelfication Parameters

'2E B 00:44fd N Boric Acid, ppm B 22500 plt =+A3 5150 Chloride, ppb s150 Fluoride, ppb Guideline Parameters 4.0 - 4,7 pH G 77

F

$500 i

Aluminum, ppb Calcium + Magnesium, ppb

$500,

$250 Magnesium

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P.evision 0 9.1 D l

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s7Ptcs UrsAn

' ACHMENT TABLE 9.3-9 SAE. 4p @

~ $ 0F S gngngAt Alm VOLUME cotr170L SYSTtH. DESIC11 PARAMLTERS General for 4

~.

32 Seal water supply flow rate, reactor. coolant pumps, nominal, gal / min 12 Seal vat;er return flow rate, for 4 reactor coolant pumps, nominal, gal / min Letdown flow:

100 Normal, gal / min 250 (Unit 1) 2 Kaximum, gal / min 198 (Unit 2)

Charging flov (excludes seal water):

80 Normal, gal / min 230 Haximumu, gal / min 570 Temperature of letdown reactor coolant entering system, *F

5303,;...., 3

" e ;,; TE@iriture ~of"cha'rging flow directed to' Reactor Coolant System, 'F 115 Temperature of effluent directed to Boron Recycle System, 'F 450 Shutdown purification flow, gal / min Minimum amount of 41 boric acid solution required

-27,000 (modes 1 through 4) @ -I-M^_Maca i--W")4 i,- :

to meet cold shutdown requirements 3po o ( m,tes C W G ) 'M

{

shortly af ter full-power operation, gal 3

3,107 Maximum pressurization required for hydrostatic testing of Reactor Coolant System, psig 30 Concentrated boric acid design flow rate, gal / min Revinion 7-9.3 89

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ML20127M020

Text

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