ML20127J590

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Insp Rept 50-302/85-11 on 850301-29.Violation Noted: Failure to Have Adequate Administrative Procedure for Procedure Review & Approval
ML20127J590
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1985
From: Panciera V, Stetka T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127J582 List:
References
50-302-85-11, NUDOCS 8505210522
Download: ML20127J590 (11)


See also: IR 05000302/1985011

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' UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

ATLANTA, CEORGI A 30323

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APR 2 31985

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Report N'o.:

50-302/85-11

Licensee:

Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302

License No.: DPR-72

Facility Name:

Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: March.1-29, 1985

Inspection at Crystal River site near C'r stal River, Florida

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Inspector:

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T. F. StetRa,--Suhior Rep 5ent Jfriipector

Date' Signed

Accompanying P rsonne h:

E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector

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Approved by:

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V. W. PanEier'a, Ch'lel,~P~roject Section 28,

D&te Sighed

Division of_ Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection -involved 130 -inspector-hours on site by two

resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological

controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, refueling-

preparations, and licensee action on previous inspection items.

Numerous

. facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.

Some of these

tours and. observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: One violation was identified:

(Failure to have an adequate adminis-

trative procedure for procedure review and approval, paragraph 5.b).

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REPORT DETAILS

. 1 ~. :

Persons ~ Contacted

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Licensee Employees-

  • D.-Bates, Quality Engineer

- *D.~ Betts, Supervisor, Quality Audits

LG.. Boldt,-Nuclear Plant Operations Manager

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  • R. Bright,tManager,' Nuclear Licensing

C. Brown, As'sistant Nuclear Outage.and Modifications Manager

  • J. Buckner,~ Nuclear Security-and Special Projects

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  • J. Bufe, Nuclear. Compliance Specialist

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  • W. Clemons, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
  • J. Colby, Manager, Site Nuclear. 0perations Engineering

L*J. Cooper Jr., Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Control

  • R._Dorrie, Quality Engineer

1*J.. Frijouf; Acting Nuclsar Compliance Specialist

  • R. Fuller, Supervisor Radiological-Support Services
  • D. Green, Nuclear Licensing Specialist

'M. Harmon,-Nuclear Operations-Administrative Manager-

  • G.;Hebb, Nuclear Shift Supervisor-

E. Howard, Director,. Site Nuclear Operations _

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  • W. Johnson, Nuclear-Plant Engineering Superintendent
  • B.:Komara, Nuclear Quality Control. Supervisor

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  • D. Kurtz, Sr., Nuclear Quality Assurance' Specialist

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  • K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance

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  • J.1 Lander,' Nuclear Outage and Modiciations Manager
  • M.-Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

P. McKee,' Nuclear Plant Manager.

  • P. Patel,-Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Engineering-(GOC)

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  • E.~ Renfro,-Director, Nuclear Operations Materials and Controls

- V.-Roppel, Nuclear Plant Engineering Technical Services, Manager

  • P.'Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation: Protection Superintendent

(*R. Smith, Nuclear Principal Mechanical / Structural' Engineer

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  • J.1Telford, Director, Quality. Programs
  • D..Visser, Material Technology
  • K. Wilson,, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Licensing
  • J. Wright, Nuclear' Support Specialist Chem / Rad. Prot. Services

Oth'er _ licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering,'

maintenance, chem / rad and corporate personnel.

  • Attended exit interview

2. . ' Exit' Interview

.The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at.

the conclusion of the inspection on March 29, 1985. During this meeting,

the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they

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are detailed in this report with - particular emphasis placed on the.

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. violation, unresolved items, and inspector followup items. Alsolduring this

-meeting, the inspectors expressed concern over an increase in.the number of'

1 Nonconforming Operating Reports (NCORs) relatiri to procedure adherence.

There appears to be an increasing trend of per onnel failing to follow

procedures as . evidenced by the increasing number of NCOR's per month

relating to this issue. -The licensee was reminded of the NRC's position

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regarding licensee identified violations, .specifically relating to the

requirement that adequate corrective actions.- must be taken to prevent

recurrence.

The -inspectors also discussed the use of outdated procedure

indexes. While there is no specific requirement'regarding these indexes, it

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appears that good practice would dictate use of current indexes. It appears

that current _ procedure . indexes are. available and that appropriate coor-

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dination between departments could ensure their distribution and use.

The. licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors' comments .and

stated they would review these issues for appropriate corrective actions.

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The . licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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3.

Licensee Action on- Previous Enforcement Matters-

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-08-03):

The licensee -has cali-

bration . checked . the instruments identified in Nonconforming. Operations

Report (NCOR) 85-26 and has evaluated the effect of out of calibration

. instruments upon system operability.

The . inspector has reviewed ,the

completed calibration data . and evaluated the . licensee's operability

determination-and has no further questions on this item.

.(Closed) Violation (302/84-22-01):

On August 1,

1984, .the licensee

. issued a Short Term Instruction that directed operators to' review the

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- calibration date of the digital voltmeter (DVM) prior to the instruments'

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use.

Subseouently, procedure SP-317, the Reactor Coolant . System leakage

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-determination procedure, was revised to require the recording of the DVM.

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calibration due date and the instrument number if the DVM is utilized during

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the surveillance test. Review of these changes and observation of subsequent.

performances of SP-317 by the inspectors indicate that these changes appear

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. to be effective to prevent recurrence of this event.

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(Closed) Violation (302/84-22-02): The license'e revised procedure SP-381,

which ~-is used 'to verify the position and -locking device status on locked

valves, to require that the locking device be verified by " physical grasping

the . lock and attempting to open it by shaki ng" .

It appears that this

revision will be adequate to ensure that locking devices are properly

established.

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-(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/82-22-04):

The licensee has

~ determined that the revision to OP-407M, Operation of the Concentrated Waste

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Storage Tanks, was inappropriate to prevent recurrence of this event. The

licensee has instead revised surveillance procedures SP-300 and SP-301,

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which direct shiftly duties of plant operators, to include a check that the

tank loop seals are filled.

In addition, the loop seals were marked to

' assist the operators in determinirg that the loop seal levels are appro-

priate.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/83-16-01):

Procedure SP-179,

Containment Leakage Test - Types "B" and "C", was revised to include minimum

times and maximum expected flow rates to ensure measurement of a stable leak

rate.

(Closed)_ Inspector Followup Item (302/83-29-02):

Procedure SP-320,

Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps, was revised to include a

note to ensure that heat tracing temperature readings are taken under static

flow conditions.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/83-11-04): Procedure SP-179 has been revised

to provide a proper vent path while testing core' flood system valves CFV-26

and CFV-27.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/83-11-05): Procedure SP-179 has been revised

to ensure that all valves required to be operated to perform a test are

included in the applicable equipment clearance.

The inspector's sampling

review of _various valve lineups in SP-179 indicates that the procedure

revision accomplishes this task.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/83-11-06): Procedure SP-179 has been revised

to require removal of the air charging line to ensure test results' are not

. invalidated by air leakage past the air charging line isolation valve.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (302/83-11-03):

Procedure SP-179 has been revised

to clarify that valve lineups for a local leak rate test may be changed by a

qualified leak rate examiner and that such changes are documented, however

the change also allows a test method change by the test engineer. When this

was discussed with licensee representatives, the representatives stated that

a test method change by the test engineer was not intended and that the

procedure would- be immediately revised.

This item remains open pending

revision of the procedure.

(0 pen) Deviation (302/84-26-01): The licensee has completed the procedure

changes to procedures SP-112 and SP-113 as stated in their response dated

January 25, 1985. In addition, most of the changes to the tracking system

have been made except for the implementation of the Nuclear Operations

Policy. As stated in the response letter, these changes will be implemented

by May 1,1985. 'This item remains open pending completion of the Nuclear

Operations Policy changes.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/83-30-02): The licensee has completed

re-training of qualified reviewers and has reduced the number of the

-reviewers, however a finalized list of qualified reviewers is not complete.

This list will be available by April 30, 1985.

This item , remains open

pending completion of this list.

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4. . . Unresolved Items,

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. Unresolved- items. are matters about which more information is required -to

determine whether.they are acceptable.or may involve violations or deviations.

A:new1 unresolved 11 tem identified during this inspection is discussed in

paragraph-5.c of. this report.

5..

Review of. Plant Operations

The plant was in power. operation (Mode 1) at the beginning of th'is inspection'

period.' At 0020 on March 9,1985, the plant .was shutdown in support of

an extensive refueling and plant modification outage. The plant entered

cold shutdown' (Mode 5) at 0210 on March 11 and the refueling. mode- (Mode 6)

at 0855'on: March 20 where 'it remained for the duration of this inspection

period-.

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.During review of . procedure OP-209, Plant Cooldown, conducted on

March 9, 1985, the inspector noted .that : step 6.2.15 was not1 accom-

plished. Step 6.2.15 requires Core Flood Valves 5 and 6 (CFV-5, CFV-6)

to _be closed and breakers red tagged in .the " Locked Reset" position

when Reactor Coolant System pressure. decreases to 700 psig or less.

Valves CFV-5 and CFV-6 were left open to allow the Core Flood Tanks-

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. (CFT) to' discharge tocthe reactor vessel to permit maintenance ~ to be

. performed on the CFT's at a later time'.

This change to . procedure

OP-209 was implemented byLthe operator initialling the step and provid -

ing a' footnote at-the bottom of the page which' detailed the reason.for

the change. Making-a procedure change in this manner is contrary to

-the requirements of TS 6.8.3 and is considered to be a_ violation. This

TS allows temporary changes to be made to procedures .but requires the

change to be made by two members of the plant management staff at least

one of whom holds.a senior . reactor operator license.

The -licensee was issued;a similar violation against TS 6.8.3 in NRC

Report 50-302/85-08. Since this report covered inspection activities

for the month of February 1985, there- has been insufficient time for-

licensee. response. Therefore, this' violation will'not be cited in~this

report but is considered to be another example of violation:50-302/85-08-07.

This violation was discussed in-the Exit Meeting conducted on March-29, 1985.

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-The licensee will address their corrective actions to this violation

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concurrently with their response to violation 50-302/85-08-07.

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b.

During: further review of OP-209, the inspectors noted that the

! Qualified Reviewers Check-off Sheet (enclosure (5) to procedure AI-401,

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Origination of and Revisions to P0QAM Procedures) attached ~to a change-

to _0P-209 was only reviewed by operations department personnel. This

change method was in accordance with AI-401, Section 4.3.4.

TS 6.8.2

requires procedure changes. to be reviewed by intradepartmental

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qualified reviewers

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in the same department) and inter-

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departmental qualified reviewers in interfacing departments.

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review cycle assures that procedures and procedure changes receive

interdisciplinary review.

Failure of procedure AI-401 to require the interdepartmental review is

contrary to the requirements of TS _6.8.2, represents an inadequate

procedure as required by TS 6.8.1, and is considered to be a violation.

Violation (302/85-11-01):

Failure to have an adequate administrative

procedure for the review and approval of plant procedures.

c.

During a review of the Operations Section Implementation Manual (OSIM)

that is used to direct plant operations, the inspectors noted that

Section VI, paragraph B.1.3 allows a procedure to be changed through

the use of an equipment clearance (system tagout).

This method of

procedure change is contrary to the review and approval requirements

for procedure changes as delineated in - TS 6.8.2 and 6.8.3.

This

finding was discussed with licensee representatives who stated that the

-intent of paragraph B.1.3 was not to circumvent the TS requirements but

was to' allow flexibility during plant evolutions.

The inspector acknowledged the licensee's position of flexibility

during plant evolutions, however the use of the equipment clearance as

stated in B.1.3 of the OSIM could result in changes that are contrary

to the TS. It appears that a clarification of OSIM paragraph B.1.3 is

in order to assure that equipment clearances address the specific

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evolution involved and are not used as a procedure change medium.

The licensee will review this OSIM section and make appropriate

clarification to assure that the TS review process is not circumvented.

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Unresolved Item (302/85-11-02):

Review the licensee's activity to

clarify the use of equipment clearances as delineated in OSIM

section VI, paragraph B.1.3.

(1) Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

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The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment

Out-of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Aux 11ary Building

Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating

Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions

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(STIs); Selected chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs; and

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Outage Shift Manager's Log.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period,. facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintanence activities in progress. - Some

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operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee

meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and

management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following

areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel

generator room; audiliary building; intermediate building; battery

rooms; electrical switchgear rooms; and reactor building.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

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(a) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation

was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in

accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area, atmospheric and liquid

radiation monitors;

electrical

system

lineup;

reactor

operating ~ parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating

parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(b) -Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown

of- the core flood and spent fuel . systems to verify that the

lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for

system operability and that system drawings and procedures

correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

No' violations or deviations were identified.

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(c) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift

staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that

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control room operations were being conducted in an orderly

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and professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed

shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity

of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent

plant information during these turnovers.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(d) Plant Housekeeping Conditions

Storage of material and

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components and cleanliness conditions of various areas

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

safety and/or fire hazards existed.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(e) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were

observed to verify proper identification and implementation.

These observations included selected licensee conducted

surveys, review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of

contaminated clothing, and area posting. Area postings were

independently verified for accuracy through the use of the

inspector's own radiation monitoring

instrument.

The

inspector also reviewed selected radiation work permits and

observed personnel use of protective clothing respirators,

and personnel monitoring devices to assure that the-

licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being followed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(f) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify

that security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty,

and access to the Protected Area (PA) is controlled in

accordance with the facility security plan. Personnel within

the PA were observed to ensure proper display of badges and

that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.

Personnel within vital areas were observed to ensure proper

authorization for the area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(g)

Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing

was appropriate and that fire alarms,

extinguishing

equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,

emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(h) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to. verify

that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel

were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify

equipment operability; calibrated equipment, as required,

were utilized; and TS requirements were followed.

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The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

SP-163, Waste Gas H/0 Analyzer Channel Functional

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Test and Channel Calibration;

SP-169, Plant Safety-Related Instruments Calibration;

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SP-190, Channel Functional and Circuitry Operability of

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Fire Detection Instrumentation;

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SP-210, ASME Class 3 Hydrostatic Testing;

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SP-301, Shutdown Daily Surveillance Log;

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SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

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'SP-406, Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements;

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SP-421, Reactivity Balance Calculations;

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SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance; and,

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SP-601, Procedure .for Load Testing Slings and ' Lifting

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Fixtures.

(1) During review of shutdown margin calculations performed

in accordance with procedure SP-421 the inspector was:

unable to calculate Xenon reactivity because the'

licensee failed to retain the computer generated data

sheets. . Xenon reactivity is calculated using a computer

program based on the previous . power history of the

plant. After these calculations are printed. out, _the

data ~is transferred to Worksheet I of SP-421 and the

computer calculations ' are discarded.

After a consi--

- derable . effort by the licensee, the ' inspector was able

to verify the Xenon reactivity -from ,a- licensee

reproduced computer calculation based on the same power

history. The-licenseeLissued a Short Term Instruction

(STI) as a temporary fix to retain the computer data

sheets. As a long term :fix the licensee is revising

procedure SP-421 -to require retention of the computer

calculation data sheets.

Inspector Followup Item (302/85-11-03): Review revision

to SP-421. to retain -Xenon reactivity computer data

sheets.

(2) - On March 7,1985, the inspector observed 'a hydrostatic

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test of the Spent Fuel (SF)-System 'in accordance ~with

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procedure SP-210.

During the test, the inspector

notified a' packing leak on Spent Fuel Valve 20 (SFV-20).

The licensee has issued a work request to repack SFV-20

which requires the SF system to .be drained down after

refueling operations are complete.

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Inspector Followup Item (302/85-11-04):

Review the

licensee's repair to the packing leak on SFV-20.

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(1) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance

activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were

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in effect; Work' Requests and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as

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required, were issued and being followed; Quality Control

personnel were available for inspection activities as

required; and TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for

the.following maintenance activities:

Setting Emergency Diesel Generator 3A (EDG-3A) start

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relays in accordance with modification MAR-2A-82-

04-23-01;

Repair of Exhaust Manifold Leak on EDG-3A; and,

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Troubleshooting and repair of source range nuclear

Instrument #2 (NI-2).

No violations or deviations were identified.

(j) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid Waste Compacting

operations and selected liquid and gaseous releases were

observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized,

that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that

required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(k) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers

and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety related systems

were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and

no leakage was evident, that restraint ' settings were

appropriate, and that anchoring points were not binding.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Review of Nonconforming Operations Reports

The inspector _ reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCOR) to verify the

following:

compliance with the TS, corrective actions as identified in the

reports or during subsequent. reviews have been accomplished or are being

pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as

required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed 'in accordance with the current NRC onforcement

policy.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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7.

Preparations for Refueling

The . inspector. reviewed refueling procedures to verify that approved

procedures were available and were technically adequate. to cover fuel

ihandling, fuel transfers, inspection of fuel to be reused, handling and-

' inspection of - core internals and core- verification.

The inspector also

observed the receipt, inspection and storage of_ new fuel elements to verify

that these . activities were conducted in accordance -with the approved

procedures-and that any deficiencies were appropriately resolved.

'The'fo11owing procedures were reviewed:

FP-203, Defueling and Refueling Operations;

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FP-302, New Fuel Assembly Unloading Inspection Storage and Container

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Reclosing;

FP-304, Receiving new fuel;

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FP-501, Reactor Internal Removal and Replacement;

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FP-601, Fuel Handling Equipment, Operations;

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FP-602, Irradiated fuel assembly inspection;

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-FP-801, Failed fuel identification; and,

FP-1001, Spent fuel handling.

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No violations or d'eviations were' identified.

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