ML20127E434
| ML20127E434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1993 |
| From: | BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127E431 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301190305 | |
| Download: ML20127E434 (9) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT Retyped Technical Specifications Pages for Amendment 166 (Unit 1) and 146 (Unit 2) l 9301190305 930113 PDR ADOCK 05000317 P
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l 3/4.9 9.EFUELING OPERATIONS 1
2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL --SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL BUILDING
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l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
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3.9.7 Loads in excess of 1600 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over
-fuel assemblies in the storage pool unless such loads are handled by the-i single-failure-proof Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane.
l APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the. storage pool.
l ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, i
place the crane load in a safe condition. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
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i' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
4.9.7.1 The weight of each load, other than a fuel assembly and CEA, shall l
be verified to be _< 1600 pounds prior to moving it over fuel assemblies unless such loads are handled by the single-failure-proof Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane.
4.9.7.2 Slings and special lifting devices shall be visually inspected and i
verified OPERABLE within 7 days prior to and at least once per 7 days thereafter during Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane operation over the. spent fuel storage pool.
l 4.9.7.3 In addition to the requirements of Section 4.9.7.2, pre-i operational and periodic tests and preventive maintenance shall be performed per plant procedures.
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CALVERT' CLIFFS - UNIT 1-3/4 9-9 Amendment No. 166-
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' 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS p
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL CASK HANDLING CRANE
\\J LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.13 Deleted by Amendment No. 166 l
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'V CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 9-18 Amendment No. 166 2
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS OQ BASES 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE OPERABILITY The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that:
(1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of CEAs and fuel assemblies, (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a CEA or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly and CEA over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.
The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane, which has a critical load capacity of 125/15 ton, meets the " single-failure-proof" criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612.
3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the, reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent baron stratification.
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The requirement to have two shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling l
loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
l In MODE 6, shutdown cooling flow must provide sufficient heat removal to match core decay heat generation rates and maintain the core exit temperature within the MODE limit. Thus, as decay heat production is reduced with time, shutdown cooling flow may be proportionally reduced.
Pursuant to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, flow reduction is necessary for operations near the mid-point of the hot leg piping to prevent vortex fomation at the shutdown cooling suction nozzle.
Prevention of vortex famation reduces the potential for a loss of shutdown cooling due to air I
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 166 i
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G 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES binding of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump (s) operating to provide shutdown cooling flow.
In accordance with the recomendations of NRC Bulletin 88-04, " Safety Related Pump Loss," a minimum flow rate requirement of 1500 gpm is imposed.
This protects the vendor-recomended minimum continuous duty flow rate of 1340 gpm for the LPSI pumps. The 4
1500 gpm minimum flow rate is also more than adequate to preclude a boron dilution event in MODE 6 operation and in no way restricts the ability to increase ficw as necessary to remove decay heat.
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM l
The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment.
The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth g
,g is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.
3/4.9.13 Deleted by Amendment No. 166.
l 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions on the containment vent isolation valves are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
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b) v CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 166
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS A
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P0OL BUILDING 4
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
3.9.7 Loads in excess of 1600 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over j
fuel assemblies in the storage pool unless such loads are handled by the i
single-failure-proof Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane.
I i
APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
1 i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
4.9.7.1 The weight of each load, other than a fuel assembly and CEA, shall be verified to be 51600 pounds prior to moving it over fuel assemblies f
unless such loads are handled by the single-failure-proo" Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane, i (N 4.9.7.2 Slings and special lifting devices shall be visually inspected and
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verified OPERABLE within 7 days prior to and at least once per 7 days thereafter during Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane operation over the spent fuel storage pool.
4.9.7.3 In addition to the requirements of Section 4.9.7.2, pre-l operational and periodic tests and preventive maintenance shall be performed per plant procedures.
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- O CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-9 Amendment No. 146
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i
3/4.9.13 fPENT FUEL CASK HANDLING CRAE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.13 Deleted by Amendment No. 146.
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,O lt CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-19 Amendment No. 146
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES
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- V 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHI_NJ OPERABILITY I
The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that:
l (1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of CEAs and fuel j
assemblies (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift j
a CEA or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are j
protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING 3
J The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a j
fuel assembly and CEA over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is droged (1) the activity release
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l will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any i
possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses. The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane, j
which h.'s a critical load capacity of 125/15 ton, meets the " single-j failure-proof" criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, 3/4.9.8 SHUTOOWN COOLING AND C,00LANT CIRCULATION 4
The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation i.
ensuras that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution ircident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to nave two shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of t
deca; heat removal capability. With tha reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core l
cooling, thus in the event of '. failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool tne core.
In MODE 6, shutdown cooling flow must provide sufficient heat removal to l
match core decay heat generation rates and maintain the core exit temperature within the MODE limit.
Thus, as decay heat production is l
reduced with time, shutdown cooling flow may be proportionally reduced.
Pursuant to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, flow reduction is necessary for operations near the mid-point of the hot leg piping to prevent vortex formation at the shutdown cooling suction nozzle.
Prevention of vorter.
formation reduces the potential for a loss of shutdown cooling due to air I
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 146 I
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS
{
BASES binding of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump {s) operating toprovide shutdown cooling flow.
In accordance with the recomendations of NRC Bulletin 88-04, " Safety Related Pump Loss," a minimum flow rate requirement of 1500 gpm is imposed.
This protects the vendor-recommended minimum continuous duty flow rate of 1340 gpm for the LPSI pumps. The 1500 gpm minimum flow rate is also more than adequate to preclude a boron
)
dilution event in MODE 6 operation and in no way restricts the ability to
)
l increase flow as necessary to remove decay heat.
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels 1
within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
4 3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM i
l The limitations on the Spent Fuel Pocl Ventilation System ensure that all l
radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be i
filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge l
to the atmosphere.
The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine remov.al capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident r
analyses.
3/4.9.13 Deleted by Amendment 'n.146.
}
3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions on the containment vent isolation valves are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 146 w 4.e g
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2 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS t
.i BASES lV binding of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump (s) operating toprovide shutdown cooling flow.
In accordance with the recomendations of NRC Bulletin 88-04, " Safety Related Pump Loss," a minimum flow rate requirement of 1500 gpm is imposed.
This protects the vendor-recommended minimum continuous duty flow rate of 1340 gpm for the LPSI pumps.
The 1500 gpm minimum flow rate is also more than adequate to preclude a boron dilution event in MODE 6 operation and in no way restricts the ability to increase flow as necessary to remove decay heat.
3 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment.
The OPERABILITY-of this system is required to 2
restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment l
atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL WA_TER LEVEL 4
The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth l
is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth j
is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM l
l The limitations on the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge i
to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine 1
removal capacity are coasistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.
l 3/4.9.13 Deleted by Amendment No. 146.
l l
l 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVES l
The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions on the containment vent isolation i
valves are sufficient tc restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 8 3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 146 j
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