ML20127D980
| ML20127D980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/12/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8506240387 | |
| Download: ML20127D980 (120) | |
Text
4 ORIGINAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
I In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Continuation of 5/16 Briefing on Mid-Year Budget and Program Review (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
)
I w
Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Wednesday, June 12, 1985 Pages:
1 - 88 Dk fjyp[ 850612 PT9.7 PDR ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 293-3950
1 D i SCLA 1 M ER 2
3 4
5 1
6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the l
l 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Wednesday, 1
3 June 12, 1985 in the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.108, it is 15 not part of the Formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of cpinion in this transcript i
17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in l
19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 1
20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorize.
22 23 24 25
1 0C$$000 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
CONTINUATION OF 5/16 BRIEFING ON MID-YEAR 6
BUDGET AND PROGRAM REVIEW 7
8 PUBLIC MEETING g
10 11 Room 1180 12 1717 H Street, N.W.
18 Washington, D.C.
14 15 Wednesday, June 12, 1985 16 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 17 a.m.,
Commissioner Thomas Roberts presiding.
18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
19 Thomas Roberts, Commissioner 20 James Asselstine, Commissioner 21 Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner 22 Lando Zech, Jr.,
Commissioner 23 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
24 S.
Chilk a
25 M.
Malsch
=
e 2
1 D.
Mausshardt 2
R.
Minogue 3
W.
Dircks 4
J.
Roe 5
J.
Taylor 6
AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
7 G.
Zech 8
G.
Ankrum 9
D.
Ross 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
a 9
1 p R OC EED i N GS 2
(10:00 a.m.)
S COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Good morning, ladies and 4
gentlemen.
5 The Chairman is on vacation or leave, and he assured 6
me that he would be thoroughly briefed on what transpires this 7
morning.
The Commissioners are meeting this morning to 8
continue the mid year status report on agency expenditures and 9
major program accomplishments or progress toward 10 accomplishments.
This meeting is a continuation of the May 11 16, 1985 meeting and will focus on topics such as quality 12 assurance, enforcement, and research programs.
13 The Staff has prepared Vu-graphs highlighting 14 today's presentation.
They are available to the audience on 15 the table in the back of the room 16 Unless there are comments at this time from other 17 Commissioners, I would ask the Executive Director for 18 Operations to begin.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have no comments.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
No comments.
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
No comments.
22 MR. DIRCKS:
Well, as they say in soap operas, the 23 last time we saw this group, Jim Taylor was going through his 24 program, and that's about where we are, right in the middle of 25 quality assurance.
4 1
So, Jim, do you remember where you left off?
2 CSlide.]
3 MR. TAYLOR:
I'll try to pick up the script, but one 4
question that the Chairman, I believe, asked last time on one 5
other part of our program, we had noted that we had observed 6
with, of course, our Regional support, thirty emergency 7
preparedness exercises at the mid year point, and the Chairman 8
logically asked, was that close to target?
9 It happens that the goal is at 72 for the fiscal 10 year, so we're very, very close to target on our exercise 11 observation, about where we expected to be.
12 (Jith that answer, I will pick up on page 17, which 13 is a discussion of the quall'ty assurance program.
I believe, 14 as you are aware, we have developed out of the big study we 15 did on quality assurance and QA problems and the mandate of 16 Congress, and we have given you a NUREG report, we've 17 developed a plan which is, I believe, currently down at the 18 Commission, trying to recommend what we think we ought to 19 proceed on, as we see it in the Staff.
20 in the meantime, I think it's important to note for 21 the Commission that there are a number of things there that 22 are right on the plate, so to speak, and we are proceeding to 23 do those things.
24 Among the most notable that I think the Ccmmission 25 ought to be aware of in things that are proceeding are the
a 5
1 Vogtle readiness review.
We are into that quite heavily with 2
Region 11 and supporting them out of Headquarters with NRR and S
IE, and the second major package is in from Vogtle.
I think 4
they had a little startup pains getting going, but that 5
program is running, and the Staff is cooperating to provide 6
its part of an overview of what Vogtle is doing.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Jim, have you all sent us 8
a paper that talks a little bit about the elements of that 9
review and how it differs from what we've done in the past, 10 and what it might portend for the future?
I can't remember 11 whether you have or not, 12 MR. DIRCKS:
I think we did send one.
IS MR. TAYLOR:
I think we did send it.
I think the 14 plan is to have Georgia power to come in appropriately on the 15 calendar, and we join in to give you a hands-on view of how 16 that program is going.
.That was to be scheduled sometime this 17 summer.
13 MR. DIRCKS:
I did talk to Mr.
Miller, who is head 19 of Georgia power, and he did indicate that he would like to 20 come in in the next 45 days or so, within, I think, after 45 21 days, come in and discuss it.
22 I think they are ready to discuss their 23 accomplishments.
I think it may be a little bit too early to 24 give our reactions to the programs, so I think it preferably 25 would be a Georgia power presentation, and we would be
4 g
6 1
available to answer questions.
2 CCommissioner Bernthal enters the meeting.]
3 MR. TAYLOR:
I think that's about where we are.
The 4
imposition of that kind of discipline on the process is, I
5 think, one of the big changes that that program brings.
6 We are continuing in the QA group to work with NMSS 7
on the quality assurance attributes and situations with regard 8
to the high-level waste area and providing direct assistance 9
to them as a program office.
10 The next bullet is a major program which we are 11 contemplating, and that has to do with the treatment of 12 outages and changes in plants.
This is very important.
I 13 will mention just briefly this program.
The Commission, i 14 believe, has done some consideration of it and has given us a 15 SECY on our beginnings of that program.
16 The object of this program is, working through, of 17 course, the Regions with appropriate design and Headquarters 18 input, to take a look at some of the major modifications as 19 plants begin to approach mid-life.
20 From my previous experience, I have seen situations 21 where lack of control of the modification and design change 22 process as plants get older can cause a reduction i n the 23 original plant safety margins.
And I have had this concern 24 because more and more plants will be entering middle age.
25 This is not to go out and check every nut and bolt m
-a w
--.-.i, -,
-.-w y
7 1
of an outage.
It is rather to try to look at it in an 2
informed and planned way, particularly how the design changes 3
are being implemented in the plant, and then actually 4
installed, and to make sure that a reduction in safety does 5
not occur.
6 We had an actual situation where Haddam Neck -- you 7
may have noted the enforcement action by virtue of their 8
refueling cavity seal failure, went backwards to look at a 9
number of changes that had been made in the plant to make sure 10 there had not been a detraction from safety, and they 11 self-identified a situation where loop flow had actually 12 this is a four-loop Westinghouse plant -- loop flow had been 13 reduced from the planned safety analysis setting of 90 percent 14
-- by the way, that's a good margin -- but by virtue of steam 15 generator tube plugging and other modifications in the plant, 16 they had actually had a reduction in loop flow to something 17 like 83 or 84 percent.
18 Now at that flow condition, you wouldn't really 19 damage the plant when a safety situation occurred, but there 20 it was an erosion of the original planned margin of the safety 21 analysis report.
22 They self-iduntified that And this is a 23 demonstration, I think Haddam Nock is ten or fifteen years 24 old, in that range and there have been lots of changes and 25 lots of modifications in that plant.
G 1
So I think it's a very important area for we on the 2
Staff to take a look at.
As you know, modifications are made 3
in the plants on the basis of 50.59 reviews.
Modifications 4
occur because vendors go out of business.
Something as simple 5
as changing a type of solenoid valve may change an important 6
time characteristic of operation, and you may not find it, 7
being quick enough in the test program to identify that that 8
time decrease of operation could affect a saf ety sys t en.
9 It is that kind of concern that I think, as the part of our responsibility, that we need to take a 10 agency's 11 look at, And it may be that the industry itself is doing just 12' fine, but we want to be sure that that type of condition is 13 being looked at 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, the major 15 modifications, particularly the real big modification efforts 16 at some of the operating plants, also give us an opportunity 17 to test out some of the concepts that were proposed in the QA 18 report.
19 MR. TAYLOR:
Particularly what concepts are you 20 referring to?
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, I was thinking about 22 looking at the qualifications and capabilities of the group, 23 the extent of planning, the monitoring points at various 24 stages in the process, to determine how well thoy're doing at 25 various stages in the program those core concepts that were
9 1
in the QA report that we aren't going to get a chance to test 2
out for a new plant until some point way down the road.
At a
least this would give us a chance to try them out and see how 4
they work.
5 MR. TAYLOR:
I understand, and I think we would 6
include part of that in our process, part of checking who is 7
doing the work 4.n d are they qualified to do it, and are they 8
qualified to inspect it.
9 We are actually -- we've gotten a letter in to the 10 Staff from WNP, the Washington project, that they are 11 projecting a potential readiness review type program for 12 WNA-3, and we are, in the Staff, trying to make preparations 13 to support that.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is that a Cembustion unit?
15 MR. TAYLOR:
Ted, can you answer that?
Which one is 16 that?
17 MR. ANKRUM:
It's a CE System 80.
18 MR. DIRCKS:
Let me make a plug here, though.
The 19 WNP-3 is a possible reactivated unit WNP-1, they are also 20 talking about resuming construction.
They would like 21 readiness reviews on 1 and 3, although 3 is the one they are 22 pushing for.
And neither one of these things, as you recall, 23 we planned for in the budget submission.
We just said we 24 weren't planning for any restarts or other construction, and 25 we just didn*t have the resources in it
10 1
So again, these are events that creep in that do 2
have a resource demand, but for which our budgets don't have 3
any provision. So it's again reprogramming and moving 4
resources around.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are they giving you any 6
timetable for when they might want to restart?
7 MR. DIRCKS:
I think it was
'88.
8 MR. TAYLOR:
Ted, do you have that time on your --
9 MR. ANKRUM:
Yes.
There will be a number of major 10 decision points along the way, but the planning at the moment 11 is that Unit-8, actual construction will restart at the 12 beginning of Fiscal Year
'88.
That's October
'87.
There will 13 be a number of points along the way with the Northwest 14 Regional Power planning Council and the Bonneville Power 15 Administration.
But in order to support that actual 16 construction restart date, there is a significant baselining 17 effort underway, and there will be a lot of effort starting 18 this July, which has been budgeted for by BPA.
19 MR. DIRCKS:
The baselining will be a big effort, o
20 because they're sort of a good way down the road and trying to 21 establish that there isn't anything that would undermine their r
22 continuation is an important idea, and we'll be very 23 interested in following that 24 MR. DIRCKS:
That's resources out of Region U.
25 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, Region V.
Two program offices.
e 11 1
The next thing I would like to mention to the 2
Commission is to take the opportunity to tell you about what 3
we've been doing in the vendor program.
As you know, we moved 4
that program up here from Arlington, effective about a year 5
ago for the actual transfer, and we have been trying to modify 6
that program to recognize, of course, that you're entering the 7
world of operating plants and to make sure that that program 8
vectors into important safety situations.
9 We have set up a situation by which we have vendor 10 inspectors actually going into plants, under the leadership of 11 the Regions, and checking on important attributes at plants.
12 Let me mentlon that among the things we're looking 13 at is the vendor / utility interface, and is important safety 14 Information being implemented.
So far, we haven't found 15 anything that is a complete disaster, but we are finding 16 numbers of cases where important vendor information is not 17 being implemented.
18 As an example, just down at Hatch, we found a 19 situation where the diesel oil lineup was not in accordance 20 with the vendor recommendations, and the not result could have 21 been an increased potential for lubrication failure due to tho l
22 diesel oil system lineup.
They weren't following the vendor l
23 instructions.
l 24 We also found at Summer a situation where the safety l
25 injection reset switch, because it was not a springloaded
12 1
switch, had a tendency to go back to a reset position, and 2
there was an actual stop modification made locally by the 3
company that had not been passed back to the vendor so it 4
could be generically implemented.
5 So it's kind of small details that sound relatively 6
small until they contribute to a safety problem.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Both of those would be 8
common mode failures, too, wouldn't they, potentially?
9 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes.
If all the diesels were lined up, 10 yes, you could get a situation in which you would continue 11 safety injection, due to the switch moving in the wrong 12 position, and you would continue to have that when you didn't 13 want it 14 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
The vendor program, I appreciate 15 the fact that you are looking at specifically -- our people 10 are looking specifically at some of the vendor supply 17 problems, and that's appropriate.
But it seems to me our 18 emphasis should be that the utilities themselves have the 19 responsibility for following through on all their vendors and 20 contractors, and that they feel that it's their job to ensure 21 that the get the vendor and contractor responsiveness.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Absolutely, if I can add on 23 to that, it is certainly unclear t o me, although arguable with 24 some of my fellows, as to whether we have any jurisdiction 25 over vendors.
And with no offense to my former colleague,
l i
13 l
1 Gary Zech, I certainly cannot conceive of the vendor 2
inspection effort increasing in our resources and activities.
S My God, you should have done this in the '70s, not 4
now.
The ballgame is over.
5 MR. TAYLOR:
I don't think we're increasing l
6 don't disagree with you, but 7
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I don't disagree with a need 8
for some effort in this direction, but it certainly should not 9
grow, as most of the government does, and become an 10 ever-expanding bureaucracy, because there is clearly no need 11 for it.
12 MR. TAYLOR:
I think we're trying to go into areas 13 where we have the perception that there are important safety and this doesn't mean all of 14 issues, that the utilities 15 them, but it is very difficult to see this interface properly, 16 as an example at the plants we've been to, and to point out 17 weaknesses where various utilities have not concentrated on 18 the vendor / utility interface.
This was the message out of the 19 Salem event.
And we're trying to make sure that where we see 20 there are problems, that we use those as examples to the 21 Industry itself.
It is there job.
They took on this 22 responsibility.
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERT 3:
it is the utility's job.
24 MH. TAYLOR:
That's right 25 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Clearly.
r 10 1
MR. TAYLOR:
Exactly.
There is no disagreement on t
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No disagreement.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would certainly agree 5
that that ought to be their responsibility.
6 Let me ask the question a little more neutrally, 7
though.
Do you find, based upon what you've done now, that 8
you find a uniformly strong recognition on the part of the 9
utilities that they have a responsibility to manage their 10 contractors and assure good performance by the vendors, and 11 that uniformly that's being done throughout the industry?
12 MR. TAYLOR:
I can't answer that, because we've only 13 done about four or five of these.
14 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Yes, but I agree, that's the key 15 question.
16 MR. TAYLOR:
We are finding flaws.
17 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Your primary responsibility 13 should be just exactly that, to make sure that the utilities 19 themselves do accept this responsibility.
20 COMMISSIONER HSSELSTINE:
And if they're not doing 21 it 22 MR. TAYLOR:
Well, we're not finding then that raises a 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
24 question in my mind about whether somebody else will have to 25 do it for them.
15 1
MR. TAYLOR:
Sure.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But that's the question.
3 The sense I've gotten in the past was that there was not that 4
uniformly high recognition of that responsibility or 5
fulfilling of it 6
MR. TAYLOR:
We are not finding a void.
We are 7
finding flaws in the plants we've been to.
8 Gary, would you like to add anything to that?
9 MR. GARY ZECH:
Yes, just a couple things, if i 10 could.
It is true that the vendor industry has changed, but 11 there is still an ongoing repair parts, r ep l a cemer,t parts 12 industry out there 13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's a fairly big 14 activity, too.
15 MR. GARY ZECH:
It is a very big activity.
And 16 there is also, in connection with the outage program, a great 17 deal of activity onsite from a variety of different vendors 18 that have different interfaces with the utility, with the 19 primary contractor like an architect engineer firm, and we're 20 looking at those relationships to the procurement activities, i
21 where they go to get their spare parts, what do they do when 22 they do a modification, what do they do with information that 23 comes in frem the vendors to look and see if it affects their 24 plant, if they should be doing something to improve their 25 systems, or make sure that they are operating equipment as
10 1
they should be.
2 So it's more an emphasis on that part of it, which 3
clearly emphasl=es the Licensees' responsibilities.
They have 4
the responsibility.
There's no question. As a result of many 5
vendor inspections, we have issued information notices that 6
point out where the utility should have been involved with 7
their suppliers, should have done mere appropriate and more 8
in-depth audits, and caught a number of things that we have 9
found.
And I think that message is getting out there.
10 And clearly, when we put an information notice out, 11 the word gets out not only to the venders and the supplier, 12 but the utilities, and we get many phone calls that say, 13 "Well, what really is the problem here?
What should we be 14 doing?
Should they be on the approved vendors list still?
15 What corrective action is being taken to improve the 16 situation?"
17 So I think there's a definite change or a new 18 awareness in that regard on the part of the utilities for 19 their responsibilities in this area.
It's not solely going to 20 the vendors and hammering on them.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS I've got a question for you.
22 You may not be able to quantify this or track it in any way.
23 But do you have any sense or feeling, are there less suppliers 24 of nuclear quality material than there were ten years ago?
i 25 Are there more?
17 1
MR. GARY ZECH:
Numbers-wise, there may be a slight 2
reduction.
3 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Just lack of business?
This 4
is purely economic?
i 5
MR. GARY ZECH:
Well, lack of business, but not only 6
fewer, but maybe the percentage of their nuclear business is they are very small 7
down, and they recognize, you know 8
percentages, but they're hanging on to their certificates from 9
the ASME.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I would like to know about i
11 that.
Are they retaining their certificates?
12 MR. GARY ZECH:
Most of them are.
We have met with 13 the ASME from time to time.
They are optimistic.
Right now, 14 there's a leveling off of certificates s however, there's a 15 great increase in foreign suppliers for ASME type of 16 certificates.
So there is a shifting of where the business is 17 occurring.
There is some concern that the certificate holders 13 numbers will decrease, yes, but I think, as a business 19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Well, is that more an 20 apprehension or a fact?
21 MR. GARY ZECH:
It's probably fact to some degree, 23 but they're hanging on to them in many cases in anticipation 23 of future business.
24 MR. DIRCKS:
I think the nuclear services supply 25 business is a growth industry right now.
That was i
10 1
demonstrated at the McGraw-Hill meetings that they hold here 2
every year.
As we license more plants and you get up to 100 3
operating plants, I think the industry is finding the amount 4
of resupply, of maintenance and insertion of spare parts, is a 5
growth industry.
6 What's happening, as Gary pointed out, there is a 7
great interest in foreign suppliers moving into this 8
- industry, in fact, we've had indications from phrometone that 9
they want to move in in a total way.
They want to have a 10 full-service supply contract with firms.
And the Germans are 11 Interested and the Japanese.
12 Many of our firms are getting out of the 13 manufacturing, heavy manufacturing business.
So we're finding 14 an increase in foreign interest 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But you also get some of 10 the firms in this country, like the reactor manufacturers and 17 some of the architect engineering firms, that are trying to is get into the service business in a much bigger way.
19 MR. DIRCKS:
They're trying to get in in the 20 absence, in holding onto the capability to deal with a future 21 order.
But it is a large business, and it seems to be 22 growing, and there is a lot of competition trying to get into 23 it.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Which plants have you 25 looked at in terms of focusing on the utilities' efforts to
19 1
deal with their vendors?
2 MR. GARY ZECH:
Three major inspections.
Those were 3
pilgrim. Dav i s-Bas.se, and Summer, and to a lesser extent at 4
Hatch, which Ted mentioned.
5 MR. DIRCKS:
We're at Quad Cities now.
6 MR. GARY ZECH:
They were at Quad Cities this week.
4 7
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What did you find at S
Davis-Besse in terms of their involvement in management of 9
their contractors?
10 MR. GARY ZECH:
Davis-Besse had a program that they 11 were working on to upgrade this whole area.
They acknowledge 12 that they have some weakness in the program.
For example, 13 they did not have a formal review of diesel generator 14 vendor-supplied information.
They have the information 15 onsite, but there was no formal procedure to review it, to 16 factor recommendations into their maintenance program and 17 their operating procedures.
So it was more of a procedural 18 type of findings that we came up with there that they need to tg work on.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSEL9 TINE:
Are you just looking at that is, whether the utility gets 21 the interface question 22 updated information from its vendors and has the updated 23 manuals, or are you also looking at how well they actually 24 manage their contractors, making sure that they are in charge 25 of their modification work, that the contractors are working
20 1
for them, they're providing quality work, that they really 2
oversee what's going on, because I think that's a very 3
significant part of the utilities' responsibilities, and it's 4
one that I think that they're really -- the sense I get is, 5
there are very mixed signals as to how well the industry is 6
doing.
7 Some firms are very much aware of that problem and 8
are very much on top of it.
I think Farley is a good example 9
of that, But others are just waking up to the fact that these 10 things really are there jobs, and that they're their 11 modifications, and they had better make sure they are done 12 right.
'13 MR. TAYLOR:
We, as part of our outage program, 14 would be looking at that more deeply than is currently done, 15 and it's not much now.
And this comes under Section 11 of the a whole different setup than 16 ASME Code, and it's diff.orent 17 Section 3, which is the section for construction.
18 1 know what you're driving at, and the owner has a 19 very big responsibility under the conditions in Section 11, 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And I gather from some of 21 the utilities that this takes a major change, a culture 22 change, on the part of the vendors, too, because there are a 23 lot of vendors that have said, "Well, you know, people tell us 24 to do a job.
We do it our way and without interference."
And 25 this change, to make sure that the utility is in charge and le
21 1
getting what it's paying for, is a big change as far as the 2
vendor is concerned, too.
and we'll 3
MR. TAYLOR:
I'd like to understand 4
give you more on that later 5
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I was going to say, we have 6
all contributed to the problem.
We are halfway through the 7
first of 26 slides, and we'll never get through.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me mention, 9
Mr. Chairman, we've got 42 pages here, and so far we've made 10 it partly through one.
11 MR, TAYLOR:
I just want to point out that we are 12 continuing 13 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I really have to leave at 11:30, 14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Commissioner Zech has to 15 leave at 11: 30, and I assure you that I will not be here past 16 twelve.
17 MR. TAYLOR:
Okay.
We can talk more.
But the only 18 thing l*ll mention as part of the effort under the QA work, we 19 are continuing the design inspections.
We are getting results 20 and information that I think is important in the design area.
21 We are seeing errors, in many cases, the margin that is 22 provided in the design of these plants accommodates the types 23 of errorA we're finding.
I don't think that should come as a r
24 shock to the Commission.
But we are finding errors, and 1 25 think it's an important effort to both establish the assurance
22 1
in the design area and to point out weaknesses.
2 The next area I will move on to is enforcement.
The 3
only thing I would like to highlight here is 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTH4L:
Jim, excuse me.
I did have 5
a question I wanted to raise on the issue of QA, and that is, O
I notice you have dropped out things, or l guess this may be a 7
decision made collectively by Staff management.
O Both the evaluation of the designated rep program 9
and also the question of third-party audits has supposedly 10 been dropped out here for budgetary reasons.
11 Are we simply not going to --
12 MR. TAYLOR:
We had a Commission decision on the 13 designated rep.
That was a specific Commission action.
And 14 the third-party type audit, I don't think we've completely 15 cast that aside, but that we'd look at it in future 16 construction.
17 la that not right, Ted?
I mean, that would be where 18 we thought that that would be most beneficial, were there to to be a resurrection of restarts.
20 MR. DIRCKSs I thought we reported on that.
21 MR. TAYLOR:
We did report on the designated rep.
22 in fact, the Commission talked about 23 COMMISSIONER AS3ELSTINE:
The designated rep one, 1 24 remember.
But third-party audits, yes, I'd be interested to 25 know what the Staff policy is now on this.
23 1
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Well, the Staff's policy 2
would tell you that there is no policy in regard to that.
1 3
would strongly disagree with that.
4 MR. DIRCKS:
No, I thought 5
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
it became de rigueur for all 6
Cps.
7 MR. DIRCKS:
No.
I thought we reported on this to 8
the Commission.
We indicated that part of the QA 9
recommendations we thought were worthwhile proceeding with j
10 now.
But in view of the fact that we had no real construction I
11 programs going on right now in terms of initiating new l
12 construction, we thought, and we did say this to the 13 Ccmmission, we recommended not moving ahead with new programs r
14 on third-party audit, given the 20-some-odd construction 15 projects we had left, about 70 or 80 percent complete.
what 10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I guess I thought 17 I was interested in, for those projects that are coming in 18 now, the third-party reviews, thu lDVps, for example, as Tom 19 was pointing out, that we were fairly consistently 20 encouraging, those seem to have sort of dropped by the way.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
The Staff would never admit 22 that that " encouraged" w a,a in cuotes.
They would always 23 maintain that the utility came forward to do that I think 04 that was hogwash.
05 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE I would agree with you
20 1
that it's within quotes, but in any event, those seem to have 2
sort of dropped by the wayside.
I guess the last few plants 3
that have come down, those haven't been done, 4
Are we not encouraging, quote, those anymore?
5 MR. TAYLOR:
Ted, would you like to address that?
6 in some cases, we're accepting modified assurances 7
of what they've done in design, like engineering assurance 8
programs done by Stone & Webster, which are not so-called 9
IDVp, but systems set up by Stone & Webster at the behest and to paid for by the utilities, like at Millstone, where they have 11 set in motion an adequate assurance program in design, and we 12 have reviewed those.
13 Ted, would you like to hit the IOVp area?
14 MR. ANKRUM' Sure.
I would not say that we've 15 dropped away from our interest in this area at all, but we 16 have refined our approach to the issue.
17 in the beginning when we had the concerns about 18 design, and it was frankly the Diablo Canyon mirror image 19 problem that raised those concerns within the Staff, the quick 20 fix was a third-party audit.
21 COMMISSIONER HS$ELSTINE:
Not to mention Marble Hill l
l 22 and Zimmer and South Texas and several others, i
l 29 MR. ANKRUMi Yes.
Thu aggregation of all of those 24 plants said that really we should look at this area, and the i
l 25 NRC had not looked in that area before, and the NRC frankly l
I
25 1
did not have much of a capability to look in this area, 2
So while we were developing that capability, the 3
quick fix was to go for third party audits, and there was a 4
very aggressive program, as Commissioner Roberts has 5
mentioned, to get those third party audits done, 6
As we developed our own independent inspection 7
capability in the form of the lDis, we have had a much firmer 8
handle within the Staff of what constitutes a good design 9
- review, And given that experience, we have moved the IDUps 10 away from a sort of last-minute, third-party audit, which was 11 the quick fix to an Applicant-directed, utility-controlled 12 process, which is where the responsibility lies and where we 13 believe that the program should be in the long term, 14 Jim mentioned that we've called that an engineering 15 assurance program in the last three plants that had enough 10 lead time to be able t o <f o this in a planned way, and I will 17 use Nine Mlle point-2, Millstone-9, and South Texas as the 18 three plants where there was enough time to do this.
10 instead of being a last-minute, several-week effort, 20 this is an ongoing effort in these three plants, it's been 21 going on for at least a year, with the Staff right on top of 22 the process.
We review the scope at the beginning.
We go up 23 onsite and review what's going on during the inspection.
For 24 instance, we will have people onsite at Millstone-3 all next 25 waeek, looking at the Stone & Webster engineering assurance
20 1
program, which is being done by off-project people, but it is 2
the AE for the project.
And then we are writing an SER input on the results 4
of these engineering assurance programs.
I might also add 5
that the readiness review programs, which the Staff believes 6
may be a pertinent substitute for these third-party audits, 7
the concept of using the readiness review program in lieu of 8
an IDUp is undertaken at Vogtle and at WNp-3.
9 So the Staff has not backed away from its interest 10 in this area or the way it follows up.
We have just simply 11 had time to put this into the normal course of business in the 12 utility, and we're making sure that the utility is doing it.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I guess my concern is that 14 we not lose sight of the broader policy consideration, and 15 we're about to send a report or a letter up to the Congress.
to And I realize from your summary what the Commission has done l
17 here.
le i don't quite understand, then, in respect to the t
19 specific issue of designated reps, and I realize that there 20 was not great enthusiasm for that concept, and I also shared 21 that lack of enthusiasm, I should say, but you indicate here 22 that you deferred consideration, pending Licensee request for 23 a pilot program, and budget priorities preclude any activity 24 in this area.
25 le the correct statement that the Commission has
(-
27 1
contravened any further activities, or where are we on this 2
business?
Are we, in fact, waiting for a Licensee request for 3
a pilot program?
4 MR. TAYLOR:
There was some discussion among the 5
utilities of them starting a pilot program.
If that were to 6
occur, we'd be quite interested.
But from the standpoint of 7
our regulatory side proceeding to look ahead to a regulation I
8 imposing a designated rep, we definitely got the sense of the 9
Commission that they were not interested in that idea.
10 if this were started by a utility, I think we would 1 1.,
be quite interested to see what the results are.
I think 12 that's wnere we are.
l 13 B,i l l, do you see it'that way?
214 r4R. DIRCKS:
My memory is getting kind of vague, but 15 I thought'we had submitted a paper to the Commission, and we s.
1 did get some guidance back.
And so we left it that if the p
,4..
17 industry wanted to come. forward, we would work with them.
s O
18 We were not proposing a regulatory change to require 19 the
(
20
COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL:
No, I understand that.
21 MR, TAYLOR:
We,would be quite interested if s
22 somebody did it.
It wE
- talded about, c
s
,s 23 The next areaY 6at I wanteoto touch upon is t
24,.
dnforcemdnt.
As the Commission knows, there is an Advisory a v 25 Commitfee on Enforcement policy which has been meeting and t
i t,
s x
a 28 1
working.
We understand that they're supposed to finish the 2
report in August, 3
in the meantime, I guess principally I'd like to 4
mention that we're pressing hard to try to improve the 5
timeliness aspect of enforcement.
We're working hard with the 1
6 Regions.
That's been a major effort, and it is -- the process 7
does take time, and we're trying to improve that.
In the big 8
cases, it gets very difficult, particularly cases where we do 9
have to come to the Commission, and time does run on us.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is the current effort 11 still thirteen weeks?
12 MR. TAYLOR:
We brought it down -- it runs about 18 thirteen weeks.
We started a big effort in January to imprvve 14 that, and we're down -- we've pulled it down since the we're down, on the 15 beginning of January.
But I'm not 16 average on the major reactor cases, to about ten ten weeks.
17 But it's only the beginning of an effort to try to make it I
18 faster.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's just Staff l
20 processing time, right?
21 MR. TAYLOR:
That includes the time from the date of 22 the last inspection until the actual issuance of the 23 enforcement action.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Oh, so that includes the 25 ones the come down here, that I assume contribute a lot.
l 20 1
MR. TAYLOR:
At this time, Gene, that includes those 2
numbers, right?
3 MR. HOLLER:
That's correct, yes.
4 MR. TAYLOR:
And we have to watch our statistics.
5 That is a thumbnail sketch on our efforts in 6
enforcement.
7 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Well, before you leave that, S
you've got a bullet here, and I am very interested in the next 9
to the last bullet:
" Developing enforcement guidance for 10 actions against individuals, which is not covered in 11 IMC-0400."
12 I want to know what kind of individuals you are 13 talking about.
14 MR. TAYLOR:
I'm talking about licensed operators.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Licensed operators, all 16 right.
My second question is, do you have input from ELD from 17 this?
18 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes.
19 MR. DIRCKS:
Maybe I'll take a little response.
20 l've been pressing Jim on it.
21 Where a utility has met all of our requirements, 22 where they have sound procedures, and where an operator who 23 holds a license from us violates the company procedures, 24 violates our own regulations, much like FAA, I don't see why 25 we shouldn't take some action to bring home to bear on those
SO 1
individuals.
They hold a license from the United States 2
Government.
S COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I don't argue with that at 4
all 5
MR. DIRCKS:
And if they mess it up, we ought to 6
have some direct action to suspend him from his duties, take 7
him off shift, do something like that.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Will the Commission have the 9
opportunity to review this, or is this going to be a fait 10 accompli?
11 MR. DIRCKS:
No, it has to come forward to the 12 Commission.
18 MR. TAYLOR:
It will be part of a policy that you 14 have to agree to.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you.
Thank you.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I guess that raises a 17 question in my mind, though.
I understand the direct nexus 18 with licensed individuals.
But that same rationale would 19 apply to some unlicensed individuals who also have capability 20 to affect safe operation very significantly.
21 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
I haven't seen it lately, and it 22 may do something along that line.
I was just pushing on Es licensed people who hold a ticket from the U.S.
Government.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
A plant manager can do 25 things that are every bit as bad as what an operator can do.
31 1
MR. TAYLOR:
Right.
We are concentrating really to 2
look at operators who hold that special ticket, and in many 3
cases, it seems to point, as Bill mentioned, there are a 4
number of instances where everything else seemed to function 5
but the operator himself.
And I think when you see it, you'll 6
understand how we're approaching it.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
8 MR. MINOGUE:
What I plan to do in the interest of 9
time, these Vu graphs are tied to the six major areas of 10 research.
11 CSlide.]
12 in each area, I'll make a very brief summary of what 13 the basic safety questions are in that area that requires 14 research, and then from this long list, I'll select a few 15 highlights that I'll focus on.
And we'd welcome any questions 16 on any that I don't address specifically.
17 The first major area relates to the degradation 18 mechanisms in service.
There has been a pattern in this 19 industry of a number of -- as a matter of fact, I would 20 describe it as widespread instances of degradation in 21 service.
Often these mechanisms have been unanticipated.
22 They have consisted of a number of corrosion mechanisms, 23 neutron embrittlement, fatigue phenomena, and so on.
24 They have occurred in a way that can affect both the 25 integrity of the systems and the operability of the systems.
32 1
The research need largely grows out of the need to 1
2 identify what these mechanisms are.
3 Second, it relates to the problems of in-service 4
inspection and surveinlance.
There has been a great deal of in fact, I've described them as 5
difficulty over the years in the techniques of nondestructive 6
serious defects 7
examination, both in terms of their ability to detect flaws 8
and to characterize flaws.
They are also characterized by a 9
high level of subjectivity of the operators.
10 An element in the regulatory context is the ability 11 to assess the significance of flaws when they are detected, 12 because frequently there is a question of whether plants can 13 be allowed to continue to operate or whether a fix is 14 required.
15 Very closely related to this, is the issue of 16 defining the operating environment of equipment, so that the 17 testing that is done to verify designs, so-called 10 qualification testing, can be assured to contain the elements 19 that are necessary to assure the continued operability and 20 integrity of equipment throughout plant life.
21 So basically that's the safety issue that the 22 research program is aimed at This is an area, as you will 23 find, which will occur several other times as we go through 24 the research areas where there is also a significant industry 25 program.
And I won't keep saying it over and over again.
By
1 33 1
and large, the research that we do is carefully coordinated 2
with the industry program, either in consolidation of program 3
planning or in joint projects.
4 Let me pick out a few highlights from these 5
accomplishments.
I think it's a very important development, 6
as these plants get significantly older, that we have been 7
able to successfully make an arrangement with the Navy people 8
to get access to a large number of components from 9
Shippingport which will be examined to determine whether there 10 may have been degradation mechanisms that are not now 11 recognized.
i2 There are a large number of components in this plant 13 that are relevant to the current generation.
We're helped 14 very much by the fact that the Navy program is characterized 15 by very careful recordkeeping, so these are well characterized 16 components.
17 This has gone well in terms of the procedural 18 arrangements, the identification.
It, of course, ultimately
~
19 has to match the decommissioning schedule.
20 Another one I wanted tc mention as an example of 21 successful field tests that a'so resolved a safety question, 22 we had developed, one of our contractors, a computerized -- a 23 computer-enhanced ultrasonic testing process, the so-called 24 SAFT-UT, and it was successfully used to resolve some 25 conflicting data that we. Sad gotten from two commercial
84 1
inspection teams.
2 Another area I wanted to mention in terms of a
summarizing some real progress, we are just now completing the 4
on-the-spot testing on the NRC steam generator facility.
What 5
that is, is a very severely degraded steam generator that was 6
removed from a power plant that contains just about every type 7
of flaw known to man.
We have used that as a test bed to 8
qualify various procedures of nondestructive examination, and j
9 also it's been used by industry.
This is one of those joint 10 programs I've talked about.
11 in the same way, the on-the-spot testing has been 12 completed.
We are entering a phase of destructive 13 examination.
The idea of this really is to improve the 14 ability to characterize flaws.
If I were going to describe 15 where we stand today in this whole touchy area of in-service 16 inspection, I think the detection capability is in place, and 17 the characterization of flaws needs more work.
That's 1
18 basically what this current program is aimed at doing.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How did the costs break i
1 20 out on that one, Bob?
Is the industry participating fairly 21 substantially?
22 MR. MINOGUE:
I believe we pay about fifty percent, 23 and the rest is partly EpRI and partly a number of foreign 24 governments are involved.
I may leave one out.
I hope they 25 won't get mad when they read this in the transcript France
35 1
is in, Japan is in, I think Spain may be in.
I know there has 2
been some discussion of this.
So it's a mix.
But It's about 3
50/50.
4 The future of that facility is worth perhaps a brief 5
mention.
As it' stands now, we plant to decommission it.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Where is it?
7 MR. MINOGUE:
It's at Hanford.
In fact, it's worth 8
a visit.
If you want to ever see firsthand what we mean when 9
we talk about degradation in service, I would suggest you take 10 a look at it.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It is.
It's very 12 interesting.
13 MR. MINOGUE:
It is so bad that it really raises 14 some questions.
We often have talked about how many tubes can 15 fall all at once, and if you look at the condition of the 16 steam generator, you haue to face the fact that the 17 probability is not low that you'll get a failure of a whole 18 bundle at one time, if you look at the condition of the steam 19 generator.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, it's in pretty sad 21 shape.
22 MR. MINOGUE:
We're also doing a program of work, 23 and I've got an example on this list related to some looking 24 at weld overlays as a method of fixing pipe cracks that has 25 been done in support of licensing.
1 86 I really have to move 1
Before I leave this area 2
ahead, because I've got a lot to go through -- there is sort 3
of a question for the future that we're very conscious of.
4 There appears to be a significant move within the industry to 5
talk about extended life beyond the design life, and this is 6
going to raise a lot of questions, because if you have 7
equipment that is designed for a certain life, and you extend 8
the life, in some cases that mean nothing; in other cases it 9
may be quite significant 10 There is a real need here to take a hard look at the 11 basis on which equipment is qualified and its applicability to 12 extended life.
13 Let me go on to the next Vu-graph, which relates to 14 the s'acond broad area of research.
15 CSlide.]
16 This is the area of thermohydraulic transients.
17 Fundamentally, the driving problem that has called for a 13 research program here is that for many, many years, the 19 licensing evaluation and the safety consideration attempted to 20 characterize thermohydraulic transients by considering 21 large-break LOCAs in accordance with some rigidly prescribed 22 rules.
23 We have learned, as more and more plants come on 24 line and as we've had one major accident, that this is not an 25 accurate way to characterize risk, that the high risk
\\
i 37 1
sequences may be related to transients other than the 2
large-break LOCA.
So there is an international perception of 3
the need to broaden capability to look at the whole range of 4
thermohydraulic transients and break sizes.
5 This problem is exacerbated in terms of the NRC's 6
research program because of the lack of standardization of 7
U.S.
plants and the fact that not only are they not all the 8
same, but the extent to which these transients can be explored 9
in pre-op testing and startup testing is very, very limited, 10 and there has been no organized program, such as the Navy has 11 in its program of testing prototypes, so that we have a 12 situation where you really sort of have to wait for something 13 to happen on one plant and ana l yze the relevance of that to 14 other plants of somewhat similar but not precisely the same 15 design.
16 This requires an analysis capability that is quite that is, the use of computer codes that have to 17 extensive 18 be developed, broadly applicable, because of the wide range of 19 designs, and well validated, so that you can believe their 20 results with some confidence.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What have we done, Bob, to 22 try and respond to the rather pointed criticisms that were 23 levied precisely in that area in the ApS source term report 24 MR. MINOGUE:
Well, there were no criticisms, to my 25 knowledge.
I'm talking about the thermohydraulic codes.
33 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL Those particular codes, i 2
see.
Well, more broadly speaking, then, what are we doing to 3
address the concerns raised about them in the area of 4
benchmarking codes and the quality assurance?
5 MR. MINOGUE:
There's a different level of maturity, 6
so l e *, me answer your question by talking about these codes, 7
because they are further along, and you can see how the 8
process goes.
There are multiple steps involved.
9 First, you can and should challenge these codes with 10 hard data.
And typically the pattern here and in other 11 countries has been to build experimental facilities.
The list 12 is quite long.
13 COMM I SS I ONER BERNTHAL:
Right.
14 MR. MINOGUE:
Which can run tests that are really 15 designed to challenge the code, to make sure of its 16 applicability, and that program, of course, has been done very 17 extensively.
18 in a similar way on a smaller scale, you can do 19 separate effects testing that can be aimed at assessing 20 elements in the code that model particular physical 21 phenomena.
You can attempt to verify that 22 There's a broader type of review that in a sense 23 comes from user experience, and that right now is being 24 organized in this area in a very structured way.
All of the 25 users have pooled together in a process of evaluation and
39 1
mutual validation and cross-comparison in an effort to -- in a 2
sense, it's a sort of peer review among the people involved 3
internationally in this kind of effort, and that is something 4
that's going on quite intensively right now.
5 Now the stuff that the APS talked about, some of 6
those codes are not very mature, and what I would take them as 7
saying is that we need to improve the level of maturity of 8
some of these codes before we start to use the result broadly, 9
and that is something i think we would all agree with.
10 They're not as far along.
11 I think the fundamental process, though, it's not an 12 appeal to some external authority in the sense of a poor 13 review alone.
You really have to challenge codes by hard 14 data, and I think that underlies it it's t r' in the seismic 15 area 3 it's true in the severe accident area, it's true in the 16 thermohydraulic area.
You have to challenge codes with hard 17 data, and you've got to get a challenge involved, as the users 18 apply this stuff, that really would look at the applicability 19 of c.od e s to different configurations and the validity when so 20 applied.
And it has to be a combination of all these.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
1 don't disagree, but it whether it's a question of maturity 22 seemed like they were they were wondering if maybe the child 23 o
whatever it is 24 was being properly disciplined as he matured, so to speak.
25 Have we done anything to --
l 40 1
MR. MINOGUE:
tJe l l, I think one of the codes that 2
they were talking about, I think, clearly did need much more 3
attention to QA.
4 MR. ROSS:
I just want to remind the Commission, 5
there was another ApS review ten years ago on these codes.
6 They left a very detailed legacy of report, things that we 7
ought to do to these codes, and speculated that it would take S
a decade.
9 Okay, it took a decade, and we've done what they 10 said.
11 MR. MINOGUE:
On the thermohydraulic codes.
12 MR. ROSS:
On the thermohydraulic codes.
And our 18 technical report which is in nearly complete assembly will 14 specifically address what the ApS said then and how we fixed 15 it 16 MR. MINOGUE:.Thore is a residual problem.
I don't 17 want to talk too long about this.
But when we -- we, being us when all the current tests 18 and the other countries involved 19 are finished, there is a need in the outyears which I think is 20 particularly critical in the U.S.,
because as transients 21 occur and you have to apply these to other not-quite-the-same 22 plants, there are going to be a lot of issues about the 23 applicability of these codes.
They are going to have to have 24 the same kind of challenge and the same kind of tests.
25 They are not mature enough to just say, "I
can use
41 1
them to analyze any thermohydraulic transient that comes 2
along."
3 MR. DIRCKS:
And I think that's the basis for a lot 4
of these international discussions.
5 MR. MINOGUE:
Yes.
6 MR. DIRCKS:
The other countries want to get 7
involved in the use of these codes, and I think they can only 8
do so when they enter into some rigorous protocols, so that we 9
can gain the advantage of what they're finding out and feed it 10 back into our codes, and we would supply the code assistance 11 from there.
12 COf1M I SS I ONER ASSELSTINE:
How successful have we 13 been in assuring that these codes are accurate predictors, a
14 given the variations in the plants here?
15 MR. MINOGUE:
Well, I think only within the 16 framework of the program established, veh i ch looked at some 17 well identified transients.
So l'd say, with the stuff that 18 you know about now, when the present work is completed, you'll 19 be in good shape.
20 When the transient that nobody thought of occurs two 21 months from now or six menths from now, I think the chances 22 are pretty good that there may be in some cases some questions t
I 23 about the applicability.
24 Let me give you an example.
When the Ginna 25 transient occurred, it appeared necessary to Denton and his
a 42 1
people that we do some testing on SEMISCALE to assess the 2
applicability of the codes to that particular class of 3
transient as it would occur in other plants, and I think 4
that's going to happen again.
5 But if I knew about it now, it would be in the 6
program already.
It's really more of a longer-term capability 7
that we're trying to structure.
8 Let me go very quickly through let's turn to the 9
next Vu-graph.
10 CSlide.3 11 1 just want to kind of run through what the status 12 of some of the major programs is.
I will begin by bragging a 13 little bit for myself and my colleagues in the other 14 programs.
This whole area is characterized by projects that 15 are on schedule and on or under budget, and they involve some 16 pretty large construction and construction to very tight 17 standards, so I think it's an area where all of us that are ourselves, the industry people, and the foreign 18 involved can take some pride in.
19 countries 20 The pWR program in the West 6nghouse configuration at 21 this stage is residual testing on SEMISCALE, and I mentioned 22 the type of work that is.
And then testing in Japan and in 23 Germany, although the testing in Germany has not yet started, 24 on very large-scale loops that were built under the 20,30 25 program, thuy are basically all on schedule.
Rosa-4, although
i 1
OS 1
they're not technically part of the 2D,3D program, it's sort 2
of the last stage of this effort, and it's being dedicated and 3
is about to go into testing service this week.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Where is that one located?
5 MR. MINOGUE:
It's at Tokal in Japan.
6 Now all of the large-scale test stuff is being built 7
in other countries.
I think with us the trend is the other 8
way.
We're looking hard at how we might be able to build the 9
future generation I've talked about on a much smaller scale.
10 in fact, there's a test loop at the University of Maryland 11 that is very small-scale.
One of the thing it's looking for, 12 hopefully, is that we might be able to do some of this testing 13 in very small-scale loops.
14 Going on to the next Vu-graph, the BWR 15 configurations.
16 CSlide.]
17 This is of some significance, of course, because of 13 TMI.
Again, this program is on schedule.
There were two 19 phases of the program.
There was a first phase, the so-called 20 Otis program, on which the testing has been completed.
The 21 facility, which is a modified facility originally built for 20 the Germans, has been modified in what is called the MIST 23 configuration.
That modification is just now being completed, I believe it's scheduled for the 24 and testing should start 25 and of this year, the beginning of next year.
It's all on
o 40 1
schedule, and the feeling of the licensing people is that the 2
Otis results to date have provided enough confidence in the 3
kinds of issues raised on the TMl configuration to provide.a 4
basis for licensing.
So they regard the MIST testing as 5
confirmatory in nature.
6 The GE loop, the so-called FIST loop, has completed 7
its testing, again on schedule and so on.
8 We are looking at all of these as a group.
We are 9
looking at some alternatives for the future, which I touched 10 on briefly, and one of those alternatives would be to move 11 these loops to one location to be available for further 12 testing.
That is by no means a settled matter, but it is 13 something that we're looking at as one of a number of 14 alternatives.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's that other facility 16 that yeu've been talking about?
17 MR. MINOGUE:
Well, at one point we talked about a 18 really goldplated, mult; purpose loop that would do any kind of 19 configuration with careful spooling, so you could change 20 configuration quickly.
That's a good idea in concept, but 21 when you get down to it in detail, it looks prohibitively 22 expensive.
l 23 COMfi l SS I ONER ASSELST I NE :
What would the costs be 24 for something like that?
l 25 MR. MINCOUE:
I don't really recollect the numbers
45 1
offhand.
I think we were looking at something like $60 2
million.
3 MR. ROE;
$60 million plus.
4 MR. MINOGUE:
it was in that range.
We were warned 5
of that by EPRI.
When we first started talking about it, they f
6 said that they had thought about the same thing several years 7
earlier and decided it was prohibitive.
8 This point came up earlier.
Before I leave these, 9
all these are joint programs that have been started within the 10 last five years, where typically our percentage is 42 11 percent That's sort of the GE formula, we've called it.
And 12 the balance would be EpRI, the manufacturer, and the owners 13 group pooling their contributions in some range.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is there joint direction 15 for each of those projects?
16 MR. MINOGUE:
.it has really worked yes, they are 17 directed by a committee, a program managemen t group, where
)
IS unanimity is a requirement, and everybody knows that if they 19 don't reach a unanimous decision, we'll stop sending food in 20 after the first five hours.
And it has worked.
It's really 21 remarkable.
22 Hil of these facilities have run on schedule.
The 23 programs have been completed.
The results have good 24 acceptability, and they are actually run by committees.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Maybe we should try that 4
l 40 1
technique on the Commission.
No food after five hours.
2
[ Laughter.3 3
MR. MINOGUE:
I didn't mean that 4
Claughter.3 5
MR. MINOGUE:
That's a cliche from the standards 6
committees, where there's a dissent among different points of lock the door and stop 7
view, and the joke is to stop 8
sending in food, Nobody leaves until there's consensus.
9 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Consensus or unanimity?
10 MR. MINOGUE:
Consensus implies that everybody has 11 to be prepared to give a little bit.
let's keep 12 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
That's not 13 going.
14 MR. MINOGUE:
Let me skip the next Vu-graph, because 15 I think we really have discussed these points, and go on to 16 the ECCS rule revision 17 CSlide.3 IG This is an interesting example of some of the 19 difficulties you run into when you try to apply research 20 results to a regulatory centext, because although everybody 21 agrees that the Appendix K mortgage was paid off several years 22 ago -- that is, the work I've been describing is for the range the fact is, we've had 23 of accidents, not large-break LOCAs 24 some difficulties figuring out how to fold this into a 25 regulatory context.
F
.+
1 07 and I think this approach is 1
Where we stand now 2
going to work -- we have gotten the affected industry people 3
to do some calculations using their models of the margins that 4
would be provided as these results are applied.
We are in the 5
last stages of developing a technical report, which could be this says a peer review 6
put out broadly for a peer review but actually an earlier version of that report 7
in December S
will be available within a month or so to go out for a broad to provide a solid consensus on the science that 9
review 10 could then be used to underlie any rulemaking action, and that l
11 appears to be the right approach, I think, going at it this l
12 way, rather than try to deal with the two together.
l l
13 Get the science laid out and agreed to first.
Then 14 move to the rule changes 1
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Bob, before you leave l
16 that, I know time is short, but if you could spend just a I
l 17 couple more minutes talking about the difficulties in taking 18 the research results and then translating them into the 19 changes, because I think this is one of the areas where there 20 are big misconceptions out there, fed in part by some of the 21 people that have been doing some of this work for us over the 22 years, quite frankly, i
23 This notion that we knew years and years ago that we i
24 had enough information to make changes, and the Commission 25 never takes research results and makes changes in its
1 1
4D 1
regulations, if you would talk about some of the difficulties 2
and the challenges that are involved in that process, it might 3
be helpful 4
MR. MINOGUE:
Well, let me rattle off some points, 5
but recognize it's as they coma to mind and not in any order 6
of priority.
7 Certainly up front, a major difficulty is, for 8
somebody who has a license and has set all these problems 9
behind him, generally they're not eager to reopen an issue 10 that basically takes a limiting case, non-realistic model, 11 scraps it and replaces it with a realistic model.
That 12 implies additional analyses and so on.
13 There was a lot of reluctance of people who felt, 14
" Gee, we have a demonstrated conservative model Why do you 15 want to reopen this question?
We're operating."
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
17 MR. MINOGUE:
There's another element that there are 18 vested interests involved in doing and reviewing these 19 analyses.
There is a certain reluctance to give up empires, 20 because fundamentally, if you begin to apply more realistic 21 models, a lot of things that you've been doing will be 22 scrapped.
There's resistance to that.
23 1 think a major factor has been concern about the 24 possibility of an extensive hearing on this very, very complex 25 issue which ten years of work have gone into, people are very
49 1
reluctant, both in the agency and in industry, to take any 2
risk at all of a hearing that goes into great detail on all 3
these scientific questions on a matter which, in a sense, is 4
resolved.
5 Recognize that the primary purpose of this program 6
when it was initiated was to demonstrate conservatism, and it 7
did that The regulations that are on the books are 8
adequately conservative.
A lot of people would say, "Stop 9
right there."
To say, "Well, I want to go the next step and 10 begin to do realistic analyses," raises some questions.
11 So these have all been problems.
12 On the plus side, I think there's a clear perception 13 that realistic analyses improve the safety assessment very 14 significantly.
They improve your ability to train operatcrs.
15 They improve the ability of the utility to refine operations 16 and possibly get some sLgnificant cost savings, modify set 17 points, and so on.
So there are seme big pluses, too.
But IS it's the balance between these.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's a message that I'm 20 not sure we've gotten out, quite frankly, as well as we need 21 to, because I think more than anything else, this is the 22 example that people who were critical of our research effort 23 and the way it's interlaced into our regulatory program point 24 to.
And it's fed, quita frankly, by seme of the people who 25 have been involved in this project for years and years, And 1 I
1 50 1
think we've got to figure out a better way to get that message 2
across to people, that it's not all clearcut and all one-way, 3
that there are some other competing considerations that have 4
to be evaluated.
5 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I agree with that.
I think it's 6
very important.
I think it merits, perhaps, some special I
l 7
attention, because i don't think we're getting the message 8
across as well as we should.
I think you're making l
l 9
significant progress and improvements to programs that simply j
l 10 aren't recognized, and I think it's important that somewhere 11 or other we figure out how to articulate that a little better l
12 in areas where it can be helpful to us.
I agree.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Maybe this process that 14 you've described here and the report that we'll get in the 15 paper is the way to try and solve that, 10 MR, M I NOGlJE :
Also, we have gotten formal letters 17 from two of the major manufacturers, saying quite explicitly l
10 that they thing this stuff can be applied.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I think that's exactly right, 20 Bob, but I'm afraid we're not getting it out far enough, i
21 think you're doing fine, but I think 22 MR. MINCOUE:
I'll say it in a nutshell.
There has 23 been a lot of industry opposit6cn to changing this rule, and 24 it's been very intense.
25 COMMIGSIONER ZECH:
yes.
L
51 1
MR. MINOGUE:
A lot of it.
2 MR. DIRCKSt I think what you're saying is, how do 3
we get people to understand the role of research and its 4
relationship to the nuclear regulatory 5
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Because clearly there's a lot 6
of misunderstanding.
7 MR. DIRCKS:
An awful lot.
It's not only in this 8
country.
We know through the OECD that Denny is sitting on 9
a committee, and we're finding it running throughout all these 10 major nuclear countries.
11 Now that they've deployed these reactors, there's a 12 tendency to pull back from a research program.
And it's 13
' disturbing, I think, to the people who manage these operations 14 to feel the support for a research program eroding.
There's a 15 feeling that, why bring us more problems?
Why upset the 16 applecart?
Why raise more questions?
17 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Well, it's not only in industry 18 in this country, really, it's in other industries 19 MR. DIRCKS:
And around the world.
20 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
and other countries around 21 the world.
20 Research is something that, in my experience, is not 23 necessarliy appreciated, but I must say that in many cases, 24 too, there has not been enough understanding of it, and there 25 hasn't been enough, really, effort put in to try to show how
e+
52 1
it does have direct application.
2 You know, it's difficult, because you've got 3
different kinds of research.
You've got the longer range type 4
basic research.
Then you've got applied research or call it 5
what you will.
But most people are looking for results, and 6
it does get involved in the budget.
You've got to show 7
somewhere or other how people are making a contribution to 8
safety.
9 I think we can do that I think Bob's program, he's to telling us here and has before, does really make a direct 11 application of safer plants.
And all I'm saying is, I think 12 we, all of us collectively, should try to figure out a better 13 way to get that message out in a factual, honest way that can 14 be understood better.
it's not 15 And it's a challenge.
It hasn't been 10 just our challenge s it's others, too, but it seems to me that 17 the research program is extremely valuable.
We know what's 18 happened this year as far as the cuts are concerned, and it 19 concerns me that we've cut it as much as we have, but we've 20 got to figure out a better way to realistically and honestly 21 support it, and I think it deserves some special attention.
22 MR. DIRCKS:
We're trying, We're trying all 23 avenues.
We're trying the international route to get a 24 consensus of what research means in nuclear programs, We are 25 trying through )he National Academy of Science to get some
1 53 1
understanding from them as to the meaning of the research in 2
the nuclear S
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I applaud your efforts, and as 4
far as the Commission is concerned, I think we should do what 5
we can to help you, too, so 18 11 just ask you to let us know.
6 MR. OIRCKSt Well, as we get the input in from these 7
various sectors, we're going to keep coming back O
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Maybe you can give us some 9
recommendations, so we can support you better ourselves.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me just make a comment.
11 One of the ways that you maintain credibility in research and it doesn't matter what program it is s it's 12 programs is by consistent, thorough, independent, 13 universally true 1
14 outside review of programs, whether it's in fusion research, 15 whether it's in nuclear physics, if it's high energy physics, 1
l 16 It's heat path, and, you know, we've talked about this, and I i
17 suppose in a sense it's a kind of free enterprise, 18 noncentralized theory and approach to research, as tends to be l
l l
10 applied in a lot of other areas these days -- but when l
00 research and the broad direction of research is left in the i
21 hands of the scientific community, and you require some kind 22 of consensus in the scientific community itself, and the 23 people are actually doing the work requiring them to justify 24 their programs, thun I think you ultimately achieve a degree 25 of credioliity that you simply can't achieve trying to direct
54 1
the programs in some kind of centralized fashion.
2 I can assure you that the thing that has credibility 3
on the hill, whether it's high energy physics or nuclear 4
physics or fusion research, and I suspect safety research in 5
nuclear programs, in our programs as well, is the group of i
6 peers who are active in the field, s i t t i ng d own, looking at 7
the budget, i coming in and saying, "This is the way we 8
think the money should be spent."
And there are very few 9
people on Capitol Hill that will presume to argue with a group 10 like that.
11 My point is that I think perhaps that's a concept 12 that we might consider as well.
~
13 MR. MINOGUE:
Let me make two comments.
First, i 14 passed it quickly because we had covered it earlier.
15 We do have a structured code assessment program, 16 involving all the counteles, all of the expert people, that is 17 in place and is structured in a very formal way, that has 18 given us an independent assessment, and that certainly speaks 19 to your first point.
It is intended, in fact, to do precisely 20 what you suggest 21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
Let me make one other 22 point, Bob, too.
23 in one area, you've done precisely this, and I think 24 the conclusion has been one that I trust we're going to act 25 on, and that was in this area of steam explosions.
e w
g i
55
.o, 4*
1 And I do also want to ask a question of how many y
y.
2 such a r ew.s there are,in severe accident research that need K'
3 linmed i a t e, careful, and structured attention?
.s But that's wbat we finally did, as you know.
As you
~
4 4
5 know far better than i do, we s a t down, we got a L
i 6
world-recognized group to look at the problem, and I think the
+.., '
4 4
N,7 conclusion was tkat for ths take o+'
public confidence, if for 8
no other reason, it deserrved somas further research and i
9 attention.
And I think that kind of thing has credibility.
10 MR. MINOGUE:
Of course, that type of thing, we've 11 done beford.. Th a t ' s a specific subtask.
I
)
12 iThe wr.c l e severe accidbbt area, we're about to sO L
f s,'
s.
t eche,1 ce l' r.iepov,t that.putis everything together for
.L 13
' pubIish a
+
- (-
.g
~. - i s,
b'had revlaw.
But the specific subproblems, we've done that a 14
\\
15
' l o t '.
15 The other thing 1 want to comment on beinfly before e-17 wie pa.u it, t hough', you car. ' t relate this review we're talking i
18 about to budgeting.
You have to realize that the code work i
(
19 *
..and thermohydraulic work, what NRC funds of that is only a I.,
y l
'smalI fraction of the total Most of that work is being done 20 21 in other countrles.
So I chn't think it's necessarily I
22 relevant.
But we agree very strongly with your view that the
[23 w
l science requires a hard review, an independent review, by si 1
l, 23' everyone with expertise who is interested enough to take a
-i k
6
\\
i_;
g, s
Wi
50 1
look at it I think that's something we share your views on.
2 Let me go ahead to the severe accident area.
Maybe 3
we can pick the pace up a little bit.
4 CSlide.]
5 This area relates to what I will describe as the 6
proper characterization of the hazards and the risks 7
associated with accidents in which fuel damage occurs.
it l
8 really was initiated as a result of TMI, because TMl showed 9
quite clearly that the characterization of such severe 10 accidents with some simple source term type numbers was not an 11 accurate characteri=ation, and this was significant in terms 12 of the situation as it arose, the kind of operational 13 decisions required, the conditions for which equipment was 14 designed, the various type of engineering safeguards.
15 There were real questions about the adequacy of the 10 regulations to provide a proper base for responding 17 Intelligently to such a severe accident, and second, the 18 adequacy of the understanding, such as was developed in 19 WASH-1400, to provide a proper characteri=ation of the 20 relative risks associated.
21 So the underlying theme of all this, I would relate 22 to operations and operations capability, the quantification of I
23 risk, and determination of conditions that equipment has to 24 survive under.
25 To do a research program in this area in a vacuum,
57 1
to identify all the phenomenology and study it, would have 2
been a 50 year program and not in any way sensible.
So very 3
early on, Bill Dircks set up a SARps special review group that under the chairmanship of Denny Ross --
4 was composed of 5
which was composed of high-level guys from each of the 6
affected offices, which has consistently from the beginning of 7
this program provided an overview and has really provided a O
program direction, with the main intent of that being to make 9
sure that what was dealt with, what needed to be dealt with to 10 enable the decisions and the regulatory applications to be 11 made was dealt with, and it was dealt with in a way that would 12 be acceptable to the regulatory staff that would have to deal 13 with that.
14 So that committee has played a very major role in this is an 15 the direction of this program.
They've produced 16 older version that is being revised now, the SARp, Severe 17 Accident Research plan.
They meet regularly, and Denny Ross 18 is here, and 1 may call on him to assist me in answering some 19 questions on it.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Bob, there's so much here t il e left, what would be of most interest, to me 21 and so little m
22 at least, is if you could briefly summarl=e the major areas of 23 uncertainty in severe accidents that you feel we need to focus 24 the research effort on.
25 I realize some of this may still be undergoing
1 50 1
evaluation.
But we mentioned one a few minutes ago, the APS and others, not just the APS report -- which seemed 2
report 3
to concur on the question of core concrete interaction.
4 How many such fairly well-defined, discrete problems 5
of significance are there that need to be put to bed, and can 6
be on some predictable timetable, in your judgment, and what 7
would they by?
8 MR. MINOGUE:
I'd be glad to do that.
9 Let me first break the accidents into two groups.
10 l'Il call them arrested accidents and non-arrested accidents.
11 in arrested accidents, you damage the core
'12 severely.
You release a lot of activity, but you don't have a 13 meltthrough.
TMI was such an accident.
14 That program involves phenomenology that would be 15 involved in the characterization of the mechanisms of core 16 damage and the propagation of that damage, the type of thing 17 you might do by in-pile testing.
I think that general area is 18 adequately resolved.
I think that's what the ApS concluded as 19 well 20 if you go to the next stage and say, "What happens 21 ex-core, and to what extent is all of the phenomenology there 22 fully understood," I think it's a fact that there are some 4
23 questions that remain regarding the possible deposition 24 mechanisms or behavior of some of the fission products, 25 particularly within the primary system envelope, for which we
59 1
don't have a complete database, nor is it clear to me that we 2
really need one.
This is something that the APS review 3
focused on as requiring more work.
4 The industry now is doing work in that area, because 5
of their concern about the economic investment.
6 Another area would be the 7
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
When you say "the industry,"
8 what is the vehicle?
Is that always EPRi?
9 MR. MINOGUE:
That's EPRI working -- they're using to some DOE facilities, and they also are participating, as EPRI, 11 in some of the foreign programs, as are we.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
But EPRI is the primary --
13 MR. MINOGUE:
EPRI is the primary.
Oh, yes, as far 14 as the planning of the activity, it's EPRI.
I 15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Okay.
16 MR. MINOGUE:.Although we're involved in this.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I understand.
13 MR. MINOGUE:
We're mutually part of each other's 19 programs.
But generally, our work, if you look at our stuff, 20 we tend to focus on the end-of-spectrum stuff where there's a 21 public safety ha=ard involved.
EPRI will tend to focus on the 22 things that may involve contamination that might affect the i
23 integrity investment They also bear on the safety question, it's really two ends of the same 24 but the orientation 25 spectrum.
CO 1
The other area, I think, is the question of 2
mechanisms of aerosol formation that might be involved because 3
of some particular situation that might arise in a particular 4
configuration, because of the way the plant is laid out, or a 5
material that might be available.
It isn't evident t o me that 6
there won't be questions raised on that as we move into the 7
next stage of the applications of these results to particular 8
plants, either what licensing might do, or more likely what 9
might happen as a result of some utility coming in and making 10 proposals for modifications.
11 Now that's the easy part, because what I've said to 12 you in a nutshell is, I think those matters are largely 13 resolved.
I think there are some phenomenological questions 14 that APS raised that we need an answer to, but we're not 15 looking at a big, long-term mortgage.
16 The other question relates to the non-arrested 17 sequences.
And there, I think there's a fundamental issue 18 that as you get a complete core melt, you have a tremendous 19 amount of energy, you have reaction with a wide range of 20 materials, the plants are all different, there comes some 21 point where one has to say, "We fully understand the risks that 22 that deal with and the risks that we don't deal with,"
23 is, we can characterize the residual risk.
24 It isn't evident to me that that matter will be 25 completely resolved in the near future.
I think there may
i 01 1
develop, just as this thing goes through a broader public 2
review process, there may develop some issues that relate to 3
full-blown core melts and the phenomenology associated with 4
that and the extent to which you can characterize that with 5
some limiting models that make sense, that aren't too 6
conservative, and that you're sure are conservative.
7 1 think there are a lot of residual questions 8
there.
Basically', our program -- we made a decision some time 9
ago not to go to really high-temperature testing, temperatures 10 that were achieved in the TMi accident, and we didn't do 11 testing at those ranges.
I don't regret that decision, but 12 that basically there's an underlying presumption that in a 13 full-blown core melt accident, there is an acceptance of a l
14 database that is much less than complete.
15 To say we've done enough and we can stop exploring 16 this 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But can you 18 MR. MINOGUE:
Can I say one more sentence?
The ApS 19 does not appear to need to have raised any question on the 20 wisdom of that decision.
In fact, I think 6t's fair to say 21 that they do not argue that we should do further in-pile 22 testing at high temperatures.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But can you define for us it may 24 things likw, for example, aerosol formation?
That's 25 be in hand, but it's a pretty arcane and terribly complex area
e' C2 1
of physical chemistry.
2 But what are the specific areas?
We've heard about 3
steam explosions.
Clearly the issue of core concrete 4
interaction was raised.
5 MR. MINOGUE:
Yes.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How many such identifiable 7
problems that you could sort of define a research program, if G
it's necessary, to resolve or not resolve the problem in some 9
definite period of time and go to the Congress and say, "We've 10 sat down the community of scholars on this subject, and we've
\\
11 decided that we need to get the work done, and it's going to 12 cost $30 million?"
13 How many things like that are there?
14 MR. MINOGUE:
That's your non-arrested sequences.
15 The examples you cite are non-arrested sequences.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHALt Right i know that that was 17 the word.
18 MR. MINOGUE:
And let me just talk about that a 19 little bit.
20 How you get a meltthrough, whether it's localized or 21 wideopread, melting a lot of the pressure vessel, whether it 22 occurs rapidly or slowly, what kind of materials you then 23 encounter, what's the exact configuration of the concrete there are 24 under the reactor, what's its composition how does all of that affect the 25 different types of concrete
C3 1
types of activity released or the aerosol production.
2 And the answer is, it does affect it.
We know that 3
much.
And to study all of those combinations and 4
permutations, I think, is a staggeringly large program.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, does that mean we 6
aren't going to try, or we can't define it for the Congress, 7
or what's we do not plan an 8
MR. MINOGUE:
We are not doing 9
extensive program on non-arrested sequences.
10 COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL:
Of core concrete 11 interaction.
12 MR. MINOGUE:
Core concrete interaction, really of 13 the characteristics of a meltthrough, the localization or 14 non-locall=ation, the amount of steel that's involved.
That 15 affects the production of flammable gases.
16 COMMIS$10NER BERNTHAL:
And the community agrees, 17 despite what appear to be concerns to the contrary raised in 18 the ApS report, the community at this point agrees that one 19 really --
20 MR. MINOGUE:
I think it would be premature to say 21 that the community agrees with that The people who plan core 22 concrete programs, which is us and the Germans, plan only very 23 limited programs.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So we've named two.
Aro 25 there any others that fall in this broad category?
1 C4 1
MR. ROSS:
You asked how many?
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I'm just trying to get a 3
sense of how many programs we could define.
4 MR, ROSS:
Eight.
Now what we have done 5
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL.
What are they?
6 MR. ROSS:
Well, I was afraid you were going to ask 7
that.
8 Claughter.3 9
MR, ROSS:
Let me explain a little bit more.
We 10 took the eighteen specific experimental recommendations, the 11 analytical recommendations, from ApS, which were also part and 12 parcel of our own specialist review that we had prior to the 13 ApS.
So I think this would constitute reasonable problem 14 definition by the academic or the technical community.
15 We regrouped these for administrative convenience 10 into a set of eight.
I,can't get them all 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Just give us a few, so we 1G can get some sense.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Then you can send us the 20 list of the eight.
21 MR. ROSBs
- Well, I'm going to be more specific.
22 When we publish our Staff report, NUREG-00SG, what we have in this chapter is and it's essentially 23 that report is Chapter 8 for the research.
it 24 essentially written 25 defines and it lists these eight areas and tells what we plan
e i
C5 1
to do and why we plan to do it and when we plan to get it 2
done.
3 With a little bit of work, we could even put a price 4
tag on it, although that's not part of the repor t at present, 5
but we have it from other sources.
it sort of gathers 6
And it's going from the core 7
issues up as you follow the melt progression into the 8
containment.
The end was containment failure modes.
That 9
would be one of the eight.
That's certainly important.
10 And then the general area of how the melt 11 progression occurs from the initially impacted core, aerosol 12 generation and trapping within the primary system, timing and 13 mode of lower vessel failure as a melt collapses down into the 14 thing.
15 A major area where we do need to refine these 16 analytical models is in ESF, engineering safety feature 17 effectivenese s pool scrubbing, which the ApS culled outs and 10 ice condenser thing, both of which need fixing, and then the 19 general aerosol generation and settling in the containment.
20 Now those are the phenomena that Bob just 21 mentioned, if it's of immediate interest, what we could do is 22 just send you the version of Chapter 8 we have, which has all l
l 23 the specificity you need.
l 24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think that would be I
25 helpful i
1 C3 1
MR. ROSS:
Does the technical community agree?
l 2
think so, because we drew upon the ApS report to write our 3
"Further Research" chapter.
But as Bob said, it's not a 4
comprehensive 50 year program.
But we think it's adequate.
5 MR. MINOGUE I think the con.munity should only be 6
seen as agreeing in the sense that there's a presumption that 7
you limit yourself to certain groups of accidents, that it's G
not all possible accidents.
If you start talking all possible 9
accidents, I think the variation among plants is sufficiently 10 large, the variation of materials, the location and 11 orientation of stuff, that you very quickly get to a program 12 that's just completely out of reason.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I would be interested 14 in seeing 15 MR. ROSS:
Let me give one more answer, Commissioner 10 Sernthal.
17 When you started your question, you asked about 18 uncertainties in the context of r sk.
Remember now that 10 everything we've talked about in the last five minutes is 20 uncertainties on consequences, given that the accident occurs.
21 We have a parallel program outside of what we're l
l 22 talking here, in the next slide, on the front end.
How likely 23 is it that a given dominant sequence occurs?
We have to 24 convolute that into the uncertainty.
We're doing that as part 25 of our program, but we haven't talked about it yet.
I i
07 l
1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you.
I would like to 2
see the specifics on what you've broken out.
It kind of gets 3
back to the point Lando had made earlier.
I have to go back 4
to steam explosions, because that's one that it seems to me we l
l 5
put in a box, and there's been an expert recommendation on l
6 what needs to be done, if not exactly the dollars, and I 7
cannot imagine that if we went to the Congress and said, "This O
needs to be resolved as a matter of public confidence.
It's a 9
well-defined issue," that they would not give the money to do 10 It.
I think we can bet the money to do things like that, and 11 that's kind of the applied side.
12 These more basic long-term problems, then you have 13 to justify on a rather different basis, as basic research, 14 things that we all feel that we need to know and that are good 15 to do and nice to do for fundamental knowledge.
But it seems 16 to me they are two rather different things there.
17 The ones that I think wu can get the money for, if 10 we define the problem well, in the context, in the way that 19 the steam explosion problem was defined, for example, or, 20 "This is a problem for plants today.
This agoney has got to 21 resolve the problem, if we're going to have public confidence, 22 and we need the money, and let's get about it and do it."
23 That's the reason I'd like to see these specifics.
24 MR. MINOGUE:
In some cases, the problem may arise 25 down a track of sequences that is sufficiently improbable
03 1
that, in fact, it would be a waste of the taxpayers money to 2
try to deal with it 3
COMMISSIONER BERNTHHL:
That may well be, but 4
MR. MINOGUE:
That element is present here.
That's 5
something that Mr. Wilson tried to raise.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And there are those who 7
argued steam explosions were in that category.
But then one 8
also has to take into account public confidence, and if you've O
got some group of scholars who are arguing vehemently the 10 opposite, sometimes you have to --
11 MR, MINOGUE:
That's the point I was trying to make 12 earlier.
That's enactly it.
The problem is, when you start 13 looking at some of these highly improbably events, you get 14 Into a klnd of never-never land where people have to agree up 15 front as to what level of probability is acceptable or would 16 require further attention, because it might relate to some of 17 these theoretically possible phenomenology.
IG Any time you've got that much energy in a system and 19 that wide a range of materials, there are all kinds of things 20 that can occur.
They may be very unlikely.
before i leave this area, 1 21 Let me go on to the 22 will make one comment, because you should be aware of it The l
i
(
23 90F te s t ing program is complete, and an issue we are wrestling i
24 with now very hard is how to deactivate the PBF facility.
I'm 1
25 sure you will hear more about in the budget context 1
I CO l
1 COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL:
When is the final LOFT l
2 extravaganza scheduled?
3 MR. MINOGUE:
At the end of this month.
It's 4
scheduled, I think, the 26th.
5 VOICER The 29th.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is it the 29th now?
That's 7
what day of the week?
9 MR. MINOGUE:
It's a Wednesday -- no -- it's the 9
29th?
i 10 COMMISGlONER SERNTHALi The 29th is a Saturday.
11 MR. MINOGUE:
Okay.
12 COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL
- Good, We have two hearings i
13 in the middle of that week, and I have given some thought to 14 joining the party out there.
I 15 MR. MINOGUE:
You have to show up a day early to get 16 checked out on respirat9e usage, because it's a fairly l
17 dangerous task.
1G VOICE:
If you want a front-row seat.
19 COMMISSIONER SERNTHHL:
I think maybe I'll settle i
20 for about fifth row on this one.
21 CLaughter.3 22 MR. MINOGUE There are two options.
One le to go l
23 out to the site and get checked out on the respirators, and 24 the other is to stay in town, which moans you're sixty miles 1
?
25 away.
I J
r
~ _ _ - - _ - - _ _.
I 1
70 1
1 Let me go on to risk assessment as the next major 2
area.
3 CSilde.3 4
The research lasues here relate to two aspects.
One 5
is the development or really expansion of the methodology, and j
6 the other is the improvement oi' the database and the l
i 7
understanding of uncertainties.
l 8
Fundamentally, the basic issue is, if the scope of 9
pRAs as they've been done and are well understood is 10 inherently incomplete, in that it does not they do not 11 really deal with a number of enternal events that could be 12 causative of c onnon-c au s e failure modes, they don't deal in an 13 organized way with human factors, and there are severe this calls for basically a program 14 limitations to the data 15 whose fundamental objective is to improve these techniques to 16 enhance their usability in the licensing process and also in 17 safety goals.
le These are not necessarily the same objectives, 1
19 because in the licensing process, you can use them in a 20 relative sense.
In fact, they are widely used.
But you get 21 Into safety goals, there creeps in an element of an absolute 22 standard that makes some of these lesues much more difficult, 29 This is also the area of research where we are 24 trying to, with a lot of very strong encouragement f r eni B i l l 25 Dircks, we're trying to structure a more organized approach to
e 71 1
the folding of research results into a regulatory centext, in 2
rulemaking, in Interfacing with the licensing people, and that 3
type of thing.
4 So those are the elenients that drive this program.
5 This first Vu-graph deals with the question of expanding the 6
capacilities.
There are a number of aspects to this.
I will 7
touch on just a few of what I think are the key one without 3
trying to track these items, because I'm really running out of 9
time here.
10 The external events issue, I think, is really 11 critical.
All the studies show that seismic la a big 12 contributor to risk, but if you look at how that's done in the 13 pMRs, there are some elements of really excessive 14 conservatism.
What we really need is an organized effort, 15 which is underway and I'll cover it more later if I have time, 16 to improve the ability to characterize the impact of seismic 17 and other external events in pMHs and take out some of this le inherent, built-in, sk ewed conserva t i sm.
19 Another very similar area relates to human factors, 20 the quantification of human factors effects, and folding them 21 Into pMAs to develop a basis for drawing insights that could 22 be used to get some feedback and to go into operator training 23 and operator competence and things like that 24 COMMISSIONEH OERNTHAL:
What is the status of the 25 underlying pr6nciples that we espouse in this country on m
.. ~. -
e I
72 j
1 seismic design?
la that still somewhat of an open question?
2 And I'm referring to our practice in this country of bu6Iding
(
3 things rigid, as opposed to the preference of others to build i
i l
4 them flexible.
l 1
l 5
la that an ongoing debate?
6 MR. MINOGUEr it's very much so.
It's an ongoing 7
debate among the countries with high seismicity, which as a O
practical matter means that the major centers of interest are 9
Japan, the U.S.,
and to a lesser degree Germany, Italy, and 10 the U.K.
I 11 The approach that's used in this country is to some 12 extent a historical artifact, it's just caused by the way g 13 rates were initially established in some of the early 14 designs.
But I think there's a general perception that the 15 proper approach to seismic design is a simpler approach, and 16 that in order to make sure that you have a sound beels for 1
17 going to a simpler approach, you need an emperimental program 10 that develops hard data that you can use to challenge these l
19 non-linear response codes that have been developed, which 20 really have to be seen as completely invalidated, lacking that 21 kind of hard data, e
22 The major status of work nowadays -- and it's in 29 Japan and Germany palmarily, although we are participants
.14 le aimed at getting that database of non-linear response, 25 inelastic response to the inelastic mode, that can be used to
I e
73 l
\\
1 validate the codes that have already been developed.
And i 2
think that's generally perceived as being the i nmed i a t e,
j 3
current need.
And without that, it's difficult to move to the l
I l
4 next step.
That's kind of it in a nutshell 5
Let me go to the next set of Vu-graphs which deal i
6 with the data and uncertaintles question on pRHs, 1
1 1
7 C911de.3
}
l 8
This is probably the most troublesome single thing l
l 9
on ARAs, because it's been recognized so long, in fact, the 10 database that's used in going through the conventional pMA 11 suffers frem some severe deficiencies, because there hasn't 12 been any broadly coherent, organized effort to develop a set 13 of data that could be used in making these decisions as you go 14 through fault trees.
15 INPQ is working on this.
The NARDS system would be 16 an ewample of a system Intended to develop that.
Research has 17 been working in the same area.
We've done a lot of evaluation 10 of LERs to try to back up that kind of data.
We've taken i
19 maintenance records from a few specific plants to try to back CO up that kind of data.
21 Fundamentally, though, the idea is to improve the f
I OO decielon-making that you do when you walk through a fault i
23 tree, when you decide how likely scmething to to happen or not l
I 24
- happen, j
i C5 I think this part of the program can be accurately l
l
I e
74 1
described as really just getting pulled together.
We have 2
developed a program plan with the cocporation of the other 3
offices that will try to do this from an agency perspective in 4
a more structured way, and we've also worked up an agreement 5
with AEOD, with Bill Dircks' approval, that would transfer i
G this function to them as we move more into an operational l
l 7
mode.
But I think fundamentally it is a key element that has l
8 to be dealt with before we can start to use pHHe in any broad l
9 way.
l l
10 Let me go to the next one, which talks about 11 regulatory applications.
12 CSilde.1 i
13 CCemmissioner Zech leaves the meeting.3 l
l 14 in doing this, what I would like to strees in the 15 Interests of time, because I think it is extremely important, 1
10 is scwie of the initiatlyse that have been taken recently to 17 sharpen the review and control of rulemaking within the Staff 10 Some time ago, Bill asked Meewarch to take on the 10 function of doing an independent review of all rulemakings, 20 underway and proposed, to asensa whether the rulemaking made 21 sense, was it in the right direction, you know, just generally 1
22 get a completely independent critique, And we had a little l
23 trouble getting that started, I will acknowledge, but it le 24 now running smoothly.
25 One of the latne Vu-graphe g6ves some specific l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.~__ _
l i
75 1
statistics on how many of these have been acted on.
I think
,7 it's really working well, and not only in terms of providing 3
some assurance of what should go f or ward and not go forward.
l 4
We have found that the questions we raise and the 5
dialogue that generates with the sponsoring office has been I
6 very, very productive and very often has led the sponsoring i
7 office itself to initiate modifications or to withdraw t
G rulemakings.
So I think in a nutshell, this is working quite l
9
- well, 10 We have recently been asked by Bill to pull together 11 a similarly structured program effort to try to make sure t
I 12 that the scheduling of rulemaking is controlled in a tighter f
13 way, so that thing move forward, they don't churn at the Staff r
14 level, but move forward to ultimate pecposals to the I
t i
15 Commission.
10 C311de,3 17 The last item l'Il touch on in this set of Vu-graphs 10 is, we have been working with the 14E people to try to develop 19 some approaches or applications of pHH that they could use in 20 looking at their planning of inspection of activities and the 21 development of Inspection modules.
We're not trying to 22 develop inspection modules, that's their job.
We're trying to 23 do PMHs, write insights into the relative significance of I
24 different types of failures or malfunctions or malfeasance on 25 the part of the operating or maintenance staffe that they
I
[
70
[
1 could use in planning inspection modules.
{
l f
2 18 ll jump ahead to the Vu-graph on severe accident S
- risk, j
4 CSlide.3 r
5 I wanted to tell you about where we stand on that, 6
We are now pretty consciously trying to get the science base.
[
t 7
Clearly at the ApS review, we've discussed I think that in O
retrospect was a very wise move to get them to do that.
1 9
think it's developed a lot of good insights.
10 The nemt step is to put out for general review the 11 NUREG-0936 document, which fundamentally would lay out the t
12 technical base that's been developed by these various 13 contractor studies, particularly as they have applied to the I
t l
14 five referenced plants, it would provide an opportunity to l
15 get a broad reaction to the adequacy of the science base.
l 16 in parallel with that review, of course, there's a 17 continuing effort with NMR to look at the questions of l
10 application into the regulatory process.
So that aspect of it l
l and Denny can correct me, if 18m wrong -- I think that's l
10 i
20 assumed to be to the Commission late this year, i
21 FM. ROSSi That's correct.
22 MM. HINOGUE:
The nont Vu-graph lists some of the l
[
(
23 rules that are currently underway that have involved some i
24 major effort on the part of the Research office, and I think
(
I 25 it's not necessary to spend any time on that, so l'Il skip
e 77 1
that.
3 COMMISSIONER BEHNTHAL:
Och, I agree, I don't think 3
we need to go through all this suneary of what we rules and 4
whatnot.
I 5
Where are we on the source term report?
What's i
6 going on?
7 I was under the impression that we were going to 0
have the document, the NUHEO, up here in fairly short order.
O it looks like that's slipping.
What's going on?
10 MR. MINOGUEi The NUMEO-0950 -- and Denny Ross can I believe is now scheduled to the Commission in 11 correct me --
l tc early July, t
I l
13 Danny, why dc.n't you answer that.
1 14 MH. ROSS:
The detnels of this are going to be sent 15 up in a few days in an updated Commission information paper, j
16 The plan that we're working on at present is to get l
l 17 00$6 lesund for public comment and review in late July.
We i
l 10 have already met with the nCHS sul) committee, and we have i
l 10 several meetings scheduled with them over the next few months, they've seen an 20 The draft that we will publish the draft that we will publish late nemt 21 earlier draft 20 month is the one we want them to focus on 23 Our present plan is that whun we have about a 90-day l
24 comment period and we have the advice of the HCHS, that we OS wou ld make wha t ever change's are required in the document and
1 i
70 1
give it to the Commission for formal review late this year.
2 The plan that we're working on would not involve a 3
formal Commission revlow of the document prior to its issuance 4
late next month.
5 COMMISSIONER SERNTHHL1 So late next month, though, l
6 you plan to issue a complete document for public comment.
7 MM. ROSS:
That's correct.
And we have a pretty I
l I
4 good working list of course, we'll put a Federal Register L
l 9
notice out and announce it's availability== we have a pretty t
l 10 good correspondence list of people we know from various 11 segments of the U.S. who are interested in it, and we'll just
(
1 12 make a direct malling to them.
l 19 Out we will make it clear what k6nd of comments.
14 Among other things, we'll ask them, le the further research i
15 adequate to anewer the remaining question, because we'd like l
16 to know what that comment is, l
f 17 We will ask about the broad verification that we i
18 have and the verification that we don't have, 10 So that's our plan, and that is how we are i
20 proceeding, 21 COMMIS910NER SERNTHALe Will thit document, then, 22 the NURES for public ccament in late July, will that also P
23 embody, then, the Staff's assesement of specific reactor typee 24 and how
==
t 25 MR. ROS$t No.
We very carefully severed that,
70 1
because we believe that's an application.
tJe have selected 2
five reference plants, and we -- by the way, everything I'm i
3 telling you will be more detailed in the information paper 4
we have a separate NUMEG number, 1150, and we're doing what we 5
call r6sk rebaselining and a risk reduction analysis for these 6
five plants.
7 COMMIS910NEM SEMNTHHL When will that be done, 8
then?
t 9
MM. ROSGt Our present schedule is February
'96.
i 10 le that close. Frank?
It's early
'06.
l 11 NM. GILLE991Ei Early
'G6.
t I
12 NH. MOSSi Now the individual plant analysis will i
1 13 come off in a serial fashion starting in October.
We don't 14 get the last one until February.
I L
15 MM. HINOGUK' This is tied in with the IOCOM.
1 r
16 COMMIS$10NEM RENNTHHLi Yes, i understand, right.
[
l I
17 MM. MOSS Mut that will be published you see, we f
l 14 have a three-phase development, 10 The first phase is what we're t a lk ing about, the 20 sc6ence and the source term.
l l
l Et The encend phase le to appraise the elek of thmee
[
l 22 five reference plante, putting the front end, 23 The third phase le regulatory applicatione.
And 24 that will take moet of calendar
'90, e suspect i
2t MM. MINOGURi The one real difficulty that has i
i l
e l
00 L
1 become clear in th6s whole th6ng is the high degree of plant 2
specificity of the elsk.
That's the gl6tch.
I 3
I think in the beginn6ng of all this there was the t
t 4
perception that you could group plants in a few broad 5
categories, and you'd understand everything, and it just l
6 doesn't work out that way.
No two plants are quite alike, and i
7 it affects the risk.
I i
L 8
COMMIS$10NEM SEMNTHALt Ae l de f rews final reports on l
1 9
all five plant types, will there be a pretty good idea
==
1 10 gather you've at least settled that there are going to be five Il plant types you look at 12 Will the general approach and methodology and method i
13 for solving and approaching the problem be available7 l've l
l I
14 already said that once, I guess.
i 15 la that going to be available ecmetime soon, or 16 where are we on that?
17 MM, MOD 3s For the how to analyze the risk of a 10 reference plant?
la that what your question wae?
to COMMIS910NEM REMNTHALi Yee, enactly, the 20 plant-specific analysis, 21 MM, MOS4i We have that in what I would call bits l'
22 and places.
We have, for ewample, one of the moet important 23 things you would do is not covered by the Ap9 type of study on 24 phenomena, it is what we call a containment event tree, i
25 How done a containment fall, given a severe
/
\\
01 1
accident?
2 Okay.
We have some narrative and some details on 3
that.
All of these things like contatnment performance, 4
containment event trees, arrival rate of sequences, will be in 5
the NURES-itto.
6 ff earlier interest is needed, say, in a formal 7
briefing or an informal reading, we would have to get 8
something up especially for that purpose, which would not be O
terribly hard to do.
We just don't have, say, a Draft 0 of 10 the second NUREG.
We're working on that 11 COMMISSIONEN ROBERTSI Could we agree that we're 12 going to terminate thle noon?
13 COftMISSIONER AS9ELSTINEi Sure.
14 MR. MINOGUE:
Then let me go ahead with the next
, 15 item.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTSr I'm not meaning to inhibit 17 you, but 1S COMMISSIONER SERNTH4Li i may have to leave a few to minutes before myself.
20 MR. MINOGUEi i have two more areas.
One is 21 seismic, and I've touched on part of that before, and I won't
)
22 repeat what I covered then.
21 Fundamentally, the safety issue here comes out of 24 two sources, First, the Charleston earthquake and other major 25 earthquakes in eastern history have in the past not been well
C2 1
Identified in relationship to scme particular geological 2
structure, and this raises the question that it may be 3
necessary to reevaluate a large number of plants in the East, 4
depending on how current understanding of the Charleston 5
earthquake develops.
6 The other is that the process used in seismic design 7
le regarded as providing a very large margin, but that margin 8
may need to be quantified, or really the regulatory Staff may 9
need to evaluate the quantification of it by industry, if, for 10 some reason, the design g value should be seen as be6ng 11 appropriately much larger for a number of Eastern plants, 12 which on some, at least, is a distinct possibility.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Bob, where do we stand on 14 the Charleston earthquake?
I remember USGS coming over
-- a year and a half or so ago --
15 what?
16 MR. MINOGUEt No.
It was more like three years ago.
17 COMMIS$10NER ASSELSTINE Three years ago.
1G MM. MINOGUE We've made a lot of progress.
There's 19 a near-term and a long-term solution, and 18 11 be brief 20 The near-term solution basically is a mixture of 21 taking all of the data base that we've got now, which includes 22 about five years of operation in the networks, and then by a 23 sort of Delphi process with a board of carefully selected 04 emperts, a model has been developed that you can use to define 25 broadly within a region what the relative seismic hazard is.
' d \\
4, g.
s 1
g %f 83 i
A
",31 This is an approach that the GS letter would countenance,
=
1 2
atthoughgit's not strictly in accordance wIth Appendix A.
It 5
%s, 3
oiearly IM countenanced as being techn'ically sound by the 4l, Geologicsi St. vey.
3
.s t
l
_ 0, The,l oriqJterm solution would be to do this in a more
+l
'V 6
cejectIve way',
not necessariiy involving exports, but wIth t
+
7
'riarch da t a. 'tJe need a fow more year,s of seismoIogicaI data.
(
8 Thera is a program plan to develop this, and it's quite far r
(
9
- along.
In (act~~the program.is good enough that we are 10 negotlating'with the Geological Survey.
They wiIi probably 11 take,over t h_i s network and run it into the outyears, because 12 it's seen as being.N-eal breakthrough in terms of 13 characterizing seismic hazard in the Eastern U.S.
._ s y t
14 So we'rd not out of the woods yet, but I think the i
o n
15 basic process of defining the seismic hazard is very weli 16 along.
i s
17 The questicd of defining the seismic margins that 3
f f
18 are present is not so simple.
I talked earlier about the need 19 to validate the nominal response models, but there is also a 20 question of getting some hard data on,the fragilities of 21 components, the margins to faiiure under shaking.
3=
_ Again in the same program pian, we*ve got an 22 s4 23 extinsive program on that.
But that, again, wili take some 24 years.
So we're not -- right now, I think the situation is ig g
' 25 adequatelyqunder control, because the hazard definition is not i
]
/
s
/
S4 1
revealing any unpleasant surprises.
But I have a very 2
uncomfortable feeling in this whole area.
3 I will feel better when we get all this stuff l
4 quantified, but it's some years in the future, it's not soon.
5 Near-term -- and it's on my list here -- the major 6
breakthroughs are that we have been successful in gett'ing a 7
piece of a major program in Germany, which is actually shaking 8
a decommissioned reactor to get some hard data, and we are 9
negotiating with the Japanese -- EPRI has been involved in l
10 this to piggyback on the Todatsu facility.
I talked 11 earlier about the need for this kind of data.
l 12 Let me go on to --
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Does that include when you 14 look at components of things, things like control systems, taking those kinds of things 15 those kinds 16 MR. MINOGUE:
.No.
That type of stuff I think is in 17 pretty good shape.
I'm really looking at the response of 18 major structural components and major systems.
19 The seismic qualifications of individual small 20 items, I think that's really in good shape.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 MR. MINOGUE:
That's not an area where there is a 23 big research component.
24 Let me go on to waste and talk about it briefly.
25 in the high-level waste area, bere the basic
/
05 and I'm talking about the research 1
problem, as I see it the approach used to ultimately license a 2
component i
3 high-level waste facility involves the application of a number 4
of performance models, evaluation models.
The submission will 5
have to include such models.
This is fundamental in the way 6
that the EPA standard is written, and it automatically takes 7
you into the fringes of technology.
8 So the research element here is basically driven by 9
the need to provide specific data on the processes involved in 10 releases from waste or transport of waste within the 11 environment that can be used to validate the component 12 elements of evaluation models that are used to predict 13 performance.
14 It is a program that obviously goes for a long, long 15 time and that you do in bits of pieces of processes, and you 16 will note that, if you look at this list.
There is an element 17 here of specific processes being evaluated.
18 We have also provided major support to NMSS in the 19 rulemaking area here, and I think that's in really in good 20 shape.
I think the Commission has been well ahead of the 21 curve on all the rulemaking.
we did an 22 We also on this list, there's a 23 assessment of the state-of-the-art in a number of areas.
It 24 was used by the NMSS in their environmental impact assessments 25 that they did recently on this under the DOE proposals.
o 86 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How much of this research 2
program has to be tailored to the specific sites and the a
specific geologic media that are being examined?
4 MR. MINOGUE:
Well, quite a bit, because of the 5
processes that are involved.
In fact, that's been a 6
difficulty.
Early on, we made some false starts, because we 7
looked at stuff that DOE said they were going to do, and then 8
they didn't do it.
So it's because of -- the dominant process 9
that may be important in the models will vary from site to 10 site or medium to medium.
That's the fundamental problem.
11 So you really need to know the kind of material 12 you're talking about.
13 I think, particularly in the last -- since Rusche 14 took over, this whole area -- where are they going, so we know has really improved.
15 what we have to be prepared to review?
16 in fact, if there's any glitch here, I think the MRS 17 route is significant, because that doesn't require a large 18 research component.
The issues there are well understood.
19 Off the top of my head, I can't think of any research 20 components.
So the timing and the level of this work would, i
21 to some extent, would be a function of what the near-term 22 plans of DOE are in terms of going the MRS route.
l 23 In my remaining few minutes --
I'm almost done.
The 24 last thing I want to talk about is low-level waste.
25 (Commissioner Bernthal leaves the meeting.]
87 1
in a technical sense, in a research sense, this is 2
actually a very difficult area, because of the wide number of 3
materials, the various types, the chemical forms, the location it's all over the country; you can't pick an ideal 4
problem 5
site someplace, unless you're going to shift this stuff.
6 We see that as involving a lot of phenomenology that 7
will have to be dealt with, particularly as alternatives to 8
shallow land burial, and may be pushed, and I think there's a 9
real move that says that alternatives should be assessed.
10 Dur main role there, in a sense, is the technical 11 assistance role to the states, as they may have interests, and 12 to NMSS.
So here you'll find there is no organized research 13
- plan, it's specific issues or problems as they may arise.
I 14 think in terms of the technical difficulty and the quantity of 15 this stuff, it is probably much more significant that the 16 high-level waste issue.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would agree with that.
18 i just went to a conference last week on low-level waste, and 19 I think that the technical challenges, particularly coupled 20 with the time pressures, are going to be very significant in 21 this area.
22 There are a number of states that are saying that as 23 far as they are concerned, part 61 just isn't good enough, and 24 it's not acceptable to them just to go with shallow land 25 burial They want some as yet-undefined improved technology,
SS 1
and given the time pressures that people like Governor Riley 2
and the other host states are putting on the other states, 3
we're going to need that information very quickly, and there's 4
going to be a big crunch with lots of application, I think, 5
all at once.
6 MR. MINOGUE:
I read it the same way, particularly 7
your comments about shallow land burial I think alternatives 8
to that are clearly in the cards.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, yes.
I'm not sure i 10 agree with that personally, but whether I agree or disagree, 11 it looks like that's the way at least some states are going to 12 be heading, 13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Any questions?
14 CNo response.]
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you very much.
It was 16 most interesting.
Thank you.
17 We are adjourned.
18
[Whereupon, at 11:55 o' clock, a.m.,
the Commission 19 meeting was adjourned.3 20 21 22 28 24 25
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL PEPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7
matter of Commission Meeting (Public Meeting)
G 9
Name of Proceeding: Continuation of 5/16 Briefing on Mid-Year Budget and Program Review 10 11 Occket No.
12 Place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date: Wednesday, June 12, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13 5
(Signature)
< l'd lo (Typed Name of Reporter)
And Riley 20 21 22 j
23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
l l
24 25
s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 MIDYEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW Al 8/
BRIEFING TO COMMISSION JUNE 12, 1985 Al RESOURCE INFORMATION AS OF MARCil 1985, PROGRAM INFORMATION AS OF APRIL 1985.
E ADDRESS,ES Tile REMAINING AREAS NOT COVERED AT Tile MAY 16, 1985 BRIEFING.
EXCLUDES PAGES 1 TilROUGil 16 WillCil HERE PREVIOUSLY COVERED.
Tile RESEARCil PORTION OF Tile PACKAGE IIAS BEEN REVISED.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW QUALITY ASSURANCE DEVELO. PED QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.
COMMISSION REVIEWING PLAN AND DISPOSITION OF NUREG-1055 (MAY 19811) RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED BY STAFF.
STAFF IMPLEMENTING SEVERAL IMPROVEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN NUREG-1055, SUCil AS:
PILOT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM AT V0GTLE (INTEGRATES LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REVIEW, AND CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION).
OA FOR lilGil-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY AND MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITY.
STARTED TO DEVELOP INSPECTION PROGRAM WillCll tilTEGRATES DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION INSPECTIONS OF PLANT OUTAGES AND MAJOR MODIFICATIONS.
PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM FOR RESTART AT WNP-3.
VENDOR INSPECTION PROGRAliilAS EMPilASIZED LICENSEE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VEllDOR SUPPLIERS TilROUGil PLANT INSPECTIONS, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND INFORMATION NOTICES.
PLANT SITE INSPECTIONS llAVE IDENTIFIED INSTANCES IN WillCil SIGNIFICANT VENDOR INFORMATION llAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED / IMPLEMENTED BY LICENSEES.
COMPLETED fl SITE INSPECTIONS TO DETERMINE ADEQUACY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR 50.f9 l
- EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION RULE.
CONDUCTED INTEGRATED DESIGN INSPECTIONS AT PERRY AND SilEARON llARRIS.
CONDUCTING INTEGRATED DESIGN REVIEW AT COMANCilE PEAK IN SUPPORT OF PROJECT DIRECTOR..
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW QUALITY ASSURANCE (CONTINUED)
ISSUED INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM (IDVP) REPORTS FOR LIMERICK AllD CLINTON.
IDVP AT 110PE CREEK IS UNDERWAY.
REVIEWING ENGINEERING ASSilRANCE PROGRAMS AT MILLSTONE 3, NINE HILE POINT 2 AND SOUTil TEXAS.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW ENFORCEMENT PROCESSED 84 ENFORCEMENT CASES.
ISSUED 113 (22 REACTOR, 21 NON-REACTOR) CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING $1.3 MILLION.
CIVIL PENALTY ACTIONS IIAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISilED, ON Tile AVERAGE, WITilIN ABOUT 13 WEEKS VS GOAL OF EIGilT WEEKS.
DEVELOPING PROPOSED POLICY ON VENDOR ENFORCEMENT.
I ISSUED FINAL IE MC 0400, ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM - GulDANCE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY.
1 DEVELOPING EilFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS, WillCil IS NOT COVERED IN IE MC Oll00.
TO BE COMPLETED JULY 1985.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICY:
FORMED NOVEMBER 198l1 CONDUCTED 3 MEETINGS AND SCllEDULED 3 ADDITIONAL MEETINGS REPORT SCllEDULED TO BE ISSUED AUGUST 1985.
i
REVISEI) AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCl[_ PROGRAMS AGING ANI) 00AliFICAT10H l
ISSI)E IDENTIFY PROCESSES LEADING TO INSERVICE DEGRADATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING SAFETY IMPLICATIONS IN LICENSING.
EVALUATE LICENSEE METil0DS FOR MONITORING, SURVEILLANCE, AND MAINTENANCE TO DETECT AND MITIGATE AGING DEGRADATION.
EVALUATE STANDARDS FOR QUALIFYING SAFETY EQUIPMENT, l
ACCOMPLISilMENTS 4
ARRANGED WITil DOE /NR TO ACQUIRE AGED-INSERVICE ELECTRICAL AND MECilANICAL COMPONEN1S !
1 AND MATERI ALS (E.G., VALVES, llREAKERS, RELAYS, PIPING) FROM SillPPINGPORT PLANT.
St.lPPAGE IN DOE DECOMMISSIONING SCllEDULE MAY DELAY RECEIPT OF SOME EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS.
COMPLETED SCOPING STUDIES TilAT DEFINE NEEDED AGING RESEARCil.
COMPLETED ADVANCED ULTRASONIC INSPECTION (SAFT-UT) 0F DRESDEN 3 AND VERMONT YANKEE PRIMARY PIPING TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR NRR DECISION ON RESTART IN CASES WilERE TilERE WAS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN COMMERCIAL INSPECTION TEAMS.
i EVAll)ATION OF CURRENT AND ADVANCED NDE TECilN100ES Sil0WED LARGE DISAGREEMENT IN DETECTION AND SIZING OF FLAWS IN STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (USING RETIRED SURRY STEAM GENE.RATOR).
VAllDATION UNDERWAY VIA REMOVAL AND TESTING OF INSPECTED TUBES (T0 IlE COMPLETED FY 1986).
CONFIRMEI) LICENSING DECISION 10 ALLOW Sil0RT-TERM OPERA! ION OF REACTORS Willi WELI)-CLAD OVERLAY REPAIRS IN STAINLESS STEEL BWR PIPE BY EVALUATING MATERIAL REMOVED FROM Tile llAlCil 2 REACTOR AFTER ONE YEAR OF OPERATION.
COMPl.ETED RESEARCil WITil FRENCil DN Tile VALIDITY OF TECilNIQUES USED FOR QUALIFICATION OF POLYMERS USED IN ELECTRIC CABLES..
HEVISED AS OF NilCl. EAR RfGULATORY CONNISS10N JUNE 10, 19ilS FY 1985 NID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW IllERMAL_11YORAULIC TRANSIENTS I
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ISSUE l'ROVIDE VERSATILE, FAST. AND INEXPENSIVE PLANT ANALYSIS CAPABILITY, BASED ON COMPUTER CODES WIN)SE ACCURACY llAS BEEN 00ANTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT AGAINST B0111 SEPARATE EFFECTS ANil litTEGRAL EFFECTS SCALED TEST DATA.
CODES ARE USED IN ANALYZING THERMAL llYDRAULIC TRANSIENTS IN FULL-SCALE PWRs ANil BWRs, 10 RESOLVE SAFETY AND LICENSING ISSUES RELATED TO PLANT DESIGN AND OPERATION.
lECilN! cal. APPROACil DUAL USE OF COMPUTER CODE ANALYSES AND TEST FACILITY DATA TO PROVIDE RESOLUTION OF REGULATORY ISSUES SUCil AS PTS, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, PERFORMANCE OF ECC SYSTEMS, PilMP OPERATION AFTER A SBLOCA, ETC.
IlSE OF INEL TEAM AS TECilNICAL INTEGRATION CENTER IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN STABLE TilERHAL llYDRAULIC EXPERTISE.
ASSISTANCE FROM LANL FOR ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL FACILITIES AND SUPPORT OF IRAC-PWR.
SlRONG SUPIN)RT FROM UNIVERSilY RESEARCil ON FUNDANNTAL TOPICS.
. 1
lifiVISfp AS ill.
JUHF 10, 19tt'~.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 HID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW m.
N/[F PWH.s COMPLETED TESTS IN Tile JAPANESE CCTF UNDER Tile COOPERATIVE 2D/3D PROGRAM AND TRAC-PWR ANALYSES, DEMONSTRATING FOR lilE FIRST TIME Tile UNIQUE BEllAVIOR OF UPI SYSTEMS IN W TWO-LOOP PWRs.
TilESE DATA ARE NOW BEING USEll BY NRC TO EVALUAlE UPI CALCULATIONS l
SUBMITTED BY LICENSEES.
PERFORMED SPECI AL LIQUID 110LDUP TESTS (IN SENISCALE), ALONG WITil TRAC-PWR AND RELAPS ANALYSES, TO AlD IN THE NRR REVIEW 0F M SBLOCA ANALYSES AND ASSESS DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN NRC AND W ANALYSES.
STARTED FEEDWATER LINE BREAK TESTS AND ANALYSES (IN SEMISCALE) 10 PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE CALCULATIONS WillCll llAVE Sil0WN POTENTIAL NONCONSERVATISM IN SYSTEM PRESSURE DUE 10 OVERLY CONSERVATIVE (POOR) HEAT TRANSFER IN THE STEAM GENERATOR.
CullRENTLY IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC ISSUES IN TiiESE GEONETRIES ARE SCilEDULED FOR RESOLUTION HY Tile END OF FY 1988, WilEN ROSA-IV TESTING WILL BE C0ffLETED.
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IEVISfp AS 01-s JUNE 10, 1 9:19 l
l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION j
FY l'J85 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW i
.IllERMAl" HYDRAULIC-TRANSIENTS -
~
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~
i j
l HgW PWRs OTIS (SINGLE RAISED LOOP) TESTS REQUESTED BY NRR COMPLETED UNDC8'THE JolNT B&W TEST i
PROGRAM WITH EPRI, BaW OWNERS, AND B8W, DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS OF B&W PROCEDURLS i
10 CONTROL SBLOCA IN PLANTS NITil RAISED LOOP GEOMETRY.
NIST (MULTIPLE LOWER-LOOP) FACILITY CONSTRUCTION ON SCHEDULE WITli TESTING TO START l
END OF CY 1985.
MIST WILL INVESTIGATE SBLOCA AND NATURAL CIRCULATION ISSUES, RAISED IlY MI-2 ACCIDENT, CONERNING C00 LABILITY OF BaW PLANTS USING BaW PROCEDURES IN FULL-HEIGHT REPRESENTAlIVE GE0 METRY (2 x 4 LOOPS).
CURRENTLY IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC ISSUES IN BtW GE0 METRY ARE SCilEDULED FOR RESOLUTION BY
~
l Tile END OF FY l'J88, WHEN PLANNED MIST FULL-POWER TESTING IS COMPLETED.
l COMPLETED ALL INTEGRAL TESTING (FIST).
?
l DATI, HAS ALREADY BEEN USED 10 ASSESS lilE NEW GE EVALUATION MODEL (SAFER).
DATA WILL l
llE USED TO ASSESS TRAC-BWR AND RAMONA CAPABILITIES TO CALCULATE BWH TRANSIENTS.
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RI.V1SI'D A8 bi-i JllNE 10, IdbS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW
']ItERMAl liYDRAUL IC" TRANSifNTS' r:
~
I CONPUIER CODES INTERNATIONAL CODE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM FORMALLY INITIATED WilH FIRST MEETING OF PARTICIPANTS.
RELEASED FROZEN VERSIONS OF RELAPS/H002, TRAC-Pf1/ MODI, AND TRAC-BD/ MODI.
DEMONSTRATED USE OF PLANT ANALYZER IN OPERATIONS CENTER TRAINING DRILL.
i SEPARATE EFFECTS /MODEL DEVELOPMENT COMPLETED CONSTRUC110N OF SMALL INTEGRAL TEST FACILITY AN UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND TO INVESTIGATE ALTERNATE FACILIlY SCALING CONCEPT.
Tills SUPPORTS LONG-TERM PLANNING T0 i
MAKE FULL USE OF COST-EFFECTIVE RESEARCil CAPABILITIES OF UNIVERSITIES, PROVIDING ALSO FOR TRAINING OF FU1URE REACTOR ENGINEERS ON REALISTIC PROBLEMS.
COMPLETED FULL-ilEIGilT STEAM GENERATOR TESTING IN COOPERATION Willi M. EPRI, AND U.K.
(MB-2) PROVIDING NRR WITil THERMAL llVDRAULIC DATA TO HELP VERIFY TilAT Tile ACTIVITY DOSES FOLLOWlHG A SGTR WILL NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SET IM 10 CFR 100 FOR TECil SPEC 101)lNE LIMITS.
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RLVISI:D As ilf NDCll:AR Rl:6tlLATORY COMMISSION JUNE lit. 11144 6 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW
~
~~
ECCS_!(UL'EidilSIONSCilEDULE(APPENDIX'K)
~
EXh'ECTED DAT!!
LOHillSSION PAPER AND PROPOSED RULE READY FOR FORMAL EDO REVIEW NOVEMBER 1985 DRAFT REGbtATORY GUIDE SPECIFYlNG ACCEPTABLE METHODS AND MODELS NOVEMBER 1985 l
REPORI SilNHARIZING TECilNICAL BASIS FOR RULE REVISION (10 YEARS OF RESEARCil) READY FOR PEER REVIEW DECEMBER 1985 l
PAPER TO IllE C0ffilSS10N DECEMBER 1985 IF RULE CilANGE IMPLEE NTED, EXPECT SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ACCURACY OF EVALUATION Pl0DELS PERMIIllNG REALISTIC ASSESSENT OF TRANSIENTS, t
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a RlVl$1!D AS 01-NUCLLAR HEGULA10RY COHNISSION JUNE 10, I E FY 1985 MID-YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVICW p
SEVERE ACCIDENT RESFARCll PROGRAP!
ISSilE
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- ~ - - -
DETERMINE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE PWR AND BWR ACCIDENTS ACCOMJ11SHMFNTS j
COMPLETED Tile FOURTil AND FINAL PBF SEVERE filEL DAMAGE ( AND FISSION PRODUCT) IEST 111G11 BURNUP FUEL, AG-IN-CD CONTROL RODS PBF RESULTS WERE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR IMI-2 CORE-DEBRIS INTERPRETATION DBTAINED ONLY LARGE INTEGRAL (MULTI-EFFECT) DATA'ON IN-VESSEL SEVERE-full DAMAGE, CORE-E LT PROGRESSION, AND FISSION-PRODUCT, AND AEROSOL RELEASE AND IRANSPORT UNDER REALISTIC CORE-UNC0VERY ACCIDENT CONDITIONS HETALLOGRAPillC EXAMINAll0N Sil0WS TilAT SOME PBF TEST DEBRIS AND SOME IMI-2 DEBRIS REACHED FULL FUEL-ELT TEMPERATUNES 0100K)
INITIAL NRU FULL-LENGTil SLOW COOLANT B0l'LDOWN TEST CONFIRED RAPID CLAll OXIDATION I
N0DELS LABORA10RY EXPERIENTS Sil0WED IllAT IIIE PREV 10tlSLY ASSiflED llYDROGEN-BLANKEllNG INillBITION OF RAPID CLADDING OXIDAT10N HEATING AND HYDROGEN GENERATION DOES NOT OCClik UNDER COOLAN1 B0iLDOWN CONDIIIONS i
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NOCLCAR RC6DLATORY C0ffilSSION JilNL 10, PJ8S I
FY 1985 MID-YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW l
SEVERF ACCIDENT RESfARCH PROGRAM E
(CONTINUED) i i
DBTAINED SIGNIFICANT DATA ON FISSION PRODUCT DEPOSITION AND REVAPORiZATION FROM STRUCIURE SURFACES FOR VALIDATION OF THE TRAP /E LT CODE AND NRC/IDCOR ISSUE ASSESSENT OBTAINED QUANTITATIVE DATA ON THE INTERACTION OF TELLURilNi WITil ZlRCALOY CLAlsl) LNG FOR f
THE SOURCE-TERM REASSESSENT AND FOR NRC/IDCOR TECilNICAL ISSUE ASSESSMENT f
THE E CilANISIlC SEVERE-FUEL-DAMAGE CODE (SCDAP) HAS BEEN Tile ANALYTIC TOOL USEU IN i
ANALYSIS IN THE TMI-2 CORE EXAMINATION AND IN PBF, ACRR, AND flRU EXPERIMfNIS Tile HYDROGEN RULE FOR CONTROL OF HYDROGEN IN llARK Ili AND ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMDIIS f
NAS BEEN PUBLISilED AND BECAME EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 25, 1985.
j Tile CONTAIN 1.0 CODE WAS RELEASED AND TAPES IIAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED BY 19 U.S. AND 5 FOREIGN LABORATORIES.
i CORIUM MELT-CONCREIE INTERACTION TESTS ARE SHONileG LONER CONCRETE PENETRATION RKIES TilAN PREVIOUS ELT-CONCRETE INTERACTl001 TESTS IISING MOLTEN ETALS OR TERMITE (CORIUM CONSISIS OF 00 AND OTilER CORE CONSTilllENTS).
TNUS PREVIOUS PENETRAT1001 RAIE 2
j CALCULATIONS ARE CONSERVATIVE.
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e kEVISili A3 W NUCLEAR REGUIA10RY CONNISSf0h JUNE 10, 1 %'>
IY 1985 HID-YEAR RESOURCE AND PH0 GRAM REVILW S!]/FRE JCCIIENT RESEARCil PROGRAM
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l' NFAR FilTURE (FY85)~PLANNFD ACCOMPIISJlMENLS
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l POST IRRADIATION EXAMINAIl0N (PIE) RESULTS FROM HIGli-BURNUP FUEL TEST PBF 1-3, AND DATA AND RESULTS FROM 141G11 BURNUP FUEL AND AG-IN-CD CONTROL-ROD 1.LST PHF 1-4, DETAILED ELT PROGRESSION AND AEROSOL DATA FROM ACRR EXPERIENI DF-3 Willi AG-IN-CD CONTROL ROD IN IEST FilEL BUNDLE i
)
NRU FULL-LENGTil NORMAL BOILDOWN AND OXIDATION TRANSIENT TEST FlitT-2 l
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COMPLETE ASSESSMENT OF Tile EFFECT OF RADIATION ON FISSION-PRODUCT DEPOSIT 10N AND j
REVAPORIZATION t
FISSION-PRODUCT REVAPORIZATION MODEL COMIX AND ELPROG ANALYSIS Of lilGH-PRESSURE IN-VESSEL NATURAL CIRCULATION AND IIEAT l
TRANSFER UNDER SEVERE-ACCIDENT DEGRADED-CORE CONDITIONS l
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QUANTITATIVE EASUREENTS OF DIRECT CONTAINENI HEATING FROM HIGil PRESSURE CORE MFLI l
EJECTIONS FROM Tile PRESSURE VESSEL l
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7 NOCLEAR HEiiULA10RY COMMISS10N JUNL 10, 198',
FY 1985 MID-YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW SEVFRF ACCIDENLRESEAR_CJ[ PROGRAM i
',NFAR fillllRE (FY85) PIDNED ACCOMPI ISilMENLS l
(CONTINUED) t ANALYSIS OF Tile HYDROGEN SOURCE AND RESULTING POTENTIAL FOR DE10NABLE CONCENTRATIONS WilllIN LARGE DRY CONTAIMMENTS IIAS BEEN C0 WLETED AND A REPORT WILL BE ISSUED IN JUNE I
1985.
DETONABLE MIXTURES WERE NOT PREDICTED FOR BEST ESTIMATE CALCULATION FOR IllE SURR0 GATE PLANT (BELLEFONIE)
SEVERE ACCIDENT DOMINANT SEQUENCES, CONSISTENT WITil REFERENCE RISK STUDIES, WILL BE ANALYSED FOR BWR MARK 11 AND 111 CONTAINMENTS.
DOMlHANT SEQUENCES FOR PWRs WILL BE ANALYSED USING THE RECENTLY INTEGRATED CODES.
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REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM, REVIEW MAJOR RESEABCil PROGRAMS REllABILITY AND RISK MET [10DOLOGY 1
i ISSilE EXISTING AGENCY GUIDANCE ON Tile EXECUTION OF PRA'S INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES COMMON CAUSE AND ll0 MAN FAILURES.
IN ADDITION, Tile LACK OF UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND i
STANDARDIZATION OF CONTENT AND F0,RMAT LIMITS TilEIR USEFULNESS FOR SAFETY GOAL
)
IMPLEMENTATION AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY APPLICATIONS.
METil0DS AND PROCEDURES TO QUANTIFY Tile EFFECTS OF LICENSEE AND STAFF IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMISSION POLICIES ON SEVERE ACCIDENTS AND BACKFITTING ACTIONS ARE NEEDED.
il ACCOMPLISilMEN]S i
L COMPLETED RESEARCil AT ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY ON COMPARING OTilER AGENCIES /0RGAN-IZATIONS USE OF RELIABILITY ASSURANCE CRITERIA / PROGRAMS--RESULTS PROVIDING BASIS F0lt BROAD-BASED PROGRAM AT BNL FOCUSED ON TRIAL APPLICATION.
i l
COMPLETED ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC llVMAN RELIABILITY /PRA DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR RESOLVING IluMAN PERFORMANCE COMPONENTS OF UNRESOLVED AND GENRIC SAFETY ISSUES.
4 COMPLETED REFERENCE CATALOG OF 11 PAST PRA'S AND PUBLISilED FOR STAFF USE.
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REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10,198!,
FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE ANI) PROGRAM REVIEW RELI ABILITY AND RISK METil01)0 LOGY - CONTINUED ELANNED ACCOMPLiSitMENTS COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION OF IMPROVED, TESTED PRA METil0DS FROM RISK METil000 LOGY INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION PROGRAM INCLUDING EXPLICIT TREA1 MENT OF ACCIDENT MANAGEMENI, lilERMAL-ilYDRAULICS, EXTERNAL EVENTS.
COMPLETE INIII AL QUANTIF1 cal 10N OF DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES ANI) IllE COLLECI10 llHMAN ERROR AND COMPONENT FAILURE DATA FOR ADVANCED PRA METil0DS TEST.
PROVIDE AN INDEPINDENT ASSESSMENT OF Tile EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE'S REL ASSURANCE PROGRAM AND DEVELOP IllE ATTRIBUTES OF SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS.
IlUMAN RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT.(llRA) ACTIVITIES lilRECTED TOWARDS IMPROVilNG COGNITIVE MODELING CAPABILITY, llRA I)ATA BANK DEVELOPMENT, AND METil0DS TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION OF GSI*S INVOLVING llUMANS.
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REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPNISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW DALA_ AND llNCERTAINTIES - CONTINUED L'LA.N_NED ACCOMPLISilMENTS IMPLEMENT INTEGRATED AGENCY DATA PLAN TRANSFER OF DATA ACQUISITION AND RETRIEVAL PP0 GRAMS TO AEOD
~
MAINIAIN A CONTINUING BASE EFFORT TO IMPROVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATING DATA, REDtlCE UNCERIAINIIES CONTINUE EFFORIS ON Tile APPLICATION OF INFORMATION ON ROOT CAUSE.0F COMPONENT FAILURES O
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_ 33 _
REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION JUNE 10, 1935 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCH PROGRAMS REGULATORY AND INSPECTION APPLICATIONS MSK PROVIDES FUNDING FOR Tile EXECUTION OF SPECIFIC ANALYSES AND EVALUATION OF T INFORMATION TO SUPPORT ACTIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICYs EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND SITING; AND BACKFITTING REQUlHEMENTS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATING FACILITIES.
STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING INTERNAL VALUE-lMPACT ANALYSIS OF RULEMAKING AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES ARE INADEQUATE TO DEAL WI REQUIREMENTS.
IN THE PAS 1, RE-EVALUAT10N OF EXISTING REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 10 ELIMINATE THOSE WHICH MAY BE OVERLY CONSERVATIVE OR COUNTE SAFE 1Y BASED ON RISK, DID NOT EXIST.
ACC0!!PLiSitMENIS PROVIDED TECilNICAL SUPPORT TO NRR IN REVIEW OF THE BYRON LC0 RELAXATION SU STUDY 10 REVISE CURRENT TECil SPECS.
PROVIDED A SYSlEM FOR Tile CENTRAL REVIEW AND CONTROL OF RULEMAKING.
O PROVIDED TECilNICAL SUPPORT FOR NHR FOR RESOLVING GENERIC ISSUE B-56 (DIESEL GENERATORS RELIABILITY) AND B-61 (ECCS ALLOWABLE OUTAGE TIMES).
COMPLETED REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ARKANSAS NUCLEAR PLANT INSPECTION MODULES.
COMPLETED A PILOT STUDY TO ASSESS APPLICABILITY OF ACCIDENT MANAfEMENT A RISK REIMICITON.
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REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tMISS10N JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW ItEGULATORY AND INSPECTION APPLICATIONS - CONTINUED PlLNNED ACCOMPLISilMENTS COMPLETE. PACKAGE FOR APPLYING PRA TO ASSIST ORDERING OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES DEMONSTRATE Tile APPLICABILITY OF TESTED RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM AS BASE FOR TECil SPEC REVIEWS PROVIDE TECilNICAL ASSISTANCE AND VALUE-lMPACT GUIDANCE FOR RULEMAKING SUPPORTING EMERGENCY PLANNING, SillNG, TRANSPORTATION, ETC.
COMPLETE FORMATION OF AN ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DATA BASE IN SUPPORT OF CRGR AND INCIDENT RESPONSE CEN1ER COMPLETE DEVEL0lHENT AND TRIAL APPLICATION OF METil0DS 10 DETERMINE STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING IllE RISK OF SEVERE ACuDENTS BY PROCEDURAL CilANGES AND MODEST EQUIPMENT MODIFICAITONS DEVELOP RISK AND COST INFORMATION FORMATTED AND ENTERED INTO A RETRIEVAL SYSTEM FOR CONDUCTING REGULATORY ANALYSES COMPLETE SCREENING OF 10 CFR PART 50 TO IDENTIFY REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS WITil MARGINAL IMPORTANCE TO RISK j
i MODIFIED VALUE/ IMPACT POLICY GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATIONS TO NON-REACTOR SITUATIONS COMPLEIED PLANI IMPLEMENIAT10N AND TEST OF RELIABILITY PROGRAM GUIDELINES m-
REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCH PROGRAMS SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK ISSilE NO INTEGRATED AND COMPLETE APFRAISAL TO BE USED AS A REFERENCF FOR REGULATORY ACTION RELATIVE TO Tile IMPACTS OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS AND SOURCE TERMS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED.
NO USER ORIENTED COMPilTER CODE FOR RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS OF POST-CORE DAMAGE SEQUENCES EXIST.
1 l
ACC!NLIS.IKNLS PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR Tile SOURCE TERM METil0DS DOCUMENT, NUREG-0956.
COMPLETION OF CONTAINMENT EVENT TREES FOR FIVE REFERENCE PLANTS.
MARCil-2 AND MATADOR CODES COMPLETED.
CLA.NNED ACCOMPLISilMENTS COMPLETION OF RISK PROFILES ON FIVE REFERENCE PLANTS, USING UPDATED ACCIDENT SEQUENCES, SOURCE TERMS, AND CONTAINHENT PERFORMANCE COMPLETE MELCOR 111 611 PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO COMBINING ACCIDENT LIKELill000 DATA BASE WITil Tile FAST RUNNING RISK CODE (MELCOR) TO PROVIDE SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK ANALYSIS TOOL COMPLETE SillDIES ON SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK, IDENTIFYING MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FAC10RS AND DISPLAYING FULL RANGE OF UNCERTAINTIES USING IMPROVED RISK CODES COMPLEIl0N OF TRIAL VAlllE-lMPACT ANALYSES OF SELECTED PREVENTION / MITIGATION FEAIURES FOR FIVE PLANTS
_ y3 _
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- REVISED ' AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-JUNE 10, 1985
~
FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCll PROGRAMS
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. REACTOR OPERATIONS AND RISK
~
N" PIUNCIPAL RES-SPONSORED Rul.ES PUBLISilED EROPOSED RULES:
LIMITING USE OF llEU IN 00MESllC RESEARCll AND TEST REACTORS, 7/6/811 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (EARTil00AKES), 12/21/811 j
DECOMMISSIONING RULE, 2/11/85 WELL-LOGGING OPERATIONS, f1/8/85
~
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u CRITERI A FOR EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE,11/9/85" PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 50.55A, 5/17/85
~
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EINALRllLES:
I ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, 11/19/881 IlYDROGEN CONTROL RULE, 1/25/85 ADEQUACY OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE, 2/11/85.
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REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10, 1935 FY 1985 MID, YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCil PROGRAMS SEISMIC i
ISSilE APPLICATION OF NEW SEISM 0 LOGICAL INFORMATION (E.G., CllARLESTON EARTil0UAKE) AT EASTERN PLANI SITES MAY REQUIRE HEEVALUATION OF SOME PLANTS FOR LAltGER EARTl100AKES.
NEED TO REDUCE llNCERTAINTIES IN ESTIMA1ES OF AVAILABLE SEISMIC MARGINS.
ACCOMPLISilMENTS 1
l 1)EVELOPEI) COMPLEX PROGRAM PLAN TilAT INVOLVES:
LARGE EXPERIMENTS WillCil MUST BE CAREFllLLY 1)ESIGNED TO CilALLENGE SEISMIC CODES INTO Tile INELASTIC REGION: IMPROVED DATA BASES AND SEISM MARGINS STUDIES.
COMPLETED RESEARCil St10 WING PIPE RUPTURE IS lilGilLY UNLIKELY FOR PWR PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP (GI) llEING. REVISED).
DEFINES IMPROVED APPROACil TO PIPE RESTRAINTS TO IMPROVE SAFETY, 1)EVELOPED COMPUTER CODES FOR CALCULATING PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC llAZARD CURVES FOR EASTER SITES.
COORDINATED EFFORT WITil EPRI AND INDUSTRY TO BE COMPLETED IN FY 198G. SUPPORlEI) IlY CON 11NilED OPERATION OF EASTEllN AND CENTRAL U.S. REGIONAL SEISMIC NETWORKS.
COMPLETED AGREEMENT FOR LARGE SCALE SEISMIC TEST WITil GERMANY AT llDR T0 llELP VAllDATE SEISMIC l
ANALYTICAL METil0DS AND GET INPUT FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION ON EQUIPMENT.
TO BE COMPLETEI) IlY FY i
- 1988, NEGOTI ATING POSSillLE COOPERATION WITil JAPAN AT TAD 0TSU TO EXTEND EXISTING TEST OF PWil LOOP INTO i
IllE INELASTIC RANGE 10 llELP VAllDATE SIMPLIFIED, NON-LINEAR PIPING COMPillER C01)ES DEVELOPED llY NRC.
COMPLETED DEVELOPMENT OF SIMPLIFIED ANALYTICAL METil0DS (FY 1985) TO ESTIMATE, AFTER PROPER VAllDATION, SEISMIC MARGINS AND RISKS OF OPERATING PLANTS, INCLUDING Til0SE PLANTS Wil0SE I)ESIGN llASIS EAR 1ll0llAKE MAY llE INCREASED.
- ?9 -
REVISED AS OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW M.AJOR RESEABCil PROGRAMS WASTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCil
((!Gil LEVEL WASTE ISSUE PROVIDE TECllNICAL BASES FOR NRC'S INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F DOE'S lilGil I.EVEL WASlE (llLW) GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY SITE SELECTION a DESIGN 8 LICENSING OF Tile FACILilY.
ACCOMPLISilMENIS REPORTS COMPLETED ON:
- IlYDROTilERMAL ALTEllATION OF BENTONITE-BASALT PACKING MATERI AL
- BEllAVIOR OF MULTI-VALENT ACTINIDES IN BASALT REPOSITORY
- IMPORTANT COUPLINGS AMONG HYDROLOGIC, lilERMAL, AND MECllANICAL PROCESSES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
- PUBLISilED PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON llLW LICENSING PROCEDllRES TO CONFORM 10 NWPA, 10 CFR PART 60
- PURCllASED REVISED STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT GUIDE FOR llLW SITE CllARACIEltlZA-Il0N REPOR1S STATE-OF-IllE-ART
SUMMARY
ON:
GE0llYDROLOGY, GE0CllEMISTRY, OVERPACK CORROSION, WASIE F0llM PEltFORMANCE, PACKING MATERIAL PROPERTIES, PERFORNANCE ASSESSMENT TECilNIQUES FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS MEll1000 LOGY FOR IDENTIFYING SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND STRUCTURES IMPORTANT 10 PRE-CLOSURE REPOSITORY SAFETY (1986)
LIKELY MODES OF WASTE PACKAGE FAILURE (1988)
GE0TilERMAL BASED REPOSITORY PERFORMANCE MODELS (1988)
CllARACTERISTICS OF FRACTURE FLOW AND TRANSPORT MODELS (1988)
_ lin _
REVISED AS OF
~
NtJCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 10, 1985 FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW MAJOR RESEARCil PROGRAMS WASTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW)
ISSUE PROVil)E TECllNICAL BASIS FOR NRC a AGREEMENT STATE LICENSING OF NEW LLW DISPOSAL FACILITIES ACCOMPLISilMENTS DEVELOPED SilALLOW LAND BURI AL (SLB) LLW RISK ASSESSMENT METil0DOLOGY, VAllDATING COMPU1 Ell CODE.
COMPLETED REPORT ON llTILITY OF ANALYTICAL TECllN10llES FOR LLW WASTE FORM LEACll ANALYSES.
DEVELOPED MElll0D FOR PREDICTING LONG-TERM WASTE PERFORMANCE Fil0M LABORATORY TESTS.
OBTAINEI) GENERIC CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SITE CONDITIONS, PROCESSES, AND MECllANISMS IllAT CONTROL LEACllATE CllEMISTRY AT MAXEY FLATS, llARNWELL, SilEFFIELD, AND WEST VALLEY LLW DISPOSAL SITES, FilfilRE 1)EVELOPMENTS ASSESSMENT OF KEY ENGINEERING FEATURES / ASSUMPTIONS OF ENGINEERED ENilANCEMENT/AllLRNATIVES TO SLB (1987)
EFFECTIVE LLW S0llRCE TERM FOR USE IN PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS (1988)
ASSESSMENT OF SEVEllAL TECilN100ES FOR CONTROLLING WATER INFILTRATION AT SLB SITES (1988) fil -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1985 MID YEAR RESOURCE AND PROGRAM REVIEW RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL INQUIRIES CONGRESS 10llAL INQUIRIES:
)
PREPARED 278 LETTERS TO CONGRESS.
ANSWERED 1879 QUESTIONS FOR llEARINGS.
OF TilESE, 192 WERE ANSWERS TO BEVILL QUESTIONS (108 0F WillCll HERE RELATED TO THE ilANAGEMENT REPORT AND 8il TO Tile BUDGET).
1:01A REQUESTS:
RECEIVED 1186 REQUESTS AND COMPLETED 3GO ACTIONS.
i.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
FY 1985 MID YEAll RESOURCE AND PROGRAll llEVIEW r.
CONCLUSIONS 1.
PROGRAMS ARE ESSENTIALLY ON TRACK.
2.
REDIRECTIONS llAVE TAKEN PLACE, AS REQUIRED, DURING FIRST SIX MONTils OF Tile FISCAL YEAR.
3.
NO MAJOR REDIRECTIONS ARE NEEDED AT HID YEAR.
fl.
filNOR REALLOCATION OF FullDS IS REQUIRED FOR SALARIES, ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT AND TRAVEL.
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12/82 TRANSMITTAL 20:
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Document Control Desk, 016 Phillips
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