ML20127B977
| ML20127B977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades, Point Beach, 07201007  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1991 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127B984 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-91-172, SECY-91-172-R, NUDOCS 9106180257 | |
| Download: ML20127B977 (50) | |
Text
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i June 7, 1991
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For:
The Coernissioners
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From:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations i
Subject:
REGULATORY INPACT SUDVEY REPORT - FINAL
Purpose:
To inform the Coernisston of the staf f's firial actions resulting from an evaluation by HRC sentor management of the effect of HRC regulatory activittes on the safe operation of nuclear power plants.
Background:
In the fall of 1989, the staff initiated the regulatory 3
impact survey (RIS). This effort consisted of three i
surveys and was patterned after a survey conducted in 1981 to determine utility views on the effect of the large number of NRC regulatory initiatives and requirements imposed after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2.
As a result of the 1981 survey, the NRC made e I
number of changes in its organization and regulatory practices.
3 The RiS was conducted to obtain the perceptions of the industry and regulatory staff of the effect of NRC's i
current activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants, and to assist the staff in determining if its regulatory programs have to be modified.
in the fall of 1989, teams of NRC senior managers conducted the 'trst survey of the effect of NRC regulatory act v t es CONTACT:
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REM TO REGULAT0.97 CfMRAl. IllES
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- % u The Comissioners at 13 ut t it ties throughout the count ry.
The.taff c or t.
lee and summarized the results of the survey in SECT-90-080 and draft HUREG-1395.
- Industry Perceptions of the i n;pa c t of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities."
The second survey began when the staff issued Generic t.etter No. 90-01, " Request for Voluntary Participation in HRC Regulatory impact Survey." In the generic letter, the staff requested that licensees provide estimates of the time spent by 6 levels of management in responding to 11 different kinds of inspections and audits.
It asked 14-censee managers to report their direct involvement in preparing for the activity, participating in the inspection or audit, and performing the necessary followup actions.
The staff received responses from 44 of the Sa nucicar utilitiest it gave results of the survey in SECY-90-205.
4 The third survey began in January 1990, when teams of NRR staff members interviewed regional and headquarters staff ranging from engineers and middle managers to associate directors and regional administrators.
The staff gave the results of this survey in SECY-90-250.
The staff evaluated the data from the three surveys and presented resultant planned improvement actiuns in SECY-90-347 On December 27, 1990, the staff published a Federal Register notir.e requesting pubitt coments on these planned actions.
This paper forwards the final staff actions in response to the concerns identified in the regulatory impact surveys.
The actions planned represent a modification of those initially proposed in SECY-90-347 based on consideration of public coments and continued staff review and evaluation.
Discussion;
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in SECY-90-347, the staff concluded that most of the coments received during the three surveys were related to three elements of NRC's regulatory program: (1) the nuetier of NRC requirements. (2) the number of NRC onsite activi-ties, and (3) the interactions between the HRC staff and Itcensee personnel. From these three elements the staff identified three specific regulatory areas for improvemert-r (1) Consideration of the cumulative effect of the NCC,,
generic rcQuirements and generic comunicat ions; l
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4 The Commissioners,
(2) scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections (3) tratning, preparation, and management of inseer' ors i
SEry-9;.347 cescribed planned improvemer.ts
't these three areas, some of which the staff nac n t'atec before the RIS. The major improvements tha t were planned or being implemented are the following:
(1) establishing a program (integrated regulatory requirements implementation schedule) to better account for and manage the cumulative impact of implementing generic requirements on a plant-speciftc basis (2) establishing limits on the number of team inspec-tions for a given site, and periodically cubitshing HRC's schedule for site activities 3
(3) documenting and communicating senior management's expectations for inspectors and their supervisors, estabitshing a cadre of trained inspection team leaders, and improving the training and qualifica-tions of professional inspection staff The staff solicited public comments on the proposed improvements described in SECY-90-347, it received comments from the institute of Nuclear Power Opera-tions, Nuclear Management and Resources Council.
Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group, 1 public interest group, 20 licensees, and 1 priva'e citizen. The comments addressed each of the major j
planned improv? ment areas and are summari:ed below:
l i
(1)
Comments were generally negative regarding the proposed integrated regulatory) requirements implementation schedule (IRRIS program. Specifi-cally, the comments indicated that the staff should focus its efforts on consideration of the cumulative impact of generic requirements during the development of the requirements instead of focusing on the canage-ment of the implementation of generic requirerents.
(2)
Several comments addressed the scheduling and control of inspections.
Several commenters indicated that the limits established on the number of team inspec-tions for a given site would still result in a
l The Connissioners l Sigt.1ticant burden on licensees.
In addition, com-menters recorrended that in order to preserve the spirit of the policy's intent, the dtfinition of ' major teaci tr-spection" be clearly established. Concents regarding the l
staff *s plans to periodically publish site att1vity schedules were generally favorable.
(3) Commenters generally endorsed proposed and i
ongoirg training initiatives. Several commentets indicated that there is a concensurate need to train i
headquarters personnel'and provide an extensive I
training program for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu-lation (MRR) pro *ect managers similar to that provided for inspectors, in addition, several connenters indt-cated that mechanisms should be established to help ensure that training and comraunication of senior management's expectations are effectively implemerted.
I
' t. accition to the above concents, many concenters suy.
gested the need for a fourth area of improvement.
Spec *.
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cally, the commenters indicated that the staff neeced to it. ttate actions to improve management involvement and (..er-sight of HRC regulatory activities and actions.
In a re-lated area, several commenters expressed a netc for the HEC to deltneate the role and responsibility of the f3C staf f in relation to those of the licensees.
The staff has revtewed and evaluated all the public coteent,.
The staf f has modified the improvement plans that were ini-tially provided in SECY-90-347 to address consideration oi l
the cumulative impact of NRC's generic requirements and generic communications, scheduling and control of inspec.
tions, and the training, preparation, and management of inspectors to reflect any changes resulting from the publi t In additton, staff actions related to improv'nq r.ctr'e n t s.
miragement i n vo l v erier t that were discussed 'n SElv 9'
14' n the ared e' train ng, preparation, and n anoceme* * *..
t:een eipa nded. Th
- s area wili be des ist.a ted a '+4e th.
- erarate arer o' staff actions.
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l The Cote.issioners The following is a surm.ary of the changes in the preposec staff actions for each area resulting from the staff's review of public concents on SECY-90-347:
(1) Discontinue the development of the !cc!S program.
Factor the more favorable aspects of the 102 :', (cete:'
'nto the development of a proposed F*ne1 Pol t,
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ment on in'.egrated Schedules for imp len.e n t a t 'on c' Plant Podifications.
(2) Develop and implement, on a trial basis, mechen'sca to improve the consideration of the cumu la t 've 'rev
- of the development of new gener'c reuu'res+ts (3) Broaden the guidance that limits the nunter of major team inspections for a given site per SALP cytic to also include major NRC noninspection activtties.
(4) increase emphasis on management involvement in training.
(5) Incorporate management's expectations and standards into programs and policies and provide for increased
' involvement by management in monitoring and providing feedback on staff activities.
The staff has initiated many of the planned improvements described in SECY-90-347, modified as described above.
For example, it has developed formal management expectations :nd issued an tiRR policy for management oversight of onsite activities.
Details of these and other major improve-ments implemented in response to R!S concerns are provided in Enclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4 Other regulatory activittes
(
that were either initiated or adjusted, but are not covered by the four major area imprevement plans, are pro-vided in Enclosure 5.
An analysis of the significant comments is provided in Enclosure 6.
The R15 provided valuable insights. The staff has moved to quickly initiate referrs of fiRC programs and activities to address the concert.5 that were ideritified.
In addition, it has provided mechanisms to ensure that ongoing oppor-tutitties exist to identify regulatory impact issues as they arise ir, the future.
The staff is firmly committed to full implementation of the improvement: described it, the enclosures and to achieving continued ie.provements in tipt's regulatory prograras and activities.
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The Conrniss ioners l
6-Ceric lu s i one. :~
The staff has evaluated the information gathertc as e resul I
of the Ris, determined the areas where improvements are nerded, i
and initiated plans to make the necessary irrprovements.
The staff is:
1.
Continuirig to irnplement the actions described in this paper and the enclosures.
2.
Updating tiUREG-1395 by addu g this Cem ss :c n:r' as an enclosure ar.c will issue it as the-sta s * "at report within 30 days.
Original StrneJ Gn JJntal M IJt Uf d a f*lt 's M,
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Enclosures:
for Operet' ens Managing the Cumulative Effect o' MC's Generic Requirenents and Genertc Communications 2.
Scheduling and Cuntrol of inscections Especially Team inspections 3.
Tratning and Professionalism 4
Management Control and involvement by i;RC Senior Managers 5.
Other SJrvey Cornment Topic Areas 6.
Analysis of Coments Distribution and concurrence see next page l
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1.
MANAGlHG THE CUltVLATIVE EFFECT OF NRC's GENERIC REQUIREMENTS A GENERIC COMMUNICATIO!!S A.
Issue The first major issue identified was the number of HRC requirements.
Specifi-cally, the major area for improvement is~ management of the cumulative effect of i!RC's generic requirements and generic comunications.
Underlying the majcr issue are, (1) deficiencies in comunication between the NRC and the regulated industry, (2) unauthorized imposition of informal requirements, and (3) insufficient participation on the part of industry in such staff initia-tives as integrated schedules or the integrated safety assessment program.
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B.
Background and Ongoing Staff Actions l
The HRC has continually initiated actions to improve the management of the creation and implementation of requirements. Many actions initiated have resulted and will continue to result in improvements in regard to the specific concerns identified in the RIS. Background information and a sumary of these ongoing actions are provided below to form a basis on which to develop what is needed to improve the NRC program.
1.
Generic Issues Management Programs The staff provides two systematic means of comunication a.
that list HRC contacts and thereby present an opportunity far industry input regarding safety importance. The first is ;he semi-annual publication of NUREG-0933, "Prioritization of Generic issues."
Priorities for the generic safety issues are established ising quantitative analyses, as applicable, to evaluate the cha ige in risk, cost, and relationship to other regulatory actions.
The second is NRR's biweekly letter to The Institute of Iluclear Power Operations (INPO) listing generic letters, bulletins, and in-formation notices being developed by the staff.
The safety issues in these letters are those for' hich resolution will be dealt with w
by HRR alone in a relatively short time, b.
In March 1989, the staff presented proposals to the Comission regarding implementation of the safety goal policy of August 1986.
In June 1990, the Comission reaffirmed its endorsement of qualita-tive goals and quantitative health effects objectives that would help in testing the adequacy of current requirements and determining the possible need for additional requirements.
The Comission also approved 13 actions related to the Safety Goal Policy Statement.
These actions included directives that the staff routinely consider the safety goals in developing regulations and regulatory practice and that it establish a formal mechanism to ensure that future regu-latory initiatives are evaluated for conformity with the safety gcels.
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! Another directive stated that the staff should strive for a risk level consistent with the safety goals in developing or revising regulations.
. For the past 10 years, the Comittee To Review Generic Requirements 4
c.
(CRGR) has reviewed proposed final new requirements for the NRC.
i The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) a manages the CRGR function.
In April 1989 AE00 conducted a survey i
of licensees to determine their perceptions of the backfitting pro-cess. The comments ' ceived from the RIS generally confirmed and 1
expanded on concern.
hat had been expressed in the earlier AE00 survey. In December 1989, the staff responded by including a sumary of backfitting considerations in generic letters and bulletins.
In j
July 1990, the staff issued NUREG-1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," to i
explain the backfitting process and to address typical questions of the public and the NRC staff. In the fall of 1990, the staff conducted public workshops in the NRC regions to explain and discuss backfit management principles.
d.
The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is revising its regu'intory analysis guidance. This work includes revising both NUREG/BR-0058. Revision 1. " Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission" (guidelines), and NUREG 3568, "A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment" (handbook).
"heguidelinesprovidedirectiontoensurethat(i)hRCgeneric regulatory decisions are based on adequate information concerning 1
the need for and consequences of a proposed regulatory action and a
t (ii) cost-effective regulatory actions are identified that are con.
sistent with providing the necessary protection of the public health and safety and comon defense and security. Since the guidelines are l
NRC's policy-setting document with respect to regulatory analyses, the staff believes that the new revised guidelines should be pub-lished in the Federal Register for public comment. Once the public J
coments are resolved, the revised guidelines will go to the Comis-j sion for approval.
The handbook contains a set of systematic procedures for providing information that can be used in performing value-impact assessments of HRC regulatory actions. It also contains various methodological
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tools and generic estimates to be used for regulatory analyses. The staff does not intend to issue it for public coment, but plans to 2
have it issued by the Executive Director for Operations.
Commenters responding to SECY 90-347 requested that the staff not consider averted onsite costs in cost-benefit analyses. The staff intends to continue to use averted onsite costs as an offset against other licensee costs and not as a benefit in cost-benefit analyses as approved by the'Comission in the Staff Requirements Memorandum j
dated June 15, 1990.
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i In addition, comenters indicated that the staff needed to focus on the origination of generic issues. The staff has addressed, and will continue to address, the origination of generic issues, as dis-cussed above. Also, the staff does not issue bulletins and generic letters unless it feels that the generic comunication addresses an issue that would justify issuance of an order to an affected 1tcer.see who has taken no action on the issue. However, the staff is consider-i ing the additional actions described in Part C of this enclosure to i
better consider cumulative impact during the origination of generic issues.
I 2.
Plant Specific Programs In August 1987, the staff completed a pilot program for the inte-a.
grated safety assessment program (ISAP). The objective of ISAP was to provide the technical basis to resolve all outstanding i
licensing actions, to establish ovarall schedults for plant improve-ments, and to be a benchmark for evaluating future: regulatory actions on a plant-specific basis. The assessment was to be based i
on (1) a review of lessons learned from the systematic evaluation program, (11) performance of a plant-specific probabilistic safety assessment, and (iii) a compilation and analysis of plant operating j
experience. The ISAP review of a plant included an evaluation of all proposed actions in Itght of the significance of all other i
i existing actions. A generic letter issued to solicit interest in
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ISAp, following an HRC-sponsored pilot program, showed little industry interest in a larger scale ISAP. This was attributed, in i
part, to an industry perception that the resultant prioritized list of actions to be implemented would be subject to inspection by the 3
i NRC and, in part, to the need to do a probabilistic safety assessment.
The HRC continues to offer the opportunity to any licensee to perform an integrated safety assessment. At pubite workshops, in March 1989 the staff reaffirmed that Itcensees could respond with an approach similar to 15AP to meet the requirements in the staff's November 1988 j
generic letter requiring an individual plant examination to look for vulnerabilities to severe accidents.
b.
In November 1987, the Comission issued a proposed Policy Statement i
I on Integrated Schedules for Implementation of Plant Modifications that offered the opportunity to develop integrated schedules based i
upon a prioritization process developed by the licensee and approved by the staff. This policy did not require a probabilistic safety assessment. However, it did not attract significant licensee participation because of an industry perception that the staff would i
require that the finished integrated schedule be incorporated into j
the plant operating itcense.
j The activities described in a. and b. above establi e and maintain formal processes viithin the NRC to manage the iswnee of new requirements and to ensure that these requirementt are promptly and 4
i
s 4-n efficiently implemented. Although ISAP and integrated schedules have not been as effective as planned, the staff will continue to pursue the objectives of these efforts. Accordingly, coments from the current surveys have resulted in the actions described below to increase licensee participation in the process of establishing and implementing requirements.
C.
Additional Actions Planned in addition to activities already under way to enhance the staff's management of new requirements, the staff is planning, on a trial basis, the.following actions to further address the concerns raised in the RIS:
1.
Generic issues Management Programs a.
NRR is developing a process to enhance its ability to estimate the impact of specific NRC generic comunications on licensees. The staff intends to incorporate an additional statement into generic comunica-tions that requests licensees to,N/4 Ue feedback voluntarily on the short-term (response-related) and.ong-term (implementation-related) impact of responding to and implementing the requested actions delineated in specific generic comunications. This information will enable a more i
effective comparison of NRC staff and industry impact estimates. result-ing in better staff estimates for future generic comunications.
b.
NRR also plans to intorporate into the generic communications process a flexible priority ranking system for generic comunications. This system entails prioritizing, on the basis of safety significance, past, present, and proposed generic communications.
It would provide both licensees and the NRC staff with a clearer understanding of which issues the staff believes to be the most safety significant. The system will be updated periodically.
c.
HRR is incorporating into the generic communications process con-sideration of the cumulative impact of NRC generic comunications on a typical Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering Westinghouse, and General Electric plant before a new generic comunication is issued.
The staff has assessed the current impact of generic communications issued after 1987 on these typical plants.
It assesses the impact of a proposed NRC generic comunication against the existing regulatory burden placed on these representative facilities.
Information ob-tained from industry concerning the plant-specific, short-term and long-term impact of generic communications will be incorporated into this activity. This methodology, when combined with the flexible priority ranking system, will aid the staff in establishing appropriate scope and schedule for implementing the action requested in the proposed generic communication.
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' 2.
Plant Specific Programs in SECY-90-347. the staff proposed to establish a new initiative, i
the Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (tRRIS), to better manage the impact of implementing generic require.
ments.
Public comments received indicated little interest in the 2
IRRIS concept. As a result, the staff will not go forward with IRRIS.
Instead. the staff will focus on revising and pubitshing in final form the Integrated Schedules for Implementation of Plant Hodifications program to incorporaf.e the more favorable espects of that program and desirable j
additions from the IRRIS concept. y
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Apro'osed'policystdementonNteg'atedScheduleswaspublished p
r for coment in the Federal Register on Hovember 27,1987 Comments on the proposed policy have been received. In addition, seven opera-ting facilities lincluding two multi-unit sites) have participated in the Integrated Schedule program. Feedback from the integrated Schedule 1
experience and comments on the proposed IRRIS concept will be incorpo.
tated.into a proposed Final Policy Statement currently scheduled for j
submittel to the Comission in August,1991.
i The staff anticipates that when N nalized the Integrated Schedule forPlantHodificationsPolicywillprovidelicensees,onavoluntary basis, with a simple scheduling mechanism to encourage early implemen-i tation of plant modifications. This should result in the most safety for resources expended, should set balanced priorities, and avoid duplication of effort.
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- 11. SCHEDULING AND CONTROL OF INSPECTIONS, ESPECIALLY TEAM INSPECTIONS A.
Issue The second major issue identified as a result of the RIS was the number of ilRC onsite activities. Specific concerns focused on the scheduling and control of NRC onsite activities, especially team inspections.
B.
Background and Ongoing Staff Actions Since the 1987 reorganizatioh when the Office of In'spection and Enforcement was incorporated into the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (flRR), the staff's continuing process of identifying and addressing lessons learned in the implementation of the reactor inspection program has resulted in a number of major program initiatives. These initiatives ensure that the limited resources available for the reactor inspection program are efficiently end effectively allocated to enhance reactor safety. The results of the RIS in the area of the implementation of the reactor inspection program confirm that many program initiatives previously implemented have resulted in con-tinued improvement in the inspection program and its implementation.
1 However, the RIS identified several areas related to scheduling and control of NRC onsite activities where continued improvement is warranted.
The staff has initiated several actions that will directly address these areas. Some of these actions were implemented before the survey; some were implemented as a result of i
the survey. The following actions are ongoing:
1.
The Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations, and Research issued a Field Policy Manual Chapter on the co-ordination of NRC activities at power reactor facilities. This policy guidance to regional administrators and office directors assigned overall g
responsibility for coordinating and scheduling NRC visits to reactor sites to the regional offices.
In addition, it established the framework for coordinattrg site activities planned by headquarters offices with the regions through a central focal point.
2.
The staff issued an Inspection Manual Chapter to provide guidance on im-plementing the policy on coordination of NRC activities at power rear. tor sites. This manual chapter established the definition of a " major team inspection" and a limit on the number of major team inspections that may be conducted during any licensee Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfor-mance (SALP) cycle without approval of the deputy regional administrator (following coordination with the Associate Director for Projects, NRR).
The guidance in the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter and Field Policy Manual Chapter will improve the scheduling of NRC activities at reactor sites and i
thereby minimize their unnecessary impact on plant operations or other major licensee activities.
)
2-1 3.
In 1988, the staff issued a major restructuring of the inspection program. Recently, the staff revised the NRC Inspection Manual to place additional emphasis on er.:uring that inspections planned by the regions are scheduled and reviewed each quarter. This process focuses on evaluating trends in Itcensee performance for the purpose i
of revising unit-specific inspection plans and resource allocations.
4.
The staff reassessed the effect of major team inspections on licensee j
activities and as a result incorporated an additional policy in the NRC i
inspection Manual to ensure that the use of major team inspections is based on Itcensee performance or generic safety significance and that major team inspections are announced to minimize the effect on licensees.
l S.
The staff developed and implemented the master inspection planning j
system (MIPS)in1988toprovideacentralizedcomputer-basedsystem for planning and scheduling inspections at each comercial reactor.
MIPS enables the staff to schedule inspections on the basis of plant performance and to develop an integrated, unit-specific inspection plan. MIPS is the primary tool for scheduling inspection and coordinating NRC activities at commercial reactors. The regions create and maintain unit-specific inspection plans with input from the s
headquarters program offices. The staff records and integrates all i
major site activities into the unit-specific inspection plans, includ-ing HRC inspection and noninspection activities. licensee activities such as refueling outages, and significant third-party activities.
Before approving and implementing the inspection plan and periodically thereafter, senior regional management reviews the plan to ensure it 3
assigns the appropriate application and scheduling of inspection activi-ties and resources in accordance with SALP performance, resource i
constraints, and policy guidelines on coordination of NRC activities at j
power reactor plants.
6.
The staff drafted a revision to the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter to provide further headquarters control of 10 CFR Part 21 reports, thus, eliminating unnecessary generic inspection follow-up by the regions.
C.
Additional Actions planned i'
The staff is planning the following actions in addition to those described i
above to further address the concerns raised in the RIS:
i j
1.
The staff will revise the NRC inspection Manual Chapter on coordination j
r,f HRC activities. The manual chapter at currently written limits j
the number of major team inspections that may be conducted during a j
licensee SA1.p cycle without senior regional and program office concur-1 rence to four per SALP cycle.
In light of the potentially equally significant impact of major noninspection activities such as research i
-3 information visits or licensing audits, the guidance will be expanded to provide controls to cover all types of major NRC visits. Operator licensing or requalification examination visits, emergency preparedness visits, and reactive team inspections will remain outside the above restrictions.
In addition, visits by senior management officials of the agency will not be subject to these restrictions.
The staff received several coments on SECY-90-347 that suggested that the threshold for the number of major team inspections to be conducted without additional management review and approval be decreased to further minimize their impact on licensees.
In addition, commenters suggested that the NRC clearly define " major team inspection" for the purposes of this restriction.
In response to these comments, the revised NRC Inspection Manual Chapter on coordination of NRC visits to commercial reactor sites will clearly define the types of major activities for which the threshold is applicable. The staff believes that the threshold of four major activities per licensee SALP
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cycle, which includes major noninspection activities, is an appropriate limit. The staff will' reevaluate these limits as part of regular inspection program reviews and modify them as necessary to ensure they are appropriate.
4 2.
The NRC reactor inspection program provides for continuing observation and verification of licensees' capability to safely design, build, and operate nuclear power plants. The NRC verifies this assessment through the use of region-based and headquarters inspectors who participate in various team and individual inspection activities.
In addition, the NRC relies on full-time, highly trained, technically competent NRC resident inspectors to observe and verify ongoing licensee activities, including those conducted during weekend, late evening, and early morning hours.
This highly evolved and comprehensive inspection environment ensures that it is unlikely that advance notification of planned inspections would enable licensees to.itgnificantly alter their activities in such a manner that would prevent the NRC from achieving its inspection objectives.
Therefore, there is no apparent advantage in continuing the general practice 4
of conducting unannounced inspections except in certain instances.
Thus.
the staff will revise Inspection Manual Chapter 0300, " Announced and Un-a announced inspections." The revised manual chapter will establish the general policy that all inspections be announced except if advance notifi-i cation could reasonably compromise the ability of the staff to obtain an accurate assessment of licensee programs, practices, or activities.
This policy will not apply to resident inspector activities. The revised policy of announcing inspections will result in increased efficiency in the use of NRC and licensee resources through enhanced planning and scheduling.
3.
In conjunction with 2. above, the staff will periodically publish site activity schedules that include NRC planned major team inspections and other major NRC noninspection site activities. The site activity schedule in Hips is a principal tool for integrating major NRC activities with significant licensee and third-party activities.
Its promulgation will facilitate early resolution of scheduling conflicts, reduce the impact of l
overlapping activities, and increase NRC and licensee efficiency.
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111. TRAINING AND PROFESS 10tlALISt4 A.
Issue The third major issue identified related to the training, preparation, and management of the NRC professional staff. Specific concerns raised were the need for increased training for the staff, for a clear understanding of expectations for staff professionalism, and for increased management oversight.
Concerns in this area were applicable to headquarters and regional staff. Those related to training are addressed in this enclosure. Concerns related to manage-ment effectiveness including management expectations,, oversight, and involvement are addressed in Enclosure 4 B.
Background and Ongoing Staff Actions Since the Davis-Besse event of June 1985, the emphasis of the inspection and licensing programs has shifted from construction and licensing to plant opera-tions. The increased tasks and responsibilities associated with responding to inspection and licensing issues in an operational environment and the increased agency focus on safety and performance rather than mere compliance have increased the complexity of the roles of inspectors, project managers, and technical reviewers.
itRC management responded to these increased demands and significant staff turnover l
with several training and qualification program initiatives.
1 Ongoing training initiatives that address RIS concerns related to training are described below. Several of these initiatives were implemented befure the survey; some were implemented as a result of the survey.
1.
Between September and November 1989, NRR reviewed the inspection program to determine its effectiveness in achieving the goals established for it.
An area of improvement highlighted by the review was the need to strengthen regional and headquarters team leader performance. As a result, the staff initiated actions to establish a structured team leader qualification process that will include specialized team leader training and on-the-job experience.
As an example of the specialized training now being provided, a team leader counterpart meeting was conducted in September 1990 to allow NRC management en opportunity to reinforce the importance of the team leader position and to communicate its expectations. During the meeting, team leaders discussed team management responsibilities and techniques, common problems, and reg-ulatory impact concerns.
Additional team leader workshops will be scheduled. The Office of Personnel developed several additional courses targeted to the needs of team leaders.
including " Leading NRC Work Teams" and " Gathering Inspection Information Through Interviews." These courses were piloted and have been given at headquarters and at several regional offices. NRR will continue to review i
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the content of the existing courses and work with the Office of Personnel to revise them as appropriate in response to the RIS.
2.
NRC management recognized the need for regional and headquarters office staff training on the backfit process.
In April 1989, AE00 conducted a i
i survey of the nuclear industry to obtain its perceptions of the backfit program. In response to the survey AE00 initiated several actions, in j
July 1990, the staff issued NUREG-1409, 'Backfitting Guidelines," to ex-plain the backfitting prott.ss and to answer comon questions raised during l
NRC staff training and by the industry. The staff conducted regional work-shops on backfitting for licensee and NRC staff during the winter 1990 and plans to periodically conduct industry workshops. These workshops address i
many of the issues identified in the backfit survey and RIS.
In addition.
the NRR staff has begun receiving backfit training that specifically addresses plant-spectitc backfitting. This training will also bc 4
provided periodically.
i 3.
The staff, through the Training Advisory Group, has drafted a major revision of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 1245, " Inspector Qualificatinns."
The purpose of this revision was to ensure compatibility of training re-quirements with current inspection requirements as defined in 'nspection Manual Chapter 2515. "I.ight-Water Inspection Program - Operations Phase";
establish a standardized Inspector Qualification Journal for each inspector discipline as a baseline document for use by all regions; and update the listing of training courses 50 that they are current with the Technical Training Center's syllabus.
In addition, the staff added new requirements in the Manual Chapter for training to be taken within 2 years after certification.
Six new inspector categories were also added two by HRR and four by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. This revision in which approximately one additional week of training for existing inspector positions, two additional weeks of training within 2 years after certification, and one additional week of~ refresher training 1
every 3 years for fully qualified inspectors have been added, will result in improved inspector knowledge, skills, and abilities.
4 NRC management has always expected the staff to exhibit professionalism in its interactions with the licensees. To support this expectation, the i
st:ff has initiated the following actions.
I The staf f is organizing a task group to modify the existing *Funda-a.
mentals of Inspection" (F01) course which is given to new inspectors and NRR employees to provide additional guidance in those areas dealing with methods and processes for planning and documenting inspection results, guidelines for inspector's conduct, and insights on professionalism.
i 3-i b.
A Fundamentals of Inspection refresher course is being developed to reinforce inspection skills and techniques and to provide the oppor-tunity for NRC management to comunicate their expectations to the j
inspectors.
Additional mandatory and optional courses for more experienced in-c.
spectors will be provided. These courses will focus on improving J
i inspection evaluation techniques, including interviewing, meeting management, problem solving, and communication skills and will use practical exercises, role playing, and case studies.
5.
In FY 1988, the NRC began to develop revised qualification programs for headquarters technical personnel. Since the technical training requirements for headquarters technical positions were not as well defined as those for regional technical positions described in NRC inspection Manual Chapter 1245 4
the staff designed a plan to determine headquarters' needs over time. This Plan was designed to identify the headquarters technical positions for which qualification programs should be developed and to provide a process for defining the qualification and technical training requirements for these technical positions.
)
In 1989, the NRC implemented a generic technical training program to identify qualification and training requirements for technical employees.
A training matrix for each staff member was developed to indicate the minimum training requirements and to establish an overall training plan for each individual. This training matrix includes technical, adminis-trative, and professional training. Additionally, a formal qualification program was established in several NRR branches that are f requently involved in inspection activities. These programs are patterned after the regions' inspector qualification programs.
6.
In 1991, the NRC estabitshed a Training Advisory Council (TAC) to provide j
en agency-wide perspective to integrate and coordinate NRC training programs. This council of senior managers provides a forum to discuss l
broad training and human resource strategic planning issues that span NRC offices and regions. The TAC provides recommendations to the Executive Director for Operations and actions necessary to ensure the NRC has the optimum mix and level of training throughout the agency.
C.
Additional Actions Planned The staff is planning several additional actions to further address the concerns raised in the RIS. These actions include the following:
1.
To reinforce the importance of the team leader position, NRC management will take action to establish team leader positions in each region.
2.
The staff received pubite comments on SECY-90-347 that t a gested that management involvement in training be increased to ensure the staff is trained in accordance with management's expectations and that mechanisms be established to ensure that training and senior management's expectations are effectively and consistently implemented. Although senior management
4 has been involved with training to some extent, efforts will be made to increase this involvement through direct participation. Wheneter appropriate.
opportunities will be provided during the courses described ab)ve for senior management to communicate its expectations philosophy directly to the staff and to answer questions or concerns that arise.
The inspection Manual Chapter on inspection program assessment, currently being drafted, will place increased emphasis on the evaluation of field activities against expected program goals. Additional actions to ensure that management's expectations for staff performance are implemented and discussed in Enclosure 4 t
3.
In response to comments received, in addition to the generic technical training program for all technical staff, management will evaluate the establishment of training requirements for project managers that will be as comprehensive as those delineated in Inspection Manual Chapter 1245 for inspectors.
A major beneficial result of all NRC's planned and ongoing training initia-tives should be improved consistency of the inspection and licensing programs.
e
4 MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND INVOLVEMENT BY SENIOR NRC MANAGERS o
1 A.
Issue Concerns in this area are related to the staff's lack of a clear understanding of management's standards and expectations and a lack of management oversight and involvement in regulatory activities and actions. These concerns were partly addressed in SECY-90-347 along with concerns related to training and preparation of inspectors. Because these concerns cross all areas of staff performance, the staff's actions in this area have been expanded and are discussed separately.
B.
Background and Ongoinq Staff Actions Because of the turnover of the professional staff, including inspectors, project managers, licensing reviewers, and managers at various levels, senior management has had to continually work to ensure that the staff clearly understands its expectations. Management has long recognized the importance of clearly comuni-cating its expectations to the staff and of actively monitoring and providing feedback to ensure that its expectations are being met. However, the RIS has indicated that improvement in this area is possible. As discussed in SECY-90-347 the staff implemented severa16 actions that will result in improved management effectiveness.
These actions include the following:
1.
MRC management drafted formal standards and expectations for management i
and staff performance and professionalism insnediately af ter the Rls. These standards and expectations are based on the principles for good regulations that were given in Announcement No. 6 dated January 17, 1991, as the ground-work for standards of performance and professionalism within the NRC. The standards and expectations clearly depict senior management's expectations of how the staff can collectively and individually implement these principles.
In addition, they clearly delineate the role and responsibility of the NRC
]
staff in relation to those of the licensees.
2.
To ensure effective direction of activities and consnunication at reactor facilities NRR promulgated a policy regarding management involvement and oversight of inspections, examinations, audits, and other onsite activities.
The policy provides detailed guidelines intended to ensure that every level of management clearly and unequivocally consnunicates expectations regarding the duties of subordinates and principles to be applied in the performance of those duties. The policy will improve line management's verification of employee performance through direct observation of and participation in site activities. For example, one feature of the policy is that it establishes the frequency at which regional division of reactor projects branch chief s should sistt each site for which they are responsible and establishes specific
r i
t j.{
management t,bjectives to be achieved during and as a result of tht:se visits.
This policy also establishes a mechanism for frequent feedback from i
licensees regarding regulatory impact concerns.
3.
The staff has initiated team leader training.
information on team leader skills and techniques, this training serves as
{
In addition to providing a forum for management to communicate its expectations to team leaders.
4.
The staff has begun to reinforce standards and expectations in formal training courses, where appropriate, in conjunction with the training in-j ttiatives describcd in Enclosure 3.
5.
The Inspection and 1.icensing Programs Branch, NRR, will continue to provide final review and oversight of all inspection procedures to be issued.
This review ensures that directions proviced to inspectors support management's expectations and standards for conduct of the inspection program by enabling inspectors to clearly distinguish between regulatory requirements and in-spection objectives or guidance.
6.
Although the staff highlighted the issue of consistency and uniformity between the regions end among inspectors as a specific area for comment by licensees regarding the staf f's proposed improvement actions, few comments were received. The staff feels that improvements in the area of training, described in Enclosure 3, coupled with the improvements described in this enclosure will increase the consistency and effectiveness of regula-tory activities and programs.
C.
Additional Actions Planned The actions outlined below are part of an overall effort by NRC management to maximize management effectiveness through clarification and connunication of standards and expectations, increased monitoring, and active feedback. The actions described below incorporate those that were previously implemented as discussed in SECY-90-347 and incorporate pubite coments as appropriate.
1.
As part of routine activities to revise and update program and office guidance and procedures, the staff will ensure that directions given to the staff are consistent with the letter and spirit of the standards and expectations.
2.
Management will review performance eierents and standards and revise them as appropriate to reilect the management expectations established in the standards and the expectations described above. Managers will discuss these standards and expectations with the staff as part of the appraisal process to ensure they are clearly understood.
/
l 3.
Management at all levels will periodically monitor subordinate performance of assigned duties, including field activities, to ensure that senior manage-ment's expectations are effectively implemented.
4.
Management will continue to provide routine and formal feedback to subor-dinates through the normal performance appraisal process on their implemen-tation of program requirements and achievement of established standards and expectations.
,Mk c.e.h 5.
The staff will continue its periodic and ongoing reviews of its regulatory programs to ensure they are effective, efficient, and implemented consistent-ly. The draft NRC Inspection Manual Chapter on the inspection program esse'.5-ment process establishes the process by which specific program goals and objectives stated in regional operating plans based on NRC's Five-Year Plan are periodically assessed. The process includes periodic monitoring and assessment of the program's effectiveness, regional implementation, and the impact of the inspection program on Itcensee activities. The process relies on insights gained through frequent participation in, and observa-tiot, of regional activities, assessment team visits to the regions by the Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, NRR Management Team visits, periodic assessi.ents by NRR division directors of their respective areas of program responsibility, and periodic interviews with licensee manage-ment.
The staff will evaluate and address concerns raised by licensees regarding regulatory impact issues as appropriate on an on-going basis, d
i
V.
OTHER SURVEY COMMENT TOPlc AREAS In the draft regulatory impact survey report (SECY-90-080), the staff grouped utility coments into 10 topic arcas.
In those areas, the staff identified actions that it would consider in order to address the licensees' issues. Subsequently, the second and third surveys supported many of the issues and actions identified for consideration. Actions that were not ad-dressed in the major improvement areas outlined in SECY-90-347, " Regulatory i
Impact Survey Report " were discussed in an enclosure. They are sumarized again here under the appropriate topic area, A.
Requirements and Perceived Requirements Staff actions are discussed in Enclosure 1.
B.
NRC Licensing Activities One of the goals of the technical specifications improvement program (TSIP) is to resolve many of the concerns that have developed regarding the current tech-nical specifications. The TSIP focuses attention on those aspects of reactor operation that are most safety significant and ensures that the requirements established in these areas are clear and concise and adequately balance all of the relevant technical considerations. Draft technical specifications have been issued. The staff is working with Nuclear Management and Resources Council to resolve any differences.
In 1988, the staff developed and implemented a priority ranking system for managing of licensing reviews.
The system assigns priorities on the basis of safety signi-ficance, operational effect, and statutory responsibilities.
In June 1989, the staff completed a study of the backlog of licensing actions and established goals _
to ensure that the staff responds to licensee requests within a specified time.
These efforts have provided significant, measurable results. NRR is currently meeting its goals regarding the total active inventory and will continue to focus attention on reducing the age of the actions in the inventory.
C.
NRC Inspection Activities !
Staff actions are discussed in Enclosures 2 and 3.
In addition, a regional administrator may recomend to senior NRC management, as part of the semi-annual Senior Management Meeting process subject to E00 approval, a reallocation of resident inspection resources for multtunit sites that have sustained exceptional performance so that a staff level of N plus one resident inspector is not necessary for that plant site for the duration of the SALP cycle. This flexibility with regard to resident inspector staffing for plants with exceptional performance would be used for example, to delay filling an open resident in-spector position or to increase an inspector's assignments to inspect other sites.
This recomendation by the regional administrator would be based on considera-tion of the long term performance of the licensee over inultiple SALP cycles.
2 D.
Performance Evaluations Even before the RIS was conducted the staff was developing proposed changes to the SALP procedures. The staff has now completed the proposed changes to the SALP procedures. On May 25, 1990, the staff sent SECY-90-189 with draft Manual Chapter 0516 to the Commission. The proposed manual chapter includes revised definitions of performance categories, retains numerical ratings, and deletes
" responsiveness to NRC initiatives" as an evaluation criterion. The staff found that a major restructuring of the SALP program was not necessary.
In accordance with the Comission's directive of August 10, 1990, the staff began implementing the new SALP procedures.
On November 28, 1989, the staff issued revised guidance regarding the use and limitations of NRC performance indicators.
The staff reissues this guidance with each quarterly performance indicator report and has inserted the guidance into the staff's computer sof tware for performance indicators, so that the guidance always appears on the screen first and must be acknowledged before reviewing the performance indicator data.
E.
Impact of Multiple Oversight Organizations As discussed in Enclosure 2, inspection program policy and the master inspection planning system will help ensure that unintended coincident inspections by the NRC and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and duplicative inspections will not occur. Regarding the possible impact of State resident engineers on licensee activities, the staff notes that the Commission policy of February 1989 and a draft subagreement with the State of Illinois (submitted for Commission approval on September 18,1990) would specifically limit State-initiated inspections to those fully in accord with NRC inspection plans and practices.
F.
Operator Licensing The staff revised examiner standards in NUREG-1021, Revision 6. " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," issued in June 1990, in which it more explicitly defined the individual simulator critical tasks and reduced the number of tasks per scenario, j
The staff discussed this approach with the industry, in addition, in meetings in Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D.C., the staff and industry discussed changes to the requalification program. The staff incorporated these changes into NUREG-1021. Revision 6.
Revision 6 is expected to stabilize the examination process for a substantial period.
j l
3 As discussed in SECY-91-034 and at the Commission meeting on February 15, 1991, the staff is also considering a pilot program to eliminate individual simulator critical tasks and to evaluate crew performance during the dynamic simulator portion of the NRC-administered requalification examination. The staff believes evaluation of crew performance rather than individual performance will emphasize the importance of teamwork, will reduce stress, and will have a positive impact
.on crew training.
The pilot program would be conducted at up to eight facilities.
The results of the pilot program would be used, if appropriate, to amend 10 CFR Part 55. Approximately 65 percent of all operators who failed a dynamic sim lator exemination were also part of operating crews that failed, and many operators failed multiple portions of the examination.
Thus, the staff believes the examination taken as a whole without individual pass / fail decisions for the dynamic simulator portion of the operating' test will discriminate unsatisf actory performance by individuals.
G.
Enforcement and Investigations i
The Director, Office of Enforcement (DE), has provided additional guidance to the staff concerning implementation of the enforcement policy that allows the staff to reduce a civil penalty or not issue a citation if a licensee appropri-ately identifies and corrects violations.
i OE is now providing the Commission a monthly report on the status of enforcement actions.
In addition to this new reporting requirement, since October 1989, OE has issued monthly timeliness reports that are distributed to the rcgional administrators.
The staff is also reviewing the enforcement policy relative to safeguards violations.
H.
Reporting Events Beginning in September 1990, the staff conducted regional workshops on the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72, 50.73, and 73.71 along with the backfit workshops.
The workshops focused on the NRC staff use of event reporting to pro-vide information regarding operating experience to licensees. The' staff is plan-t ning to issue a revision to NUREG-1022 concerning licensee reporting to provide additional guidance under the current rules and to respond to questions raised at l
the workshops.
Finally, the staff is considering revising 10 CFR 50.72 and i
50.73 to eliminate unnecessary reports of invalid actuation of certain engineered safety features such as cleanup system isolation if revision to the 1
i guidance is insufficient to effect the needed improvements.
1.
Communications Staff actions are discussed in Enclosure 3;
.).
Qualifications, Training, and Professionalism of NRC Personnel Staff actions are discussed i'n Enclosures 3 and 4 t
i l
t I
i l
3 VI. ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC COMMENTS l
A.
List of Commenters 1.
Institute of Nuclear Power O'perations 2.
Georgia Power Company 3.
Alabana Power Company t
i 4
Yankee Atomic Electric Company i
5.
Omaha Public Power District 6.
Nuclear Management and Resources Council 7
Centerior Energy - Perry Nuclear Power Plant 8.
Detroit Edison 9.
Not used
- 10. Northeast Utilities
- 11. GPU Nuclear Corporation 12.
Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group 13.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
14 Florida Power and Light
- 15. TU Electric l
- 16. Entergy Operations, Inc.
J
- 17. Consumers Power
- 18. New York Power Authority 19.
E. J. Wagner, Duxbury, MA
- 20. Washington Public Power Supply System
- 21. Gulf States Utilities
- 22. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 1
- 23. Centerior Energy - Davis-Besse 24 Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
- 25. Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy l
- 26. Florida Power Corporation 0
l l
1 4
. - ~
. B.
Analysis of Comments 1
Managing the Cumulative Effect of NRC's Generic Requirements and Generic Communications Connent Commenter Staff Response 1.
The NRC should not consider " averted 4, 6, 16 Averted onsite costs will be used as onsite costs" in costs-/ benefit analyses.
an offset against other licensee costs in cost-benefit analyses.
2.
The NRC has shifted focus to managing 6, 7, 12, 14, The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the implementation of generic
- 16. 18
. requirements from considering how the (NRR) plans to increase consideration the burden was created.
of"the cumulative impact during the origination of generic connunications.
3.
The integrated regulatory requirements 6, 14, 15 IRRIS will not be pursued. Comments implementation schedule (IRRIS) will not be sufficient if it freezes outage will be considered in development of activities.
Final Policy Statement on Integrated Schedules for Plant Modifications.
4 Adequate protection and compliance issues 6, 12, 15, 18 Same as 3.
should be included in the IRRIS. Non-outage 20 ss items and analyses and evaluations that require large resources should be included in the IRRIS.
5.
The IRRIS review and response schedule 12, 16, 20 Same as 3.
should leave sufficient time for licensee coordination of the final outage schedule.
. II. Scheduling and Control of Inspections, especially Team Inspections.
Comment Commenter Staff Response 1.
Promulgation of a schedule of planned 6, 16 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 2.
inspections will assist licensees in scheduling internal resources and will assist in the coordination of licensee activities.
2.
The NRC policy of what constitutes 6, 12, 16, 18 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 2.
a team inspection, as well as the nature and scope of each of these types of activities, should be clearly delineated.
3.
The limit of four team inspections 8, 12, 14, 18 The staff believes that the' threshold of within a year would still greatly 24 four major activities per licensee impact ifcensees. No more than two SALP cycle, which includes major team inspections per year should noninspection activity, is an ap-be the threshold.
propriate threshold for additional manage-ment review and approval. Limits estab-Itshed will be reevaluated as part of regular inspection program reviews and modified as necessary. See Enclosure 2.
4 The NRC should consider planned refueling 8, 12, 16 The staff agrees. This is consistent outages in developing inspection with current inspection program schedules.
policy.
. 5.
The effect of major noninspection NRC 16 The staff agrees. The Inspection activities should also be considered in Manual Chapter on the coordination the scheduling and number of team of NRC visits to commercial reactor inspections, including voluntary research sites requires that inspection and information-gathering activities, plans for each site include noninspection activities.
W i
l l
-S-III. Training and Professionalism Consnent Coninenter Staff Response 1.
The training of headquarters 4
personnel needs to be improved.
The staff agrees. See Enclosure 3.
2.
NRR project managers should participate in a training program that is similar to Management will evaluate the estab-the extensive, thorough training program ment of training requirements for provided for inspectors.
project managers that are as comprehen-sive as those delineated in Inspection Manual Chapter 1245 for inspectors.
3.
A beneficial result of the NRC's enhanced 6, 14 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 3.
training of NRC personnel should be improved consistency among inspection team leaders and NRC staff.
4.
The direct involvement of NRC senior 6, 14 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 3.
management, both regional and headquarters, in the development and implementatfod of the training of inspectors is necessary.
In addition, mechanisms should be established to help ensure that training and commun-ication of senior management's expectat-tons are effectively implemented.
5.
Continued training on backfitting is 6, 12 The staff agrees. As stated in necessary.
SECY-90-347, additional tra'.ning is planned. See Enclosure 3.
m i
IV.
Management Control and Involvement by NRC Senior Managers Comment Commenter Staff Response 1.
Actions discussed in SECY-90-347 do not 6, 16, 7, 11 Staff actions to address these adequately address the underlying need 13, 17, 18, concerns are discussed in Enclosure 4.
t for clearly defined management expect-24 attons for all activities and for the assessment and followup processes necessary to ensure they are carried out.
2.
The NRC needs to delineate the role, 11, 24 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 4 responsibilities and management of the NRC staff in relation to those of Itcensees.
3.
Improved management controls and involve-1, 13, 17, 18 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 4.
ment by senior NRC management in 24 monitoring and followup are needed.
4 Performance expectations should be made 16 The staff agrees. See Enclosure 4 part of the appraisal process to ensure accountability.
5.
It is proper that the assessment of the 16 The staff agrees. As discussed in impact on licensee activities be an SECY-90-347, in 1990 NRR expanded the integral, routine part of MRC evaluations.
scope of its activities to 3ssess its inspection program to include a periodic review of the effectiveness of NRR programs and their effect on licensee activities. This initiative is being incorporated into the Inspection Manual Chapter now being developed.
i
, V.
Other Survey Coment Topic Areas Coment Comenter Staff Response 1.
Most coments were the predictable 25 The staff remains strongly comitted complaints by an industry that to NRC mission of ensuring adequate does not want to be regulated. However, protection of public health some legitimate coments were made; and safety, the comon defense and for example, some testing required by security, and the environment, in technical specifications may be excessive the use of nuclear materials in the and operator Itcensing training is turning United States. The staff has worked out operators who blindly follow procedures to continually improve the effective-without thinking. The NRC should focus ness of its regulatory activities and on these issues rather than on issues programs. SECY-90-347 and this paper related to economic and pubile relations provide details of actions that have aspects which are not in the NRC's been implemented or are planned jurisdiction.
to address recurring concerns or those identified in the RIS.
Although comments that were less prevalent are not discussed in SECY-90-347 or this paper, all were evaluated. Legitimate concerns that were not addressed by ongoing programs or planned improvements have resulted in additional staff action.
2.
The practice of assigning numerical 6
In 1990, the Comission decided that ratings as part of the SALP process numerical ratings for functional j
should be reevaluated.
areas should be maintained.
4 i
September 10, 1992 SECY-92-314 Enr:
The Commissioners EEnm:
James M. Taylor 4
]
Executive Director for Oper,ations l
Sub.iect:
CURRENT LICENSING BASIS FOR OPERATING PLANTS i
Puroose:
To respond to Commission staff requirements memoranda (SRM) regarding compiling the current licensing basis (CLB) and determining the industry's methods for updating the final safety analysis reports (FSARs).
4 Summary:
On November 29, 1991, the Commission requested information and recommendations from the staff concerning compilation of the CLB and current industry practices in updating the FSAR.
To ensure that design changes and modifications, safety evaluations, and operability determinations are properly i
carried out, the licensee must be able to retrieve docketed correspondence on a system or topic that might contain CLB information, find the CLB within the documents, and use the CLB effectively.
The staff will use its regulatory oversight programs to ensure licensees are preserving the underlying safety interest of the CLB.
]
No licensee has volunteered to compile their CLB, although two licensees have volunteered to demonstrate the adequacy of their document search and retrieval systems. As a result, the staff recommends ending the program for volunteers to compile the CLB. The staff also recommends that compilation of the CLB within a single document not be required and that the interpretation of the FSAR update rule should not be revised at this time to include the entire CLB. The staff will evaluate the need for revisions to CONTACT:
Ricky Twigu 504-1312 SECY NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SPJ4 IS MADE AVAILAELE.
t 2
j~
The Commissioners :
current regulations to ensure that the processes for effective management of the CLB, the FSAR, design basis, docketed correspondence, and plant records are complete and l
clear.
3ackaround:
Responding to the Commission's direction, the staff issued Generic Letter (GL) 92-03, " Compilation of the Current l
Licensing Basis: Request for Voluntary Participation in a 2
Pilot Program," March 19, 1992. The staff also conducted audits of the FSAR on specific issues (e.g., anticipated i
transient without scram (ATws), Three Mile Island (TMI) requirements) at 14 sites to determine the way in which licensees update their FSARs and the relationship between the updated FSAR and the CLB. Enclosure 1 is a report on i
these audits, and Enclosure 2 is a sumary of a 2-day j
workshop for representatives of the utilities.
is the definition of CLB contained in 10 CFR 54.3.
Discussion:
The following information responds to the specific requests j
and direction in the SPM of Nove;nber 29, 1991:
i Item 1 Solicit industry particioants in a oilot oroaram in which a small number of reoresentative volunteer-licensees would compile their CLB and advise the NRC on the advantaces and disadvantaces of such an effort.
1
. Assess the usefulness of the comoiled CLBs for the ll licensees' operations and the NRC's reaulation of those olants.
Make recommendations to the Commission on the usefulness of j
the CLB compilation for all operatina plants.
t To bound the pilot program, the staff needed definitions for i
both "CLB" and " compilation." The definition of CLB in j
10 CFR 54.3, which applies only to license renewal, was used 1 -
to bound the secpe of the CLB for the pilot program. CLB is mentioned in 10 CFR 50.54(f); however, there is currently no i
definition of CLB in 10 CFR Part 50. Defining CLB for 10 CFR Part 50 will be part of a coordinated evaluation of possible rule changes discussed later in this paper.
In GL 92-03, the staff defined " compilation" as a single set of documents in one location or a system that references 1
l documents that can be retrieved easily from several l
locations.
Either a single set of documents in one location containing 1
and identifying all the CLB or a system that references such documents for the plant would require a large initial investment of resources and time to research the complete docket and find all the CLB. This single set of documents i
or system that references such documents will be referred to as the CLB document. For the CLB document to be effective, 4
The Commissioners :
1 it must have a complete system of cross references and the licensee's staff must be able to adequately use it.
In the long term, this CLB document might lose its effectiveness unless the staff maintaining it could find the CLB within new correspondence, extract it and appropriately file it within the CLB document so that it could be retrieved when l
needed. No licensee has volunteered for this type of compilation. However, Southern California Edison and
+
Baltimore Gas and Electric have volunteered to demonstrate the adequacy of their document search and retrieval systems.
From the audit, the staff found that most licensees have recognized the benefits that could be obtained from a well managed CLB. The industry seeks to improve its management j
of the CLB by improving the various processes for retrieving j
the documents containing the CLB, finding the CLB within the documents, and using the CLB effectively. The staff refers j
to these processes collectively as a CLB process.
{
The difference between the licensees' CLB process and the j
single CLB document is that the licensees use the CLB process to maintain the documents containing the CLB (i.e.,
i the docket) and extract the CLB when needed. However, to i
establish the CLB document, the licensee would need to 1
extract the CLB from or identify the CLB within all j
documents before finding a need.
Efficient and effective management of the CLB process will i
benefit the licensee and the NRC by:
J' promoting plant safety by enhancing the licensee's e
i ability to resolve operability issues and concerns and
{
to prepare corrective actions and by ensuring i
maintenance and modifications to the facility and its 1
programs are made within the bounds of the CLB.
l establishing a common framework for interaction between the industry and the NRC on safety l
issues, thereby optimizing regulatory oversight, I
responses to events, and routine inspection and reviews, and increasing NRC's confidence in the i
licensee's capability to preserve the safety basis of the plant; and 4
conserving the licensee's and the NRC's resources.
The large volume of documents that contain the CLB, including NRC requirements and the licensee's commitments to
}
the NRC, also contain general information that is not in the j
Ct.B. All audited licensees appeared to be able to retrieve documents containing the CLB for specific issues, such as i
ATWS, because a separate subject file is usually maintained; however, their ability to determine which documents contain j
the CLB pertinent to a specific modification of a design, 1
4
The Commissioners !
4-component, or program varies according to the sophistication j
of their document retrieval methods and their ability to j
find comitments within those documents. The document I
retrieval methods can be grouped in two distinct but acceptable ways, each with its advantages and disadvantages.
1
{
One method consists of maintaining paper files that are j
searched manually. This method may include limited text (synopsis) electronic search systems such as NUDOCS, which primarily support the manual search process. The licensee's i
staff must expend much effort retrieving the CLB for a j
particular application, since it must store, track, search, 3
and reference large volumes of documents for which it has few or no cross references. This method requires a large l
staff to be effective.
i The second method consists of maintaining electronic or l
laser disk storage systems containing all docketed
{
correspondence, the FSAR, and, in some cases, the design basis documents (DBDs). The documents are stored electronically, which enables the licensee to maintain central control of data, speed access, and speed searches i
for the specific CLB. Most licensees in the FSAR audit and j
the CLB Workshop are using computer information management systems for document retrieval to some degree. Although the
)
licensees using the second method need fewer staff, the staff must be skilled in the proper use of search j
capabilities to ensure the search is valid and thorough.
j Once the documents are retrieved, the licensee must find the i
i licensing basis within the documents. The staff found that various members of the licensees' organizations differ over j
the interpretation of the definition of "comitment."
i During the audits and the workshop, various licensees stated that their ability to determine which statements constitute j
a "comitment" is limited by the lack cf a clear definition and that additional guidance would assist in applying that j
definition.
l To complete the CLB process, the licensee must effectively use the portions of the CLB that it has found.
In 5
i conducting the FSAR audit, the staff found indications of j
insufficient procedural requirements to ensure the CLB and the CLB process are used when implementing design changes and modifications, conducting safety evaluations, and i
determining operability.
The staff recomends ending the fonnal pilot program because j
the pilot has not attracted any volunteers to compile their 4
CLB. The staff does not recomend a new requirement that i
would result in CLB compilation' for all plants. The licensee's CLB process can be acceptable to the NRC with proper attention to the vulnerabilities of the methods used.
j The staff will continue to encourage licensees to improve i
i I
I i
1 i
1
The Commissioners !
.the processes by which they retrieve, find and use the CLB i
and will support any licensee's improvements as may be j
appropriate. NRR expects to gain sufficient knowledge from j
these efforts to write guidance for our activities to j
oversee the acceptability of CLB control and use.
Item 2 1
i i
Determine how licensees are resoondina to the reauirement in i
10 CFR 50.71 for annual updates to their FSARs to ensure F
j that the infomation included in the FSAR contains the
'atest material developed.
I Determine whether and how the annual undates to the FSAR l
fall short of describina the licensee's CLB.
1 Exolore the cotion and the advantaaes and disadvantaaes of i
j revisina the interoretation current 1v civen to 10 CFR 50.71 j
to include the CLB.
)
i i
j As allowed by the update rule,10 CFR 50.71(e), most i
licensees conduct updates annually and take up to 6 months j
before revising the available paper copies of the FSAR
~
accordingly. The current annual update requirements allow the docketed FSAR to be as much as 18 months out of date. A proposed rule change currently under consideration to extend the update interval to once every refueling outage would result in the docketed FSAR being as much as 30 months out of date. Some of the licensees recognize a need for more timely updates so that the document is more useful to their i
staff. The licensees who maintain the FSAR in an electronic l
format for easy access and updates are beginning to make electronic copies available to their staff in lieu of
{
continually printing paper updates to the docketed FSAR.
I l
The statement of considerations published with the update rule in 1980 clearly defined the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) as containing or referencing all the new analyses the Commission required or requested of the i
licensees. However, the update rule states that the FSAR is j
to be revised to include "the effects of" all new analyses
)
i and modifications made to the plant as described in the i
FSAR. Most of the licensees audited have interpreted
" effects of" to mean that the update need only include those changes that would create error in the existing FSAR. The 1
licensees sometimes did more than merely correct errors, but included considerably less detail than was included in the analyses submitted to the NRC and usually did not include i
the new licensing basis. When new information is added, it 4
is based on the licensee's judgement of significance and i
usually includes no greater detail than was included in the original operating license (OL) FSAR, which varies according l
to the year of issuance. Any references were usually to the NRC's initiating document, such as a generic letter or a new i
l
/
1
t j
The Commissioners '
1 I
rule, and not to the licensee's correspondence containing
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the analyses or commitments.
i i
During the audits, the staff found that the FSARs, at the time of licensing, usually contain most of the plant-i specific design basis as defined by 10 CFR 50.2. However, 10 CFR 50.71(e) does not include a specific reference to 10 CFR 50.2 and most of the new design bases and commitments i
made to the NRC after licensing to address generic letters, bulletins, enforcement actions, and license event reports (LERs) are not included in the FSARs.
t Capturing all the analyses and CLB commitments in the FSAR i
would make the FSAR difficult to manage. Alternatively, i
referencing in the FSAR the documents containing the CLB may I
not improve the ability of the licensee to find or retrieve l
pertinent correspondence. Extracting the CLB from the correspondence and then adding it to the sections of the j
FSAR where appropriate would be an expensive effort for i
licensees and would yield little safety benefit over current
}
retrieval systems used by most licensees.
The staff does not believe that the FSAR update rule as written can be interpreted to require that the FSAR include all the elements of the CLB. Moreover, current regulations do not ensure that the FSAR references all of the design bases (10 CFR 50.2) and do not provide a regulatory means to modify all of the elements (e.g., letter commitments) of the CLB. The staff will conduct a coordinated evaluation of possible revisions to the change rule (10 CFR 50.59) and the update rule (10 CFR 50.71(e)) to ensure that the FSAR, design basis documentation, docketed correspondence, and plant records are complete and to verify that the processes for controlling and using the CLB are clear.
FOUR ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMMISSION'S OUESTIONS
- 1. No clear orocess is defined for makino chances to the CLB flicensee commitments) that are not included in the FSAR The licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. However, the NRC has not issued regulatory guidelines for changes to the CLB not contained in the UFSAR.
The NRC staff is not interested in revising 10 CFR 50.71(e) to include the entire CLB or to subject every change of a licensee's comitments to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
However, the staff is concerned that the licensees may not be consistent in controlling changes to those portions of the CLB outside of the FSAR.
If commitments are to be allowed to remain outside the FSAR, a change proces: must be devised and required of licensees
~
i The Comissioners i to ensure the underlying safety interest of the comitment is preserved. Accordingly, the staff plans to emphasize l
this matter in working with industry on developing guidance for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and on i
developing recommendations for a requirement (rule or rule change) to establish a change process for those portions of the CLB that may remain outside the FSAR. This change process, including reporting and approvals, must be consistent with the category of information and its safety significance. The staff will include this issue in the rule l
change evaluation.
- 2. No clear understandino exists for "desian bases" in terms of its scone and its relationshio to the CLB During the CLB workshop, the staff found confusion among the licensees over " design base's" as defined by 10 CFR 50.2.
This led to many questions on the scope of the term and its i
relationship to the CLB. The scope of design basis was discussed extensively in the context of design basis reconstitution.
In NUREG-1397, "An Assessment of Design Control Practices and Design Reconstitution Programs in the Nuclear Power Industry," the staff defined a new term, engineering design bases, specifically for NUREG-1397. As stated in NUREG-1397, " engineering design bases are not i
limited to design features or considerations that are necessary to satisfy regulatory requirements." However, a definition of CLB satisfying regulatory requirements for operating reactors would be limited to plant-specific design basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2.
The industry has issued additional guidance on the scope of the design bases in conjunction with the continuing efforts to reconstitute the design bases; see NUMARC 90-12 " Design Basis Program Guidelines." The staff will continue to work with industry _
to ensure the design information is adequate and available.
- 3. No industry-wide aareement exists on a definition of CLB (i.e. licensee comitments) for coeratina reactors There is no agreement throughout the industry on the interpretation of the definition of "comitment" in 10 CFR 54.3. During the CLB workshop, the industry discussed continuing initiatives to define "comitment".
Some licensees see the separation of the information into licensing basis comitments and the details describing the implementation of the comitment as confusing at best. The staff will continue its efforts with industry to better define "comitment" for the CLB and consider this issue in evaluating any rule changes.
- 4. Accuracy of the docket with resoect to the CLB As a result of the differing interpretations and the lack of a clearly defined process for making changes to comitments
i j
The Comissioners l i
As a result of the differing interpretations and the lack of a clearly defined process for making changes to commitments j
outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.59, some licensees have not docketed changes made to some licensing basis comitments.
4 l
This was a common conclusion by the NRC and the industry at
)
the CLB workshop. The staff will address this issue in its continuing efforts with industry to develop guidance for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and will consider this issue in evaluating any rule changes.
1 Followun Actions: In responding to the SRM, the staff has found that there is no definition of the CLB for operating reactors and no clear understanding of design bases and comitments in the CLB.
j Additionally, the change rule (10 CFR 50.59) applies only to j
the facility and procedures as described in the FSAR and to tests or experiments not described in the FSAR. Therefore, there is no requirement to ensure adequate process control i
of changes to comitments and design bases (10 CFR 50.2) that are not contained in the FSAR. Although the Design i
Basis Reconstitution Program contains engineering design i
bases that includes design bases (10 CFR 50.2), it is also j
not subject to the change rule. As a result of these findings, the staff will 1.
work to define CLB for operating reactors 2.
work to clarify the process for changing the FSAR and the CLB 3.
work to clarify the definition of comitment and design bases in the CLB 4.
increase emphasis on ensuring that licensee comitments on the docket are appropriately changed and that the changes are reflected on the docket 5.
evaluate proposed changes to the following rulet to ensure that the FSAR, design basis documentation, i
docketed correspondence, and plant records are i
i complete and that the processes for controlling and using the CLB are clear, a.
The rule for FSAR updates (10 CFR 50.71(e))
b.
The change rule (10 CFR 50.59) c.
" Definitions," 10 CFR 50.2 The evaluation will include a regulatory and cost benefit analysis to justify the impact to both the NRC and the industry.
The Commissioners 1 Recommendations: That the Commission
^
1.
end the formal pilot program for compiling of the CLB j
2.
not require compilation of the CLB 3.
not revise the interpretation of 10 CFR 50.71 to include the entire CLB at this time i
/
ames M.Ta or Executive Director for Operations i :
FSAR Audit : Workshop
- Definition of CLB Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to SECY by c.o.b. Friday, September 25, 1992.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT September 18, 1992, with an information copy to SECY.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners t
4 I
i ENCLOSURE 1 l
Audit of Fourteen Plants i
BACKGROUND i
In November 1991, the Commission directed the staff (1) to determine how i
licensees are responding to the requirement in 10 CFR 50.71 for annual updates j
to the final safety analysis report (FSAR), (2) to ensure that the FSAR contains the latest material, and (3) to determine whether and how the annual i
updates to the FSAR fall short of describing the licensees' current licensing i
basis (CLB). The staff used the definition of CLB.in Section 54.3 (see i ) in its evaluation.
l The staff obtained this information by visiting 14 licensees that represented a cross section of the industry. The plants visited were licensed between 1970 and 1987 and included plants of all reactor vendor types and from all regions, plants having computer systems for tracking commitments, and plants lacking such systems. The Attachment lists the plants audited and their profiles.
The staff visited each site and discussed plant-specific programs for updating the FSAR by examining, with the licensee, the resolution of selected issues through the update process. The licensee discussed its update process with the staff, and the staff audited each of the selected issues to confirm the overall discussions. The staff also observed computer systems used to track commitments, to search data for CLB information, or to store the FSAR for easy update, search, and retrieval.
The staff selected up to five of the following issues for each licensee:
automatic actuation of shunt trip attachment (W, B&W), GL 83-28 ATWS rule,10 CFR 50.62 reliability of air systems, GL 88-14 safety parameter display systams, GL 89-06 instrumentation for inadequate core cooling, NUREG-0737 improved accident monitoring, Regulatory Guide 1.97 The issues expanded or further defined the licensing basis of the plants and required facility modifications or new systems. The staff did not focus on the technical adequacy of the issues but sought to understand the licensee's methodology and process for updating the FSAR and the extent to which the licensee incorporated or referenced the analyses from the issues in its updated FSARs (UFSARs).
AUDIT FINDINGS The staff found that FSAR updates for the issues audited contain or reference only a small portion of the licensing basis added after 1980.
The staff found that this resulted from the licensee's interpretations of 10 CFR 50.71e,.
m--
1 I
4 which states that the FSAR is to be revised to include "the effects of" all l
i new analyses and modifications made to the plant as described by the FSAR.
j Most of the audited licensees interpreted " effects of" to mean that the update need include only changes that would create error in the existing FSAR.
In the Statement of Considerations supporting 10 CFR 50.71(e), the Commission j
stated that "New analyses...may be incorporated...within the FSAR." These l
licensees interpreted this section to mean that if new analyses may be incorporated, they may also not be incorporated. The staff found that licensees seldom add entirely new information to the FSAR. The licensee adds I
new information upon determining its significance and usually includes no l
l greater detail than was included for the original license. None of the audited licensees' updates included the full text of analyses or reference to all licensee correspondence containing the analyses. Any references included l
were usually to the NRC's initiating document such as a generic letter or new rule. Some partial updates of the FSAR included more than corrections for i
errors, but less than the analyses submitted to the NRC, and usually did not include the new licensing basis.
i The staff found that the design basis as defined by 10 CFR 50.2 is not j
included in the UFSAR from analyses performed after 1980.
This omission l
appears inconsistent with the definition of CLB in 10 CFR 54.3, where plant-specific design basis is that which is located in the most recent UFSAR.
i J
The UFSAR is used primarily by the engineering staff for conducting design modifications and the related safety evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59 to l
determine if it must obtain the NRC's approval before conducting tests or experiments; making plant design modifications; issuing licensing correspondence to support licensing amendments; and updating the FSAR as j
required in 10 CFR 50.71(e). Some licensees report using the FSAR for operability determinations, although the audit did not focus on this use.
]
None of the licensees reported using the FSAR as a single document for any i
process, but each reported using the FSAR in conjunction with docketed j
correspondence, design basis documents, plant commitrent tracking systems, and j
plant records. The licensees manage this information manually and, in varying degrees, by computer.
4 Some of the audited licensees reported that the procedures for the design j
change process include specific requirements to search the FSAR and docketed j
correspondence files for the applicable CLB. However, one of the audited i
licensees with a limited search capability did not have such requirements and i
relies entirely on the training and experience of its staff. This and other j
licensees with limited search capabilities and procedures may unknowingly j
modify the licensing basis, thereby compromising the CLB's underlying role in j
the safe operation of the plant.
Most licensees recognized that retrieval of the current licensing basis must include searches of both the FSAR and docketed correspondence. This creates additional questions about the validity of the search method, the thoroughness of the search, the recognition of the differences between the CLB and the j
design implementation details, and the access of licensee staff to the search method (especially computer systems), training, and the adequacy of procedures j
to ensure a proper search on the complete files (FSAR and docketed l y i
/
i
correspondence).
In its audit, the staff also continued to identify questions about the appropriate process by which the licensees change the various elements of the CLB: doign basis as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and commitments not contained in the FSAR.
The staff made the following general observations during the audit:
The detail included in an FSAR corresponds approximately to its size and age. The thickness of an FSAR produced by one architectural engineering firm ranged from 16 inches in 1974 to 99 inches in 1982, although the staff found no correlation between the architect-engineer and the amount of detail in an FSAR. The detail in the FSARs more than doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Of the licensees audited, 85 percent have the UFSAR on searchable word processing systems, and almost all plan to upgrade to a searchable system and make it available to all site organizations.
i Of the licensees audited, 80 percent update the FSAR only as needed to document the design modification and license amendment processes.
Of the licensee audited, 20 percent specifically review new rules, orders, generic letters, information notices, licensee event reports, enforcement actions, and confirmatory action letters to determine if they warrant FSAR updates. The licensees update their FSARs to incorporate information on reviews, plant modifications, and licensee amendment processes.
The audited licensee with the least dependable automated information system spent more than 2.5 times longer than the average licensee to search and retrieve the CLB for the issues audited.
CONCLUSIONS 9
The FSAR is not a single reference document and may be overly relied upon by some to support significant activities.
Portions of the CLB are located in various documents and places, requiring the licensees to assemble this information to support the audit. The staff's concern is that the processes used to retrieve, find and use the CLB may not be adequately defined for and understood by the licensee's staff.
Inadequately managing the CLB may result in a failure to preserve the underlying safety interest of the CLB.
Attachment:
UFSAR Audit l
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AUDIT APRIL /MAY 1992 SITES AUDITED SALEM BEAVER VALLEY CALVERT CLIFFS TMI AT GPU NUCLEAR ZION FORT CALHOUN AT OPPD WATERFORD I
GRAND GULF ARKANSAS AT GRAND GULF RIVER BEND BRUNSWICK AT CP&L DAVIS BESSE DIABLO CANYON AT PG&E SAN ONOFRE AT SCE DISTRIBUTION OL N o.
REGION N o.
ISSUANCE N o.
REACTOR
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- 4 1
2
'73 4
W 2
11 3
'74 5
CE 2
111 1
'75 2
B&W 4
IV 2
'*6 3
GE i
2 V
1
'77 1
'81 2
'82
\\
2
'85 REPRESENTING ARCHITECT ENGINEERING FIRMS: S&L,BECHTEL, S&W, GIBBS, EBASCO, UEAC, AND THE LICENSEE.
j i
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ENCLOSURE 2
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WORKSHOP The NRC held a current licensing basis (CLB) workshop on June 23 and 24,1992, at the Holiday Inn, Crown Plaza, in Rockville, Maryland.
Licensees participating in the FSAR audit and others requested the workshop to discuss the many questions about the licensing basis, updated final safety analysis reports (UFSARs), design bases, and the process for making changes to i
commitments. Views expressed by individuals on the topics were not taken as j
the licensees' or the NRC's positions unless expressly stated to be. The participants exchanged information and opinions to help the NRC form the i
recommendations to the Commission on the CLB and the FSAR update process.
Over 200 people attended the workshop, representing almost all utilities, NUMARC, the NRC, and numerous vendors. Along with the NRC staff, licensee representatives chaired and participated in seven panel discussions. The participants discussed the following topics.
1.
Components of the Current Licensino Basis Most of the workshop participants recognized that CLB is not a new concept; however, they did not all agree on the interpretation of the definition from 10 CFR 54.3.
Most agreed that the documents containing the CLB (i.e.,
requirements and comitments to the NRC) can be ordered in a hierarchical fashion and that they include a large volume of information that is not in the CLB.
They did not agree on a clear definition of "comitment." Some of the attendees saw the separation of the information into licensing basis comitments and details describing the implementation of the comitments as confusing at best.
The CLB definition in 10 CFR 54.3 includes only that information which is docketed and is in effect. Therefore, licensees must ensure that the docket accurately reflects the CLB. Licensees consider docketed correspondence to include portions of the CLB but questioned whether other information should be docketed that is considered a basis for licensing, such as operability decisions and justifications for continued operation. The NRC relies on much of this information, only some of which is docketed. The CLB also includes the plant-specific design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, as contained in the most recent UFSAR.
In the FSAR audit (Enclosure 1), the staff established that the USFARs do not include most of the post-licensing plant-specific changes to the design basis.
Licensees also questioned the definition of design basis in 10 CFR 50.2 for its practical application to design basis reconstitution, FSAR updates, and the processes by which a licensee may change the design basis.
2.
The Sionificance and Use of the CLB Participants made strong statements of opinion that compiling the CLB involves significant costs without comensurate benefit. However, they generally agreed that they benefit from retrieving and using the CLB when needed. The
_ _ _. _. _ ~. _. _. _
j form of the CLB and the process for maintaining it are not as important as the accuracy and availability of the CLB. Among other benefits noted, an efficient and effective CLB process will promote plant safety by l
enhancing the licensee's ability (1) to resolve operability issues and concerns and (2) to prepare corrective actions, including l
interim actions that may be needed to avoid unwarranted plant j
shutdowns; and i
ensuring that modifications to the facility and its programs are made with an awareness of their effect on the underlying safety l-interests; establish a comon framework for interaction between the industry and
=
l the NRC on safety issues, thereby l
optimizing regulatory oversight, responses to events, and routine j
inspection and reviews; and j
increasing NRC's confidence in the licensee's capability to preserve the safety basis of the plant; and conserve the licensee's and the NRC's resources.
a Participants asked about the NRC's needs regarding the CLB. One participant stated that the NRC inspector views the CLB as an essential starting point for inspection. The CLB is included within a large volume of documents with few
}
cross references.
Therefore, NRC inspectors and reviewers use the licensee's systems or seek the licensee's assistance in gathering desired information.
Another participant stated that, although the NRC is concerned that the CLB is maintained adequately, the licensee is responsible to meet the " contract" established by the CLB.
Several participants believed the process for meeting this " contract" could be improved to simplify the license renewal process.
Others saw the more imediate benefits of using the CLB in daily activities such as in evaluating changes to the plant, procedures, and programs and evaluating degraded and nonconforming conditions.
3.
The Sianificance and Use of the USAR Most of the participants agreed that the NRC staff relied extensively on the FSAR during the licensing process. Some stated that the licensee's staff also uses the FSAR to support daily activities such as plant design modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. Some participants stated that the level of detail in the FSAR was dictated by its use. These participants indicated that, while both the headquarters and the regional NRC staff use the FSAR, they also rely on docketed correspondence to verify the accuracy of the information.
In discussing the frequency of NRC-required FSAR updates, a few licensees recognized a need for their staff to use an FSAR that is updated frequently.
These licensees typically maintain the FSAR in an electronic format for easy access and updating.
i The staff learned that the scope and content of the FSARs varies widely within j
the industry. Thus, the licensees differ in the manner in which they apply 10 CFR 50.59 and in the level of detail included therein. To some degree, NSAC-125 serves as a standard for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations by extending the i
applicability of this section to structures, systems, or components not i
described in the FSAR if the change to the structure, system, or component affects a larger structure, system, or component described in the FSAR. This i
standard directs the licensees to safety evaluation reports (SERs) and safety
)
analysis reports probabilities, con (SARs) that contain the acceptability criteria for the sequences, and margins of safety. This information is in l
the docketed correspondence for a facility if not located in the FSAR.
l
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4.
The Sionificance and Use of the Desian Basis Reconstitution Efforts The design basis document (DBD) programs defined by 10 CFR 50.2 encompass i
approximately 80 percent of the CLB. Most of the licensee participants i.
recognized that the key to maximizing the benefits from the DBD programs is to j
make them available to their staff in a user-friendly format with managers
)
establishing expectations and policy to ensure that they be used.
Participants agreed that DBDs must be both used and useful to justify the j
large investment of time and money needed to produce them.
Clearly written DBDs that contain an easily retrievable design basis will ensure that the i
licensee's staff understands the capabilities, performance parameters, and j
interactions of systems. This improves the modification processes, the ability to handle routine and abnormal plant conditions, the maintenance and training programs, and the regulatory oversight. The DBD effort is vital to i
the overall effort on the CLB.
4'
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5.
Manaaina Chanaes to the CLB i
Almost everyone believed that, although the CLB varies among plants, each licensee must know what it is, and manage changes to it. The CLB helps assure i
the NRC that operating plants will not compromise the public health and j
safety. The industry and the NRC need regulatory processes for making changes i
to the CLB that ensure the CLB continues to support the safe operation of the plant.
Some of the participants stated that the means for changing the CLB are i
primarily distinguished by the amount of NRC involvement: none, notification after the fact, prior notification, and prior approval. Although the licensee can not always be certain which mechanism applies, it usually determines this I
by categorizing the information in the CLB according to the significance of the information and its final location. The information assigned to each j
category differs between plants. Correctly categorizing a commitment ensures j
that the licensee will use an appropriate means to make each change.
However, various licensees did not have clear criteria for determining the i
i category in which to place a comitment. Some licensees found it difficult to j
decide whether or not to add a commitment to the FSAR if that commitment would enable control as required by 10 CFR 50.59.
I Some of the participants stated that the level of detail in the UFSAR and its quality appear to determine how broadly the licensee applies 10 CFR 50.59.
Some licensees appear to have gone beyond NSAC-125 guidance in applying 10 CFR i
i 50.59 to avoid any question of compliance. They are managing changes to the u
j i
many comitments not included in the FSAR, but included in docketed j
correspondence with the NRC. Some were concerned that this could reduce the effectiveness of the 10 CFR 50.59 process for reviewing significant safety issues. However, the licensee could not easily use 10 CFR 50.59 to determine which issues must first be approved by the NRC if the licensee does not incorporate certain types of commitments in the FSAR.
For example,
{
commitments that define the critical functions and performance parameters of new equipment and comitments stated in NRC SERs (previously agreed to by the licensee) may require previous NRC approval if the level of safety has decreased in any fashion, but these commitments may not be incorporated in the
]
FSAR.
6.
Manaaina Licensee Comitments During the discussion, one of the industry participants submitted the following definition of a commitment as adopted by the Regulatory Commitments Tracking Group:
A documented obligation, expressed or implied, made either by the license or through an uncontested imposition by a regulatory agency, that either establishes requirements or promises actions to be performed.
The definition covers a range of licensee actions including continuing obligations to resolve significant safety issues, simple statements to complete minor actions by specific dates, and comitments to comply with the l
previously established licensing basis, as is the case for most licensee event reports (LERs) and enforcement actions, or to irplement by some date a new level of licensing basis to cover a deficiency. The obligation to comply or to restore compliance is a commitment lasting until compliance is reached.
Thereafter, the level of compliance is part of the licensing basis and the l
implementation of the comitment need no longer be tracked.
Licensees are also attempting to manage the implementation of this type of comitment by combining, deleting, adding, or using other reasonable means to limit the total outstanding comitments. The staff learned that licensees have not docketed changes to some licensing basis comitments as a result of differing interpretations and a lack of a clearly defined process for changes to comitments outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC initiatives in the area of comitments include the proposed final policy to establish the Integrated Scheduling Program with the voluntary Integrated Licensing Schedules. This program gives the licensees a process to make changes to comitment schedules based on safety priorities and NRC acceptance by negative consent.
7.
Storina and Retrievina (Comoilina) The CLB Most licensees are integrating computer information management systems into their CLB and DBD processes. These licensees recognize accurate and timely retrievability as the key to CLB management.
The licensees appeared interested in sharing more electronic information with the NRC. The licensees generally have infonnation configuration management /
l 4
4 systems that are the state of the art. The NRC will begin with a limited pilot program to share electronic versions of licensing correspondence with all licensees.
IRM will develop a longer term incremental program for transmissions between machines.
IRM and NRR will work with licensees to i
establish and implement standards for electronic interface.
8.
Observations The staff observed the following during the workshop presentations and discussions:
l The industry should take additional measures to ensure that the underlying role of the CLB in safe operation of a plant is maintained.
i The definition of CLB should be clarified, specifically for the terms
" commitment" and " design basis."
The industry should take additional measures to ensure the docket accurately reflects the CLB.
The NRC should clarify the FSAR update rule (10 CFR 50.71(e)) to address the design basis (Section 50.2) and its implications for the change process (Section 50.59).
The NRC should issue guidance for controlling changes to commitments and other portion of the CLB not covered by 10 CFR 50.59.
d i
ENCLOSURE 3 Definition of CLB from 10 CFR 54.3 Current licensina basis (CLB) is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant and a licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in effect.
The CLB includes the NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 30, 40, 50, 51, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, and 100 and appendices thereto; orders; license conditions; exemptions; and i
technical specifications.
It also includes the plant-specific design basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent final safety analysis report (FSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71 and the licensee's commitments remaining in effect thst were made in docketed licensing correspondence such as licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and enforcement actions, as well as licensee commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or licensee event reports.
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'b9W P O L.I C Y...-.I..S....S U.E (Notation Vote)
MorCh 15, 1994 SECY-94-066 f.QB:
The Comissioners flQ5:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
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EVALUATION OF ISSUES DISCUSSED IN SECY-92-314. " CURRENT LICE BASIS FOR OPERATING PLANTS" PURPOSE:
To provide the results of further staff evaluation of issues identified in SECY-92-314, which involve (1) licensee comitments outside the FSAR and (2) the licensees' understanding of design bases in terms of scope and relationship to the current licensing basis (CLB).
To inform the Comission of staff initiatives which address additional issues and followup actions listed in SECY-92-314.
To respond to the recomendations made by the Office of Policy Planning (OPP) concerning issues related to the CLB.
SUMMARY
in 1991, during the Comission's deliberations' on the license renewal initia-tive, an issue arose about the possible need for, or utility of, compiling the CLB for all operating plants.
Although the principles upon which the license renewal rule, 10 CFR Part 54, are predicated involve the acceptability and maintenance of the CLB, the Comission was interested in the utility of compiling the CLB for currently operating reactors.
In November 1991, the Comission directed the staff to provide information and recomendations NOTE:
TO DE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WiiEN Tile FINAL SRM IS MADE CONTACTS:
AVAILADLE Eric J. Leeds /NRR S04-1133 Scott C. Flanders /NRR
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O The Comissioners concernino CLB compilation for currently operating reactors and current staff responded to the Comission in SECY-92-314 date The recomending that the Comission (1) end the formal pilot program for compil-10, 1992, interpretation of 10 CFR 50.71 to include the entire CLB.in In conducting the activities that led to these conclusions, the staff identified issues related to specific elements of the CLB that warranted additional staff action.
The staff's principal concern was that an element of the CLB, licensee comitments that are not contained in the plant's FSAR is not controlled by a regulatory process that (1) defines licensee comit-ments, (2) provides licensees with a process for changing these comitments The staff proposed a series of actions to further examine audits of seven licensee programs to (1) determine track, implement, and change comitments, and (2) examine licensees' and the CLB as defined in 10 CFR Part 54. understanding of the rel category of docketed licensee comitments, those not included in either a facility's license or in its FSAR.
a facility's CLB as defined in 10 CFR 54.3, are not subject to a process and can be legally changed without NRC approval or notification.
Although these comitments are not currently governed by a regulatory c and notification process, the staff found that all seven of the audited licensees had established programs that identified these comitments and provided for NRC notification.their implementation, evaluated the i
, ensured The staff did not identify any safety significant issues requiring imediate action and concluded that the CLB was being maintained for all audited issues.
However, the staff found that the current situation has resulted in licensee and staff uncertainties regarding appropriate interactions between the licensees and HRC for comitment cha As a result, application of licensee and staff resources is not as efficient as is desirable.
The staff audits did not find any evidence that the term
- design bases" needs further clarification as it is used within the regulat process.
The staff found that licensees conducting design basis reconstitu-tion or documentation programs recognized the difference and understood the relationship between the plant's design bases and its licensing basis.
The Regulatory Review Group (RRG), a group assemb licensees with little or no direct safety impact, has recomended changes to the regulatory process which include proposals that would address many of the concerns and followup actions identified in SECY-92-314.
The staff has prepared an implementation plan for the RRG recommendations and submitted it to the Comission in SECY-94-003.
The issues and followup actions include:
(1) review of the current 50.59 process, (2) review of the FSAR update rule
The Comissioners 2 50.71(e), (3) possible modification of the definition of CLB and incorporation of the definition into both Part 50 and Part 54, and (4) providing guidance on what constitutes a comitment and the types of controls to be placed on changing comitments.
In response to a Comission request for a review of CLB issues and before the staff completed its evaluation of certain SECY-92-314 issues, OPP proposed recomendations to resolve the issues discussed in, or related to, SECY-92-314.
In its report, OPP, reposed both a definition of CLB different from the definition of CLB contained in 10 CFR 54.3 and the actions necessary to implement its proposed CLB definition.
Neither staff nor OPP identified safety significant issues that would warrant the changes proposed by OPP.
In sumary, this paper is intended to provide the Comission with the results of further staff evaluation of issues in SECY-92-314 regarding comitments outside the FSAR and relationship of the plant design basis to the CLB.
staff concludes that there is no indication that licensees view compliance The
)
with comitments which are outside the FSAR as discretionary and that the CLB l
is being maintained for all audited issues.
i SAGGR0tJND:
in 1991, during the Comission's deliberations on the license renewal initia-l tive. an issue arose about the possible need for, or utility of, compiling the CLB for all operating plants.
Although the principles upon which the license renewal initiative are predicated involve the acceptability and maintenance of the CLB, the Comission was interested in the utility of compiling the CLB for currently operating reactors.
It should also be noted that the term "CLB* is defined in 10 CFR 54.3 but is not defined in 10 CFR t
Part 50 for operating reactors.
In its Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of November 29, 1991, the Comission directed the staff to provide infor-mation and recomendations concerning CLB compilation for currently operating reactors and current industry practices for updating the FSAR.
The staff responded to the Comission in SECY-92-314 dated September 10, 1992, recom-mending that the Comission (1) end the formal pilot program for compiling the CLB, (2) not require compilation of the CLB, and (3) not revise the interpretation of 10 CFR 50.71 to include the entire CLB.
However, in conducting the activities that led to these conclusions, the staff identified issues related to the CLB that warranted additional evaluation.
The principal issue was that an element of the CLB, licensee commitments that are not contained in the plant's FSAR, is not controlled by a regulatory process that (1) defines licensee comitments, (2) provides licensees with a process for changing these comitments, and (3) specifies reporting requirements for comitments that are changed.
The staff also identified that some licensees were confused about the relationship between the " design bases," as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, and the CLB, as defined in 10 CFR Part 54.
The staff comitted to carry out a series of actions to further examine and resolve the issues.
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The Comissioners On September 29, 1992, Comissioner Curtiss requested that the staff and OGC answer questions regarding the issues discussed in SECY-92-314.
In a response, dated December 4, 1992 (Enclosure 1), the staff indicated that although the issues did not involve significant safety concerns, further evaluation of the SECY-92-314 issues was warranted to determine any actions needed to ensure that regulatory requirements and guidance are clear and are being properly implemented by the licensees.
On October 28, 1992, the Comission directed OPP to systematically review and analyze the issues discussed in SECY-92-314.
" Current Licensing Basis for Operating Plants," of NovemberIn its response, OPP-92 30, 1992, OPP proposed a definition of CLB different from the definition of CLB contained in 10 CFR 54.3.
In its report, OPP also recomended (1) establishing a defini-tion of CLB in Part 50 for operating reactors, (2) revising the current definition of CL8 in 10 CFR 54.3 to reflect the definition established for Part 50 and, (3) considering changes tc 10 CFR 50.59, 50.71(e), and 50.109 on the basis of the implications of the established definition of CLB.
On May 28, 1993, the RRG, a group assembled to identify where increased I
flexibility in the regulatory process could be made available to licensees with little or no direct safety impact, issued its report for public coment.
In its report, the RRG referenced the issues discussed in SECY-92-314 and recomended actions to resolve the issues.
The staff has prepared an implementation plan for the RRG recomendations and forwarded it to the Comission in SECY-94-003.
During the preparation of this paper the Comission issued an SRM dated October 15, 1993, which returned SECY-92-314 to the staff for farther consideration.
The Comission requested that the staff integrate current information, such as the response to the OPP report on current licensing basis, in formulating recomendations concerning compilation of the CLB and current industry practice in updating the FSAR.
DISCUSSION:
In developing SECY-92-314, the staff conducted onsite audits and a public workshop to collect information for answers to the Comission's questions on the relationship between the CLB and FSAR, and the usefulness of compiling the CLB for operating reactors.
ing each in approximately I day.The staff performed audits at 14 plants, complet-For the audits, the staff focused on a limited set of technical issues for which actions were requested by the NRC after the FSAR update rule was issued in 1980 and, in most cases, after the operating license was issued for the facility audited.
The staff assessed the amount of information added to the updated FSARs (UFSARs) as a result of these issues and, to a limited extent, the processes used by licensees 'or managing the resulting comitments.
The issues identified by the staff in 'ECY-92-314 were as follows:
1.
"No clear orocess is defined for makino chances to the ClB (licensee commitments) that is not included in the FSAR.
The licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR in accordance with
The Commissioners 10 CFR 50.59.
However, the NRC has not issued regulatory guidelines for changes to the CLB not contained in the UFSAR."
2.
"No industry-wide acreement exists on a def f nition of CLB (i.e.. licensee commitments) for coeratina reactors.
There is no agreement throughout the industry on the interpretation of the definition of " commitment" in 10 CFR 54.3."
3.
" Accuracy of the docket wi..) resoect to the ClB. As a result of the dif fering interpretations and the lack of a clearly defined process for making changes to conmitments outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.59, some licensees have not docketed changes made to some licensing basis i
con nt tments."
4.
"No clear understandina exists for "desion bases" in terms of its scoce and its relationshio to the CLB.
During the CLB workshop, the staff found confusion among the licensees over " design bases" as defined by 10 CFR 50.2."
The first three issues concern licensees' written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements.
l These commitments were made in docketed licensing correspondence, such as licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and enforcement actions and licensee commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or as described in licensee event reports.
SECY-92-314 described this aspect of the CLB as "those portions of the CLB outside of the FSAR" since such commitments may not affect the plant FSAR and, if modified, are not required to be reported in updated FSAR submittals.
Such connitments can be changed without either NRC approval or notification.
The remaining SECY-92-314 issue concerns the element of the CLB involving the plant-specific design bases information defined in the most recent FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71.
To address these issues, the staff committed to carry out follow-on efforts to (1) define or clarify the terms "CLB " " commitment," and " design bases" for operating reactors, (2) ensure commitments are changed appropriately and reflected on the docket, and (3) evaluate proposed changes to 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 50.59, and 10 CFR 50.71(e) to ensure the FSAR, design basis documentation, docketed correspondence, and plant records are complete and that processes for controlling and using the CLB are clear.
Subsequent to submitting SECY-92-314, the staff provided additional infor-mation and clarification of the issues in a memorandum dated December 4,1992, from the Executive Director of Operations to Commissioner Curtiss.
Specifi-cally, the staff emphasized the relatively narrow focus of the 1-day audits and noted that the language used in SECY-92-314 may have implied a greater safety significance than the staff intended.
The staff noted that the audit findings did not raise significant safety concerns for operating reactors.
Additionally, the staff indicated that additional actions would be taken to ensure that the regulatory process and licensee programs related to commitment changes are adequate to ensure that the CLB is being maintained.
The Comissioners To accomplish this, the staff initiated a more intensive examination of the SECY-92-314 issues to better understand the licensees' programs in these The staff conducted week-long team audits at seven plants, represent-areas.
Ing different NSSS vendors, vintages, and regions, to assess licensees' processes for controlling comitments that are part of the plants' CLB.
The sites were selected to provide a representative sample of the industry, including utilities with multiple nuclear sites and utilities with single nuclear units.
The sample included sites with a spectrum of regulatory performance characteristics as indicated by the NRC's systematic assessment of licensee performance (sal.P) process.
The purpose of the audits was to examine licensees' practices in comitment management.
Comitment management includes the processes licensees use to identify, track, and ensure implementation of cumitments.
It also includes the processes licensees use to maintain comit-ments so that comitted actions, whether hardware modifications or procedural changes, are not inadvertently changed or deleted after implementation.
Finally, comitment management includes the processes licensees use to decide if they should inform the NRC when a comitment is changed.
The audit teams also examined licensees' design basis reconstitution programs to determine licensees' understanding of design bases and its relationship to the CLB.
The audit teams reviewed the seven licensees' programatic and administrative conti als for comitment management.
To examine the programs in actual prac-tice, the teams reviewed the status of licensee comitments made to the NRC in response to specific safety issues.
selected because of their generic safety significance.Five of these issues were specif The remaining issues were specific to the individual licensees and included comitments made in licensee event reports (LERs) and responses to notices of violation contains a list of the plants audited and the issues rev(iewed.NOVs).
The audit teams relied on standard NRC inspection practices in conducting the review of licensee comitments.
While this was a special effort focused on the review of licensee comitments, the NRC routinely audits the status of licensee comitments during team inspections and certain resident inspector inspections.
In conducting the audits, the teams performed system walkdowns, reviewed applicable documentation (including design chan records, and procedures), and interviewed the licensees'ge packages, training personnel.
The teams examined between 50 to 75 comitments at each site, some from docketed correspondence as early as 1981, and reviewed the initial implementation and the current status of each comitment. At the completion of each site audit, the teams reviewed their findings with the licensee and documented the findings in an audit report. is a copy of one of the seven audit reports.
The staff is in the process of issuing the audit reports to each licensee audited as part of the docket.
Overall, the staff found that each licensee audited had established programs for identifying and implementing its comn.itments to the NRC.
In conducting the audits, the staff did not find any safety significant comitments that licensees had not implemented or failed to maintain.
The majority of licen-sees had developed formal commitment management programs that tracked identi-fication and implementation of comitments.
These licensees also had programs
/
The Comissioners for maintenance of comitments so that subsequent actions, such as revision of a procedure, did not inadvertently modify or delete a comitted action.
The licensees, without formal comitment management programs, used action tracking systems and computerized data bases to accomplish these same functions.
The staff found very few examples in which a licensee changed a comitment without (1) deliberate consideration of the underlying safety intent of the comitment or (2) docketing the comitment change when it involved a possible change in intent.
The few examples in which a licensee inadvertently changed a comit-ment, or chose not to docket the change, were fully evaluated by the audit teams and found to be of very low significance.
ISSUES IDENTIf!ED IN SECY-92-314 1.
"Ho clear orocess is defined for makino chances to the CLB (licensee commitments) that is not included in the fSAfl.
The licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
However, the NRC has not issued regulatory guidelines for changes to the CLB not contained in the UFSAR."
Figure 1 is a conceptual illustration of the regulatory processes for changing different elements of the CLB.
a of licensee comitments, as shown in the figure, each level in the NRC'sWith hierarchical structure includes a change mechanism for licensees to use to control changes to their facilities' CLB.
Regulatory 50.90, 50.92 50.71(e) 50.54 No' Prescribed Process 2.202 50.59 50.12 Process Toch Specs Licensco CLB QA Commitments to:
Elements:
Uconse FSAll Securtty GLs Corditions EP Bu!!stins Exemptions LERs Orders NOVs Othors
)
Figure 1:
Regulatory Processes Applicable for Changing, and Reporting, Various Elements of the Current Licensing Basis Although no formal change or reporting requirements exist, the staff found that the licensees audited have developed programs and processes for managing and controlling changes to such comitments.
As a result of these programs, the staff audits did not identify any safety issues associated with the current situation for changing comitments.
There was no it.dication that, as a result of the lack of a required change process, licensees viewed compliance with comitments as completely discretionary.
Although there is no defined
The Comissioners process for licensees to follow when changing comitments, the staff found that licensees evaluate comitment changes.
The staff found, through discussions with the licensees, NRC resident inspectors, several NRC regional section chiefs, and NRR project managers, that an informal process, comon across the industry has developed. A licensee wishing to change a comit-ment performs an eva,luation of the change and typically discusses the change with the NRC resident inspector staff, the NRC regional section chief, or the NRR project manager.
In almost all cases, the NRC staff advises the licensee to docket the change in a letter to the agency.
These letters commonly inform the NRC of the change and do not request confirmation or approval.
In conducting the audits, the staff identified only two instances in which commitments were purposely changed and not reported on the docket to the NRC.
action was not appropriate. Staff evaluation of both instances determined that enforceme) with low safety significance. Both instances are considered to involve changes Although the NRC has not promulgated regulatory requirements or explicit guidelines for licensees to use for changing written commitments that are not contained in the license or the FSAR, the NRC expects that licensees will maintain the intent of their comitments.
flexibility for changing comitments which is afforded by the NRC, theDespite Commission's expectation that comitments will be met is briefly addressed in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, D.(1), " Notices of Deviation."
For many such comitments, for example, information provided by licensees addresses how compliance with NRC regulations is or will be attained.
While the regulatory process permits licensees to make changes to the specifics of such comitments without NRC interaction, it requires that the regulations continue to be met.
The regulatory process also provides the NRC with means (e.g. inspection program activities) to evaluate Itcensee comitment changes an,d to take appropriate enforcement action if or when necessary.
While no safety issues were identified, the staff audits did indicate that many licensees and NRC staff do not have a clear understanding of when comitments can be changed without NRC interaction.
In practice, as noted previously, licensees interact with the NRC before changing most comitments, regardless of safety significance.
In the absence of a defined process licensees, very often with informal staff encouragement, opt for a conse,rva-tive approach regarding staff interaction.
An effort to develop staff ruidance on what constitutes a comitment and the types of controls to be placed on changing comitments is being carried out in response to the recomendations of the RRG.
for rulemaking after staff guidance is implemented. Additionally, the staff will reasse Since safety-significant issues have not been identified by the staff audits, the staff withdraws the statement contained in SECY-92-314 that "... a change process must be devised and required of licensees to ensure the underlying safety interest of the comitment is preserved."
2.
"No industry-wide aareement exists on a definition of CLB fi.e.
licensee I
comi tment s ) for operatina reactors.
There is no agreement throughout the industry on the interpretation of the definition of "comitment" in 10 CFR I
54.3."
l
The Comissioners The staf f's audits confirmed that there are some differences among licensees in their interpretation of the term 'comitment."
Comitment is not defined in 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 54, although the term is currently referenced in 23 separate regulations.
However, there is an industry working group, the Regulatory Comitment Tracking Group (RCTG), that has developed a definition of comitment, which a number of licensees have adopted.
The purpose of the RCTG, which includes about 30 utilities, is to provide licensees the opportunity to share information and techniques for comitment management.
The staff found that five of the seven licensees audited had developed a definition for comitoont, some adopting or basing their definition on the RCTG's definition, for their plant staff to use when dealing with regulatory issues.
Despite differences among licensees in their detailed interpretations of comitment, the staff found only one issue concerning what constituted a comitment in practice.
This issue involved three licensees that took explicit credit for existing programs in their response to generic letters or bulletins but did not include these programs in their comitment management systems.
The staff believes that if a licensee uses an existing program to address a regulatory concern, then a traceable correlation of the program to the concern would be necessary for the licensee to adequately evaluate sub-sequent changes to the program.
When the staff identified this anomaly to the three licensees involved, the licensees agreed with the staff and indicated that they would review their definition of comitment and/or their process for identifying and changing comitments.
With the exception of this issue, there were no disagreements between the staff and the licensees audited concerning the actions the licensees had comitted to accomplish. Although differtit licensees used slightly different definitions of comitment, the safety i. sues important to the NRC were being appropriately managed.
3.
" Accuracy of the docket with respect to the CLB. As a result of the dif fering interpretations and the lack of a clearly defined process for making changes to comitments outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.59, some licensees have not docketed changes made to some licensing basis comi tmen t s. "
Licensees are not legally required to report changes to comitments that are not included in the license or the FSAR.
In practice, however, the staff audits found very few instinces in which licensees changed the intent of a comitment and did not provide docketed notification to the NRC.
The few instances were evaluated in detail and found to be of very low safety significance.
All of the licensees audited, relying on the judgment of their licensing and compliance managers, deliberately considered whether a change to a comitment should be comunicated to the NRC.
Most of the audited licensees typically placed a change to a comitment on the docket based on a change to the comitment's intent or a change to the scheduled implementation date.
Several licensees indicated that they would also formally notify the NRC of a change to a comitment on the basis of their perception of the importance of the issue to the NRC, even if they believed that the intent had not been changed. Most licensees also noted that if they were unsure about the
The Comissioners appropriate course of action, they would typically notify the NRC of the change.
In addition the audits found that informal staff guidance to the licensees encourages,the licensees to report changes to comitments on the docket.
The staff did find several examples of comitments that had been Madvertently changed by the licensees' staff.
However, these instances invol' ed comit-ments made by licensees in LERs and NOVs and were of very low s'gnific:nce.
For example, in response to an NOV, a licensee comitted to enf ure that the fire raarshall kept all master equipment keys in his possessior.
Contrary to this, the staff found that the process for controlling the keys had been changed and that the keys were now kept in a locked box in the shift engineer's office.
However, the licensing group, responsible for deciding whether to inform the NRC of changes to comitments, was not informed of the ctange.
Although the licensee's failure to notify the NRC of the change was 1
loconsistent with its established process, such notification is not required ty existing regulations and in this case, the staff believes that the licensee had preserved the intent of its comitment (i.e., the master equipment keys were adequately controlled).
An issue also has been raised about the accuracy of docketed CLB information and the Comission's requirement, for license renewal, that each plant's CLB be maintained for any renewal period.
Specifically, since some comitments included in the 10 CFR 54.3 definition of CLB can be changed without docketed NRC notification, does the current regulatory process ensure a plant's CLB is maintained?
Although some licensee written comitments can be changed without docketed notification to the NRC, licensees are generally making such notifications when they change the intent or scheduled implementation of a comitment.
More importantly, the staff has found that licensees are evaluating comitment changes to ensure that the underlying safety intent of the comitment will be maintained.
It is the preservation of the underlying intent of such licensee
{
comitments, rather than the implementation specifics, which is fundamental to safety.
Additionally, although written notification of a comitment change is not currently required, the NRC inspection program provides a vehicle for verifying that the CLB is being maintained.
If, as a result of HRC inspections, problems wi'h comitment changes and their impact on the safety focus of the CLB are identified, the regulatory process provides for the possibility of both imediate regulatory action (e.g., orders) and the future imposition of explicit regulatory requirements for comitment changes.
As noted previously, the staff will follow through on the RRG implementation plan recomendations which will examine new initiatives for enhancing the regulatory process in the area of comitments.
- 4. "No clear understandino exists for "desian bases" in terms of its scope and its relationshio to the C13 During the CLB workshop, the staff found confusion among the licensees over " design bases" as defined by 10 CFR 50.2.*
,e I,
-m
The Comissioner: The staff found that the audited licensees that were conducting design basis reconstitution or documentation programs recognized the difference and under-stood the relationship between the plant's design bases and its licensing basis.
As defined by 10 CFR 54.3, the CLB includes the plant-specific design bases information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent as required by 10 CFR 50.71.
Several of the licensees indicated that one of the reasons for performing these programs was to clearly identify the design and the licensing bases of the facility.
bases and the licensing basis and the margins between the two providedC licensees with the knowledge to make sound changes to their facility, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, without adversely affecting safety.
In conducting design basis reconstitution programs, several of the audited licensees had performed a thorough review of historical comitments based on system or topic to ensure that the licensing basis was accurately described.
Where discrepancies were identified, the licensees added the comitment to their tracking systems for implementation and continued maintenance.
A more detailed study of licensees' design basis reconstitution or documen-tation programs is documented in NUREG-1397, "An Assessment of Design Control Practices and Design Reconstitution Programs in the Nuclear Power Industry."
This study involved six utilities (five of the six were different than those audited for this report) and found that most of the programs reviewed cor-tained system-specific licensing comitments and exceptions.
EVALUATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING On October 28, 1992, the Commission requested that OPP systematically review and analyze the CLB issues discussed in SECY-92-314 and to discuss the regulatory significance of these issues.
On the basis of its review, OPP proposed a definition of CLB (OPP-92-02) different from the current definition of CLB in 10 CFR 54.3.
The purpose of the OPP proposal was to more clearly define those issues that require NRC approval before licensee modification and to eliminate from the current CLB definition those items that the licensee ca change without prior staff approval.
The OPP also recomended (1) establish-ing a definition of CLB in 10 CFR Part 50 for operating reactors, (2) revising the definition of CLB in 10 CFR 54.3 to reflect the definition established for 10 CFR Part 50 and, (3) considering changes to 10 CFR 50.59, 50.71(e), and 50.109 based on the implications of the established definition of CLB.
The OPP recomendation is that the CLB should be redefined to represent the delineation of how applicable regulations will be met, as evaluated and relied upon by the NRC and documented in safety evaluation reports (SER), the facility license, or technical specifications or otherwise imposed on the licensee.
The OPP recommendation would establish the CLB as "...the minimum safety envelope within which operrtions must take place."
The key objective is to include within the CLB only items which must be approved by the NRC before any change is made.
For NRC SERs, only that information identified as essential to demonstrate how regulations will be met would be considered as part of the CLB.
The principal advantages of such an approach are stated to I
The Comissioners be increased certainty about what changes require NRC approval and the elimination from the current CLB definition items that can be changed as a result of the licensees' own initiative.
As explained in the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for 10 CFR Part 54 and in OPP-92-02, the regulatory process is necessarily broad in scope.
The definition of CLB in Part 54 was developed to recognize and take credit for the broad scope of NRC activities as the basis for an exclusive license renewal focus on aging effects in the period of extended operation.
The Comissicn indicated in the 50C that as a result of the full scope of ongoing regulatory activities, issues other than aging need not be evaluated for license renewal.
This recognition of the full scope of reguietary activities is viewed as appropriate and reflects the existing regulatory a;)proach.
Although the regulatory process is hierarchal, it is structurcJ deliberately to ensure the closest scrutiny is given to issues which have the greatest safety significance.
It is the entire process, however, including aspects which can be changed without NRC approval, which is utilized by the agency in carrying out its overall safety mission.
The OPP view that the Part 54 CLB definition is inappropriate "because it includes items which may be changed by the licensee's own initiative and are not part of the NRC rcview and approval process" contrasts with the existing hierarchal regulatory process.
The OPP recommendation to define the CLB as that information that would require NRC approval prior to change is not considered practical.
OPP suggests that the CLB information (i.e., information that must be approved Although by NRC before any change) be defined so that it must be only that information relied upon for meeting applicable regulations, this is not current regulatory practice.
For example, NRC staff SERs have not been developed to ensure that all information that is provided by a licensee to establish regulatory compliance (e.g., FSAR), and that could require NRC approval before change, is included and specifically identified in the SER.
As a result, licensee-specific application of the OPP definition of CLB would, as a practical matter, require an evaluation process with uncertainties which could reduce the suggested benefit of the CLB redefinition.
Implementation of the definition would require licensees and HRC staff to deter.nine which items are included within the OPP definition of CLB.
10 CFR Part 50 would not be expected to be justified on the basis of theAddition evaluation criteria of 10 CFR 50.10.r.
significant issues during the recently completed site audits that wouldThe staff d warrant the changes proposed by OPP.
OPP also expressed the view that the l
current CLB situation does not adversely affect the safety of operating reactors.
CONCLtfSIONS:
1.
The staff found that the audited licensees had developed programs and processes for managing the comitments they make to the NRC and for controllinq changes to these comitments.
There was no indication that, as a result of the lack of a required change process, licensees viewed compliance with comitments as discretionary. Although licensees are not legally required to report changes to comitments that are not included in the license and the FSAR, the staff found very few examples in
/
w uumig nu g y
IU
The Comissioners which a licensee changed a comitment without (1) deliberate consideration of the underlying safety f atent of the comitment or (2) docketing the comitment change when it involved a possible change in intent.
l The staff did not identify any safety significant issues requiring imediate action.
2.
Although the NRC has not promulgated regulatory requirements or explicit guidelines for licensees to use for changing written comitments that are not contained in the license or the FSAR, the NRC expects that licensees will maintain the intent of their comitments.
While the regulatory process permits licensees to make changes to the specifics of some comitments without NRC interaction, the process also provides the NRC with the means (e.g., inspectinn program activities) to evaluate licensee comitment changes and to take appropriate enforcement action if as neces sa ry.
3.
Although the process for maintaining and changing some comitments is not subject to formal regulatory controls and does permit unreported changes to some comitments, the staff concludes that licensees' conservative implementation of their administrative processes and the NRC's regulatory process as described in the Statements of Consideration accompanying 10 CFR Part 54 ensures that the CLB will be maintained to provide an acceptable level of safety.
Although licensees may change some documented comitments without formal NRC interaction, the stiff concludes that licensees ensure that the underlying safety intent of their comitments will be maintained.
4 The staff audits identified that many licensees and NRC staff do not have a clear understanding of when comitments can be changed without NRC interaction.
This has led most licensees to act conservatively, interact-ing with NRC staff and reporting changes to comitments regardless of safety significance.
This in turn, has resulted in an inefficient expenditure of licensee and NRC resources.
The staff's implementation plan for RRG recomendations includes an effort to do elop guidance on what constitutes a comitment and the types of controls to be placed on 9
comi tmen ts.
5.
The staff did not identify a need to further clarif bases" as it is used within the regulatory process.y the term " design 6.
Neither the staff nor OPP identified any safety significant issues that would warrant the changes proposed by OPP.
The staff believes that the CLB definition contained in Part 54 is appropriate and, that the OPP redefinition contrasts with the existing regulatory process, and would not provide a practical approach for achieving significant regulatory improvements.
{00RDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviered this paper and has no legal objection to its content.
The Comissioners RECOMMENDATIONS:
That the Comission:
1.
Approve the staf f's recomendations presented in SECY-92-314.
The recomendations of SECY-92-314 were that the Comission:
end the program that sought volunteers to compile their CLB, a.
b.
not require licensees to complie the CLB within a single document, j
not revise the interpretation of the FSAR update rule to include
)
c.
the entire CLB.
i 2.
Not adopt the recomendatiens forwarded in OPP-92-02.
l 3.
Make this paper pubilcly available with SECY-92-314 and the October 15, 1993, SRM.
/
l WW0
\\
amps M. Tay1 Ep cutive Di ector
/ for Operations Encloe.ures:
1.
Dc-amber 4, 1992, Memorandum from C"O to Comissioner Curtiss 2.
Audit Plants and Issues 3.
Hope Creek Audit Report Con.mi s s ione r s ' comments or consent should be provided directly the Office of the Secretary by COD Wednesday, March 30, 1994.
to
{
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted j
to the Commissioners NLT Wednesday, March 23, 1994, with an i
information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be l
{
apprised of when comments may be expected.
l DISTRIDUTION:
Commissioners OCC i
OCAA
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OIG l
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e, UNITED ETATIS
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION wwoTow. o. c. rce.sa k....
December 4,1992 HEMDRANDUM FOR:
Comissioner Curtiss FROM:
James H. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CURRENT LICENSING BASIS 1
1 have enclosed answers to the questions you asked about SECY 92-314, ' Current Licensing Basis for Operating Plants."
The answers to questions 1 and Ba include discussions on the legal ramifications of certain staff findings documented in SECY 92-314.
These answers have been coordinated with OGC.
The staff conducted the current licensing t, asis (CLB) audits and workshop, as discussed in SECY 92-314, to collect information for the Comission's ques-tions on the relationship between the CLB, the final safety analysis report (FSAR), and the usefulness of compiled CLBs for operating reactors.
There were 14 audits in all, each taking approximately one day to complete.
The i
audits were narrowly focused on the content of the FSARs and the processes for r.anaging commitments and design bases.
staff conducted a CLB workshop which featured open discussions on theAs a res processes for managing and changing the CLB. Some of the language used in SECY 92-314 may have implied a greater safety significance than the staff intended.
While some weaknesses were observed, the findings and conclusions in SECY 92-314 should be understood in context that all of the audited facilities have developed basic programs and processes in response to the NRC's requirements for managing changes to the CLB.
The principal require-ments for managing these changes are contained in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50,10 CFR 50.59,10 CFR 50.90,10 CFR 50.54(a),10 CFR 50.54(p),10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.71(e),10 CFR 50.72,10 CFR 50.73 and plant-specific license conditions.
The audits focused on a limited set of technical issues for which actions were requested by the NRC after the FSAR update rule was issued in 1980 and, in most cases, after the operating license (OL) was issued for the facility audited.
The audits assessed the amount of infonnation added tr the Updated FSARs (UFSARs) as a result of these few issues and, to a limited extent, the processes used by licensees for canaging comitments and design bases.
The principal findings from the audits of the 14 facilities are as follows:
1.
FSARs for the audited facilities included only a portion of the CLB.
This is consistent with the discussion in the Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR Part 54 about the CLB for license renewal.
CONTACT:
H. Virgilio 504-1353 m-
%-e-..
Comissioner Curtiss December 4,1992 2.
The processes for evaluating changes to the facility against the CLB comitments and design bases vary significantly between licensees and there were indications of weaknesses in the processes used at some of the facilities audited.
3.
Most of the audited facilities are improving the management of co mitments and design bases.
reconstitution programs, comitment tracking systems, and electrnnic information storage and retrieval systems.
The F5AR update requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.7)(a) have not been interpreted by either the licensees or the staff to require new comitments and design bases developed in response to rules, generic letters, bulletins and enforcement actions, and those proposed in licensee event reports be included in the FSAR.
audited facilities wereAs a result, the staff found more than half of the changes to the facility and its programs. updating the FSAR to only reflect the effec In general, the scope of the FSARs-was not being expanded to address issues not originally included at the time of OL issuance.
that the complete CLB for a facility is not included in the FSAR.The S The staff found that some of the audited facilities rely on a manual capability to search information contained on the docket and that others use electronic databases and retrieval systems to recall documents that contain commitments and design bases.
The thoroughness of the search, the ease of retrieval, and the atsility of the licensee's staff to access the documents varied among the licensees, depending on the method used.
At some of the audited facilities it took hours to recall the docketed correspondence on an issue with only a few of the licensee's staff able to perforu this task.
All of the audited facilities were performing safety assessments U changes to the facility and its programs. However, some of the..
ted support facilities had neither procedures that would require all docke'ed a
correspondence on a particular issue to be reviewed and evaluated before implementing a change to the facility nor other r..chanisms to er.sure commitments would not be changed without licensee review and subsequent written notification to the NRC.
The staff found that licensees use a variety of processes for assessing the reportability of changes to comitments and design bases that are not included in the FSAR.
Not all of these processes include notifying the NRC and docketing the change.
Thus, the audits and CLB workshop disclosed that the HRC docket file may not necessarily contain a description of the current manner in which every comiteent to the NRC is carried out.
Licensee changes to important comitments are comunicated on the docket through vehicles such as FSAR updates (including 50.59 summaries), LER supplements, and letters.
Changes to minor comitments may not be placed on the docket if the subject is not covered by the FSAR or an LER, or is otherwise not deemed by the licensee to be sufficiently important to warrant additional correspondence to the NRC.
The CLB workshop discussions indicated that such changes are often, but not
Conr.issioner Curtiss
. always, discussed orally with resident inspectors or other rembers of the regional er hER staff.
Nevertheless, the result is that the docket may not r.ecessarily include a description of how all coni.itments (a pt.t :f the CLB as now defined in 10 CFR Part 54) are currently ret.
While the original cor.-ittent remains on the docket, the licensee ety have subsequently altered 4
the ra.ner in which the conviteent is fulfilled.
SICY 91-314 are meant to further investigate the acceptability of currentWhile the staff lite ste practices, we do not at this time believe that current practices represent a significant safety concern for operating reactors.
No specific safety concerns were identified either during the limited audits perferre. ty the staff or during the CLB workshop. However, based on the audit art weekshop findings and the November 30, 1992, OPP Report on the CLB, regulatory recuirements and guidance are clear and are be teple ented by the licensees.
01rginatitaned by 4tm:5 H.SNeuk4 ames M. Taylor Executive Direct 6r Eaticsure:
for Operations Fes;:nse to Co--issioner Curtiss' Qsestions on SECY 92-314 cc w/ enclosure:
Q15TRIBUTf0Nt The Chairman Central File J. Roe P. Noonan OPA Cc--issioner Rogers PDIV-1 r/f M. Virgilio A. Bill Beach OCA Co.-issicner Rer.ick AD r/f J. Larkins E. Beckjord EDO r/f Co rissier.er de Planque J. Scinto E. Jordan J. Taylor T. Gibbons S!CY W. Russell J. Sniezek B. Clayton J. Blaha C;C D. CrutchfieldF. Gillespie H. Thompson J. Partlow T. Murley/F. Mirag*ita D. Wigginton j
NRR Mail Room w/ incoming i
Inclosure 2
ANSVERS TO COMMISSIONER CURTISS' OVESTIONS ABOUT SECY 92-314
.~
1.
Duestion What are the legal ramifications of the staff's findings in SECY 92-314 f
for the agency's approach to license renewal? Specifically, what impact do these findings have on the first of the two basic generic principles upon which the license renewal rule was based: that the regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the licensing bases of all currently operating plants provide and maintain an acceptable level of safety for operation so that operation will not be inimical to public health and safety or common defense and security?
An1Eir d
r The staff's audit findings and the discussions at the current licensing basis (CLB) workshop raise questions that need to be resolved concerning two aspects of the Part 54 license renewal rulemaking: (i) the first principle of license renewal, and (11) the Commission's determination that a finding of compliance of a plant with its current ifcensing basis is not required for issuance of a renewed license.
1 l-The first principle of license renewal concerns the adequacy of the NRC's 4
regulatory process for assuring that the licensing basis of ali currently-
~
operating nuclear power plants provide and maintain an acceptable level of safety, so that operation will not be inimicable to the public health and safety or comon defense and security.
'56 FR 64943, 64946 December 13, i
1991). That principle, along with the second principle of license
{
renewal', formed the basis for the Comission's conclusion that a formal license renewal review by the NRC of a plant's CLB against the full range
)
of requirements on safety and comen defense and security is not necessary, since such a review would not add significantly to safety or comen defense and security. M 56 FR 64945, 64947. The Comission also concluded that a finding of compliance of a plant with its current licensing basis at the time of renewal is not required.
M 56 FR 64943, j
64951-52.
i The Commission's conclusions that neither a safety review against the full range of safety requirements nor a finding of compliance with the CLB are necessary at the time of renewal were based upon two findings: (1) the j
adequacy of the NRC's regulatory process, and (11) the ifcensee's i
ac'ivities to update (maintain) the CLB and ensure compliance with the J
CLB. 56 FR at 64947-52.
The NRC's regulatory process consists of many j
distinct elements, including the review of operating events, the review of i
l generte safety and unresolved safety issues, the systematic evaluation i
4
'The second principle is that each plant's current licensing basis cust be maintained throughout the renewal term.
M 56 FR 64943, 64947.
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3_
program, activities under the severe accident program, and the NRC's i
inspection, audit, and enforcement activities.
It was recognind'that from time to time there would be instances of licensee noncompliance with j
Comission regulatory requirements and licensee comitments, but the i
Comission believed that the regulatory process was sufficient to rectify these instances and to generslly assure adequate protection of the public health and safety and compliance with the license.
The licensees' programs for updating its CLB and assuring compliance with the licensing basis also encompass many discrete licensee programs / activities.
These include programs and procedures for properly recognizing and appropriately controlling NRC-initiated and licensee-initiated changes to the facility's licensing basis, developing the necessary documentation to support such changes, and making any necessary changes to the FSAR.
Many of these e'ements of the NRC regulatory process and the licensee programs are una'fected by the results of the 14-plant audit and the CLB workshop.
However, the results of the audit and CLB workshop do raise questions regarding whether all licensees: (1) have adequate measures for controlling changes to the itcensing basis (ii) properly consider the CLB when making changes to their design, hardware or procedures, and (iii) report to the NRC all changes to their licensing basis.
As discussed in the remorandum from the E00 to Comissioner Curtiss forwarding this response, the staff has concluded that the findings of the audit do not raise significant safety concerns for operating reactors.
Nevertheless,
l
. the audit results and the CLB workshop discussions lead the staff to l
question the adequacy of the NRC's regulatory practices with yesp'ect to I.
clearly identifying: (1) which NRC requirements and ifcensee comitments constitute new design bases, and which new comitments and requirements j
are not considered to be design bases but nonetheless form part of the plant's licensing basis, (ii) the recordkeeping and reporting requirements with respect to licensing basis information, and (iii) the change process d
applicable to licensing basis information. These questions relate to the long-term control of the CLB to assure the underlying safety interests of 4
the Cl.B are maintained.
Neither the audit findings of the staff nor the discussions at the CLB workshop identified any specific safety concerns warranting imediate action.
However, deficiencies were identified that warrant further evaluation and act!sns to assure that the regulatory process and licensees' programs are adequate to maintain the CLB and assure compliance with all portions of the CLB. The staff plans to resolve the uncertainties concerning control of the CLB and to develop any needed regulations within the framework of 10 CFR Part 50.
Amendments of present Part 50 regulations and staff interpretations to add definitions, eliminate ambiguities in existing definitions, and to tighten requirements for controlling and documenting changes to the CLB and to plant design and procedures may be necessary. Dealing with this issue for currently-operating reactors will assure that the first principle of the license renewal rule is preserved.
I
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- ,- 4
- 2. Deestion j
If this basic principle of 10 CFR part 54 remains valid today, notwith-standing the findings set forth in SECY 92-314, why is there a need for
}
ny further action along the itnes of what the staff has recomended in 3
this SECY paper to improve the existing regulatory process (e.g., to define CLB for operating reactors, to clarify the process for changes to
{
the CLB, to clarify the definition of the terms 'comitment" and ' design j
bases" as those terms are used in the CLB, and to establish a process that will ensure that licensee changes to any comitments are reflected on the i
docket)?
If, on the other hand, the staff believes that further steps are required to improve the regulatory process to address the shortcomings 1
identified in SECY 92-31< in our approach to CLB, along the lines of the j
steps recomended in this SECY paper, how does one escape the conclusion
}
that the regulatory process as it relates to maintaining an adequate CLB appears npl to be adequate at the current time?
i j
Answer I
i l
During the FSAR audits and the CLB workshop, the staff found certain process weaknesses at the audited facilities.that could allow changes to l
be made without a licensee review to assess the impact on docketed CLB c omitment s.
In SECY 92-314, the staff proposed to conduct an evaluation to determine if the existing requirements and guidance should be revised Once the evaluation is complete, the staff can better determine whether to i
further clarify existing regulations, issue new regulations or guidance or I
, 9 take action to ensure implementation of existing requirements. These actions are examples of the NRC's regulatory process that roupneTy finds and corrects weaknesses in the regulatory fabric and that forms the basis j
for the basic principles underlying 10 CFR 50.54.
i i
4 3.
Duestion l
2 Please provide some perspective on the safety significance of the staff's findings and the priority and schedule for the actions that the staff has proposed to address the matters raised in the subject SECY paper.
i 1
l Answer i
i j
No specific safety concerns warranting frxradiate action were identified t
{
during the limited audits performed by the staff.
In conducting the i
i audits, the staff noted possible weaknesses in the processes some i
licensees used to ensure that design changes, procedural modifications and i
i l
safety evaluations are being evaluated against docketed comitments.
- i The staff expects the scoping evaluation to take approximately 8 to 10 months.
If rule changes appear warranted, the change would take about 2 more years.
I
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7 i
i 4
DJestion j
To the extent that the remedial steps that the staff proposes to take i
)
would constitute backfits, how will the NRC show that such actions 4
result in "a substantial intresse in the overall protection of the pu i
health and safety
- and that the " direct and indirect costs of i
implementation...are justified in view of this increased protection"
\\
i (10 CFR 50.109(a)(3))?*
I Answer I
The staff cannot yet determine which actions, if any, will be requ beyond the evaluation discussed in SECY 92-314.The staff will evaluate any proposals for either additional action or regulatory changes wl.en i conducts its evaluation, in which it will compare various alternatives action, and catermine whether such actions are justified under the Rule.
The decision to take additional action will depend, in part
, on the results of the evaluation and the safety significance of any possible problem areas found.
The backfit analysis of 20 CFR 50.109(a)3 will not be required if the staff concludes that actions are necessary to ach e
compliance with existing requirements.
2 issue, please be specific about the requirements in that the staff believes are not presently being met by licensees
/
. e i
5.
Duestion t
i With regard to the staff's proposal to initiate rulemaking to provide a definition of the CLB for operating rectors, why isn't the definition of CLB that is contained in 10 CFR 54.3, which in turn is based upon our i
d experience with operating reactors, sufficient? What is the rationale for having a separate CLB definition in Part 507 I
4 l
Answer i
{
1he staff believes that the definition of CLB in 30 CFR 54.3 is a j
{
suf ficient definition of " licensing basis" for 10 CFR Part 50.
The staff will evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of adding this definition j
to 10 CFR Part 50.
It is noted that the November 30, 1992, OPP Report, 52-02, raises further questions about the appropriate definition of CLB.
l 6
Ducs t ion 4
To what extent, if at all, would the problems that the staff has identi-fled in SECY 92-314 be corrected by simply requiring that the CLB be j
complied?
3 I
.g Answer
~
The audits found that licensees can access the documents containing the CLB.
Compiling the CLB would have little positive effect on the process weaknesses identified in SECY 92-314.
7.
Duestion Does the staff consider undocketed, detailed ' design basis documentation' saintained by licensees to be a part of the CLB7 If so, is this con-sistent with the definition of CLB in Part 547 Answer l
s The staff's viu is that "undocketed" infomation is not considered
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part of the CLB.
The tem " design basis documentation" has been discussed in SECY 91-364 dated November 21, 1991, and in NUREG-2397 on "An Assessment of Design Control Practices and Design Reconstitution Programs in the Nuclear Industry." Due to the confusion in the industry over this tem, the staff defined ' engineering design bases' to include both (1) the design bases as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, which is part of the CLB, and (2) other design considerations implemented to optimize the system design for operation, maintenance, procurement, installation, or construction.
. _ _ 8.
Dvestien SECY 92-314 points to the apparent lack of a clear and uniform under-standing of the term ' design basis," noting that this term has been employed in a number of different contexts to mean different things.
In this regard--
(a)
What are the technical and legal ramifications of reinterpreting the definition of " design basis' to encompass a broader range of design features than those specifically related to design basis accidents and transients?
(b)
What are the advantages and disadvantagt c of broadening the inter-pretation of the term " design basis" to include all aspects of facility designs mandated by regulation?
(c)
What are the advantages and disadvantages of broadening the inter-pretation of the term " design basis' to include all aspects of the j
design contained in the CLB7 Answer (a)
In SELY 92-314 the staff stated it found differences among the licensees in interpreting the term " design bases".
Some of the questions raised by industry at the CLB workshop were related to scope; however, most were related to depth.
-_,-w'y--
l 1 i i
The staff has not expanded its interpretation of ' design bases" as that term is used in 10 CFR 50.2. This tern has not been ilmite solely to design basis accidents and transients.
4 tiewever, over the years, many of the discussions have focused on design aspects to cope with destgr basis accidents and transients and in these discussions the term ' design basis' has been limited in context to refer to the conditions associated with design basis accidents and i
Nevertheless, the term as used in 50.2 refers to a wider range of struttures, systems, csmponents and functions than those necessary to cope with design basis accidents and transients In connection with the design basis reconstitution program, the i
staff has utill2ed the term " design bases
- to include a broader range of design features than those specifically related to the i
design bases accidents and transients discussed in the FSAR when the 4
operating license was issued (e.g. ATWS, Station Blackout).
The scope of the design bases has been interpreted by the staff to encompass all of the functions performed by the structures, systems j
and components at the facility. Exceptions to this general rule include the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47 for emergency facilities and equipment and the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 for safeguards i
facilities and equipment.
l Although broad in scope, the term " design bases" is limited in depth of detail to decketed information and comitments made by licensees to identify the specific functions to be performed by the
i i,
i structures, systems and components of the facility and limiting values for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design i
of plant features.
i From a legal standpoint, if the staff were to reinterpret a specific j
application of the " design bases" to encompass additional functions to be performed by a structure, system or component of the design and the matter involved a change or effect covered by 10 CFR 50.,. (e), the broadened scope of the interpretation of ' design bases" could potentially result in a broadening of the design i
aspects or of the structures, systems or components included in the UFSAR and covered by 10 CFR 50.59. As discussed in the memorandum from the EDO to Comissioner Curtiss forwarding this response, the FSAR update requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.7)(e) have not been interpreted to require that newly developed design bases as a result of generic letters, bulletins, and other sources be included in the FSAR.
While 10 CFR 50.59 allows, among other things, certain changes to the facility as described in the FSAR without prior NRC approval, it does not provide a process that explicitly covers the design bases which are on the docket but not in the FSAR.
In license renewal under Part 54, the functions of the structures, systems and components "important to Itcense renewal" are set ferth in 10 CFR Part 54.
Thus, a staff broadening of the term " design bases
- would not directly affect the structures, systems and components covered by 10 CFR 54.3. However, if the staff should I
. interpret what is required to accomplish the functions specified in 10 CFR 54.3 more broadly than previously, this could have-th'e effect of broadening the scope of structu:es, systems or components covered by 10 CFR 54.3.
1 The staff's followup actions in SECY 92-314 are directed toward clarifying the definitions, processes, regulatory guidance and requirements to ensure that the FSAR, design bases documentation.
docket and plant records are complete and the processes for matetaining and changing the design bases and other components of the CLB are clear.
(b)
The staff's approach to design bases as discussed in (a) above is broad based and includes all functions of the facility design features mandated by the regulations within the definition c,f the design bases with the exception of the emergency facilities and equipment and safeguards facilities and equipment.
The requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and (q) provide for saintenance and change of the associated CLB in these areas.
While there may be some advantage to expanding the definition of the design ba:es to include these features, such as allowing for a more inclusive set of administrative requirements to govern the process for evaluating the acceptability of and reporting design changes to the NRC, the current requirements for controlling the CLB for emergency facilities and equipment and safeguards facilities and equipment are adequate.
I
l I
(c)
As discussed in (c) above, the staff's interpretation of the term
" design bases" is broad in scope but limited in depth of1 detail to docketed information and docketed comitments made by licensees to j
address the functions and limiting values for the design of plant features. Additional docketed details related to the design say be part of the CLB, but are not considered design bases. Expanding the definition of ' design bases
- to include this additional detail, in conjunction with other process changes (e.g. 10 CFR 50.59, Appendix i
B to 10 CFR Part 50) might provide a more inclusive and consistent i
approach for controlling and reporting changes to the design; however, such an approach may be overly conservat'ive and burdensome.
l l
List of Plants Audited and Issues Reviewed PLANTS AUDITED 5.ils Dates Audited Etqi_qn ES15 OL 1ssuance Hope Creek March 8-12 I
GE 1986 Crystal River March 29 - April 2 Il B&W 1977 Fort Calhoun April 19-23 IV CE 1973 Braidwood May 10-14 Ill W
1987 & 1988 Davis-Besse May 17-21 Ill B&W 1977 Heaver Valley June 7-11 I
W 1976 & 1987 McGuire June 7-11 11 W
1981 & 1983 ISSUES REVIEWED 10 CFR 50.62 Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)
Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment Gereric letter 88-14 Instrument Air System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment NUREG-0737, l.C.5 Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff Bulletin 85-01 (PWRs)
Steam Binding of Auxiliary feedwater PumpsBulletin 87-01 (BWRs)
Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors Assorted Licensee Event Rrports (between 6to 10 LERs per plant)
Assorted Notices of Violation (between 3 to 6 NOVs per plant)
The licensee's Design Basis Reconstitution or Documentation Program ENCLOSURE 2 ww w _
f.
k
[.,L' S
UNITED STATES l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
"..N /
j WASHINGTON. D C. 20$5W1 August 23, 1993 Docket No. 50-354 Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 i
Dear Mr. Miltenberger:
SUBJECT:
SPECIAL AUDIT OF CONTROL PROCESSES FOR COMMITMENTS THAT A THE CURRENT LICENSING BASIS, HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION (TAC NO. M85807)
This letter provides the results of the comitment management audit conducted by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Hope Creek Generating Station, on March 8-12, 1993.
As you are aware, the staff is conducting audits at a crsss-section of reactor plants to assess the proces i
ing basis.
The staff will use the information gathered during the audits to evaluate the regulatory process in this area.
l visited by the staff, and our audit report is enclosed. Hope Creek was the first site i
The audit team focused on three principal areas:
(1) management of commit-ments made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), (2) reporting of changes to comitments made to the NRC, and (3) maintaining and updating the
]
final safety analysis report (FSAR).
In addition to reviewing the governing programs for these areas, the team reviewed the status of comitments made to licensee event reports, and notices of violation) in order to exam programs in actual practice.
I Overall, the team found that comitments affecting the plant's current licensing basis were being implemented and maintained.
The team also found that the programs for managing and reporting comitments controlled the reporting of changes to comitments to the NRC.
Finally, the team found that the comitments it reviewed that affected the plant updated FSAR (UFSAR) were captured by the UFSAR update process.
The team did not identify any items of significance in its review of comitments made in response to the specific issues.
gLf 0
I
Mr. Steeen E. Miltenberger August 23, 1993 The team thanks the plant staff for its candor in our discussions and its cooperation in providing the team the information necessary to conduct an efficient audit.
report, please contact me or Eric Leeds at (301) 504-1133.If you have Sincerely,
/S/
Michael J. Davis, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Reactor Projects - !/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Audit report cc w/ent.losure:
See next page DISTRIBUTION Docket file MDavis NRC & Local PDRs M0'Brien PDI-2 Reading SNewberry SVarga Eleeds I f, ' 'l JCalvo EWenzinger, RGN-1 MBoyle JWhite, RGN-I 0FFICE PDir2AM PDI-2/PM PDI-2/D_
NAME MdBr'i e$ '
MDavis:rb* T'MBoylk DATE
[/3393
? /.'5/93 TM/93 OffIC1AL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME:
HC85807. GEN 9
I
Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger August 23, 1993 The team thanks the plant staff for its candor in our discussions and its cooperation in oroviding the team the information necessary to conduct an efficient audi',
report, please contact me or Eric Leeds at (301) 504-1133.If you have Sincerely,
/OYl cum Michael J. Davis, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation t
Enclosure:
Audit report cc w/ enclosure:
See next page t
l a
l l
\\
e t
e I
Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger Public Service Electric & Gas Hope Creek Generating Station Company cc:
M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston & Strawn Mr. J. A. Isabella 1400 L Street, N.W.
MGR. - Generation Department Washington, DC 20005-3502 Atlantic Electric Company Post Office Box 1500 1199 Black Horse Pike R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire Pleasantville, New Jersey 08232 Law Department - Tower SE 80 Park Place Richard Hartung Electric Service Evaluation Newark, New Jersey 07101 Board of Regulatory Commissioners Hope Creek Resident inspector 2 Gateway Center, Tenth Floor Newark, NJ 07102 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer i Lower Alloways Creek Township Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 c/o Mary O. Henderson, Clerk Mr. J. Hagan Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157 Vice President *- Nuclear Operations Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Mr. R. Hovey General Manager - Hope Creek Operations Hope Creek Generating Station P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Mr. Frank X. Thomson, Jr., Manager Licensing and Regulation Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dr. Jill Lipoti, Asst. Director Radiation Protection Programs
- NJ Department of Environmental Protection and Energy CN 415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0415 l
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ENCLOSURE 4~
COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATIO_N i
MARCH 8-12. 1993 1.
Scooe and particiDant]
The purpose of the audit conducted at Hope Creek was to assess the licensee's programs for identifying and controlling comitments that affect the facility's current licen ing basis.
The audit focused on three principal (1) management of comitments made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory areas:
Comission (NRC), (2) reporting of changes to comitments made to the NRC, and (3) maintaining and updatin team reviewed the licensee'g the final safety analysis report (FSAR).
The s administrative procedures involving comitment management; reporting; action tracking; control of design, configuration, test and experiments; and others.
team revieweJ the status of comitments made by the licensee to the NRC response to specific issues.
the following:
Five of these issues, generic in nature, were 1
j 10 CFR 50.62 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Generic letter 88-14 Instrument Air System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Bulletin 88-07 Power Oscillations at Boiling Water Reactors NUREG-0737, l.C.5 Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff q
The remaining issues were specific to Hope Creek, involving licensee comitments made in licensee event reports (LERs) and responses to notices of 4
violation (NOVs).
The team also reviewed the licensee's configuration j
baseline documentation (CBD) program to determine how a comitment from the program would be captured in the comitment management process.
i i
The team relied on standard HRC inspection practices in conducting the review of pecific comitments.
walkdowns, reviewed applicable documentation (including design ch packages, training records, and procedures), and interviewed plant staff.
detailed review for each issue specified above is contained in the appendix to A
this report.
)
j The following NRC personnd participated in this audit:
Eric J. Leeds, Team Leader James E. Beall Steven R. Stein Anthony J. D'Angelo Mi
. II.
Findinos and Conclusions The following are the team's findings and conclusions for the three major areas of focus:
(1) commitment management, (2) reporting changes to comitments made to the NRC, and (3) maintaining and updating the FSAR.
Commitment Mananement:
plant's current licensing basis were being implemented and maintained.Ov significant deficiencies were found in the identification, tracking, No completion, or maintenance of licensee comitments involving design modifications, procedures, and programs.
procedural steps that were added as the result of a comitment made to theThe lice NRC.
The administrative control process for revising procedures prohibited removing annotated procedu al steps without the concurrence of the licensing organization.
This process provided assurance that revised procedures would include previous comitments.
the review of previous comitments for design modifications, the team did n identify any examples in which a comitted modification was inadvertently altered by a subsequent modification.
The team attributed this to the experience level of the engineering organization and the multiple levels of review anti approval required by the design change process.
)
B.nortinc Chances to Comitments Made to the NRC:
The licensee's programs for managing and reporting comitments controlled the reporting of changes to comitments to the NRC.
The programs differentiated between:
(1) changes to regulatory requirements that require NRC approval before implementation, such as the license and technical specifications; (2) changes to comitments that
- he licensee requires its staff to notify the NRC (even if the NRC has no formal reporting requirements), such as the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), LERs, and responses to generic letters, bulletins, and notices of violations and deviations; and (3) changes to comitments that do not r cuire NRC approval or formal notification, such as internal responses to information notices.
The team fcund two instances in which changes to comitments previously made to the NRC were not formally documented in i
docketed correspondence by the licensee.
In one case, the licensee had discussed the change with the resident inspector.
In the other case, the itcensee had not informed the NRC of the change.
However, the change was of a minor nature.
Details of both cases are discussed in the body and the appendix 0f the report, Chances Made to the Uodated Final Safety Analysis Reoort:
The comitments the team reviewed that affected the plant UFSAR were captured by the licensee's UFSAR update process.
The team reviewed eight design changes to the redundant
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reactivity control system (RRCS), an ATWS system, and eight LERs in which the 1 wnsee had comitted to make a plant change.
In all cases, the design chayes that affected the UFSAR were captured in the UFSAR update process.
_,,,,,,,... -, -, - =,
A !!!.
Discussion i
A.
Comitment Manaaement basis were being implemented and maintained.The team found th In its review of licensee comitments to specific issues, the team found no significant deficiencies design modifications, procedures, and programs.in identifying, t The licensee required annotating procedural steps that were added as the result of a comitment made to the NRC.
The administrative control process for revising procedures prohibited removing annotated procedural steps without the concurrence of the licensing organization.
procedures would include previous comitments.This process provided assurance th effectively disThe licensee maintained a computerized action tracking system (ATS Other programs, played pending and completed items, including comitments.
for inclusion in the ATS as comitments.such as the CBD program, contained mechaj Although there was no defined process requiring the review of pre'tious comitments for design modifications inadvertently altered by a subsequent modification.the team did not to the experience level of the engineering organization and the multiThe team attributed levels of review and approval required by the design change process. ple The licensee's comitment management program, as described in Procedure NC.NA-AP-ZZ-0030, prescribed assigning a comitment management number (C long-term comitments.
or continuous activity, a plant modification, or a procedure cha i
the comitment.
The program required the CHN to be annotated in the documents that implement the comitment.
The licensee used some discretior:
CHNs and might assign one to a one-time comitment as a means of providingin aJ additional control.
The licensee defined comitment as "a (written or verbal) statement calling for action in response to a regulation, finding, or recomendation."
Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0035, " Nuclear Licensing and Reporting," the licensee In included as comitments responses to ac-neric letters, bulletins, notices of vio'ations and deviations, and firspection report followup items; licensee 4
evert reports; the UFSAR; and internal responses to information notices, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) findings and significant observations and suggestions. operating event reports (SOERs), quality assuranc During the review of the specific issues, there were no instances of disagreement between the team and the licensee involving the identification, interpretation, or intent of any comitment.
concluded that the licensee's definition was adequate tc, capture the pertinent The team information and identify this information as comitments.
y y-w-
'-se wv-
8.
3 R portino 3ances to Comitments Made to the NRC j
The licensee's programs for managing and reporting commitments controlled The programs differentiated between
)
the reporting of changes to the NRC.
(1) changes to regulatory requirements that require NRC approval before implementation, such as the license and technical specifications; (2) changes i
to commitments that the licensee requires its staff to notify the NRC (even if the NRC has no formal reporting requirements), such as the UFSAR, licensee event reports, and responses to generic letters, bulletins, and notices of violations and deviations; and (3) changes to comitments that do not require NRC app-oval or formal notification, such as internal responses to information notices, INPO findings, and NRC or INPD observations and suggestions.
The programs allowed managers to use judgment in deciding if changes to comitment s that do not require NRC approval or formal notification are discussed with the NRC.
The programs required such discussion if the manager had reason to believe the NRC was aware of the comitment's implementation.
The team found two instances in which changes to comitments previously made to the NRC were not formally documented by the licensee in docketed correspondence.
The changed comitments were (1) returning to the original wording in a procedure that had been changed in response to NOV 89-80-01 and (2) r.at meeting the schedule for instrument air system testing comitted to in tER 89-17.
The NRC was not informed of the procedure change that reversed the change made as a comitment in response to NOV 89-80-01, although the licensee's program required such notification.
Although the NRC was not informed of the change, the audit team found that the change was of limited significance.
Regarding LER 89-17, the licensee had discussed the missed testing schedule with the NRC resident inspector when the licensee discovered it, although the program required a revised LER for a change in commitments made in an LER.
However, the delayed testing was an existing test developed in response to Generic Letter 88-14 and only referenced in the LER as being scheduled for completion during the 1988 refueling outage.
The testing was completed during the next refueling outage.
The licensee provided the audit team an example of an NRC notification for an issue that was not part of the audit team's review, but that exemplified how the licensee's notifications were sensitive to the significance of the issues.
During plant licensing, the licensee had comitted in its UFSAR to remove power from selected solenoid-actuated valves in response to Generic Letter 81-12. " Fire Protection Rule." The licensee subsequently determined through analysis that the affected systems were within acceptable design parameters and, through its 10 CFR 50.59 review process, that the change did not represent an unreviewed safety question.
Although prior notification of the NRC was not required (per 10 CFR 50.59), the licensee officially notified the NRC of the change by letter, because the issue had been considered significant during the licensing process.
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Maintainino and Vodatino the FSAR The licensee's control of the UFSAR updates and figure changes ensured that plant modifications were captured and incorporated in the UFSAR.
The Hope Creek site procedure for controlling plant design and configuration changes and experiments that would cause a modification to the physical plant or effect a change to a plant document (such as plant drawings or equipment l
specifications) required the originator of the change to complete a document l
change request, and this process included changes to the UFSAR.
Before a physical change was made to the facility, the licensee conducted a review for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability.
It was during this review that the licensee identified the documents that would be affected by the proposed plant change.
The team reviewed eight design changes to the RRCS, an ATWS system, and eight LERs in which the licensee had committed to make a plant change.
all cases, the design changes that affected the UFSAR were captured in the In l
UFSAR update process.
The team found that the 10 CFR 50.59 review packages were of sufficient detail and depth and concluded that the control of UFSAR changes would ensure that the UFSAR accurately reflected changes made to the plant design.
50.59 packages reviewed were of such detail that the specific section numbers The 10 CFR and titles of paragraphs in the UFSAR, or other documents that were reviewed for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability (such as regulatory guides), were documented in l
j the review package.
In addition, many of the 10 CFR 50.59 packages contained, l
as excerpts, the specific UFSAR paragraphs affected by the change.
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j APPENDIX - SPEC 1F1C ISSy[1,g[yl[ RED AT HOE [ R (([
To examine the implementation of the licensee's programs, the team reviewed the licensee's comitments to the following specific issues:
10 CFR 50.62 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related [quipment Generic Letter 88 14 Instrument Air System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Dulletin 88-07 Power Oscillations at Bolling Water Reactors NUREG-0737, l.C.5 Procedures for feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff Configuration Baseline Documentation Program Notices of Violation 09 07 01 and 89 60 01 (NOVs)
L see Event Reports 87-23, 87-25, 87-46, 88-11, 88-16, 88-21, 88-28
(
)
89-17, and 89-21 10 CFR 50.62 Anticitated Transient Without scram (ATWS)
The audit team reviewed eight chan was initially approved by the NRC.ges made to the ATW5 system since the system The licensee implemented these design changes after reviewin them for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability.
The team also selected for review el hl LCRs in which the licenses had committed to make some modification to t e plant. All comitments made by the licenses to the NRC involving the ATWS system had been fulfilled.
The ATWS design changes included several changes to components in the system and one change to the logic for the starting criteria of the standby liquid control system.
The changes were all reviewed for 10 CFR 50.59 ap (one required NRC approval because it was a ch6nge to the license)plicability The 10 r,fR 50,59 packages reviewed by the team typically contained two to three pages of excerpts from the Llf5AR or other documents that may have affected the proposed change or have been affected by the proposed change and require updating.
The team concluded that the review appeared to be detailed and accurately documented.
In accordance with its design change program, the licensee reviewed previously made comitments that may have affected the proposed design change during its 10 CFR 50.59 review process.
The design change process was documented in ProcedureHC.NAAP,ZZ0008(Q),
The team determined that, although the procedur# did n0l Contain IDGElflf dirithlon or a litt O ' defumanti (0 be FRV14W#d (0F 60 Mllmentti ladlViduil inQ'AllrI Ulld the.icentes't (0mputer-based systems to research applicable comitments.
/
2-Engineers used a number of computer-based systems to research past comitments that were documented in correspondence.
These systems included the action tracking system and several text retrieval systems that contain the majority of licensee correspondence with the NRC.
The UFSAR was also placed on the text-retrieval system.
The team interviewed several engineers who uniformly indicated that the text-retrieval systems were of great help in researching comitments and requirements during 10 CFR 50.59 reviews.
The team concluded that this review process appeared to work well, based on the ltatul of comitments reviewed.
The team also noted that the thoroughness of the revlow for palt comitmenti depended on the technical expertise of the individual engineers performing the review.
The ten identified a potential weakness in the licensee's design change program for comitmenti made in L[R$ and in responto to NOVs.
Design changes Implomonted to most these comitments may not be identified during the 10 CFR l
50.59 review for subsequent design changes.
Licensee engineers routinely checked the UFSAR for comitments and requirements imposed on the facility, but might not necessarily check LERs or responses to NOVs in which the licensee comitted to make a plant modificat',on.
for example, the licensee had comitted in LCR 00 07, as the result cf a reactor protection system actuation, to post signs on preamplifier panels cautioning personnel not to grind, weld, or cut in the vicinity of the panels.
The signs were subsequently installed. However, plant design documents, such as the panel drawing or the equipment manual, were not changed to include the signs in the plant configuration.
If any change were to be made to the panels, the engineer making the modification might not routinely check for commitments made in an LER or response to an NOV and discover the requirement for the signs.
During a field walkdown, the team observed that one of four preamplifier panels did not have a sign.
The licensee had no explanation for the missing sign, The licenses acknowledged the potential program weakness and Indicated it would study possible program changel.
The team noted that the safety significance of the missing sign was limited because three of the four signs were posted as comitted to by the licensee.
Generic Letter 09-1L ' Service Water Svitem Problemi Af fectino Saf_ety Related Eculoment" The control and implementation of comitments at Hope Creek in response to Generic Letter 89-13 were complete and comprehensive.
The licensee documented comitments to address Generic Letter 89-13 in letters of January 26, 1990, and December 10, 1992.
The actions included hardware modifications, procedure changes, and periodic tests.
The hardware modification packages were satisfactory and the components were confirmed to be installed in the plant.
The new and revised procedural were adecuate and clearly identified the comilmenti bein1 fulfilled, The perlette telli latisfied the comitmenti and identitled the a; tributes that were intended to meet the Generte Letter 09 13 (0mitments, The work order databile for reestvina talks included information linking the debt to the gentfif IllllF (and til0Elltid E0mitmtnll)
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Generic letter 88-14. " Instrument Air System Problems Affectino Safety-Related Eouiement" The team reviewed the licensee's response to the generic letter, the UFSAR change notice addressing Generic Letter 88 14 issues the latest rivision i
of the associated UTIAR sections, work orders for sys, tem testing, and 1
maintenance / surveillance schedules.
The team walked down accessible portions of the instrument air system (IAS) and primary containment instrument gas
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system (PClGS) to verify implementation of a design change referenced in the j
1he staff reviewed the licensee's method for tracking all the response.
i actions associated with its response in the action tracking system (ATS).
The licensee's comitments included changes in air quality testing, testing i
for component failure positions, and design changes following the testing.
All but one of the comitments had been implemented.
The final comitment j
scheduled for implementation a design change to several air dampers following the a!r system testing, was c,ontrolled by a design change package and was i
tracked in the ATS.
The licensee had also included in its ATS, as an item to l
be completed, a final review for completion of all comitments to meet the j
generic letter requirements.
l The team compared the current version of the UFSAR to the comitments made in i
response to the generic letter and the UFSAR change document issued as part of i
the generic letter actions.
The changes were consistent or were addressed in i
subsequent UFSAR change documents. As part of its system walkdown, the team verified the replacement of compressor motors that were installed to increase l
the capacity of the IAS.
t The team verified a comitment to change the frequency of a.rtain air system i
testing through the automated preventive maintenance and surveillance work i
order system.
The automated system correctly identified the new testing j
frequency.
The system also noted that the testing was associated with a comitment and referenced a comitment management number, the associated UFSAR section, and the licensee's response to Generic letter 8914.
These j
j associations would alert utility personnel, who tiight wish to change some j
aspect of the preventive maintenance testing, to possible ramifications.
The progress to completion for all of the Generic Letter 89-14 comitments was tracked in the ATS and none of the comitments had been changed since the j
licensee submitted its response to the generic letter.
1 l
NRC Dulletin 88 OL ' Power Oscillations at Boil,ts_ Water Reactors.' and Bulletin 88-07. Suoolement 1 In response to the bulletin and its supplement, the licenses comitted to take actions recomended in the bulletin wit) respect to procedures, o training, and review of apslicable instrumentation for adequacy. perator The team reviewed the adeQuary of ta procedural thingoli ThelicentesUDditedleven Optriting ind three reafter snaineering 0F0tedural With Information from the
- bulletin, The team reviewed all 10 procedures and determined that the changes made by the licenlee refletteo retomandationi from the bulletin and were
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adequalli i
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4 HUREG-07M.1.C.5. ' Procedures for Feedback of Ooeratina boerience to Plant Staff" The licensee's comitments with regard to the requirements of Item 1.C.5 are contained in the plant UFSAR.
The team reviewed these requirements, the licensee *s comitments, and the implementation of the comitments.
All comitments had been tracked and implemented.
The team reviewed the licensee's actions in response to a specific issue discussed in NRC Information Notice 9t=Hi "Intersfltem LOCA Qutside Containment ' to examine the expertencefeedbackprogram.litanie0's'mplementahtonofitsoperatino The re lab'llty and assessment organization had performed the initial review of the information notice, determined the need for further evaluation, and, after meeting with senior plant management, assigned actions to the probability risk assessment group and the training and operations departments.
The responsible departments evaluated the information notice and responded to the probability risk assessment group as required by the licensee's process. Changes to the training program included classroom and simulator training on intersystem LOCAs and were implemented.
The team determined that licensee personnel had reviewed the information notice in accordance with the licensee's program.
Confiouration Baseline Documentation (CBD) Proaram Each CBD for service water and related systems contained a section on applicable codes, standards, and regulatory documents, as well as a section on design basis.
Historical design change requirements were included so that the design could be traced from the original to the current design.
The open items list was part of the published CDD to that the nature and status of an item were readily available.
The licenses had evaluated open items in accordance with Procedure NC.0E-AP.ZZ-0018 Discrepancy Control," using discrepancy eva(Q)a, tion forms (DEFs). Revis lu Each DEF is reviewed for operability impact and also for classification as an incident report in accordance with Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0006(Q), " Incident Report / Reportable Event Program and Quality / Safety / Concerns Reporting System."
The licentes reviewed the incident reports for reportability assigned any documented entered com(e.g., in LERs) comitments a comitment managemen,t number, and itments in the ATS.
Therefore, comitments that resulted from C00s were captured in existing programs and tracked to closure.
In sumary, the team found that the CBD program was well structured and the implementing procedures were comprehensive so that comitments identified during the CBD process had a high assurance of being identified and incorporated into the licensee's comitment management program.
l i NOV 89-02 Control of Temocrary Jumoers i
The NRC had issued an NOV for inadequate contro j
operating staff.
The licensee had assigned a comitment management number to i
the corrective action (modtfying the troubleshooting procedure for the j
instrumentation and control department) to which it had comitted in its i
response to the NOY, and the comitment management i
j the ATS.
NOV and the associated comitment mansgament number remained in thei after it was revised several times, although the wording of the procedure j
modification had been changed.
i and control procedure, the licensee changed the
-i i
procedures and identified in the procedures the changes to the comitment j
management number assochted with the NOV.
NOV 89-80 Eloht Eramoles of Failure To Follow Procedures i
The NOV from the NRC's maintenance team inspection included eight divers examples of licensee work activities during which site procedures had not be followed.
The audit team reviewed each corrective action in the licens
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response to the NOV through the AT5 to final implementation in procedur9 changes, plant changes, or work practices.
i comitments made in response to the NOV.The licensee had not as i
It correlated in its All one corrective action (procedure changes to improve administrative control of the temporary plugging of floor drains) to an existing comitment management number issued for an earlier INPO significant operating event report (50E the same topic.
The audit team reviewed the file for the INPO $0ER comit and found that it contained a cross-reference to the NOV.
Ilowever, the If tensee informed the team of one com since it was implemented.
The wording in Procedure NC.HA-AP.ZZ-0009,
- Work Control Process,* for requiring an equipment tag to be hung at a component associated with a work request had been changed to satisfy one of the HOV ttoms and had since been changed back to its original wording.
tag had originally been changed to 'should* hsag a tag because of the N0Y*$ hall subsequent revisions of the procedure, the wording had been changed back to In
'shall* hang a tag.
The licensee's program, described in Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0035, ' Nuclear Licensing and Reporting,' required notification of the NRC when a comitment made in response to en NOV is changed.
Althou thecaseofProcedureNC.NAAP.!Z0009(above)ghnonotificationwasmadein was of Ilmited significance.
, the team found that the change E
i 4
j l.11tMte EVenillD@
i The team reviewed the comitments associated with corrective actions cont in the following nine LERst I
87-23 Technical Specification Violation - Emergency Olesel Generators B and C Starting Air Pressure Low Due to Technical specification 2
Inconlittency i
87-25 Non-Conservative Liquid Effluent sampling Frequency Due to i
Inconsistency Between Specification Requirements and l
Procedural Requirements i
87-46 Primary Containment Isolation System Swapping Reactor Protection System Bus (PCIS) Initiation When Power Due to Lack of Indication - Design Deficiency 80 11 Olscovery of Non $sismically Qualified Instrumentation Tubing Installation on IE Instrument Racks - Personnel Error 80-16 Unanticipated PCIS Actuation j
Homentary Power Losses - Equipment Failureand CREF Initiation Cause 88-21 i
Discovery of Cracking in an FRYS Recirculation Fan Ductwork With a Second FRV5 Fan Ou; of Service - Design Deficiency 4
i 88-28 Both CREF Units Inoperable - Equipment Failure 1
09 17 Reactor Scram caused by failure of soldered scram Valve Pilot Airline - Installation Deficiency 09 21 Deviation from Electrical leparation Criteria Detween franstont i
Monitoring Circuitry and Reactor Protection System Panel Circuitry Due to Inadequate Review of Design Change Package in 1986 The team found no significant deficiencies with respect to meeting and i
maintaining the comitments in the sampled LERs.
In the case of one LER, i
some weaknesses were noted.
In LCR 8917. the licenses comitted to complete certain testing before startup from the then current refueling outage, but i
noted after startup that not all testing had been done.
The testing was i
completed during the next refueling outage.
The cause of the mistake was that the LER comitments originated as recomendations in the first Hope Creek significant event response team report and, as such, were not entered into the i
j ATS.
The procedures were amended so that items in subsequent SERT reports j
were cntered into the AT5 and tracked.
Licensee practice and intent are not to notify the NRC formally of all changes to comitmentslanEs would lead to 4 Fev' led L[f lubmittil but rather to alleil each thante individually, Changes in intent or lubi i
or schedule changes might only be reported by phone to the residenti but min 0F'chin l
inspectors, j
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i POLICY ISSUE (Information)
December 20, 1995 SECY-95-300 i
FOR:
The Comissioners FROM:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE'S GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, " GUIDELINE FOR MANAGING NRC COMMITMENTS" PURPOSE:
To inform the Comission of the staff's activities with regard to docketed comitments made by licensees and acceptable methods for changing these i
comitments.
To inform the Comission that the staff intends to notify the Nuclear Energy
}
Institute (NEI) by letter that its guidance document " Guideline for Managing NRC Commitments" is ae *-aotable guide for licensees to follow for managing and changing their comitments to the NRC.
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SUMMARY
In this paper, the staff describes its activities to implement a recommendation that was made by the Regulatory Review Group (RRG), a group of senior NRC staff, in SECY-94-003, " Plan for Implementing Regulatory Review Contacts:
NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN 5 Eugene V. Imbro, NRR WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS PAPER 415-2969 Eric J. Leeds 415-8505 4
&(7h5 j 9.
p,
i i
t i
The Comissioners 2
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1 i
Group Recomendations."
In SECY-94-003, the staff informed the Comission that to implement the RRG recomendation it would either endorse the industry j
guideline or develop and promulgate staff guidance on what constitutes a comitment and acceptable methods for changing commitments.
In this paper, the staff discusses its interaction with NEI regarding the development of the I
NEI guidance document, which defines the term "conmitment" and creates a i
process for changing comitments, and the staff's evaluation of the adequacy j
of the guidance document through implementation of the guidance in a pilot program. On the basis of its review, the staff intends to notify NEI by
}
letter that its guidance document " Guideline for Managing NRC Comitments" is 1
an acceptable guide for licensees to follow for managing and changing i
4 comitments to the NRC.
In accordance with the RRG recommendations, the need i
for NRC rulemaking to define a commitment change process will be evaluated j
after experience has been gained using the NEI guidance.
BACKGROUND:
l In the original Statements cf Consideration for 10 CFR Part 54, " Requirements i
for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," Federal Reaister Vol. 56, No. 240, Pg. 64943, dated December 13, 1991, the Commission explained in some detail the basis for its belief that the current regulatory process provides an acceptable level of safety. Among other things, the Comission described a process whereby licensee-initiated changes to any particular plant's licensing basis are subject to the Commission's formal regulatory j
controls. This process ensures that a documented basis for licensee-initiated changes in the licensing basis exists and that Conmission review and approval i
is obtained before implementation if the changes to the licensing basis raise an unreviewed safety question or involve changes to the technical j
specifications.
i In SECY-92-314, " Current Licensing Basis for Operating Plants," dated
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September 10, 1992, the staff responded to the Commission's request to provide i
information and recomendations concerning compilation of the current i
licensing basis for operating reactors and current industry practices for i
updating the final safety analysis report (FSAR). In conducting the j
activities necessary to respond to the Comission, the staff noted that some licensee commitments are not contained in the plant's FSAR and therefore are i
not centro 11ed by a defined regulatory process such as 10 CFR 50.59. As a l
result of the findings described in SECY-92-314, the staff proposed a series of actions to further examine the issues. The staff summarized these actions in SECY-94-066, " Evaluation of Issues Discussed in SECY-92-314, ' Current Licensing' Basis for Operating Plants,'" which is discussed below.
On January 4,1993, the EDO established the RRG to identify those areas in which increased flexibility in the regulatory process could be made available i
to licensees without adversely affecting the level of safety at operating
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plants.
In SECY-94-003, " Flan for Implementing Regulatory Review Group i
Recommendations," the staff informed the Commission of its plan to implement j
recommendations made by the RRG. One of the areas identified in SECY-94-003 i
that would substantially reduce unnecessary regulatory burden was the i
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development of guidance for use by licensees to control docketed comitments that are not contained in the FSAR. Two options were presented to the Commission in SECY-94-003 to complete this RRG item: (1) to develop and promulgate staff guidance on what constitutes a "comitment" and the types of controls to be placed on changing commitments or (2) to endorse a guideline developed by the industry. As described below, NEI volunteered to develop a guideline for managing comitments.
In SECY-94-066, the staff submitted to the Commission the results of its further evaluation of the issues identified in SECY-92-314. With respect to the issue of licensee comitments, the staff found that licensees had developed their own programs and processes that effectively managed commitments made to the NRC and controlled changes to these comitments.
In its evaluation, the staff found that many licensees and NRC staff members did not have a clear understanding of when commitments can be changed without NRC interaction. This circumstance led most licensees to act conservatively, interacting with NRC staff and reporting changes to commitments regardless of safety significance. This type of action resulted in an inefficient exper,diture of both licensee and NRC resources. Therefore, in SECY-94-066, the staff referred to the recommendation of the RRG in SECY-94-003 to develop guidance, either by the staff or by the nuclear industry, on what constitutes a commitment and the types of controls to be placed on commitments.
DISCUS $!0N:
Reaulatory Sianificance of Commitments Regulatory comitments are specific actions that have been voluntarily agreed to or that have been offered by a licensee in docketed correspondence to the inmmi uinn on a voluntary basis. Unlike regulatorv requirements contained in regulations, licenses, and orders, regulatory commitments are not legally binding. However, the regulatory process relies on comitments in many instances to resolve safety-significant issues and the NRC expects licensees to honor in good faith those comitments that have a safety or regulatory purpose. Nany regulatory commitments are not contained in the FSAR but in other docketed correspondence such as licensee event reports (LERs), responses to notices of violation (NOVs), and responses to generic letters. Those commitments not contained in the FSAR are not controlled by a defined regulatory process such as 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, licensees have the abilitytochangedocketepcommitmentsnotcontainedintheFSARwithout informing the Commission.
The NRC staff has the ability to issue an Licensees are required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.9, to notify the Commission of information identified by th' licensees having, for the e
regulated activity, a significant implication for public health and safety.
This regulation could be read as requiring licensees to provide after the fact notification to the NRC of changes to commitments that the licensee evaluates as significant to safety. The NEI guideline appears to comporc with this requirement in that the guidance recomends NRC notification whenever a
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enforcement order if it learns of the change and determines that the
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licensee's failure to implement a commitment has the potential to adversely affect reactor safety. The staff also uses the administrative enforcement tool of notices of deviation if a commitment is not followed. However, j
consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, a commitment is not an appropriate j
means to resolve an issue that has a high safety or regulatory significance such that adeaunte orotection of the public health and safsty is in question.
Such significant' matters are to be included either as conditions of the license or as a part of the plant's technical specifications so that they j
cannot be changed without the prior approval of the staff.
Reduction of Unnecessary Reaulatory Burden Throuah the Develooment of a l
Structured Commitment Chanae Process Although licensees have the ability to change regulatory commitments not contained in the FSAR without informing the Commission, based on an audit of l
seven licensees' programs conducted by the staff and documented in SECY ;
065, the staff found no indication that this activity had occurred.
i Typically, licensees are reluctant to modify or delete a regulatory commitment j
without first consulting the regional or headquarters' staff.
- Further, licensees occasionally choose to retain regulatory commitments that have been shown to be inefficient or ineffective rather than necessary to revisit the issue with the NRC staff., expend the resources As recognized by the RRG in SECY-94-003 and again by the staff in SECY-94-066, the lack of a oefined commitment change process has resulted in an unnecessary regulatory burden on i
the licensees. Staff resources have also been affected because licensees tend j.
to discuss all changes to regulatory consitments with the staff, even those changes of negligible regulatory significance.
4 The guidance developed by NEI on managing commitments provides a structured process, acceptable to the staff, that licensees can use on a voluntary basis.
1 This guidance describes a process that can be used by licensees to modify or delete commitments and defines the circumstances in which interaction with the i
staff is appropriate.
The use of this guidance will reduce unnecessary interactions between the licensee and the staff and provide licensees a level j,
of confidence and the flexibility to modify or delete commitments that have been shown to be inefficient or ineffective without unnecessary staff involvement.
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Although the use of the NEI guideline by licensees is not mandatory, i
j indicaticns are that many licensees intend to incorporate the NEI guideline in their procedures when NRC formally indicates its acceptance of the process.
j Therefore, the NEI guideline should be effective in achieving the RRG goal of licensee identifies a change that is significant to safety.
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i The staff's acceptance of the NEI guideline should clarify that i
licensees have the ability and authority to modify those commitments not 4
contained in the FSAR without first consulting with the staff.
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reducing unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees. However, it should be emphasized that there is no requirement for licensees to adopt this approach.
If adopted, the failure of any licensee to properly implement the approach is not subject to enforcement action. However, an administrative action, such as a notice of deviation, may be warranted. Although licensees implementing the NEI guideline will have less frequent contact with the NRC regarding modification or. deletion of commitments, the staff has not diminished its reliance on comitments or their importance in the regulatory process.
Consequently, the staff expects that licensees will continue to appropriately control commitments.
Develooment of the Nuclear Enerav Institute Guidance Document During the staff's interaction with industry to set the priorities for implementing the RRG recommendations, the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), now known as NEI, volunteered to develop an industry guidance document on managing licensee commitments to the NRC.
From March through August 1994, the staff held a series of five public meetings with NEI to obtain information and hear industry views regarding the development of the industry guidance document that would define the term "comitment" and create a process for changing commitments. As part of the opening dialogue, both NRC i
and NEI representatives agreed that unnecessary regulatory burden could be reduced by providing guidance to the industry and the NRC staff on the issue of commitment management. NEI estimated that licensees currently track and j
maintain records of between 5,000 to 10,000 commitments to the NRC for each plant. Both the NRC and NEI agreed that a significant number of these comitments were made in excess of regulatory requirements and could be relaxed without affecting plant safety.
Luring the course of the public meetings, NEI developed the attached draft guidance document (Attachment 1). This guidance document provides the following definitions to help licensees understand the regulatory significance of and distinction between an obligation and a regulatory commitment:
Oblication means any condition or action that is a legally binding requirement imposed on licensees through applicable rules, regulations, orders, and licenses (including technical specifications and license conditions).
Reculatory Comitment means an explicit statement to take a specific action agreed to or volunteered by a licensee that has been submitted on the docket to the Commission in writing.
The NEI guidance document explains that licensees frequently communicate their intent to take certain actions (regulatory commitments) to restore compliance with obligations, to define a certain method for meeting obligstions, to correct or preclude the recurrence of adverse conditions, or to make improvements to the plant or plant processes.
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The NEI guideline provides a process flowchart for licensees to follow when j.
considering a change to a commitment. The NEI decision criteria includes five l
steps that categorize commitments according to progressively decreasing i
regulatory and safety significance. The first step captures commitments that are already subject to codified processes, such as 10 CFR 50.59 or 10 CFR i
50.54 (a), (p), and (q). The second step asks the licensee to evaluate the safety significance of the change to the commitment to verify that the change would not negatively impact the ability of a structure, system or component (SSC) to perform its intended safety function. An assessment of the commitment is made using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92, if the evaluation determines that the commitment change could impact the ability of an SSC to perform its safety function. Changes to commitments that upon evaluation i
would result in a significant hazard condition, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, j
would not be implemented without prior discussion with NRC and review and j
approval, as appropriate. The third step applies to commitments that were
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made to achieve and maintain compliance with NRC requirements.
If the changed commitment does not preserve compliance, the licensee would have the option of j
not proceeding with the change, or formally requesting regulatory relief (e.g., license amendment, exemption). The fourth step involves commitments i
(exclusive of those made in confirmatory action letters) in which the NRC 1
either reviewed and approved the action volunteered or agreed to by the licensee or relied upon the commitment in lieu of taking other action, such as issuing an order. Commitments included in this step are specific statements j
in NRC safety evaluation reports; commitments made in response to bulletins, generic letters, and 10 CFR 5.0.54(f) letters; and commitments identified as t
long-term corrective actions in response to an NOV.
If the original commitments have not yet been implemented, the licensee can proceed with the change. However, the NRC would be notified as soon as practicable after the i
change is approved by licensee management, but before any committed completion i
d at e:.
The HEl process does not apply to commitments made in confirmatory action letters as these commitments generally have a high regulatory significance.
Confirmatory action letters, pursuant to Section 182 of the l
Atomic Energy Act, normally specify that licensees must notify the NRC if they do not meet a commitment contained in a confirmatory action letter (see SECY i
92-347, October 14,1992). The last step in the NEI' guidance involves i
commitments made to minimize recurrence of adverse conditions, such as those described in some LERs.
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Each step of the process gives licensees guidance on changing the applicable commitment and en recommended interaction with the NRC.
Depending on the l
safety or regulatory significance, commitments that satisfy one of the five j
NEI decision steps either need prior NRC approval for the change or may be changed without prior interaction with the staff.
Commitments that satisfy i
none of the five decision criteria are considered by the staff to have negligible regulatory or safety significance.
In addition, for commitments that satisfy ene of the five NEI decision criteria not involving a codified 4
1 regulatory prc:ess, the NEI guidance specifies periodic staff notification, either annually or along with the FSAR updates as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e).
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i The NEI guideline further specifies that comitments dispositioned through the NEI process that satisfy none of the NEI decision criteria do not need to be included in the licensee's periodic report because their regulatory and safety significance is negligible. However, the guideline specifies that these i
commitments and the justification for their modification or deletion be retained as a plant record for the life of the facility.
l Ccnduct of the' Pilot Proaram In August 1994, NEI completed its initial draft of the guidance document and, at the request of the staff, agreed to initiate a pilot program to test the implementation of the guidance at licensee facilities. On August 25, 1994, j
the NRC staff held a public meeting with NEI members and representatives of i
the six licensees who volunteered to participate in the pilot program and described NRC's expectations for the' pilot program.
Specifically, the staff indicated that it planned to visit each plant participating in the program to review implementation of the guidance document and to determine those areas that required additional clarification or improvement, those areas that required interpretation by the licensee, or those areas not adequately discussed in the guidance. The staff also stressed the importance of the l
licensees' use of the draft NEI guidance document on commitments from a i
variety of sources to test the validity of the entire process flowchart. The staff requested that licensees participating in the pilot program include commitments made in response to NRC generic letters, bulletins, enforcement j
actions, LERs, and other sources.
l From February through April 1995, the staff reviewed the pilot program at four i
of the six pilot plants, one in each region. The staff did not conduct audits at all six pilot plants because the audits conducted at the four sites produced similar results and identified relatively few areas in which the guidance document needed to be improved. The onsite, 3-day reviews were -
conducted by audit teams consisting of representatives from the appropriate region and members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
In addition, members of the Office of Enforcement participated in two of the audits. The
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audit teams reviewed the licensees' administrative controls implementing the NEI guidance document and reviewed between 50 and 100 commitments processed by i
each licensee using the NEI guidance.
l The audit teams substantially agreed with the licensees' assessment of commitments based on the NEI guidance. However, the audit teams and the participating licensees identified several. areas in the NEI guidance document that could be clarified or otherwise improved. The staff discussed these i
areas for improvement with the licensees during the audit tear exit meetings i
at each site and subsequently discussed these areas with NEI. All the i
licensees involved were positive about the value of the NEI guidance document and indicated that it offered a logical, coherent method for evaluating i
commitments for possible modification or elimination. The licensees also indicated that evaluating and changing commitments were resource-intensive I
activities. The licensees believed that the vast majority of commitments made i
to the NRC in the past were improvements in the way they conducted business r
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and they had no intention of changing these comitments. Three of the four licensees indicated that they did not plan to review all their comitments to a
the NRC against the NEI guidance. Rather, these licensees indicated that they intended to incorporate the NEI guidance in their procedures and use the NEI guidance for changing commitments that pose an unnecessary regulatory burden, 4
comitments that are no longer applicable because of facility modifications, or commitments that are not effective. One licensee indicated that it would j
review all its 'ctive commitments to the NRC against the NEI guidance.
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On June 7,1995, the NRC staff met publicly with representatives from NEI to discuss ~ the staff's oversight evaluation of the industry's pilot program to implement the NEI draft guidance document. The staff provided comments to NEI on the guidance document, specifically on the processing of commitments by licensees in response to NRC NOVs and commitments made in response to NRC demands for information under 10 CFR 2.204. NEI agreed to incorporate the j
staff's comments into its guidance document.
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[onsiderations With Respect to the License Renewal Process l
In the original Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR Part 54, " Requirements i
for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," Federal Reaister l
Vol. 56, No. 240, Pg. 64943, dated December 13, 1991, the Commission stated j
that a formal license renewal review against current safety requirements would not add significantly to safety because regulatory controls ensure that a i
documented basis for licensee-initiated changes in the licensing basis exists and that review and approval by the Commission is obtained before 1
implementation if changes to the licensing basis raise an unreviewed safety j
question or involve changes to the technical specifications. However, in the j
discussion of the existing regulatory controls with respect to licensee-j in1tlatec changes to the licensing basis, the Statements of Consideration s
emphasized the formal regulatory controls applying to licensee-initiated c
1 changes to comitments contained in the FSAR. The Statements of Consideration i
did not address the existing informal process, described earlier, that has been relied on by the staff to control licensee-initiated changes to that part j
of the licensing basis residing on the docket but not contained in the FSAR.
1 One of the provisions of the NEI guideline is that the licensee may change comitments that do not satisfy any of the five decision criteria without i
reporting the change in its periodic report to the NRC staff. The staff considered this provision in the context of license renewal because it relates i
to one of the principal bases for the staff's conclusion that a formal license renewal review against the full range of current safety requirements would not j
add significantly to safety. A basis for this conclusion, discussed in the Statements of Consideration, is that regulatory controls ensure that a i
documented basis exists for licensee-initiated changes to the plant's j
licensing basis.
It is the staff's view that although commitments that do not j
satisfy any of the five NEI decision criteria are part of the licensing basis i
for the facility, they are of negligible regulatory significance.
Nonetheless, a situation is created whereby a docket may continue to contain commitments that have been changed or are no longer being implemented by the
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licensee. As previously stated, this status is permissible under the current regulatory process, which provides no formal control for commitments not contained in the FSAR. Currently, these commitments can be changed by licensees without informing the NRC or documenting the basis for the change, although in practice, experience has shown that licensees typically contact the staff before changing commitments.
The NEI guideline will enhance and provide structure to the current regulatory process, to the extent that it is voluntarily implemented by licensees, by specifying that licensees keep a permanent record of changes to commitments and the justification for these changes. The disposition of these commitments will be available for the staff's review during the, life of the facility and will be reviewed periodically, on a sampling basis, during the inspection process.
Therefore, consistent with the Statements of Consideration, a documented basis for these licensee-initiated changes to the licensing basis will exist, but not on the docket.
In the staff's view, this practice is not The Statements of Consideration for the license renewal rule overstated new.
the formality of control over licensee-initiated changes to commitments.
In fact, as previcusly stated, docketed commitments not contained in the FSAR can be chan change.ged by licensees without informing NRC or documenting the basis for the The NEI guideline greatly improves this situation.
Therefore, the NEI guideline is consistent with the essential premise of the license renewal rule and provides greater assurance that a documented basis for changes to commitments will exist for those licensees who adopt and implement the NEI guideline.
Requiring licensees to report changes to these comitments that have negligible regulatory significance would add regulatory burden without providing a commensurate increase in safety.
Considerations with Respect to Staff Activities Related to 10 CFR 50.59 The staff has committea to the Commission that within 120 days an action plan will be finalized regarding the implementation of 10 CFR 50.59.
One of the 3
long-term tasks in this plan will be to consider the need for additional regulatory guidance or clarification regarding the scope of applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 and the threshold for determining whether a proposed change, test, or experiment will result in an unroviewed safety question (USQ). The staff has also committed to the Commission that before any 10 CFR 50.59 guidance is finalized it will be issued to the public for comment. The staff anticipates that the action plan will be completed over the next 18 to 36 months and may result in changes in the staff's implementation of 10 CFR 50.59. The NEI commitment management guideline incorporates, builds upon and is consistent with the existing 10 CFR 50.59 process. Therefore, any changes to the 10 CFR 50.59 process that result from the staff's completion of the action plan may effect licensee's future use of the NEI guideline. However, in the opinion of the staff, the use of the NEI guideline will strengthen the existing regulatory process by providing a structured process in an area that previously lacked formality and consistency.
The use of the NEI guideline may need to be reevaluated depending on the outcome of the 10 CFR 50.59 action plan.
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The Cox. W ioners 10 i
Future Staff Activities in Manaaino Commitments i
The staff intends to notify NEI by letter (Attachment 2) that NEI's guidance j
document (Attachment 1) is an acceptable guide for licensees to follow for managing and changing their commitments to the NRC. The staff plans to conduct training sessions on managing comitments at resident inspector 1
counterpart meetings in each region and for project managers, inspectors, and other appropriate technical personnel based at Headquarters. This training wil' include a discussion of the regulatory significance of commitments and obligations and the use of commitments and obligations in the regulatory process. After the staff and licensees have gained experience using the NEI guideline, the staff will assess the need to hold workshops on the guidance.
J The staff concluded (in SECY-94-066) on the basis of audits of seven j
licensees, that licensees had implemented processes and procedures that were j
effective in controlling commitments made to the NRC. The staff will monitor the licensess' implementation of the NEI guideline or their alternative commitment control processes through periodic inspections to verify on an i
i ongoing basis that commitments are being appropriately controlled. However, i
if the inspection process shows that a significant number of licensees do not j
implement the NEI guidance in full, or have not adopted some equivalent level of control and documentation of changes to their commitments, the staff will reassess the need to promulgaite staff guidance or initiate rulemaking, as stated in SECY-94-003. This reassessment will be initiated after the commitment control process has been inspected at all facilities.
It is anticipated that the first round of inspection of all facilities will be completed in approximately 2 years. The staff is modifying its current inspection procedures to include examination, on a sampling basis, of commitments modified or deleted by licensees. The staff will also modify the enforcement manuai to c1:rify the use of notices of deviation in consideration of the NEI guidelines.
COORDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection to its content.
. 11 or E ecutive trector for Operations Attachments: 1.
NEI document " Guideline for Managing NRC Commitments 2.
Letter to NEI re " Guideline for Managing NRC Commitments"
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11 Disintouilvan Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG OPA OCA VF.S REGIONAL OFFICES EDO SECY l
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