Proposed Tech Specs Submitting TS Change Request 208 to Establish New TS Limiting Condition for Operation Applicable to Control Complex Habitability Envelope Allowing Breaches to ExistML20117G661 |
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Crystal River ![Duke Energy icon.png](/w/images/7/75/Duke_Energy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
08/28/1996 |
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From: |
FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML20117G655 |
List: |
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References |
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NUDOCS 9609050276 |
Download: ML20117G661 (9) |
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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20212C0961999-09-16016 September 1999 Proposed ITS & Bases Changes Strikeout & Shadowed Text & Revision Bar Format,Increasing Licensed Capacity for Spent Fuel Assembly Storage in SFP & Revising Configuration for Storage of Fresh Fuel ML20211L1011999-09-0202 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Once Though SG Tube Surveillance Program,Alternate Repair Criteria (ARC) for Axial Tube End Crack (Tec) Indications ML20209D2971999-07-0808 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing ITS for CREVS & VFTP & Correcting Typo in ITS Section 5.6.2.12 ML20195B8091999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising ITS Bases That Will Update NRC Copies of ITS ML20195B7081999-05-17017 May 1999 Proposed ITS Section 3.3.8, EDG Lops, SR 3.3.8.1,revising Note for Surveillance & Deleting Note for Frequency ML20206S7691999-05-12012 May 1999 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Pages 3.4-21 Through 3.4-21D ML20206N1401999-05-10010 May 1999 Proposed ITS Administrative Controls Section 5.8, High Radiation Area ML20206M0961999-05-0707 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Wording for SR 3.5.2.5 to Be More Consistent with NUREG-1430,Rev 1 & Clarifying Process of Valve Position Verification ML20206H6541999-05-0505 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Proposing Alternate Repair Criteria for Axial Tube End crack-like Indications in Upper & Lower Tubesheets of CR-3 OTSGs ML20204D9211999-03-18018 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re OTSG Tubes Surveillance Program,Tube Repair Roll Process ML20202E6551999-01-27027 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re OTSG Tubes Surveillance Program,Insp Interval Extension ML20196D6761998-11-30030 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs LCO 3.9.3,allowing Both Doors in Personnel Air Locks & Single Door in Oeh to Be Open During Refueling Operations ML20195K4551998-11-24024 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Installing diesel-driven EFW Pump to Remove Interim ITS & Provide Resolution to EDG Capacity Limitations ML20195K0031998-11-23023 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re LAR Number 241,rev 0 for High Pressure Injection Sys Mods ML20195H6581998-11-17017 November 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs (Its),Revising 5.7.2 by Changing Type of Structural Integrity Assessment Required from Probabilistic to Deterministic ML20155F4501998-10-30030 October 1998 Proposed Revised Improved Tech Specs (ITS) Deleting Note Re Number of Required Channels for Degrees of Subcooling Function & Subdividing Core Exit Temp Function Into Two New Functions in ITS Table 3.3.17-1 ML20155F4021998-10-30030 October 1998 Proposed Revised Improved Tech Specs (ITS) Section 5.6.2.19, ITS Section 3.4.11,Bases 3.4.11 & 3.4.3 Re PTLR & LTOP Limits ML20155F9551998-10-30030 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages to LAR 245,changing Methodology for Sf Pool B Criticality Analysis ML20154P3101998-10-16016 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Resolving USQ by Leaving Valves DHV-34 & DHV-35 Normally Closed ML20154C1581998-09-30030 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re LAR 238,to Correct RCS Leakage Detection Capability of RB Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitor Described in ITS Bases & FSAR ML20238F4761998-08-31031 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Proposing New Repair Process for Plant OTSGs ML20151X0431998-08-31031 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding Three Addl Reg Guide 1.97 Type a Category 1 Pami Variables & One Type B Category 1 Pami Variable to ITS Table 3.3.17-1, Pami ML20236V8831998-07-30030 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re CREVS & Ventilation Filter Test Program ML20236E9851998-06-30030 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Exigent License Amend Request 228,rev 1 for Once Through SG Tube Surveillance Program ML20249B2671998-06-18018 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re one-time Exigent License Amend to Allow Operation W/Number of Indications Previously Identified as Tube End Anomalies & Multiple Tube End Anomalies in OTSG Tubes ML20247P8931998-05-22022 May 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs 5.2.1 Re Onsite & Offsite Organizations ML20217P5181998-04-28028 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Flywheel Insp ML20217G0121998-04-23023 April 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Section 5.7.2, Special Repts, Clarifying That Complete Results of OTSG Tube Inservice Insp Shall Be Submitted to NRC 90 Days After Startup (Breaker Closure) ML20217C6341998-03-20020 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Editorial Changes to Improved TS Saftey Limits & Administrative Controls to Replace Titles of Senior Vice President,Nuclear Operations & Vice President, Nuclear Production W/Position of Chief Nuclear Officer ML20217C4931998-03-20020 March 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs 5.6.2.8.c Re Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Flywheel Insp ML20203D1611998-02-20020 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Revs to CR-3 Improved TS Bases That Update NRC Copies of Improved TS ML20198S9151998-01-22022 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Consisting of Rev 1 to TS Change Request 210,correction of Typo & Addition of Footnotes ML20202G8511997-12-0505 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Establishing New Improved TSs (ITS) Surveillance Requirement for Performance of Periodic Integrated Leak Test of Cche Boundary & Revising ITS Bases 3.7.12 to Define Operability of Cche ML20202G7991997-12-0505 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Description of Starting Logic for RB Recirculation Sys Fan Coolers to Ensure That Only One RB Fan Starts on Es RB Isolation & Cooling Signal ML20199G8461997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Involving Additional Restrictions, Editorial Clarifications & Typos ML20212F2741997-10-31031 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Decay Heat Removal Requirements in Mode 4 ML20212C9801997-10-25025 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Power Operated Relief Valve Lift Setpoint TS Limit That Has Been Revised for Instrument Uncertainty ML20217F5231997-10-0404 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Addressing Revision to Description of Electrical Controls for Operating Reactor Building (RB) Recirculation Sys fan/cooler,AHF-IC,as Discussed in FSAR & Improved TS ML20217D2741997-10-0101 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding Methodology to Monitor first-span Intergranular Attack (Iga) Indications & Disposition Growth During Future B OTSG Eddy Current Exams ML20210T9771997-09-12012 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Replacement Pages Re New Improved TS 3.4.11 Re Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys ML20216F8481997-09-0909 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Analysis Rev for Makeup Sys Letdown Line Failure Accident as Discussed in FSAR ML20217Q2121997-08-26026 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Design Basis of EDG Air Handling Sys ML20217N2501997-08-20020 August 1997 Proposed Improved Tech Specs 5.6.2.10 Re Tube Surveillance ML20210K8921997-08-16016 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 3.8.1.3,requesting one-time Outage on Each EDG to Perform Necessary Mod & Maint ML20151L7541997-08-0404 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Frequency of EDG Surveillances During Period of Time CR-3 EDGs Are Being Modified ML20196J1431997-07-29029 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding EDG Kilowatt Indication to post- Accident Monitoring Instrumentation to Support CR-3 Restart Issue of EDG Load Mgt ML20196H0281997-07-18018 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Changes Establishing Requirements for Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Sys ML20148K7811997-06-14014 June 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Efw,Hpi,Emergency Feedwater Initiation & Control Sys ML20138H8781997-05-0101 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing Prescriptive Requirements of 10CFR50,App J,Option a w/performance-based Approach to Leakage Testing Contained in 10CFR50,App J,Option B ML20137X5361997-04-18018 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Revs to CR-3 Improved TS Bases That Update NRC Copies of Improved TS 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20212C1121999-09-16016 September 1999 Criticality Safety Analysis of W Spent Fuel Storage Racks in Pool B of Crystal River Unit 3 ML20212C0961999-09-16016 September 1999 Proposed ITS & Bases Changes Strikeout & Shadowed Text & Revision Bar Format,Increasing Licensed Capacity for Spent Fuel Assembly Storage in SFP & Revising Configuration for Storage of Fresh Fuel ML20211L1011999-09-0202 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Once Though SG Tube Surveillance Program,Alternate Repair Criteria (ARC) for Axial Tube End Crack (Tec) Indications ML20212C0991999-08-31031 August 1999 Criticality Safety Analysis of Crystal River Unit 3 Pool a for Storage of 5% Enriched Mark B-11 Fuel in Checkerboard Arrangement with Water Holes ML20209D2971999-07-0808 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing ITS for CREVS & VFTP & Correcting Typo in ITS Section 5.6.2.12 ML20195B8091999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising ITS Bases That Will Update NRC Copies of ITS ML20195B7081999-05-17017 May 1999 Proposed ITS Section 3.3.8, EDG Lops, SR 3.3.8.1,revising Note for Surveillance & Deleting Note for Frequency ML20206S7691999-05-12012 May 1999 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Pages 3.4-21 Through 3.4-21D ML20206N1401999-05-10010 May 1999 Proposed ITS Administrative Controls Section 5.8, High Radiation Area ML20206M0961999-05-0707 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Wording for SR 3.5.2.5 to Be More Consistent with NUREG-1430,Rev 1 & Clarifying Process of Valve Position Verification ML20206H6541999-05-0505 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Proposing Alternate Repair Criteria for Axial Tube End crack-like Indications in Upper & Lower Tubesheets of CR-3 OTSGs ML20204D9211999-03-18018 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re OTSG Tubes Surveillance Program,Tube Repair Roll Process ML20205A7651999-03-18018 March 1999 Rev 29 to AR-305, Es E Annunciator Response ML20205A7961999-03-15015 March 1999 Rev 22 to AR-301, ESA Annunciator Response ML20205A8051999-03-15015 March 1999 Rev 33 to AR-303, ESC Annunciator Response ML20205A8211999-03-15015 March 1999 Rev 35 to AR-403, PSA H Annunciator Response ML20205A3441999-03-12012 March 1999 Rev 25 to AR-402, PSA G Annunciator Response ML20204D5781999-03-0909 March 1999 Rev 10 to AP-513, Toxic Gas ML20204D5821999-03-0808 March 1999 Rev 22 to AR-603, Tgf O Annunciator Response ML20207H7741999-03-0303 March 1999 Rev 15 to AR-602, Tgf N Annunciator Response ML20207J6591999-03-0202 March 1999 Rev 18 to AR-504, ICS L Annunciator Response ML20207J6461999-03-0202 March 1999 Rev 21 to AR-301, ESA Annunciator Response ML20206S7561999-02-28028 February 1999 Rev 2 to Pressure/Temp Limits Rept, Dtd Feb 1999 ML20203C7461999-02-0303 February 1999 Rev 2 to AR-801, FSA Annunciator Response ML20202E6551999-01-27027 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re OTSG Tubes Surveillance Program,Insp Interval Extension ML20202B1411999-01-22022 January 1999 Rev 22 to AR-401, PSA F Annunciator Response ML20199G5201999-01-15015 January 1999 Rev 11 to AP-961, Earthquake ML20199G5581999-01-12012 January 1999 Rev 4 to AP-404, Loss of Decay Heat Removal ML20199G5691999-01-12012 January 1999 Rev 4 to AP-604, Waterbox Tube Failure ML20198T2411999-01-0606 January 1999 Rev 19 to AR-701, Ssf P Annunciator Response ML20196G6771998-12-0101 December 1998 Rev 17 to Annunciator Response AR-702, Ssf Q Annunciator Response ML20196D6761998-11-30030 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs LCO 3.9.3,allowing Both Doors in Personnel Air Locks & Single Door in Oeh to Be Open During Refueling Operations ML20196G5851998-11-25025 November 1998 Rev 32 to AR-303, ESC Annunciator Response ML20196G3371998-11-25025 November 1998 Reissued Rev 15 to AR-702, Ssf Q Annunciator Response ML20195K4551998-11-24024 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Installing diesel-driven EFW Pump to Remove Interim ITS & Provide Resolution to EDG Capacity Limitations ML20196F6691998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 11 to AP-330, Loss of Nuclear Svc Cooling ML20195K0031998-11-23023 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re LAR Number 241,rev 0 for High Pressure Injection Sys Mods ML20196F7721998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 3 to EOP-12, Station Blackout ML20196F7031998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 3 to AP-404, Loss of Decay Heat Removal ML20196F7541998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 7 to EOP-08, LOCA Cooldown ML20196F7461998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 6 to EOP-07, Inadequate Core Cooling ML20196F7241998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 2 to AP-510, Rapid Power Reduction ML20196F7161998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 9 to AP-470, Loss of Instrument Air ML20196F8711998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 28 to AR-305, Es E Annunciator Response ML20196F9451998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 7 to AP-1080, Refueling Canal Level Lowering ML20196F9381998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 27 to AP-770, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation ML20195H6581998-11-17017 November 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs (Its),Revising 5.7.2 by Changing Type of Structural Integrity Assessment Required from Probabilistic to Deterministic ML20196D8321998-11-13013 November 1998 Rev 1 to Crystal River Unit 3 ASME Section Xi,Isi Program Interval 3 & Ten Yr NDE Program ML20195H8761998-11-0505 November 1998 Rev 23 to AR-302, Esb Annunciator Response ML20155F4021998-10-30030 October 1998 Proposed Revised Improved Tech Specs (ITS) Section 5.6.2.19, ITS Section 3.4.11,Bases 3.4.11 & 3.4.3 Re PTLR & LTOP Limits 1999-09-02
[Table view] |
Text
_ _. . _ - _ _ . _._ _ . _ _
l-
.t
, i CCHE i
3.7.18 1
l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS j
- 3.7.18 . Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) i
.\ ,
i LC0 3.7.18 The CCHE shall be OPERABLE by restricting breaches to within '
limits.
5 4
P APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, ;
. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ,
1.
i i
! ACTIONS i j _........_____.......................N0TE------------------------------------- !
i 1 Personnel and equipment passage through the CCHE is permissible on a !
continuous basis provided doors are closed immediately following passage.
l -
r CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
- 1
. A. Control Complex _
A.1 Restore CCHE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
- Habitability Envelope boundary. [
- (CCHE) breached ~1n !
- excess of limits. Og l
A.2.1 Establish capability 1 Hour !
to close or seal the '
breach. !
- a. AND A.2.2 Restore CCHE 24 Hours boundary.
~
l 1 B. Required Action and B.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.
(Continued) l 1
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7- Amendment No.
96o9050276 960028 2 s eDR ADOCK 0500
, e
$ CCHE 3.7.18 0
i - ACTIONS-(Continued)
. . l CONDITION ~ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME !
1 1
- C. Required Action and C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately 1 associated Completion irradiated fuel j Time of Condition A assemblies.
i not met in MODE 5 or 6 during movement of I irradiated fuel 2
assemblies.
t
! I I
e i
s I
?
!' l i
i !
4
} i i ;
i-i 1 . i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7- Amendment No.
CCHE 3.7.18 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l l
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i i
SR 3.7.18.1 Verify CCHE door seals are in good 31 Days condition with no missing, loose, or damaged parts.
SR 3.7.18.2 Verify CCHE floor drain loop seals are 31 Days filled with water.
SR 3.7.18.3 Verify the CCHE/CREVS isolation dampers are 24 Months
, 'in good condition with no missing, loose, or damaged parts'.
SR 3.7.18.4 Verify the CCHE penetrations are sealed. 24 Months l
i I
l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7- Amendment No.
1 1
l CCHE I B 3.7.18 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE)
BASES BACKGROUND The Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) is the space within the Control Complex served by the Control Room l Emorgency Ventilation System (CREVS). This includes Control l Complex floor elevations from 108 through 180 feet and the j stair enclosure from elevation 95 to 198 feet. The elements i which comprise the CCHE are walls, doors, a roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers. Together the CCHE and CREVS provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.
The CCHE design is based on outside air in-leakage of greater than or equal to 6% of the enclosed CCHE volume per hour. The
, calculations for operator dose allow in-leakage to the CCHE of 355 cubic feet per minute (cfm) (Ref.1). A certain amount of 1 this total is attributed to specific elements of the CCHE i boundary such as ventilation isolation dampers and doors.
There is al so an amount of leakage attributed to
' unidentified' leakage paths that may exist, such as open penetration seals, or compromised door or damper sealing ,
surfaces. )
Design calculations allow a finite area of ' unidentified' I leakage paths or breaches (Ref. 2). Breaches in excess of the !
calculated area requires entry into CONDITION A of LC0 3.7.18. '
Routine opening and closing of CCHE doors for personnel passage and the movement of equipment is accounted for in the design calculations. A continuous leakage of 10 cubic feet per minute is assumed to account for this. Holding doors open for short periods of time to allow passage of personnel or material does not constitute a breach of the CCHE as long as the doors can be closed immediately upon notification of a radiological or toxic gas release.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7- Revision No. O
'. CCHE B 3.7.18 BASES APPLICABLE During emergency operations the design basis of the CCHE SAFETY ANALYSIS is to provide radiation protection to the control room )
operators. The limiting accident which may threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e., accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is the postulated design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which is assumed to occur while in MODE 1. The consequences of this event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4, and results in the limiting radiological source term for the control room habitability evaluation (Ref.1). A fuel handling accident (FHA) may also result in a challenge to control room habitability, and may occur in any MODE, including the defueled condition, during the movement of irradiated fuel.
However, due to the severity of the design basis LOCA and the MODES in which the postulated accident can occur, the FHA is the limiting accident only 'in MODES 5 and 6, and when defueled. The CCHE together with the CREVS ensures that the control room will remain habitable following all postulated design basis events, maintaining exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A l (Ref. 3). i l
The CCHE integrity is not in the primary success path for any '
accident analysis. This specification is established to provide limited periods for breaches to exist and is supported by safety assessments which demonstrate that there will be no significant decrease in safety as a result of allowing ;
breaches to exist for limited and controlled periods of time.
l LCO The CCHE is a single train system consisting of walls, doors, !
a roof, floors, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation i dampers. Breaches in the CCHE in excess of allowed I
' unidentified' leakage pathway sizes as specified in approved design calculations must be controlled to provide assurance that radiation dose to control room operators remains within limits in the unlikely event of an accident. The CCHE also
, limits the control room concentration that may result from an
[ onsite toxic gas release.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7- Revision No. 0
CCHE B 3.7.18 BASES l
l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CCHE must be OPERABLE to ensure '
that the Control Complex will remain habitable during and following a postulated DBA. During movement of irradiated ;
fuel assemblies, the CCHE must be OPERABLE to cope with a radiological release due to a fuel handling-accident. )
I l
ACTIONS A.1 With breaches in the CCHE in excess of allowed ' unidentified' leakage pathway sizes as specified in approved design calculations, actions should be taken to close or seal the breaches and restore the CCHE to OPERABLE status within I hour. Restoration is not limited to returning the opening to its pre-breached condition, but can also be accomplished using j temporary sealing measures as described in plant procedures i and/or work instructions. j However, when planned maintenance or modifications require breaches to be created, or where permanent restoration of a discovered breach is preferred to temporary sealing, and there is 'no threat of a radiological or toxic gas challenge to the CCHE,. ACTIONS A.2.1 and A.2.2 are an option. ;
l 1
1 (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7- Revision No. O
CCHE B 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS. A.2.1 ACTION A.2.1 requires that a contingency response be ,
established which is capable of closing or sealing the breach ,
immediately upon notification from the control room. Closure is not limited to returning the opening to its pre-breached condition, but can also be accomplished using temporary !
sealing measures as described in plant procedures and/or work '
instructions. This response capability will be described in I plant procedures, and must include the following elements:
continuous presence of a person or persons at the breach ;
site capable of sealing or closing the breach, and '
capability for immediate communication between the <
control room and the breach site, and '
materials staged at the breach site for sealing or '
closing the breach.
A.0 2 In combination with the contingency response provided by ACTION A.2.1, this ACTION requires sealing or closure of CCHE ;
breaches within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Allowing the existence of breaches for reasonable periods of time is . supported by the low .
probability of a core damage accident with containment failure, or of a release of toxic gas which would threaten control room operators. No significant increase in risk to the operators or to the public is created by the existence of breaches under these conditions. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable for restoration of breaches in the CCHE when the capability to immediately close or seal the breach, upon 1 notification of a threat, has been established. The time at I which a breach is made or discovered is considered to be the j start of the allowed outage time. !
IL1 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if breaches in the CCHE in excess of l allowed leakage pathway sizes cannot be closed or sealed within the associated Completion Time, the CREVS may not be capable of performing its intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3. must be entered immedintely.
(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7- Revision No. O
CCHE B 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS Cd
-During movement'of irradiated fuel assemblies, if breaches in the CCHE in excess of allowed leakage pathway sizes cannot be restored within the associated Completion Time, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could release radioactivity that could enter the control room. This places the plant in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.
This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 REQUIREMENTS CCHE doors should be visually inspected to verify that door seals are in good repair with no missing, loose, or damaged parts that degrade a door's capability to close and seal the envelope. Since total leakage calculations assume a certain leakage through doors, their condition must be verified to assure their capability is maintained. Due to the high traffic through Control Complex doors, surveillance every 31 days is judged to be prudent.
SR 3.7.18.2 Control Complex floor drains are routed to collection tanks in the Auxiliary Building. If the loop seals in these drains do not remain filled with water and the collection tank level is below the end of the drain discharge pipe, then a breach will exist in the CCHE. This SURVEILLANCE will verify that loop seals are refilled each 31 days.
SR 3.7.18.3 Isolation dampers should 'oe visually inspected periodically to verify that damper components are in good repair with no missing, loose, or damagad parts that degrade a damper's capability to close and seal the envelope. Since total leakage calculations assume a certain leakage through isolation dampers, their condition must be verified to assure their capability is maintained. Inspection of dampers creates breaches in the CCHE, therefore, inspection will be conducted during refueling outages.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7- Revision No. 0
CCHE B 3.7.18 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.4 REQUIREMENTS CCHE penetration seals should be inspected periodically to i veri fy that they are in good repair and that no gaps or i unsealed areas exist between the seal and CCHE walls, or I around items penetrating the seal. This is accomplished by l
- performing visual inspection of one side of the penetration. ,
Since penetration seals are passive components of the CCHE, I inspection once per 24 months is considered appropriate.
REFERENCES 1. CR-3 Control Room Habitability Evaluation Report, submitted to NRC on June 30, 1987, via letter 3F0687-16 i
- 2. FPC Engineering Calculation I-92-00ll.
- 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
I Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7- Revision No. 0 l l