Text

Amend 44 to License NPF-58,revising TSs by Removing Component List from Sections 3.6.4 & 3.8.4.1,per Guidelines in GL-91-08, Removal of Component Lists from Tss
	ML20116H240
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	10/28/1992
From:	Hall J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20116H245	List: ML20116H240; ML20116H248;
References
	GL-91-08, GL-91-8, NUDOCS 9211130013
	Download: ML20116H240 (31)
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.f UNITED STATES n

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~,E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINoToN. D.C. 20066 os,,.... +,j THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY. ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-440 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER _ PLANT. UNIT l[QQ AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendinent No. 44 License No. NPF-58 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by The Cleveland Electric 111uminating Company, Centerior Service Company, Duquesne Light Company Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, and Toledo Edison Company (the licenseet) dated June 19, 1992, supplemented September 24, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy-Act of 1954,.as amended (the Act), and the Commissior's rules and regulaticns set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 6.

The facility will operate in conformity with the applicetion, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and tregt.'lt'. ions of '.he Commission; that the activities authorized There is reasonable assurance (1)d without endangering the health C.

by this amendment can be conducte and safety of the public, and (ii) thtt such activities will be.

conducted in cumpliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of. this amendment wili not be inimical to the common defer,se and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Dart-51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been ratisfied, n

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by-changes to the Technical"Specifi-cations -as indicated in the attachment to this111 cense amendment,-and i

paragraph-2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No NPF-58 is_hereby amended to read as follows:

L 9211130013 921028-

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(2) leshnical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 44 are hereby incorporated into-this-Itcense.

The Cleveland Eltotric Illuminating Compaiy shall f

operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifi--

cations and the Eny'ironmental Protection Plan.-

i 3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

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75 Jame R. Hall, Sr. Project Manager Pro ect Directorate III-3 "ivision of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regt.lation

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Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: October 28,1992 I

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 44 i

FACilllLOPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 P0CKET NO. 50-440 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Cpecifications with the attached pages.

The_ revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Overleaf pages are 1

provided to maintain document completeness.

j Remove Insert 1-6 1-6 3/4 3-11 through 3/4 3-11 through 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-78 3/4 3-78 3/4 6-1 through 3/4 6-1 through 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-5 3 4 6-28 3/4 6-28 i

f 3/4 6-29 3/4 6-29 3/4 6-30 through 3/4 6 - 3/4 8-21 3/4 8-21 3/4 8-22 3/4 8-22 3/4 8-23 3/4 8-24 B 3/4 6-6 8 3/4 6-6 B 3/4 8-3 8 3/4 8-3 5

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DEFINITIONS LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN 1.22 A LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN shall be a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limitir.g value for APLHGR, LHGR, or MCPR.

LINEAR HEAT GEfXRATION RATE 1.23 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) shall be the heat generation per unit length of fuel rod.

It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.

LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.24 The LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is any process or control equipment used to reduce the amount or concentration of liquid radioactive materials prior to their discharge to UNRESTRICTED AREAS.

It involves all the. installed and available liquid radwaste management system equipment. as well as their controls, power instrumentation, and services that make the system functional.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.25 A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all logic components, i.e., all relays and contacts, all trip units, solid state logic elements, etc, of a logic circuit, ftom sensor through and including the cctuated device, to verify OPERABILITY.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total system steps such that the entire logic system is tested.

MEMBER (S) 0F THE PUBLIC 1.26 MEMBER (S) 0F THE PUBLIC shall include all pert.ons who are not occupa-tionally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the utility, its contractors, or vendors.

Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries.

This category does include persons who usc portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant.

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO 1.27 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall be the smallest CPR which exists in the core.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION KANUAL (ODCM1 1.28 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses due to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of geseous and liquid effluent moni-torine, alarm / trip setpoints, and in the conduct of the radiological environmental monitoring program.

PERRY - UNIT 1 1-5

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DEFINITIONS e

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OPERABLE - OPERA 8ILITY 1.29 A system,. subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of perfoming its specified function (s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).

l OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION 1.30 An OPERATIONAL CONDITION, i.e.. CONDITION, shall be any one inclusivt combination of mode switch positio?,and average reactor coolant temperature as.

4 specified in Table 1.2.

1 PHYSICS TESTS 1.31 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundament.a1 nuclear characteristics of the reactor core ai1 related instrumentation and 1) described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR, 2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 or 3) otherwise approved by the Commit,sion.

PRESSU U BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 1.32 PRES:,URE BOUNDARY. LEAKAGE shall be !aakage through e non-isolable fault in

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a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vesse? wall.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRI7 r

1.33 PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

All containment penetrations required to be closed during accident-a.

conditions are either:

1.

Capable of being closed by an DPERABLE containment automatic isolation system, or 2.

Closed by at-least one manual valve, blind flange, or deacti-vated automatic valve secured in its closed position 'except for

- valves tnat may be. opened.as pemitted by Specification 346.4.

s b.

The containment equipment hatch is closed'and sealed.

Each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of c.

Specification'3.6.1.3.-

l d.

The containment-leakage rates are in compliance with the requiremenis' of Specification 3.6.1.2.

The suppression pool-is in compliance with the requirementsJof-e.

Specification 3.6.3.1.

- PERRY UNIT 1-1-6 Amendment-No. 44

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PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 44

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

A ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION g

MINIMUM APPLICABLE g

OPERABLE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)

CONDITION ACTION 3.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, level 2 2

1, 2, 3 and #

25 b.

Drywell Pressure - High 2

1, 2, 3 25 c.

Manual Initiation 2

1,2,3 22 2

25 4.

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

A Flow - High 1

1,2,3 27 b.

A Flow Timer 1

1, 2, 3 27 mA

- c.

Equipment Area Temperature -

y High 1

1, 2, 3 27 5

d.

Equipment Area a Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 e.

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 2 2

1, 2, 3 27 f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel y

Ambient Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 8

g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel a g

Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27

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SLCS Initiation 1

1,2,3 27 1.

Manual Initiation 2

1,2,3 26 o.

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TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) h ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION Ci MINIMUM APPLICABLE t

c OPERABLE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL j

TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)

CONDITION ACTION 5.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

RCIC Steam Line Flow - High 1

1,2,3 27 b.

RCIC Steam Supply Pressure -

F Low 1

1,2,3 27 c.

RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High 2

1,2,3 27 d.

RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 i

e.

RCIC Equipment Room a w1 Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 Y

f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel 0-Ambient Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temperature - High 1

1,2,3 27 h.

Main Steam Line Tunnel I

Temperature Timer 1

1,2,3 27 3I 1.

CHR Equipment Room Ambient

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Temperature - High 1/ Area 1, 2, 3 27 2

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RHR Equipment Room a E

Temperature - High 2/ Area 1, 2, 3 27 i

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RCIC Steam Line Flow High.

Timer 1

1,2,3 27 1.

Drywell Pressure - High 1

1,2,3 27 m.

Manual Initiation 1

1,2,3 26 l

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TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) hh ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 4

MINIMUM APPLICABLE e

OPERABLE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL c-35 TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)

CONDITION ACTION j

6.

RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

PJ1R Equipment Area Ambient Temperature - High 1/ Area 1, 2, 3 28 b.

RHR Equipment Area a Temperature - High 1/ Area 1, 2, 3 23 c.

RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow - High 1

1, 2, 3 28 R:

d.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 2

1,2,3 28

$2 e.

Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure -

High 2

1,2,3 28 f.

Drywell Pressure - High 2

1,2,3 2A g.

Manual Initiation 2

1,2,3 26

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TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACT16I4 ACTION 20 -

In OPERATIONAL t0NDIT10N 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION f, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour or:

ACTION 21 a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

In Operational Condition ", suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status ACTION 22 within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION ), 2, or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment.

Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves ACTION 23 closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at ler.st HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 24 Verify SECONDARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY with the annulut, exhaust ACTION 25 gas treatment system operating within one hour.

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status ACTION 26 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour and ACTION 27 declare the affected systec inoperable.

Within one hour lock the affected system isolation valves closed, ACTION 28 or verify, by remote indication, that the valve (s) is closed and electrically disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s) and declare

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the affected system inoperable.

, NOTES When handling irradisted fuel in the primary containment and during CORE.

ALTERATIONS and operations with a potectial for draining the reactor vessel.

When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or the key locked Condenser Low Vacuum Bypass Switch is in the normal position.

During CORE ALTERATIONS and operstions with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-15 Amendment No.W,42

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION i

NOTES (Continued)

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance without placing the trip tystem in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in tha same trip system is monitoring that pcranater.

l (b) Containment and Drywell Purge System inbcard and outboard isolation I

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valves each use a separate two out of two is >lation logic.

2 (c) There is only one (1) RCIC manual initistion thannel for RCIC system containment isolation valves.

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PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. 44 L

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ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION ~ RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTION-RESPONSE TIME'(Seconds)(

1.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT IFOLATION a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 NA.

b.

Drywell Pressure - High NA Containmentand{gywellPurgeExhaustPlenum

< 10(,)

c.

Radiation - High a

d.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 RA.

e.

Manual Initiation NA 2.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION

< 1.0*/< 10(a),$

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - LowIDgevel1 I 1.0*/E 10(*)**

b.

Main-Steam Line Radiation - High c.

Main Steam Line Pressure - Low i 1.0*/E 10(a),

d.

Main Steam Line Flow - High i 0.5*/E 10(a),,

e.

Condenser Vacuum - Low RA

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f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High NA g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temperature - High NA-h.

Turbine Building Main Steam Line Temperature - High NA 1.

Manual Initiation NA 3.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT, ISOLATION a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 NA b.

Drywell Pressure - High NA c.

Manual Initiation NA 4.

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

A Flow -High NA b.

A Flow Timer NA c.

Equipment Area Temperature --High NA d.

Equipment Area A Temperature - High -

NA e.

Reacter Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 NA' f.

Main Steam Lire Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High NA' g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temperature - High-NA h.

SLCS Initiaticn NA i.

Manual Initiation NA PERRY - UNIT l' 3/4 3-21

4 TABLE-3.3.2-3 (Continued)

ISOLATION-SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAT, ION RESPONSE-TIME TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE-TIME (Seconds)#

)

5.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION p

a.

RCIC Steam Line Flow - High NA F

b.

RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low NA RCIC Turbine Exhaust-Diapnrcam Pressure - High NA c.

d.

RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High NA RCIC Equipment Room A Temperature - High

. NA e.

f.

Main Steam Lire Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High

-NA g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel a Temperature -_ High NA h.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer NA 1.

RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High NA j.

RHR Equipment Room A Temperature - High NA k.

RCIC Steam Line Flow High Timer NA 1.

Drywell Pressure - High NA-m.

Manual Initiation NA J

6.

RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION RHR Equipment Area Ambient Teuperature - High NA a.

b.

RHR Equipment Area o Temperature - High NA c.

RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow - High NA 1

d.

Reactor Vessel Water ievel - Low, level 3 NA e.

Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) i Pressure - High NA f.

Drywell Pressure - High NA g.

Manual Initiation _

NA e.

(a) Isolation system instrumentation response time specified includes the diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays.

(b) Radiation detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Response time shall be measured from detector. output or the input of the first' electronic-component in the channel.

Isolation system instrumentation response i: 9 for_MSIVs only.

No diesel generator delays assumed.

l

- Isolation system' instrumentation response time. for associated valves exceot MSIVs.

1 solation system instrumentatiot, response time specified for the Trip Function actuating each containment isolation valve shall be 'added to the isolation time for each valve to obtain ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE 1 TIME for each valve.

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PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 44 t

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. a INSTRUMENTATION -

? ACCIDENT MONITORING-INSTRUMENTATION.

7

. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.3.7.5 The accident monitoring instrumentation channelsLshown in Table

'3.3.7.5-1 shall be OPERABLE.

. APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1.

ACTION:

1 With one or more accident monitoring instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.7.5-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.7.5 Each of the above required accident monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated 0PERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown-in-Table 4.3.7.5-1.

4

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3.

TA8LE 3.3.7.5-1 h

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 22

[

MINIMUM APPLICABLE REQUIRED NUMBER CHANNELS OPERATIONAL

=

INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE CONulTIONS ACTION 1.

Reactor Vessel Pressure 2

1 1,2,3 80 2.

Reactor Vessel Water Level 2

1 1,2,3 80 3.

Suppression Pool Water Level 2

1 1,2,3 80 4.

Suppression Pool Water Temperature 16, 2/ sector 8, 1/ sector 1,2,3 80 5.

Primary Containment Pressure 2

1 1,2,3 80 6.

Frimary Containment Air Temperature 2

1 1,2,3 80 7.

Dryvell Pressure 2

1 1,2,3 80 8.

Drywell Air Temperature 2

1 1,2,3 80 9.

Primary Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and Monitor 2

1 1,2,3 80 R>

10. Safety / Relief Valve Position Indicators **

2/ valve 1/ valve 1,2,3 80

11. Primery Containment /Drywell Area Gross Gamma y

Radiation Manitors 2*

1*

1,2,3 81 y

12. Offgas Venulstion Exhaust Nonitor, 1

1 1,2,3 81

13. Turbine Building / Heater Bay Ventilatic', Exhaust Monite.#

1 1

1,2,3 81

14. Unit 1 Vent Monitor, 1

1 1,2,3 81

15. Unit 2 Vent Monitor, 1

1 1,2,3 81

16. Neutron Flux

a. Average Power Range 2

1 1,2,3 80

b. Inter'diate Range 2

1 1,2,3 80 F

c. 'ource Range 2

1 1,2,3 80

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17. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position 2/ valve 1/ valve 1,2,3 82 8

E

, Each for primary containment and drywell.

One channel consists of a pressure switch on the SRV discharge pipe, the other channel consists of a g

,,, temp 6rature sensor on the SRV discharge pipe.

One channel consists of the open limit switch, and the other channel consists of the closed limit switch i

for each automatic containment isolation valve.

1

High and intermediate range D19 ystem noble gas monitors.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.

ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 7NTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months end in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the primary containment air locks, if opena:1 following Type h or B test, by leak rate testing the seals with gas at Pa, 11.31 psig, and verifying that when the seasured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary contaire penetrations ** not espable of being closed by OPERf4LE primary con-tainment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed.during -

accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deacti-vated automatic valves secured in position, except for valves that may be opened as permitted by Specification 3.6.4.

c.

By verifyir.g each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

d.

By verifying the suppression pool is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

- Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the primary containmarit, drywell, or the steam tunnel portion of the auxiliary building, and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. 44

3/4.C.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT-PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

shall be mair.tained.E APPLICABILITY:

When irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment, cod during CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Under these conditions, the requirements of PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY do not apply to normal operation of the inclined fuel transfer system.

ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, ed operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary contain-ment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deacti-vated automatic valves secured in position, except for valves that may be opened as permitted by Specification 3.G.4.#

b.

By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

The primary containment leakage rates in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.2' are not applicable.

Except that six (6) 3/4" vent and drain line pathways may be opened for the purpose of performing containment isolation valve leak rate. testing provided the plant has been subtritical for at least seven (7) days.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Amendment No.

.T9, 7), 44

Ai CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Primary containmsnt leakage rates shall be limited to:

a.

An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.75 L '

a O.20 percent by weight of the primary containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at P,11.31 psig.

a A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 L, isolation b.

for aH penetrations and all valves, except for main steam line valves and valves which are hydrostatically' leak tested, subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P,,11.21 psig.

c.

Less than or equal to 25 scf per hour for any one main steam line through the isolation valves when tested at P, 11.31 psig, a

d.

A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.0504 L f r all a

penetrations that are secondary conthinment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to the required test pressure, e.

A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 1 gpm times the total number of containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment, when tested at 1.10 P,,

l 12.44 psig.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.

AC TION:

With:

a.

The measured overall integrated primary containment leakage rate exceeding'O.75 L,, or b.

The measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and all valves except for main steam line isolation valves and valves which are hydrostatically leak tested, subject to Type B and C tests-l exceeding 0.60 L,, or c.

The measured leakage rate exceeding 25 scf per hour for any one main--

steam line'through the isolation valves, or d.

The combined leakage rate for all penetrations that are secondary-containment bypass leakage paths exceeding 0.0504 L,,-or e.

The measured combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment exceeding 1 gpm times the total number of such valves:

See-Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

PERRY --UNIT 1 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 44 4

y ww.-een w we,

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued) res tc,re:

a.

The overall integrated leakage rate (s) tn less than or equal to 0.75 L, and a

b.

The combined leakage rate for all penetrations and all valves, except for main steam line isolation valves and valves which are hydrostati-cally leak tested, subject to Type B and C tests to less than-or l

equal to 0.60 L and 3

c.

The leakage rate to less than 25 scf per hour for any one main-steam line through the isolation valves', and d.

The combined leakage rate for all penetrations that are secondary centainment bypass leakage paths to less than or equal to 0.0504 L '

a and e.

The combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate t(.e primary containment l

to less than or equal to 1 gpm times the total number of such valves,.

prior to increasing reactor coolant system temperature above 200'F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 The primary containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the cri-teria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50-using the methods and r1vi-sions of ANSI N45.4-1972 and BN-TOP-1; test results shall also be repor6ed based on the Mass Point Methodology described in ANSI /ANS N56.8-1981:

a.

Three Type A Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate tests shall be conducted at'40110 month intervals during shutdown at P,,

11.31 psig during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year'-

plant inservice inspection.

b.

If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 La, the test schedule-for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission.

If two consecutive Type A' tests fail to meet 0.75 L,, a Type A te';t shall be-performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L.:at which time the above test a

schedule may be resumed.

c.

The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 44

_ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEltLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1.

Confirms the accuracy of the tett by ver_ifying that the-difference between the supplemental data and the Type A test data is within 0.25 L.

The fonnula to be used is:

a

[L

+L

- 0.25 L,) 1 c 1 El

+l N.0.25 L ) dere L L

o am o

am a

c supplemental test result; L = superimposed leakage; g

L

= measured Type A leakage.

am 2.

Ha5 duretion sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test.

3.

Requires the quantity of gas injected into the primary contain-ment or bled from the primary containment during the supple-mental test to be between 0.75 L and 1.25 L

a a

d.

Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at P, 11.31 psig*,

at intervals no greater than 24 months exceptforkestsinvolving:

1, Air locks, 2.

Main steam line isolation valves -

3.

Valves pressurized with fluid from a-seal system, 4.

All containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment, and

[

5, Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient q

material seals.

Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance e.

Requirement 4.6.1.3.

f.

Main steam line isolation valves shall be leak tested at least once per 18 months.

i Leakage from isolation valves that are sealed with fluid from e seal.

9 system may be excluded, subject to the provisions of_ Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 Section III,C.3, when determining the combined leakage rate provided the seal system and valves are pressurized to at least 1.10 Pa, 12.44 psi 9, and the seal system capacity is adequate to maintain system pressure for at least 30 days.

h.

All containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment shall be leak tested Et'least once per 18 months.

Unless a hydrostatic test is required.

l.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-5 Amendment No. E.10,77,97,44

_.. - ~ -

~.

4 1

CONTAINMENT' SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREME_NTS (Coiitinued)-

i 1.

' Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material i

. seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance

)

Requirements 4.6.1.8.3 and 4.6.1.8.4.

j.

The provisions of-Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable to Speci f i cations 4. 6.1. 2. a. 4. 6.1. 2. b, 4. 6.1. 2. c, and 4. 6.1. 2. d.

i

_C Y

~(Ner.t Daae is 3/4 6-6.)!

' PERRY'- UNIT 1 3/4.:6-Sa

Amendment-No. 10

-)

JCONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-

=

. SUPPRESSION POOL MAKEUP SYSTEM.

~

LIMITING CONDITION-FOR 0PERATION.

3.6.3.4-.The suppression pool makeup system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

c With one suppression pool makeup line inoperacle, restore the. inoperable a.

makeup-line to OPERABLE-status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or'be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within.the_

following'24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

O b.

With the upper containment pool water level less than.the limit restore the water level to within the limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within~the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , c.

With upper containment pool water 1 temperature greater than the limit, restore the upper containment pool water-temperature to within the limit-within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the'next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.4 The suppression pool? makeup system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.-

At least-once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the uopericontainment pooli water:

s 1.

Level to t o greater _than or eoual to 22'10" above-theLreactor pressure veswel flange, and 2.

Temperature to be less than or equal to 100*F.;

b.

At least once per 31 days _ by verifying-that:

1.

.The steam dryer storage / reactor well pool gate _.is removed'and the fuel transfer pooligate is in place.

2.

Each valve, manual, power _ operated or automatic, in the flow path that is~not locked,> sealed, or otherwise secure in position,'is in-its correct position.-

a c.-

At least.once_.per.18 months by performing a syctem functional _ test which includes simulated automatic' actuation oftthe system throughout its emergency operating, sequence and verifying that each-auter,atic valve in.the flow path actuates to its correct position.

Actualt makeup of water toothe suppression pool mayLbe excluded-from this test.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6,

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Ll_M,lTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.#

l APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL COND!TIONS 1, 2, 3, and "*.

ACTig:

a.

With one cr more et " * ;ontainment isolation valves inoperable, maintain l

at least one isola.

<alve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and within

5 either:

1.

Restore the inopeie "alve(s) to OPERABLE status, or 2.

Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position,* or 3.

Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange.*

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provic'ed that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with ACTION a.2 or a.3 above, and provided that the associated system, if applicable, is declared inoperable and the appr:priate ACTION statements for that system are performed.

Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITPJN 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTD0WN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION **, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

lsolation valves closed to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.

- Wnen handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment and during CORE ALTRATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

The Containment Vessel and Drywell Purge system 42-inch inboard purge valves IM14-F045 and -F085 are not required to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

The RCIC system containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITION **. The Fire Protec-tion system manual hose reel containment isolation valves IP54-F726 and

-F727 may be opened as necessary to supply fire mains in OPERAT;0NAL CONDITION **. Locked or scaled closed isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.

PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-28 Amendment No. 44

d CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS S' RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS U

4.6.4.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replace-ment work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

4.6.4.2 Each automatic containnent isolation valve shall be demonstrated l

OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that on an isolation test signal each automatic i;olan'on valve actuates to its isolation nosition.

4.6.4.3 lhe isolation time of each power operated or automatic _ containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

t l

l PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-29 Amendment No. 44 (Next page is 3/4 6-40)

4 f

Pages 3/4 6-30 through 3/4 6-39 are deleted.-

l'.

I -

p Amendment No.44-

14 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 8.4. l ~ Primary and backup containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each containment-electrical oenetration E

circuit shall be OPERABLE.

The scope of these protective devicer excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed-the electrical penetration design rating.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one or more of the primary and backup containment penetration conductor 'l-6.

overcurrent pratective devices inoperable, declare the affected system or

(.amponent inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION statement for the 3ifected system and:

l '.

For 13.8 kV circuit breakers, de-energize the 13.8 kV circuit (s) by -

tripping the a:;sociated redundant circuit breaker (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and verify the redundant circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereofter.

2.

For 120-volt circuit breakers, remove the inopet able circuit breaker (s) from service by racking out* the breaker within 71. hours and verify the inoperable breaker (s) to be racked out* at.least once per 7 days thereafter.

Otherwise, be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN wi'hin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHbTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicabic to overcurrent-l devices in 13.8 kV circuits which have their redundant circuit breakers:

j tripped or to :1?0-volt circuits which have the inoperable circuit breaker l-racked out.*

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l-l 4.8.4.1-Each of the primary and backup containment penetration conductor I' ~

overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l a.

At least once per 18 months:

1.

By verifying that the medium voltage 13.8 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10%

of the circuit breakers and performing:

a)

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the i.;sociated protective relays, b)

An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and overcutrent control circuits function as designed, and

- Racking out may be accomplished by tripping the breaker under administrative control.

FERRY!- UNIT 1 3/4 8-21 Amendment No.40

' ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-(Continued)

1

~

c)

For each circuit breaker found inoperable.during these i

fntctional tests, an additional. representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit-breakers sf the inoperable type shall also be. functionally-tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers'of that type-have been functionally tested.

2.

By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample-of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers.

t Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected en a rrtating basis.

Testing of these circuit:

breakers shall. consist of injecting a current in' excess.of tha-breakers'~ nominal'setpoint including the instantaneous eleva//

setpoint and measuring the response time.. The measured rer'+nse time shall be compared to the manufacturer's data to ensure.t ?t<

it is less than or equal to a.value specified bytthe aanufacturer.

-Circuit breakers found inoperable-during_ functional: testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resumingLoperation, for each circuit breaker found inoperable during there functional-tests, an additional representative semple-of at leastL10% of all the circuit breaker: of the inoperableftype-shallialso be functionally tested-until no more failurer are.found or.all-circuit breakers of that type have been-functionally tested, b.

At least-once per 60 months by subjecting each-circuit' breaker to an-inspection and-preventive maintenance in accordance with instructions prepared in conjuncticn with-its manufacturer's recommendations.-

o PERRY -LUNIT 1 3/4 8-22:

Amendment' No. 44 (Next page is13/4 8-25)-

e r

a e

-,-r m

w Jn

h t

~$

r Pages 3/4 8-23 and 3/4 8-24 are deleted.

i-l l-I' l-l l

f 1

l' t

Amt.',dmont No. 44 er y

e

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression pool water, operating procedures define the action to be taken in the event a safety-relief valve inadvertently opens or sticks open.

As a minimum this action shall include:

(1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling, and (3) ff other safety-relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open safety relief valve, where possible, to assure mixing gnd uniformity of energy insertion to the pool.

The containment spray system consists of two 100% capacity luops, each with three spray rings located at different elevations about the inside circum-ference of the containment.

RHR pump A supplies one loop and RHR pump B sup-plies the other.

RHR pump C cannot supply the spray system.

Dispersion of the flow of water is effected by 345 nozzles in each loop, enhancing the condensa-tion of water vapor in the containment volume and preventing overpressurization.

Heat rejection is through the RHR heat exchangers.

The turbulence caused by the spray system aids in mixing the containment air volume to maintain a homogeneous mixture for H2 control.

The suppression pool cooling function is a mode of the RHR system and functions as part of the containment heat removal system.

Tne purpose of the systera is to ensure containment integrity following a LOCA by preventing exces-sive containment pressures and temperatures.

The suppression pool cooling mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F con-sidering all of the post-LOCA energy edditions.

The suppression pool enoling trains, being an 17tegrai part of the RHR system, are redundant, safety-related component systems that are initiated following the recovery of the reactor vessel water level by ECCS flows.from the RHR system.

Heat rejection to the emergency service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers.

The suppression pool make-up system provides water from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow through two 100%

capacity dump lines following a LOCA.

The quantity of water provided is sufficient to account for all conceivable post-accident entrapment volumes, ensuring the long term energy sink capabilities of the suppression pool and maintaining the water coverage over the uppermost drywell vents Curing refueling, there will be adrainistrative control to ensure the make up dump valves will not be opened.

3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of racioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

Containment isolaten within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close auto-matically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5

CONTAIMiENT SYSTEMS e

BASES All required Containment Isolation Valves are listed in the PNPP Unit 1 Plant Data Book.

The opening of normally locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves under administrative controls in accordance with footnote # includes the following considerations:

(1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls. (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

The above considerations do not apply to the norvally locked closed (LC) Fire Protection system manual hose reel contair. ment isolaticn valves IP54-F726 and

-F727 when opened as necessary to supply fire mains when handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

3/4.6.5 VAC_Ul[M RELIEF 3/4.6.5.1 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF AND 3/4.6.5.2 CONTAINMENT HUMIDITY CONTROL Vacuum breakers are provided on the containment to prevent an excessive vacuum from developing inside containment during an inadvertent or improper operation of the containment spray.

Four vacuum breakers and their associated isolation valves are provided.

Any two vacuum breakers provide 100% vacuum relief.

The containment vacuum relief system is designed to prevent an excessive vacuum from being created inside the containment folicwing inadvertent initia-tion of the containment spray system.

By maintaining temperature / relative humidity within the limits for acceptable operation shown on Figure 3.6.5.2-1, the maximum containment vacuum created by actuation of both containment spray loops will be limited to approximately -0.7 psig.

3/4.6.5.3 DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS Drywell vacuum breakers are provided on the drywell to prevent drywell flooding due to differential pressure across the drywell and to equalize pressure between the drywell and containment.

Two drywell vacuum breakers nnd their associated isolation valves are provided.

Any one vacuum breaker can provide full vacuum relief capability.

3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is desioned to minimize any ground level release of radioactive mater tal which may result from an accident.

The Shield Building provides secondary containment during normal operation when the containment is sealed and in service. At other times, the containment may be open and, when required, secondary containment intecrity is specified.

Est6blishing and maintaining a vacuum in the annulus with the annulus exhaus t gas treatment system, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.

The OPERABilliY of the annulus exhaust gas treatment systens ensures tnat sufficient iodine rem; val capability will be available in t'ne event of a LOCA.

The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site PERRY - UNIT 1 3 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 44

4 o

a ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

BASES 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PR01ECTIVE DEVICES Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. A list of required circuit breakers is contained in the PNPP Unit 1 Plant Data Book.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provides assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representa-tive simple of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker.

Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested.

If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

I I

i l

l l

PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 44 l

1

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ML20116H240

Text

Attachment:

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