ML20116G399
| ML20116G399 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1992 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116G389 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211110308 | |
| Download: ML20116G399 (3) | |
Text
._ _
ps* ** %
!(
f, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{.'>"#c
,E WA$mNGTON D. C. 205$$
\\...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OfflCE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR R_LGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMEN1 NO.166 TO FAClllTY 0PERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 AMENDMENT NO. 48 TO FACILITY OPERATING __11gNSE NO. NPF-73 DUOVESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY EENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY TJiE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY THE TOLED0 EDISON COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-334 AND 50-412
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated October 9,1991, the Duquesne Light Company (DLC/the licensee) submitteo a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos.
I and 2 Technical Specifications (TS).
The requested changes would revise the primary containment-air-temperature-sensor locations currently specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.5 for Units 1 and 2.
Specifically, the amendments designate alternate sensor locations, change sensor descriptions,.
i and revise sensor elevation to reflect actual in-plant location.
In addition, the Unit I amendment replaces the word " thermocouple" with " detector" to more accurately describe the resistance temperature devices installed in Beaver Valley, Unit 1.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The containment average air temperature is determined per Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.5 to ensure that containment operation remains within the limits assumed in the ccntainment design bases analyses.
Containment average air temperature is calculated by obtaining temperature readings from the five specified sensor locations and taking the arithmetic average. This single value is representative af rne average air temperature within containment and is used in the LOCTIC comsater program for containment integrity analyses.
For Beaver Valley. Unit I six different limiting analyses are performed.
These include peak containment pressure (Loss of Coolant Accident and Main Steam Line Break), depressurization time, sub-atmospheric peak pressure, minimum pressure-(inadvertent spray), Low Head Safety Injection Het Positive Suction Head (NPSH), and Recirculatior, Spray System NPSH.
Baaver Valley, 921111030s 921103 PDR ADOCK 05000334 p
-. -.. -~.
4 '
Unit 2 has similar containment analyses, but does not use the LOCTIC Program for pump NPSH calculations.
The depressurization time and sub-stmospheric peak pressure determinations use a minimum containment air temperatura inpL:
for the limiting case.
This m1ximizes the mass of non-condensibles and thus makes depressurization slower.
All other cases use maximum air temperature as the limiting input. This has the effect of raising f.he initial peak pressure during large breaks (steam line or reactor coolant system) primarily due to the higher heat sink initial temperatures.
This also has the effect of providing lower pressures in the longer tern combined with a minimum ini+ial air pressure due to the lower mass of non-condensibles.
3.0 EyALVATION Duquesne Light Company conducted a containment temperature profile study over a 3-month period to determine the air temperature sensor locations to best represent true containment conditions.
The 20 containment sensors in Units 1 and 2 were classified according to elevation, temperature trending, functional location, and containment quadrant location.
The temperature trends for each sensor were reviewed at different points in a year to take into account outside temperature effects.
From this data base, five sensors were selected to be included in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.5, which specifies the sensor locations used.
It was fcund that one sensor in Unit I and two sensors in Unit 2 should be changed.
Specifically, for Beaver Valley Unit 1, it was found that location 4.6.1.5.c, " Annulus," should be replaced with the sensor located in the Dome Area above Steam Generator 18.
For Beaver Valley Unit 2, it was found that locations 4.6.1.5.a and d, "Leactor Head Storage Area" and "RHR Heat Exch nger," should be replacad with the sensors located in the Steam Generator 218 Cubicle and Dome Area above Steam Generator 21B, respectively. These changes will provide a better overall representation of bulk air temperature inside containment.
The better representation of average air temperature will ensure that containment operation is maintained within the limits as specified in Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.5 for maximum and minimum containment average sir temperature.
The amendments also change the sensor description and/or elevation of the remaining seven sensor locations specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.5 for Beaver Valley Units I and 2.
These changes reflect the actual-in-plant locations and better represent the sensor's total description.
The changes are administrative in nature and do not change containment average air temperature determination.
In addition, the changing of the word " thermocouple" in Unit 1 Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.5 to " detector," more accurately describes the resistance temperature devices installed in Beaver Valley Unit 1.
Therefore, the change is acceptable.
The NRC staff has concluded, based on the discussion stave, that the new sensor locations and changes in sensor descriptions will prcvide a better w.
T representation of the bulk air temperature inside containment.
The ability of the containment to perform its intended function as a fission product barrier remains unchanged.
Therefore, the changes requested are approved.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State officiel was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments.
The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change surveillance requiro.nents.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a propnsed finding that the amendments involve no significent hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 2592). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 LONCLUSlQH The Commission tas concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the fomnission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be iniv.ical to the common defense and security or to the health and sefety oi the public.
Principal Contributor:
James Andersen Date:
November 3, 1992
_