ML20115F159
| ML20115F159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1985 |
| From: | Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GN-579, IEB-79-15, NUDOCS 8504190429 | |
| Download: ML20115F159 (121) | |
Text
p- :
Georga Power Company I
~
Rout 3 2 Boy 299A W:ynesboro, Georgia 30830 -
. Telephone 404 554 9961 404 724 4114 Southern Company Services,inci Post Office Box 2625 p
Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 Vogtle Proj.ect
-April 15, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X7BC35 Attention:
Ms. Elinor G. Adensam, Chief Log: GN-579 Licensing Branch #4 Division of Licensing-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
_20555 NRC DOCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109
'V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION STATUS MEETING - DSER OPEN ITEMS
Dear Mr. Denton:
On April 11-12, 1985, a meeting was held with members of your staff to discuss and resolve open items remaining on the VEGP draft SER. Attachment 1 is a listing of enclosures. The enclosures address those open items discussed in the meeting and provide the information necessary for their resolution. Also included is supplemental information requested by your staff but not specifically called for in the draft SER.
If you staff requires any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.-
Q.jerely,.c f
J. A. Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /caa Enclosure xc:
D. O. Foster R. A. Thomas G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire J. E. Joiner, Esquire C. A. Stangler L. Fowler M. A. Miller hg[/
L. T. Gucwa G. Bockhold, Jr.
l h) 8504190429 850415 1
0173m PDR ADOCK 05000424 E
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[ ATTACHMENT OPEN ITEMS INDEX:, APRIL 10--11 MEETING e
Item Enclosu're-Remarks 01-2
'A Supplemental information on; correlation of old and new.
meteorological tower data.
.B Supplemental information requested-in the 3/22/85 meeting concerning drill hole,107.
-0I-36 C
Additional information requested-in the 3/22/85 meeting. This information will appear in Amendment 16..
'0I-26K D
-Supplemental information requested in the'3/22/85 meeting.'
+
'01-32 E
Supplemental information--
requested by telephone on 4/4/85.
0I F Information requested on bypass
'i and inoperable status panel.
30I-69' G
' Process measurements used for safety' functions..This information change will appear
-iniAmendment 16.
01-86 '
H Correction.to chemistry-j parameters as discussed.in the s
3/29/85' letter. -This change-will appear in Amendment 16.
101-89 I
Reply to AECC-2 topical report on Byron Station with respect to-VEGP.
i 01-95E J
Information discussed in the 4/1/85 teleconference. This change will appear in Amendment 16.'
n --
01-117' K
Evaluation of double-ended I'
rupture of circulating water system. This will appear in Amendment 16.
Q430.2 L
Revised to supplement the 3/26/85 submittal. This change 4.
will appear in Amendment 16.
s
. - _, _ - _.,.. _ -, -., _ _ - - _, _ _, - _ _ - - - -. ~. -... _ _ _. _. _. - _. _.. _. _, _. _ _ - _... _
' 4'-
Attachment Open' Items Index: April 10-11 Meeting
-Item
- Enclosure Remarks.
~ 430.12
- M Revised to supplement the Q
3/26/85 submittal. This change will appear in Amendment 16.
Q430.33
~ N Revised to supplement the
-3/26/85 submittal. This change will appear in Amendment 16.
Q430.41 0
This revision as discussed in the.4/.10/85 meeting will appear in Amendment 16.
~Q430.73 P
Revision to supplement the 3/26/85 submittal. This change will appear in Amendment-16.
METB-Q Additional information requested by the METB during the 4/10/85 meeting.
Figure 10.R2-1 will be updated in Amendment 16.
ASB R
Additional information requested in NRC letter dated 2/14/85.
~' MEB S
Additional information requested in the 1/8 1/10/85 audit.
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-,,-+-+-.---r-
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r v-v-
6ns.ko3#G Vogtle Old and New Meteorclogical Towers
~
Wind Speed and Direction The wind speeds and directions from the old and ne towers agree very well over the three month period cal wind roses from the 33ft and 150ft levels on the old towerFigu through 5 are wind roses from the new tower at the 33ft Figures 3 levels, respectively.
,148ft and 195ft The main difference in the wind roses is t percentage of calm wind speeds.
instrumentation had no hours of calm wind speed.The The old tower had 2.4%
and 0.4% calm wind speeds at the 33ft and 150ft levels The only minor difference in the wind direction is that there greater percentage of west-northwest winds on the old tower was a west-southwest winds on the new tower.
Table 2 shows a comparison of monthly average wind speeds from the old and new towers.
The wind speeds are quite consistent and agree well.
Vogtle Old and New Meteorological Towers Temperatures Both the ambient and dew point temperatures agree quite well.
Table 3 shows monthly average temperature and dew point temperature data from the old and new towers.
There are some minor differences particularly in the dew point temperatures. These differences can be attributed to the fact that the dew point units are difficult to calibrate and any two units are likely to give somewhat different readings.
The joint frequency tables of wind speed and direction versus delta temperature are shown in Tables 4 through 7 and summarized in Table 8.
The tables show some discrepancies between the old and new meteorological towers. When grouped by the general categories of unstable, neutral and stable conditions, the two towers compare quite well. The cifferences between the two towers can be attributed to different instrumentation and, therefore, calibration.
The delta temperatures on the old tower were adjusted in April.
It is possible that with a larger data base the differences between the two towers could be reduced.
l l
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Table 1 Vogtle Old and New Meteorological Towers Data Recovery by Parameter Old Meteorological New Meteorological Tower (Percent)
Tower (Percent)
Wind speed 33ft~
97.1 99.7 Wind speed 150ft 97.1 99.8 Wind speed 197ft NA 99.8 Wind direction 33ft 98.1 98.0 Wind direction 150ft 98.1 94.8 Wind direction 197ft NA 97.9 Temperature 33ft 97.2 99.8 Dew point temperature 33ft 92.9 99.9 Delta temperature 150-33ft 97.2 96.5 Delta temperature 197-33f t NA 97.0 Rainfall 98.9 NA Composite Wind speed and direction 33ft, 96.3 95.4 delta temperature 150-33ft*
Wind speed and direction 150ft, 96.3
- 91. 4 delta temperature 150-33ft*
i NA - Not Available
- The height for the new tower is approximately 45m or 148ft.
I l
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l m
Table 2 Vogtle Old and New Meteorological Towers Wind Speed Comparison
~
33Ft 33FT 148Ft 150Ft New Tower Old Tower New Tower Old Tower February 7.1 6.6 10.6 10.1 March 6.5 8.1 10.8 11.9 April-
- 7. 3 8.0 10.2 11.1 98 6
9
(
1 l
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I
i Table 3
\\
Vogtle Old and New Meteorological lowers
\\
Temperature Comparison i
Ambient Temperature *F Dew Point Temperature 'F New Tower Old Tower New Tower Old Tower February 49.7 50.1 35.9 36.2 March 54.2 56.7 42.3 40.9 April 59.0 62.0 42.5 46.2 o
t l
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.. _ _ _... _.. _ _. _ _ _.. _. _ _ _.., _ _ ~ _ _. _ _., _ _ _. _ _. _.. _ _ _.. _, _. _ _ _. _ _
m Tchle 4 1 cf 8 Old Meteorological Tower Joint' Frequency Table of Wind Speed and Direction 33ft-versus Delta TemperaNre 150-33ft 2/1/8A - 4/30/84 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION-PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
A DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 3
3 3
0 0
9 NNE 1
5 6
0 0
0 12 NE 8
2 1
0 0
0 3
Erie 2
1 2
0 0
0 5
E O
3 10 4
0 0
17 ESE O
O 4
2 0
0 6
SE 1
1 1
1 0
0 4
SSE O
O O
O O
O O
S 8
0 0
0 0
0 0
SSU 0
0 0
2 0
0 2
SU 3
6 8
14 2
0 33 USU 0
10 12 13 3
0 38 U
1 21 42 26 0
0 90 UNU 0
7 18 20 1
0 46 NU 2
12 16 1
0 0
31 NNU 1
8 5
0 0
0 14 TOTAL 11 79 128 86 6
0 310 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
m 4
Table 4 (continued) 2 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE
~
HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION i
PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
B DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEEDUfH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 5
1 2
0 0
9 NNE O
3 1
3 0
0
?
NE 8
1 3
0 0
0 4
ENE 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
E O
1 0
0-0 0
1 ESE O
O O
1 0
0 1
SE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
SSE O
O O
O O
O O
S 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SSU 0
0 2
0 0
0 2
SU 0
0 3
0 0
0 3
USU 0
0 3
1 2
0 6
U 0
2 8
0 0
0 10 LMU 0
5 0
3 0
0 8
NW 1
1 1
0 0
0 3
NNU 0
2 0
0 0
0 2
TOTAL 3
20 23 10 2
0 58 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
i HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80 F
+
Table 4 (continued) 3 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND' DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
C DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PFH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 1
3 0
0 0
4 NNE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
NE O
O 1
1 0
0 2
ENE O
O O
O O
O O
E O
1 0
0-0 0
1 ESE O
8 0
0 0
0 0
SE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
SSE O
O O
8 0
0 0
S 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SSU 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SU 0
0 3
0 0
0 3
USU 0
3 2
0 1
0 6
U 0
1 2
1 0
0 4
IJiu 1
2 0
2 0
0 S
NU 1
1 0
0 0
0 2
NNU 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
TOTAL 2
11 11 4
1 0
29 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
Table 4 (ctntinued) 4 cf 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED ANO" DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
D DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (ifH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
2 10 4
2 0
0 20 NNE 1
5 5
5 0
0 16 NE 4
6 3
8 0
0 21 ENE O
3 7
4 0
0 14 E
2 6
7 11 -
1 0
27 ESE O
17 15 5
2 0
39 SE O
10 20 5
0 0
35 SSE 1
6 16 3
0 0
26
~
S 1
10 18 8
0 0
37 SSU 0
3 16 3
1 0
23 SU 1
7 9
14 0
0 31 USU 1
5 13 16 5
0 40 W
3 12 22 13 2
0 52 LMU 3
12 13 2
0 0
30 NU 3
10 4
1 0
0 18 NNU 2
10
-4 1
0 0
17 TOTAL 24 132 178 101 11 0
446 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
P Table 4 (continued) 5 of 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
E DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PFH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
2 8
2 1
0 0
15 NNE 3
4 4
0 0
0 14 NE 5
9 5
0 0
0 49 ENE 3
19 12 2
0 0
36 E
5 12 13 5-1 0
36 ESE 8
37 21 4
1 0
71 SE 4
42 21 7
0 0
75 SSE 2
33 20 8.
0 0
55 S
2 21 20-2 0
0 45 SSU 1
16 10 3
1 0
31 SU 3
12 15 9
0 0
39 USU S
24 14 10 1
0 54 U
9 41 46 1
0 0
97 IAtu 8
45 23 2
0 0
79 NU 5
12 13 1
0 0
34 NNU S
10 5
0 0
0 21 TOTAL 70 345 47 4
0 721
______________________________244 PERIDDS OF. CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80 9
Table 4 (continued) 6 of 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
F DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (IPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
6 3
1 0-0 0
14 NNE 4
3 0
0 0
0 7
NE 4
7 2
0 0
0 13 ENE 5
2 1
0 0
0 8
E 1
7 0
0.
0 0
9 ESE 9
8 1
0 0
0 18 SE 12 7
1 0
0 0
20 SSE 7
16 1
1 0
0 25 S
3 19 0
0 0
0 22 SSU 1
5 0
0 0
0 6
-SU 2
8 0
0 0
0 10 USU 2
25 4
0 0
0 32 U
7 27 1
0 0
0 35 UNU 10 15 2
0 0
0 27 NU 8
4 0
0 0
0 13 NNU 1
8 0
0 0
0 13 TOTAL 82 164 14 1
0 0
272 PERIODS OF CALN(HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
1:3URS OF MISSING DATA:
80
Table 4 (continued) 7 of 8 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
G DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (ifH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
8 7
1 0
0 0
24 NNE 9
4 0
0 0
0 15 NE S
3 0
0 0
0 11 ENE 7
2 0
0 0
0 11 E
S 3
0 0
-0 0
9 ESE 3
5 0
0 0
0 8
SE 10 1
0 0
0 0
12 SSE 2
8 0
0 4
0 10 S
2 10 0
0 6
0 12 SSU S
8 1
0 0
0 14 SW 2
18 0
0 0
0 20 USU 4
17 2
0 0
0 23 U
8 19 0
0 0
0 27 LFlu
?
9 1
0 0
0 17 NU S
3 0
0 0
0 13 NNU 8
5 0
0 0
0 18 TOTAL 90 122 5
0 0
0 244 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
Table 4 (continued) 8 of'8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-8404?024 STABILITY CLASS:
ALL DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 1 DIRECTION:DIR 1 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PFH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
.>24 TOTAL N
19 37 15 8
0 0
95 NNE 18 25 16 8
0 0
72 NE 18 28 15 9
0 0
73 ENE 18 27 22 6
0 0
75 E
13 33 30 20.
2 0
100 ESE 20 67 41 12 3
0 143 SL 27 62 44 13 0
0 148 SSE 12 63 37 4
0 0
116 S
8 60 38 10 0
0 116 SSU
?
32 29 8
2 0
78 SU 11 51 38 37 2
0 139 USU 12 84 50 40 12 0
199 U
28 123 121 41 2
0 315 Litu 29 95 57 29 1
0 212 NU 25 43 34 3
0 0
114 NNU 17 43 14 1
0 0
85 TOTAL 282 873 601 249 24 0
2080 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80 l
l t
Table 5 1 cf. 8 Old Meteorological Tower Joint Frequency Table of Wind Speed and Direction 150ft s
versus Delta Temperature 150-33ft 2/1/84 - 4/30/84 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND QIRECtION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024-STABILITY CLASS:
A DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PFH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 4
7 1
1 0
13 NNE B
2 4
1 1
0 8
NE O
4 0
0 0
0 4
ENE 1
1 1
0 0
0 3
E O
4 9
5 0
0 18 ESE O
O 3
3 0
0 6
SE O
O 1
1 0
0 2
SSE 2
1 0
0 8
0 3
S 0
1-1 0
0 0
2 SSU 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
SU 2
2 6
2 1
1 14 USU 0
4 18 16 14 2
54 U
1 16 33 24 15 1
90 UNU 0
4 16 19 13 3
55 NU 1
5 10 6
0 0
22 NNU 0
2
.12 1
0 0
15 TOTAL 7
51 121 79 45 7
310 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
?
Table 5 (centinued) 2 cf 8 l
j SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
B DT/DZ j
ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PFH)
UIND l
DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL l
N 0
S 0
S 0
0 10 l
NNE 1
2 2
1 0
0-6 tE O
O O
O E
O 2
0 0
0 0
2 ESE O
8 0
1 0
0 1
SE O
O 1
0 C
0 1
SSE O
O O
O O
O O
S 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
SSU 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SU 0
0 1
2 0
0 3
USU 0
0 2
2 1
1 6
i U
0 1
3 4
2 0
10 Litu 0
0 3
3 1
1 8
NU 0
1 3
0 0
0 4
NNU 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
i
, TOTAL 4
12 17 19 4
2 S8 l
i PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
2 HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
88 l
I Table 5 (continued) 3 cf 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
C DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEEDGPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O O
3 1
0 0
4 NNE O
O 1
0 1
0 2
NE O
O O
O O
O O
ENE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
E O
O O
O-0 0
0 ESE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
SE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
SSE 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
S 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SSU 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SU 0
0 3
0 0
1 4
USU 0
0 2
2 0
0 4
U 0
2 1
0 0
0 3
LMU 1
1 0
1 1
2 6
NU 0
2 1
0 0
0 3
NNU 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
Tabic 5 /j.;ontinued) 4 cf 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84828101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
D DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 WIND SPEED (PPH)
WIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TUTAL.
N 8
7 9
4 8
8 28 NNE 2
3 4
9 4
8 22 NE 1
6 3
5 8
8 15 ENE 1
5 4
3 1
0 14 E
8 3
4 14 -
2 0
23 ESE 2
18 5
13 '
2 8
32 SE 8
6 26 10 8
8 42 SSE 1
6 12 7
2 0
28 S
1 5
18 17 2
0 35 SSW 3
6 9
8 2
2 38 SW 1
5
-7 12 5
1 31 USW 8
1 11 7.
11 3
33 W
8 8
28 16 13 4
61 LMW 8
2 11 11 3
0 27 NW 2
5 7
3 1
8 18 NNW 2
5 7
8 1
0 15
-TOTAL 16 83 149 139 49 18 446 i
-PERIDDS OF CALM (HOURS):
8 l
UARIABLE DIRECTION 8
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
88 l
l t
Table 5 (continued) 5 cf 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
E DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (ffH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 5
9 2
0 0
16 NNE 1
4 1
0 1
0 7
NE B
5 5
3 0
0 13 ENE 3
10 7
9 1
0 31 E
2 13 10 10 -
2 0
38 ESE 1
11 22 6
1 0
41 SE 4
23 43 12 0
0 82 SSE 1
14 48 11 2
0 76 S
2 11 41 11 1
0 66 SSU 1
11 12 7
1 1
34 SU 1
5 19 7
8 0
40 USU 3
7 21 14 9
1 55 U
0 7
32 33 2
1 76 tstu 2
10 38 38 1
0 89 NU 5
8 12 13
'2 0
40 NNU 1
5 7
4 0
0 17 TOTAL 27 149 327 180 31 3
721
-PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80 9
.l Table 5 (continued) 6 of 8 SITE: UDGTLE t
HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED ANDPDIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
F DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTI0ri-DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEED (PPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
0 1
1 2
0 0
5 NNE 1
3 2
1 0
0 7
NE O
O 2
0 0
0 2
ENE 1
1 6
2 0
0 10 E
O 6
7 0-0 0
14 ESE B
5 6
0 0
0 11 SE 1
10 13 0
0 0
24 SSE 1
4 14 3
0 0
22 S
3 10 22 2
0 0
37 SSU 2
2 8
0 0
0 12 SU 0
1 15 3
0 0
20 USU 0
3 14 7
0 0
24 U
0 3
14 16 0
0 33 Lriu 8
4 15 5
0 0
24 NU 3
3 6
3 0
0 15 NNU 1
1 8
2 0
0 12 TOTAL 13 57 153 46 0
0 272 PERIODS OF CALM (HCURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
Tcble 5 (continued) 7 cf 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
G DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 UIND SPEEDUPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 4
3 0
0 0
8 NNE O
4 6
1 0
0 11 NE O
5 3
0 0
0 8
ENE 2
6 2
2 0
0 13 E
O 4
1 0.
0 0
5 ESE 2
5 3
0 0
0 10 SE 1
7 7
0 0
0 15 SSE 1
6 7
2 0
0 16 S
2 7
11 2
0 0
22 SSU 1
12 13 2
0 0
28 SU 1
4 15 10 0
0 30 USU 1
4 9
8 0
0 22 U
2 3
12 7
0 0
24 Lttu 1
9 5
4 0
0 19 NU 1
2 4
1 0
0 8
NNU 0
2 3
0 0
0 5
TOTAL 16 84 104 39 0
0 244 PERIDOS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80
-Table 5 (continued) 8 ef 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
ALL DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 2 DIRECTION:DIR 2 LAPSE:DT 2 i
UIND SPEED (ifH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL I
N 1
26 32 15 1
0 76
)
NNE 5
18 20 13 7
0 63 NE 1
21 13 9'
8 0
44 ENE 10 23 22 16 2
0 75
}
E 2
32 31 29 -
4 0
100 ESE 5
32 39 23 3
0 102 SE 6
47 91 23 0
0 167 SSE 6
31 81.
23 4
0 145 S
9 34 85 32 3
0 163 i
SSU 7
32 42 17 3
3 105 i
SU 5
17 66 36 14 3
142 l
USU 4
19
??
56 35 7
198 i
U 3
40 115 100 32 6
297 IJiu 4
30 88 81 19 6
228 j
NU 12 26 43 26 3
0 110
'l FINU 4
15 38 7
1 0
65 TOTAL 84 443 883 506 131 25 2080 1
PERIODS OF CALN(HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
80 E
.9
~,
1 of 8
-._ Table 6 y
New Meteorological Tower Joint Frequency c
c Table of Wind Speed and Direction 33ft versus Delta Temperature 148-33ft 2/1/84'- 4/30/84 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
A DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
UIND u
DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 9
3 0
0 0
13 NNE 1
4 2
0 0
0 7
NE 8
4 1
0 0
0 5
ENE 1
7 1
0 0
0 9
E 1
3 3
0 -
0 0
?
ESE 1
5 6
1 0
0 13 SE 1
4 8
1 0
0 14 SSE 1
8 9
0 0
0 18 S
1 16 7-0 0
0 24 SSU 2
4 15 1
1 0
23 SU 1
16 20 13 1
0 51 USU 0
27 41 20 1
0 89 U
1 12 38 34 2
0 87 UNU 0
7 7
11 0
0 25 NU 0
5 6
0 0
0 11 NNU 2
8 4
0 0
0 14 TOTAL 14 139 171 81 5
0 410 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99
Table 6 (continued) 2 of 8 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
B DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (ifH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 4
0 1
0 0
5 NNE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
NE O
3 0
0 0
0 3
ENE O
6 1
0 0
0
?
E O
1 5
1 -
0 0
7 ESE 1
1 2
0 0
0 4
SE O
1 2
0 0
0 3
SSE O
2 1
0 0
0 3
S 1
4 2
1 0
0 8
SSU 0
2 3
1 0
0 6
SU 0
5 7
2 0
0 14 USU 0
4 0
3 0
0 7
U 0
4 6
3 0
0 13 LMU 0
1 4
0 0
0 5
NU 0
5 4
0 0
0 9
NNU 1
2 2
0 0
0 5
TOTAL 3
4S 40 12 0
0 100 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99
Table 6 (continued) 3 cf 8 SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DJRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024
.i STABILITY CLASS:
C DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (ifH) i UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 0
0 1
0 0
2 i
NNE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
NE O
1 1
0 0
0 2
l ENE O
1 2
0 0
0 3
E 2
1 0
3 0
0 6
ESE O
2 0
1 0
0 3
SE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
SSE O
2 1
0 0
0 3
S 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
~
j SSU 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
SU 1
1 1
0 0
0 3
USU 0
4 0
2 0
0 6
U 0
S 2
2 0
0 9
UNU 0
4 1
1 0
0 6
NU 0
4 3
0 0
0 7
NNU 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
I
[
TOTAL 4
28 13 10 0
0 SS PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 UARIABLE DIRECTION O
l HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99 4
Table 6 (continued) 4 of 8 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
D DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL 3
l N
2 18 14 4
0 0
38 NNE 1
5 12 9
1 0
28 NE 1
7 13 3
0 0
24 ENE 2
13 10 1
0 0
26 E
S 24 22 10 2
0 63 ESE 1
26 25 7
0 0
59 SE 1
16 13 0
0 0
30 SSE 1
14 10 0
0 0
25 S
2 14 10 0
0 0
26 SSU 1
8 4
0 1
0 14 SU 1
8 8
3 0
0 20 USU 0
21 13 26 1
0 61 U
2 22 40 12 1
0 77 UNU 2
12 15 1
0 0
30 NU 1
17 6
0 0
0 24 NNU 0
17 2
2 0
0 21 TOTAL 23 242 217 78 6
0 566 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99 1
m
Table 6 (continued) 5 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
E DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (ifH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
3 6
0 0
0 0
9 ilNE 2
2 0
0 0
0 4
tie 1
5 4
0 0
0 10 ENE 7
4 6
0 0
0 17 E
3 12 6
1 0
0 22 ESE 2
33 1
0 0
0 36 SE 2
27 7
0 0
0 36 SSE 6
24 4
0 0
0 34 S
1 18 4
0 0
0 23 SSU 1
9 6
0 0
0 16 SU 2
25 10 6
0 0
43 USU 2
43 16 2
0 0
63 U
9 49 26 0
0 0
84 Utfu 3
18 11 0
0 0
32 NU 2
11 3
1 0
0 17 NNU 3
11 0
0 0
0 14 TOTAL 49 297 104 10 0
0 460 PERIODS OF CALM (h?URS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99
Table 6 (continu:d) 6 cf 8 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
F DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 2
0 0
0 0
2 l
NNE 4
2 1
0 0
0
?
NE 6
5 0
0 0
0 11 ENE 2
9 2
0 0
0 13 E
2 6
0 0-0 0
8 ESE 4
5 0
0 0
0 9
?
6 0
0 0
0 13 4
i SSE 8
15 0
0 0
0 23 3
3 6
0 0
0 0
9 SSU 2
6 0
0
~0 0
8 i
SU 1
28 1
0 0
0 30 USU 4
30 0
0 0
0 34 U
2 16 3
1 0
0 22 i
UNU 4
12 0
0 0
0 16 NU 2
5 0
0 0
0 7
NNU 3
5 0
0 0
0 8
-TOTAL S4 1S8 7
1 0
0 220 j
PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99 i
i i
e
Table 6 (continued) 7 of 8-I l
4
(
SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF. RECORD -
84020181-84043024 l
STABILITY CLASS:
G
- DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3 WIND SPEEDOPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL j
N 3
3 0
0 0
0 6
NNE 8
0 1
0 0
0 9
i NE 3
8 0
0 0
0 11 ENE 11 3
0 0
0 0
14 i
E 12 4
0 0-0 0
16 I
ESE 10 4
0 0
0 0
14 SE
?
9 0
0 0
0 16 SSE 4
13 1
0 0
0 18 S
7 IS 0
0 0
0 22 I
SSU 9
9 0
0 0
0 18 SU 10 18 0
0 0
0 28 USU 9
1S 0
0 0
0 2S U
S 16 0
1 0
0 22 LFlu 4
4 1
0 0
0 9
i NU 3
1 0
0' O
O 4
I NNU 8
10 0
0 0
8 18 i
TOTAL 113 132 3
1 0
0 2S0 PERIODS OF' CALM (HOURS):
1 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
l HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99 1
i
b leole 6 (continued) 8 of 8 i
SITE: V0GTLE s
l HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND.DJRECTION t
PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
ALL DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 3 DIRECTION:DIR 3 LAPSE:DT 3-UIND SPEED &FH)
UIND i
DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
10 42 17 6
0 0
75 NNE 16 14 17 9
1 0
57 NE 11 33 19 3
0 0
66
,l ENE 23 43 22 1
0 0
89 E
25 51 36 15 -
2 0
129 ESE 19 76 34 9
0 0
138
~SE 18 63 31 1
0 0
113 SSE 20
'/8 26 0
0 0
124 i
S 15-74 23 1
0 0
113 SSU 15 39 28 2
2 0
86 SU 16 101 47 24 1
0 189 USU 15 144 70 53 2
0 285 U
19 124 115 53 3
0 314 LMU 13 58 39 13 0
0 123 j
NU
-8 48 22 1
0 0
79 NNU 17 53 9
2 0
0 81 i
TOTAL 260 1841 555 193 11 0
2061 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
1 i
VARIABLE DIRECTION O
j HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
99
I c
Table 7 1 of 8 New Meteorological Tower Joint Frequency-Table of Wind Speed and Direction 148ft versus Delta Temperature 148-33ft 2/1/84 - 4/30/84 SITE: V0GTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
A DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3
-UIND SPEED (ffH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 6
3
'O O
O 10 NNE O
8 0
0 0
0 8
NE 1
7 1
0 0
0 9
ENE 2
2 2
0 0
0 6
E O
O 2
0 0
0 2
ESE O
4 3
0 0
0 7
SE 1
3 12 7
0 0
23 SSE 1
9 10 3
0 0
23 S
2 S
11 4
0 0
22 SSU 1
?
9 S
1 2
2S SU 0
6 13 18
?
O 44 USU 2
12 3S 17 12 2
80 U
1 S
19 30 IS 1
71 Urlu 1
4 10 10 9
3 37 NU 0
8 10 1
0 0
19-NNU 0
3 4
0 0
0 7
TOTAL 13
~
89 144 9S 44 8
393 PERbbbbFCALMHbbRh$
b VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
18S
Table 7 (centinued) 2 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
B DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (PPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
0 4
1 0
0 0
S NNE O
1 1
1 0
0 3
NE O
3 0
0 0
0 3
ENE 1
2 1
0 0
0 4
E O
3 2
2-0 0
7 ESE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
SE O
1 3
3 0
0 7
i SSE O
3 1
0 0
0 4
S 0
1 0
3 0
0 4
SSU 0
2 1
0 1
0 4
i SU 0
2 3
S 1
1 12 USU 0
3 7
1 2
0 13 U
0 1
3 2
0 1
7 WU 1
0 3
1 0
1 6
NU
-0 3
3 1
0 0
?
NNU 0
1 2
0 0
0 3
TOTAL 2
30 32 19 4
3 90 l
1 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
j HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
18S i
Table 7 (continued) 3 of 8 1
SITE: UDGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 4
STABILITY CLASS:
C DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (PPH)
WIND I
DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 0
1 1
0 0
3 NNE O
2 0
0 0
0 2
j NE O
1 2
0 0
0 3-1 ENE O
O 2
1 0
0 3
'E O
O 1
2-0 0
3 ESE O
O O
1 0
0 1
SE O
O 1
0 0
0 1
SSE O
1 0
0 0
0 1
S 0
1 1.
0 0
0 2
SSU 0
1 1
0 0
0 2
SU O_
1 0
1 0
0 2
USU 0
2-1 0
1 1
5 U
1 4
1 0
2 0
8 UNU 0
2 2
3 0
0 7
NU 0
2 2
8.
0-0 4
NNU 0
3 2
0 0
0 5
l
-TOTAL 2
20 17 9
3 1
52 l
PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
i HOURS DF MISSING DATA:
185 1
k
Table 7 (continued) 4 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020181-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
D DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (ifH) l UIND i
DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
1 13 13 5
0 0
32 NNE 1
9 7
16 2
0 35 NE 1
3 11 4
1 0
20 ENE 2
5 10 4
0 0
21 E
1 13 15 18 1
0 48 ESE 1
12 22 17 1
0 53 SE O
10 17 16 0
0 43 SSE O
5 17 5
1 0
28 S
1 10 13 4
0 0
28 l
SSU 0
2 6
4 0
1 13 i
SU 1
2 7
4 4
1 19 l
USU 0
6.
14 10 16 4
50 i
U 0
10 18 33 11 3
75 l
UNU 0
9 25 12 1
1 48 i
NU 0
8 10 3
0 0
21 NNU 1
9 9
1 2
0 22 i
TOTAL 10 126 214 156 40 10 556 PERIODS DF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
185 i
t
Table 7 (c:ntinued)-
5 cf 8 5
e SITE: V0GTLE s
HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIfECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
E DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (PPH) i UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
0 5
2 0
0 0
?
NNE 2
2 1
0 0
0 5
NE 8
3 5
2 0
0 10 ENE O
1 5
1 0
0
?
I E
O 5
5 2
0 0
12 ESE O
8 19-0 1
0 28 i
SE O
4 33 9
0 0
46 SSE 1
5 24 4
0 0
34 S
0 8
9 3
0 0
20 j
SSU 1
2 4
7 0
0 14 i
SU 3
4 13 11 4
2 37 USU 2
10 30 15 1
0 58 i
U 1
7 34 34 0
0 76 UNU 0
3 24 19 1
0 47 NU 1
11 10 2
0 0
-24 NNU 2
4
?
1 0
0 14 j
TOTAL 13 82 225 110 7
2 439 4
l PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
4
' HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
185 2
~
Table 7 (continu d)
~6 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE-HOURS AT EACH UIND' SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
F DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
0 1
1 0
0 0
2 NNE O
3 2
0 0
0 S
NE 1
0-2 0
0 0
3 ENE O
2 8
0 0
0 10 E
O 7
3 0 -
0 0
10 ESE 1
4 8
0 0
0 13 SE 1
2 6
0 0
0 9
SSE O
6 20 2
0 0
28 S
1
-11
.6 0
0 0
18 SSU 2
3 4
2.
0 0
11 SU 1
1 14 7
0 0
23 USU 0
2 22 4
0 0
28 U
O' 1
12 9
1 0
23 UNU 0
1 11 3
0 0
1S NU 1
3 6
0 0
0 10 NNU 1
3 4
0 0
0 8
TOTAL 9
SB 129 27 1
0 216 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION 0
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
18S
Table 7 (continued) 7 of 8 SITE: UOGTLE HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
G DT/DZ ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
WIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
O 6
3 0
0 0
9 NNE 1
3 3
0 0
0 7
NE O
6 5
0 0
0 11 ENE O
6 2
0 0
0 8
E 2
3 1
0-0 0
6 ESE 3
5 6
0 0
0 14 SE 1
5 5
0 0
0.
11 SSE 1
8 12 2
0 0
23 i
S 3
8
?
O O
O 18 i
SSU 1
9 12 0
0 0
22 SU 0
9 12 5
0 0
26 USU 1
9 11 6
0 0
27 I
U 0
3 10 5
1 0
19 UNU 1
2 10 1
0 0
14
.NU 2
3 5
0 0
0 10 NNU 0
2 2
0 0
0 4
i TOTAL 16 87 106 19 1
0 229 i
PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 VARIABLE DIRECTION O
HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
185
Table 7 (ccntinu d) 8 of-8 I
SITE: UDGTLE i
1 HOURS AT EACH UIND SPEED AND DIRECTION PERIOD OF RECORD =
84020101-84043024 STABILITY CLASS:
ALL DT/DZ i
4 ELEVATION:
SPEED:SPD 4 DIRECTION:DIR 4 LAPSE:DT 3 UIND SPEED (MPH)
UIND DIRECTION 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24
>24 TOTAL N
3 35 24 6
0 0
68
}
NNE 4
28 14 17 2
0 65 NE 3
23 26 6
1 0
59 2
l ENE 5
18 30 6
0 0
59 E
3 31 29 24 1
0 88 ESE 5
33 59 18 2
0 117 SE 3
25 77 35 0
0 140 SSE 3
37 84 16 1
0 141 S
7 44 47 14 0
0 112 SSU 5
26 37 18 2
3 91 SU 5
25
'62 51 16 4
163 USU 5
44 120 53 32-7 261 i
U 3
31 97 113 30 5
279 l
t#1U 3
21 85 49 11 5
174-NU 4
38 46 7
0 0
95 j
NNU 4
25 30 2
2 0
63 TOTAL 65 484 867-435 100 24 1975 PERIODS OF CALM (HOURS):
0 l
.UARIABLE DIRECTION O
i HOURS OF MISSING DATA:
185 1
i
Table 8 Vogtle Old and New Meteorological Towers Stability Percentage Comparison Old Meteorological Tower New Meteorological Tower Stability 125 and WD 33ft, DT 150-33ft WS and WD 33ft, DT 148-33f t Class A
14.9 19.8 B
2.8 4.9 C
1.4 2.7 D
21.4 27.5 E
34.7 22.3 F
13.1 10.7 G
11.7 12.1 l
I l
\\
l l
l l
4
... m.
- 51..-.
A g E.
i!!
9 R
E
=
1 M
M 3
=
2
=
7b 3=
=
E$
E E
o
-g gg d%D rs
~ 2.S R
,9 y a ge as E,3 o '
o C E5E
>n sos
==N O
III[
ae 1[
Ill
.g.
Elli tttt EEEE
<+4+
=
1 1
Figure 2 Plant Vogtle 150ft level Old fleteorological Tower-2/1/84 - 4/30/84 o
e =
Jt La =
i
=
=
=
WIND ROSE (UINDS FROM)
M i
u
, Wine ePEEo uss ruan s.s ePn
, WIND SPEED Liss THAM 7.5 MPH gWINS $ PEES LESS TM4n 12.5 MPM eWIMO $ PEED GetaTEa THaN 12.5 MPH 4.4 PERCENT CALPS (CA*MS CEFINED As SPEED LEsg twan e.5 3
II l
1 e
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- Discussion of Water Losses Near the Top and Base'of Marl in' Hole 107 LDuring the'Feb.L12, 1985 NRC-Applicant meet'ing on ground water conditions
.at Plant Vogtle,Lthe staff requested the applicant to discuss the cause of
~
water' loss at the4 top and bottom of the. marl shown on the log for hole.107.
C 2The'following is a short discussion on the water losses, based solel'y on the drill logs.
The drill log for 107 indicates that the. top of the marl is at a-depth of
- 74 ft and.that-NX casing was set to 75 ft.
The next drive sample was taken from-78.5 to 80.0 ft.
The log' reports a water loss at a depth of 79.5 ft or while sampling was underway. The jarring action of' drive sampling
-in the casing probably caused 'a-loss of the seal between the casing and the-marl. The. casing.was.then advanced to 87.0 ft.
No additional fluid loss occurred until near the base of the marl, which is expected. Setting the. casing.only one foot into the marl was not normal practice, the casing more'was; commonly set 5 ft;into the marl.
A fluid loss at the' base of.the marl occurred at'a depth of 140 ft.
The contact between the marl and underlying silty sand is shown to be at 143 ft.. The base of.the marl is. frequently altered.or becomes gradationally more sandy.at its contact with-the silty sand. The lower sands are more permeable and typically result in fluid loss. The contact between geologic units was determined primarily with the split spoon samples taken every 5 ft.
~The contacti could. occur between 140 and 143.5 ft.
The log for drill hole 107A located.15.f t to the east-northeast of 107 shows the base of the marl Lat'137.5.ft.
Therefore, the loss of fluid at 107 could have occurred at
~
the contact between the marl and the underlying sands.
.The' marl between these fluid loss areas at the top and bottom did not show any evidence of fluid loss or zones of soft material. This 60 ft consistently impervious material which provides a competent. bearing strata as well as-
.an1 effective aquiclude between aquifers.
Drill, hole 107A did not' indicate any fluid loss in the same zones as 107
~nor did it show any soft, fractured or void zones near the top or base of l
'the marl. 'Therefore, it is believed that the fluid losses in 107 do not L
represent.a more permeable zone or void area within the marl.
g
Ewe.kO$t4ft. b VEGP-FSAR-6
- a 6.6.3 EXAMINATION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES The
- visual, surface,~and volumetric examination techniques and
. procedures.are-in accordance with the requirements of American
-[
Society of Mechanical Engineers Code,Section XI, subarticle IWA-2200 4-The liquid penetrant or magnetic particle methods are used for surface examinations. ' Radiography or ultrasonic methods,
,whether manual or remote, are used for volumetric examina'tions.
I The reportable indications and data compilation format provide for comparison of data from subsequent examinations.
GPC will apply the code cases listed in Regulatory Guide 1.147 on a case-by-case basis as the need arises during the preservice inspection.
No code cases will be used for the preservice or inservice inspection other than.those approved for us in Regulatory Guide 1.147.- When used for Section III, Class I construction these code cases will be identified in the FSAR.
l l
1 1
l e
i l-6.6.3-1 L'
m, Eu.los*ro D
RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 79-15 (SRP 3.10.2)
DSER OPEN ITEM 26K In response to IE Bulletin No. 79-15, the only deep draft pumps similar to those identified in the bulletin are the six (per unit) nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pumps and two (per unit) -NSCW transfer pumps. The functions of these pumps are described in subsections 9.2.1 and 9.2.5.
The salient data for these pumps are as follows:
.o < Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps Manufacturer: Bingham-Willamette Company
.Model:
18x27B VCM,:2 stage self-lubricated Rated Capacity: 8600 gpm at 230 feet TDH Overall Length:
94' - 3 3/4" Width (with motor):
3' - 5" o Nuclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pumps Manufacturer: Bingham-Willamatte Company Model: 8x12A VCM, 2 stage self-lubracated Rated Capacity: 600 gpm at 110 feet TDH Overall Length:
94' - 7/8"'
Width' (with motor):
2' - 4" As part of the program to ensure long-term operability of these pumps, the pump shafts are provided with reversable precipitation hardened stainless steel sleeves. The. sleeves are positioned against a shoulder, with keys used.to prevent rotation on the shaft.
Pump degradation due to debris, contamination, or' impurities in the process fluid is minimized by trash screens and. mud sills at the pump inlets, and by continuous control of the NSCW tower basin' chemistry. Also, as part of the inservice inspection program, pump performance (flow and head) will be periodically monitored in accordance with Section XI of the ASME code to detect pump performance degradation.
In addition, vibration sensors are mounted at each end of the pump shaf ts to detect bearing /shaf t sleeve problems.
Because the pumps are not yet installed and operational, there is as yet no list of pump startup, preoperationdi testing, operating experience, or maintenance.
Such information will be accumualated as it becomes available, and will be made available for inspection at the plant site. Also to be made available for inspection at the plant site will be:
o-Pump drawings, sectional assemblies, design specification (X4AF02),
and parts list o Quality assurance records The Equipment Qualification Data Package (EQDP), including results of o
the qualification program.
o Details of the procedure used to align the pump column m
m
SEP 131979 Georgia Power Company h
I Post Offee Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 3o302 Vogtle Project Te 404 s22-soso M. Z. JERIC September 7, 1979 SEP 131979 United States lluclear Regulatory Commission REFEREflCE:
RII: JP0 Office of Inspection and Enforcement 50-424 Region II - Suite 3100 50-425 101 Marietta Street File: X7BC24 Atlanta, GA 30303 Log:
GM-496 Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Gentlemen:
The following is submitted in response to your letter dated July 11,1979, concerning I.E.Bulletin 79-15.
Eight deep draft pumps, similar to those identified in the bulletin are utilized in the following safety related applications for each Vogtle
(
Unit:
6 iluclear Service Cooling Water Circulating Pumps (per unit) iluclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pumps (per unit) 2 The manufacturer, model, capacity and plant application for the N
pumps are:
iluclear Service Cooling Water Pumps Manufacturer: Bingham - Willamette Company Model:
18 x 27B VCM, 2 stage
.N Capacity:
8600 gpm, 230 TDH Application:
Cool various nuclear loads, s
fluclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pumps 'N, Manufacturer:
Bingham-Hillamette Company Model:
8 X 12A VCffM, 2 stage Capacity:
600 gpm, 110 TDMs Application:
Transfer water between cooling tower basins.
The byerall dimensions of the pumps are:
A n w n o n vi
'O v Ly t sq -
,~2 A
- s United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission G!1-496 September 7, 1979 Page 2 Nuclear Service Cooling Water Circulating Pumps Length:
94' 3/4" Width:
3' - 5" (w/ motor)
Nuclear Service Cooling Hater Transfer Pumps Length: 94' - 7/8" Width:
2' - 4" (w/ motor)
The information requested in items 4, 5 and 6 of the bulletin per-taining to start-up and oeprational information is not applicable to Plant Vogtle.
rul ours,,
)
Doug Dutto Project General 11anager CWH:tp xc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~ (
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, DC 20555 l
- 11. D. Hunt - USNRC, Region II gu wo_
m 1""YqFfS A g prX/
J. H. Miller, Jr.
W. E. Ehrensperger J"
L F. G. Mitchell, Jr.
59 13.fg f.
C. F. Whitmer R. J. Kelly R. E. Conway i... )
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R. W. Staffa 1i-i J. T. Beckham, Jr.
K. M. Gillespie Joe L.__,p *' :."
gi 6-r'
'C' d"+I [C~'
iC. W. Hayes
- E. D. Groover
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CLARIFICATION OPEN ITEM 32: LOOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM-VEGP's loose parts training program for operations personnel is equivalent to or would exceed a vendor program for loose parts training. The length of this course is one-half day. A course' outline is identified below for further information:
Describe the operations of piezoelectric accelerometers.
Give' the purpose and function of the DMIMS.
Describe the purpose,' function, and locations of these DMIMS components, a.
Accelerometer b.
Charge Preamplifier
- c. _ Signal Conditioner d.
_ Impact Monitor e.
-CPU and Intel Computer
-f. LAlarm Control g.
Audio Monitor
'h.
Integrity Monitor 1.
Impact Simulator.
Give the design criteria of the DMIMS.
Describe the inputs to and outputs'from the DMIMS.
- Describe the vendor supplied operation of the DMIMS.
Give. a practical example of two failures or accidents where DMIMS may be helpful.
Give the LCO, ACTION, and SURVEILLANCE requirements for the DMIMS.
r Ea\\osura G Additional Information For Open Item 64 The VEGP bypass and inoperable status panel, referred to as the System Status Monitoring Panel (SSMP), provides automatic, system level indication of inoper-able or bypass conditions.^.
c.....J in the following systems that are expected to be bypassed or inoperable more frequently than once per year.
Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (NSCW)
Component Cooling Water System (CCW)
Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System (ACCW)
Electrical Tunnel Ventilation System Diesel Generator Building HVAC System Standby Power System Diesel Generator Fuel Oil and Air Start System Safety Injection System (SI)
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
Auxlilary Feedwater System (AFW)
Containment Spray System (CS)
Esser.tial Chilled Water System Resicual Heat Removal System (RHR)
Containment Building Air Cooling System Auxiliary Building ESF Room Coolers Auxiliary Feedwarter Pumphouse HVAC Cortrol Building ESF Electrical Equipment Room HVAC Control Building Control Room HVAC Fuel Handling Building Purification and Exhaust System Control Building Electrical Penetration Room Filter and Exhaust' System Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pool Cooling and Purification System
~~
Tr ' : ti;t ' ' n.. ' -? : f : 2 -- "- ' ' '7 ' f - -"- *P ^-
l Because the VEGP SSMP does not automatically illuminate all of the interfaces i
between the various systems monitored, an initial assessment and response matrix is being developed (a preliminary copy of this matrix is attached).
l This matrix will be used by the Operator to determine which "-
r77^"
'" " systems are potentially inor.erable due to an initial automatic indication of an inoperable or bypass condition occuring for a specific moni-tored system.
Also, the matrix allows the Operator to illuminate all affected systems doe to an initial man /ual illumination of a SSMP window.
The Operator will manually illuminate the windows of systems identified by the matrix as l
being potentially inoperable by selecting the " Bypass" position on the window switch.
This matrix will be readily available to the Operator since it will be included in the Plant Data Book and will be referenced in Operations Admini-strative Procedure 10005-C " Operability Status Indication for Plant Safety Systems".
Subsequent to this initial rapid illumination of affected system windows, l'
the Operator will use an Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP 17004) as the diagnostic tool for detecting exactly what caused the initial automatic annunci-ation.
Upon discovery of the initial failure / problem, ARP 17004 will direct the Operator to begin corrective action and also to update the SSMP to extin-guish those system windows proven to be unaffected.
This will leave only those windows illuminated which have systems / components truly inoperable, b
s
' Additional Information For Open Item 64 - Continuation Sheet Page 2 of 2 This methodology, as described above, will be used for all SSMP window illumina-tions-except those which occur from a pre-planned evolution.
For pre-planned evolutions only the initial illumination of-the SSMP utilizing the matrix will-be ' performed.
The SSMP.will then be restored at the conclusion of the evolution.
J.
S 9
9 0
~
I INTERTIE MATRIX Impacted Sys.
us*
u o
o e
L U
U
=
=
R E E s
s 5
5 0 %
M h h 5 5 E
2 m
=
2
=
m 0e O
E 5 S @ 5 5 5 & S 8 h 5 Inoperable 'Syste
.$ 8 W b m
NSCW h D D
I D
D D
D D
D I-1 I
D I
\\
D D
\\
\\
\\ D D
D
'CVCS D \\
\\
\\
RHR D
D
\\
CNitTGLG
\\
I I
I I
\\
D D
D D
I ECW I
l ABSF/AFW I
I I
I I
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I CBSF-I I
I I
I I
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PPEN I
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D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D D \\ D
-CNMTH2-
\\
TDAFW TABLE 2 LEGEND:
.D = Directly-Impacted I =l Indirectly Impacted h'
(.
OMEb gpI M VEGP-FSAR-9 q.
i-i 9.2.7.2.3.2 Emergency Operation.
The reactor makeup water J
system is also designed to provide a backup source of makeup water for the spent fuel pool, component cooling water system, auxiliary component cooling water system, and the ESF chilled water systems.y The water is delivered through manual operation of the reactor makeup pumps in conjunction with the seismically designed portion of the piping and' valving.
The pumps are
. manually loaded onto the non-1E emergency bus after all safety loads have been automatically sequenced.
In addition, makeup water can be provided to the spent fuel pool via the Seismic Category 1 header, using gravity as the driving head instead of the pumps.
D
'9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation x
Tnenf coo /,%~ RfEh #gsfem d*hty dompone Opo6 Mer Midem ard St.\\
i AEsF cAille/
The p rtion of the eactor makeup water syst'em require o
as a. backup source of makeup water for the spent fuel kkler system.
serv pool is designed and built to Seismic Category 1 requirements.
/he iping between the safety-related reactor makeup water tank h
anda ther safety-related systems is Seismic Category 1.
Two Q
9eismic Category 1 air-operated isolation valves are provided 40 to. effectively separate the seismic piping from the nonseismic j
. portion of the system.
These valves receive train-related electrical power and are controllable from the main control room.
In addition, the Seismic Category 1 header is automatically l isolated from the Seismic Category 2 header on a low-level signal from the reactor makeup water tank.
. Since makeup water is not required immediately following a design basis event, the reactor makeup water pumps are not considered safety _relatad.
However, they are seismically designed and follow the material requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers III, Class 3.
This ensures the integrity of the flow path and provides reasonable assurance of the operability of the pumps. ' Power for the pumps is supplied from train-related, non-1E electrical buses.
In an emergency, I
these non-1E buses can be manually loaded onto the 1E'onsite
. power source-once the automatically started, safety-related loads are running.
Should both motors fail, the Seismic
< Category-1 piping and pump casings provide a flow path to allow gravity-induced flow from the storage tank to the spent fuel pool.
9.2.7.4 Tests and Inspections No special tests or features for unique inspection capability are provided since the system is normally in continuous i
operation and individual components are readily accessible.
9.2.7-5 w,.
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INSE2 T liow ever, as dis cussed in ca bsec/ tons L7.2, 9. 2.2 and 9 2.9' nukeup waler 10' lhe componen/ coolg waler spslem, auxi/ tag coniponen / eooAng wafer syslen.
and E6F chilled waler dylear is nol repired for sa fe dAu/down o/ /Ae p/onLad ss discussed in Subseclion
- 9. /. s
/Ae rencfor tnskeup wa/er 6/orage /ank is one o/ /Aree 6ources of nukeup wafer lo
+h e spenf fael pool.
TAe o/Jer Iwo dources are fhe.
Yeluelins waler 6 fora 3e. IanL (a. seismic.
cource) 6nd 1%e.
densenerolleed fouler dystem (4-nondeismic Source).
There fore tnake up waler lo
/A -
spen / 4e/ pool is avallaile fror r a llernafe sources if fAe reac:for makeap waer 3;1slen. 4 Is and.
inakeup u>afer is required.
T Even thougA f i/~re of /Ae reaclar makeup waler cys/em wi//
nof esmpromise the safely of /Ae plan /,
f
+
.e
7
-VEGP-FSAR-7.
~7.6.6 INTERLOCKS' ISOLATING SAFETY SYSTEMS FROM NONSAFETY SYST MS
'M M e-dek/e/.
't'
~ T a
7.6.6.1 Reactor-Makeup Water-Storage Tank Isolation
- 7. 6..1.1 ' Description J
.hr j. A's des ibed:in detail in subsection 9.2.7, the' reactor ~
1(eup
, water st rage tank (RMWST)-supplies the makeup water to, e
plant's a tems through both seismic and nonseismic p ing.
7
- Four air-o rated,' seismically qualified, train-ori ted valves are provide for isolation of seismic from nonseis e portions of the system.
All~ valves fail closed upon the oss of instrument air and/or control power.
The valve, arrangement provides comple e redundancy of.the isolation unction; two valves,'each con rolled by a different safe
' train, are mounted in. series on the drains that are t be isolated.
The-isolation valve are automatically ct ated to close upon a.f low-level signal' fro the redundant ST level switches.
This-signal is indicative f leakage in
.e nonseismic portion of.
~
- I-f the system.
.{
Each. isolation valve wil remai. closed until individually
-opened by the operator's nu action. -Such action will result'in the-opening of-t elve only if the RMWST low-level signal is no longer present
'The capability for remot man al isolation from the control-E
. room is also-provided.
he stayus of each isolation valve is
.-displayed by the indi ting'ligh in the control. room.
.The closure of eit isolation valve will cause both
-degasifier pumps stop.
[
'.7.6'.6.1.2 In iating Circuits Automatic olation-of the RMWST takes p ace upon receiving a low-level ignal from the redundant level switches.
For manual
- C..; _
,-each isolation valve has a cordesponding handswitch initiati
.onithe in control board.
/,
7.6
.l.3 Logic-l T efisolstion logic is shown in figure 7.6.6-1.
7.6.6-1
r-k VEGP-FSAR-7
- 6. 6.1.= 4 Bypass Neit er bypass indication nor manual override of the aut atic actua on is provided.
}I 7.6.6.1.5 Interlocks The'isolatio interlocks are shown in figure 7.6.6-1.
7.6.6.1.6 Sequ cing The solenoid valveu controlling the RMWST / solation valves are powered from a safe'ty-related, 125-V_de,, battery-backed power
supply; the valves 2 e-not sequenced.
See section 8.3.)
7.6.6.1.7 Redundancy The RMWST isolation equip nt is fully redundant.
Each of the j
two isolated lines'is prov d with two independent isolation valves controlled and powere ify separate safety trains (A and-
- B).
All_ associated controls d indicators are also completely independent.
)
7,.6.6.1.8 Diversity Diversity of components and equipmen between the redundant g
trains ~is not required to protect agaitst systematic failures, such as multiple fa'ilures resulting fro a credible single event.
The assocgated components are en ironmentally and seismically qualified in accordance with he procedures described in sof::tions 3.10 and 3.11.
Funct tmanualoperationisavailab(onaldiversityis provided in t e as a backup-to the automati mode.
/
)
7.6.6.1.
Actuated Devices
- The a uated devices:are four solenoid valves (HY-7 (3A, HY-7 3B, HY-7760A, HY-7760B) controlling the air sup y to the pne atic actuators of the gate-type isolation valves T
(
-7733A, HV-7733B, HV-7760A, HV-7760B, respectively).
_/
)
7.6.6-2
op
(
VEGP-ESAR-7 7.
6.1.10 Supporting Systems The follo g systems support the RMWST isolation,equiipment:
(,
/
e Class 1,
5-V de power system.
/
o Instrument air tem. /
/
Failure of either or both s,yst.
will cause immediate closure
{
of all four isolation valves and 1 not degrade the isolation function.
7.6.6.1.11 alysis Anal s is provided in paragraph 7.6.6.7.
,1
-v.. L,.
,n
,$.L'% $55 udL. AEGNook isol_shm lhe~Ve 56=wd=
S -
l
- 7. m. Os Kerueling NaTer bv.orage taux Isolatfon g% peg,
% D.-7. Q shy ~ taeh r-m %
7.6.6.2.1 Description
%y4mn-iserfa44mm.o4%
de r.d rwrr.
.[
As described in detail in section 6.3, the refueling water storage tank (RWST) provides a source of water for the emergency core cooling operations.
The RWST is a nuclear safety class, seismic Category 1 structure..However, the aludge mixing pump and the electric circulation heater connected to the tank do not meet these qualification requirements;.therefore, an isolation capability is provided to prevent a loss of the RWST water volume.
Two train-oriented,
- air-operated, seismically-qualified valves mounted in series on the suction line to the sludge mixing pump provide this capability.
When closed, they isolate the safety-related
. portion of the line (connecting to the RWST) from its nonsafety-related, nonseismic portion connected to the sludge mixing pump.
Both valves fail closed upon the loss of
-(*
instrument air and/or control power.
Each valve is automatically actuated to close upon a RWST low-level signal from a redundant level switch in its respective safety train.
'The isolation ve,1ves will remain closed until individually opened by the operator's manual action.
Such action will result in the opening of the valve only if the RWST low-level C
signal is no longer present.
1 The capability for remote-manual isolation from the control room is p.lso provided.
The status of each isolation valve is displayed by the indicating lights in the control room.
0 l
7.6.6-3
VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.2.9 Actuated Devices The. actuated devices are two solenoid valves (HY-10957 and HY-10958) controlling the air supply to the pneumatic actuators of the gate-type isolation valves-(HV-10957 and HV-10958, respectively).
7.6.6.2.10 Supporting Systems The following systems support the RWST isolation equipment:
o Class 1E, 125-V de power supply.
e Instrument air systems.
Failure of-either or both systems will cause immediate closure of the isolation valves and will not degrade the isolation function.
7.6.6.2.11 Analysis Analysis is provided in paragraph 7.6.6.7.
7.6.6.2.12 Periodic Testing ge d It4N98W8f 15
'Provis, ions for the periodicAtesting of the actuation systemgare _
discussed in the Technical Specifications.
TMs par raph has bee deledecl-f 7.6.6.3[ C.~m.._;g::
- v
- H ;; hti... C
-7. 6. 6. 5...)
-ip del.ekk As described i detail in subsection 10.4.9, the two cond peate I'
storage tanks p ovide a source of water for the auxiliary P
l l
feedwater pumps.
Both tanks are safety-related stru6tures, whereas the degas ying loops connected to them are nonsafety and nonseismic equi ment.
The isolation. capability is provided by two safety-relate air-operated, isolation valves, each r
l mounted on the line co ectingthe' condensate storage tank with
?'
the degasifier feed pump
, suction.
When closed, each valve L
prevents the leakage of-w er from its respective condensate l
storage tank.,The'9alves ar normally open and fail closed upon a loss-of instrument air nd/or control power.
Each valve belongg-to a different safety t in and is automatically actuated to close upon receiving a low degasifier feed pump suction pressure signal from a separate pressure switch.
Each j
7.6.6-5 Amend. 15 3/85
~
a l
gh VEGP-FSAR - isolatf6n'va_lve canibe. closed or opened manually ~from the
- control room Howev.er,.after releasing...the handswitch handle,
~
the va'lve will close,'Enless _the, low-pressure signal actuating s
it has cleared.
The status of' bach valve lis displayed by the g
s indicating. lights 1in the c~ontrol roomT'
)
~
.)
~a j
q 7.6.6-Sa Amend. 15 3/85
VEGP-FSAR-7
(
(This page has intentionally been left blank.)
{
(
(
7.6.6-5b Amend. 15 3/85 Lzt
g us VEGP-FSAR 7 V
f7-6.3.2 Initiating Circuits
-Autom tic isolation of the condensate storage tanks occurs when a.dega ifier feed pump low suction pressureisignal is receiydd T-from th redundant pressure switches.
Each isolation valve'has
. _)
a corres nding handswitch on the miscellaneous equipment panel in-the-'co trol room for manual isolation.
17.6.6.3.3 Lo ic-
~
The-isolation'l ic-is shown in figure 7.6.6-3.-
7.6.6.3.4 Bypass N' capability for man \\
ually overriding the automatic closure signal is provided on 'each isolation valve.
The~ valve will not close as long as~its ha'ndswitch handle is maintained in the open position.
When relhased, the handle returns to the
-neutral position; the valve cle'ses if the signal is'still present.
There is no' bypass, indication for the isolation valves.
-7.6.6.3.5 Interlocks
.The' isolation'interloc s are shown\\in' figure'7.6.6-3.
,/
\\
/-
7.6.6.3.6 Sequencing
/
The solenoid valves controlling the pneumatic isolation valves are powered fr,p'm a safety-related, 125-V dc?N attery-backed
~
b power supply nd are not sequenced.
(See secti,on 8.3.)
'7.6.E.3.7/edundancy
}
Redurdangy of the isolation equipment for each conden te
-stort.ge gank is not required because the tanks are redundant; therefore, the single failure criterion is met even though the two dedasifier feedlines are provided with one isolation valve.
Each 'alve is controlled and powered by the same safety train
}
'as o er equipment associated with respective tanks.
7.6.6-6
VEGP-FSAR-7 L
t 7.
.6.3.8 Diversity
/
Manu peration is available as a backup to the automati
(.
- node, viding functional versity.
1 7.6.6.3.9 A
ed Devices N'are two olenoid valves'(HY-87 and N
Th actuated dev c HY-
- 88). controllin'gs 'esair supply to the pne ' atic actuators
- - {.
of thg gate-type isola onsval es (BV-5087 HV-5088,
{ respectively).
'N.s' N
~
7.6.6.3. lON Supporting Systems
\\
The followingysystems support en' sate storage tank isolation equipment:
\\
4 N
x Class lE,\\l25-V power supply.
e
\\
e Instrument a system.
/
[
Failure of eithe/
or bo systems causes immediat closure of the isolation' lves and hence does not degrade the solation function.
/
\\
7.6.6
.11 Analysis j
~
1 ysis is_provided'in paragraph 77676 7 3
11)
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n,
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7.6.6.4.1 Description "l /O 'i."" K _(
As described in detail in subsection 9.2.8, the auxiliary T.,
component cooling water ( ACCW) system cools the thermal
' ' ~ ' ~ ' " ' "b barriers of the reactor coolant pumps.
The portion of the ACCW 4
system related to this function is safety-related and Seismic Category 1; it interconnects with the nonsafety-related and nonseismic portion of the system.
An isolation valve (HV-2041) is provided separating the safety from non~=fety class, nonseismic portions of the thermal barriers ACCW disc'4arge line.
The valve is a safety-related, motor-operated gate valve interlocked in a menner that prevents a spill of the reactor
~C coolant from the postulated, breached thermal bar-ier should a
' break occur in the nonsafety-related piping downscream of that 7.6.6-7
. ~
C%
k V
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This fa deleled. bure has b 9MBON163 NEW._4_
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vocne REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STORAGE TANK staci,neco vu.natweG PL ANT ISOLATION LOGIC DIAGRAM l'
- osus, GengiaPbuty ma u.1 A
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r lEWCk^$MFC VEGP-FSAR-lO feedwater system.
The oxygen concentration is measured by process ana.yzers in which an electric current is generated at an electrode in proportion to oxygen dissolved in a flowing sample stream.
Oxygen is also measured on a grab sample by color comparison after reaction with a reagent.
B.
In the absence of significant impurities, the pH is centrolled by the concentration of ammonia and hydrazine.
Maintaining the pH within the recommended band results in minimal corrosion rates of ferrous materials.
The pH is measured in both process and bench instruments which measure the potential across an electroce sensitive to hydrogen ions and a reference
~
electrode.
C.
By passing the sample through a cation resin column, conductive anions (such as chloride, sulfate, and to a lesser extent carbonate) can be indicated in a conductivity cell.
Cation conductivity is a sensitive method for indicating soluble species which have been indicated in many localized corrosion mechanisms.
D.
Sodium is an effective continuous indicator of many forms of containment ingress.
The ability to analyze for the species at the low ppb level makes it a very 15-useful chemical tracer.
Increased sodium levels can be indicative of condenser leakage or makeup water contamination.
Sodium is measured by process analyzers using specific ion electrodes.
Grab samples are analyzed by furnace atomic absorption.
E.
Silica is an effective continuous indicator of many forms of contaminant igress.
The ability to analyze for this species at the low ppb level makes it a very useful chemical tracer.
Increased silica levels can be indicative of a condenser leakage or makeup water contamination.
Grab samples are analyzed for silica by spectrophotometry.
E.
Chloride is aggressive to ferrous materials at steam generator operating conditions, particularly in crevice regions.
It also has been identified as an aggravant relevant to inconel 600 pitting.
Grab samples are analyzed for chloride by ion electrode.
(ate is gg re t2 to fergous' mat dal/,at stead g
gdcond{t}i%, p f
cJpng 2
^
Ip t
gaj'sQrrhl
'a AIfn 3p'6f /Reklube jk,\\r9 gg dj terdra u.
/]
idgoqq -
ces.
so lud' [t 'e omposit,ionL6f ' forPexc an V
>i y
10.3.5-6 Amend. 15 3/85
VEGP-FSAR-lO condenser () leak ge, pd mQeup Otar O
-4n s@j/ ion wi a g-qp h t W ' % n'ynemicf4s mipa ples
.u
.e chrumaa m,.
The chemical analysis methods listed above represent current tachnology applicable for power plant laboratories.
These methods may be changed over the lifetime of the plant as new technology is proven to be more effective.
10.3.5.8 Sampling In addition to the sampling locations listed in table 10.3.5-1, many other sampling points are installed in the secondary side water system.
These sampling points are identified in table 9.3.2-3 (grab sample points and process instrumentation) and table 9.3.2-4 (grab sample points).
These sample points include hotwells, condensate storage tank, condensate, feedwater system, auxiliary feedwater system, steam generator blowdown, reheat steam, and heater drains.
Many of these points will be sampled and analyzed routinely, others only as needed for troubleshooting and problem diagnosis.
No action levels are associated with these sample points, because contamination which leads to corrosion is best identified and controlled at those points identified in table 10.3.5-1.
15 10.3,9 Condenser Inspection
.The secondary side water chemistry program will include a comprehensive inspection program of the condenser will be developed to ensure condenser integrity.
This program includes a visual inspection of the condenser every refueling outage, waterbox inspection for tube leaks during plant operation, and component inspection for oxygen leaks during plant operation.
These water box inspections and component inspections will be performed as necessary to diagnose and troubleshoot abnormal chemistry levels.
10.3.5.10 Analytical Data Recording and Management and Corrective Actions for Out-of-Specification Condition i
All analytical data will be recorded on pre-drawn data sheets, es the data are taken in the laboratory.
The data sheets will contain the specification values for parameters being analyzed, or will contain the expected ranges for analyses performed to aid diagnostics.
The technician performing the analysis will compare the analyzed value to the specifications value, where specifications are established, and promptly report any valuns 10.3.5-7 Amend. 15 3/85
VEGP-FSAR-lO l
TABLE 10.3.5-1 SECONDARY SIDE WATER CHEMISTRY SPECIFICATIONS DURING POWER OPERATION Normal Sample Normal Action Levels Parameter Frequency Value 1
2 3
Condensate pump discharge Dissolved Oxygen, ppb Continuous 510
>10
>30 or daily 3h'hO (Ta D Steam generator blowdown
$i^ ^7 i pH Continuous'
.:~~
or daily Cation Conductivity, pho/cm Continuous 50.8
>0.8
>2.0
>7.0 or weekly Sodium, ppb Continuous
>20
>20
>100
>50 15 or daily Chloride, ppb Three times
$20
>20
>100 a week Silica, ppb Daily 5300
>300 Sulfate, ppb Weekly s2O
>20 l
l l
Amend. 15 3/85-t
VEGP-ESAR-10 TABLE 10.3.5-3 STEAM GENERATOR BULK WATER GUIDELINES DURING HEATUP Value Prior Value Prior to Power to Power Normal Normal Initiate Escalation Escalation Parameter Frequency Value Action
>5%
>30%
9.o
- 9. o
- 9. o pH Continuous ke-P 20.7 Cation con-Continuous s2.0
>2.0 s2.0 50.8 duc tivi tiy,
u /cm Specific Continuous
>2.7 conductivity,
<11 u c/m Dissolved Daily 55
>5 2, ppb' O
Sodium,. ppb Continuous
$100
>100 5100
$20
- Chloride, Daily
$100
>100 s100 s2O 15 ppb
- Sulfate, Weekly
$100
>100 5100 520 ppb Silica, ppb Daily
' <300
<300 h
0614V Amend. 15 3/85
p v
EWa.bWFG
' Although the AECC-2 topicallreport is not directly applicable to
' the VEGP VRSS, the staff evaluation has been reviewed by.VEGP and the fol-lowing comments are provided for those items identified as: site or: applicant. specific.
'l&2.
Shielding The compliance of the radwaste facilities with 10 CFR Part 20.101 is discussed in FSAR section 12.3.
-3.-
'10 CFR 20.105 The permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas are shown-in the rad zone maps (FSAR fig. 12.3.1-1).
4.-
10 CFR-20.106 The radioactivity in effluents to unrestricted areas is discussed'in sections 11.2.3 and 11.3.3.
- 5.-
Handling of Solid Waste The handling of the dry product from the VR system is discussed in sections 11.4.2.3.8 and 9.
1
6.
Isolation Provisions for Maintenance Manual valves (some with reach rods) have been provided i
for the mechanical components as shown in FSAR figures 11.4.2-1 and 11.4.2-2.
7.
Means to Monitor for VR System Leaks Vogtle has a selective cubicle monitor that will monitor
~
certain cubicles.
This monitor is discussed in FSAR section ll.4.2.3A. 17 through 20.
8.
Monitoring of Offsite Discharges The RSB stack etfluent monitors are discussed in FSAR sections ll.5.2.3A 12 through 14.
9.
Off-Gas Being Detrimental to HVAC Ductwork The Vogtle system off-gas is routed in stainless steel piping up to the dedicated VR system HVAC unit.
See FSAR figure 11.4.2-1 sheet 5 and figure 9.4.3-5 sheet 4.
The ductwork downstream of the off-gas filters is of standard design.
Once through the HVAC filter, the off-gas stream is diluted with the other RSB exhausts.
The VR off-gas stream represents = 4% of-the total outflow from the building.
In addition, the Vogtle system has active pH control which minimizes the acidic off-gas problem.
2204t 2
t-
' 10.
Regulatory Guide 1.143 Compliance Vogtle compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.143 is discussed in'FSAR section 1.9.143.
11.
Compliance with Appendix I The calculated releases from Vogtle with respect to Appendix I are discussed in FSAR section 11.3.3.
12.
Conformance with 10'CPR 61 The activities and volumes of feed streams to the VR system are shown in FSAR table 11.4.2-2,
-3, and
-4.
The media used to solidify the VR product is discussed in FSAR paragraph 11.4.2.3.9.
13-Postulated Accidents Associated with the VR System Vogtle's Environmental Report sections 7.1.6.4 and 7.1.6.7 discuss accidents associated with the VR system.
SCS needs to confirm that the rupture of the VR system discussed in section 7.1.6.7 envelops a failure of the storage hopper.
2204t 3
14.
Operation and Testing of Off-Gas-System with Regulatory Guide 1.140 Regulatory Guide 1.140 requires that the HEPAs and charcoal adsorber be procured and tested prior to instal-lation in accordance with ANSI N509. "Ehis should not be
- a problem since we l ave committed to similar thkegs in 4esh.nJpr.,t.v,," "i Ayu,",b FSAR section 9.4.
e e
Section C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.140 requires four tests to be done upon initial installation.
1 m
a.
Visual Inspection b.
Airflow distribution for HEPA filters (bypass leakage) c.
Adsorber leak testing (Air-Distribution and Tracer Tests) 8 r. W-3 S
The BE *f S filters were designed with sample and the injection ports,so they have the ability to carry out required tests.
Our filtersfare contained in a pressure vessel with no space between the HEPAs and the charcoal.
.The visual inspection outlined in ANSI N510 can be accomplished during installation.
An overall pressure drop test can be accomplished after installation and then compared to the design data.
The design of these filters 2204t 4
g
is that of a process filter.
The VR off-gas system is hard piped before and after the filter vessels.
The size flow of the piping is not +aendable to accurate Adistribution readings as re y: red far. +k a { tar g;,+,.;y,f,,,
4,,4,_
The installation of the filter assembly follows a specific procedure that minimizes the potential for the HEPAs and adsorber to be damaged.
The DOP and tracer tests cannot be accomplished on an individual or overall basis at this time.
Section C.5 also requires in-place HEPA DOP and adsorber leak testing at intervals of every 18 months.
The expected change-out frequency of the filters is every 6 months at which time the on-line filter is valved out of service and allowed to decay.
At that time the idle filter is valved into service and used.
Because of the
+esis changeout frequency, the 18 month intervaleAare not applicable.
FSAR questions 460.06 and 460'.12 deal with the filters and compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.140.
2204t 5
15.-
Regulatory Positions of 1.143
~
1.1.3 The design and classification of'the walls and foundations for the radwaste solidification building are discussed in FSAR section 3.2.
1.2.1.through 1.2.4.
Tank Overflow and Drains The tank level indication and overflow disposition of the tanks in the solidification building are tabulated in table 11.4. 5-1.
4.1 The design of the RSB with respect to Regulatory Guide',8.8 is~ discussed in chapter 12.
5.2 The seismic design of the RSB is discussed in FSAR section 3.2.
6.2 The QA program associated with the systems in the RSB which are designated 427 are discussed in FSAR paragraph 3.2.2.3.3.
/
16.
Sulfur and Halogenated Plastics (PVC)
The limit of 1% halogenated plastics is consistent with AECC requirement for hath the B 3C'": system as well as ours.
The 0.3% sulfur restriction should not be required f or the Vogtle system.for +he f.1/.yf, c,,,,,,,,.
2204t 6
l s t. rale rlf we se n c c n fre+o r-4 Eyron a.
The Vogtle system is of Inconel while the S aed syrfem l
..sh..f,/
e g is of stainless which is susceptible to cons +<<stad s+ a e l acidic corrosion.
b.
As a part of.the resin incineration design i
changes, active pH control was added to the design.
This provides the ability to continuously add caustic to the scrub loop to neutralize the acid gases.
AECC in its limits testing indicated that at the Vogtle feed rates and composition there is no problem with acid-gas.
17.
Training-of Operators There has been ongoing discussion with GPC with respect to dedicated radwaste operators for the WPSL and RVRSS systems.
18&l9.
Accident Analysis SCS has performed an accident analysis and reported the results in 7.1.6.4 and 7.1.6.7 of the environmental-report.
2204t 7
20.
Normal Effluents The volume reduction system contribution to the liquid and gaseous effluents are discussed in FSAR section 11.2.3 and 11.3.3.
21.
Fire Protection The fire protection provisions associated with~the volume reduction system are discussed in FSAR section 9.5.
O
//
2204t 8
T
~
kWO SufC VEGP-FSAR-13 C
13.2.2 TRAINING FOR NONLICENSED PLANT STAFF The VEGP staff will consist of individuals with significant differences in previous education, training, and experience.
The training programs have been formulated to provide the required training based upon the individual's prior experience.
Personnel will either meet the minimum education and experience recommendation of ANSI /ANS 18.1-1971 or complete a qualification program which will demonstrate their ability to perform the specific tasks.
The organization conducting the training for the nonlicensed plant staff is the same as that for the licensed plant staff and is shown in figure 13.2.1-1.
13.2.2.1 Training Program A training program has been established for each VEGP organizational group.
At the time of fuel load, personnel assigned to a particular group will complete the initial training before performing independent tasks or will meet the minimum educa' tion and experience required by ANSI /ANS 18.1-1971.
The training programs will be the same before and after initial fuel load. A -On-the-job-training-will be-used-to--+:
~ supplement.mtherindicated-o-lassroom-instruc tion-as-necessaryato -i Qpare-indivitmrls-for--thei-r-a ssigned, resoonsibi-1i ties. -
u
{jh[
sut boun/s of non - fic ased perso,in c/ fa,u q Jere aaw/,%fp risa. ),' Ye C
Individual specific training requirements"may be waived on a 54c/ ed case-by-case basis with adequate justification and approval o ego,mfs,f the superintendent of nuclear training.
gug Specific criteria must be met prior to approval of a waiver.
Waivers will be granted only if one of the conditions listed below has been satisfied.
A previous course of instruction has been completed which contained the same topics and was at least the duration of the course being waived.
The course may have been completed at VEGP or anotner facility.
For example, a trainee who completes a course of instruction at Plant Hatch meeting the above criteria would not be required to repeat the course at VEGP.
A previous course of instruction has been completed which e
contained all of the objectives of the course being waived.
This would be determined by comparison of the objectives of the course completed and the course being waived.
If the already completed course of instruction did not meet all required objectives, these additional topics may be taught and course completion may be granted.
13.2.2-1 Amend 16 4/85
..~.....u,.
s
VEGP-FSAR-13 f
Approximate Curriculum 0"tline Duration Heat transfer and fluid flow, 1 day secondary systems, electrical systems, and accident analysis Nuclear instrumentation systems, 1 day nuclear control systems, integrated plant control, and simulator plant operations Reactor protection systems, safety 1 day injection actuation system, and simulator plant operations B.
Continuing Training During periodic reviews of GPC's manpower plans, training goals will be established for professional employees to fill key supervisory positions as vacancies develop.
13.2.2.2 Shift Technical Advisor Training Program The shift tec'hnical advisor training program is described in paragraph 13.2.2.1.5.
13.2.2.3 Mitigating Core Damage Training Program The VEGP training program for mitigating core damage is not a separate program but is integrated into licensed personnel training, pressurized water reactor senior reactor operator certified personnel training, and shift technical advisor training.
Other personnel includingkthe managers of the Health Physics, Chemistry, and Instrumentation and Controls Departments, as well as the plant manager will' complete training in mitigating core damage commensurate with their responsibilities.
f Edwttuay) k 13.2.2-19 Amend. 16 4/85 i
kW
$dre. - k VEGP-FSAR-Q cp
-Question 410.26 In section 3F.1 you state that an analysis for the effects of a circulating water system failure.have been provided.
- However, this analysis has apparently been omitted.
Provide this analysis and the following information:
A.
The maximum flowrate through a completely failed expansion joint.
B.
The potential for and the means provided to detect a failure in the circulating water transport system barrier such as the expansion joints.
Include the design and operating pressures of the various portions of the transport system barrier and their relation to the pressures which could exist during malfunctions and failures in the system (rapid valve closure).
C.
The time required to stop the circulating system waterflow (time zero being the instant of failure) including all inherent delays such as operator reaction time, drop out times of the control circuitry, and coastdown time.
D.
For the worst case postulated failure give the rate of rise of water in the associated spaces and total height of the water when the circulating water system flow has been stopped or overflows to site grade.
E.
For each flooded space provide a discussion, with the aid of drawings, of the protective' barrier provided for all essential systems that could become affected as a result of flooding.
Include a discussion of the consideration given to passageways, pipe chases, and/or cableways joining.the flooded space to the spaces containing safety-related equipment.
Response
The analysis of,the circulating water stem failu is bei 510 rev e
to s
er t e
ets of do e-end ru ure a
15 t
res a will rovided ubsection
.4.in 198 T V6.f EC.7~tDN 3f=.fy qqpg y q, W
NM OF M M'M dy / coins 5 4 0 0 6 ris/G psnts /f/ 3 -
s l
Amend.
9 8/84 j
Amend. 10 9/84 Q410.26-1 Amend. 15 3/85
.. mm
. - ~
VEGP-ESAR-3F 3F.4.2.5 Initial Conditions
~
Table 3F-3 provides the initial conditions for both case 1 and case 2 analyses.
b 3F.4.2.6 Design Provisions i
Plots of the time-history of the compartment pressure and temperature for case 1 are given in figure 3F-5.
The plot of the compartment pressure is truncated at 10 s because the peak
)
pressure has been reached.
The plot of compartment temperature is truncated at 10 s because the peak temperature has been reached.
Table 3F-3 provides the peak transient values of the compartment pressure and temperature analyses.
The MSIV/MFIV compartment is designed to withstand these conditions.
All safety-related equipment will be qualified to these s
environmental conditions.
s
'N 3F.4.3 EVALUATI.ON OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM-(RCS) LOOP BRANCH LINE BREAKS j
The evaluation of effects on safety-related equipment resulting I
from branch line breaks in the RCS is presented in table 3F-4.
The evaluation shows that breaks in the RCS will not ccmpromise the capability to safely shut down the plant.
a.
3F.4.4 TURBINE BUILDING FLOODING EVALUATION The flooding effects of a pipe break in the turbine building have been evaluated.
Although the turbine building does not.
contain any safety-related equipment, it is connected to other safety-related structures by piping and electrical tunnels.
% However, it has been_ shown that the f4 pod lavol in the-turMne-I f bui-itti'hg wfil not ruch the erlevation-bf-the-tunnel cpenings,-
hOThe design basis pipe'f FVLL Ct/%C.mFC/ENTIAL 6fEAK
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failure in the turbine building is postulated to be a critin='
-isk in the 96-in. circulating water piping to the condensers.
The -ize and the con figu ra tivn d '- % -rac'
+ in 2ccordancc n u. Standard Reviev utan 1
Jrf.2 ( 2. e..e.'.
_ _. 2 -
1 Pccitici. MCO 3-it.
A complete rupture i-e net assumed bec2ure *he cyete= ia mode r s te ="_e rgy and of fQ condenser riser expansion joints have not been implemented in y
the VEGP design.7
/gf w0r detyv /0/TuuTW 4#
s V C tl 3 0/ N V S CC6The circulating water sys' tem design pressure is 80 psig, m
with a
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normal anticipated operating pressure of 45 psig.
The maximum 3F-8 Amend, 10 9/84 l
VEGP-FSAR-3F
- (
transient analysis pressure (unscheduled shutdown) is 54 psig.
1 Lacd ei, i orinel cpcrating conditions, t h
.c. m. m.
m..
fle.c through ihr c r r'- ir c21ru12ted te Ec t?E ft'/nin.
This flowrate will cause the water level in the turbine building to rise at a rate
(
of ft/h.
Iu;rt,rt; turbin; building f1;;r ;c located at cl 105 ft.
The 10.:cc*
op ings in the tunnels which lead to safty-related s*.ructu s
are ated at el 215 ft.
Based on the' calculated flood vel rate of crease, these tunnels would begin to flood I
approximat 27 h.
Flooding of safety-related co nents would not begin unt several hours after that.
The f oding may be detected shortl fter the initiating event b one or more of the four turbine b ding sump level detec s and alarms.
If 10 these instruments are ot functional (t are Seismic Category 2), the flooding will be etected by rmal turbine building surveillance.
An indicatio to th operators that a problem exists will also be given as e
'pment in the building begins to fail due to flooding, althou circulating water pumps will not receive an automatic p signa The 27 h of flooding needed to cause flow i the tunnels
'll provide an adequate time for detection o the break and manua tripping of the pumps.
(
Following t trip of the pumps the operators wou close the pump dis rge valves.
If one or more of the these lves are not f etional, the elevation difference between the tu ine bui Ing and the pump suction piping will preclude gravit low i_2 r the turbine hullding.
A failure of the condensate feedwater sytstem piping would result in significantly less ficoding than a circulating water system failure.
Even if the entire condensate /feedwater inventory flooded into the turbine building, the final flood level would be less than 1 ft above the level A floor.
4
- % Nw rah Oro Ne, break is c.o ns e r va-h uely c.5btd 4 0 h e- (ol'2.000 GPM, w k;c h is b mbined raned Mow of be circu le=.haq Wder paMPs.
t 3F-9 Amend. 10 9/84
w
. Insert.
3F-9 i
If it is assumed that the turbine building flood detectors and the circulating water basin level detectors fail, the flooding could continue until the basin is empty. As the water level rises in one unit, the concrete block wall between units will fail due to high static water pressure, allowing the water to spread into both halves of the building. Calculations have shown that the block wall will not withstand more than 8 feet of water and will fall before the water level reaches the operating deck at elevation 220' 0".
6 ft.3 is pumped If the entire circulating water system volume of 1.2x10 into the turbine building, the resulting flood level in both units would be 211'.
Should flood water enter the main steam tunnels at the east-or west end of the turbine' building,-it is precluded from entering the control and auxiliary buildings by sealed penetrations in the walls of the safety related structures. The piping and electrical tunnels along the south wall at the centerline of the turbine building extend above grade level.
Thcr; se p;;;tratiana-inte '.h 21cctrie:1 tuunci bcicu grade, all p;;ctratiene int: the piping enaa=1 bele,w gi.Je arc accled. Acce.b.4;us iwto Ae.
Sea (ed.
4mge(s b ela u> g r*Me_.
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& c.l c s u r e. L F}
VEGP-ESAR-Q w
, Question 430.2 N Operating experience of two nuclear power plants has shown that
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during periodic surveillance testing of a standby diesel generator, initiation of an emergency start signal (loss-of-coolant accident or loss of offsite power) resulted in the diesel failing to start and perform its function due to depletion of the starting air supply from repeated activation of the starting relay.
This event occurred as the result of
- )
inadequate procedures and from a hangup in engine starting and control circuit logic failing to address a built-in time delay my relay to assure the engine comes to a complete stop before attempting a restart.
During the period that the relay was timing out, fuel to the engine was blocked, while the starting air was uninhibited.
This condition, with repeated start attempts, depleted starting air and rendered the diesel generator unavailable until the air system could be repressurized.
Review procedures and control system logic to assure this event will not occur at your plant.
Provide a detailed discussion of how your system design, supplemented by procedures, precludes the occurrence of this event.
Should'the diesel generator
]
starting and control circuit logic and procedures require changes, provide a description of the proposed modifications.
Response
such nS The. o# We is Vfhere will be a 90-s time! delay initiatedv hen the engine is w
intentionally shut.down uring. periodic surveillance... testing se i _ r.. ^ _ _., ;11: ;;r -.
If during the 90-s time delay period a loss-of-offsite power signal is received or a manual start attempt is initiated, the engine will not start because fuel to the engine will be blocked.
If the operator depresses the manual start pushbutton during the 90-s time delay period, the starting air valves will open for 5 s and automatically r~)
close after the 5 s have elapsed.
This' built-in S-s time limit on the opening of the starting air valves is to prevent the 1;
depletion of the starting air.
This 5-s limit also applies to control panel.GLgr:;;1r,grt signals received at the engine loss-of-offsite power st
.'* an emergency start signal (loss-of-coolantaccidentjhisreceivedatthecontrolpanel es
,j during the 90-s time delay period, the engine control system will automatically bypass the 90-s time delay and will allow fuel oil and starting air to be admitted to the engine - Also, the 5-s time limit will be automatically bypassed, i.e.
the starting air valves remain open until the engine starts (starting air pressure above 150 ; sig), or until the startids.
mawA Nopped a~k f
aer ;[ <. dierel eatrAor is bei f
G O wik or && loss of o$skt PMc Amenu. 7' 5/84 g3 g,,
0410.2-1 Amend. 13 1/85
~
VEGP-FSAR-Q
.O y
air pressizra drops to 150 psig.
At this pressure, the automatic start attempt will stop because at 150 psig the starting air valves automatically close.
At this point, the engine can only be started manually by pushing the manual start button.
Pushing the manual start button will cause the starting air valves to C
open again.
There is no built-in time delay between the V
conclusion of the automatic start sequence and the manual start attempt.in a situation as described above.
In other words, if the engine fails to start automatically, a manual start can be initiated immediately.
The starting air sequence is designed in this manner so that the manual, start attempt capability is A
available if an automatic. start attempt fails.
The engine can be manually started in this manner until the starting air pressure drops to 90 psig.
Generally, starting air pressure below 90 psig will not start the engine when an attempt is initiated.
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t.he mode switch 4e in the i
"uperational" position, ana une' point of control ~switen ae in l
the " Remote",_ position M ;,;_271 :th =_,1..__. 3..
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In order.to maintain the emergency start capability of the diesel generator, operating pFocedures will specify that periodic surveill'ance testing is to be initiated only from the control room, i.e.,
control switch is in the " Remote" position.
Also, the operator will be made aware of the built-in 90-s time i
delay and will be instructed not to initiate manual starting of j
_ the engine during this period.
See figure 430.33-1.
m I
Oz. cklesal eners.kor 40 be.a.OowbIc*N Sharh*N er l
g f
.sfacted from +ke c.odret roou l
@, on de_ eqiwe. codrol Pe(must be.
I
@ on do. J:esel c. drol peal
. A i FL s~ poSom an g rg ak & the s-;+e.kes ara
+ke bypass an. wop-ceble i
aWem i,s +k e. c.odrol roo n^
on s kWs Pael will aleri de. o perater %d +ke d iesel is disable.o,% lop sgod by 354 hu nA override 4L 10-5
+1uc de\\ay.
J hMOd Amend. 7 5/84 Q430.2-2 Amend. 13 1/85 l13
n:
- 430.2 woewa 1g
@ Loss of offsite power to the plant is discussed in subsection 15.2.6.
If I
.~one diesel generator is being tested and then is manually stopped at the time of loss of offsite power, the other diesel generator would automatically start without any delay to provide the emergency power. If in addition, it is assumed that the diesel generator that is not being tested fails, there would be a 90 second delay before the other diesel generator automatically startsi.
However, the auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump system which starts automatically on a loss of offsite power signal relies only on emergency DC power. The 90 second delay in the diesel generator start would not prevent auxiliary feedwater from being delivered to the steam generators and thus the analysis presented in subsection 15.6.2 envelopes the VEGP design.
l
E M osa.w o M VEGP-FSAR-Q i
i j
Question 430.12 In the FSAR, you state that the fuel oil storage tanks are vented to the " valve house" located between the storage tanks.
Expand your FSAk to provide additional informa ible of the structure so as to preclude a buildup of combust bility gases and the provisions to prevent the ventilation capa i
being blocked as a consequence of any weather condition.
i Resoonse tue o 1 is a heavy distillate gas oil, which by v e e$ f a
- ntain ts specification and chemical composition does not and petroleum distillate products such as propane, b
- ano, o
adily e, which are volatile and can transform into lig is highly Therefore, at room temperature e means for gasol r a combustible gas to build up, since le gases.
combust combustible gases is not present.
unlikely p.roducing f of the valve d vents are provided on the rder the most Two 4-in., U-b edundancy in ventilation 4-in., U-bend vents 1
house to provide Similarly, twel oil storage tank itions.
adverse weather co of of each diesel are provided on the l
pumphouse.
One is rate locations.
in two se 430.12-1 The storage tank is vente a shown in figure house i
located outside of the valv line from the 4-in. truck and the second is through a b day tank vent line as shown in nc fill line to the diesel fuel oi figure 9.5.4-1 of the FSAR.
side of the valve house is i
ocated o t lines downstream of The storage tank vent line ate 4-in. v one branch is l
branched out into two sep the valve hou a 180" bend, and the the flame arrester insi ve house roof,wi house wall with a 4
terminated above the vother branch is termi ated out e valve house are 90' band..Neither missile protected.
to the g for the storage tank is connect a day tank 14 day tank vent line just upstream of The second vent ester located outside the diesel generat diesel fuel o e flame arrester and connected piping buil - g are vent flame a rom tornado missiles as shown in figure 430.13 building.
protecte niikely event that both of the diesel fuel oil storag
- blocked, J
ent lines outside the valve house are damaged or In the d vent point j
the storage tank can still be vented by the secon tank i
Amend. 7 5/84 l
s,,
Amend. 13 1/85 Amend. 14 2/85 Q430.12-1 4
- (
.~.
4430.1L
Response
g.,
The storage tank went b6me is branched into two separate 4-in vent lines 4
i downstream of the flame arrestor located inside of the valve house. One branch is externally terminated in an open vent above the valve house roof and the other branch, oriented 900from the first vent, is esterna11y terminated in an open vent outside the valve house wall.
7 Thus, all storage tank vents terminate outside of the valve house / which l
precludes an accumulation of combustible gases within the structure.
I Furthermore, diesel fuel oil is a heavy distillate which, by virtue of l
its specification, does not contain light petroleum distillate products such as propane, butane, or gasoline which are volatile and readily form combustible gases. Therefore, at room temperature the means for producing appreciable amounts of combustible gases are not present.
- -*= - e ----if;f ::ter sl te th: ::1.. uvu.. so provice wwuwil;;ist
- =a g;f:-'aa y nad--
rer::;. ;;ih;;....Jiti;;;. IL ;;es;;; :: ' ic "e-t_ed i
';..; : rrete le-rti:n 1s/The valve aa"==
vents are shown on figure (T30.12-Igreir"-- --
-: ::;u;;te ;;;:eCt :r: trr' 7::t, Jti;t i:
i
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- 'e t-i-tre:S fi;; ;;;; t; th; di;::1 fuel til f:y t;-k a-
'i e ;;;;i;e,vi iu. a1.1 -
---* lin:. Tt: 7 :tir_ ^* *ha==eand waa*
g;n rrer teildin; : f the f ;l Oil eter=0- tir' i: te.4 0 -ud, su s Z w e;,
r.at_subiae * *r '-- ;e r-'er iferr e "rrth::......wavus.
If a postulated tornado sevets b:th went lines, the vents continue to operate. For the h4=hiv (merobable event of a postulated tornEdo blocking both vents [ e storage tank is sealed from the escape or any sv,uussio1 Q gas.s.
o C;= -
The second storage tank vent, flame arrestor, and connected piping are missile protected.
In the unlikely event that both of the diesel fuel oil storage tank went lines outside of the valve house are damaged or blocked, the storage tank can be vented through the second vent when the fuel oil transfer pump is in operation. The fuel oil transfer pump creates sufficient differential pressure between the vaper pressure within the tank and the ambient atmosphere to ensure proper transfer of diesel fuel from the storage tank to the day tank, regardless of the L condition of the storage tank vents.
If necessary, emergency venting of the storage tank can be accomlished by unbolting the side plates of the flame arrestor or by opening the storage tank man way cover.
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4
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. Lsert A A =
430.12 hedieselfueloiltransferpumpisstillcapableoftransferringfuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank because there is'a built-in
. drain line (1/2-in. tubing) from the pump motor ring base to'the pump mounting flange. This draf t. line is provided as an integral part of the pump.to direct any fuel oil leakage collected at the pump motor ring base due to pump packing failure back to the storage tank. This drain line will act as an air inlet line into the storage tank during pump operation in the event that the 4-in. tank vent is completely block.ed. There are'two fuel oil transfer pumps mounted on the fuel oil storage tank and, therefore, there are two such drain lines connecting the tank to atmosphere. The fuel oil transfer pump has a rated capacity of 25 gallcus per minute, and these two drain lines are more than adequate to admit air into the tank to replace the fuel oil vol me pumped.
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VEGP-FSAR-Q Question 430.33 In FSAR paragraph 9.5.7.5 you briefly discuss the low -lube oil Expand your FSAR-to provide additional pressure trip.
information on this trip function, including more details on the the location of pressure switches (manufacturer, model, etc.),
these switches on the diesel generator, and identification of these switches on the piping and instrumentation diagram (figure 9.5.4-1).
. r
Response
The low pressure lube oil trip function is provided for the automatic safe shutdown of the engine during both normal and emergency operations.
It is a two out of three logic (see paragraph 9.5.7.2.2).
This means that there are three oil sensors installed on the engine luhe oil inlet header.
The lube oil pressure sensors are set to trip open at 30 psig decaying Their operation is similar to mechanical valves which pressure.
are closed when pressure is above 30 psig and trip open on l
These sensors are monitored by a series of decreasing pressure.
pneumatic logic circuits mounted inside the engine control In the event that any two of the sensors are tripped panel. they vent 60 psi pressure from an alarm / shutdown circuit
- open, in the pneumatic safety system.
When venting occurs, a control air pressure extends the fuel rack shutdown cylinder at the engine.
The cylinder moves the fuel racks to the no fuel position, and the engine stops due to fuel starvation.
At the same time, a pressure switch in the engine control panel indicates to the electrical. system that a. malfunction has occurred in the lube oil system.
1 The oil pressure sensors are manufactured by California Controls Company (model B-4400), and the pressure switch is manufactured Inc.
by Barksdale Controls Division,.Transamerica Delaval,
-(model E15-M90).
The oil pressure sensors and switches are furnished by the engine manufacturer as integral parts of the engine and control panel. *They are shown on engine pneumatic schematic and engine control panel schematic drawings furnished by the vendor.
Therefore, they are not shown on the piping and instrumentation
(
13 diagram.
The high temperature jacket water and low pressure lubricating i
oil sensors remain active for tripping during the emergency i
operation.
As shown on. figure 430.33-1, three sensors are used
!f to monitor each of these parsmeters.
At least two of these sensors must trip $before a shutdown occurs.
For example, if l \\
Amend. 7 5/84 Q430.33-1 Amend. 13 1/85
VEGP-FSAR-Q only the low pressure lubricating oil sensor on line 10A trips, there is a loss-of pressure at port 1 of the UPPER lA.6943 assembly.
This causes element.MEM-5 to stop transmitting which, The NOT-9 i
in turn, causes element NOT-9 to have an output.
and is also output is applied to port "A" of element AND-13, applied to port 8 of the assembly through elements OR-17 and i
OR-18.
Pressure at port 8 activates pressure switch PS-48N which indicate to the electrical system that one of the luce oil sensors has malfunctioned.
If a second lube oil sensor were to indicate a malfunction condition, the engine would shut down.
i For example, if the sensor on line E-LOB vents, in addition to g
the sensor on line E-LOA, then the loss of pressure at port 3 of f
the upper lA-6943 board would result in an output from element l
AND-13.
The AND-13 output pressurizes port 6 of the assembly, and is also applied to both port "B" of element NOT-12, and to an accumulator pair at port 11 through orifice / check 16.
Port 6 pressure causes pressure switch PS-42N to transmit the trip l
indication to the alarm system.
NOT-12 has an output for approximately two minutes, until terminated by the accumulator j
timer.
The NOT-12 output pressurizes port 12 of the upper assembly, and is transmitted through the lower assembly to pressurize port 4 of logic board 1A-7055.
Note that the port 4 stop signal bypasses the NOT-17 and NOT-18 elements which 13 ~
I inhibit a normal safety shutdown.
The port 4 signal produces a memorized output from element AND-24 which ext. ends the fuel rack
)
shutdown cvlinder throuch nort 7 of 1A-7055.
This shutdown
._ y
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' =1 iaWJC.:: c.t = c x t = * " =
Gw ~ 9 g = * ;' a = 'y.
si- - M e m ;; n e __ % rminated al.. approximately two m2.nutes to allow the engine to be
[
restarted if the problem is corrected.
j Figure 430.33-1 includes the engine control panel schematic,
~ engine pneumatic schematic, lube oil piping schematics and control logic diagram.
The lube oil pressure sensors are mounted on the engine, but all other related pneumatic safety components a e mounted in the l
Seismic testing of anel to simulate its permanent installation at VEGP has been performed and has
}
engine control panels.
L One engine control panel has s
passed the seismic shake test.The other three panels are seismically been seismically tested.
qualified since they are identical to the one tested.
l Therefore, the engine control panels meet the Seismic Category 1 Safety-related components inside the panel, which are required to perform safety control functions of the diesel
}
requirements.
4 323-1974.
generator, are environmentally qualified per IEEE l
Also, these safety-related components are powered by Class lE electrical power supply, and the peumatic air supply to the engine control panel is from safety-related starting air receiver.
j g
I
.Isuste.
l Te Me.M Amend. 7 5/84 l
Q430.33-2 Amend. 13 1/85
\\
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4 s
.m
INSERT TO 430.33
'Once the diesel-generator is running at a' sustained load, the' engine g,g3,el G..
will keep on running even'though the pneumatic control air system is 3/26l&fSqh-disrupted and becomes unavailable subsequent to engine start.
The continued operation of the diesel-generator is possible without pneumatic control system due to the following reasons:
o The fuel pump is engine-driven and does not require pneumatic control.
o The engine governor is electrically operated and is provided with an integral independent mechanical. backup neither of which require the
. pneumatic control air system to sustain operation.
o The fuel shutdown cyclinder is normally open and air supply is required to move the cylinder to a 'no fuel" position. Therefore failure of the air supply to the pneumatic logic control will not cause the diesel engine to stop due to fuel starvation.
o The safety-related sensing lines for the 2 out of 3 trip logic for' low pressure lube oil and high temperature jacket water can be vented only by sensor actuation. These sensing lines are pressurized during startup via safety-related check valves 1, 2
- and 3 (see Figure 430.33-1, sheet 1).
The check valves will maintain these lines pressurized in case of an air supply failure.
If a 2 out of 3 trip signal is generated after an air supply failure, the pneumatic logic will not be operable to provide an, output signal to the shutdown cyclinder.
In addition, no air will be available to move the shutdown cylinder to "no fuel" position.
'Therefore, the failure of air supply system will not cause fuel starvation to the diesel.
Starting air quality is discussed in subsection 9.5.6.
The pneumatic control system air quality is the same as for air start system.
E Ac.leS$4re O VEGP-FSAR-Q Question 430.41 In FSAR table 9.5.8-1, you list the combustion air intake filter, silencer, and flexible connections as being designed to l'
" manufacturer's standard."
In addition, the diesel engine exhaust silencer, exhaust piping, and flexible connections are l
listed as being designed to " manufacturer's standard" or an ASTM standard.
This is not acceptable without further justification.
The staff normally requires the entire diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system to be designed, fabricated, and
. installed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements.
Provide justification for noncompliance.
Response
The combustion air intake piping As designed to Seismic Category 1, ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements, and the project class designation is 013.
However, due to the high operating temperature of the engine exhaust, there are no acceptable materials available that will meet both ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements and the operating temperature requirements.
Therefore, the exhaust piping is designed in
(...
accordance with ANSI B31.1 with stress allowables in accordance with ASME Section III.
The material used is ASME II SA-155, KC 70, Class 1 carbon steel, rolled and welded pipe.
The pipe is manufactured from SA-515 Grade 70 plate.
Material allowable stresses are based on SA-515, Grade 70 at 900 "F and are found in ASME Code Section 1, Table PG-23.1, 1974 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1975.
Except for the temperature limits, the exhaust piping meets ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements.
Also, the exhaust piping is designed to Seismic Category 1 3
requirements, and the project class designation is 015.
Th; ;;..iusti;n ;.ir filters and eilenc....nd ih.
.,da.u.i.
eilencer rett er exe::d e.: ::nuf;;tur r's stenderd.
m.
7
.u..
th;nf;r;;;nrcielepplicatipTo th:t :::: r:teri:1: ::: 5::vi::
- tr;ngth;n;d with entre welding, etc.
- nd th;t th; _ nit; :::
qualify these components for Seismic Category 1 service, the manufacturers have provided equipment which is made of heavier material than standard commercial products, and reinforced to withstand the seismic as well as the operating forces involved.
Model analysis is used to determine that stresses will not exceed the allowable for the material used.TAJ3 err @ project class The designation for these components is 015.
b Ab k o the low operatin pressures f the combustion air intake i
and exhaust systems, requiremen to design th::: ;-,et;;; to
- rgletely meet ASME Section III, Class 3 :: pirent-M f: not
(
add to the reliability of these systems.
%' 3 rw
% _n m aw+o % us
"' M % G m M 969 M
a.ec Amend. 7 5/84 NP qQ4g 430.41-1 Amend. 13 1/85 M
E, Ck 9.
.v.
.7:
C Q %36.41
~Cwse r k A The combustion air filters, silencers and flexible connections are sub-
-supplied components that meet a manufacturer's standard design developed from manufacturer _ testing and operating experience. Quality standards
- were established commensurate with the safety function to be performed
- and procurement controls were established for the procurement of all sub-supplied components. These components-were purchased and inspected to detailed specifications and drawing requirements. Periodic reviews of sub-supplier
_ performance and audits of vendor records were conducted to ensure that the quality of the items provided were acceptable.
VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.5.8-1 EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA Air intake filter Quantity (per engine) 1 Make/model/ size AAF, P01-V Cycoil, 84 g
Type Oil bath R
Design flow at LOO'F (ft / min) 25,100 8
Design pressure / temperature (psig/*F)
Atmospheric /120 d
Material Carbon steel ggra Quantity of oil (gal) 109 Code Manufacturer's standard Pressure drop at rated load (in. WG) 3
/(
Seismic design Category 1 Intake silencer Quantity (per engine) 2 Make/model/ size AAF, 4R, 24 Type Pulsco tubular duct Design flow at LOO *F (ft / min) 14,030 2
([g Design pressure / temperature (psig/*F)
Atmospheric /120 N-Material Carbon steel Code Manufacturer's standard Pressure drop at rated load (in. WG) 0.65
/\\
Se,ismic design Category 1 Exhaust silencer Quantity (per engine) 1 Type Horizontal Design flow at 900'F (fts/ min) 27,000 Design pressure / temperature (psig/'F)
Atmospheric /900 Material Carbon steel Code Manufacturer's standard Pressure drop at rated load (in. WG) 5.0 A
i Seismic design Category 1 Piping Material Carbon steel Design code Intake piping (except ASME Section III, flexible connectors)
Class 3 Exhaust piping (except ASTM A-155, Class 1 flexible connectors)
Flexible connectors (intake Manufacturer's standard and exhaust) jg Seismic design Category 1 l
l l
l
EC.luure.P VEGP-FSAR-Q Question 430.73~
Regarding motor-operated valves with power lockout:
A.
Provide or reference motor control schematic drawings for the valves listed in FSAR paragraph 8.3.1.1.11.A which show the power lockout capability at the main control board.
Describe the technique used to lock the power out, and describe the redundant valve position indication and their power supplies provided for each valve.
B.
Clarify that the power is locked out to the ac:umulator isolation valves identified in paragraph 8.3.1.1.11.B by drawing the circuit breaker from the motor centrol center during startup and maintaining it in the racked out position during reactor power operation.
C.
Identify how the accumulator isolation valve circuits.
comply with each position given in Branch Technical Position ICSB-4 (PSB) and provide or refgrence meter control schematic drawings for the valves.
Identify the redundant power supplies provided to the position indicators of each valve.
Response
i The following elementary diagrams detail the circuitry associated with the valves listed _in section 8.3.1.1.11.A:
[
A.
Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) valves and relative figure numbers are listed below:
I HV-8806 Figure 430.73-1 HV-8835 Figure 430.73-2 HV-8802A Figure 430.73-3 HV-8802B Figure 430.73-4 HV-8840 Figure 430.73-5 HV-8809A Figure 430.73-6 HV-88098 Figure 430.73-7 HV-8813 Figure 430.73-8 a,-600;?E-Fi;rr: 000,70 10 9L 13
'TJ-60030 t Ji;ur: '20.73-14 1 Power lockout for the ECCS valves is attained at the main control board through the use of a lockout switch.
Amend. 7 5/84 0430.73-1 Amend. 13 1/85
B VEGP-ESAR-Q Redundant indication is provided at indicator light boxes ZLB6 and ZLB7 which are mounted on the main control board.
The power supplies for these light boxes are from termination cabinets which are supplied power from 120-V distribution panels located in Class lE motor control centers (one per train).
The termination cabinet is not powered from a motor control center providing main power to any valve listed acove.
The second position indication is powered from the motor-operated valve control circuit.
Valves HV-8803A and B are two new valves identified in paragraph 8.3.1.1.11 which will r.lso have power lockout using locked open breakers.
The circuit breakers for these valves will be padlocked in the open position during reactor power operation. after the valves have been aligned to the required position.
g'igSGRT A,,
(-
Light box ZLB6 is powered from distribution panel 1AYC131 (MCClABC), with the valve position indicating,
lights for valves HV-8802A, NV-8809A, and HV-8835.
None of these valves are powered from MCC 1ABC.
Light box.ZLB7 is powered from distribution panel 1BYA131 (MCC 1BBA), with the valve position indicating lights for valves HV-8802B, HV-8809B, HV-8806, HV-8813, and HV-8840.
Non s of these valves are powered from MCC 13 1BBA.
The correct position of the lockout switch contacts is monitored by a white light on the main control board.
When the lockout switch is on the " lockout" position, two contacts from the switch w},gagable the control One of the switch ::ntr:_ Pwill disable the circuitry. hot leg of the circuitry and at the same time will deenergize the white light. The other switch contact will disable the neutral leg of the circuitry. A I A/ SERT *B"T deenergized white light when the lockout sw J th* "
- "t" P *iti " ***"" *h* " "*" l ir "it"Y *
- v inoperable ((JIn t=:
ven; ib.i iba cu;tch cerr'rr na 7s x;; _f the circuitri f;il. ;
- upou, th: chi.
. i p ht till ::::in light:d, but
- k-
- ntrel circuit H 14 li; ar411 b di:_ti;d t...a;; th: :n.;mL cent::t er
- k-
- utr:1 1;, of th; circuit aill epen 91 th: ::::
- ^'--
def::tiv; tu1L f.ilin; to...; niter th; :t;tu: ^' the ket-leg ewit-h cent :t aill et ::u:: p -ah l -- ci..;; ;L. L_:nt::: e.- th: neutr:1 1 7 "411 -*ill di-sbl: the Amend. 7 5/84 Q430.73-2 Amend. 13 1/85
VEGP-FSAR-Q / - it. The defecti:: bulb es-he d;;.;ted _t.:. the l E chut cri. h i: pl:;;d .. mL. "0N" ; -i + i- "ith th h M te li;ht :till der.::;i::d. 3. The accumulator isolation valves circuit breakers will 13 i be padlocked in the open position during reactor power operation. Paragraph 8.3.1.1.11 has been revised and notes have been added to the individual schematic diagrams for each of the accumulator isolation valves to indicate the padlock requirement. C[ The accumulator isolation valve circuits conform with Branch Technical. Position ICSB-4 (PSB) by virtue of: 1. K621 and K603 relays for automatic valve opening. 2. Handswitch indicator lights for visual valve indication. 3. Critical function alarm with periodic reflash for independent audible and visual alarm. 4. Relay K603 automatic prevention of valve closure. w Motor control schematic drawings and drawings for the critical function alarm have been provided in figures 430.73-9 through 430.73-12. For ves using locked open circuit breakers, t \\ i position in lights on the handswit e j U* ly to the r*g,1f_ 4 doen,ey g>d. This p howe
- monitggg, 13 i
'the r r light box. c_ light box-is ont of the power ed to the j/ Redundant indication and power supply provided to the t j position indicators of valves are l l 1. Motor-operated valve control handswitch indication l light, feed from control circuit. 2. Monitor light (on main lighting board), fed from termination. cabinet. 3. Critical function alarm (periodic reflash), fed from annunciator panel (de and diesel generator- [ backed ac powered). I i Amend. 7 5/04 s Q430.73-3 Amend. 13 1/85 l13 \\( l
Insert A: The monitor light box for valve BV-8803A is MLB05, which is powered from distribution panel 1AYC1 (NCC 1ABC). Valve BV-8803A is powered from NCC.1ABD. The monitor light box for valve 5V-88035 is NLB06, which is powered from distribution panel 18YA1 (NCC 1BBA). Valve BV-88038 is powered from NCC IBBD. ~ Insert B: ? In the event that the switch contacts on either the hot leg or the neutral leg i of the circuitry fail to open (undetected failure) the control circuit will still be disabled and the white light will still be deenergized, because the switch contact on one of the circuit legs (either the hot leg or the neutral 3 leg) is open, rendering the control circuit loop open. Assuming that, in [ addition to this failure, a second failure occurs such that the switch contact that' opened when the lockout switch was initially placed in the " lockout" position shorted out or became bypassed, two things can happen. The second _ failure can generate a short circuit which will open the fuse (installed to 4 J l protect the circuit from this incident). The opening of the fuse will, isolate the fault and at the same time will doenergise and disable the control j circuitry. On the other hand, the second failure can complete the control l circuit loop such that the control circuitry is energized and the white light l ' turned on. This condition will indicate to the operator a discrepancy and j that a problem exists in the power lockout control circuitry and that some measure has to be taken to correct the situation. Suppose that instead of the i I ~ white light being energized a third failure occurs, which causes the bulb filament of the white light to fail. In this case, the doenergized white light (defective bulb) would indicate that the lockout circuitry is disabled, l although, under this particular condition because of the different failures postulated above, the lockout circuitry is in fact energized. Still, a fourth failure will be required to take place - that of an operator action, accidental or otherwise - to change the position of the valve. If the operator actuates the switch which will change the position of the valve, visual and audible indications from three different places will be actuated. The system status monitor panel will provide visual and audible indication on a system level that a particular condition has been violated. Concurrent with this, the annunciator panel will provide visual and audible indication, on a group level, and identify the group to which the affected component belongs. The monitor light panel, which arranges the components in groups, will provide visual indication on a component level and identify exactly the component, the position of which was violated. As postulated above, it will require four successive failures (beyond the single failure criterion) to bring the lockout control circuitry to a condition that will allow the valve position to be changed. Assuming, however, that such a condition can be obtained, the presence of redundant visual and audible indications alerting the operator of the violated condition will prevent the condition from taking place. On the other hand, let's assume 0080m l
-that the undetected failure-occurred in the switch contact in the neutral leg of the power lockout circuitry and that a hot short occurred in the hot leg of the circuitry such that the valve solenoid is energized and the valve position is violated. As discussed above, this condition will cause variance levels of visual and audio indications to actuate which will-alert the operator of the violated condition and will therefore prevent the valve position from being reversed. Moreover, the occurrence of accidental hot shorts which will cause-the valve's solenoid to be energized and change position is not credible. The wires are terminated on terminal blocks with barriers between the block points so as to prevent adjacent points from shorting each other. In addition, the points in question are terminat.ed far apart such that the only credible hot short is ~ obtained by intentionally connecting the points manually with a long piece of bare copper wire. Insert C .The position indicating lights.on the handswitch for each. accumulator isolation valve indicate the open or closed status of the valve when it is stroked open for operation at power or stroked closed for shutdown. When the isolation valves are padlocked in the open position during reactor power operation by locking open the circuit breakers, these pocition indicating lights on the han'dswitch will be deenergized. At this time, this position is monitored by MCB annunciators or in the monitor light box. The position signal is from'a contact on the valve cam operator switch. Another contact on the valve. cam' operator switch signals the critical function valve alarm that the valve is.not opened. There is also a critical valve reflashing alarm that indicates when the valve is not fully open which is signaled from a stem mounted limit,s. witch. These diverse indications warn the operator if the valve is not open when it is required to be open for correct ECCS alignment. The power supplies to the MCB annunciators'on the monitor light box are independent of the power provided to the valves. ;"! 0000A i 9 "ili h'ee y --. Icet;d cut. In saat* inn-eba at--tric-1 cc-eectione te th::: 721"a operaterc
- he e:1/;; will bc padlocked vvun.
+111 b: rer.e"eA ar Valves 8803 A and B are the Boron Injection Tank (BIT). inlet isolation valves. In'the past, the BIT was filled with concentrated boric acid (20000 ppm boron), and the system was' required to be isolated from the normal charging and ECCS injection paths by the BIT solution and also preventing inadverten't boration of the RCS. Recently, analyses have shown that the high boric acid concentration is not needed for a safe shutdown after a LOCA, and the decision was made to lower the concentration in the BIT solution to 2000 ppm boric acid, which is the normal concentration of the ECCS water. As a result of this change, the requirement' for having the BIT inlet and outlet isolated was eliminated. To minimize changes to Plant Vogtle while still maintaining an increased operability factor for the BIT system, the inlet isolation valves HV-8803A and B will bc locked in the open position, and electrical power will not be connected to the valves motors. 't' 4 ,y .-u w
Response A NRC Queslion fr~ om Jpril II,/985 B7eeliny on Condenser Air Ejector and Sleam Packing Exhassler Radia/ ion filonilor .ne condenser air ejeelor and sicam packing exl,aasler radis4io n monilor (.RE-1A139 A, G od C) coniinuousQ rneasures ntdicac k f in & diseharge. from lhe air ejeefor Acader of /Ae condeners and lhe cleam packiny exhausler as siswn in /igure 9.44-l. The dischsge hon /Ae air ejeefor Aeader co//ec/s /he effluent from the air e-jecise condensers and lhe yacuar pamps as shown in figure /0 4.1-I, and dhe. slesm packing exAsus/er dischsye collecis the effluent from /Ae slam psching exAsasler blowers as shourn in revised fi are 10 2 2-/, cheel 3 (allacked). 3 Th e. condenser air ejeclar and slam packiy exhaasfer radialion Inonilor is afilived /ir nornu/ operslions as ue// as for accident ConoVlions. 7Ais msni/er 4 described 41 parsyraphs ad //, 5 5. E 4 //. s.s. F and lables ll.s.5-I 4AroayA // 5. 5 - y ..fl.50-4,and //. S. 3 -/.
st 3 :,s :o ! !U_ E 3B s ik J3 l !l dliiill ' ' ~~m i EEE ~ "5 5.!!, e' Bi I p! e= 1 i 3 I I '{j j l 4 l, ig3 I ,4, O l s 89 dj %. !'t!l.!.y.n.istll o w SU h a u t i .*,Li,)3 w a Uy '*[H h]c y n k g=k g kgi'.+,im n I _lMiIh,Mihi, f i, i ] = il D GM 's r 4 H r ej 9 ziq e4 1 6 el; lj et f [!! h j Lp"!,g-i I y [ I O' i
- e. 4.#r. i s.
~ A. x gli.' ' g ' k(( 7.. gif4 7[{ l To U, I*p;ar g! e# ~ $.w-g. _ u gm Y P I-Q g g f = =- = o kk i
bc O$MIO ASB Items from NRC Lutter dated February 14, 1985 \\ The following items refer to thelstaff's additional areas to be addressed as identified in the NRC letter dated February 14, 1985. -(1) As a result of a recent amendment, the applicant-needs to add further discussion to the FSAR on the essential and normal chilled water systems, especially concerning alarms.
Response
See attached annotated copy of FSAR subsection 9.2.9. The VEGP inservice inspection pump and. valve test program will include testing of the essential chilled water system chillers and pumps on a quarterly ~ basis. In addition, the technical specifications will require valve lineup be verified on a monthly basis, and at least once per 18 months automatic start on a safety injection test signal of each chiller and pump be verified. (2) All sheets of FSAR figure 10.3.2-1 need to be updated to correspond to sheet 2 of the figure. Also, bypass lines were added to the figure and the associated test now needs to be updated.
Response
See amendment 14 to FSAR section 10.3. (3) In FSAR Amendment 7, nonsafety connections above the 330,000 gallon level were deleted from table 10.4.9-4. This needs to be clarified. i
Response
See FSAR paragraph 9.2.6.4.C. (4) The staff will require at least one RER suction valve in each RCS hot leg suction line to have power removed for alternate shutdown.
Response
Still under evaluation. Will be addressed as part of draft SER open item 77. i. (5) If sheets 1 and 2 of FSAR figure 9.2.1-1 are correct, a discussion needs to be added to FSAR to explain the seismic class change between the orifice and isolation valve on the sample lines. If the figure is wrong, it needs to be corrected.
Response
See amendment 14 to FSAR paragraph 9.2.1.2.3. 2154t 1
0 (6) In response to a staff question, the applicant indicated that the air compressors cannot be manually loaded on to the diesel generator busses.
Response
No additional response required. (7) The staff emphasized the need for Technical Specifications concerning the control room ventilation system when Unit 1 is operating and Unit 2 is still under construction because control room pressure envelope needs to be maintained. A similar situation may exist in the fuel building.
Response
The technical specifications will address the control room ventilation system when Unit 1 is operating and Unit 2 is still under construction. Even though the fuel handling building ventilation system is shared by both Units 1 and 2, the normal and energency FHB ventilation systems will be complete and operational when Unit 1 is operating and Unit 2 is under construction. See amendment 14 to FSAR subsections 6.4.2, 9.4.1 and 9.4.2. (8) In response to a staff question, the applicant stated that failure of a non-safety-related ventilation system will not affect safety-related equipment. Response" l See amendment 14 to FSAR section 9.4. (9) In response to a staff question, the applicant stated that the only safety-related equipment in the equipment building is seismic Category 1 duct work.
Response
The safety-related equipment located in the equipment building is the containment purge and preaccess filter system containment isolation valves and associated piping. The Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 Category 2 plant vent exhaust radiation monitor is also located in the equipment building. (10) The applicant should add discussion to the FSAR as to consequences of loss of ventilation in the main steam isolation valve and feedwater isolation valve areas and the consequences of exceeding 200*F in these areas.
Response
See attached revision to response to NRC question 410.55. (later) 2154t 2 l . ~
(11) The applicant should add a discussion to the FSAR on the main steam isolation valve / main steam dump valve as to how the system works, whether or not it interfaces with the nitrogen system, what happens on loss of nitrogen. etc.
Response
'A detailed description of the MSIVs is provided in FSAR paragraph 10.3.2.2.4. A description of the atmospheric dump valves is provided in the attached annotated copy of FSAR paragraph 10.3.2.2.3. (12) The applicant needs to provide discussions in the FSAR as to what type of protection was required for the AFW pung missile.
Response
I See FSAR table 3.5.1-1 sheet 3. Missile protection for the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine disk missile is provided by the 24-inch thick concrete auxiliary feedwater pump room walls. l l ~ 9 l 2154t 3
VEGP-FSAR-lO )r The power-operated atmospheric relief valves also serve'to l14 L prevent operation'of the safety valves during.relatively, mild transients and,-following safety valve actuation, act to assist the safety valves to positively reseat by automatically reducing ~ -.and regulating steam pressure to a value below the safety valve g resenting pressure. The operation of each power-operated atmospheric relief valve is controlled from a pressure tap on the steam generator steam line with which it is associated. This piping connection is separate from the.other steam piping -pressure taps which are used for reactor protection, to satisfy the requirenent for separation between control and protection systems. The power-operated atmospheric relief valve consists of-a l14 Control Components, Inc., pressurized seat offset globe drag valve'(8-in. inlet-offset, 10-in.. outlet, 900-lb valve rating) with electrohydraulic actuator and a restrictor. The nuclear 1 Class 2 globe drag valve is located inside the MSIV areas; the restrictor (silencer) is placed on a roof outside the control and auxiliary buildings to vent to atmosphere. The noise 1 attenuation is divided into two stages: one by the disk stack inside the main globe valve and the second by the disk stack in I the restrictor. This design approach reduces the size of the main valve and the size of the restrictor. The combined design has the capability of controlling the distant field noise as ) ~ well as the local field noise. It is sized for a sound pressure level of 90 dBa at 3 ft near field noise and less than 55 dBa at 4000 ft for far field noise. The atmospheric relief valves are electrohydraulically operated l and are controlled by Class 1E sources. The capability for remote manual valve operations is provided in the main control l room and at the shutdown panels. The-valves-ar- ---d cle::d, er.d sedulai..d by hydr:.ulic pressur+,-with an crrrgency<. l ~ valve ciceing eperaticr. utilizing a nitrogen prc::urized L tydr ulic ree.tyvirv21 Local manual operators are provided to permit operation of the valves in the event of a complete loss of automatic or remote manual control. Y{fNSES)C) 10.3.2.2.4 Main Steam Isolation Valve System l14 l .The function of the main steam isolation system is to limit blowdown to one steam generator in the event of a steam line I break in order to: l A. ' Limit the related effect upon the reactor core within specified fuel design limits. l B. Limit containment pressure to a value less than 90 percent of design pressure. 10.3.2-6 Amend. 14 2/85
3 Insert to 10.3.2.2.3 The valve operator is a self-contained linear modulating electro-hydraulic valve operator for use with~an 8 I 10 inch globe drag valve. On loss of power and/or signal, the actuator will extend the operator and close the valve. The operator is mounted on the valve by attaching the base plate to the gland of the i valve. The operator rod is attached to the line valve stem. The primary function of the operator is modulation. The actuator recognizes.4 to 20 milliamp command signals: four milliamps represents full extension (valve closed) and with increasing signal the actuator retracts (valve opens). The incoming signal is compared to the feedback signal coming from the position transducer by an on-board servo amplifier. If there is a change I from the previous level greater than the deadband..the actuator is i set in motion until the corresponding position is reached. Loss l of command signal will extend the operator and close the valve. I The system stores energy in a pneumatic accumulator and gas bottle pressurized by an electrically driven pump which is controlled by two fluid pressure switches; one to turn pump actor on (decreasing) and the other to turn pump motor off (increasing). Opening or closing during normal operation is accomplished by either energizing both solenoids or de-energizing both solenoids, to either retract (open valve) or extend (close valve) the operator cylinder rod. Manual overide of the solenoid is necessary for operating the valve operator during a 115 VDC power loss. Speed or retracting (opening valve) or extending (closing valve) is controlled by a flow control valve which meters the flow of hydraulic fluid from the cylinder to return. The operator can be positioned by means of a hand pump in the event of pump failure with the solenoids in the proper mode. The electrical system consists of servo-valve, three pressure switches (one for gas, two for oil) and a reservoir low fluid level indicator. The system also features a servo amplifier which compares incoming command signals with actuator position feedback transducer and then energizes the corresponding solenoid valve to comply with the command. The hydraulic system stores sufficient energy to perform its intended functions. The energy is stored in an on-board piston i type accumulator. Charging is initiated by a " fluid" pressure switch which is set to indicate the minimum system pressure necessary for proper operation. When the minimum is reached the system's hydraulic power supply is turned on to restore the system to its peak pressure. Upon reaching maximum, systes pressure as indicated.by another pressure switch, the power supply is turned off. As the operator modulates, the system pressure drops. When the minimum. pressure switch set point is reached, the above process repeats and the actuator is recharged. l 2154t 4
= __ _ l l For modulation, the dual coil servo valves in the system are operated. This is automatically done by the servo amplifier when there is a change in the incoming signal. To extend the actuator (and close the valve) solenoids AGB are de-energized. Upon reaching the set point when extending, solenoid B is energized to stop the actuator. If a command signal is received to retract the actuator, the servo amplifier energizes solenoids A&B. At the set point, solenoid A is de-energized and solenoid B remains energized (as extending). The hydraulic circuit is protected from extreme pressure transients by two thermal relief valves. These valves become active when their relief setting is exceeded. Reseat is automatic. Stroking speed is controlled by a cartridge type flow control valve which is preadjusted to provide the specified stroking speed. l i r i e M i 2154t 5 i
t T VEGP-FSAR-9 r 9.2.9 CHILLED WATER SYSTEMS 1 9.2.9.1 Essential Chilled Water System 9.2.9.1.1 Design Bases j 9.2.9.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases. A. The essential chilled water system is designed to remain functional during and following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). I B. The essential chilled water system is designed to maintain stipulated ambient air temperature of the l' engineered safety features (ESF) equipment rooms and the switchgear rooms during operation under accident conditions below the maximum design ambient air temperature of 104'F. l C. The essential chilled water system is designed so that a single failure of any active component, assuming loss of offsite power, cannot result in loss of ESF switchgear or the ability to operate at least one of the redundant emergency safeguard feature pumps. A failure mode and effects analysis of the system is provided in table 9.2.9-3. 9.2.9.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases. A. During its operation the essential chilled water system is designed to maintain ambient air temperatures within the switchgear rooms, battery rooms, and control room as specified in table 9.4.1-2, within the limits recommended by the battery manufacturer, and in the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers ( ASHRAE) i Comfort Standard 55-74, respectively. B. The essential chilled water system is designed to permit periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance i jg,, of principal corponentsgai:L-e ei..i-__.f 1..^.....y...J ~ 4 9.2.9-1 -vc ,y---,_m.,--,--mr, ,w - w --,-,-- -,..-. y,,w.. - m.wr w-.- o.. w -- -,,ey__
PREujgf. e VEGP-FSAR-9 ] buildings and the heat sink of the nuclear service cooling Heat picked up at the air cooling coils and water system. transferred by the chilled water is piped past the chemical addition system feed input point and the air separator to the j suction of the chilled water pump.
- rr_
f Chilled by the refrigeration t i ?- -.s ; - r -- ^2 the water leaves the evaporator at about 44*F to
- circuit, return to the coils.
M_. _.m_ c,,: r,e r 1_,_:1 a r m r..........- (.. -s ^ - - - - w w. wm. s - - j - 9.2.9.1.3 Safety Evaluation Safety evaluations are numbered to correspond with the safety design bases. The condenser water pump, chiller, chilled water pump, A. and piping are designed in accordance with Seismic category 1 requirements as specified in section 3.2. The essential chilled water system capacity is B. designed to provide adequate heat transfer to allow the coils to maintain design ambient air temperatures in essential areas. Two separate 100-percent-capacity independent systems C. provide complete mechanical backup. Coupled with the redundancy of electrical design, a failure of any single active component cannot result in a complete loss of both trains of ESF equipment, thus ensuring a safe shutdown condition. g*ent C-gt.
- 4
.yg O de d "- 9.2.9.1.4 Tests and Inspections The chilled water piping circuits are hydrostatically tested and balanced to provide design flowrates and temperatures ^ within-e-tolerance of +20 percertt r - 7 : -- T ___,_1_.. ~. i_, _..~ proper perf rmance of system 4 ^ components. 9.2.9.1.5 Instrument Applications Chiller and pumps are operable from the main control room and the remote shutdown panel. Indicators are displayed in the main 12 control room and the remote shutdown panel for chiller and pump (status. Compressor and chilled water pump malfunctions are 9.2.9-3 Amend. 12 12/84
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) 9.2.9.2 Normal Chilled Water System 9.2.9.2.1 Design Bases 9.2.9.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases. The normal chilled water i system has no safety design basis. 9.2.9.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases During normal operation the normal chilled water A. system is designed to maintain normal design ambient air temperatures in various areas throughout the turbine, auxiliary, control, and fuel handling buildings. The normal chilled water system is designed to permit B. periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of ) principal components with a minimum loss of normal operation. 9.2.9.2.2
System Description
General Description. The normal chilled water 9.2.9.2.2.1 system consists of three chillers shown schematically in figure 9.2.9-2. Major components include centrifugal chilled water refrigeration machines (chillers), chilled water pumps, The air separator, and chemical feed system. expansion tank, normal chilled water system is not a safety-related system as 14 I indicated in table 3.2.2-1. i tksfw The normal chilledAsystem supplies chilled water to the essential and nonessential cooling units during normal plant l During an accident or loss of offsite power, the I operation. normal chillers shut down, while the essential air cooling units ( are supplied with chilled water from the essential chilled water system for safe shutdown. Component Description. Design data for major 9.2.9.2.2.2 components of the normal chilled water system are listed in table 9.2.9-2. Amend. 12 12/84 I 9.2.9-4 Amend. 14 2/85 L
I NN AWC h ff l TABLE 3.5.1-1 (SHEET 3 OF 4) Calculated Calculated Missile Thickness or Maximum Residua 1 Surrounding Mater-l Missile Steel Velocity ial to Prevent Cha rac te ri st ics Pe r f o ra-Casing After Steel Missile CIC011e Equiv. . tion Thick-Casing Casing Concre te Pe rfo ra-. P ro tec t-Identi-Source of Velocity Dia. Mass Depth ness Pe rfo ra-Pe rfo ra-Spalling tion tion riv tlon Missile Location (ft/s) (in.) (lba) (in.1 (in.) tion. tion (in.) (in.) Provided Impeller Spent fuel Aux. 55.8 2.09 0.38 0.005 0.31 No Mone Mone None None g pool bldg. skimmer level A pump room R-A53 Impeller Spent fuel Aux. 77.7 6.93 23.10 0.06 0.25 No None None None None pool pump bldg. t ra in A level A room A-53 Fan MCC room Aux. 41 1.2 1.12 0.012 0.078 No None None Mone None blade cooler b1dg. train A level 1-4 room 116, 118 Y Fca Ra il corr. Aux. 101 1.83 4.5 0.065 0.078 No None None None None M blade ac unit -bldg. M level 1 Fan A8 cont. Aux. 229 1.37 3.43 0.215 0.1644 Yes 132.2 1.03 None None blade exhaust bldg. y unit level 2 room 212 Fcn Elect. Aux. 109.5 0.591 0.242 0.032 C.G28 Yes 46 0.081 0.01 None Clade swg r and b1dg. MCC room levei 2 cooler room 212 Impeller Turbine-Aux. 150.0 5.69 21 0.01 2.0 No None None None None d riven feedwater pump pumphouse room 106 Impeller Motor-Aux. 164.85 4.85 21 0.13 1.44 No None None None None d rivon feedwater pump pumphouse room 106 o) None Trrbine Steam Aux. 892 3.7 30 Casing 1.1 Yes $49 10 None -Vev-dick turbine feedwater wi18 be pumphouse fulIy room 106 penet ra ted. d l
TABLE 3.5.1-1 (SHEET 4 OF 4) Calculated Calculated Missile Thickness of Maximum . Residual Su rround i ng Ma te r-Missile Steel Velocity ial to Prevent ' Cha racte ri st ics Pe rfo ra-Casing After Steel-Missile CIC36te Equiv. tion Thick-Casing Casing Conc rete Perfora- ' Pro tec t-Identi-Source of Velocity Dia. Mass Depth ness Pe rfo ra-Pe rfo ra-Spalling tion tion fication Missila l_oca tion (ft/s) (in.) (lbe) {in.) (in.) tion tion (in.) (in.) Provided layeIIer Fan - Control 49.7 0.164 0.042 0.0125 0.041 No Mone None None Mone a/c unit building room 226 reIsy room Impeller Centriru-Control 222.916 1.066 1.532 0.157 0.165 No None None None None gal fan-building filter room 248 unit (HVAC) 19 {0 Ni$3llC ff0ltCllon l$ frevided by /fe 3) rug,)MA$ CCDCTC C * ? Y O o m in>
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i EWC !GTM T'O 3 Co. 11409-CAI.C
- gDT ntnues omston I.ADISH CO. 1 tus'Ah wiscowsw PRODUtf DESIGN & ENelNEERING OSPT.
APPaavan ~ save 3/21/85 ~ Reinforcement calculations for 28" 0.D. extruded outlet header with 5-9" 0.D. outlets and 1-4" 0.D. outlet per Ladish Co. drawing 11409-W. Design Conditions: 1200 psi G 600'F per ASME Code Section III - NC3643.4 i l Material SA106 Gr. C S = 17500 psi Wall required for pressure Dr = 28" and tr = y$o([4 (1200) " *
- 4. Tr = 2.625 min.
Do, = 9" and tbg = 1200-(4.'5) (1z00) =.300 Tbg = 1.448 min. 17300 +.4 j Dog = 4. 5" and tb = 1200 (2.25)- --- = 1.50 tb4 4 =.295 min. 17300 +.4 (1200) I I For 4" outieti Formed I.D. - Dog = 3.75, K =.6+ 2 Dog 3 Dr A = K (tr x D ) =.707 (.934 x 3.79 = 2.476 o A1 = Do (T - t ) = 3.75 (2.625 .934) = 6. 341 > A r r For 9" Outieei h Formed I.D. = Do9 = 5.875 K =.6 =. 814 A = K (tr x Do) =.814 (.934 x 5.875) = 4.468 Ag = Do (Tr - tr) = 5.875 (2.625 .934) = 9.935 p A 2N cE '. _LTeM 8 DsetL Q Peu E' rem Ve s lh4 dw 8-tO, (98s M. m f l Ma=,,2;c, AJo res dJee M%k 9 iss0 j 1 -.-. - - -. - -- - --.- ~ - r- -}}