ML20115D100

Listing of Procedure Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed During Month of Sept 1992 & Summary of Safety Evaluations, Per 10CFR50.59 & 10CFR50.71(e)

ML20115D100
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/06/1992
From:	Tietz G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GCT-92-41, NUDOCS 9210200228
Download: ML20115D100 (17)

Text

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Commonwealth Edison

, ound Ciuss Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Corcova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241 GCT-92-41

'i October 6,1992 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTH: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 ,

SUBJECT:

-Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed EC_DacteLNoL30-254 and EQ._26.5' Enclosed please find a itsting of those facility.and procedure-changes, tests, and experiments requiring safety evaluations completed during the month o' September 1992, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2. DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).

~

Respectfully, COMMONHEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION dl/)dd Gerald T etz '

Technical Superintendent CCT/dak

-Enclosure cc:' A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator-T.-Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector 190109:

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'. '. SE-92-161 QOS 5750-2, 005 5750-51 DESCRIPTION:

Added steps to procedure to allow for use of normal Service Water instead of RHR Service Hater for cooling to the condenser for the Refrigeration

Condensing Unit 1/2-9400-102. Steps were also added to provide guidance on how to meet the Generic letter 89-13 requirements on the Control Room ventilation system. Additional steps ensure that the digital multimeters installed on the Air Filtration Unit 1/2-9400-101 were removed prior to completing the surveillance.

SAFETY EVALUATIOW SUMARY:

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

- The change alters the initial condi' ions used in the UFSAR analysis.

. - The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impitcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

- Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

LOCA UFSAR SECTION: 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not incritose the probability of an occurrence or the I consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since adding steps to the procedure which specify which water supply to provide to the Control Room ventilation "B" train heat exchanger 1/2-9400-102 will not alter the operation of the system. The steps to ensure installation and removal of the digital multimeters do not physically affect the system and are only being added to verify that an existing step is perforned. All other changes to the procedure serve to clarify and explain existing steps in the procedure. Since none of the above actions alter the performance, design, or function of the Control Room ventilation system, there is no possibility of creating an accident or malfunction that was not already analyzed in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

TS 115

SE-92-164 Exempt Change #E04-0-92-008 DESCRIPTION:

Replaced existing 1/4 inch plastic tubing to Diesel Generator cooling fan damper 1/2-5772-86 with 1/4 inch copper tubing.

SAFETY EVALUATION SU MARY:

1. The change described abcVe has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

- The change aert the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

- Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

LOCA UFSAR SECTION: 15.6 for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change i described alsove will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the acc' dent, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the replacement of the plastic instrument air tubing to the DG cooling fan l damper with cooper tubing does not alter the function or operation of the damper in any manner. This means that the function and operation of the DG ventilation system and the DG Fire Protection Cardox system will remain unaffected. Also, no additional load will be added to !.he instrument air system so as to cause the instrument air system to fall. Therefore, no i accident or maltunction of a type different from those described in the

UFSAR could occur. This is also true because the failure modes for the tubing are not being changed by using copper tubing in place of plastic.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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SE-92-169 QCAN 901(2)-5 A-16, Channel B Hain Steam Line Low Pressure DESCRIPTION:

1. Added the following operator aids:

a. Added sensor that causes the alarm.

b. Added references.

c. Added probable causes for the annunciators, i

2. Added steps from Q0A 250-1 to this procedure instead of referencing to the procedure.

3. Added nanual initiation of Reactor Scram and croup 1 Isolation in case the alarm is legitimate and auto actions did not take place.

a. Added steps to trouble shoot if alarm is not a valid alarm.

5. Added step to perform QCOS 1600-6, instrument outage report for inoperable instrument.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUDMARY:

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where anj of the following is true:

- The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly

, assumed to function dering or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component

, could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

l TS 115

SE-92-169 (Continued)

QCP.N 901(2)-5 A-16, Channel B Main Steam Line Low Pressure

)

2. The possibility for an accident or malfvaction of a diffe: ,t type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not cteated because these steps are for aid to the operator and does HQI dtrect api cctions.

ihe addition of steps from QOA 250-1 will HQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a'different type than described in the UFSAR because these steps were performed under the old procedure-so that this step does HQI add any additional action to this procedure.

The addition of steps to manually perform Reactor Scram and G oup 1 Isolation does HQI create a possibil1ty of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR because'the-operator is only i performing the actions that the auton,atic actions should have performed if.

, logic would have worked properly.

The addition of steps for trouble shooting if instrument or logic has

. malfunctioned will HQI create a possibility of an accident or-malfunction of a different type than described in_UFSAR. If ths instrument or logic

, is malfunctioning trouble shootirg and repairs would have to be performed anyway even under the old procedure. This procecare is just more specific on some of the possible verifications to perform to isolate the source of trouble.

The addition of the step to perform QCOS 1600-6 will HQI create a possibility of ar, accident or malfunction of a diffe:' type than described in the UFSAR, this step is just a flag to m a procedure that is required to be performed if an instrument bet , inoperable so

,- that it does HQI get overlooked.

l 3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore,- the safety margin is not reduced.

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TS 115 l

S E-92.-170 QCAN 901(2)-5 09 Channel A Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature DESCRIPTION:

< l. Added the following operator aids:-

I a. Added sensor that causes the-alarm.

b. Added references,

c. Added probable causes-for-the annunciators.

2. Added manual initiation of Reactor Scram and Group 1 Isolation in case the alarm is legitimate and auto actions did not take place.

3. Added staps to trouble shoot if alarm is not a valid aa .n.

4 -. Added step to perform QCOS 1600-6, initrument outage report-for-Inoperable instrumcat.

6 SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:

1. The change described above has bec- .nalyzed to determine each accident or anticipated trh.. .6 describau in the UFSAR where any of'the following:is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used:in the UFSAR analysis.-

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during-or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the-changed-structure,. system, or component could lead to the accident. i

-The accidents which meet these criterialare listed below:  !

None For each of those accidents, it has been determined th'at the change-described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence.or the consequence of the accident,.or malfunction of-equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfuncticn of a different type than-any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not cree d because the addition- q of--sensor, probable causes, and references will'1 create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a'different type than described in the '

UFSAR. These steps are- for aid to_ theioperator -and does-RQI direct ADY '

actior.'.

"1 TS 115- 1

SE-92-170 (Continued)

QCAN 901(2)-5 09 Channel A Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature The addition of steps to manually perform Reactor Scram and Group 1 Isolation does NQI create a p^:sibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR because the operator is only performing the actions that the automatic actions should have performed if logic would have worked properly, The addition of steps for trouble shooting if-instrument or logic has malfunctioned will NQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR. If the instrument or logic is malfunctioning trouble shooting and repairs would have to be performed anyxay even under the old procedure. This procedure is just more specific on some of the possible verifications to perform to isolate the source of trouble.

The addition of the step to perform QCOS 1600-6 will NOI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR, this step is just a flag to perform a procedure that is required to be performed if a-instrument became inoperable so that it does HQI get overlooked,

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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TS 115

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SE-92-171 QCAN 901(2)-5 D-16_ Channel B Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature DESCRIPTION: ,

1. Added the following operator. aids:

a. Added sensor that causes:the alarm.

b. Added references.

c.- Added probable causes for the annunciators.

2. Added manual initiation of Reactor-Scram and_ Group 1 Isolation in. case the alarm is legitimate and auto actions did not'take-' place. ,

3- Added steps to trouble shoot if alarm is not a valid alarm. 4

4. Added step to perform QCOS 1600-6', instrument outage report for-Inoperable-instrument.

SAFETY = EVALUATION SUPMARY:-

1. The change described above.has been analyzed to determine each accident or-anticipated transient described in_the UFSAR where any_of-the following is.

true:

4 - The change alters the initi:1 conditions used in the-UFSAR analysis, i

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- The changed structure, system or component 1; explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after-the accident.

I

-- Operation or failure of the changed structure, system,-or component could lead to the accident.

f- The accidents which meet these criteria are listed'below:

None For each of these accidents, it has been determined-that.the change described above will not increase the-probability of~an occurrence or the

.. consequence of the accident, or malfunction __of-equipment important-to

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safety as_previously-evaluated in'the=UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident-or-malfunction of a different type tFan-any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not: created because:the' addition of sensor, probable causes, and references will HQI' create a possibility ef an accident-or-malfunction.of a different' type than described:In the UFSAR. These-steps are_for aid to the operator and does FQI direct any acttons.

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QCAN 901(2)-5 D-16 Channel B Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature l

The addition of steps to manually perform Reactor Scram and Group 1 Isolation does HQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR because the operator is only performing the actions that the automatic actions should have performed if logic would have worked properly.

The addition of steps for trouble shooting if instrument or logic has malfunctioned will HQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR. If the instrument or logic is malfunctioning trouble shooting and repairs would have to be performed anyway even under the old procedure. This procedure is just

, more specific on some of the possible verifit tions to perform to-isolate the source of trouble.

The addition of the step to perform QCOS 1600-6 will HQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR, this step is just a flag to perform a procedure-

< that is rsquired to be performed if an instrument became inoperable so that it does HQI get over looked.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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SE-92-172 i

QCAN 901(2)-5 A-9 Channel A Main Steam Line Pressure DESCRIPTION:

1. Added the following operator aids:

?. Added sensor that causes the alarm,

b. Added references.

c. Added probable causes for the annunciators.

2. Added steps from QOA 250-1 to this procedure instead of referencing to the procedure.

3. Added manual initiation of Reactor Scram and Group 1 Isolation in case the alarm is legitimate and auto actions did not take place.

4. Added steps to trouble shoot if alarm is not a valid alarm.

5. Added step to perform QCOS 1600-6, instrument outage report for inoperable instrument.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUPMARY:

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or cot onent it explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

- Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described abovc. will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possittlity for an accident or malfunction of a different type thhn any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the addition of sensor, probable causes, and references will HQI creaf a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than os.cribed in the UFSAR. These steps are for aid to the operator and does HQI direct any actions.

TS 115

i SE-92-172 (Continued)

QCAN 901(2)-5 A-9 Channel A Main Steam Line Pressure The addition of steps from Q0A 250-1 will 801 create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR because these steps were performed unaer the old procedure so that this step does NQI add any addition action to this procedure.

The addition of steps to manually perform Reactor Scram and Group 1 Isolation does HQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR be:ause the operator is only performing the actions that the automatic actions should have performed if logic would have worked properly.

The addition of steps for trouble shooting if instrument or logic has malfunctioned will H01 create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR. If the instrument or i logic is malfunctioning trouble shooting and repairs would have to be performed anyway even under the old procedure. This procedure is iust more specific on some of the possible verifications to perform to isolate the source of trouble.

The addition of the step to perform QC05 1600-6 will EQI create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than described in the UFSAR, this step is just a flag'to perform a procedure

, that is required to be performed if an instrument became inoperable so that is does HQI get over looked.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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SE-92-174 Component Replacement C04-1(2)-92-040 3

DESCRIPTION:

I' Replaced the existing Electo-hydraulic (EHC) system 'XK' relays and relay-rockets manufactured by General Electric (GE) with Potter-Brumfield relays

' and relay sockets, j SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY: .

The change described above has been analyzed to determine each a'ccident or l.

anticipated transient described in the UFSAR-where any of the following is.

5 true:

- The change alters the_ initial-conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

- The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly j assumed to function during or after the accident.

- - Operation or failure of the changed; structure, system, or. component could lead to the accident.

.The accidents which meet these criteria are~ listed below:

I Load Rejection with Bypass UFSAR SECTION: 15.2-2.2 Turbine Trip with Failure of Bypass System _

UFSAR ECTION: 15.1.3.1

Turbine Trip with Partial Bypass UFSAR SECTION: 15.2.3.2 Load Rejection without Bypass UFSAR SECTION: 15.2.'2.1

} For each.of these accidents, it-has been determined that the change-described above will not increase the-probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the'accioent, or malfunction of equipment important to-safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. _The possibility-for an accident _or malfunction _of a different type than

any-previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the new-

Potter-Brumsfield relay--coils' operate at the same voltage L 24 VOC)'as the existing GE' relay coils. The reley contact ratings-are also-identical (10-l amps resistive'at 120 Vac). Installation of the new Potter-Brumfield relays and relay sockets will not change any existing interactions with .

other structures, systems or components. - The new relays do not have any

additional functions. Ihere are no new failure M eL created _by-1- installation of this comoonent reolacement.

Since replacement of the existing _GE 'XK'; relays with Potter-Brumfield:

relays is essentially like-for-like and creates no new failure modes,:it

!- 1s not possible forLan accident.or malfunction'of a type _different from.

those evaluated in the UFSAR:

! 3. The margin of safety, is not defined in.the basis for-any Technical

!' Specification, therefore, the safety-margin is not reduced.

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SE-92-175 Component Replacement C04-1(2)-92-023 l n

! DESCRIPTION: $

1

- Replaud the existing GEMAC 553 transmitters with Rosemount transmitters  !

model 1153DF5TJN0012 in the Residual Heat Removal-(RHR) system heat.

exchanger discharge flow instrument loops.

SAFE 1Y EVALUATION SUWARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident-or

anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of.the-following is

! true:

i- .

l

- The change alters- the in1 Mal conditions usediin the UFSAR analysis, i

I - The changed structure, system or component is explicitly orl implicitly assumed to function-during or after the accident.

[ - Operation'or failure of the changed structure, system; or coi..psnent:

could' lead to the accident.

l i The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below::

None For each of these accidents..it has been-determined that-the change

described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or_the

consequence of the-accident,._or-malfunction-of. equipment-important_toi

safety as previously evaluated in_the.UFSAR.

u . .

[ 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than-i- .any previously evaluated in the UFSAR-isLnot created because the Residual 4

! Heat Removal (RHR) system heat exchanger discharge flow Instrument' loops-l will remain the same;=therefore, there will?not be anv: adverse;1mpact on

, systems or functions from those evaluated in the UFSAR.

I 3. The margin of_ safety, is not defined in:the bastsafor any Technical l

Specification,-therefore, the safety margin:is'not-reduced. .

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SE-92-176 t Procedure QOP 5400-T7 1-i  :

!' DESCRIPTICW:

The objective of the catalytic recombiner is to reduce the'offgas volume by recombining hydrogen and oxygen into water (2H 21+ O 2H O).

2 It also serves to limit the magnitude of the hydrogen 2 . catalyst.)

content downstream 4 for safety purposes.(offgas fires or explosions) i The baseline plot of recombiner temperature has,an upper limit of 790*F @

100% of rated core thermal power. The recombiner is_ rated at 900'F l (independent of rated core. thermal. power). The proposed _ change is to raise the upper band on the recombiner curve to 900*F at 100% of rated l- core thermal power'and adjust the rest of the upper band curve proportionally.

i i

l ~ SAFETY. EVALUATION Sl4 MARY:

1. 1he change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or

anticipated transient described in theLUFSAR where any of the:following is-l true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in--_the_UFSAR analysis.

The changed-structure, system or component-is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident, i.

Operation or' failure of the changedLstructure,-system, or' component' l could lead to the accident.

j The-accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

L None i

i for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability _of an_ occurrence or the

, consequence of the accident, or. malfunction _of equipment importantfto-

- safety as previously evaluated /in the UFSAR.

2. T_he possibility for an accident or-malfunction of a different-type.than-

any previously. evaluated in the UFSAR-is'not. created because the change.

i will-not affect the operation:of>the recombiner,4 or any of the related-piping downstream'of the recombiner. The-recombiner and'related piping

are ASME Section.III, Class 3 rated. Operating at higher recombiner.

r temperatures,'up.to the design-temperature of 900*F, will not add any.-

. accident or malfunction scenario that-has not_.been analyzed in the UFSAR.

Failure of the-recombiner will'be the same before'and'after-this' change.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical l- Specification, therefore, the safety margin is-not reduced.

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1 SE-92-179 ALARA Dose Reduction Request'92-063

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DESCRIPT!ON:

Installed lead shielding at biological shield wall penetrations N12 "A"

, and."B".

3 SAFETY EVALUATION SU100RY:

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or:

i anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where;any of the following is-true:.

j -

The change alters the initial-conditions 4used in the UFSAR analysis.

I - The changed structure, system or' component is' explicitly orfimplicitly 1 i assumed to_ function during:or:after the accident.

Operation or failure of theLchanged structure,-system,-or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these' criteria are' listed below:

i None 4

For each of these acciderts, it has been determined'thatithe change described above-w!11: not increase the-probability of an occurrence or the consequence of-the-accident,for malfunction of-equipment important to -

safety as previously; evaluated =in the:UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an=-accident or malfunction of-a:different type than.

any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because these-biological shleid: wall _ penetrations have been-evaluated byLSargent & Lundy-to ' safely support:1000 pounds. As:long as this-maximum-loadLis not exceeded, none of the UFSARl accident analyses lilli-be r affectedinor wili any new accidents;be introduced.

3. _.The margin of' safety, = 1s not defined in the basis for any1 Technical Specification, therefore,.thefsafety margin is not reduced.

.TS,115

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SE-92-180 .

l Temporary Alterations 82-1-64 & 65 DESCRIPTION:

To bypass the High-High Radiation signal from the Drywell Radiation Monitors 1-2419A & B. These monitors provide Auto actions as follows:

1. Group II isolation.

2. RBV Isolation

3. SBGTS Auto start

4. Control Room Ventilation Isoiucion.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUPMARY:

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Control Rod Drop Accident UFSAR SECTION 15.4.10 DBA LOCA UFSAR SECTION 15.6.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UF; A is not created because the Drywell Radiation Monitors provide 5 functions:

1. Post Accident Monitoring of DW Radiation.

2. Group II isolation on Hi Hi Radiation.

3. RB Vent isolation on Hi Hi Radiation.

4. Control Room Vent Isolation on Hi Hi radiation.

5. SBGTS Auto Start on Hi H1' Radiation.

Of these 5 functions, only Post Accident Monitoring is required by the Technical Specifications, and then onlv in the Power Operation Mode.

TS 115

4 SE-92-180 CONTD Temporary Alterations 82-1-64 & 65 The FSAR addresses all functions of the Drywell Radiation Monitor. The basis for these auto actions is to mitigate the conseritences of a DBA LOCA. Under the present Refuel condition a DBA LOCA cannot occur.

Likewise,_ installation of this jumper will not affect any circuitry that could cause a DBA LOCA or any other accident or malfunction.

Additionally in the current mode of operation there are 2 significant concerns. The first is the Design Basis Refueling Accident and the second is an uncontrolled level decrease in the Reactor. Neither of these takes credit for the DH Hi Rad monitor providing the Group II Isolation, RB Vent Isolation, CR Vent Isolation, or SBGTS Auto start.

3. The margin of safety, as' defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the PCI Group II function c? the DH Rad Monitor is not required by Technical Specifit2tions.

TS 115