ML20114C143
| ML20114C143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1985 |
| From: | Bridenbaugh D, George Minor MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20114C149 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#185-297 OL, NUDOCS 8501300032 | |
| Download: ML20114C143 (62) | |
Text
~
g7 EM ATTD CORRESPONDDR O-C0CKETED SUFFOLK COUNTY, January 2$',W I985
.O 85 JM 28 Pi:36 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' ~ ~r
( ~ ~. '
.,. n F.a
()
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
().
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,-
)
Unit 1)
)
O I
TESTIMONY OF DALE G.
BRIDENBAUGH AND GREGORY C.' MINOR REGARDING SUFFOLK COUNTY'S tj.
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD CONTENTION Testimony, Attachment and Exhibits O-O g:
85o1300032 850125 PDR ADOCK 05900322 T
PDR ;;
\\
om
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETED L"i4RC Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing.4 card,28,,i.36 us ora i
C i.Cf 7 3ECACA?v
)
..:gjimn(i
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL 1
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
TESTIMONY OF DALE G.
BRIDENBAUGH AND y'
GREGORY C. MINOR REGARDING SUFFOLK COUNTY'S EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD CONTENTION I.
Introduction and Qualification r
O.1. Mr. Bridenbaugh, please state your name, address, and
~
occupation.
A.l.
My name is Dale G.
Bridenbaugh.
I am president of
)
MHB Technical Associates, Inc., a technical consulting firm on nuclear power plant safety and licensing matters located at 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, San Jose, California 95125.
Q.2. Please describe your qualifications and experience relevant to the matters you address in this testimony.
+
h, y
)
h A.2.
I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical en-gineering and am a licensed professional nuclear engineer.
I have more than 30 years of experience in the engineering field, primarily in the areas of power plant analysis, construction,
)
maintenance and operations.
Since 1976, I have acted as a con-sultant to a large number of domestic and foreign government agencies and other groups on nuclear power plant safety and li-
)
censing matters.
Between 1966 and 1976, I was employed by the Nuclear Energy Division of General Electric Company in various managerial capacities relating to the sale, service and. product p
improvement of nuclear power reactors manufactured by that com-pany.
Between 1955 and'1966, I was employed in various'engi-neering capacities working with gas and steam turbines for Gen -
eral Electric.
I have written numerous technical papers-and articles on the subjects of' nuclear' power. equipment and nuclear r
-power-plant safety and'have given extensive testimony on those
[
' subjects.
~A further statement of my professional _qualifica-tions previously has been submitted on the record in1this case.
Q.3. Mr.1 Minor, please state your.name, address and occu-pation.
A.3. My name is Gregory C. Minor.
I amlvice president of MHB Technical Associates, Inc., which was identified by Mr.
[.'
- Bridenbaugh.
f I u.
f
)s P
i O.4.
Please describe'your qualifications and experience relevant to the matters you address in this testimony.
A.4.
My educational background is in electrical engineer-ing (with a power systems option) in which I received Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees.
I have over 24 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including design and testing of systems for use in nuclear power plants.
Since 1976, I have acted as a consultant to a large number of domes-tic and foreign government agencies and other groups on nuclear power. plant safety and licensing matters.
Between 1963 and
)
1976, I was employed by the Nuclear Energy Division of Gene,ral r
Electric Company as a design engineer and manager of engineer-ing design organizations.
My responsibilities included the de -
sign,-testing, qualification and pre-operational testing o'f safety equipment and. control rooms for use in' nuclear power plants.'. A further statement of my professional _' qualifications.
l
[is attached,to this testimony as Attachment.1.
g
.Q.5.fWhat is the purpose-of your testimony? /
l 1
A.S. The purpose of our-testimony is to demonstrate the-validity of.Suffolk County's Emergency Diesel Generatori("EDG").
t.
("
-Lead Contention by addressing the specific issues. set forth i'n f
1 A
1/;.The testimony that follows is the' joint testimony of Mestrs..Bridenbaugh and Minor.
I i'
l Y
)
the subparagraphs of the Contention.
The EDG Load Contention states:.
Contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17 --
Electric Power Systems, the emergency diesel generators at Shoreham ("EDGs") with a maximum
).
'" qualified" load of 3300kW do not provide suffi-cient capacity and capability to assure that the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of the first paragraph of GDC 17 will be met, in that (a)
LILCO's proposed " qualified load" of 3300kW is the
)-'~
maximum load at which the EDGs may be operated, but is inadequate to handle the maximum load that may be imposed on the EDGs because:
(i) intermittent and cyclic loads are excluded;
[
(ii) diesel load meter instrument error was not con-
_ sidered; (iii) operators are permitted to maintain diesei load at 3300kW +100kW; (iv) operators may erroneously _ start additional equipment.
I
_(c)
The EDG qualification. test'run performed by LILCO was inadequate to assure that the EDGs are capable of re--
)
_ liable operation.at 3300kW because:
(l'ii) operators were permitted.to control the diesel' generators at 3300kW +100kW during the test; and (iv) instrument accuracy was'not considered.
I
~-Q.6.
How is this testimony organized?
A.6. We have addressed the contention issues in the same
)
forder as stated in the Licensing Board's January 18, 1985
' Order.2/
)L 2/f Memorandum and Order Ruling on' Admissibility of Emergency
-Diesel Generator-Load Contention (January 18,.1985).
)
t I
07.
Would you please explain the basis for these conten-tions and summarize your concerns with regard to the EDGs at Shoreham?
A.7.
Subsequent to commencement of the hearings on Suffolk
).
County's EDG Contention but prior to their completion, LILCO.
decided to revise the licensing basis of the EDGs to reduce the emergency loads the EDGs would be committed to supply.
LILCO's I-original LOOP /LOCA load requirements, as specified in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1, projected that the maximum coincident demand for the highest loaded EDG was 3881.4kW.3/
This load was estimated
)'
to be approximately constant for the first ten minutes of the accident.
After ten minutes, manual action was assumed that resultei in reducing the post-ten minute maximum load to 3409.2kW.
[
In an' October.18, 1984 letter,4/ LILCO advised that an FSAR revision would be submitted in the near future which would
)
provide the basis for the qualification of the EDGs at the re-duced. load requirement cf 3300kW. - This revision to Section
~
.8.3.1 of the FSAR was formally submitted by LILCO on November 29, 1984 as Amendment 52, consisting of FSAR Revision 34.5/
3/'
FSAR Table 8.3.1-1, at 3 (Revision 31).
4/
SNRC-1094, Confirmatory Testing of TDI Diesel Generators, i.
J.D.
Leonard to Harold R.
Denton, October 18, 1984.
Sj SNRC-1115,RJ.D. Leonard to Harold R..Denton, November 29, 1984.
): ?
=
i i
I Revision 34 contains a number of changes to the original I
emergancy load definition that are of particular relevance.
They are:
(a)
Two new load terms were added that did
)
not appear on the original Table 8.3.1-1.
The first, " Maximum emergen-cy service load", is defined as'the
)
maximum load which would exist during a LOOP /LOCA.
It consists of both nameplate and measured loads.
The y-second term, " qualified load," is defined as an upper bound of the maxi-mum emergency service load of all three EDGs.5/
Revision 34 provides that the " qualified load" of 3300kW "will be used for all purposes."1/
lt h
is thus the maximum load at which the EDGs may be operated.
LILCO has pro-posed to change the Shoreham Technical f'
Specifications to provide a limit of 3300kW for the EDGs.$/
6/_
FSAR, at 8.3.6 (Revision 34).
7/
FSAR, Section 8.1.4, at 8.1-3.
Draft Supplemental Sa'ety Evaluation Report, Emergency 8/
f Load Requirements for' Emergency Diesel Generators, December 3, 1984 ("Dec. SSER"), at 5.
(b)
Revisions were made to Table 8.3.*l-1 j
of the FSAR.
The changes included the removal of a major load on EDG-103 from the automatic start category, ad-h justments to several loads made on the basis of measurnd rather than name-plate data, and the addition of foot-j.
notes indicating that other loads are to be tripped intentionally and in sono cases prevented from starting until ten minutes after the LOCA sig-nal.
(c)
An additidr.a1 table, 8.3.1-1A, enti-tied "!!aximum Emergency Service Loads"
("MESL"), was added.
This table de-velops MESL totals for each EDG by re-p moving from the1 Table 8.3.1-1 totals.
g all loads that are cyclic or intermit-tent or that are tripped or manually initiated after a LOCA signal.
By these deletions, LILCO was able to de-i velop loads that are-less than 2 per-cent below the maximum 3300kW load at.
which the confirmatory test was p
proposed to be run on EDG 103.
LILCO's current proposal to operate the plant with the EDGs " qualified" to a nominal level of 3300kW raises the issues I~
expressed in the stated contentions.
Our concerns regarding this proposal are several, and can be stated in summary form as follows:
(1)
The nominal load at which the EDGs have been
" qualified" (3300kW) is almost identical to the maximum contin-uous emergency service load the EDGs are expected to see in a I
. LOOP /LOCA' accident.
The lack of any margin for intermittent and cyclic loads, uncertainties, operator error, and - the ab-sence of any overload rating, are unprecedented, and do not provide the'EDGs with " sufficient capacity and-capability to
- assure" ti at the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) of GDC 17 will be met.
)
-(2)
In developing the maximum emergency loads used by LILCO to justify the 3300kW 1evel, LILCO has used a load combination methodology that relies on some measured loads and f
some nameplate loads.
This is ina'ppropriate because it further degrades the margin that should be present for accident situa-
'tions.
It appears to be.an attempt on LILCO's part to justify I
the decision to-conduct the EDG endurance test at a level
. 3 I.
L
substantially below that at which the majority of the accident analyses at Shoreham have been performed.
(3)
The EDG qualificacion test run conducted on EDG 103 is inadequate to assure that the EDGs are capable of reli-able operation at 3300kW because instrument accuracy was not considered and because operators were permitted to control the EDGs at 3300kW+100kW during the test.
Q.8. Section (a)(i) of the Contention states that the 3300kW " qualified load" is inadequate to handle the maximum load imposed on the EDGs because intermittent and cyclic loads are excluded.
Which intermittent and cyclic loads have been excluded by LILCO?
A.8.
The intermittent and cyclic loads (hereinafter referred to as cyclic loads) excluded by LILCO are identified h
It is necessary to refer in FSAR Tables 8.3.1-1 and 8.3.1-1A.
to the " remarks" column of Table 8.3.1-1A to identify all of the cyclic or non-continuous loads by function and then refer to the " maximum coincident demand" columns-of Table 8.3.1-1 to determine the magnitudeslof each of these loads.
The cyclic loads are identified on Table 8.3.1-1A by the entry of the re-marks number 5 or 8 and include the following:
Diesel Generator Air Compressor
. a
1 E
l Diesel G,enerator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Operated Valves i
Nonoperating MOVs FSAR Table 8.3.1-1 reports the following maximum electrical loads for each of these functions on each EDG as follows:
FUNCTION EDG 101 EDG 102 EDG 103
' Diesel Generator Air. Compressor 12.0kW 12.OkW 12.OkW Diesel Generator
- Fuel Oil Transfer Pump-0.4kW 0.4kW
'O.4kW
. Motor, Operated Valves 19.7kW 18.3kW 0.7kW
'(next to'last item
~
on page 3 of FSAR Table-8.3.1-1)
. Motor OperatedcValves (removed.by LILCO'from
~
'the load identified as
~
"480 V MG Set":-on-'page 3 of FSAR Table 8.3.-1-1) 46.OkW 46.OkW
- 46.0kW I'-
Non-operating MOVs 95.9kW 75.~3kW TOTALS 174.OkW 152.OkW 59.1kW The maximum loads imposed or the EDGs exceed 3300kW when.-
these loads are added to the MESL totals.
Cyclic loads in-
. crease the MESLs to 3427.3kW for EDG 101, 3360.7kW for.EDG 102
[ t n
and 3284*.6kW for EDG 103.
At other nuclear plants and as contemplated by the regulatory requirements, cyclic loads are i
bounded, if not by the continuous rating, by a short-time over-load rating.1/
LILCO's proposal to. operate the EDGs without a
.short-time rating is a departure from the general industry practice.lS/
Q.9. Will these loads automatically be applied in the event of a LOOP /LOCA?
A.9. Yes.
The actions represented by the above loads are programmed into the automatic sequence which will respond to a j
LOCA signal.
These loads will occur during the first minutes following the initiating event and will be loaded to the diesel generator during the first minutes when the EDG loads are ex-pected to be the highest.
0.10.
Will any of the cyclic loads occur subsequent to li.
the first minutes?
[
A.10.
Yes, some of the cyclic loads will continue throughout the course of the accident.
Specifically, the die-sel fuel oil transfer pumps will cycle on and off as required
[
to replenish the diesel oil and the EDG day tanks. The EDG air 9/
Dec. SSER at 2.-
10/
Deposition of John Knox, December 13, 1984, at 22 (Exhibit
)'
1); Dec. SSER at 2.
) )
compressors will run for a minimum of twelve to fifteen minutes following the accident initiation, if it is assumed that the EDGs all start on the first attempt, and will run even longer if additional attempts are made or required to get the EDGs operating.ll/
Additionally, subsequent motor operated valve operation is required in response to operator actions when ad-ditional safety related equipment is brought on or when recirculation of cooling flows is transferred.
Q.ll.
How do you recommend that the electrical load represented by the cyclic loads be accomodated in the design, rating and qualification of the onsite emergency power system?
A.ll.
There are basically two ways that the cyclic loads can be accomodated.
First, if all of the maximum emer-gency service loads ("MESLs") are identified and measured, it f
would be possible to include the cyclic loads in the MESL total and rate and " qualify" the EDGs at that electrical level, after allowing a minimal but reaso'nable degree of margin for-uncertainties, modeling error, system degradation, etc.
The second way to accomodate these cyclic loads would be to assess their magnitude'but exclude them from the MESL total, making
-11/
Deposition of Jack D. Notaro, Edward J. Youngling, George F.
Dawe and William Schiffmacher, December 12, 1984, at 61-63 (Exhibit 2).
)
- )
)-
i sure that a normal amount of margin is provided in the EDG qualified load to make certain that all of the uncertainties plus the cyclic loads can be accomodated well within the un-brella of the qualified load.
Q.12.
Do any of the regulations require the provision for margin?
A.12.
The need for margin is implicit in the language of GDC 17 which states that the safety function for structures, p
systems and components important to safety shall be provided by an electric power system of sufficient capacity and capability to assure the various required safety functions.
Regulatory Guide 1.912/ also requires margin, particularly if the magni-tude of all loads are not precisely known.
Regulatory Guide l'.9 discusses two positions to be taken when developing the emergency load envelope.
Position 1, nor-mally followed at the PSAR stage, states that when load charac-teristics are not accurately known, the EDG continuous; rating should exceed the conservatively estimated loads needed to be powered by the EDG at any one time.
This would normally mean that the actual loads would be reduced as the uncertainties 12/
" Selection, Design and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units Used As Standby (Onsite) Elec-tric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, December 1979. i-
c-
)-
were removed and, since the EDG rating would not change, it would be expected that a significant amount of conservatism would be present when the operating license stage'of review is performed.
Position 2 states that, when a more accurate esti-h mate of-safety loads is available, a somewhat less conservative approach is possible and the predicted loads should not exceed the short-time rating of the EDG.13/
)
0.13.
Which of these positions applies to the EDGs at Shoreham?
A.13.
At Shoreham, there-is no continuous or f
short-time load rating, only one " qualified load" rating (claimed by LILCO to be 3300kW), and many safety loads have not been estimated any more accurately than'in the PSAR stage.
Thus, position 2 is not relevant, and position 1 should apply.
Therefore, the " qualified" load should exceed all expected loads, both continuous and intermittent, and all such loads
}
should be conservatively set, not measured to the absolute min-imum as LILCO has proposed..
Q.14.
What would you consider to be a " normal" amount of margin if cyclic. loads are excluded from the MESL total?
13/
Regulatory Guide 1.9 at 1.9-2. br u.
y A.14.
It is essential that enough margin is available to ensure that all expected loads, including cyclic loads, can be accomodated, taking into account the modeling and other
. uncertainties inherent in predicting the accident condition, plus providing some margin so that the plant operators will not
.be restricted in their manual load transfers and manipulations in the later stages of the accident.
Moreover, as previously testified to by the County's witnesses, it is industry practice to operate diesel engines at only about 75 to 85 percent of their maximum rated loads, in order not to.overstress the en-gine and to enhance reliability.14/
It has been the standard practice in the licensing of all boiling water reactors
("BWRs") in the past to provide for a significant margin be-tween the MESL and the maximum rated load of eme,rgency diesel generators, regardless of whether cyclic loads are included.
We have performed a. survey of the onsite emergency power supply characteristics of all BWRs that have received their operating licenses as of December 31, 1984.
Our curvey in-cludes some 27 BWRs licensed during the fifteen year period from 1969 through 1984 and a range of power ratings from 500MW 14/. Joint Testimony of Dr. Robert N.
Anderson, et al.,
regarding Suffolk County's Emergency Diesel Generator Con-tentions, at 18.,
i
)
__-______.___-----a
?
to 1300MW.- The average EDG rating exceeds the expected peak load (maximum emergency service load) by over 33 percent.
The lowest' margin we have been able to find is 9.9 percent while the largest is more than 100 percent.
A listing of the plants and respective loads and ratings is presented in Exhibit 3.
j This data-is_ extremely important because it demonstrates the accepted-interpretation of the requirements of GDC 17 as to the sufficient capacity and capability to assure appropriate re-sponses to postulated accidents.
.Q.15.
Has the NRC Staff. confirmed your view that all g
.BWRs'that have been licensed have had a substantial degree of margin between the maximum emergency service loads'and the rat-ings of:their.EDGs?.
A.15.
Yes, it has. 'The,Transamerica.Delaval. Diesel
' Generator' Owners Group Program Plan, NRC Safety. Evaluation Re-port, ' August :13, 1984, at 9, states that
" the staff notes that ' for many. plants, that the maximum emergency service load requirements.for worsticase loss of off-site power or. loss of off-site power and Loss of Coolant Accidents are significantly less than'the engine name plate rating."
p.
In addition, Dr. Carl H.
Berlinger of the NRC Staff has further-stated, with; respect to the above-quoted SER language,~that h
t
" 'many plants' refers to just about every plant that I am familiar with that is either in o
operation or under construction in the United States.
I don't know of any exception to that."15/
Q.16.
Are all of the emergency loads precisely known at Shoreham?
l A.16.
No.
LILCO has attempted to measure individual loads and in fact used some of the measured loads to reduce or increase.the contribution of that load to each EDG's MESL.
However, LILCO still proposes that name plate values be used for the. majority of the MESL loads,.thus providing little as-surance that the name plate values may not be exceeded under certain circumstances.
LILCO also performed an integrated electrical test-("IET") which apparently was an attempt to ver-ify that the appropriate conservatism does exist in the aaximum
)-
' load.that. each' EDG may experience.
The IET,-however, did not measure individual equipment. loads.15/
Moreover, this test contains a substantial amount of uncertainty as it was simply a measurement of combined loads of equipment assumed by LILCO to operate in a LOOP /LOCA.
Because there is no assurance that the-15/
Deposition'of Carl H.
Berlinger, December 13, 1984, at 5.
(Exhibit 4).
p6/I-SNRC-lO74, J.D.
Leonard Jr. to H.R.
Denton, NRC, August 22,-1984, at 2.
9 precise accident conditions were simulated, uncertainty remains concerning the need for additional equipment and their associ-ated loads to respond to the precise conditions.
This was confirmed by Dr. Carl H. Berlinger of the NRC Staff f
who stated that:
?
"I am familiar with the integrated electrical
. test and the results of those tests.
There are limitations with regard to those tests and al-though the results of the tests indicate that the total load measured was less than the defined maximum emergency service load in the
'FSAR modification, there was no way in the conduct of the integrated electrical test to be able to simulate 100 percent accurately what would transpire at the/ plant in response to a particular accident.ll 0.17.
Are there other documents which you have reviewed that also confirm the uncertainty present in the load I
- levels deteroined by the IET?
A.17.
Yes, there are.
For example, a Stone & Webster memorandum dated June 7, 1984, discussed the need to lock cer-
-tain valves in the RBSW system into throttled positions.18/
Whether such " locking" has.been made a perraanent requirement is 17/
Deposition.of Carl H.
Berlinger, December 31, 1984, at 21.
(
(Exhibit 4).
?
1B[
Interoffice memorandum, J.
Carney to R.H.
Kascak, June 7, 1984.
(Exhibit 5)..
k_
e
~
not known, but this demonstrates that conditions and adjustments used during load measurement tests may not exist during future accident conditions.
Q.18.
Why did LILCO measure some loads but not all loads in establishing the MESL?
A.18.
We are not certain, but the fact that the bulk of the measurement tests were performed during the summer and fall of 1984 would indicate that this.atep was taken only in response to the dilemma created by LILCO's inability to qualify the EDGs at 3500/3900kW.
O.19.
Can you quantify how accurate the combination load definition used by LILCO is in the establishment of the MESL load?
A.19.
The accuracy of LILCO's combination load.defini-f tion cannot be precisely quantified, but it can estimated to_
some degree of certainty.
The four loads actually measured and utilized by LILCO in the generation of Table 8.3.1-1A account for the following percentages of the loads on EDGs 101, 102, and 103:
Type of Load EDG 101 EDG 102 EDG 103 Measured Loads 34%
35%
64%
Name Plate Loads 66%
65%
36%
If we conservatively assume that the measured loads are at best accurate to + 2-1/2 percent system error, and that the name plate loads are at-best accurate to 1,5 percent, we can conclude that the total load defined for the MESL is no more accurate than 1,3.9 percent.
Thus, the peak load might well be 128kW higher than LILCO has specified.
O.20.
What is the margin for the EDGs at Shoreham?
A.20.
The difference between the highest EDG maximum emergency service load calculated by LILCO (3253.3kW) and the 3300kW maximum load ~at which the EDGs may operate is only 46.7kW, or 1.4 percent of the maximum' load allowed.
This small margin assumes no increases in the maximum emergency service.
loads'due.to.the factors discussed above.
Q.21.
What then do you conclude as to the need. for margin in'onsite emergency power systems.at BWRs in general and at Shoreham in particular?
A.21.
No BWR has ever been licensed by the NRC in the past-without a substantial amount of margin between the expect-ed maximum-emergency service load and the EDG continuous or short-term rating.
This history clearly establishes the ac-
[
cepted requirements of EDG capacity and capability under GDC 17 f
[
r s
to provide suf.ficient reliability.
Tha proposal by LILCO at Shoreham, where essentially no margin is bel.,g provided between the qualified rating (3300kW) of the EDGs and the predicted MESL (peak of 3253kW), a margin of less than 1.5 percent, does
[.
not therefore meet the requirements of GDC 17.
There is, ac-cordingly, little or no margin available at Shoreham to accomodate the cyclic loads which are known to be approximately 5 percent of the EDG rating, none for the potential peak load measurement / calculational error of approxima*a 3.9 percent, and none to provide for the modeling, calculational, and other uncertainties inherent in the accident scenario forecast.
Q.22.
Are there concerns present in the onsite emer-gency power scheme proposed by LILCO other than the inadequacy of the qualified load you have described above?
b A.22.
Yes there are.
One such inadequacy is the fact that LILCO did not consider the potential effect of the inaccu-racy of the EDG load indicating instrumentation in the design and conduct of the load qualification test.
This deficiency relates to section (a)(li) of the Contention which states:
" diesel load meter instrument error was not censidered."
Q. 2 3,.
How has the EDG load meter instrumentation error affected the " qualified" load of the EDGs?
I 1
L
f A. 23.-
LILCO utilized the EDG indicating instrumen-tation in the Shoreham control room for setting the load level during the performance of the endurance test run on EDG 103.
T1.is. meter is a full scale 5600kW indicating device which has a i
specified accuracy of i 2 percent at full scale.
LILCO required no calibration of the meter in direct conjunction with the. endurance test but has recently provided calibration data
.'h ich indicates that the meter accuracy at the 3300kW 1evel is no-better than i 6,0-70kW.
Since LILCO has been. unable to dem-
.onstrate any closer accuracy of the qualification testing that
. + 70kW, it can only be concludedmthat the qualification run was performed at a level no higher than 3230kW.
This is slightly
. lower.than the MESL for the EDG 101, approximately the same as the MEJL for EDG 103, and less than 1 percent higher than the MESL for EDG 102.
t Q.24.
Does the inaccuracy in the EDG load meter pres-s ent any uncertainty in future opergtion and reliability of the onsite emergency power systems?
A.24.
Yes, it does present a small uncertainty.-
Since the. accuracy of the load me'er is at best +60-70kW of 330GkW, one must conservatively assume t ad this error may run in the
" worst case" direction for futur$ surveillance testing of the engines and can then result in a 2 percent overload condition for the EDGs during surveillance testing.
. t, 1
1 I
Q.25.
Are you aware of any other condition that might further exacerbate this situation?
A.25.
Yes, we are.
We note that the periodic surveil-lance testing to be performed in accordance with the Shoreham Technical Specifications and Procedures calls for the 3300.kW surveillance testing to be performed at 3300kW i 100kW.
Assessing this instruction conservatively, one must assume that the periodic tests can be performed at 3400kW plus the~instru-ment err'or or approximately 3470kW.
This non-conservatism is referred to in section (a)(iii) of the Contention:
" operators are permitted to maintain diesel load at 3300kW i 100kW."
Q.26.
How does the load meter error and the operating tolerance 1100kW described above affect the adequacy of the EDG g
power supply?
f A.26.
LILCO's-failure to consider these small but sta-tistically present discrepancies further erodes the almost nonexistent margin present in the " qualified" load level pro-posed by'LILCO and accordingly reduce,s the EDG reliability even further.
Q.27.
Do you have any concerns regarding potential misoperation of the equipment by the human operators?.
A.27.
Yes, we do.
This issue is referred to in sec-tion (a)(iv) of the Contention which states:,
" Operators may erroneously start additional equipment."
Q.28.
How can this affect the reliability of the onsite emergency power system?
A.28.
Human error cannot be precluded in the operation of any equipment and it is likely to be even more prevalent under the stress and strain of the rapid responses that would be required in the event of a serious emergency situation.19/
It is particularly important to recognize that nearly all of the focus in the training of operators for response to accident
-situations is to assure that adequate or surplus cooling is being delivered to the reactor core.
Operators will tend to maintain full pumping of all cooling sysetms until there is positive assurance that some systems are not necessary for'the situation.
As the TMI accident demonstrated it, could be hours or even days before the plant conditions are fully understood.
Therefore, it is to be expected that maintaining the EDG load below a specified value will receive a lower priority.
The initial equipment response to a LOOP /LOCA is automat-ically programmed by the load sequencer which will start the EDGs automatically and place the initial equipment into service 19/
Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, " Reliability of Standby Emergency Diesel Generators," December 18, 1984, at 12. -
during the first ten minut.es of the accident sequence.
Operation beyond the ten minute point is performed manually by the. operators and requires the startup and shutdown of numerous pumps, fans,. manipulation of valves, etc.
We have examined the Shoreham site procedures governing the operation of the EDG equipment in the emergency situation, and find that the
^
operations are relatively complex and offer many opportunities for error.
For example, following are some of the instructions given to the operators by several of the different procedures governing the operation of the EDGs under emergency conditions:
(a)
Emergency diesel generators procedure SF 23.307.01, revision 12, provides guidance for the loss of a diesel generator during an acci-dent condition.
First, _the abnormal performance section of the procedure, section 8.2, begins on page 15 of this procedure.
We note however, that the procedure states on page 3 that this section is supposed to begin on page 13.
The j.
page 3 statement is no doubt in error.
- Second, section 6.6 of this procedure advises operators on the balancing of electrical loading of emer-gency buses 101, 102 and 103 to preclude
. operating one EDG at a higher load than the
! l' L
l 1
other two.
This* procedure, however, fails to advise the operator how to perform the load bal-ancing.
Although Procedure SP 29.015.04, discussed below, addresses load control, it, pro-vides n.o guidance on how operators are to accom-plish load balancing.
In addition, LILCO has advised the County that it intends to delete Procedure SP 29.015.04.
Thus, LILCO has not completed the procedures necessary to satisfy these three (potentially conflicting) require-ments, namely, supplying all necessary emergency s
- loads, balancing the loads on the EDGs, and mak-
~ ing certain that the load on each EDG does not exceed 3300kW.
h
' (b)
Procedure SP 29.015.04, revision 0, loss of
- coolant accident coincident with a-loss of.
)
off-site power, requires that the operator veri-fy automatic start and actions which include re-actor scram, main turbine trip, NSSS isolation, start of'all'three EDGs, RBSVS initiation, res-l I.1 1-toration of the reactor vessel level by the emergency equipment, and a tripping of non-emergency loads from the emergency busses.. _
F R
The operator is then advised to verify that each ED3 load does not exceed 3300kW and if the load in excess of 3300kW to immediately reduce that load to less than 3300kW by verifying that a list of equipment some 32 items in length is not operating.2Q/
-(c)
Procedure SP 29.015.01, revision 7, loss of offsite power emergency procedure, refers to ap-pendix 12.1 which is a listing of all loads ca-pable of being placed on each EDG.
This' list is some 3 pages in length and includes 140. loads that can be placed on the EDGs under various conditions.
p; (d). A fourth procedure that must be followed by the operator at'the same time refers to numerous actions that must be taken by the operator to assure appropriate reactor water level control.
This procedure, SP 29.023.0-1, revision 4, level
' control emergency procedure, is a four page emergency procedure that requires the operator 4
to verify the status of numerous. equipment 20/
SP 29.015.04, rev. O, at 2.
groups and to restore and maintain reactor pressure vessel water level through the use of one or more of six pumping systems.
The. actions required by the preceeding four emergency pro-cedures place numerous demands on the operator in the emergency condition and act to increase the probability of an EDG loading error.
O.29.
What would be the impact of a single error made by an operator in EDG load manipulation subsequent to the f
initiation of an accident at Shoreham?
A.29.
As attested to by the LILCO witnesses, the largest single-loads that could be manually erroneously applied to the MESLs of EDGs 101, 102, and 103 are, respectively, 206.lkW, 206.lkW and 358%W, with corresponding total loads of.
3459.4kW, 3414.8kW, and 3583.5kW for the LOOP /LOCA condition.
For only the LOOP condition, the largest single loads are even higher, 998kW, 998kW and lO22kW,.with corresponding total loads of 3839.2kW, 3627.6kW and 3867.3kW for EDGs 101, 102 and 103, respectively.- We must point out that these maximum loads con-sider only the single-erroneous addition of the largest load available to each EDG and are not necessarily appli' cable to an accident scenario that begins when one EDG'is'already out of-service.
This would of course be a possible sequence since - - - -
i operation with one EDG out of service is permitted for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> by the Technical Specifications.
Q.30.
Should such erroneously applied loads be consid-ered as part of the qualified load rating of the EDGs?
A.30.
Yes.
The loads that would result from an acci-dental or untimely application of a single load beyond those programmed for loading onto the individual EDGs could affect the quality and reliability of the EDGs' operation.
Thus, when determining the qualified load for the EDGs, there should be enough margin to allow for a misappl.*ed or untimely load.
Ap-Plying this margin to each EDG contributes to the reliability of its: performance under accident conditions.
Thus, when the single failure criterion is applied to the onsite power
-sourcesi and one diesel is assumed to have failed, the other f.
diesels.will be qualified with adequate margin to assure reli-able operation.
0 31.
How then does the potential for human error af-feet the reliability of the Shoreham onsite emergency power system?
A.31.
Failure by LIICO to provide even a nominal amount of margin between the maximum emergency service loads and the ' qualified load for each EDG provides little or no mar-gin for.such error.
This paucity of margin is further 29 -
exacerbated by the fact that LILCO has similarly provided no
. margin for the cyclic loads or for any inaccuracies which may exist in the predicted accident scenarios, modeling, or loading conditions.
We conclude that this failure to provide margin
+
seriously jeopardizes the reliability of the onsite emergency power system.
As discussed above, these factors show that the EDGs do not meet the requirements of GDC 17.
Q.32.
What inadequacies exist, if any, in the qualifi-cation test run of EDG 103, purportedly at 3300kW, as performed by LILCO?
A.32.
As stated in section (c)(iii) of the Contention, the " qualification" run was performed at a load level of 3300 1100kW as measured by an indicating instrument with an accuracy that is.now admitted by LILCO to be no better than 170kW at the 3300kW' level.
With regard to the setting of the load by the r
operators at 3300 1100kW, we have reviewed the data sheets for each of the recorded data points and have determined that the majority of the recorded loads were at 3300kW.
Readings of as low as 3250kW were noted but these appear to be somewhat offset by readings above 3300kW with the highest recorded load being 3400kW.
Some of the recorded data points, however, are ques--
tionable.
We note for example on October 12, 1984, that the load level was recorded several times to be 3326kW.
Other i
e 5
-w
+
9
questionable readings are 3292kW on October 12, 3317kW cn October 13, 3317kW and 3326kW on October 14 and October 15.
While these numle-p are at the appropriate level, we find it difficult to unuerstand how such apparently precise numbers could be read from an instrument with a full scale reading of 5600kW.
Copies of the cited data sheets are attached as Exhib-it 6.
Q.33.
Do the data discrepancies identified in the preceeding question and answer significantly affect the results of the test run?
A.33.
Probably not although it does raise a' question as to the validity of the data.
The most significant conclu-sion we reach after review of the data sheets, however, is that since the majority of the load points recorded are indicated to f
be 3300kW,-the highest qualified load that could reasonably be claimed by LILCO is 3300kW, before correction for the instru-ment error.
Since the instrument error is +70 kW at this load point, no argument can be made that these EDGs are qualified for anything greater than 3230kW.
6 O
e ATTACHMENT 1
f
)
)
l
h
,c i
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF GREGORY C. MINOR GREGORY C. MINOR MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, California 95125 i
(408) 266-2716 EXPERIENCE:
1976 to PRESENT Vice-President - MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, California Engineering and energy consultant to state, feder:1, and private organizations and individuals.
Major activities include studies of safety and risk involved in energy generation, providing technical consulting to legislative, regulatory, public and private groups and expert witness in behalf of state organizations and citizens' groups.
Was co-editor of a critique of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) for the Union of Concerned Scientists and co-author of a risk analysis of Swedish reactors for the Swedish Energy Commission.
Served on the Peer Review Group of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group (Rogovin Committee).
Actively involved in the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee work for the Instrument Society of i
America (ISA).
1972-1976 Maneger, Advanced Control and Instrumentation Engineering, General Electric Compar;,', Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed a design and development group of thirty-four engineers and support personnel designing systems for use in the measurement, control and operation of nuclear reactors.
Involved coordination with other reactor design organizations, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and customers, I
both overseas and domestic.
Responsibilities included coordinating and managing and design and development of control systems, safety systems, and new control concepts for use on the next generation of reactors.
The position included responsibility for standards applicable to control and instrumentation, as well as the design of short-term solutions to field problems.
The disciplines involved included electrical and mechanical engineering, seismic design and process computer control / programming, and equipment qualification.
1970 - 1972 Manager, Reactor Control Systems Design, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed a group of seven engineers and two support personnel in the design and preparation of the detailed system drawings and control documents relating to safety and emergency systems for nucl. ear reactors.
Responsibility required coordination with other design organizations and interaction with the customer's engineering personnel, as well as regulatory personnel.
1963 - 1970 5
Design Engiceer, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Responsible for the design of specific control and instrumentation systems
)
for nuclear reactors.
Lead design responsibility for various subsystems of instrumentation used to measure neutron flux in the reactor during startup and intermediate power operation.
Performed lead system design function in the design of a major system for measuring the power generated in nuclear reactors.
Other responsibilities included on-site checkout and testing'of a complete reactor control system at an experimental reactor in the Southwest.
Received patent for Nuclear Power Monitoring System.
1960 - 1963 Advanced Engineering Program, General Electric Company; Assignments in Washington, California, and Arizona y.
Rotating assignments in a variety of disciplines:
Engineer, reactor maintenance and instrument design, KE and D reactors, Hanford, Washington, circuit design and equipment maintenance coordination.
)
Design engineer, Microwave Department, Palo Alto, California.
Worked on design of cavity couplers for Microwave Traveling Wave Tubes (TWT).
Design engineer, Computer Department, Phoenix, Arizona.
Design of core driving circuitry.
Design engineer, Atomic Power Equipment Department, San Jose, California. Circuit design and analysis.
Design engineer, Space Systems Department, Santa Barbara, California.
Prepared control portion of satellite proposal.
)
).
hiin m iq
Technical Staff - Technical Military Planning operation.
(TEMPO),
Santa Barbara, California.
Prepare analyses of missile exchanges.
During this period, completed three-year General Electric program of extensive education in advanced engineering principles of higher mathematics, probability and analysis.
Also completed courses in Kepner-Tregoe, Ef fective Presentation, Management Training Program, and various technical seminars.
EDUCATION University of California at Berkeley, BSEE, 1960.
Advanced Course in Engineering - three year curriculum, General Electric t
Company, 1963.
Stanford University, MSEE, 1966.
I HONORS AND ASSOCIATIONS Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honorary Society Co-holder of U.S. Patent No. 3,565-760, " Nuclear Reactor Power Monitoring System," February, 1971.
Member:
American Association for Advance of Science.
Member: Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee, Instrument Society of America.
L PERSONAL DATA Born:
June 7, 1937 Married, three children Residence:
San Jose, California PULLICATIONS AND TESTIMONY 1.
G. C. Minor, S. E. Moore, " Control Rod Signal Multiplexing," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol NS-19, February, 1972.
l 2.
G. C. Minor, W. G. Milam, "An Integrated Control Room System for a i
Nuclear Power Plant," NEDO-10658, presented at International Nuclear l
Industries Fair and Technical Meetings, October, 1972, Basle,
[
Switzerland.
l l.
i i
The above artic.le was also published in the German Technical-Magazine, 3.
f NT, March, 1973.
l-4.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before l
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing held February 18, 1976, and published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, l.'
5.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and l
Energy, March 8, 1976.
l 6.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard before the California State Senate Committee on Public Utilities, Transit, and Energy, March 23, 1976.
.7.
Testimony of G. C. Minor. regarding the Grafenrheinfeld Nuclear Plant, March 16-17, 1977, Wurzburg, Germany.
l Testimony of G. C. Minor before the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, 8.
21, 1977.
Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, Department i
9.
The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors:
A Review of the'NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/0140), H. Kendall, et al, edited by G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard for the Union of Concerned Scientists, August, 1977.
I 10.
Swedish Reactor Safety Study:
Barseback' Risk Assessment, MHB i.
Technical Associates, January,-1978.
(Published by Swedish Department of Industry as Document Sd1 1978:1)
/
11.
Testimony by G. C. Minor before the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, February 13, 1978, Loss of Coolant Accidents: Their Probability and Consequence.
j-I 12.
Testimony by G. C. Minor before the California Legislature Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, AB 3108, April 26, 1978, Sacramento, California.
Presentation by G. C. Minor before the Federal Ministry'for Res,earch-13.
and Technology (BMFT), Meeting on Reactor Safety Research, Man / Machine l
f_
Interface in Nuclear Reactors, August 21, and September 1, 1978, Bonn, j
Germany.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard, before 14.
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, September 25, 1978, in the l,
matter of Black Fax Nuclear Power Station Construction Permit Hearings, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
h
. )
l-i
~
s l
t.
15.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, ASLB Hearings Related to'TMI-2 Accident,
(
Rancho Seco Power Plant, on behalf of Friends of the Earth, September n
13, 1979.
i i
16.
Testimony of G. C. Minor before the Michigan State Legislature, Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy, Implications of Three Mile Island Accident for Nuclear Power Plants in Michigan, October 15, l
1979.
17.
A Critical View of Reactor Safety, by G. C. Minor, paper presented to I
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Symposium on Nuclear Reactor Safety, January 7, 1980, San Francisco, California.
t 1
18.
The Effects of Aging on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants., paper presented at Forum on Swedish Nuclear Referendum, Stockholm, Sweden, March 1, 1980.
i l
19.
Minnesota Nuclear Plants Gaseous Emissions Study, MHB Technical
[
Associates, September, 1980, prepared for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Roseville, MN.
20.
Testimony of G. C. Minor. and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New York State Public Service Commission, Shoreham Nuclear Plant Construction
' Schedule, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company Temporary Rate Case, September 22, 1980.
~
- 21. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Oyster Creek 1980 Refueling Outage
' Investigation, in the matter of Jeresey Central Power and Light Rate Case, February 19, 1981, f;
22.
Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion, MHB Technical Associates, January,1981, prepared for and available from the Swedish'.
Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
23.
Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion:
Phase II Report, L
MHB Technical Associates, February 1982, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
l l
24.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on PORV's and L
Pressurizer Heaters.
Diablo Canyon Operating License hearing before
(;
- ASLB, January 11, 1982.
Y 25.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard on Emergency Response Planning. Diablo Canyon Operating License hearing before ASLB, January 10, 1982.
)
L l
l i,
i e
~e e
~-s-w,,
.o a,v,--w,een,,-
,,,ww-*..,--,
.---,_---,,..,am-n.m-,s,,rwe-wrn,.
,,4--
,-er,me--
p.----m,-,
---e-nw-
s--
c
l I'
- 26. Testimony of G. C. Minor, R. B. Hubbard, M. W. Goldsmith, S. J.
Harwood on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Contention 7B, Safety Classification and Systems Interaction, April 13, 1982.
27.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of r
Long Island Lighting company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 11, Passive Mechanical Valve Failure, April 13, 1982.
28.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 27 and SOC Contention 3, Post-Accident Monitoring, May 25, 1982.
29.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suf folk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 22, SRV Test Program, May 25, 1982.
30.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk k
County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of f
Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit I regarding suffolk County Contention 28(a)(vi) and SOC Contention 7A(6), Reduction of SRV Challenges, June 14, 1982,
- 31. Testimony of G. C. Minor on behalf of Su'f folk County, before the t
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, it :he matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, regarding Environmental Qualification, January 18, 1983.
- 32. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania F
Public Utility Commission, on behalf of the Office of Consumer Advocate, Regarding the Cost of Constructing the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit I, Re: Pennsylvania Power and Light, March 18, 1983.
33.
Supplemental testimony of C. C. Minor, R. B. Hubbard, and M. W.
I Goldsmith on behalf of Suf folk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County
~
Contention 7B, Safety Classification and Systems Interaction, March 23, 1983.
)
. )
k inp-urii n-ii
- i
.mm.
,...,,i,,,
- 34. Testimony before the District Court Judge in the case of Sierra Club et al. vs. DOE regarding the Clean-up of Uranium Mill Tailings.
June a
20, 1983.
l 35.
Systems Interaction and Single Failure Critt ion: Phase 3 Report, MHB Technical Associates, June, 1983, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
36.
Systematic Evaluation Program: Status Report and Initial Evaluation, MHB Technical Associates, June, 1983, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
37.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, F. C. Finlayson, and E. P. Radford before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Emergency Planning Contentions 65, 23.D and 23.H, November 18, 1983.
38.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, Sizewell 'B' Power Station Public Inquiry, Proof of Evidence Regarding Safety Issues, December, 1983.
39.
Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, L. M. Danielson, R. B. Hubbard and G.
C. Minor before the State of New York Public Serevice Commission, PSC Case No. 27563, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company Proceeding to Investigate the Cost of the Shoreham Nuclear Generating-Facility -- Phase II, on behalf of County of Suffolk, February 10, 1984.
I e
f e
EXHIBIT 1 r
i S
)-
CR21398.0 AG3/cjg y
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 4
In the Matter of:
5 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322-1 (OL) 6 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station) 7 8
DEPOSITION OF JOHN KNOX i
9 Bethesda, Maryland Thursday, December 13, 1984 10 Deposition of JOHN KNOX, called for examination pursuant 11 to agreement by counsel, at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 12 Maryland National Bank Building, 7735 Old Georgetown Road, 13 at 9:00 a.m. before ANNE G. BLOOM, a Notary Public within L
14 and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf 15 of the respective parties:
6 ALAN ROY DYNNER,'ESQ.
DOUGLAS SCHEIDT, ESQ.
17 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, Christopher & Phillips 18 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036
)
13 On behalf of Intervenor Suffolk County.
20 21
-- continued --
)
22 A. dill @,.A.
?
22 0980 02 05
- AGBbrb 1
A No, I don't.
2 Q
Did you or anyone from the Staff ask LILCO why 3
the EDGs would have no short-time rating?
)
4 A
I guess I don't recall if we did or not.
5 0
You agree, don't you, that not having the short-6 time rating was a departure from general industry practicar
)
7 isn't that right?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Uell, do you know why LILCO departed from
)
10 industry practice in this case?
11 A
I would assume it would be the overloading of the 12 diesel generator, this two-hour --
13 MR. ELLIS:
I object to the question.
If the 14 witness doesn't know the answer, he's speculating.
15 MR. DYNNER:
Let the witness answer.
You're not 16 defending the witness.
He's capably being defended by.
i 17 Mr. Perlis.
18 Please answer the question.
p 19 MR. ELLIS:
I object to any speculation.
20 MR. DYNNER:
Don't interrupt the witness to make 21 an objection.
j 22 MR. ELLIS:
I want the record to reflect my I
L
1-i t.
I.
t
(-
EXHIBIT 2
)
l' I
m au s
CR21397.0
>AG2/cjg 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x t
4 In the Matter of:
5 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322-1(OL) 8 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station)
)
7 8
DEPOSITION OF JACK D. NOTARO, EDWARD J. YOUNGLING,
)
9 GEORGE F.
DAWE, AND WILLIAM SCHIFFMACHER 10 Wading River, New York Wednesday, December 12, 1984 Deposition of JACK D. NOTARO, EDWARD J. YOUNGLING, t
12 GEORGE F. DAWE, and WILLIAM SCHIFFMACHER, called for examina-13 tion pursuant to agreement by counsel, at the Shoreham Nuclear l 14 Power Plant, Education Center, Long Island, at 2:45 p.m.
before ANNE G.
BLOOM, a Notary Public within and for the 15 District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the I respective parties:
17 18 ALAN ROY DYNNER, ESQ.
DOUGLAS SCHEIDT, ESQ.
18 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill,
)
Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.
20 Washington, D.
C.
20036 On behalf of Intervenor Suffolk County.
21 y,
22
-- continued --
$ce $deral$ porters, $,c.
EggTii i
ti bg i i
5970 06 03 61 y
AGBbrb 1
In the event of a LOOP /LOCA, isn't a near-2 certainty that these compressors will autostart and run 3
during at least a portion of the first part of the i
4 LOOP /LOCA?
5 A
In response to a LOOP /LOCA, the diesel engine 6
will utilize the passive air in the air receivers to start t
7 the engine.
If those air compressors were not there at all, 8
I don't need them to start that engine and support that 9
LOOP /LOCA.
Will they start?
10 0
Will they start?
11 A
Yes, they will start.
12 O
And will they run?
13 A
They will run for a period of time, yes.
14 O
How long will they run?
15 A
I believe in our response to the NRC we said it 1
16 was approximately 15 minutes.
Now, that's a conservative 17 number.
It's less than that.
18 Q
And does the 15 minute number assume that all of 19 the EDGs start on the first attempt?
20 A
That is a start from the first attempt.
21 Incidentally, our starting record on the EDGs is extremely 22 good, very, very good.
l I
)
3970 06 04 62
)
AG@brb 1
Q Uell, since the past is not necessarily prologue, 2
if an EDG didn't start on its first attempt --
3 A
I don't need the air compressors.
The tanks have
)
4 enough capacity to give me five starts without the 5
compressors.
6 Q
That's very good anticipation of the rest of my I
7 question.
8 Now, given the fact that the --
9 A
Just a second.
10 (Witness panel conferring.)
11' Q*
If an EDG doesn't start on the first attempt, 12-will the compressor run longer than 15 minutes?
j f
13 A
If the diesel generator does not start on the 14 first attempt, whether the air compressor is running or not, 15 there is enough air in there to allow for a second attempt,
)
16 to allow for a third attempt, a fourth attempt, and then a 17 fifth attempt.
18 Q
I don't think you understood my question, 19 Mr. Youngling.
20 My question is:
if the EDG does not start on the 21 first attempt, will the compressors run longer than 15 l
22 minutes?
I l
i i
8 l
f39700605 63 AGBbrb 1
A Yes.
If a second attempt is made, more air would 2
be used and, yes, the compressor would run longer.
But it 3
would not be a linear situation.
4 Q
When you say it's not a linear situation --
5 A
In other words, it's not twice as long as the 6
first.
I 7
Q So it would be something longer than 15 minutes 8
but, you think, less than 30?
9 A
Oh, yes, absolutely.
Less than 30.
I 10 Q
Your Remark No. 5, which is related to the diesel -
11 generator air compressor, indicates that " Loads are cyclic 12 and not continuous; therefore not included in the total."
13 Do you have some basis for not including the 14 cyclic loads from any Reg. Guide or other authority?
15 A
Yes.
We have guidance from NRC through the NRC 16 Staff TDI Owners Group SER, and discussions with NRC on that 17 document.
And also Mr. Dawe reminds me of a recent imc SER 18 on the 3300 loading position.
19 Q
So is it your testimony, then, that in not 20 counting these so-called cyclic loads, that you.did that on 5
21 the basis of the NRC advising you that you di n't have to d
22 count them?
A 3
n P
sj,
l 5
5 K
E i-I_
r c
I EXHIBIT 3 s.
e N
i F
.y I
P r
L l
P
Comparativo BWR EDG Ratings and LOOP /LOCA Loadsl/
% Margin EDG Rating (kW)
(% of peak load)
Unit Continuous 2000-Hour Peak Continous 2000-Ilour Plant Rating (MW)
In Service Rating Rating Load (kW)2/
Rating Rating Oyster Creek 650 1969 2500 4/
1950 28.2 Duane Arnold 597 1975 2850 3000 2480 14.9 21.0 Cooper 836 1974 4000 4700 3619 10.5 29.9 Dresden 2-3 828/828 1970/71 2600 2860 1950 33.3 46.7 Quad Cities 1-2 828/828 1973/73 2500 2850 1980 26.3 43.9 Pilgrim 678 1972 2600 2860 2398 8.4 19.3 I
)
Peach Bottom l
2-3 1152/1152 1974/74 3250 4/
2560 7.0 Drunswick 1-2 867/867 1977/75 3500 3550 2311 51.4 66.6 i
Hatch 1-2 850/850 1975/79 2850 3100 2669 6.8 16.1 l
LaSalle 1-2 1078/1078 1984/84 2600 2250 /
2860 15.6 27.1 5
l WPPS-2 1100 1984 4400 4650 3860 14.0 20.5 Susquehanna 1-2 1152/1152 1983/85 4000 4700 3542 12.9 32.7 Fitzpatrick 883 1975 2600 4/
1906 36.4 l
Browns Ferry 1,
2, 3
1152/1152/
1152 1974/75/73 3/
2850 2594 9.9 Nine Mile Pt.
642 1969 2560 29501/
1470 74.1 100.6 Vermont Yankee 563 1972 3000 4/
2446 22.6 l
Millstone 1 662 1971 27656/
3042 2678 3.3 13.6 l
Montfcello 569 1971 2500-4/
2002 24.9 l
AVERAGE 24.3 33.4
- - -. - =
l NOTES:
(1)
All data taken from USNRC Public Document Room FSARs and USNRC NUREG 0020.
1 (2)
Peak load requirement based on auto-start loads listed in the FSARs.
l (3)
FSAR does not provide a continuous rating.
The 7 day rating is 2950kW and the 30 minute rating is 3050kW.
(4)
FSAR does not provide a 2000-hour rating.
(5)
This peak load does not include the EDG dedicated to the HPCS.
is 2719kW.
(6)
The single Millstone EDG is backed up by a 12MW gas turbine.
(7)
This is actually the 1500-hour rating.
be s.
f
,- [
i I
1 i
EXHIBIT 4 4
h 1
)
CR21399.0 AGB/sjg 1
1 3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x In the Matter of:
5 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322-1 (OL) 6 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station) l 7
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x DEPOSITION OF CARL H.
BERLINGER k
8 Bethesda, Maryland Thursday, December 13, 1984 10 Deposition.of CARL H.
BERLINGER, called for examination 11
(
pursuant to agreement by counsel, at the Nuclear Regulatory 12 f
Commission, Maryland National Bank Building. 7735 Old 13 Georgetown Road, at 12:45 p.m. before ANN G. BLOOM, a 14
)
Notary Public within and for the District of Columbia, when l
15 were present on behalf of the respective parties:
1 16 ALAN ROY DYNNER, ESQ.
l DOUGLAS SCHEIDT, ESQ.
I7 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, Christopher & Phillips 18 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 19 On behalf of Intervenor Suffolk County.
)
20 21
-- continued --
)
22 DLALt%, L.
990 01 02 5
RGBagb 1
please?
2 A
Got it.
3 O
In the last paragraph on that page you see there 4
is a reference or a statement as follows:
5 "The Staff notes that for many 6
plants the maximum emergency nervice load 7
requirements for worst-case loss of off-8 site power or loss of off-site power and 9
loss of coolant accidents are significantly i
10 less than the engine nameplate rating."
11 A
Yes, I see that.
12 O
Can you tell me what are the "many plants" that 2
13 you are referring to in that statement?
14 A
"Many plants" refers to just about every plant 15 that I am familiar with that is either in operation or under 16 construction in the United States.
I don't know of an 17 exception to that.
=
18 Q
Could you tell me generally speaking what is the 19 difference in those many plants?
20 I am asking for an approximation or a percentage 21 between the continuous rating of the EDGs there on the one I
22 hand and the maximum emergency service load requirements on
l
@990 02 06 21 I
AGBagb-1 actually seta during a LOOP /LOCA are significantly lower?
2 A
I am familiar with the integrated electrical test 3
and the results of those tests.
There are limitations with 4
regard to those tests and although the results of the tests 5
indicate that the total load measured was less than the 6
defined maximum emergency service load in the FSAR 7
modification -- Could I ask that the question and my answer 8
up to this point be reread?
I lost my track of thought.
9 (Whereupon, the Reporter read from the record 10 as requested.)
11
-- there was no way in the conduct of the 12 integrat'ed electrical test to be able to simulate 100 13 percent accurately what would transpire at the plant in 14 respo'nse to a particular accident-that's simulated.
15 For instance, the heat load in a containment 16 during the test would not necessarily be the same as in an 17 accident situation.
There might be emergency lights on the 18 site which could not be simulated accurately because it 19 depends on whether the accident occurred maybe during. the 20 day or at night whether the lights on the fence needed to be t
21 on or off, air conditioning loads couldn't necessarily be
(
22 simulated 100 percent accurately.'
k
O i
i EXHIBIT 5, y
n I
1 E_
647
/
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM go N.
11600.37
~
o l
a.
DC 103 LOAD REDUCTION
.DATE June 7,1984 SUBJECT REMOYA1. OT (3fE OgANCE SEIVICE WATER Pme PROM AUTO-START SIORERAM NUCLEAR POWER STAT 10ll-UNIT 1 l
.-.JCarney.
I TO
-2m
~~
E
- cc,
sn.rar41 5WWakefield IMEasceak(LILCD-UR)
RFGauthier s.
a JAPissi IIMisiassek i
EMAllegro(enc)
=
UFC 245/3 (RD1-1160002-1240) 7 General. Files TMJacob RittacDonald(ene)
JJPowers/JR EK 222.4(enc)V I
~
In accordance with your request, enclosed is a copy of' Stoaa & Webster Calculation No. 11600.37-19.2.1-17-103 antitled " Verification of the Adequacy of flows and Suction Pressure to the CRAC Pumps during Accident i
Pre-Op Coeditions using one Servica Veter Pump (and flow to the existing
[
EDCs)." This calculation was prepared in order to assess the feasibility of deleting the' auto-etart logic from one of the two Reactor Building Service Water (RSSW) p? amps powered by EDG 103 (the orange bus).
The results of the calculation indicate that in the 10 minuta interval following an accident, one RBSW pump per system train abould be adequate In order to verify to provide the required system flows and pras.sures.
=
~
f the calculation results. it is recommended that a field test be performed L
7 to simulate one pump operation per RBSW system train following an accidene sispal. We would be pleased to prepare.an Engineering Test procedure for this purpose should you elect to proceed in this direction.
An additional conclusion supported by the calculation is that the manually operated ball valves in the backwash linea from strainars 1P41-5-001A,3.C.
and D should be locked in a throttled position of 65 percent open in order to limit backwash flow to the design of 250 syn.
L It should be noted that removing the auto-start feature from one orange i;
RESU psaip will require that the appropriate operating procedures be revised.
This revision will reflect the requirement for manual start of the pist?
a.
E prior to initiating RBSW flow to the respective RNR heat exchaeger (due to the large flow requirement) following an accident. Since RER flow initiatien
[
is in itself a manual operation, the additional operation of manually start-b ing an RBSW pump is not seen as a significant departure from the current f
operational philosophy.
6 Should you have any questions on the abeve or the calculation. Please do not hesitate to call.'
.~
ey k
Project Engineer 5
..ae -o Fn m
o.
.w,
,, n
I i
EXHIBIT 6 k
h...
(
p ;. L c f 2.
<3 N~
1
~
-l o &}. _ f, so j
of0, OH V l O 5~5 0 $c)
~
~~
T,ME-DATE:
/% k f 7'
p-76 ri R, ME T E R RCADI MG F/ C/F I
i,,
h,,
(iEN. LCAD Kd/XVAR M
LV6 E 01 L TEMP.
I W/ 0 LT d
LUSC 01 L PRESS. ENG. /T U RBO 3
o LUBE 01 L SUMP TK. LEV E L.
51 t
J-ilf Lg3C 0; L SUMP TK, PRESS,
,j
~ '
I LUBE OtL F I LT.OI FF P R ESS.
9.
[.
t T
UBE oI L STRAltl.DiFi". PRESS - l $
Ebi L
g i
g JACKET e/ATER TEMF. lu/oo r y3
,g JACKET WATER PRES $VRE N-23 b N.
JACKET WATER LEVcL.
l '. O D ComBUSTiCN AIR PRESSURE
. $W f0L Tl,
{
==-
CCMBU57 IcN A7R TEMPERATURE l l47, ld l4T. g
_y
~[
f' O, ? RE S S, 9.I. AT D6 P MJf L.
}h, 29
~
1 FJEL 00MP DISCW Af4E press.
313
_y rs -_
qq 7
Ih F. O, STRA iM ER D t FF PRES $.
.38
="g b
<h 55VE h
i stARnos A ta retssuRc
'210.
)
uove i sauToown PREssvRe f6,6
_=
{
ruReo TMMUST TMPERAfvRE 8 43 BN
[47 i
i
}-
PY TANK LE VE L ST A r[f rNi ed 4-
- h. M ggf V t h
@ f@
D* ** B Y 1
7
}
" " ~ ~
TAU E i
/
,gg, b
015 0 l c.LCO Yhh otoo olic)
~
{ o lO TAME:
/C'[/h6 g-f 9 /0/'2/rr, ogTE-4 I R, ME T E R READl uG S"Aitr/Fi N.
')
GEN. LOAD Kd/KVAR.
LV 6 E 01 L ?EMP, IW/CL'r qv i
EN'G. / URBO q
LUBE 0 L P'tE 55
=
LUBE 01 L SUMP TK. L N E L-9.D
,h @
~
i i
_JbE OI L SUMP TK, PRESS, LUBE otL F I LT.O I FF. P R ESS.
h i.UBE ot L STRAltl.DiFF. PRESS r si
\\'
JACKET w/A7E R TEMP. I PJ/OU T 4
q
'JAC KET WATE R PRE S5 URE 33,
,g g g
.g TA'CKET WATER LEVEL l;00 ccmauSTION AIR PRESSURE fJ.
g, COMBUST IcN AIR TEMPERATUR.E
- l4q, jdq yef E O. P RE SS. P.I. AT D6 P ANEL 2 '),
.f ag,, f FUEL hMP DISC,4AP4E PRESS.
}(,,3 j
F. O, S TRA I N ER, D i F F. FRE55.
,9 h
CPAHYCASE PRESSURS
,D a
STARTING AIR PRI55URE M.
GFouP i SHUTOOWN PRESSURE
['.
(
ruRt3D ZDIHAU5T TEMPEI?A 70RE j '-\\\\
qq c.
PAY TANK LEVEL STA C/irN154 l'
A DD MMN 3Y h
/
i f_
~
YA6LE i 59 A c f 2, TsME:
3 i e-c ty ~
gy:n q;g
(. y(.
l
]
ygg
,,,, p.
W R, ME T E R READlMG STAC/Fi d.
GEN. LCAD Kd/XVAR g
cf)
LV G E 01 L TEMP, I L/ C M s
LUBE 01L PRESS. ENG. /iU RBO M,'
su g
e 9l ll I
uy3c 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS, 3
.I l
S &W TH f,
LUBE OIL F I LT.0[ FF P R ESS.
/u
.x r.,,_;
-.l
-.. T z __
LUBE of L STRA ul.Di Fr. PRESS
'f (S
l JACKET WA7E R TEMP. iN/OUT f,.
l r
'JAC KET WATE R PRE SS URE il c A3 #
2 7.(
JACCT WATER LEVEL p
c0MBU5flON AIR PRESSURE Fu 49 w, c; CCMBUST ION AJ R TEMP ERATURE f u <(
/d
/Y '
~
k6 E 0. P RE S S. P. I. AT D6 P ANE L.
FUEL '0GMP DiSCWAP6E PRESS.
3(,
F. O. STRA IN ER Di FF. PRESS.
Ow l
CPANKCASE PRE 550RE C3
.3 6' 3 STARTING AIR PRESSURE 21 c; a
6FouP 1 SHurooWN PRESSURE QL I
rv Aso r_:sHAUST TEMPERATURE M4 S5d-g Dor 4 TAKEN S Y Ge#
T'
'I:
3l [
)
3
w
(
s-
\\
)\\l w
p; TABLE i i
p3i lor 2.
y
[
TsME: (
p 8 y, l 3 g(c cny
_9 c,(
g 9y,.,
if
[
p--
c.13 vi R, MET E R, READ 1MG START /F't N.
7 GEN. LOAD KW/xvAR j
LVdE 01 L TEMP, l u/O t.tr f
LUSC OIL PRESS. EMG. /T URBO
=c Y T
/
. LUBE 01 L SOMP '?K.
LEVEL.
c
-- ~
Lt/8E 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS,
/
?
?
g-g 7 y LUBE o f L F I LT.OI FF. P R ESS.
/ 1 q
[
LUBE of L. STRAld.DiFi~. PRESS 3
JACKET WA7E R TEMP. IN/OUT s
f JACKET VATEF. PRES 5URE
- ? c 5
M JACKET WATER LEVEL.
- g
?
i COMBUSTION AIR PRESSURE o e c/
ve y 4, CCMBU57 tcN AJR TZMPERATURE p,,
,f yy E 0, PRE SS, P.'L. AT DS P kNE L-u(
yf f
i p
FUEL 'DOMP DISCHA ASK FRESS.
2 f; e
m F. O. STRA INER, D FF PRESS.
b~~
y
~
j CPANKCASE PRES 5URE d.3
,h
,h j
+
b STARTmG AIR PRES 5URE 11L E
gi Group i SHUTDOWN PRESSURE
=i N M O U % $T M ERATU M fij; qtjcy PY TANK LEVEL STAR:-/rrNI54
/,.D h
D+T4 MKEN B y
.m t
- = -
,.--....,,,...-..m
~
TASLE i
(
P3 i cf 2.
[es., [ o n,
gg i - vc;
^<-t-TIME:
r DATE; c.
b
'n R, MET E R READIWG STACT/Fi rJ.
[
GEN. LOAD KW/XVAR M
'f'g LU $ C 01 L TEMP, IW/ CUT
,,,_t(p
(
LUBE c1L PRESS. EMG. /T U RBO /.
LUBE 01 L SUMP TK. LE/EL.
s, j
E LU6E 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS,
/
__ _-Q 9"'
LUBE OtL F I LT. O I FF. P R E 55
/(
j
.~j LUBE oI L STRA1M.D WF. PRESS y
s JACXET JA7E R TEMP. I M/OUT k 2-I c
k JACKET WATER PRES 5URE 2:
,g p3 *
{
I JACGT WATER LEVEL
/ #D j i g
49
V6I l
COMBUSTION AIR FRE55URE 50 t'
/
g COMBUST IcN AIR TEMPE RATURE lu,
jd7 j
f 6. (
-v U
E. o, P RE SS. P.L AT D6 P ANE L.
2J L
.r gg g
l FUEL VOMP DiscH ARSE PRESS.
3f
[
=
t 3
[
F. D. STRA INER 01 FF, PRESS.
C 'i
~
f CPANKCASE PREt 50RE C.3 c' f C,3 g
3 STARTING AIR T RSSURE 21L h
E GFoVP 1 SHUTOOWN PRESSURET f/
h fur 80 F3HAUST TEMPERA TURE 7((
60 l
Dara ranw a y
[
c;p' %
,(.A(' f i
L-.
wG{
{
~ ^ '
L TIME:
j ) 3co '
49 I/vrc l % fcf @-
} >$$
@ TE,
,10 M 't 9
/G'+'" t ' ' d h N 'V q s 's t *
/*q f
].
. /! @./ ;/ - 3,?,;i.~4/. j 7%(SU
/
~
/
%R. METER READ 1t.G STA C/ fin.[y
- V-l
,,)
- vf J I
} j.d GEN LOAD Kv//KVAR A
' l
'e.o j& rfu 50 tv $ E 01 L TEMP, l u/CJ l
l 7
m L.uSC 01G PRESS. E%./TURBD 5
~
a
==.
jQ
' oi l
~ ',
8 M Bimi !
LyBE 01 L SUMP TK-LW E L-
'gj
~,-
Ji3c c1 L SUMP TK, PRESS,
-['
PJ o %
LUBE CIL F I LT.OI FF P R ESS.
f5
_--~.
-p et,;
fI. h JACKET VATE R TEMP. iM/ N T P
gg..a.j'q
'JAC KET VATER PRES $ URE
[' '
- f. 5
[d3 f CKET WATER LDrcL-l}
?
n' C 093U 5 f i CN AI R PPsE 5 5U RE j(
'/f l -#f CCMBU sr IcN A J R TZMPERATURE j >f
/y '/
/ s' 7 F~ o, F RE S S. P. I. AT D6 P Mrt. L.
77
!D
'~
FVEL 'DOMP CISCHAGE PRESS.
1-
))
F. O, S T RA I M E Ps Di F f', PRES $,
I
/
s-GWJKCASE PRESSURE
,b
^ ""&, b_
START ING A I R PRES SU RE G AOUP 1 SHUTOOWN PRESSURE i.. k.
au YY C
NA0bT k { g }r $ U b
)
-2!
b,,,
~
nyx uvu sueyem[~s s Jg'W.
_suar.1 6 '-
1._ _. L. u. L 1
i 's i
o k',
)4 I4 IN Kd N 3 f, j ' '3 I
l y,A I
6
ev(
/
~AL_
i
~
,;,3 c
i p
-r lldco_ (J $c: l iu to tofcl,qn l 159 g
___j'M.
[0 + t'I't il W; m i4 b ic ty g 3c jy qi j
- OATE,
. lc W H i
9 /\\, m,/,i 7. -J
- N). 3 '
i
~
i w _M.,9-
/,7w 531 1
4 R, ME T E R READitiG STAE/Fi rd. {.i
" I m
-: M -
3~~~
3fj6
}
p,[ /e 'b'h iJ g,e g
pgg e
f
,C GEN. LOAD KW/XVAR r_
Lv 6 C O I L TEMP, l u/C L*r fy h
m
- .yBE OIL PRESS. EW. /T URBO b v/ 1 JQ 9,
}-
'~
m LUBE OJ L SU P ?K. IEE L.
-7
'n w
~ "We
-Z vac 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS, e-u LUBE OtL F I LT.OI FF. P R ESS.
E', -
k N)oArn
~ ' - ^ - "
i.UBE 01 L ST Al Fi'. PRESS.
f
,2 JACKET WA7E R TEMP. iM/00T I"
- }
dd
\\
/
=
' JACKET h/ATER PPE55vRE y
f.f
[. j
- g i
JAC)CT k/ATT.R LEVEL l% "'
k COMBUSTiCN AIR PRE 5 5UrsE h(y, f,
Vf h~
W ccMau st icN AJ R TzmPERATURE j[
/y{
fy k
t' j-77
.b F o, P RE SS. P.I. AT D6 P ANF.L.
^ p.u k-FUEL 'DOMP DisCH AR.SE PRESS.
O L' E
i r
f'. O. 5 TRA I N ER D I F F PRESS,
I U
CPAUKCASE PRES 5URE c <.
.[
[
h STARTING AIR PRESSURE
/
~
GF4UP i SHUTooWN PRESSURE S' -.'
E s
rvR60 DH AJ5r TErVEFJruRE F/i. ')
3[
, 'E '
h TAf4 K LEVEL stair *[FINied r
fY _
P,
p 3
?
}
s
-~
C v ( 'g,
- l O O ' _. '.2 ) h I M ' ' ' _j. 2 i d A >
- .L S Q l
1 I'*
1Ml
$[,
Iclpjp W E; lc/,(p, ( l, L f g tuf M/
[,
__I 14[ t 7 [ h.b.,
- , Le g
.4 H R., ME T E R RE ADI NG STAitT/Fi rJ. li_ -
..X.. d6yL ;,g
,4 p
. t 50 {fp f, GEN. LcAD Ks/XVAR.
l N
i o
W8E 01 L TEMF, 10/00T t
Lv SE o 1 L PRES 5 ENG. /T U RBO s
3
.- ~ _
LUBE 01 L Sump 7K. LEV E L.
7~
Jbc 01 L SVMP Ti<.
PRESS.
LUBE 01 L F I LT. O I FF. P R ESS. [
ru o,T %
LUBE Of L STRAltl.DiFF. PRESS. h a
I
'v JACKET WATER TEt@. IM/OUT
'A J3'
.3.8 JACKET VATER PRES $URE JhCKET WAT'ER LEVEL.
,/ ' '
r COMBUSTiCN Al'& PRES SURE A/7 a
CCMBUST ION AIR TEMPERATURE / f'79
.y
~ C' f~ 0, P RE S S, P. I. A1' 06 P ANE L.
7 NEL 'UOMP DiSCW ARSE PRESS. g[
F. O. STRA INER 0 t FF. PRESS.
q'
/
CPANKCASE PRESSURE
,g
\\
E-STARTING AIR PRf 55URE GF4UP 1 SHUTooWN PRESSURE ((
<o EO rae o.must t w ee ruce pr (9
... c..
.?
(
y;.f.q s,.; j ; -J.3.i.
pv Twg tevet3xiefgryu w
g l7
[
f' kl' D4 ra rag a e y 3
~~
~ ~ "
i gf TA6LE 1.
U pg, ggz
=
TIME:
po o ' o^o k N J;c o g ],g 4
OATE-
, y, -pd
,g : L % 0 2-lv
--2n
% f~
(., p},y g
1 4'40l
/>b\\'eM >I', < 4 7 I;
'y[p;;
r.
W R, MET E R, READIWG STAE:r/F't N.
i
/)
VW/Jco'W 4
$1" 3S ;OD d
C GEN. LOAD Kw'/XVAR r?-
Y yee me O
i llo
,'i '
,{*/7 LV 8 E. O 1 L TEMP.
IW/OUT
(/
J!
f,, 7 o
jo LVSE 01 L PRESS. EMG. /T URBo 2
,y7
=_
b I
LUBE 01 L SUMP '1'K.
LJD/EL w
Lyac 01 L SUMP Ti,.
- PRESS, d
5 pc g. [u j
LUBE OtL F I LT.O ! 'F. P R ESS.
(o p o q c.
LUBE ot t. STRA1 Al.DiFr. press ;
)
/
[W$
y JACKET WA7E R TD49. IN/ouT p
3, 2
=
' JACKET VATEtt PRESS URE M,
[ b.f 3[ [MN b.g
[
N:
~ s;:g;-
7 3.: ' :.,,. i. 9.,. '..
s L3us.y. r :.,
e, :.2 e-si r c.
~-
/@
@ i../. @. c,.- ;,, _x..i. ' W;, U...%
_ d. m.a 4 i f +
_= ;
u
. 3h COMBUf!.GN AIR PAE55U AE
,.!',~ (i h)
J 5f$;_-
.,.. i.% ;
L, :g. -
- e >,. : -..
i9 C OMBU S T IcN A J R TEMP E RATURE / Nn
,G f."Vi / ef
.?
V hp?.?.
' / 7
/,.
l.L(,h Yd&
._2 F o, PRE 55. 9.L AT D6 PMEL Ce 7 k) i^E
- f.,..fi 4C'^4 l 's bii G
%1
.3
. E..y-
.s
- w
'b g q.. 0 % U'i, -.."'t.e 'M h(, b ^ 'd,l.%g.ldN& WEh,-,.
?
.. i
' l^ '
\\
A FUEL DUMP DiscHARSK press.
.. l.;_ %,.
o (j-,.;z y.. r ;.v.5 b. f...
k-aX
..-;.. ; *;3 gj p, 99y v.o.sr w uER orrv.Pness.
j_p. j$
- i v
. ;.. a ;.).f. [E.
cp+nxcAsE Pressure
, /,
I.
.f &
.h
~.
..[
.;4 "' aQ., -
e
. Mk 3 e:.,,l..,'
s
-. ' Q.%
Mh 4.i.. w;.... :. n$'. lR.
',,'b (.O . ' e'.. ' '::.F,.
>- ' 3d STARTING AIR PRISSURE e-.n GF4UP 1 SHUTDOWN PRESSURE h
4
?
M j.. g g y ? 4 ( B i-P f 3 1 ; ;
re m es. -,,Arugs g
Mh$$.Qhk2$ @3
- Tm um mew n= 74-s y 49 c,
1 s
m N
_e
TAGLE i LV P9 i c f 2.
/
TkME:
nwo n"ir l 9 Tnn as3n mc l y ;c,
=
y,y.
g v.9 ' : - + -]~ < i '&
o,s f'
- 3..... J.,
,c.,f.
r4 R, MET E R READIWG STAF/Fi N.
GEN. LCAD KW/XVAR 00 3
3ro LV 8 E O I L TEMP ~
1d/00T LvSE o11., PRESS. EM. /T URBO LuaE OIL Sumt 7K. LEVEL Lyac 01 L SUMP TK, Priss, O
LUBE o f L FI LT.OI FF. P R ESS.
LUBE Ot L STRAltl.DI N. PRESS E
N
.h JACKET WATE R TEr4P. IN/OUT JACKET WATER PRESSURE 1, "b
]M bbb 3CKET WATER LEVEL
/2(Jj COMBUSTION AIR PRESSURE COMBU5r IcN AJR TzmpE,RATURE
/6 M
,M E o, PRa ss. P.I. AT 06 P ANEL Q7,2
- 7.3 U(
FUEL 90MP O!5CWARSE PRESS. [
F. O, STRAINER 0 t FF PRESS,
/8 CPANKCASE PRES 5URE
_f
,b i
g STARTING AIR PRESSURE GC4UP 1 SHUTOOWN PRESSURE ruR8o TxWAust TTM9ERATURE
['
h' CAY TMK level STAR /fTN15d sh D4T4 TAKEN S y
,
- j'j,, _,
[ T' -
$f l.'
^
i' i
I
+
\\D
TAGi.E i
' C' f P9 L o r 2.
T'ME:
c/c o e/3a l m ec Dia c h lugj
((fy sk
'[/ T['I DATE:
v
/
R. ME T E R READ 1uG STA2:r/Fi rd.
0 GEN. LOAD KW/MVAR tv&E O 1 L TEMP, IW/Our h
5 tu sc o n L. PRESS. EMG. /T URBO 3
Luar OIL some TK. LEVEL b
uvac oi L sump TK, PRESS,
,5 N C/2 N LUBE OtL F I LT. O I FF. P R ES 5 M
LUBE Ot L STRA
'F. PRESS N
_ w_
JACKET WA7ER TEMP. IM/ouT O-02 b b
'JAC KET VATE R PFE 55 VRE
%b JACKET WATER LEVEL
/fde COMBUSTION AIR PAE55URE k
b
CCMBUSricN AJR TEMPERATURE /h F 0, PEE 55. 9. I. AT D6 P ANE L.
93 9 d I'
FUEL 'DOMP O!SCHARSE PRESS. [
F. O,5TRA1WER 01 FF PRESS.
3 cp+nxcAsE PasssuRe
, l, srAnrmG AIR PAISSURE 2CS ssour i sHuToown PnEssvae
[,.,
Tu ASO F.3HAUST TEMPERATURE t'
t cn rang i.cveL sur/gruz3w j3 D AT4 TA KEN B Y,
fl)/,.
]
\\\\
1 l
b TA6cE i q.
! v f 2.
T,ME:
) $Jac>
cr 230 g yao e
_ _g go
,g c, 73c f
DATE:
lck>k /j&fu//r&/,/g py' fy Ayf ',
^
in R. ME T E R READING STAE, /Fi N. /
)I 3
[
4
<JE N. LCAD K* XVAR 3
C LV8E 01 L TEMP, IW/ CUT
/_
7 I
muse o1L PRESS. ENG TURBO
,j i,
l jY/
l LUBE OI L Sump TK. LNEL uJbc 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS, 2/
LUBE OtL F I LT.OI FF P R E55 4
LUBE ot L S? FAltl.DiFf~. PRESS j j
JACKET WA7E R TEt49. IM/OUT
/
gp s
-__s
'JAC K ET WATE R, P RE SS URE 2
]g sf 215' F
LTACKET k/ATER LEVEL
[M C OMBUS TI CH AI R PRE S SU RE
$ f)
V/(
CCMau st IcN AIR TEP19EFATURE /f7
'y'
/-j7 e o peess.v.1.ar os p w t u 27f 275 n:
Fu;L 'Durp Disc 4 ARSE FRESS.
) $. [
-s F O, STRA IN ER Di FF. PRESS.
- 3 CAANKCASE PRESSURE
.b
,y STARTING AIR PRESSURE 32 [
m sgcVP 1 SHUTOOWN PRESSURE h
=
Q O DHAUST g g@ TURE
[%
___t_
k[
E) p PY tat 4K LEVEL 5 T A r-[f rN I y {
. yg,g,,
p g, g4, g g,,,
Dw rm
, a v.
,. 3 l2
~
. ~ -.
,3,,l,33, TsmE:
g,3 y 7 3 a l gpn_; _ gc g
h
_?.4*r.eW1telb%s^zkk o^'a; 7* 7g f7 r
lri R, ME T E R RCADING STACfFi N. l[_ 9
}
w
.,7 v#
)
00c
,o GgstI: LOAD KW/KVAR 3o0 t--
j 7f
'//
LU8E -01 L TEMP, I W/ O t* ~
3
- i
, LUBE 011., PRESS. EMG. /i U RBO ;,
~
Luar of L SUMP TK. LWEL y/
LtJ8E 01 L SUMP TK, PRESS,
(/
l nog.TH LUBE O t L FI LT.OI FF. P RESS.
/7 Q;ai LUBE oil STRA1 AI.DWF. PRESS ; k 2
JACKET WA75R TEMP. i M/OU r
)_.
/
S3-JACKET WATER PRE 55URE 234 hf r
// 80
- ' JACKrr WATER LEVEL comausfloN AIR PAE55URE ff g
t/
comausricN AIR TEMPERATURE //7 gjy y' 7 29.7 C o, P RE SS. P.T. AT DS PWc.L l))
/
FUEL VOMP D15cNARSE PRE 55'.
)6 F. O,5 TRAINER D t FF. PRESS.
,. (7 S
C cu ngcssE Pressure stAnr1m AIR PRESSUREQ s mue i sauroo.as oRtssuse d N YbT &kEh TuR ,Y'f pc n, - -,,,,, - DAr4 r4 mea a y k d l l'f h J b /I P s !o' 7 i t3 1--}}