ML20114A802
| ML20114A802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1992 |
| From: | Quay T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20114A805 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-91-08, GL-91-8, NUDOCS 9208210213 | |
| Download: ML20114A802 (17) | |
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F n-UNITED STATES 3
2: E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20566 s...../
o PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY D_0CXET NO. 50-275 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT h0._1_
AMENDMENT TO FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 73 License No. DPR-80 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 26, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the licen n is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as ind'eated in the attachment to this ' license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(E) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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ADOCK 05000275 PDR
. (2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specificatiot:s contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 73, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Pa ific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwisc stated in specific license conditions.
3.
This lic+:nse amendment is effective as of tha date of its issuance, and shall be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of 1ssuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,/ tuTb* [ 47 Theodore R. Quay, Director Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Re:ctor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
August 10, 1992 If
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
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WASHINGTON. D C 20%5
%...,*f PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-323 D!ABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING llCENSE I
Amendment No. 72 License No. DPR-82 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 26, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended sthe Act), and the Commission's regulations set fceth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by th'.s amendment can ba conducted withm:t endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inima al to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph ?.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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Technical-Soecificationi The~Tect cal Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Enviter.. ental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised -
through _ Amendment No. 72
, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications &nd the Er.vironmental Protection ~ Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific _ license conditions.
. 3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.
- FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Theodore R. Quay, Director Project Directorate V.
2 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications.
Date of Issuance: August 10, 1992 4
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO FAtlllTY OPERAllNG LICENSE NO DPR-80 AND AMENDMENT NO, 72 TO FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE NO DPR-82 Q0CKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.
Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.
REMOVE JNSERT ix ix l-2 1-2 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-23 3/4 6-24 3/4 6-25 3/4 6-26 3/4 6-27 B 3/4 6-4 B 3/4 6-4
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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLA%E REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
~3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS............................................
3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350'F...
3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg LESS THAN350'F..................
3/4 5-7 3/4.5.4 DELHED 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK............................
3/4 5-11 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity...................................
3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage.....................................
3/4 6 2 Containment Air Locks...................................
3/4 6-5 Internal Pressure.......................................
3/4 6-7 Air Temperature........................................
3/4 6-8 Containment Structural Integrity........................
3/4 6-9 Containeent Ventilation System..........................
3/4 6-10 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System................................
3/4 6-11 Spray Additive System...................................
3/4 6-12 Containment Cooling System..............................
3/4 6-13 1
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES............................
3/4 6-15 I
3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL l
Hydrogen Analyzers / Monitors.............................
3/4 6-17 i
Electric Hydrogen Recombiners...............
3/4 6-18 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 ix Amendment Nos. 73 8 72
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@'h Reissued September.19,1991 12EX LINITINC CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AE SutVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4;7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1
'3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE
-Safety Va1ves...........................................
3/4 7-1
. TABLE 3.7-1 ' MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRDN FLUX HIGH SETPoINT WITil-INDPERABLE STEAM LIIE SAFETY VALVES.......
3/4 7 ' TABLE 3.7 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PERL00P....................
3/4 7-3 Auxil iary Feedwater System..............................
3/4 7-4 Condensate Storage Tank...............
3/4 7 Specific Activity.....................
3/4 7-7 TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY-SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PR0 GRAM.............................
3/4 7-8 Main Steam Line Isolation Va1ves........................
3/4 7-9
- Steam Generator IGE Atmospheric Dump Valves.............
3/4 7-Sa 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE /TEWERATURE LIMITATION.........
3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3- -VITAL COMPONENT C0OLING WATERSYSTEM....................
3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4
' AUXILIARY SALTWATER SYSTEM..............................-
3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM.........................
3/4 7-13
- 3/4.7.6.
AUXILIARY SUILDING SAFEGUARDS AIR FILTRATION. SYSTEM.....
3/4 7-16 3/4;7.7- '$NUBBERS................................................
3/4 7 FIGURE.4.7-l' SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST..........
-3/4 7 TABLE 4.7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL 1 INSPECTION INTERVAL...................._
_3/4 7-23*
l 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE C0NTMINATION.............................
3/4 7-24
[
-3/4.7.91 FIRE SUPPRESSION:5YSTDtS o
Fire Suppression Water Systas...................
3/4 7-26 15 pray and/or Sprinkler Systems.........................
3/4 7 :C02 ystem..............................................
3/4 7-30 S
1 TABLE 3.7-3 C0 SYSTEM.................................:..........-
3/4 7 2 Halon Systes......................
3/4 7-32
-Fire Hose Stations................
3/4 7-33 iDIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 x
Amerwhent Nos.- 66 and 65 P
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.1.0 DEFINITIONS-
_7 The defined teres-of this-section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical-Specifications.
ACTION 1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.
ACTUATION LOGIC TEST 1.2 An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the. application of various simulated input combinations _in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of-the required logic output.
The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a continui.y check,- as a minimum, of output devices.
ANALOG' CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1,3' An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the_ injection of a simulated signal'into_the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERA 8ILITY'of alam, interlock and/or trip functions.
The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or_ trip setpoints such that the setpoints are within the required range-and accuracy.
AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE 11'.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1;5-A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall-be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel such that it responds within the required range and accuracy to known_ values of input._ The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall-encompass the entire channel including the sensors and alam, interlock and/or trip functions and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such' that the entire channel is calibrated.
-CHANNEL CHECK-1.6 A CHANNEL CNECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior-
'during operation by_ observation.
This~ determination shall include,'where
.possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indicationsi and/or_ status-derived from independent-instrument channels measuring the same parameter.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-1
9 DEFINITIONS CNANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
'1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
a.
Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as-close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alars and/or trip functions, or b.
Bistable' channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor' to verify. 0PERABILITY including alars and/or trip functions.
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
-1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:
a.
All penetrations: required-to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or 2.
Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except-for valves that are-open under administrative control as permitted by Specifi-cation 3.i6.3.
b.
All equipment hatches are closed and sealed, c.
Each air lock is. in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3, d.
TheLeontainment' leakage rates are-within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and e.
The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.
CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.9 CONTROLLEO LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor
-coolant pump seals.-
1.10 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources,
.orLreactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessei head removed and fuel in the vessel.
Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to-a safe conservative position.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 AMENOMENT N05. H & g, 73 & 72
-3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT
' CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 CONTAINNENT INTEGRIT) shall be maintained, i
o APPLICABILITY:
HOCES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONi Without CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.).1 CONTAI ENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
At lean once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations
- not a.
capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic ve!ves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
b.
. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements'of Specification 3.6.1.3; and c.
After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or D test, by leak rate testing the seal _with gas at grtater than or equal to P, 47 psig
'nd verifying that when the measured leakage rate for thes$ seals"
-.ed to the le&hage rates determined pursuant to Specification
.i.I.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less-than'or equal to 0.60 L,.
- Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated. automatic valves which are
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located inside the containment and are locked,. sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.
These penetrations shall be verified closed-during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-1 Amendment Nos. 73 & 72 ewae--= gee---w----
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CONT AI"ENT SYSTEMS
_ CONT AINME' 7 LEAKAGE LIMI11NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION
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3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:
a.
An overall integrated leakage ra+.e o):
1)
Less than or equal to L,, 0.10% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P,, 47 psig, or, as applicable, 2)
Less than or equal to L, 0.0472% by weight of the containment t
air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at a reduced pressure of P, 25 psig.
b.
A corrbined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 L, for all pene-trations and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P,.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
Wit' either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L, or 0.75 L, as applicable, or the measured combined leakage rate for g
all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L,,
restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to 0.75 L, or less than or equal to 0.75 L, as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penet ations subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to 0.60 L, prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200 F.
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DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-2 Y
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l CONTAINQNTSYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each containmen,..olation valve shall be OPERABLE.d APPLICABilllY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTION:
With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:
Rcstore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, a.
or b.
Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c.
Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or d.
De in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHulDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent oasis under administrative control.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or repl.3 cement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.
4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at i
least once par 18 months by:
a.
Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation rasition; b.
Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test sigrial, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, c.
each containment ventilation isolation valve actuates to its 1sola-tion position.
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable power-operated or automatic i
containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when I
tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve, except the air sample l
supply and return valves, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after each closing of the valve, except when the valve is being used for multiple cycling, then at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, by verifysng that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specifica-tion 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.6 L,.
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DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 Amendment Nos. 73 & 72
T:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL HYOR0 GEN ANALY2ERS/MONITCNS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers / monitors shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2.
- ACTION:
a.
With one hydrogen analyzer / monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable snalyzer/ monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b.
With both hydrogen analyzer / monitors inoperable, restore at least one analyzer / monitor to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEliTS 4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer / monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using a zero and span gas.
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I DIABLO CANYON --UNITS 1 &'2 3/4 6-17 Amendment Nos. 73 & 72
CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS ELECTRIC HYOROGEN RECOMBINERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6,4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES I and 2.
ACTION:
with one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 6 months by verifying, during a Recombiner System a.
functionel test, that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to 700'F within 90 minutes.
Upon reaching 700 F, increase the power setting to maximum power for P minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater th n or equal to 60 kW; and b.
At least once per 18 months by:
)
1)
Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits, 2)
Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and 3)
Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional 1: st.
The resistance to ground for any beater phase shall be greater than or-equal to 10,000 ohms.
2 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-18 Amendment Hos.73 & 72 l
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS
)
3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.
The pressure reduction and resaltant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment atmosphere.
However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.
I 3/4.6;2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM l
The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.0 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.
This pH band mini-mizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic l
stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank dis-charge line location or other physical characteristics.
These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.
3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The' 0PERABILITY of the containment fan cooler units ensures that:
(1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation (2) adequate heat removal capacity is.available when operated.in conjunction with the containment spray systems-during post LOCA conditions, and (3) adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.
_The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment atmosphere.
As a result of this redundancy in ecoling capability, the allowable out of service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been
-appropriately adjusted.
However, the allowable out of service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 6-3 Amendment Nos.14 and 13
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
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BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT IS0lATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.
Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
A list of the TS controlled containment isolation valves is maintained in the Diablo Car. yon plant procedures.
The administration of the list shall be conducted in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 and the provisior.,
in the Administrative Controls 5tction of the TS.
Records of the changes to the valve list are maintained and an annual report is made which includes a brief description of changes and a summary of the safety evaluation of each in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations:
1).
stationing a person, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, 2).
instructing this person to close these valves in an accident situation, and 3),
assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to
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close the valves ana that this action will prevent the release of 4
radioactivity outside the containment.
l 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.
Either recombiner unit is capable of con-trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:
(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.
These Hydrogen Control Systems are functionally consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-4 Amendment Nos. 73 & 72 I
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