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Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Section 3/4.5.4, Boron Injection Sys, Modifying Bases Section B3/4.5.5, Refueling Water Storage Tank & Incorporating Necessary Changes to Index
	ML20113D443
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	04/09/1985
From:	; SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20113D431	List: ML20113D429; ML20113D443;
References
	NUDOCS 8504150296
	Download: ML20113D443 (10)
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ATTACHMENT A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES B504150296 DR 850409 ADOCK 05000395 PDR

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INDEX Ii LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS............................................. 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg >350*F........................... 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg <350*F........................... 3/4 5-7

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INDEX p BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.6 STEAM GENERATORS.......................................... B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE............................ B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 CHEMISTRY................................................. B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.9 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY......................................... B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS............................... B 3/4 4-6 3/4. 4. n STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 4-15 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS.............................................. B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS............................... B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 00:0M : = CTION SYST01.................................... : /4 ;-2

( 4 B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK ............................

3/4.6 CONTAIMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY C0NTAIMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND C00Lhh SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3 3/4.6.3 PARTICULATE IODIME CLEANUP SYSTEM......................... B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 CONTAIMENT ISOLATION VALVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.5 ComuSTIB LE GAS CONTR0L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-5 l

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM BORM INJECTION TANK LIMIT ONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4.1 The ron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A min um contained borated water volume of 900 gall ns,

' b. A boron ncentration of between 20,000 and 22,50 ppm, and

c. A minimum s ution temperature of 145'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, and 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank 1 operable, resto the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in HOT STAN Y and borate to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 2% delta k/k at 200*F within t e next 6 urs; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or b in HOT HUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l l

i 4.5.4.1 The boron injecti tank shall be demon rated OPERABLE by: !

a. Verifying th ontained borated water vol at least once per 7 1 days, l

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b. Verifyi the boron concentration of the water the tank at least once p 7 days, and

c. Ver' ying the water temperature at least once per 24 ours.

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SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-9 w- -- -- - , +

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\fMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS H T TRACING @IM l

LIMIT G CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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l 3.5.4.2 At least two independent channels of heat tracing shall e OPERABLE for the boro injection tank and for the heat traced portions the associ-ated flow path .

APPLICABILITY: DES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one channel heat tracing on either th boron injectica tank or on the heat traced portion f an associated flow pat OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 day provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be greater than r equal to 145*F a least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; otherwise, be in at least HO STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E \

4.5.4.2 Each heat tracing ch nel for the boro injection tank and associated flow path shall be demonstra ed OPERABLE:

a. At least once p 31 days by energizing e h heat tre .ng channel, and

b. At least on per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the ta and flow path temperatur to be greater than or equal to 145 The tank temperat e shall be determined by measurement. e flow path tempera re shall be determined by either measureme t or recircula-tion f ow until establishment of equilibrium tempera res within the tank i

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SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-10

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5. REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK c

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 453,800 gallons,

b. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2100 ppm of boron, and

c. A minimum water temperature of 40'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days. bye

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40*F.

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

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BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a' maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE charging punis to be inoperable below 300*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

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'3M. 4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM 'DR ET6 The 0 ILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ensures that sufficien ative reactivity is injected into the core counteract any positive increa n reactivity caused by RCS system down. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadver t depressurization, a lo -coolant accident or a steam line rupture. '

The limits on injection tank mi contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the as tions in the steam line break analysis are met. The contained wat olume limit inc an allowance for water not usable because of tank charge line location or o physical characteristics.

The OPE ITY of the redundant heat tracing channels ciated with the bor njection system ensure that the solubility of the boro lution wi e maintained above the solubility limit of 135'F at 22,500 ppe .

!- 3/4.5. REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection i by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and -

' boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within contain-ment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will

, remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the L

SU M ER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

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BASES REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued)

RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

I ' The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

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AAAh4 the OPERABILITY of the 5:= 3jectier :[f d=UM as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accide~nt or a steam line rupture. - - - -

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SUPMER - UNIT -1 B 3/4 5-3

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Attachment B No Significant Hazards Determination 1.)- Is the probability of, occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated significantly-increased? NO.

There is no increase in the probability of an accident occurrence above that previously evaluated due to the removal of the BIT.

Equipment removal and minor SI piping rerouting do not increase the likelihood of accidents. Fire protection analysis is not inpacted, however fire sources in the plant are reduced since equipment which is a potential fire source is removed.

There is no increase in the consequence of an accident previously evaluated due to.the removal of the BIT. Accident analysis has demonstrated that the containment environmental conditions (pressure / temperature) are not above that previously generated for the main steam line break. DNBR has been demonstrated to remain above the 10 CFR limit of 1.30. Failed fuel quantities are unchanged; therefore,10 CFR100 criteria are still satisfied. Pipe rupture analysis has demonstrated that new postulated pipe mptures do not affect the ability to safely shutdown the plant.

There is no increase in the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated due to the removal of the BIT. The main steam line break analysis has demonstrated that the containment environmental conditions (pressures / temperature) are not above that previously generated. Therefore, equipment inportant to safety will still perform necessary functions to mitigate the consequences of the accident. Pipe mpture analysis demonstrates that equipment important to safety is not compromised. The likelihood of fire is _not increased and therefore will not have an inpact on-equipment .important to safety.

Radioactive releases due to the main steam line break are bounded by FSAR 15.4 analysis since postulated fuel f ailure has not changed from

original licensing analysis (Source term does not change.)

2.) Is 'a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created? N0.

There is no creation of a different type of accident or malfunction beyond those previously evaluated due to the removal of the BIT.

No new radioactive material release paths, and no new fire hazards are

created by removal of the BIT. Actually, removal of the BIT eliminates heat tracing which is a potential fire hazard and also eliminates the BIT safety relief valve which is potential radioactive material release path.

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3.) Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification significantly reduced? NO.

- There are no reduced safety margins as defined in Technical Specifications bases due to removal of the BIT. Reactor core analysis has demonstrated that~ the pressure / temperature response is less severe

- than the results obtained in the plant licensing analysis. Safety margins for. pipe nJpture/ jet inpingement, radioactive material release, equipment qualification, and fire hazards are not adversely affected by the removal of the BIT.

ML20113D443

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