ML20102B867

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Special Rept 85-01:on 850207,leakage Observed Around post-indication Valve V-9-13.Fire Suppression Water Sys Isolated on 850211 to Facilitate Valve Repair.Caused by Crack in Valve Body.Valve Replaced
ML20102B867
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 02/21/1985
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
85-01, 85-1, NUDOCS 8503040464
Download: ML20102B867 (2)


Text

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GPU Nuclear Corporation NggIgf Post Office Box 388 Route 9 South Forked River,New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

February 21, 1985 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Fire Protection Special Report Enclosed is Fire Protection Special Report No. 85-01 which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.3.d and 3.12.8.3(3).

If any questions or comments should arise, please contact Mr. Draw Holland, Oyster Creek Licensing Manager at (609)971-4643.

Very truly yours, AL S. ' kn 3

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Peter B.Tiedler Vice Dresident and Director Oyster Creek PBF/PFC/ dam Enclosure cc: NRC Resident Insoector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stdtion Forked River, NJ 08731 8503040464 850221 PDR ADOCK 05000219 g

PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation y4

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0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Fire Protection Special Report 85-01 Report Date February 21, 1985 Occurrence Date February 11, 1985 Identification of Occurrence The Fire Suppression Water System was rendered inoperable in order to perform maintenance on post indication valve (PIV) 7-9-13.

This Special Report of the above condition is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12. B. 3(3 ).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The reactor was in the cold shutdown condition.

Description of Occurrence On February 2,1985 at 0432 hours0.005 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.142857e-4 weeks <br />1.64376e-4 months <br /> leakage was observed around PIV Y-9-13 which branches off the main fourteen (14) inch firewater feed from fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2.

Repair efforts on PIV V-9-13 could not be immediately initiated due to the firewater system operability requirement when one (1) Core Spray System train is inoperable, per Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.

Following verification of the operability of Core Spray Systems I and II, on February 11,1985 at 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> the fourteen (14) inch firewater main was isolated in the area of PIV V-9-13.

Prior to isolating the firewater main the Redundant Fire Protection Water Supply System pump was tested for operability, aligned to the fire suppression underground header and was continuously run to maintain Fire Protection System pressure.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Upon examination of PIV Y-9-13, a crack was found in the valve body which caused the leakage.

In order to perfonn maintenance on PIV V-9-13, the fourteen (14) inch firewater main had to be isolated and drained, rendering fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2 inoperable.

Fire Protection l

Special Rep:rt 85-01 Page 2 Analysis of Occurrence There was no safety significance associated with this event. Both Core Spray Systems were operable and the Redundant Fire Protection Water Supply System was operating to maintain firewater header pressure.

The Fire Suppression Water System was out of service for approximately thirteen (13) hours.

Corrective Action Corrective action was to replace PIV Y-9-13 and restore the Fire Suppression Water System (14 inch main from fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2) to operable status.

This was completed at 2220 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.4471e-4 months <br /> on February 11, 1985.

Further investigation to determine the specific cause of the valve failure has been initiated.

Non-destructive examination (NDE) will be performed on the valve body. Results of NDE performed on PIY V-9-13 will determine if any further action is necessary.

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