ML20101T933

Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Repts,Items 127 & 199 Re Weld Defects in Hammel Dahl Itt Chilled Water Valves.Initially Reported on 830505 (Item 127) & 841221 (Item 199).Valves Returned to Vendor.Next Rept Due by 850731

ML20101T933
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/18/1985
From:	Parsons R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
CON-NRC-314, REF-PT21-85, REF-PT21-85-185-000 127, 199, PT21-85-185, PT21-85-185-000, NUDOCS 8502060450
Download: ML20101T933 (4)

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o# e, Cp&L Carolina Power & Light Company

' Unii CC Pll G3 P.O. Box 101, New Hill, N.C. 27562 January 18,1985 Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC-314 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900)

Atlanta, Georgia 30323-CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1986 - 900,000 KW - UNIT 1 WELD DEFICIENCIES IN UNIT 1 CHILLED WATER VALVES, HAMMEL DAHL ITT -ITEMS 127 & 199

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is an interim report on the subject items which were deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21 on May 5,1983 (Item 127) and December 21,1984 (Item 199). By copy of this correspondence, Item 127 is re-opened by Carolina Power and Light Company. This report supersedes the previous final report on item 127 issued October 31, 1983. Carolina Power and Light Company is pursuing this matter, and it is currently projected that corrective action and submission of the final report will be accomplished by July 31,1985.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours very truly, W N=L R. M. Parsons Project General Manager Completion Assurance Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant RMP/dd Attachment cc: Messrs. G. Maxwell /R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. R. C. DeYoung (NRC)

B O h PDR OmCIAE COPY

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7 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.1 WELD DEFICIENCIES IN UNIT 1 CHILLED WATER VALVES ITEM 127 ITEM 199 INTERIM REPORT JANUARY 18,1985 i

l REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.55(e) AND 10CFR21 1

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SUBJECT:

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit No.1, 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21 reportable items. Shop weld deficiencies in three-way chilled water valves purchased under Purchase Order N.Y. 435176, line items 163 and 168.

ITEM: To date, valves identified are as follows:

Item 127; (DDR-1422) Valve 3CX-W25SB-1 Item 199; (NCR 84-2372) Valves 3CX-W175A-1 and 3CX-W24SB-1 (Note: Others are suspect)

SUPPLIED BY: Hammel Dahl ITT, Warwick, Rhode Island NATURE OF DEFICIENCY: In March 1983 (Item 127) and in December 1984 (Item 199),

the Quality Assurance Department, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, reported lack of penetration on the I.D. of vendor shop welds in the above referenced valves.

DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED: Refer to the section above.

DATE PROBLEM REPORTED: On May 5,1983 (Item 127) and December 21,1984 (Item 199),

CP&L (Mr. N. 3. Chiangi) notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) that these items were reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21.

On October 31,1983, CP&L (Mr. R. M. Parsons) issued a final report to the NRC (Mr. 3. P. O'Reilly) on Item 127.

(Note: This report supersedes the final report on Item 127 issued October 31,1983)

SCOPE OF PROBLEM: The deficiencies involve the loss of safety-related chilled water. To date, three (3) valves have been identified as being deficient. An investigation is continuing to determine the full scope of this problem.

SAFETY IMPLICATION: Loss of safety-related chilled water could potentially jeopardize the allowabic environmental parameters of certain vital Instruments in the main control room.

REASON DEFICIENCY IS REPORTABLE: The loss of chilled water due to failure of the welds could result in the reduction of cooling in safety trains A& B air handling units. On the assumption failure occurs simultaneously on both trains, the loss of cooling in the control room would occur. This could result in a heat up which may exceed environmental qualification parameters of vital instruments.

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' CORRECTIVE .

ACTION: The three identified valves have been returned to the vendor for repairs. One valve (3CX-W25SB-1) has been received back on site and accepted based on repairs performed by the vendor.

An investigation is currently underway by site QA personnel to identify additional valves from the subject order which are now.

suspect.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES: Preventive measures will be by Hammel Dahl ITT.

FINAL REPORT: The final report on these items will be issued af ter completion of our investigation and the affected valves have been repaired, accepted and adequate preventive measures have been received from Hammel Dahl. The projected date for the issuance of a final report is now July 31,1935.

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