ML20101D396
| ML20101D396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1984 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-741, NUDOCS 8412240043 | |
| Download: ML20101D396 (2) | |
Text
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SEABROOK STATION e) _
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Engineering Office l
New Hampshire Yankee Division December 18, 1984 SBN-741 T.F. B7.1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter SBN-514, dated May 31, 1983, "Open Item Response (SER Section 9.3.4.2: Chemical Engineering Branch)", J. DeVincentis to G. W. Knighton
Subject:
Revisions to Post-Accident Sampling System
Dear Sir:
A copy of Reference (b), submitted for your review on May 31, 1983, has been annotated to reflect the latest Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) design. The change, to Reference (b), is the removal of the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) sample from the PASS design. This was done as a result of a review which indicated that the PRT sample was a redundant sample source and that other sample points were capable of extracting samples indicative of the chemistry and radionuclide content of the Reactor Coolant System.
Please also note that the PASS piping and instrumentation diagrams which were included in Reference (b) have been revised during the design evolution of this system. We will submit the revised PASS drawings for your review in a future submittal.
Very truly yours, John DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing Enclosure cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List
$2gg$foN E
RO. Box 300 Seabrook.NHO3874 Telephone (603)474-9521 s I 1
l William S. Jordan, III Dians Curran Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Brentwood Board of Selectmen 20001 S Street N.W.
RED Dalton Road Suite 430 Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C.
20009 Robert G. Perlis Office of the Executive Legal Director Edward F. Meany U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Designated Representative of Washington, DC 20555 the Town of Rye 155 Washington Road Robert A. Backus Esquire Rye, NH 03870 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Mancehster, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Department of the Attorney General Augusta ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. John B. Tanzer Office of the Attorney General Designated Representative of 208 State House Annex the Town of Hampton Concord, NH 03301 5 Morningside Drive Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Roberta C. Pevear Town Hall Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03S42 the Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road Patrick J. McKeon Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Rye, NH 03570 Designated Representetive of the Town of Kensington Carole F. Kagan, Esq.
RFD 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel East Kingston, NH 03827 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie N6chiros Environmental Protection Bureau Chairman of the Board of Selectmen Department of the Attorney General Town of Newbury One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Newbury, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 Town Manager's Office Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town Hall - Friend Street U.S. Senate Amesbury, Ma.
01913 Washington, DC 20510 (Attn: Tom Burack)
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Diana P. Randall Concord, NH 03301 70 Collins Street (Attn: Herb Boynton)
SEabrook, NH 03874 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Donald E. Chick City Hall Town Manager Newburyport, MA 01950 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter NH 03833 r-,
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1671 Wormeser Rood Phm* M. W M e 01701 Pub 5c SerWee of New Hampshire (4171-872 8100 bcc:
J.P.
Cady G.S. Thomas A.C. Cerne J.E. Tribble May 31, 1983 S.D.
Floyd UE&C(SB-15840)
SBN-514 J.H. IIerrin ASLB T.F. B7.1.2 G.F. Mcdonald R.J. Harrison D.N. Merrill J. Salvo D.E. Moody P.L. Anderson NRC Chrono W.N.
Fadden United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission II. T. Tracy (2)
G. Tsouderos Wa shing ton, D. C. 20555
.ProjgctsgAlb Gro3 e'c'ts-SLA' Attention:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Ropes & Gray (Dignan/Ritsher/ Gad)
Licensing Branch No. 3 A.M. Shepard Division of Licensing J.W.
Singleton
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T.F.
B7.1.2 l
Re fere nces :
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPP10,F36lUB6 bht i
Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter, dated December 1, 1982, " Revised Response to I
RAI 281.6; Post-Accident Sampling; (Chemical Engineering Branch)", J. DeVincentis to G. W. Knighton t
Subject:
Open Item Response (SER Section 9.3.4.2; Chemical Engineering Branch)
Dear Sir:
In response to the Open Item included in the Safety Evaluation Report (Section 9.3.4.2) regarding NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 (Post-Accident Sampling Capability) we have enclosed a report which addresses the status of our compliance with each of the Item II.B.3 criteria. We have included commitments to complete the development of sampling and analysis procedures, shielding studies, and sampling system time and motion studies not later than six months prior to fuel load.
The enclosed report supplements the information included in Reference (b) and OL Application Amendment 48.
Note that the method of obtaining a containment recirculation sump sample has been modified.
Very truly yours, YANKEE A*IOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY J. DeVincentis Project Manager
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ALL/fsf Enclosure ec: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List
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1000 ElmSt..P.O Box 330 Monchester. NH O3105. Telephone (603)669-4000. TWX 7102207595
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CRITER10N: (1)~
The Ifeensee shall have the capability to promptly obtain reactor coolant samples and containment atmosphere samples. The combined time allot ted for sampling and analysis should be 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or less from the time a decision is made to take a sample, p.
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RESPONSE
The post-accident sampling system provides the capability to obtain liquid samples from reactor coolant loops I and
- 3 (hot legs), containment recirculation sumps.
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L. ECCS pump room sumps and gas samples of the containment atmosphere within three hours from the. time a decision is made to take a sample. All electrically powered equipment (i.e., solenoid valves and i
sample pumps), whose operation is required to perform-post-accident sampling, is powered from an emergency
-backup power source.
Specific details concerning time spans to enter and exit the saeple panel area, operate the sample panel manual valves, perform manual sample dilutions, and transfer sample to the shield cart for analysis will be perfor=ed when construction activities allow an accurate appraisal but no later than six months prior to fuel load.
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Criterion:
(2) The licensee shall establish an unsite radiological and chemical analysis capability to provide, within three-hour time t
f rame established above, quantification of the following:
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(a) certain' radionuclides in the reactor coolant and contain-ment atmosphere that may be indicators of the-degree of core damage (e.g., noble gases; iodines and cesiums, and I
non-volatile isotopes);
i (b) hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere; i
(e.g., H ); chloride (time allotted for
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(c) dissolved gases 2
analysis subject to discussion below), and boron con-centration of liquids.
(d)
Alternatively, have inline monitoring capabilities to perform all or part of the above analyses.
Clarification: 2 (a)
A discussion of the counting equipment capabilities is needed, including provisions to handle samples and reduce background radiation to minimize personnel radiation exposures (ALARA). Also a procedure is required for relating radionuelide concentrations'to core damage-The procedure should include:
1.
Monitoring for short and long lived volatile and non volatile radionuclides such as 153xe, 1311, 137Cs, 140,, and 88Kr (See Vol. II, Part 2, 134,, 85Kr.
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pp. 524-527 of Rogovin Report for further in fo rmation).
2.
Provisions to estimate the extent cf core damage based on radionuclide concentrations and taking into consideration other physical parameters such as core temperature data and sample location.
2 (b)
Show a capability to obtain a grab sample, transport and analyze for hydrogen.
2 (c i Discuss the capabilities to sample and analyze for the accident t aepl e spec 2er. listed here and in Repulst cry Guide 1.97 Rev. 2.
2 (d)
Provide a discussion of the reliability and maintenance information to demonstrate that the selected on-line instrument is appropriate for this application.
(See (8) and (10) below reinrive to back-up grab sample capability and instrument range and accuracy).
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l Response 2 Onsite radiological and chemical analysis capability will be established to meet the three-hour time frame. The post-accident j
sampling subsystem provides the capability to obtain liquid samples 6
from reactor coolant loops 1 and 3, ECCS pump room sumps (RHR/CBS Sumps "A" and "B" and PAB Sump "A").
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.s1..f :; ':, and the RHR pump discharge (containment recirculation sump sample). Gas samples of the containment atmosphere under post accident conditions can be drawn from the installed hydrogen analyzer system.
tedionuclides will be measured on grab samples by gamma ray spectroscopy using germanium detectors. Hydrogen concentration in containment will be measured on grab samples of the containment atmosphere. Dissolved gas will be determined by degassing an aliquot of liquid and obtaining a grab sample of gas for hydrogen analysis.
Chloride and boron concentration on dilute liquid samples will be determined by analysis of grab samples.
Background levels will be reduced in the counting room through the use of a shitided cave. Personnel teiiation exposure will be maintained ALARA through the use of lesa ihield carrying devices and remote handling devices where appropriver.
A procedure will be developed for relating radionuclide con-centrations to core damage levels taking into account core temperature and sample location. Specific radionuclide identification and con-centration will be accomplished through the use of a full spectrum scan.
b' Sampling procedures and core damage level determination proce-dures are currently under development and will be available six months t
prior to fuel load.
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-6 CRITERION:
(3)
Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling
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isolated auxiliary system- [e.g., the letdown system, reac tor wat er c leanup sy st em (Rb'C1'S)] i n be placed in operation in order to use the sampling system, f
RESPONSE
Neither the reactor coolant / sump nor containment 1
atmosphere sampling system requires an isolated auxiliary system to be placed in service for the purpose of i.
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sampling.
L RCS Sampling In the case of the RCS sa=pling system, samples can be supplied to the panel directly from reactor coolant. loops 1 and 3 (hot legs), the discharge of either RHR pump (containment recirculation sump sample), - 2._:h;;;:
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7, the discharge of P
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the PAB sump "A" sa=ple pump, and the discharge from either RHR/CBS equipment vault "A"
or "B" sunp sample l
pump. See revised FSAR Figure 9.3-Sc, attached, and FSAR l
Figure 9.3-5a.
The system interface valves include both manually-operated and remotely-operated valves. All manually-operated valves required for system alignment i
are equipped with accessible handwheel reach-rod extensions, which are located on a wall adjacent to the saeple panel.
All remotely-operated valves are environmentally qualified for the conditions in which they need to operate and are cycled from either the Control Room or local panel, f
The post-accident sampling system will provide a means to override the safeguards signals that automatically close the sample isolation valves.
Containment Atmosphere Sampling The containment atmosphere sampling system draws sa'eples frot the hydrogen analyzer suction line and returns the sample flow to containment through the hydroger analy:er return line.
Inside containnent, both of these lines are open-ended to the containment atmosphere.
The sample supply and. return taps are located !! t he mo t.
steam and feedwater pipe chase building and tie into the hydrogen analyzer suction line upstrear and downstrea of Valve CGC-V13, for Train "A" (CGC-V35 for Train "B") set revised FSAR Figure e.2-95, attached, e
The system interface valves are manually operated.
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Criterion:
(4) Pressurized reactor coolant samples are not required if the licensee can quantify the amount of dissolved gases with unpressurized reactor coolent samples.
The measurement of either total dissolved gases or H2 gas in reactor coolant samples is considered ade-l
.quate.
Measuring the 02 concentration is recom-mended, but is not mandatory.
Clarification:
Discuss the method whereby total dissolved gas or hydrogen and oxygen can be measured and related to f
reactor coolant system concentrations. Additionally, if chlorides exceed 0.15 ppa, verification that
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dissolved oxygen is less than 0.1 ppa is necessary.
Verification that dissolved oxygen is <0.1 ppm by r
measurement of's dissolved hydrogen residual of > 10 cc/kg is acceptable for up to 30 days after the acci-dent. Within 30 days, consistent with minimizing personnel radiation exposures (ALARA), direct moni-toring for dissolved oxygen is recommended.
Response (4) e The amount of dissolved gases in reactor coolant will be deter-mined by extracting a gaseous sample from the post-accident sampling panel using a shielded syringe if necessary. This sample will be ana-lyzed for hydrogen and gamma spectrum only. The procedure for this analysis is currently under development and will be available six months prior to fuel load.
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Criterion:
(5) The time for a chloride analysis to be perfoimed is
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dependent upon two factors:
(a) if the plant's coolant water is seawater or brackish water and (b) f if there is only a single barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling water. Under both of the above conditions the licensee shall pro-vide for a chloride analysis within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the sample being taken.
For all other cases, the licen-l see - shall provide for the analysis to be completed within 4 days. The chloride analysis does r.ot have to be done onsite.
Clarification:
BWR's on sea or brackish water sites, and plants which use sea or brackish water in essential heat exchangers (e.g. shutdown cooling) that have only a single barrier protection between the reactor coolant are required to analyze chloride within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
All other plants have 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to perform a chloride an'aly si s. Samples diluted by up to a factor of one i
thousand are acceptable as initial scoping analysis for chloride, provided (1) the results are reported ppm C1 (the licensee should establish this as value; the number in the blank should be no greater than 10.0 ppm C1) in the reactor coolant system and (2) that dissolved oxygen can be verified at <0.1 ppa, consistent with the guidelines above in clarifi-catioa no. 4.
Additionally, if chloride analysis is performed on a diluted sample, an undiluted sample need also be taken and retained for analysis within 30 days, consistent with ALARA.
Response (5)
Grab sample analysis for chloride on a diluted liquid sacple will be completed within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> of drawing the sample.
Seabrook Station j
utilizes seawater for cooling water but the design incorporates a double barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling at the secr'=
water. Samples may be diluted up to a f actor of 1000 station. However, the analysis employed will provice for a m;.icec detectable threshold of 10 ppm C1.
The post accident sampling system will provide for the repabil:ry of taking an undiluted semple consistent wi t h A;. ARA pri. capir This undiluted sample will be retained for analysis within 30 days.
Procedurer for dr.>ving bett the diluted an'
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samples and for the analysis of the diluted chloride sample art under development and will be available six months prior to fuel load.
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' CRITERION:
(6)
The design' basis for plant equipment for reactor coolant
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and containment atmosphere sampling and analysis must assume that it is pnssible to obt a i n a nd analyze. a sample without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding f
=the criteria of GDC 19 (Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50)
(i.e., 5 rem whole body, 75 rem extremities). (Note that the design and operational review criterion was changed from the operational limits of 10 CFR Part 20 (NUREG-0578) to the GDC 19 criterion (October '30,~
1979 h
letter from H. R. Denton to all licensees).).
RESPONSE
-A shielding analysis will be performed, no later than six-months prior.co. fuel load, to ensure that operator radiation exposure from reactor coolant / containment atmosphere sampling and analysis is within the acceptable i
limits of 5 rem whole body and 75 rem extremities. The operator exposure will include entering and exiting the sample panel area, operating the sample panel manual valves, perf orming manual sample dilu: ions, and transf erring sample to shielded car: fo analysis.
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L Criterion:
(7) The analysis of primary coolant samples for boron i6 required for PWRs.
(Note that Rev. 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 specifies the need for primary coolant boron analysis capability at BWR plants).
I, 3-Clarification:
PWR's need to perform boron analysis. The guidelines for BWR's are to have the capability to perform boron analysis but they do not have to do so unless boron was injected.
Response (7)
Boron analysis will be conducted on a diluted liquid grab sample.
Procedures are under development and will be available six months prior to fuel load.
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s Criterion:
(8)
If inline monitoring is used for any sampling and analytical capability specified herein, the licensee
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shall provide backup sampling through grab samples, and shall demonstrate the capability of anlayzing the samples. Established planning for analysis at off-site facilities is acceptable. Equipment provided for backup sampling shall be capable of provid;ng at least one sample per day for 7 days following onset of the accident, and at least one sample per week until the accident no longer exists.
Clarification:
A capability to obtain both diluted and undiluted backup samples is required. Provisions to flush inline monitors to facilitate access for repair is desirable.
If an of f-site laboratory is to be relied on for the backup analysis, an explanation of the capability to ship and obtain analysis for one sample per week thereafter un}.il accident condition no longer exists should be provided.
e Response (8)
The Seabrook Station post-accideht sampli6g system does not utilize any inline monitoring capabilities.
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s Criterion:
(9) The licensee's radiological and chemical sample ana-i lysis capability shall include provisions to:
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!i (a)
Identify and quantify the isoptopes of the nuclide categories discussed above to levels 5
corresponding to the source terms given in Regulatory Guide 1.3 or 1.4 and 1.7.
Where necessary and practicable, the ability to dilute samples to provide capability for i
and reduction of personnel exposure measurement should be.provided.
Sensitivity of onsite liquid sample analysis capability should be such as to permit measurement of nuclide con-centration in the range from approximately 1 pCi/g to 10 Ci/g.
t (b)
Restrict background levels of radiation in the radiological and chemical analysis facility from sources such that the sample analysis will provide results with an acceptably small error (approximately a fJetor of 2).
This can be accompolished through the use of sufficient shielding around samples and outside sources, and by use of a ventilation system design which will control the presence of airborne k
radioactivity.
Clarification:
(9) (a) Provide a discussion of the predicted activity in the samples to be taken and the methods of handling /
dilution that will be employed to reduce the activity sufficiently to perform the required analysis.
Discuss the range of radionuclide concentration which can be analyzed for, including an assessment of the j
of overlap between post accident and normal amount sampling capabilities.
(b) State the predicted background radiation levels in t
the countinF room. including the contribution from samples which are present.
Also, provide data demonstrating what the background radiation levels and radiation effect will be on a sample being counted to assure an accuracy within a factor of 2.
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1 Response (9)
(a)
Isotopes of the nuclide categories of noble gases, iodines, cesiums and non-volatile isotopes will be
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identified and quantified to levels corresponding to
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the source terms given in Regulatory Guides 1.4 and
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1.7.
There will be provisions for a 1000 to one dilution of the sample at the sampling station. This will be sufficient for transporting a small aliquot to the counting room using lead shield carrying devi-I ces and remote handling devices. If necessary, the sample can be counted using collinated counting geometry. Liquid sample measurement capabilities I
will permit measurement of radionuclides concentration in the range from approximately 1 pCi/g to 10 Ci/g.
Procedures for this analysis will be available six i
months prior to fuel load.
(b)
Background levels of radiation will be restricted in the counting room and the primary laboratory through the use of shielding and ventilation to provide rekults within an acceptably small error. The counting room has 30 inch concrete walls and roof.
Ventilation will be controlled to both areas to limit the ingress of airborne radioactivity. All wet chemical analysis will be performed in an operating fume hood. Samples will remain behind shielding during both storage and analysis.
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1-f Criterion: (10) Accuracy, range, and sensitivity shall be adequate to pro-vide pertinent data to the operator in order to describe
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radiological and chemical status of the reactor coolant
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Clarification:
The recommended ranges for the required accident sample analyses are given in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
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necessary accuracy within the recommended ranges are as i
follows:
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- Gross activity, gamma spectrum: measured to estimate core damage, these analyses should be accurate within a factor of two across the entire range.
- Boron: sessure to verify shutdown margin.
In general this anlaysis should be accurate within 1 52 of the seasured value (i.e. at 6,000 ppm B the tolerance is +
300 ppm while at 1,000 ppm B the tolerance is 1 50 ppm).
For concentrations below 1,000 ppm the tolerance band 50 ppm.
should remain at
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- Chloride: measured to determine coolant corrosion potential.
For concentrations between 0.5 and 20.0 ppm chloride the analysis should be accurate within 1 10% of the seasured value. At concentrations below 0.5 ppm the tolerance band remains at 1 0.05 ppm.
- Hydrogen or Total Gas: monitored to estimate core degradation and corrosion potential of the coolant.
An accuracy of + 10% is desirable between 50 and 2000 '
e For concentration cc/kg but + 20% can be acceptable.~
below 50 cc/kg the tolerance remains at 1 5.0 cc/kg.
- Oxygen: monitored to assess coolant corrosion potential.
For concentration between 0.5 and 20.0 ppo oxygen the saa-lysis should be accurate within 1 10* of the measured value. At concentrations below 0.5 ppm the tolerance band remains at 1 0.05 ppm.
pH: measured to access coolant corrosion potential.
Between a pH of 5 to 9, the reading should be accurate
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within 1 0.3 pH units.
For all other ranges 1 0.5 pH units is acceptable.
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To demonstrate that the selected procedures and instrumen-tation will achieve the above listed accuracies, it is
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necessary to provide information demonstrating their k
applicability in the post accident water chemistry and radiation environment. This can be accomplished'by per-forming tests utilizing the standard test matrix provided below or by providing evidence that.the selected procedure or instrument has been used successfully in a similar i
environment.
STMDARD TEST MATRIX FOR UNDILUTED REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLES IN A POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT Nominal Constituient Concentration (ppm)
Added as (chemical salt)
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40 Potassium Iodide Cs+
250 Cesium Nitrate Ba+2 10 Barium Nitrate La+3 5
Ammonium Cerium Nitrate Cl-10 B
2000 Boric Acid Li+
2 Lithium Hydroxide NO -
150 3
NH +
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K+
20 Camma Radiation 104 Rad /gm of Adsorbed Dose (Induced Field)
Reactor Coolant NOTES:
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- 1) Instrumentation and procedures which are applicable to diluted samples only, should be tested with an equally diluted chemical test matrix.
The induced radiation environment should be adjusted enmmensurate with the weight of actual reactor coolant in the sample being tested.g
- 2) For PWRs, procedures which may be af fected by sprav ad d i ti ve c h e r.: c 3 sust be tested in both the standard test matrix p:us appropriate sr-additives. Both procedures (with and without spra. additives: are i
required to be available.
- 3) For BWRs, if procedures are verified with baron in eb ter* matrix, they do not have to be tested without boron.
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- 4) In lieu of conducting testi utilizing the standard test matrix for
, ins truments and proc edures, provide evidence that the selected instru-
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ment or procedure has been used successfully in a similar environment.
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All equipment and procedures which are used for post accident sampling and anlayses should be calibrated or tested at a frequency which will ensure, to a high degree of reliability, that it will be avat.able if required.
Operators should receive initial and refresher training in post accident sampling, analysis and transport. A minimum frequency for the above efforts is considered to be every six months if indicated by testing.
These provisions should be submitted in revised Technical Specifications in accordance with-Enclosure 1 of NUREG-0737. The staff will provide model l
Technical Specifications at a later date.
Response (10)
The accuracy, range and sensitivity of post-accident analyses capabi-lities will be detailed in the analytical procedures currently under deve-lopment. The procedures will be available six months prior to fuel load, i
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CRITERION: (11)
In the design of the postaccident sampling and analysis capability, consideration should be given to the following items:
p (a) Provisions for purging sample lines, for reducing plateout in sample lines, for minimizing sample loss or distortion, for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the RCS or containment, e
_for appropriate disposal of the samples, and for flow restrictions to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line. The postaccident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples should be representative of the reactor coolant in r
the core area and the containment atmosphere following a transient or accident. The sample lines should be as short as possible to minimize the l-volume of fluid to be taken from containment. The residues of s. ample collection should be returned to containment or t o a closed system.
(b) The ventila. ion exhaust from the sampling station i
should be. filtered with charcoal absorbers and j.
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters,
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RESPONSE
(a) RCS Sampling I.
The Post-Accident Sampling System (see revised FSAR Figure 9.3-5c,' attached and FSAR Figure 9.3-5a) is capable of obtaining samples from reactor coolant loops 1 and 3 under accident conditions where the Reactor Coolant System remains pressurized. Under these conditions,' natural circulation could be established to remove decay heat and provide mixing of the RCS water.
Loop samples are taken from existing sampling points located in the hot leg of loops 1 and 3.
These sampling points are the sample points utilized for i
routine primary sampling.
t If an accident resultr/ i. the depressurization of l
4 LbCA), long-term, the primary syster be provided from the post-accident sai i
discharke of the-r-
These saeples would bc
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ri rc irculation surp, througS the KHR heat e x c h a'y.e r anc back in:o the reactor vessel. Mixing in thi ves.el is accomplished as the recirculation water is forced to flos through the core to remove decay heat v
o capabi. ; of obt ai ning a T '.e s amp l i nt.
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- im n en-c he samp pump.
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i Equipment / valve Icakage will be collected in RHR/CBS Sumps "A" and "B", a s well as' PAB Sump "A". Samples can be taken from these sumps and supplied to the sample panel from the discharge of.the RHR/CBS sump sample-pumps and the PAB Sump "A". sample pump, respectively, b
L The sampling system is purged using demineralized water which is flushed through the system. In the 5
event of a loss of off-site power, the sample system is purged by establishing flow through the sample line, panel and. returning the flow to the containment. See revised FSAR Figure 9.3-5c, attached.
The sample purge flows discussed above are within the region of turbulent flow which should promote mixing in the sample lines and help reduce sample plateout and distortion. Each sample line of the Post-Accident Sampling System will be kept as short as possible to limit the volume of fluid needed to be taken from the system.
s The sample panel has two sample return lines. One t
line-can be valved to return samples to the containnent. This flow path is used under j
post-accident conditions when it is desirable to return the sample purge flow to the containment.
The second return line is used for normal operation which includes testing and operator training exercises. This line returns sample flow to the Floor and Equipment Drain System.
Flow restrictions in the sample line are provided by L
flow restrictors (orifice) and rolenoid-operated i
isola.*an valves to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of a sample line.
Strai mrs/ screens shall be incorporated in the samris Jines or pump inlets, respectively. to
{
mm-syst.t b:clare.
Co nt a i n_ gent Atmosphere Sampling i
The Containment Atmosphere Sampling System draws air sa:ples from two existing lines which are open to tbr c niainment at the dome area.
Sampling froe these areas should provide samples representative of 7
the containment atmosphere. See revised FSAR Tigure
,f 6.2-95, attached.
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h-Purging 'of the sampling lines is accomplished by establishing ~ flow through the hydrogen analyzers using the analyzer sample. pump.
Recovable sample cylinders are installed upstream of the analyzer
[
with bypass lines to allow continuous purging.
Redundant sample lines exist (one for each H2 analyzer), therefore, blockage of a sample line will not prevent the capability to obtain samples.
-Heat tracing has been provided to both sample' lines and will maintain the sample temperature at
['
approximately 3000F. This will ensure that moisture in the sr.mple will not condense before-reaching the sample cylinder. Sample lines will be kept as short as possible to limit the air volume t
I needed to be taken from containment.
(b) The post-accident RCS sampling panel vacuum pump and vents-discharge into the PAB Ventilation System.
The PAB ventilation flow passes through roll, medium efficiency, HEPA and carbon filters before being discharged to the plant primary vent stack.
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J Rep. Beverly Hollingworth Ms. Olive L. Tash 4~
Coastal Chamber of Commerce Designated Representative of 209 Winnacunnet Road the Town of Brentwood Hampton, NH 03642 R.F.D.
1, Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833
- Willias S. Jordan, III, Esquire 3-Haraoh & Weiss Edward F. Meany i
- 1725_I Street, N.W.
Designated Representative of suite 506 the Town of Rye Washington, DC 20006 155 Washington Road Rye, NH 03870 Roy P..Lassy, Jr., Esquire Office of ' the Executive Legal Director Calvin A.
Canney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Manager Washington, DC 20555 City Hall 126 Daniel Street Robert A. Backus, Esquire Portsmouth, NH 03801 126 Lowell Street
- P.O. Box 516 Dana Bisbee, Esquire M&nchester, NH 03105 Assistant Attorney General.
i Office of the Attorney General Philip Ahrens Esquire 208 State House Annex Assistant Attorney General Concord, NH 03642 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen
(-
Mr. John B. Tanzer Town Hall Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03842 s.
the Town of Hampton 5 Morningside Drive Patrick J. McKeon Hampton, NH 03942 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Roberta C. Pevear Rye, NH 03870 Designated Representative of the Town of Hampton Falls Ruthanne G. Miller, Esquire Drinkwater Road Law Clerk to the Board H,ampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Washingten, D.C.
20555 Designated Representative of
+
the Town of Kensington Dr. Maury Tye, President RFD 1 Sun Valler Association East Kingston, NH 03827 209 Sunper Street I
Haverhill, MA 01830 Edward J. McDermott, Esquire Sanders and McDermott Mr. Angie Machiros Professional Association Chairman of the Board of Selectmen j
408 Lafayette Road Town of Newbury Hampton, NH 03842 Newbury, MA 01950 o
(
Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
+
Environmental Protection Bureau i
i Department of the Attorney General
(
One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 ia k
-~
. _... _ _