ML20100B994
| ML20100B994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1996 |
| From: | Prager D, Swamy S WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20100B990 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-14535, NUDOCS 9601290404 | |
| Download: ML20100B994 (123) | |
Text
.-
.. _ ~..
~. -.
Westihabouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 WCAP 14535 -
I TOPICAL REPORT ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP i
FLYM.'SEL INSPECTION ELIMINATION i
JANUARY 1996 r
t I
P. L. Strauch W. H. Bamford B. A. Bishop D. Kurek Approved By 4 I
Icra Reviewed By
[
m S. Apl Mechanics Technology y/ Manager, g
D. E. Prager Structura V
j WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION Systems and Major Projects Divisior.
P. O. Box 355 i
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 l
01996 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Reserted 9601290404 960124
~
PDR ADOCK 05000334 p
PDR m:\\2537w.wpf:1h-011596 i
~. _... _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _.. _
l i
L TABLE OF CONTENTS
{
SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 Introduction 1-1 i
2.0 Design and Fabrication 2-1 3.0 Inspection 3-1 i
4.0 Stress and Fracture Evaluation 4-1 5.0 Risk Assessment: Effect of Inspections 5-1 I
i 6.0 Summary and Conclusions 6-1 7.0 References 7-1 Appendix A Regulatory Position A-1 Appendix B-Historical Inspection Information: Haddam Neck B-1 i
Appendix C Sample Flywheel Inspection Procedures C-1
)
i Appendix D Sample Flywheel Material Test Certificates D-1 m:\\2537w.wpf:lholl596 i
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION An integral part of the reactor coolant system (RCS) in pressurized water reactor plants is the f
reactor coolant pump (RCP), a vertical, single stage, single-suction, centrifugal, shaft seal pump. The RCP ensures an adequate cooling How rate by circulating large volumes of the primary coolant water at high temperature and pressure through the reactor coolant system.
Following an assumed loss of power to the RCP motor, the flywheel, in conjunction with the impeller and motor assembly, provide sufficient rotational inertia to assure adequate cooling flow during RCP coastdown, thus resulting in adequate core cooling.
During nonnal power operation, the RCP flywheel possesses sufficient kinetic energy to produce high energy missiles in the event of failure. Conditions which may result in overspeed of the RCP increase both the potential for failure and the kinetic energy of the Dywheel. This led to the issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.14 in 1971 (Reference 1), which i
describes a range of actions to ensure flywheel integrity.
i One of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.14 (a portion of which is shown in Appendix A) is regular inservice volumetric inspection of Hywheels. Operating power plants have been inspecting their flywheels for over twenty years nov,, and no flaws have been j
identified which affect flywheel integrity. Flywheel inspections are expensive, and involve I
irradiation exposure for personnel, so this study was commissioned to present the safety case for Oywheels, and to quantify the effects of elimination of such inspections.
1 1.1 Previous Flywheel Integrity Evaluations Westinghouse Plants Fracture evaluations were performed in WCAP-8163 (Reference 2) for a postulated rupture of the RCP discharge piping. The RCP Oywheel evaluated had an outer radius of 37.5", a bore radius of 4.7" and a keyway with a radial 1:ngth of 0.9" and a width of 2.0", which are typical dimensions for RCP flywheels. Th: flywheel material was A533, Grade B, Class I steel plate, which is typically used in Oyw1 eel construction. The ultimate tensile stress (for ductile failure analysis) was 80,000 psi, and the fracture toughness at 120 F in the weak or transverse direction was 220,000 psi Vinch. Detailed finite element analyses were performed to determine the stress intensity factors for cracks emanating radially from the Dywheel keyway. These results were compared to closed fonn solutions for crack tip locations remote from the keyway, with good correlation. The conclusion of the Reference 2 evaluation was that the limiting speed for ductile failure of 3485 rpm (about 290 % of the normal operating speed) is governing for crack lengths less than 1.15 inches, and that the brittle fracture limit is m:\\2537w.wpf:ll>0ll596 1]
governing for larger crack lengths. Because the 1.15 inch crack is very large in comparison to that detectable under inspection and quality assurance procedures for the flywheel design, it was concluded that 3485 rpm was the limiting speed for design. The failure prediction methodology was verified by scale model testing, which is discussed in detail in Reference 2.
A series of flywheel overspeed studies were carried out for postulated circumferential and longitudinal split pipe breaks. Table 1-1 summarizes the studies performed in Reference 2.
The maximum speed of 3321 rpm is less than the original design limiting speed of 3485 rpm.
Table 1-1: Summary of LOCA Speed Calculations for Westinghouse Plants Case Description Peak Speed No.
(rpm) 1 4 Loop plant, double ended bmak, RCP trip after 30 seconds.
1248 2
Case I with instantaneous power loss.
3321 3
Case I with instantaneous power loss and break area equal to 2609 60% of double ended break area.
2 4
Case 3 with break area equal to 3.0 ft.
I189 2
5 Case 3 with break area equal to 0.5 ft,
3jg9 6
Case 3 for a 3 loop plant 2330 7
Case 2 with moment of inertia increased by 10%
3200 8
Case I with moment of inertia increased by 10%
1248 9
Case I with loop out of service 2965 2
2 10 Case I with longitudinal split break areas of 0.5 ft,3.0 ft 1200 and pipe cross sectional area.
I1 Case 10 with instantaneous power loss 1200 Babcock and Wilcox Plants Babcock and Wilcox analyzed the RCP for a spectrum of postulated reactor coolant system breaks for a typical Babcock and Wilcox 2568 MWt,177 fuel assembly, nuclear steam system (Reference 3). A stress analysis of the upper flywheel assembly top flywheel was conducted to determine areas of stress concentration, stress magnitude, and the most likely j
flawed configurations to consider in the fracture mechanics analysis. The upper assembly top l
flywheel was considered to be the most critical component, and was the only component ma2537w.wpf:ll>0ll546 12
modeled for the stress analysis. This spoked flywheel had an outer radius of 36", and an inner radius of 15.2". The flywheel material was ASTM A-516-67 grade 65. The ultimate tensile stress was 76,500 psi, the yield stress was 48,500 psi, and the fracture toughness at 70*F and 120 F was 67,000 and 109,000 psi Vinch, respectively. Stresses were calculated using a finite element model.
Three flawed configurations were considered in the linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis.
These configurations were through-wall radial cracks perpendicular to the faces of the flywheel, and emanating from the following locations: the inner bore, a bolt hole, and a keyway. Since shrink fi! forces would retard the growth of radial cracks in the keyway area, they were omitted from the analysis of the wyway crack. The initial crack length was assumed to be the largest crack that could be missed in nondestructive testing (0.24").
Linear clastic fracture mechanics calculations were performed for flywheel temperatures of 70 F and 120 F. The results of the analysis indicated that the flywheels of the RCPs will not fail under the expected normal operating conditions and that failure conditions are not reached until 220% of the normal operating speed is attained, for the assumed initial crack of 0.24".
(The normal operating speed is 1190 rpm, rounded off to 1200 rpm for calculational purposes).
Fatigue crack growth calculations were performed to determine the size of the flaw over the life of the plant. Motor startup is the only plant transient significant to the flywheel. It was assumed that there are 500 stans over the 40 year life of the plant. The applied cycle stress was based on 125% of normal speed. Fatigue crack growth was calculated to be less than 0.0002". Therefore, it was concluded that the assumed initial crack would not grow to critical length during the design life of the flywheel.
LOCA evaluations performed in Reference 3 included eight different cold leg breaks, including the 8.55 ft double ended break at the RCP discharge (with and without electrical 2
braking effects), and smaller break sizes. A summary of the results from the eight analyses are provided in Table 1-2.
m:\\2537w.wpf:lb-Oll596
]-3
t Table 12: Summary of LOCA Speed Calculations for Babcock and Wilcox Plants Case Description Pump Trip Max No.
Time Speed (seconds)
(rpm) 2 I
8.55 ft cold leg guillotine break (pump 0.1 3310 discharge).
2 2
8.55 ft cold leg guillotine break (pump 30.0 1700 discharge).
3 5.00 ft: cold leg split break (pump discharge).
30.0 1210 4
3.0 ft cold leg split break (pump discharge).
30.0 1200 i
2 2
5 1.0 ft cold leg split break (pump discharge).
30.0 1190 2
6 8.55 ft cold leg guillotine break with 80%
30.0 2510 voltage (pump discharge).
2 7
8.55 ft cold leg guillotine break with 90%
30.0 1750 pump and motor inertia (pump discharge).
2 8
8.55 ft cold leg guillotine break (pump 0.1 1190 suction).
Notes: Maximum speed is for the pump in the broken line.
Pump trip time is seconds after the break.
1.2 Leak Before Break (LBB) Considerations
'l Subsequent to the analyses of References 2 and 3,10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General i
Design Criterion 4 was revised to allow exclusion of dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures, including the effects of missiles, pipe whip, and discharging fluids from the design basis, when analyses reviewed and approved by the NRC demonstrate that the probability of fluid system rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping. This is commonly referred to as leak-before-break (LBB) licensing. Since that time, all domestic Westinghouse and Babcock and Wilcox designed PWR plants have qualified for LBB exclusion of the primary loop double ended guillotine LOCA.
m:\\25%.wpf:ll>0ll596 14
Given that a plant has LBB exclusion for the main loop LOCA, the largest break required to be postulated under the structural design basis becomes that of the largest branch line. The largest branch lines not covered by the LBB exclusion would be 14" schedule 140 or 160 piping (0.72 ft: break area, maximum), typically the accumulator line in the cold leg 2
piping. Such a break may be treated as the equivalent of a 0.72 ft longitudinal split break in the primary loop piping.
Westinghouse Plants 2
As shown in Table 1-1, the smallest breaks examined were 3.0 ft and 0.5 ft longitudinal 2
split breaks (Cases 10 and 11). The 3.0 ft spl t break would bound the largest branch line 2
break not covered by the LBB exclusion (0.72 ft ) with respect to the effect on the RCP speed. From Reference 2,it is apparent that with or without RCP power, the RCP speed will 2
2 not exceed 1200 rpm for 3.0 ft or 0.5 ft longitudinal split breaks for the model 93A 6000 hp RCP described in Reference 2.
2 Reference 2 concluded that the increase in RCP speed due to the 3.0 ft area split break was less than 1I rpm over the normal operating speed of i189 rpm, or less than 1%. Given that 2
the Reference 2 analysis shows that the RCP speed increase is less than 1% for the 3.0 ft longitudinal breaks area, and that the maximum credible break under LBB is less than 1/4 of that size, it is concluded that any RCP speed increase resulting from a branch line break will be well within the design RCP speed tolerance of 25%, i.e.,1.25 times the design speed of 1200 rpm, or 1500 rpm, with or without the dynamic braking effects from the RCP being energized. No known non-LOCA events which lead to RCP speedup would be more limiting than the above mentioned pipe break with respect to overspeed. (Further studies extended this conclusion to a range of RCP designs including 63A (4000 hp),93 (6000 hp),
93A (6000 hp),93A (7000 hp) and 100 (8000 hp). Note that RCP rotational inertia is a plant specific parameter. The above conclusion for RCP applicability is only valid for the range of 2
pump rotational inertias from 45000 to 123000 lb -ft. As shown in the next section, all Westinghouse flywheels meet this criterion. Therefore, a peak LOCA speed of 1500 rpm is used in the evaluation of Westinghouse RCP flywheel integrity in this report.
Babcock and Wilcox Plants 2
2 2
As shown in Table 1-2, the smallest breaks examined were 5.0 ft,3.0 ft, and 1.0 ft split 2
breaks (Cases 3,4 and 5). The 1.0 ft split break would bound the largest branch line break 2
not covered by the LBB exclusion (0.72 ft ) with respect to the effect on the RCP speed.
2 From Reference 3, the RCP speed will not exceed 1200 rpm for 1.0 ft split breaks, with the effects of electrical braking. Although calculations were not specifically performed to determine the effect of excluding electrical braking effects, the Babcock and Wilcox pumps mA25W.wpf.1hol1546 1-5
are similar in design to Westinghouse pumps, where the effect of electrical braking was found to be very small on the small break sizes of interest. (As noted for typical Westinghouse pressurized water reactors, a loss of RCP drive power due to electrical faults in the 30 second time interval following a large area break LOCA is an event of extremely low probability, in the range of 3.0 x 10'). Therefore, a peak LOCA speed of 1500 rpm is used in the evaluation of Babcock and Wilcox RCP flywheel integrity in this calculation.
1.3 Report Purpose The purpose of this report is to provide an engineering basis for the elimination of RCP flywheel inservice inspection requirements for all operating domestic Westinghouse plants and the following Babcock and Wilcox plants:
Crystal River Unit 3 Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Davis Besse Three Mile Island Unit 1 Three complimentary approaches will be used to demonstrate that flywheel inspection may be safely eliminated. A study of the inspection techniques and a summary of inspection results to date shows no indications have been found which affect flywheel integrity (see Section 3.)
A stress and fracture evaluation has shown that very large flaws are needed to cause a failure under maximum overspeed conditions (Section 4). Finally, a risk assessment has been completed to directly compare the flywheel failure probabilities with and without further inspections (Section 5).
l 1
m:\\2537w.wpf;1t>0ll596 l-6
l SECTION 2 DESIGN AND FABRICATION Reactor coolant pump flywheels consist of one or more large steel discs which are shrunk fit either directly to the RCP motor shaft or to spokes extending from the motor shaft. In the case of two or more flywheel discs, the individual flywheels are bolted together to form an integral flywheel assembly. Each Dywheel is keyed to the motor shaft with one or more vertical keyways.
2,1 Flywheel Geometry The flywheels which are attached directly to the motor shaft typically consist of two flywheel discs which are bolted together and are located above the RCP rotor core. The top and bottom discs typically have the same outer diameter and bore dimensions but different thicknesses. The bottom disc usually has a circumferential notch along the outside diameter bottom surface for placement of antirotation pawls. Typically, each flywheel is keyed to the motor shaft by means of three vertical keyways, positioned at 120 intervals. An example of this type of flywheel is shown in Figure 2-1.
The spoked flywheels consist of an upper and a lower flywheel assembly, above and below the RCP rotor core. The upper flywheel assembly consists of three discs bolted together, with the top dise having a larger outside diameter than the middle and bottom disc. The lower flywheel consists of a single disc, of the same dimensions as the middle and bottom disc of the upper flywheel assembly. There are eight spokes 2.5 inches thick, extending from and welded to the motor shaft. Each flywheel assembly is keyed to the spokes by means of one keyway. An example of this type of flywheel is shown in Figure 2-2.
For the purpose of the evaluations performed for this report, the larger flywheel outside diameter for a particular flywheel assembly is used, since this is judged to be conservative with respect to stress and fracture. For the flywheels investigated in this report, outer diameters range from 65 to 76.5 inches, bore diameters range from 8.375 to 30.5 inches (the later being the spoked flywheel), and keyway radial lengths range from 0.39 to 1.06 inches.
Most of the flywheels covered by this repon are made from A533 Grade B Class I or A508 Class 3 steel. Flywheels for the pumps at three plants are made from A516 Grade 70 steel, and those at one plant are made from boiler plate.
A summary of pertinent flywheel parameters is provided in Table 2-1. Plant alpha designations used in Table 2-1 are identified in Table 2-2.
mA25m wpf:lt>0ll596 21
2.2 Material Information The pump motors for all the Westinghouse plants and many of the Babcock and Wilcox plants were manufactured by Westinghouse. All of the Westinghouse flywheels except Haddam Neck are made of A533 Grade B Class I steel. The Haddam Neck flywheels were made of boiler plate steel.
~
It has not been possible to locate each of the certified material test repons for all of the flywheels, but a sample is contained in Appendix D. It will be helpful to examine the ordering specifications for the Westinghouse flywheel materials. The first specification is dated December 1969, and requires that the nil-ductility transition temperature from both longitudinal and transverse Charpy specimens be less than 10 F. This does not guarantee RTyn7 is less than 10 F, but it is highly likely that this is the case.
The Westinghouse equipment specification was changed in January of 1973 to require both Charpy and drop weight tests to ensure that RTsur is no greater than 10 F.
Even though it is likely that most, if not all, of the flywheels in operation have an RTsor of 10 F or less, a range of RTsn1 values from 10 F to 60 F has been assumed in the integrity evaluations to be discussed later.
m:\\2537w.wpf It>0ll596 2-2
Table 2-1: Summary of Westinghouse and Babcock &Wilcox Domestic Flywheel Information Keyway Pump &
Outer Radial Motor Diam.
Bore Length Inertia Material Applicable Plants Group (Inches)
(Inches)
(Inches)
(Lh.ft')
Type (Plant Alpha Designation) 1 76.50 9.375 0.937 Il0,(XX)
SA533B TGX/THX/ Spare 2
75.75 8.375 0.906 82,000 SA533B PSE'/PNJ/ Spare 3
75.00 9.375 0.937 95,(XX)
SA533B CQL; CAE/CBE/CCE/CDE';
DAP/DBP/DCP/DDP; GAE/GBE'; SAP / Spare; NEU; NAH; CGE/ Spare; WAT/ Spare; TBX/TCX/ Spare; SCP; VRA/VGB/ Spare i
4 75.00 9.375 0.937 83,000 SA533B TVA/ TEN / Spare 5
75.00 9.375 0.937 82,000 SA533B ALA/APR/ Spare; AEP/ AMP / Spare: CWE/COM:
DLW/DMW 6
75.00 9.375 0.937 80.000 SA533B NSP/NRP'; WPS' 7
75.(X) 8375 0.911 82,(KX)
SA533B INT Spare 8
75.00 8.375 0.906 82,000 SA533B IPP/ INT; 10E/ PEG 9
75.00 8.375 0.906 80,(XX)
SA533B WEP^/WIS 10 72.00 16.125 0.906 72,000 SA533B BOCO/ Spare S
11 72.00 9.375 0.937 72,700 SA533B BDAVI 12 72.00 8.375 0.906 80,(XX)
SA533B RGE' 13 72.00 8375 0.906 70,(XX)
SA533B CPL / Spare; FPL/FLA/ Spare:
VPA/VIR' 2
14 65.00 8.375 0.656 45,(XX)
Boiler CYW Plate 15 72.00 30.50 0.390 70,540 A516 B3 mil' 16 65.00 13.800 1.060 70,(XX)
A516 BCRY3 Notes:
- 1) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.885*.
- 2) Haddam Neck spare has a keyway radial length of 0.618", and material is S A533B.
- 3) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.883".
- 4) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.911"
- 5) Spares have a keyway radial length of 0.942", one spare is of S A508 material.
- 6) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.937".
- 7) Spoked flywhccis, m:\\2537w.wpf;lt>011596 2-3
Table 2-2: Plant Alpha Designation Listing i
Plant Alpha Designation Plant l
AEP/ AMP D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 ALA/APR J.M. Farley Units I and 2 CAE/CBE Byron Units 1 and 2 CCE/CDE Braidwood Units 1 and 2 CGE V.C. Summer CWE/COM Zion Units 1 and 2 CPL H.B. Robinson Unit 2 l
CQL Shearon Harris CYW Haddam Neck DAP/DBP McGuire Units 1 and 2 DCP/DDP Catawba Units I and 2 DLW/DMW Beaver Valley Units I and 2 FP11FLA Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 GAE/GBE Vogtle Units I and 2 IPP/ INT Indian Point Units 2 and 3 i
NAH Seabrook i
NEU Millstone Unit 3
{
NSP/NRP Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 PGE/ PEG Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 l
PSE/PNJ Salem Units I and 2 RGE Ginna SAP Wolf Creek l
SCP Callaway TBX/TCX Comanche Peak Units I and 2 TVA/ TEN Sequoyah Units I and 2 TGX/THX South Texas Units 1 and 2 l
VGB/VRA North Anna Units I and 2 l
VPA/VIR Surry Units 1 and 2 l
WAT Watts Bar Unit I WEP/WIS Point Beach Units I and 2 WPS Kewaunee BCRY3 Crystal River Unit 3 BDAVI Davis Besse BOCOl/BOCO2/BOCO3 Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 l
B3 Mil Three Mile Island Unit I l
1 i
l i
m:uS37w.wpf lt> 0ll596 24
I O
O 2.
1 +,.- r * ' ' "
O q l
o O Ii I,
l ll O
I ii l! I I
l I l
Il ll l
37.5 la RAD.
l
- j i
i
+
4.7 im RAD.
- 7. 5 I N 6.5 IN g
2 la DIA. 80LT MOLES % h 32.5 in R AD.
l.25 IN DI A. GAGE MOLES -> +
l Figure 21: Example of a Flywheel which is Attached Directly to the Motor Shaft s
m:\\2537w.wpf:lb-Oll596 25
30.5" ID bore Bolt holes for I
i
/
72 OD bolting flywheel plates i
/
8 spokes: 2.5" thick, welded to together I o shaft. One spoke is keyed to
'4_
o flywheel with a 3/4" thick key.
The keyway is 0.39" deep.
K' Upper Flywheel assembly:
consists of 3 plates shrunk fit 7
49.6" dD Q
j onto the spokes.
A k-M Y
j i
- Rotor Core p
j Lower Flywheel: Consists of 1 plate
_// shrunk fit and keyed to spokes A
Motor Shaft 1
Figure 2-2: Example of a Spoked Flywheel l
m:\\2537w.wpf:lb-Oll596 2-6
SECTION 3 INSPECTION Flywheels are inspected at the plant or during motor refurbishment. Inspections are conducted under Section XI (Reference 4) standard practice for control of instrumentation and personnel qualification. The inspections are conducted by UT level 11 and level Ill examiners.
3.1 Examination Volumes Reactor Coolant pump flywheel examinations are conducted under the control of Utility ISI programs according to surveillance schedules governed by individual Plant Technical Specifications. The volumetric examinations recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.14 have been uniformly applied to the accessible surfaces of the pump flywheel after removal of the shroud cover and gauge hole plugs. The volume of flywheel is inspected generally with straight beam techniques applied laterally, checking the plate material for planar defects emanating from the bore, keyways, and around the gauge holes and ream bolt holes.
3.2 Examination Approaches Generally, three examinations are performed. The keyway comer exam is conducted by inserting specially designed ultrasonic probes into the gauge holes and directing the sound laterally through the plate material so that reDections are obtained from the center bore radius.
Normal reflections will then be seen from the corners of the keyways. These reDections are predictable in distance and rate of occurrence, with abnormalities such as cracking branching out from the keyway being detectable as an abnormal response. A second examination is performed when the sound is projected laterally towards the other remaining gauge holes, for evidence of cracking emanating from the bores of the holes and plate material between the holes. The third examination is commonly referred to as the " Periphery" examination. In this test, standard contact transducers are placed on the outer edges of both upper and lower j
flywheel plates. The sound is directed laterally into the plate material for examination of the material between the peripheral holes and the plate outer edge.
3.3 Access and Exposure Access to the exam surfaces is made possible by permanent walkways or by erecting scaffolding. R idiation exposure depends greatly on the amount of pump motor work being conducted nearby and can range from 20-100 millirem / hour.
mA2537w.wpfholI596 31
l 3.4 Inspection History l
A survey was conducted of historical plant inservice inspection results, and all member utilities contributed. The flywheel population surveyed was a total of 217. A total of f
i 729 examination results were reported, and no indications which would affect the integrity of the flywheels were found. These results are summarized on a plant by plant basis in Table 3-1. A summary of recordable indications is provided in Table 3-2. It.is interesting to l
note from Table 3-2 that a number of indications in the form of nicks, gashes, etc. were t
found at the keyway area, having been created by the act of removing or reassemblying the j
flywheel. These were all dispositioned as not affecting flywheel integrity, but are clear j
evidence that disassembly for inspection and reassembly actually can produce damage.
l Indications were found at the Haddam Neck plant,in the weld used to join the two flywheel plates together. The indications identified were associated with this seal weld and resulted in no radially oriented cracking, and no impact on the integrity of the flywheels. A detailed summary of this finding is given in Appendix B. Sample flywheel inspection procedures are i
provided in Appendix C.
i i
I i
l I
I l
~'
i l
l I
f l
1 m:\\2537w.wpf:1b-011596 3-2
=
Table 3-1: Flywheel Inspection Results Total Number Total of Inspections Number of Number of Total with No inspectkms Indications Number Number of Indicatkms or with Affecting Plant Alpha of Flywheel Nonrecordable Recordable I'lyw heel Ibignation Plant Flywheels inspections Indicatkms Indications Integrity AEP Cook 1 4
14 13 1
0 AMP Cook 2 4
12 12 0
0 ALA Farley 1 3
17 17 0
0 APR Farley 2 3
19 19 0
0 CAE/CBE Byron I & 2 8
20 19 1
0 CCE Braidwood 1 4
13 11 2
0 CDE Braidwood 2 4
9 8
1 0
CGE Summer 4
10 10 0
0 CWE Zion 1 4
10 9
1 0
COM Zion 2 4
16 16 0
0 CPL Robinson 2 4
22 20 2
0 CQL Harris 3
17 17 0
0 CYW Haddam Neck 4
32 28 4
0 DAP McGuire 1 4
13 13 0
0 i
DBP McGuire 2 4
8 8
0 0
DCP Catawba 1 4
6 6
0 0
DDP Catawba 2 4
6 6
0 0
DLW Beaver Valley 1 3
15 11 4
0 DMW Beaver Valley 2 3
5 5
0 0
FPl>FLA Turkey Point 3 and 4 7
36 34 2
0 GAE/GBE Vogtle I and 2 9
19 19 0
0 IPP Indian Point 2 5
21 21 0
0 INT Indian Point 3 5
17 17 0
0 NAH Seabrook 4
8 8
0 0
NEU Millstone 3 5
12 12 0
0 NSP Prairie Island 1 2
13 12 1
0 NRP Prairie Island 2 2
11 10 1
0 m:\\2537w.wpf:lt>0ll596 3-3
Table 3-1: Flywheel Inspection Results (continued) -
Total Number Total of Inspections Number of Number of Total with No Inspections Indications Number Number of Indications or with Affecting Plant Alpha of Flyw heel Nonrecordable Recordable FI3iheel Designation Plant Flyw heels Inspections Indications Indications Integrity PGE Diablo Canyon 1 4
12 11 1
0 PEG Diablo Canyon 2 4
11 11 0
0 PSE/PNJ Salem 1 and 2 9
24 13 11 0
RGE Ginna 3
21 21 0
0
]
SAP Wolf Creek 4
13 12 1
0 SCP Callaway 4
11 11 0
0 TBX Comanche Peak I 4
8 8
0 0
TCX Comanche Peak 2 4
4 4
0 0
TVA/ TEN Sequoyah I and 2 9
37 36 1
0 TGX South Texas 1 4
12 12 0
0 THX South Texas 2 4
12 12 0
0 VGB/VRA North Anna 1 and 2 7
37 33 4
0 i
VPA/VIR Surry I and 2 7
17 17 0
0 WAT Watts Bar 1 4
4 2
2 0
WEP Point Beach 1 2
12 12 0
0 WIS Point Beach 2 2
13 13 0
0 WPS Kewaunee 3
6 5
1 0
BCRY3 Crystal River 3 4
30 30 0
0 BDAVI Davis Besse 5
24 22 2
0 BOCOI Oconee 1 4
6 6
0 0
BOCO2 Oconee 2 4
2 2
0 0
BOCO3 Oconec 3 4
3 3
0 0
B3 Mil Three Mile Island I 4
9 9
0 0
TOTALS 57 217 729 686 43 0
i mA2537w.wpf:m 011596 3-4
t Table 3 2: Summary of Recordable Indications Plant Alpha Designation Year Description of Recordable Indications AEP 1987 Surface examination on RCP flywheel no.13 showed two 3/8" long i
recordable indications. Surface chatter removed by minor surface reconditioning.
CAE/CBE 1993 0.45" rounded indication in RCP flywheel IB Leyway area (surface exam) characterized as minor tool mark.
CCE 1991 PT indications on RCP "A" flywheel were acceptable.
1994 Indications noted on RCP "B" flywheel with FT and VT-1 were resurfaced and found to be acceptable.
CDE 1994 Four 1/16" rounded indications noted in various areas krated approximately 0.8" below top surface of RCP "C" flywheel. One linear indication noted (cire. oriented). Indications were acceptable.
CWE 1986 PT recordable indication in loop i RCP flywheel, bleed out from gouges and metal folds in keyways.
i CPL 1984 PT recordable indication on RCP "C" flywheel bore was filed out and
)
reexamined.
1992 Gouge on spare Cywheel blended out to 3 to I taper.
DLW 1980 PT indication, unsatisfactory mechanical damage from removal of RCP "B" flywheel. Grinding repaired condition.
i 1987 IT recordable indication dispositioned as satisfactory for RCP "A" nywheel. Damage from handling.
l 1993 UT recordable indication in RCP "B" flywheel due to geometry, dispositioned as satisfactory. IT recordable indication due to handling, j
dispositioned as satisfactory.
1994 UT recordable indication in RCP "C" flywheel due to geometry, dispositioned as satisfactory.
FPUFLA 1974 Laminations midwall (UT) in motor IS-76P499 flywheel accepted as-is.
1993 Torn metal in keyway (PT) on motor 2S-76P499 flywheel removed by tuffing.
NSP 1994 MT of flywheel no. I1 periphery (0.4 inch) to be re-examined in January 1996 outage.
NRP 1995 MT indications in periphery of flywheel no. 21 (which were buffed in 1993) were found to be unchanged.
PGE 1995 Multiple MT linear indications (laminations) on lower periphery of RCP l-4 flywheel, accept as-is, monitor.
j PSE/PNJ 1983-1995 Eleven recorded indications from surface examinations on seven flywheels were identified as minor chatter marks in keyway from original rough machine cuts due to the arbor tool used during manufacture.
Accept as is.
mA2537w wpf.lb.Oll5%
3-5
Table 3-2: Summary of Recordable Indications (Continued)
Plant Alpha Designation Year Description of Recordable Indications SAP 1995 Wear marks on bottom surface of RCP 1 Dywheel within seal ring (circular like spacer wear) - removed.
TVA/ TEN 1993 Recorded indications (10 year MT) in Dywheel 3S-81P352. Laminations in edge, dispositioned as acceptable.
VGB/VRA 1983 Tool marks noted in keyway of flywheel 2S-81P355.
1986 Four PT indications m the keyway of flywheel 3S-8lP355 caused by incorrect installation.
i 1988 Six reportable indications from keyway scratches in flywheel 3S-81P777, 1993 Three acceptable rounded indications in the keyway of flywheel 2S-81P777.
WAT 1986 PT reconied indication in keyway area of RCP 1 flywheel resulted from tool chatter which occurred during manufacture of the Oywheel. The indications were formed by the teanng and smearing of the raised metal (intnx!uced by the tool chatter) at disassembly and reassembly of the keys.
1986 VT recorded indication in keyway area of RCP 4 flywheel.
WPS 1976 Visual recorded indication in RCP "A" Dywheel. Machine chips in five small holes in center of shaft BDAVI 1975 Volumetric preservice indication in RCP 2 flywheel found to be acceptable. Surface tears in keyway removed by surface conditioning.
4 1988 Surface gouges in bore of RCP 4 flywheel from flywhccl removal found to be acceptable.
CYW 1971 See Appendix B.
l m:\\2537w.mpf:lb-Cll596 3-6
SECTION 4 STRESS AND FRACTURE EVALUATION All of the flywheels were subjected to a detailed stress and fracture evaluation, which is summarized in this section. To avoid repetition, the flywheels were grouped by geometry, and the logic for this grouping is explained in Section 4.1. There are two possible failure mechanisms, ductile and brittle, which must be considered in flywheel evaluation and these are discussed in detail in evaluations reported earlier (References 2 and 3). Figure 4-1 shows the results of a typical flywheel overspeed evaluation, where the flywheel failure speed was calculated for a range of postulated crack depths. Note that the brittle failure limit governs for large flaws. The limiting speed increases for small flaws. Using brittle fracture considerations alone, the limiting speed would approach infinity for vanishingly small flaws.
For these situations, the ductile failure limit governs, a finding that has been proven by scale model tests whose results are reported in Reference 2.
Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1 Section C, Subsection 2 (see Appendix A, or Reference 1), provides the following regulatory position for flywheel design:
a.
The flywheel assembly, including any spe ed-limiting and antirotation devices, the shaft, and the bearings, should be designed to withstand normal conditions, anticipated transients, the design basis loss-of-coolant accident, and the Safe 1
Shutdown Earthquake loads without loss of structural integrity.
b.
Design speed should be at least 125% of normal speed but not less than the j
speed that could be attained during a turbine overspeed transient. Normal speed is defined as synchronous speed of the a.c. drive motor at 60 hertz.
c.
An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speedfor ductile failure of theflywheel. The methods and limits of paragraph F-1323.1(b) in Section j
111 of the ASME Code are acceptable. If another method is used, justificatwn should be provided. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC stafffor evaluation.
d.
An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speedfor nonductile failure of the flyrheel. Jusnfication should be given for the stress analysis method, the estimate offlaw size and location, which should take into account initialflaw size andflaw growth in service, and the values offracture toughness assumedfor the material. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC sta.[ffor evaluation.
mA2537w.wpf;1b Oll596 4-]
e.
An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speedfor excessive deformation of the flywheel. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation. (Excessive deformation means any deformation such as an enlargement of the bore that could cause separation directly or could cause an unbalance of theflywheelleading to structuralfailure or separation of the flywheelfrom the shaft. The calculation of deformation should employ clastic-plastic methods unless it can be shown that stresses remain within the elastic range).
f.
The normal speed should be less than one. half of the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c, d, and e above.
g.
The predicted LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c, d, and e above.
These guidelines will be reviewed in this section, for all the flywheels covered by this report, and the results tabulated.
4.1 Selection of Flywheel Groups for Evaluation P
From the flywheel dimensional information provided in Table 2-1 of this report, six flywheel groups were selected for evaluation, which encompass the range of domestic flywheel dimensions covered by this report. These groups are as follows:
Table 4-1: Flywheel Groups Evaluated i
Outer Flywheel Diameter llore Keyway Radial Group (Inches)
(Inches)
Length (Inches)
Comments 1
76.50 9.375 0.937 Maximum flywheel OD.
2 75.75 8.375 0.906 Large flywheel OD, Minimum nywheel bore.
10 72.00 16.125 0.906 Large flywheel OD, Large flywheel bore.
14 65.00 8.375 0.656 Minimum Hywheel OD, Minimum flywheel bore.
15 72.00 30.500 0.390 Maximum Dywheel bore (spoked flywheel), Minimum keyway radial length.
16 65.00 13.800 1.060 Minimum flywheel OD, Maximum keyway radial length, m:us37..wpr:ttwol1596 4-2
4.2 Ductile Failure Analysis The capacity of a stnicture to resist ductile failure with sufficient margin of safety during faulted conditions can be demonstrated by meeting the faulted condition criteria of Section Ill of the ASME Boiler arid Pressure Vessel Code. The faulted condition stress limits for elastic analysis, P, and P, + P., are taken as 0.7 S, and 1.05 S,, where S, is the minimum specified j
ultimate tensile stress of the material. As in Reference 2,80 ksi was used for S, which is the minimum specified value for A-533 Grade B, Class I steel. The stresses in the RCP flywheel, neglecting local stress concentrations such as holes and keyways, can be calculated by the following equations (Reference 2):
/
i o'
(3+v) por b:+ a:
"'h 2
-r 8
386.4 r
2 1
h_f l+3v' (3 +v) p(d 2
2 a
2.
2 2
y',
r 3
8 386.4 r
3+v 2
r 1
where o, radial stress, psi
=
circumferential, or hoop stress, psi c.
=
Poisson's ratio,0.3 v
=
flywheel material density, 0.283 lb,/ inch' p
=
flywheel angular speed, radians /second to
=
flywheel outer radius, inches b
=
flywheel bore radius, inches a
=
flywheel radial location of interest, inches r
=
Since the stress in the thickness direction (o,) is assumed to be negligible, and the radial stress (o,) always falls between a, and 0, the maximum stress intensity at any point in the 3
flywheel is equal to the circumferential stress, o. It should be noted that the circumferential o
stress peaks at the flywheel bore and keyway locations and decreases approximately linearly j
thereafter in the radial direction. To apply the faulted stress limits to a nonlinear stress m:\\2537w.wpf:1t>011596 4-3
distribution, the actual stress distribution must be resolved into its membrane and bending components:
I (b-a) f,o, dr P, =
b 6
f,a, (r, - r) dr P, =
(b-a)2 where r, is the flywheel mean radius defined as (a + b) / 2. Substituting the circumferential stress term shown above and carrying out the integrations yields (b - a ') l1 1+ 3v #
p*, ' 3 +v '
poi 8
8, 386.4 (b-a) 3 3+v, p*, ' 3 +v '
6 poi
~b' 1 +3v ( b 'a 1 'l+3v' j g_ I 8
386.4 (b-a): _I2 3+v,
2 3+v,
(
j In(I) b a' [3 } ( 1 + 3v)j _ g ( 1 + 3v )'
2
-a b a
2 3
3+ v 12 3+ v i As was performed in the Reference 2 evaluation, a ductile failure limiting speed was detennined for each flywheel group selected for evaluation, assuming that cracks are not present and neglecting the local stress effects from holes and keyways. Limiting speeds were also calculated considering the reduced cross sectional area resulting from the keyway, and from assuming that cracks may be present. Cracks were assumed to emanate radially from the keyway, through the full thickness of the flywheel. The results of these calculations are provided in the following table.
mA2537w.wpf:lt>0ll596 44
Table 4-2: Ductile Fallure Limiting Speed (rpm)
Asst, ming No Cracks Crack Length (from Keyway)
Neglecting Considering Keyway Keyway Flywheel Radial Radial 1" Crack Group Length Length 2" Crack 5" Crack 10" Crack 1
3487 3430 3378 3333 3240 3012 2
3553 3493 3435 3386 3281 3060 10 3503 3471 3443 3398 3238 2990 14 4086 4032 3961 3903 3768 3448 15 3175 3155 3105 3056 2915 2698 16 3900 3850 3815 3760 3565 3264 Per Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, Section C, item 2f, the normal speed should be less than one-half of the lowest of the critical speeds as calculated for ductile failure, nonductile failure and excessive deformation. At the minimum calculated limiting speed of 3155 rpm (assuming cracks are not present), the normal speed must be less than 1577 rpm. Since the normal operating flywheel speed is 1200 rpm, item 2f of the Regulatory Guide is satisfied for ductile failure with no cracks present. Assuming that a rather large crack of 10" depth is present, item 2f is still satisfied for ductile failure since one-half of the lowest calculated critical speed (2698 rpm) is 1349 rpm, which is higher than the normal operating flywheel speed of 1200 rpm.
Per item 2g of Section C of the Regulatory Guide, the predicted LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated for ductile failure, nonductile failure and excessive deformation. Since the predicted LOCA overspeed is in all cases less than 1500 rpm, and the minimum calculated limiting velocity for ductile failure is 3155 rpm, item 2g of the Regulatory Guide is satisfied for ductile failure, assuming no cracks are present.
Assuming that a rather large crack of 10" length is present, item 2g is still satisfied for ductile failure since the lowest calculated critical speed (2698 rpm) is higher than the LOCA overspeed of 1500 rpm Therefore, the Regulatory Guide acceptance criteria for ductile failure of the flywheels are satisfied, mA2537w.wpf.Ib-011596 4-5
I 4.3 Nonductile Failure Analysis As provided in Reference 2, an approximate solution for the stress intensity factor for a radial full depth crack emanating from the bore of a rotating disk may be calculated by the j
following equations (Refemnce 5):
. v:
e a x(__ __)
por b b K, =
b"2 $
386.4 (1_v ),
e
~ a 3 _a b '
1 + _a_
+ _b j ') _ c[
2 2
$ = (3+v) 3 1 %._
+
a b>
a 32 b2 b
+
c, b
2
(
(
b,,
(
'e v'
u e u e
~
~
- 'l + 3v '
b
- b>
1 E>
t
+ __ '),c' 32
'c _a' 3
j b
b b
-t where p flywheel material density (Ib,,, per cubic inch)
=
flywhccl angular speed (radians per second) to
=
b flywheel outer radius (inches)
=
flywheel inner radius (inches) a
=
radial location of crack tip (inches) e
=
Poisson's ratio (0.3) v
=
In the Reference 2 analysis, the keyway radial length was initially assumed to be included as part of the total crack length for conservatism. Using the closed form solution, a nonzero value of stress intensity was obtained for a zero crack length (i.e., c = a + keyway radial length), as would be expected, since the keyway itself was in essence considered to be a crack. To eliminate this undue conservatism for shon crack lengths. finite element analysis was performed. It was shown that cracks emanating from the center of tk-keyway yielded higher stress intensity factors than cracks emanating from the keyway corner, and that a zero length crack resulted in a zero stre.,s intensity factor. The finite element analysis results were in close agreement with the closed form solution for crack lengths larger than about 1.0 inch.
It was also shown in the Reference 2 analysis that the ductile failure mode controls for smaller crack lengths (less than 1.15 inches for the particular flywheel evaluated), and that m:\\2537w.wpf:HrolI596 4.(3
nonductile failure controls for larger crack lengths. Therefore, the closed form solution was used for calculation of the stress intensity factors in this report, keeping in mind that it is overly conservative for small cracks. (However, small cracks are controlled by the ductile failure mode).
To envelope the range of RTyor values for the flywheel materials, an upper and lower bound value of 0 F and 60 F were used in this report. The lower bound fracture toughness for ferritic steels was calculated by the following equation (Reference 4):
K = 33.2 + 20.734 exp[0.02 (T - RTm)]
ic This resulted in fracture toughness values of 117 ksi Vinch and 58.5 ksi Vinch for RTsur values of 0 F and 60 F, respectively, at an ambient temperature of 70 F. The ambient temperature used for the fracture evaluation represent., a much lower temperature than would be expected in the containment building during normal plant operating conditions (typically 100 F to 120 F), and is therefore conservative with respect to nonductile failure analysis.
I At the maximum flywheel overspeed condition of 1500 rpm, the following critical crack lengths were calculate 1 for cracks emanating radially from the keyway. Note that an intermediate RTsor value of 20 F (K c = 79.3 ksi Vinch) is included in the table.
i Table 4-3: Critical Crack Lengths for Flywheel Overspeed of 1500 rpm Critical Crack Length in inches and % through Flywheel p
Group RT
16.6" 7.7" 3.1 *
(50G>)
(24%)
(99-)
2 17.5" 8.5" 3.6" (53G)
(264 )
(11 9 )
10 15.1" 7.5" 3.3" (569)
(27%)
(129 )
14 20.3" 14.4" 8.3" (73%)
(52%)
(309 )
l 15 10.4" 5.3" 2.6" (519 )
(26"r)
(129) 16 17.2" 11.4" 6.0" (707)
(46%)
(24 5 )
Note: Crack length is meastved radially from the keyway, and percentage through flywheel is calculated as the crack length divided by the radial length from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius, f
m:uS37w.wpt:1b-ol 596 47 I
l As shown in the above table, the critical crack lengths are quite large, even when considering higher values of RTm and a lower than expected operating temperature.
4.3.1 Fatigue Crack Growth To estimate the magnitude of fatigue crack growth during plant life, an initial radial crack length of 10% of the way through the flywheel (from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius) was conservatively assumed. The fatigue crack growth rate may be characterized in terms of the range of applied stress intensity factor, and is generally of the form (Reference 4):
d
= C (AK )"
_dN o
3 where da/dN =
crack growth mte (inches / cycle) slope of the log (da/dN) versus log (AK )
n
=
i Co scaling constant
=
The fatigue crack growth behavior is affected by the R ratio (K JK,,) and the environment.
Reference fatigue crack growth behavior of carbon and low alloy ferritic steels exposed to an air environment is provided by the above equation with n = 3.07 and Co = 1.99 x 10~' S. (S is a scaling parameter to account for the R ratio and is given by S = 25.72 (2.88 - R)'"'
where 0 s R < l. Since the maximum stress intensity range occurs between RCP shutdown (zero spm) and the normal operating speed of approximately 1200 rpm, the R ratio is zero, and S = 1). The fatigue crack growth rate for the flywheels may therefore be estimated by i
b = 1.99 x 10-' (AK,)"7 dN Assuming 6000 cycles of RCP starts and stops for a 60 year plant life (typical for RCP design including the potential for extended plant life, and conservative for actual operation),
i the estimated radial crack growth is as shown below:
m:\\2537w.wpf.It>0ll596 4-8
Table 4-4: Fatigue Crack Growth Assuming MMM) RCP Starts and Stops CRACK KEY-LENGTH ASSUMED GROWTH FLY-FLY-WAY FROM INITIAL AITER FLY-WHEEL WHEEL RADIAL KEYWAY CRACK MMMI WHEEL OD BORE LENGTH TO OD LENGTH AK, (KSI CYCLES G ROUI' ONCHES)
(INCHES)
(INCH)
(INCHES)
(INCHES)
VINCH)
(INCH) 1 76.50 9.375 0.937 32.63 3.26 38 0.08 2
75.75 8.375 0.906 32.78 3.28 37 0.08 10 72.00 16.125 0.9 %
27.03 2.70 35 0.07 14 65.00 8.375 0.656 27.66 2.77 25 0.02 15 72.00 30.500 0.390 20.36 2.(M 33 0.05 16 65.00 13.800 1.060 24.54 2.45 28 0.03 As shown in the above table, crack growth is negligible over a 60 year life of the flywheel, even when l
assuming a large initial crack length.
4.4 Excessive Deformation Analysis The change in the bore radius (a) and the outer radius (b) of the flywheel at the overspeed condition may be estimated by the following equations (Reference 6):
Aa - l P "#
8 2
i E [(3 + v) b2 + (1 - v) a j 4 386.4 Ab = 1 pn b
2 386.4 E [(1 - v) b 2 + (3 + v) a ]
4 bore radius (inches) where a
=
outer radius (inches) b
=
flywhcci material density (0.283 lbdcubic inch) p
=
flywheel angular speed (radians per second) to
=
Young's modulus (30 x 1(f psi)
E
=
Poisson's ratio (0.3) v
=
l mA2537w.wpf:ll>0ll5%
4-9
At the flywheel overspeed condition of 1500 rpm (157.08 radians /r ond), the change in the bore radius and the outer radius is calculated as shown below:
Table 4-5: Flywheel Deformation at 1500 rpm CHANGE IN CHANGE IN FLYWHEEL HORE RADIUS OUTER RADIUS GROUP (INCH)
(INCH) 1 0.003 0.006 2
0.003 0.006 10 0.005 0.006 14 0.002 0.0(M 15 0.010 0.009 16 0.0(M 0.0(M As shown in the table above, a maximum flywheel deformation of only 0.010 inches is anticipated for 2
the flywheel overspeed condition. As deformation is proportional to (o, tids represents an increase of 56% over the normal operating deformation. This increase would not result in any adverse conditions, such as excessive vibrational stresses leading to crack propagation, since the flywheel assemblies are typically shrunk fit to the flywheel shaft, and the deformations are negligible.
i i
4.5 Summary of Stress and Fracture Results The integrity evaluations presented in tids section have shown that the reactor coolant pump flywheels t
have a very high tolerance for the presence of flaws. The results obtained here are even better than those obtained in earlier evaluations, because the application of leak before break has demonstrated that flywheel overspeed events are limited to less than 1500 rpm.
[
There are no significant mechanisms for insen' ice degradation of the flywheels, since they are isolated from the primary coolant environment. Analyses presented in this section have shown there is no significant deformation of the flywheels even at maximum overspeed conditions. Fatigue crack growth calculations have shown that for 60 years of operation, crack growth from large postulated flaws in
]
each of the flywheel groups is only a few mils. Therefore the flywheel inspections completed prior to service are sufficient to ensure their integrity during service. In fact, the most likely source of inservice degradation is damage to the keyway region which could occur during disassembly or reassembly for inspection.
i m:\\2537w.wpf:Ib-Oll596 4-10
i i
l i
4000 3ng J/////sssj.
EE S
a y
U EUC1lLt A 3000
[NIE' 3
250 o E
E D
u E
CT at LtNlt 200 l
l l
l 2000 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 CRACKDEPTH(INCHES)
Figure 41: Results of a Typical Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Overspeed Evaluation mA2537w.wP :lh0ll596 4,jj f
SECTION 5 RISK ASSESSMENT: EFFECT OF INSPECTIONS To investigate the effect of flywheel inspections on the risk of failure, a structural reliability and risk
[
assessment was performed for each_of the flywheel groups selected for evaluation in Section 4. A 40 year plant life including the potential for an extended plant life of 60 years, and 12 month operating cycles were assumed for the evaluation. The following subsections describe the 3
methodology used and the results of this assessment.
5.1 Method of Calculating Failure Probabilities The probability of failure of the RCP flywheel as a function of operating time t, Pr(t g td, is calculated directly for each set ofinput values using Monte-Carlo simulation with importance sampling. The Monte-Carlo simulation does not force the calculated distribution of time to failure to be of a fixed I
type (e.g. Weibull, Log-normal or Extreme Value). The actual failure distribution is estimated based upon the distributions of the uncenainties in the key structural reliability model parameters and plant j
i specific input parameters. Importance sampling, as described by Witt (Reference 7), is a variance reduction technique to greatly reduce the number of trials required for calculating small failure probabilities. In this very effective technique, random values are selected from the more severe high or low regions of their distributions so as to promote failure. However, when failure is calculated, the count is corrected to account for the lower probability of simultaneously obtaining all of the more i
severe random values.
l l
To apply this simulation method to reactor pump flywheel (RPFW) failure, the existing Westinghouse PROF (probability of failure) Software System (object library) is combined with the problem-specific l
structural analysis models described in Section 4.3. The PROF library provides standard input and output, including plotting, and probabilistic analysis capabilities (e.g. random number generation, importance sampling). The result is the executable program RPFWPROF.EXE for calculation of pump flywheel failure probability with time. The failure mode being simulated by the program is an initial flaw, undetected during pre-service inspection, growing by fatigue crack growth due to pump startup and shutdown until a critical length is obtained. The critical length is that which causes the flaw stress j
intensity factor due to pump overspeed during the design limiting event to exceed the fracture toughness of the flywheel material.
f The Westinghouse PROF Software Library, which was used to generate the RPFWPROF program, has been verified and benchmarked in a number of ways. Table 5-1 provides a comparison of probabilities from hand calculation for simple models where the only random variables are the initial and limiting crack depths. The crack growth due to two independent mechanisms is deterministic (variables are constant). As can be seen, the W-PROF calculated values agree very well (less than 4% error) for a number of different distributions and with the effects of importance sampling.
m:\\2537w.wpf:Hv0123%
5-1
Table 5-1: Simple Verification of Results for Westinghouse PROF Methods Type of Import.
Iland W-PROF Distribution on Sampling Calculated Calculated Percent Crack Depths (1)
Shift (2)
Prob. (3)
Probability Error Normal 0.0 0.1003 0.100(M
-0.26 Normal 1.0 0.1003 0.09889
-1.41 Log-Normal 0.0 0.1003 0.09880
-1.50 Log-Normal 1.0 0.1003 0.09652
-3.77 Uniform 0.0 0.1003 0.10393
+3.62 Log-Uniform 0.0 0.1003 0.10018
-0.12 Weibull 0.0 0.0950 0.0934
-1.68 l
(1)
Same type of distribution on the random values of initial crack depth and limiting crack depth.
i (2)
Median value of initial depth shifted +1 standard deviation and median value of limiting depth shifted -1 standard deviation when impoltance sampling (Reference 7) is used with less than half the number of trials.
(3)
Calculated using stress-strength overlap techniques on crack depth.
De calculation of failure probability using the W-PROF methods and importance sampling was also compared to that calculated by an alternative method for more complex models. The more complex model also included the uncertainties in growth rate, which were also a function of the crxk depth.
The alternative method was the @ RISK add-in for Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets (Reference 8). As seen in Figure 5-1, the comparison of calculated probabilities is excellent at the low probability values, where importance sampling is normally used.
In the verification of the simplified piping fracture mechanics (SPFM) structural reliability programs for risk based inspection (Reference 9), the calculated probabilities for thermal transient induced j
fatigue crack growth were compared with results from the pc-PRAISE program (Reference 10).
PRAISE, which was developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the NRC, is the nuclear industry's standard for calculating the structural reliability of piping. As shown in Figure 5-2, the comparison of calculated leak probabilities with the number of operating cycles, without the effects of inspection, is excellent for both the SPFMPROF and SPFMSRRA programs. He SPFMSRRA program uses Westinghouse developed approximations to estimate the changes in probability with time due to changes in the input variables relative to a reference case. The reference case is initially calculated using the SPFMPROF Program, which is the same type of program as RPFWPROF.
When the same inservice inspection frequency and accuracy are used, Figure 5-3 shows that essentially the same failure probabilities are calculated by pc-PRAISE, SPFMPROF and SPFMSRRA.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Westinghouse methods employed in calculating probabilities with mA2537w.wpf:1b 012396 5 -
4 the RPFWPROF.EXE program have been sufficiently verified and benchmarked for the assessment of pump flywheel failure risk and the effects of inspection.
'Ihe input parameters to the RPFWPROF program are described in Table 5-2. Vaiiables 1 to 4 and 9 to 17 are the key input parameters needed for failure probability calculation, as identified in Section 4.3.
'Ihcir usage in the program is specified as shown in the last column of Table 5-2 and schematically in the flow chart of Figure 5-4. " Initial" conditions do not change with time, " Steady-State" is not needed for RPFWPROF, " Transient" calculates fatigue crack growth and " Failure" checks to see if the accumulated crack length exceeds the critical length.
Table 5-2: Variables for Structural Reliability Model of RCP Flywheel Failure No.
Name Description of Input Variable Usage Type 1
ORADIUS Outer Flywheel Radius (Inch)
Initial i
2 IRADIUS Inner Flywheel Radius (Inch)
Initial 3
PFE-PSI Probability of Flaw Existing After Preservice Initial Inspection 4
ILENGTH Initial Radial Flaw Length (Inch)
Initial 5
CYl-ISI Operating Cycle for First inservice Inspection Inspection 6
DCY-ISI Operating Cycles Between Inservice Inspections inspection 7
POD-ISI Flaw Detection Probability per Inservice Inspection Inspection 8
DFP-ISI Fraction PFE Increases per Inservice Inspection Inspection 9
NOTR/CY Number of Transients per Operating Cycle Transient 10 DRPM-TR Speed Change per Transient (RPM)
Transient 11 RATE-FCG Fatigue Crack Growth Rate (Inch / Transient)
Transient 12 KEXP-FCG Fatigue Crack Growth Rate SIF Exponent Transient 13 RPM-DLE Speed for Design Limiting Event (RPM)
Failure I
14 TEMP-F Temperature for Design Limiting Event (F)
Failure 15 RT-NDT Reference Nil Ductility Transition Temperature (F)
Failure 16 F-KIC Crack Initiation Toughness Factor Failure 17 DLENGTH Flywheel Keyway Radial Length (Inch)
Failure Variables 5 to 8 are available to calculate the effects of an inservice inspection (ISI) in the RPFWPROF program. In a Monte-Carlo type simulation, the failure probability at a given time is approximated as the ratio of the number of failures at that time to the total number of trials. For inservice inspections, this ratio is modified to reflect the fact that only those cracks that are not m:\\2537w.wpf;tt>012396 5-3
-. - ~ -. - - -. - -.
. -. -. _ ~ -
(
detected will remain to possibly cause failure. Dat is, a component with a detected crack is assumed j
to be repaired or replaced, returning it to a good-as-new condition.' Ris modified ratio for ISI is j
expressed by the following equation:
Pr = Summation [ Pr (n) F(n) ) / N r
un n = 1 to N i
Where:
[
Pr, = the approximate probability of failure,
-l Pr (n) = the ISI non-detection probability for the nth trial.
un F(n) = the failure weight for the nth trial j
(e.g.1 if failure occurs and 0 otherwise for no importance sampling), and i
l N = the total number of trials (simulations).
l 1
l De non-detection probability normally varies as a function of time since it depends upon the size of j
the crack at the time the ISI is performed. Dat is, the larger the crack size, the lower the probability l
l of not detecting it. His is also expressed in equation form for the Ith inservice inspection as:
f Pr (n) = Product [ Pruu(n,t,) ]
l sn i = 1 to I
(
r Where:
Prun(n,t,) = the probability of non-detection for the inservice l
inspection of weld n at time t,.
I These equations, which are used in the simplified model for the effect of ISI, are consistent with those f
described in the pc-PRAISE Code User's Manual (Reference 10). Bey are somewhat optimistic since -
there is no correlation between successive inspections of the same material, which may systematically occur in actual practice. The parameters needed to describe the selected ISI program are the time of j
the first inspection, the frequency of subsequent inspections (expressed as the number of fuel or operating cycles between inspections) and the probability of non-detection as a function of crack I
length. For the reactor pump flywheel, the non-detection probability, which is independent of crack length, is simply one minus a constant value of detection probability, variable 7 in Table 5-2. An increase in failure probability due to pump inspection (chance of incorrect disassembly and reassembly) was included in the ISI model but not used (variable 8 set to zero).
t j.
De median input values and their uncertainties for each of the parameters of Table 5-2 are shown in Table 5-3. The median is the value at 50% probability (half above and half below this value);it is also the mean (average) value for symmetric distributions, like the normal (bell-shaped curve) distribution. Uncertainties are based upon expert engineering judgement and previous structural m:\\2537w.wpf:1hol23%
5-4 i
i L
reliability modeling experience. For example, the fracture toughness for initiation as a function of the reference nil-ductility transition temperature and the uncertainties on these parameters are based upon prior probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses of the pressure vessel (Reference 11). Also note that the stress intensity factor calculation for crack growth and failure used the flywheel keyway radial length (variable 17) in addition to the calculated flaw length. This allowed the probabilistic models to be checked using the results of the conservative deterministic evaluations of Tables 4-3 and 4-4.
1 Table 5-3: Input Values for Structural Reliability Model of RCP Flywheel Failure i
No.
Name Median Distribution Uncertainty
- 1 ORADIUS Per Flywheel Group Constant 2
IRADIUS Per Flywheel Group Constant 3
PFE-PSI 1.000E-01 Constant 4
ILENGTH 1.000E-01 Log-Normal 2.153E+00 1
5 CYl-ISI 3.000E+00 Constant i
6 DCY-ISI 4.000E+00 Constant 7
POD-ISI 5.000E-01 Constant 1
8 DFP-ISI 0.000E+00 Constant 9
NOTR/CY 1.000E+02 Normal 1.000E+01 10 DRPM-TR 1.200E+03 Normal 1.200E+02 11 RATE-FCG 9.950E-Il Log-Normal 1.414E+00 12 KEXP-FCG 3.070E+00 Constant 13 RPM-DLE 1.500E+03 Normal 1.500E+02 14 TEMP-F 9.500E+01 Normal 1.250E+01 15 RT-NDT 3.000E+01 Normal 1.700E+01 16 F-KIC 1.000E+00 Normal 1.000E-01 17 DLENGTH Per Flywheel Group Constant
- Note: Uncertainty is either the normal standard deviation, the range (median to maximum) for uniform distributions or the corresponding factor for logarithmic distributions.
Table 5-4 provides sample output from the RPFWPROF Program for the values of the input variables in Table 5-3. The first page of the output describes the input that is used for the calculations. The
" SHIFT MV/SD" column indicates how many standard deviations (SD) the median value (MV) is shifted for importance sampling (Reference 7). The second page of the output provides the change in failure probability per fuel (operating) cycle and the cumulative probability. The deviation on the m:\\2537w.wpf:lhol2396 5-5
cumulative total that is output is the deviation due to the Monte-Carlo simulation only. Figure 5-5 shows the computer generated plot comparing the calculated reactor pump failure probabilities with and without the effects ofinservice inspection. As can be seen, the effect of ISI, even with a 50% probability of detection, is very small. This is because the failure probability is not changing much with time; therefore, the rate of increase cannot be significantly reduced even for a perfect inspection with 100% probability detection.
Table 5-4: Example Output from the RPFWPROF Program i
i i
l STRUCIURAL RELIABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT (SRRA) l WESTIIGIOUSE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE PROGRAM RPFWPROF ESBU-NID 4
...--.......--....--.......--....--....---u------...---..
I INPUT VARIAME FOR CASE 1: REACIOR CDOLANT RNP FLYWHEEL FAILURE NCYCLE -
60 NFAIIB = 1000 NIRIAL = 9999 IOVARS =
17 NLFEET =
4 NCNISI -
4 j
NLFESC =
0 NLMIRC =
4 NLNEIO =
5 VARIABLE DISTRIBUTICN MEDIAN DEVIATICN SHIFT USAGE NO.
NAME TYPE I.OG VALUE OR FACIOR MV/SD NO. SUB 1 ORADIUS
- CINSTANT -
3.6000D+01 1 SET 2 IRADICE
- CINETIANT -
3.0625D+00 2 SET 3 PFE-PSI
- CINETIANT -
1.0000D-01 3 SET i
4 IIRGIH ICRMAL YES 1.0000D-01 2.1528D+00 1.00 4 SET 5 CY1-ISI
- CINSIANT -
3.0000D+00 1 ISI 6 DCY-ISI
- CIN57IANT -
4.0000D+00 2 ISI 7 PCD-ISI
- CIN57IANT -
5.0000D-01 3 ISI l
8 DFP-ISI
- CENS'IANT -
0.0000D+00 4 ISI 9 ICIR/CY ICRMAL 20 1.0000D+02 1.0000D+01
.00 1 TRC 10 DRIN 'IR ICRMAL 20 1.2000D+03 1.2000D+02 1.00 2 'IRC 11 RATE-PU3 ICRMAL YES 9.9499D-11 1.4142D+00 1.00 3 'IRC 12 KEXP-FU3
- CINS'IANT -
3.0700D+00 4 TRC i
13 RPM-DLE NORMAL 10 1.5000D+03 1.5000D+02 1.00 1 FIO 14 TEMP-F NORMAL 10 9.5000D+01 1.2500D+01
-2.00 2 FIO 15 RT-NDP ICRMAL 20 3.0000D+01 1.7000D+01 2.00 3 FIO 16 F-KIC NORMAL NO 1.0000D+00 1.0000D-01
-1.00 4 FIO l
17 DIBGIH
- CINE 7IANT -
9.0600D-01 5 FIO 1
4 m:\\2537w.wpf:lb-012306 5-6
Table 5-4: Example Output from the RPFWPROF Program (Cont'd.)
i PRCBABILITIES OF FAIwRE EDE: FATIGUE CRACK GRONIH SIF > 'IOUGHNESS NGGER FAILED = 470 NGEER OF 'IRIALS = 9999 IDO OF FAIwRE PRCBABILITY WTIKX7T AND WrIH IN-SERVICE DEPECTICN CYCLE FOR PERICD CIN. 'IUIAL PCR PERICD CIN. 'IUIAL 1.0 9.00777D-08 9.00777D-08 9.00777D-08 9.00777D-08 2.0 1.00713D-08 1.00149D-07 1.00713D-08 1.00149D-07 3.0 8.70982D-11 1.00236D-07 8.70982D-11 1.00236D-07 11.0 3.56616D-11 1.00272D-07 8.91540D-12 1.00245D-07 12.0 9.40206D-13 1.00273D-07 1.17526D-13 1.00245D-07 13.0 2.17369D-11 1.00294D-07 2.71711D-12 1.00248D-07 14.0 4.71179D-10 1.00766D-07 5.88974D-11 1.00307D-07 18.0 2.91939D-10 1.01058D-07 1.82462D-11 1.00325D-07 19.0 1.59524D 1.02653D-07 9.97024D-11 1.00425D-07 24.0 6.00973D-12 1.02659D-07 9.39020D-14 1.00425D-07 26.0 2.07667D-11 1.02680D-07 3.24480D-13 1.00425D-07 31.0 1.30332D-09 1.03983D-07 1.01822D-11 1.00435D-07 32.0 2.87692D-11
-1.04012D-07 1.12380D-13 1.00435D-07 34.0 1.81125D-11 1.04030D-07 7.07521D-14 1.00435D-07 35.0 1.30472D-10 1.04160D-07 5.09655D-13 1.00436D-07 38.0 1.12340D-10 1.04273D-07 2.19414D-13 1.00436D-07 40.0 2.93218D-11 1.04302D-07 2.86346D-14 1.00436D-07 46.0 8.71264D-11 1.04389D-07 4.25422D-14 1.00436D-07 47.0 1.12251D-10 1.04501D 07 5.48099D-14 1.00436D-07 50.0 7.94921D-11 1.04581D-07 1.94072D-14 1.00436D-07 51.0 5.07795D-12 1.04586D-07 1.23973D-15 1.00436D-07 52.0 2.88193D-12 1.04509D-07 3.51798D-16 1.00436D-07 54.0 4.48702D-10 1.05037D-07 5.47732D-14 1.00436D-07 55.0 1.17426D-11 1.05049D-07 1.43343D-15 1.00436D-07 58.0 9.35600D-11 1.05143D-07 5.71045D-15 1.00436D-07 59.0 2.43375D-11 1.05167D-07 1.48544D-15 1.00436D-07 60.0 0.00000D+00 1.05167D-07 0.00000D+00 1.00436D-07 DEVIATICN CN CIMKATIVE 'IUIAIS =
4.73585D-09 4.63324D-09 Note: Failure probabilities are provided in double precision format 4
(e.g. 4.28172D-08 is 4.28172 x 10 )
mA2537w.wpf:lt>012396 57
5.2 Evaluation of Risk for RCP Flywheels Evaluations were performed to determine the effect on the probability of flywheel failure for continuing the current inservice inspections over the life of the plant and for discontinuing the inspections. Since most plants have been in operation for at least ten years, the evaluation calculated the effects of the inspections being discontinued after ten years, it is important to keep in mind that the probability of failure determined by these evaluations is only a calculated parameter. The reason for this it that the evaluation conservatively assumes that the probability of a flaw existing after preservice inspection is 10%, and that the ISI flaw detection j
probability is only 50%. In reality, most preservice and ISI flaws would be detected, especially for the j
larger flaw depths which may lead to failure. Therefore, the calculated values are very conservative.
(The effects of some important parameters on the calculated probability of failure are discussed later in Section 5.3). The most important result of the evaluation is the change in calculated probability of failure from continuing to discontinuing the inspections after ten years (cycles) of plant life.
As shown in Figures 5-6 through 5-11, the effect of inservice inspection on failure probability has little effect on minimizing the potential for failure of the flywheel. The results of this assessment are summarized as follows for a plant life of 40 and 60 years:
Table 5-5: Probability of Failure after 40 and 60 Years with and without inservice Inspection Probability of flywheel failure Probability of flywheel with ISI prior to failure with ISI prior to 10
% Increase in failure Flywheel and after years and without ISI after probability for eliminating Group 10 years 10 years inspections i
At 40 years At 60 years At 40 years At 60 Years 1
2.45E-7 2.50E-7 2.57E-7 2
5 2
1.43E-7 1.45E-7 1.47E-7 1
3 10 1.00E-7 1.04E-7 1.05E-7 4
5 14 2.98E-10 2.98E-10 2.98E-10 0
0 15 1.15E-8 1.18E-8 1.22E-8 3
6 16 6.92E-9 7.02E-9 7.02E-9 1
1 It can be seen above that continuing inspection after 10 years has essentially no impact on the failure probabilities.
i m \\2537w.wpf:ltAl2396 5-8
5.3 Sensitivity Study A sensitivity study was performed to determine the effect of some important flywheel risk assessment parameters on the probability of failure. Flywheel group 10 was arbitrarily chosen for the study. The parameters evaluated included the probability of detection, the initial Haw length, and the initial flaw length uncenainty. The results of this study are summarized in the table below. Note that this study was performed for a flywheel design life of 40 years.
Table 5-6: Effect of Flywheel Risk Parameters on Failure Probability Probability of Probability of nywheel failure nywheel failure after 40 years with after 40 years with ISI prior to 10 Description of nywheel risk ISI prior to and years and without parameter varied after 10 years ISI after 10 years Base Case 1.00E-7 1.04E-7 Probability of Detection of 10%
l.03E-7 1.04E-7 Probability of Detection of 80%
l.00E-7 1.04E-7 Initial flaw length of 0.05 inches 4.57E-8 4.74E-8 Initial Haw length of 0.20 inches 2.97E-7 3.01 E-7 Ilength 3 Sigma Bound Factor of 3 6.40E-8 6.46E-8 Ileingu o sigma Bound Factor of 20 1.94E-7 1.95E-7 The values for the base case, shown in Table 5-6 above are for a 10% probability of a flaw existing after preservice inspection, an initial flaw length of 0.10 inch (1.006 inch with keyway), an initial flaw length (llength) 3-sigma bound factor of 10, an initial inservice inspection at three years of plant life and subsequent inspections at four year intervals, and a probability of detection of 50% per inservice inspection (see Table 5-5, flywheel group 10).
The flaw detection probability was varied from 50% to 10% and 80%. Failure probability increased approximately 3% for a decrease in Haw detection probability from 50% to 10%. Failure probability did not change for an increase in flaw detection probability from 50% to 80%. Therefore, flaw detection probability, which is a measure of how well the inspections are performed, has essentially no effect on Oywheel failure probability.
The initial flaw length was varied from 0.10 inch to 0.05 inch and 0.20 inches. Failure probability decreased by 54% for a decrease in initial flaw length from 0.10 inch to 0.05 inch. Failure probability tripled for an increase in initial Daw length from 0.10 inch to 0.20 inches. Therefore, initial flaw length does affect flywheel failure probability, but the failure probability is small, even for larger ma253?w.wpr:tb.ol23%
5-9
initial flaw lengths. Moreover, the probability of the larger Daw being missed during preservice inspection would be even smaller than the assumed 10 percent.
The initial flaw length 3-sigma bound factor was varied from 10 to 3 and 20. Failure probability decreased about 38% for a decrease in the 3-sigma bound factor from 10 to 3. Failure probability increased about 90% for an increase in the factor from 10 to 20. Therefore, the uncertainty in the deviation factor does affect flywheel failure probability, but failure probability is still small, even for a higher 3-sigma bound factor of 20.
S.4 Risk Assessment Conclusions An evaluation of flywheel stmetural reliability was performed for each of the flywheel groups selected for evaluation in Section 4, using methods which have been sufficiently verified and benchmarked.
Using conservative input values for preservice flaw existence, initial flaw length, inservice flaw detection capability and RCP start /stop transients, it was shown that flywheel inspections beyond ten years of plant life have no significant benefit on the risk of flywheel failure. The reasons for this are that most flaws which could lead to failure would be detected during preservice inspection or at worst early in the plant life, and crack growth is negligible over the plant life. It should be noted that the effect on potential flywheel failure from damage through disassembly and reassembly for inspection has not been evaluated. It is believed that this effect could demonstrate that the risk of failure by continuing flywheel inspections is the same as or greater than the risk by eliminating the inspections.
Sensitivity studies showed that improved flaw detection capability and more inspections result in a small relative change in calculated failure probability. Failure probability was most affected by the initial flaw length and its uncertainty. These parameters are determined by the accuracy of the preservice inspection. The uncertainty could be reduced using the results from the first inservice inspection but would probably not change much during subsequent inspections.
m us37. wpr:ib-oi23%
5-10
80 8
70 -
60 Z
_Jg 50 C
ca E
40
@ RISK Estimate a
o_
w C5000 TRIRLS) 30
_J 2
0 W-PROF WITH f
(
b0 R
o 10
/
^-==^ ' a a
0 30 35 40 45 50 55~
60 TIME IN YEARS l
Figure 5-1: Importance Sampling Check of Westinghouse PROF Methods m:\\2537*.wpf:lholl596 5.((
SMALL LERK PROBABILITY, NO ISI 20 C
0 PC-PRRISE a
a SPFMPROF A
O 10 a
o
^
7 SPFMSRRA w
o o
C O
v O
N A
3
^
c-m S
Q J
0 10 20 30 40 NUMBER OF CYCLES i
l Figure 5-2: Comparison of Leak Probabilities without inspection m:C$37w.wpf:lholl596 5-12
SMALL LERK PROBRBILITy VITH ISI 20 0
o PC-PRR15E
^
^
SPPMPROP 10
- v SPFMSRRR v
E 5
6 n
O O
o 3
C.
C CD k
Q.
i 0
10 20 40 NUMBER OF CYCLES Finre 5 3: Comparison of Leuk probabilities with Inservice inspection m:\\2537* wpf:1b-011$96 5-13
l I
I l
READ IN INITIALIZE e
STEADY-STATE y
y 4
UNCERTAINTIES PARAMETERS CHANGES l
l V
TRANSIENT CHANGES U
~
CHECKIF NO NEXT FAILURE
> TIME OCCURS?
STEP YES YES U
V NO PRINT OUT NEXT CALCULATE EFFECTS OF PROBABILITY <
RANDOM <
FAILURE ISIOR WITH TIME TRIAL?
PROBABILITY MONITORING Method for Component Probabilistic SRRA Analysis i
i l
Figure 5-4:
Westinghouse PROF Program Flow Chart for Calculating Failure j
Probability I
I m:u537w.wpf:1b-011506 5-14
e t
1 4
i i
188
,m Nestinghouse 3
ESBU - NTD
+
Maxinun S
Probabilitu
$ le.
of 8.1852E-86 A
h Maxinun Tine of 68 Cycles g
1.8 _..
~
Current Case 1 X 1.8 a
a a = No ISI 8.1 D
D D = Mith ISI 8.8 25 58 75 188 P-v-o mr3
- o v' es e x i e,ue, r aege.
Case 1
Title:
REACIDR C00UWT PUNP TLYlelEEL FAILURE i
l Figure 5-5: Computer SRRA Plot for RCP Flywheel Failure Probability m:\\2537w.wpf:lh012396
$-]$
5 o,3 - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __
0.29 -----r----------------__.._.
W g
0,2g D
d 0.27 " - -
---u-.
A<
1 0.26
_a-O5
> j 0.25
+*--
-++ +*+
r---
b5 p..._.. + 2 + m r*;***. q,,_ _.,, n.._
_ a, __.9, _,,,,.,, c d
- 0.24 L- - -,-
-a
. z.
m h
0.23
L----
.- _._ a.
O M
0.22
. - --. - - -q - - -
L i
0.21 F--
0.2
.-l----L-
.a-.-.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS
l Figure 5-6: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 1 0.2 r------
0.19
-M -- _.
~
m M
0.18 F- - -- --+-- ---
-4 DJ 0.17 F-1 0.16 " --
+
w a
Oj
> E 0.15
~
+
h o
.oooe'
+
- i ***. R:-- *i**,*** *: ] * : ~ ^ ** **
i 0.14 e-----
-+-
CO
[
0.13 O
0.12
+
L 0.11 0.1
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
' YEARS
.. W/O ISI W/ISI
.4 Figure 5-7: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 2 mA2537w.wpf:lt>012396 5.] 6 i
0.13 J
)
J
-. + - + - + - - - +. - - +
+ + - - +
0.1
~
-~+
--4 -+ 4-4 4 4 a as!
.s
_32 0.03 -
o c
w 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS
Figure 5 8: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 10 0.0003 i
I.)g 0.00029 h - -----
U--------'---
+-- - - - -
D 3
i k
I l
[6 0.00028 -
- - - - +-
-+ -
-i n
3 i
s a
=.
era g4 0.00027 L
- -- e -
2<n D2 0.00026 -
+
4 0.00025 ' -
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS W/O ISI
_c._ W/ ISI Figure 5 9: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 14 m:\\2537w.wpf:lb-012396 5-17
0.015 -
I w
l g
0.014 r D
I d
i 1<
i i
t, 0.013 ' -
+
t-----
OE i
g n
=.-
-y d
0.012
- - - - - - - - + - - - -
m
=
i
. = = m = = = & - w n -.._. -1,._n
--.-.w
+e m
O
- L----
I E
0.011 L
--2 l
i 0.01 I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS
... W/O ISI W/ ISI Figure 5-10: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 15 t
0.01 i
{
t i
w 1
p 1
-- -- r-- - -
g 0.009 1
I i
2.
i I
w 6
0.008 H------;----------E-------a--
u-
i Oj i
I
>2 b E5 d
- 0.007 6 : _.._:: w _c--.=._. J.._._
d._-___..__2._.._._..
i
. - +:t m
m O
M 0.006
~ - - -
--- - ^-
-~-----4--
c L
i I
)
0.005 '-- ---
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS
Figure 5-11: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 16 mA2537w.wpf.lM)12396 5-18
i SECTION 6
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS Reactor coolant pump flywheel inspections were implemented as a result of United States Nuclear
- Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.14, which was published in 1971 and revised in 1975.
Flywheels are carefully designed and manufactured from excellent quality steel, which has a high fracture toughness.
t Flywheel overspeed is the critical loading, but leak-before-break has linsted the maximum speed to less than 1500 rpm.
Flywheel inspections have been performed for 20 years, with no indications of service induced flaws.
t Flywheel integrity evalur.tions show a very high flaw tolerance for the flywheels.
Crack extension over a 60 year service life is negligible.
Structural reliability studies have shown that climinating inspections after 10 years of plant life will not significantly change the probability of failure.
Inspections result in man-rem exposure and the potential for flywheel damage during assembly and reassembly.
i Based on the above conclusions, continued inspections of reactor coolant pump flywheels are not f
necessary. Furthermore, overall plant safety could be increased by eliminating these inspections, because man rem doses would be lowered, and the potential for flywhccl damage during disassembly
{
6 and reassembly for inspection would be eliminated.
i i
I 1
l t
I l
l i
m:\\2537w.wpf:th0123%
6-1 I
SECTION 7 REFERENCES 1).
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, Regulatory Guide 1.14, " Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," 1971; Revision 1, August 1975.
-2)
Westinghouse report WCAP-8163, " Topical Report Reactor Coolant Pump Integrity in LOCA "
September 1973, WNES Class 3.
3)
Babcock and Wilcox Power Generation Group. Nuclear Power Generation Division Topical Report BAW-10NO, December 1973, " Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis "
4)
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1995 Edition.
5)
J. G. Williams and D. P. Isherwood, " Calculation of the Strain Energy Release Rates of Cracked Plates by an Approximate Method," Journal of Strain Analysis, Vol. 3, No.1,17-22 (1968).
6)
Formulas for Stress and Strain, Fifth Edition, R. J. Roark and W. C. Young, McGraw-Hill Book Company,1975.
7)
" Development and Applications of Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics for Critical Nuclear Reactor Components," pp 55-70, Advances in Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics. ASME PVP Vol. 92, F. J. Witt,1984 8)
@ RISK, Risk Analysis and Sirnulation add-in for liitus 1-2-3, Version 2.01 Users Guide, Palisade Corporation, Newfield, NY, February 6,1992 9)
Final Report Documenting the Developn.ent of Piping Simphfied Probabilistic Fracture -
Mechanics (SPFM) Models for EG&G Idaho. Inc., B. A. Bishop, October 1993, transmitted by Westinghouse Letter FDRT/SRPLO-027(94), February 17,1994 10)
NUREGICR-5864, Theoretical and User's Manualfor pc-PRAISE, A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Comptaer Codefor Piping Reliability Analysis, Harris and Dedhia, July 1992 11)
EPRI TR-105001, Documentation of Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Codes Usedfor Reactor Pressure Vessels Subjected to Pressuried Thermal Shock Loading, K. R. Balkey and F. J. Witt (Part 1) and B. A. Bishop (Part 2), June 1995 m:\\2537w.wpf;lt>.Oll596 71
APPENDIX A REGULATORY POSITION
'Ihe United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Regulatory Guide 1.14, (Reference 1) to describe acceptable methods to ensure RCP flywheel integrity. Under Section C of the regulatory guide, the NRC Regulatory position is defined. ' Itis portion of the regulatory guide is provided below.
l 1.
Material and Fabrication r
a.
The pywheel material should be of closely controlled qttality. Plates should conform to ASIM A20 and should be produced by the vacuum-melting and degassing process or the electroslag remelting process. Plate material should be cross-rolled to a ratio of at least Ito3.
b.
Fracture toughness and tensile properties of each plate of apywheel material shotdd be checked by tests that yield results suitable to confirm the applicability to thatpywheel of the properties used in the fracture analyses calledfor in regulatory positions C.2.c, d, and e.
t c.
Allpame-cut surfaces shotdd be removed by machining to a depth of at least 12 mm (1/2 inch) below the flame cut surface.
d.
Welding, including tack welding and repair welding, should not be permitted in the finishedpywheel unless the welds are inspectable and considered as potential sources of _
}
paws in thefracture analysis.
2.
Design a.
Thepywheel assembly, including any speed-limiting and antirotation devices, the shaft, and the bearings, should be designed to withstand normal conditions, anticipated transients, the design basis loss-of-coolant accident, and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake loads without loss of structural integrity.
b.
Design speed should be at least 125% of nonnal speed but not less than the speed that could be anained during a turbine overspeed transient. Normal speed is depned as synchronous speed of the a.c. drive motor at 60 hert:
c.
An analysis shotdd be conducted to predict the critical speedfor ductilefailure of the pywheel. The methods and limits ofparagraph F-1323.l(b) in Section ill of the ASME Code are acceptable. If another method is used justification should be provided. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC stafffor evaluation.
m:\\2537w.mpf:lt>0ll596 A-1
d.
An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speedfor nonductilefailure of the flywheel. Jusdjication should be given for the stress analysis method, the estimate offlaw size and location. which should take into account initialflaw size andflaw growth in service, and the values offracture toughness assumedfor the material. The analysis shordd be submitted to the NRC stafffor evaluation.
e.
An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speedfor excessive deformation of the flywheel. The analysis should be stdimitted to the NRC stafffor evaluation. (Excessive deformation means any deformation such as an enlargement of the bore that could cause separation directly or could cause an unbalance of theflywheel leading to structural failure or separation of theflywheelfrom the shaft. The calculation of deformation shordd employ elastic-plastic methods unless it can be shown that stresses remain within the elastic range).
i f.
The normal speed should be less than one-half of the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regidatory positions C.2.c, d, and e above.
g.
The predicted LOCA overspeed shoidd be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regidatory positions C.2.c, d, and e above.
3.
Testing l
Each flywheel assembly shordd be spin tested at the design speed of the flywheel.
1 4.
Inspection a.
Following the spin test described in regulatory position C.3, each finished flywheel should receive a check of critical dimensions and a nondestructive examination as follows:
(1) Areas of higher stress concentrations, e.g. bores. keyways, splines, and drilled holes, and surfaces adjacent to these areas on thefinished flywheel should be examinedfor surface defects in accordance with paragraph NB-2545 or NB-2546 of Section til of the AShiE Code using the procedures ofparagraph NB-2540. No linear indications more than 1.6 mm (U16 inch) long, other than faminations, should be permitted.
(2)
Each finishedflywheel shordd be subjected to a 100% volumetric examination by ultrasonic methods using procedures and acceptance criteria specified in paragraph NB-2530 (for plates) or paragraph NB-2540 (forforgings) of Section Ill of the ASAfE Code.
m:us37w.wpr;it,.01:596 A-2
l b.
Inservice inspection shoidd be performedfor each flywheel as follows:
(I) An in-place udtrasonic volumetric examination of the areas of higher stress concentration at the bore and keyway at approximately 3 year intervals during the refueling or maintenance shutdown coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the AS&fE Code.
(2) A surface examination of all exposed surfaces and complete tdtrasonic vohemetric examination at approximately 10 year intervals, during the plant shutdown coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the ASA1E Code.
(3)
Examination procedures should be in accordance with the requirements of Subarticle IWA-2200 of Section XI of the ASME Code.
(4) Acceptance criteria should conform to the recommendations of regulatory position C.2.f (5) If the examination and evaluation indicate an increase in flaw six or growth rate greater than predictedfor the ser. ice life of theflywheel, the results of the examination and evaluation should be submitted to the stafffor evaluation.
l l
l l
l m:\\2537w.wpf:thol1596 A-3 1
APPENDIX 11 IllSTORICAl, INSPECTION INFORMATION: IIADDAM NECK
'Ihe following chronological listing shows the results of reactor coolant pump flywhcci inspections at I
the liaddam Neck Plant:
1970 -
Prior to the April 1970 refueling outage, Westinnhouse and the AEC, became concerned about the possibility of cracks being initiated at or propagating from the interior corners of l
the keyway areas in RCP flywheels. Ultrasonic examinations were performed during the refueling outage on all four RCP flywheels and resealed a <5% amplitude indication on RCP flywheel #4 in the hore keyway area and it was not recordable. 'the indication was recorded by Westinghouse personnel purely for future reference purposes.
RCP flywheel #1 was liquid penetramt inspected in the bore area after it had been removed from the shaft and no indications were observed.
Total radiation exposure for these first inspections was 1.038 Person REM and included examination technicians, and engineering and maintenance personnel. This amount of personnel radiation exposure has continued to he expended to complete these inspections when they were required during the last 25 years.
1971 -
In April 1971, the Inservice inspection Program Requirements of ASME Section XI, were put into the Plant Technical Specifications. Requirements were additionally added for RCP fivwheels, outside of Section XI Requirements, based on AEC request.
Technical Specification Requirement - One different flywheel shall be examined visually and 100% volumetrically at every other refueling shutdown.
The AEC requested that all four fivuheels be examined at the next refueling outage before this inspection sampling program could be put into effect.
During the May 1971 refueling outage, all four flywheels were inspected. The bore seal weld area of RCP 11vwheel #4 was found to he cracked. The cracks were identified in the bore seal weld and it's associated heat affected zone. Cracked areas were removed by crinding and weld repaired.
Review of the inspection data shows that these cracks may have been identified by the ultrasonic examination indication reponed in 1970, but the data is not conclusive. One point that does stand out is that the material of the RCP flywheel #4 is Grade T-1 Boiler Plate and is different than the other three flywheels which were fabricated to a Westinghouse specification.
mM537w.wpf.Ihol 1546 B.]
1 l
1973 During the 1973 refueling outage, the inspection samDlinE Drogram now required bV Plant Technical Specifications henan. RCP flywheels #1 and #4 were examinM. Both flywheels were removed from their shafts. Cracks were discovered in the RCP flywheel
l Westinghouse was contacted and recommended that the hore seal weld and associated heat aff'ected zone be removed by urinding. Ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations were performed following the grinding repair and no indications were identified. Additionally, liquid penetrant examinations were performed in the bore pawl areas of both RCP flywheels. Liquid penetrant indications were identified in RCP flywheel #1 at two Imre pawl areas. These indications were determined to be from mechanical surface marks and were dispositioned as acceptable.
1980 During this time frame inspections continued under the sampling program provided in l
to 1986 Plant Technical Specifications with continuing efforts by CYAPCO to meet a request by the NRC to comply with the inspection requirements specified in Renulatory Guide 1.14.
l No further flaws / cracks were identified in any of the flywheels. In 1980, one of the flywheels had liquid penetrant indications in the bore keyway areas, but were once again j
determined to be from mechanical surface marks and dispositioned as acceptable.
l Plant Technical SDecifications were chanced under Amendment No. 87 g specifically 1986 include reference to Regulatory Guide 1.14 inspection requirements.
l 1987 -
During this refueling outage all four of the RCP flywheels were completely removed from the motors and sent to Westinnhouse for a 10-year refurbishment. RCP flywheel
- 1 and #2 were examined to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.14 and magnetic particle indications were found in the seal haffle surface fillet weld area of RCP flywheel #2. These indications / flaws / cracks were removed by grindine, weld repaired and reinspected until no indications were found. RCP flywheel #3 was not required to be inspected per Regulatory Guide 1.14 requirements. The RCP flywheel #4 hore seal weld area that had been ground out in 1973 was machined smooth, liquid penetrant inspected, and no indications were observed.
1988- -
No cracks have been identified on any of the RCP flywheels in, the critical areas of the M
bore and keyways since 1973.
Present No cracks have exceeded the critical flaw size needed to cause a catastrophic failure of our flywheels in a normal operating overspeed condition.
bil of the 1973 RCP flywheel #4 cracks were of a limited depth approximately 1/2" deep and the bore seal weld and heat affected zone is now totally removed.
Note: Additional details are available in Docket No. 50-213, B15320, dated August 10,1905.
m:\\2537wavf:1h01I596 B.2
APPENDIX C SAMPLE FLYWIIEEL INSPECTION PROCEDURES m:\\2537w.wpf:ltroll596 C-l
1 NORTHEAST UTILITIES i
NUCLEAR QUALITY-RELATED NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION PROCEDURES l
NU UT-24 Ultrasonic Examination Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Connecticut Yankee i
Issue NUSCO Level III Director QSD Auth. Insp. Agency Rav Date Approval /Date Approval /Date Approval /Date 5
11/29/88 R.J. Fu11er-10/12/88 B. Kaudman 10/18/88 R. L. Zoner-10/28/88 s
I-4-9I d20ZL ckbo s.t%)~ csAn At d17%,A 1
1/QO-98 4. &{/_
qq/g/93 B,fulm&tt)Q3 f/
f fbg.93 e-(
Alvsys verify with the procedure Status Log before using this procedure.
cKC201XK.079
I ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION REACTOR COOIANT PUMP FLYWHEEL CONNECTICUT YANKEE r
I 1.
. SCOPE 1.1 INTENT This procedure shall be used in conjunction with Procedure NU-UT-1 I
unless otherwise specified.
NU-UT-1 contains all the general requirements applicable to this examination procedure. This pro-cedure contains all the specific application requirements for the examination of areas specified in paragraph 1.2.
1.2 AREAS OF EXAMINATION This document covers the ultrasonic examination procedure for the f
bore and keyway areas and the remaining volume of the Connecticut Yankee reactor coolant pump (RCP) flywheels.
1.3 TYPE OF EXAMINATION 1.
Volumetric examination shall be performed using ultrasonic pulse echo O' and 3b' beam technique applied to the gage holes in the flywheel.
2.
The examinations shall be performed manually using contact search units.
2.
REFERENCES 1.
NU-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination General Requirements.
/ 1 2.
Calibration block CYW 47.
3.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Cuide 1.14.
4 ASME Section XI Code - IWA 2240, 3.
PROCEDURE CERTIFICATION The examination procedure described in this document is in conjunction with Procedure NU-UT-1 and complies with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and l
Pressure Code, 1983 Edition, Summer of 1983 Addenda, except where examina-tion coverage is limited by part geometry or access.
4 PERSONNEL CERTIFICATION l
1.
Each person performing ultrasonic examination governed by this proce-l dure shall be certified in accordance with Procedure NU-UT-1.
l Rev.:
7 omm.um.
Procedure NU-UT-24 Page:
1 of 5
-. ~
l 1
5.
EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS 5.1 EXAMINATION FREOUENCY The nominal examination frequency shall be 5 MHz.
Other frequencies may be used if such variables as materials, attenuation, grain struc-ture, etc., necessitates their use to achieve penetration or resolu-tion.
-5.2 EXAMINATION ANGLES AND COVERACE 1.
The bore and keyways and the remaining accessible volume of the RCP flywheel shall be examined using special design 0* and 3b' azimuth probes.
Coverage will be limited to those areas of the i
flywheel that can be scanned from the four gage hole probes in each flywheel.
2.
Other angles and techniques may be used if required for aid in evaluating indications.
6.
' EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 6.1 EXAMINATION EOUIPMENT
{
The following test equipment or its equivalent shall be provided for examinations specified in this procedure.
1.
Special design azimuth probes 2.
Couplant l
7.
EXAMINATION SYSTEM CALIBRATION 7.1 Calibration using the.920" diameter azimuth probe shall be performed as follows:
1.
Fully insert the.920" diameter transducer and set the O' on the azimuth to coincide with the axial centerline and facing the bore of the flywheel calibration block.
i 2.
Inject couplant and establish acoustic contact.
3.
Set the amplitude of the reflection from the bore to 100% full i
screen height.
l 4
Rotate transducer counterclockwise, CCW, through 90' and locate the k" diameter through drilled hole. Adjust gain if necessary.
5.
Using the sweep control, establish a 20" sweep on the display by placing the signal from the sidewall at 5.75" along the time-base.
Return to the bore signal and place this at 10" on the l
timebase.
Rev.:
7 i
a monsom Procedure NU-UT-24 Page:
2 of 5 j
Thrcugh tha use of ths swasp control and dalay control, rapset.
the above procedure until the display is as described above.
6.
Sensitivity: Rotate the transducer to locate the signal from the number one k" diameter thru hole, see Figure 1, and adjust signal amplitude from this reflector to 80% FSH. Rotate transducer to locate signal from the number two k" diameter thru hole and record % FSH.
Draw DAC curve between two points obtained from holes #1 and #2.
Rotate transducer to notch in flywheel keyway and record % FSH.
If the CRT is saturated, record the dB difference to bring notch signal to'80% FSH.
7.
Attenuation:
Locate the signal from the bore of the CYW 47 and 4 i adjust the amplitude to 80% FSH and note the gain setting.
Locate the signal from the bore of the flywheel and set the signal to 80% FSH and record the gain setting.
The difference between the gain setting on the calibration block and flywheel must be added or subtracted to the instrument settings for calibration to account for any attenuation differences between the calibration block and the flywheel.
j[fg B.
Repeat the above calibration steps for the.721" diameter and 34* aziumth probe.
9.
Upon completion of the calibration, ensure that all data and instrument settings are recorded on the appropriate calibration data sheet (NU-UT-1. Figure 6).
7.2 CALIBRATION CHECKS Calibration checks shall be performed in accordance with Procedure NU UT-1.
8.
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 1.
Insert.920" diameter azimuth probe into gage holes on the RCP fly-wheel and examine bore and keyway to maximum extent possible.
2.
Insert.721" diameter azimuth probe into gage holes on the RCP fly-wheel and examine bore and keyway to the maximum extent possible.
3.
Insert the 34* angle beam azimuth probe so that the transducer just clears the threaded portion of the gage hole.
Examine the bore and keyway to maximum extent possible.
9.
RECORDING CRITERIA 1.
All indications with a signal amplitude >100% DAC at reference level shall be recorded and investigated to ensure proper evaluation.
2.
The reference point for recording all indications shall be as follows:
Looking down at the top surface of the flywheel, locate all indications clockwise, CW, from the gage hole in line with the largest keyway in the flywheel. All radial and angular measurements to recordable indications shall be taken from the exit point of the Rev.:
7 Procedure NU-UT-24 Page:
3 of 5 omm.x:n.
prcba. A ckotch of all record:ble indications chc11 ba ettcchad to the RCP flywheel data sheet.
Rev.:
7 ceuxsom Procedure NU-UT-24 Page: 4 of 5
F2 CURE l CALIBRATION BLOCK CYW-47 i
I L.)
[
d y
.656"
.921" DRILL 2.OO"DR REAM TO 125 RMS FINISH i
12.471" 4218"R e.719" DRILL REAM J
[
4
\\
TO 125 RMS
]
FINISH 100" 2.184" b
CHD 6 218" ELOX. SLOT THRU HOLE *1.250" h"DPx.136WDE [ DRILLED THRU 1.00"
,9 -
)
o o
-100" HOLE
- 2
.2 50" DRILLED
- !"f l,l, 2 O0" i
lI l,l!
THRU g\\
-i3
[-
l l
150" x
-DRILLED AND TAPPEC 7.87" FOR1 EYE BOLT
=
15.7B" 2
i
=
Rev.:
7 Procedure NU-UT-74 Page: 5 of 5 omsomom
- +
m-
REVISION / CHANGE ATTACHMENT SHEET t
Revision Section Chance i
5 All Major Rewrite l
i 6
All Major Rewrite
{
7 Para. 2.2 Change Blocks to Read " Block" i
i Para. 7.1.6 Correct Typo f
i Para. 7.1.7 Reword 1st Sentence Para. 7.1.8 Change 7.6.1 to Read "7.2.1" j
t i
'j i
[
I f
i 1
(
l t
i l
i I
.i
- - som Procedure NU-UT-24 l
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY INSPECTION AND TESTING SERVICES MANUAL ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR FLYWrIEELS UT-V-417 I
REVISION 3 l
P t
Im 2Lt/tu O D.:m, % m v PREPAPfD BY
/
SUPERVISOR, NDE* PROJECTS APPROVAL
.b n _. (~L c;,d//Y f[ANAM ITS APPROVAL f
WDE LEVEL JI'I APPROVAL o
i 1l l PLANT VOGTLE APPRdVh a.p.
?....o ; G
///il'i.T DATE
l l
UT-V-417 Rev. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS i
SECTION T!TLE PAGE t
i 1.0 Purpose 1
2.0 Scope 1
3.0 Applicable Documents 1
4.0 Responsibilities 1
5.0 Qualification of Ultrasonic 2
Examination Personnel 6.0 Ultrasonic Equipment 2
7.0 Surface Preparation 3
8.0 Equipment Calibration 3
9.0 Examination Procedure 5
1 10.0 Investigation of Indications 6
j 11.0 Recording of Indications 6
12.0 Reporting of Indications 7
l I
l
..l
UT-V-417 Rev. 3
.O PURPOSE This procedure provides the ultrasonic examination requirements for reactor coolant pump flywheel in accordance with the applicable,American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
2.0 SCOPE 1
This procedure defines the method for ultrasonic examination reactor coolant pump flywheel to facilitate preservice and inservice inspection all high-stress regions (bore, keyways and bolt hole regions) with or without the removal of the flywheel 1
from its shaft.
4 Note: Applications in this procedure are not covered in Section
]
XI and are based on special techniques as allowed in IWA-1 2240.
3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS This procedure is written to comply with the requirements of the following documents to the extent specified within this procedure.
1 3.1 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1983 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1983, " Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components."
3.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section V, 1983 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1983, " Nondestructive Examination."
3.3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.14
" Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity" Revision 1 dated August 1975.
4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Manager-Inspection and Testing Services shall be responsible for the approval and control of this procedure.
4.2 An ITS NDE Level III individual certified in ultrasonic examination is responsible for having ultrasonic procedures and techniques developed, approved, and for assuring that this procedure, when correctly followed, will detect discontinuities which do not meet the applicable acceptance standards.
1 of 9
UT-V-417 (l
Rev. 3 5.0 QUALIFICATION OF ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION PERSONNEL 5.1 All personnel performing ultrasonic examinations in accordance with this procedure shall be qualified and certified to the requirements of a procedure (written practice) written and approved by ITS in accordance with the "American Society cf Nondestructive Testing" (ASME)
SNT-TC-1A.
5.2 The ultrasonic examination may be performed by a Level I Examiner under the direct supervision of a certified Level II or Level III individual in ultrasonic examination; i
however, all interpretation of the results shall be performed by a Level II or Level III examiner certified in ultrasonic examination.
6.0 ULTRASONIC EQUIPMENT 6.1 The Ultrasonic Instrument 6,1.1 A pulse-echo type ultrasonic instrument with an A-Scan presentation and operating frequencies of one to ten MHz shall be used to perform examination in accordance with this procedure.
6.2 The Ultrasonic Transducer Search Unit 6.2.1 Search units with a nominal frequency of 2.25 MHz shall be used for examination in accordance with this procedure.
6.2.2 Search unit size for the " periphery" scan shall be
.750" to 1.00" diameter straight beam.
6.2.3 Search unit size and configuration for " radial gauge hole" and " keyway corner" examination will be a special des (gn internal probe from the gauge hole.
6.2.4 Upon ITS NDE Level III concurrence, other frequencies and sizes of search units may be used if l
product grain structure precludes achieving the necessary penetration or sensitivity required.
6.3 Couplant Any commercially available ultrasonic couplant may be used and shall be cert fied for total sulfur and halogen content in accordance with the American Society for Testing and Materials ' ASTM) C-129 and DO808.
The notal residual amount of sulfur and halogen shall not exceed one percent by weight.
2 of 9
UT-V-417 Rev. 3 6.4 Reference Block Reference blocks (e.g., IIW, ROMPAS, DSC) if used, shall be of the same material as the component to be examined.
6.5 Calibration Block The flywheel to be examined shall be used for calibration.
l 6.6 CABLES Coaxial type cables shall be used and may be of any convenient length not to exceed 50 feet (unless permitted by qualification).
The type and length shall be recorded on the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Report, (Figure 417-1), or l equivalent form.
7.O SURFACE PREPARATION The finished contact surface shall be free from any roughness that would interfere with free movement of the search unit.
This examination and calibration may be performed through tightly adhered paint.
8.0 EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION 8.1 A daily linearity, as a minimum, shall be performed to verify the instrument to linearity requirements of Procedure UT-V-455.
8.2 The reject control shall be placed and remain in the "0"
(off or minimum) position during calibration and examination.
8.3 Temperature of the flywheel shall be recorded on the Data Report.
8.4 The equipment calibration shall be performed in accordance with the following and the results documented on the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Report, (Figure 417-1), or equivalent j
form.
8.4.1 Keyway Corner Examination 8.4.1.1 Reflections from the bore of the flywheel shall be used for calibration.
8.4.1.2 From the gauge hole, obtain the maximum reflection from the bore of the flywheel using the special gauge hole probe.
3 of 9
.~.___.-..._
UT-V-417
(-
Rev. 3 8.4.1.3 Establish a horizontal-screen range by setting.the response from the_ flywheel bore at a maximum off60 percent of the instruments screen range.
8.4.1.4-Bring the' bore reflection-to 80% FSH.
This shall be the primary reference-level.
8.4.2 Radial Gauce Hole Examinations 8.4.2.1 Reflections from any two holes shall be used for calibration.
The hole selected for the longest metal path shall be a maximum of 25 inches.
8.4.2.2 From the hole, obtain the maximum response from the nearer of the two holes.
Set this response at 80% FSH.
8.4.2.3 Without changing the gain setting, obtain the maximum response from the remaining hole.
[
8.4.2.4 Mark these amplitudes on the CRT.
Connect the two points with a smooth line.
Extend the DAC to cover the maximum calibrated screen width.
This shall be the primary-reference level.
8.4.3 Periphery Examination 8.4.3.1 From the edge of the flywheel, obtain the maximum response from any two holes with a minimum of 10 inches metal path separation.
8.4.3.2 Eqtablish the horizontal screen range to coincide with the hole location from the from the hole with the greatest metal,ined edge of the plate.
The response obta path shall be set between 50-80 percent of screen range.
8.4.3.3 Construct a DAC curve by setting the maximum response from the hole with the shortest metal path at 80% FSH.
8.4.3.4 Without changing the gain setting, obtain the maximum response from the hole with the greatest metal path.
Mark these points on the CRT and connect them with a smooth line to cover the examination area.
This shall be the primary reference level.
6 fd @
UT-V-417 Rev. 3 8.5 Calibration Checka 8.5.1 A calibration check shall be performed at thIe beginning and end of each examination or every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, whichever is less.
8.5.2 If, in the opinion of the examiner, the validity of the calibration is in doubt, a calibration check shall be performed.
8.5.3 If any point of the calibration check has moved on the sweep line by more than 10 percent of the sweep division reading, correct the sweep range calibration and note the correction on the applicable calibration sheet.
If recordable indications are noted, the examination is voided, and a new calibration Section 8.0) shall be recorded and the voided examination shall be reexamined.
8.5.4 If any point of the calibration check has decreased 20 percent or 2 dB of its amplitude, all data and/or l
calibration sheets since the last calibration or calibration check shall be recorded and the voided examinations shall be reexamined.
8.5.5 If any points of the calibration check was increased more than 20 percent or 2 dB of its amplitude, all i
recorded indications since the last valid calibration or calibration check may be reexamined with the corrected calibration and their value shall be recorded on the applicable calibration and data sheet.
9.0 EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 9.1 Keyway Corner Examination 9.1.1 Scanning of the. keyway corners shall be accomplished starting at the top of the gauge hole and rolling j
the sound be%m from the bore over to examine the keyway and back.
Insert the probe with a minimum of 25% overlap and repeat until the entire length of the keyway has been examined.
9.1.2 Each gauge hole shall be used to examine the keyway corners for indications propagating from the keyway.
9.2 Radial Gauge Hole Examination 9.2.1 Scanning shall be accomplished by inserting and retracting the probe the full length of the gauge hole and overlapping a minimum of 25% for each insertion.
5 of 9
UT-V-417 l
Rev. 3 J
9.2.2 Each gauge hole shall be used to scan the complete available portion of the flywheel cross-section.
9.3 Periphery Examination
,4 9.3.1 Scanning from the edge shall include the area from
)
the edge up to and including the gauge holes.
9.3.2 The transducer shall be moved across and along the flywheel edge so as to scan the entire edge overlapping each scan by a minimum of 25% of the transducer diameter.
9.4 Scanning speed shall not exceed six inches /second.
9.5 Scanning shall be performed at a minimum gain setting of two times the primary reference level sensitivity (6 dB).
NOTE:
If conditions such as material properties produce noise levels which preclude a meaningful examination, then scanning shall be performed at the highest possible
(~
sensitivity level above the primary reference level.
The examiner shall note the dB and the reason on the applicable data sheet hnd notify the site NDE coordinator to proceed per the applicable ITS PM Procedure 2-1.
9.6 Upon completion of the ultrasonic examination, the couplant j
shall be removed from the area of examination to the extent j
practical.
j i
10.0 INVESTIGATION OF INDICATIONS 10.1 All indications shall be investigated to the extent that the examiner can determine the size, identify and location of J
the reflectors.
i 10.2 Previous data, when applicable, shall be made available to the technicians to provide previous examination information.
11.0 RECORDING OF INDICATIONS 11.1 For the keyway corner examination, all indication which exceed 10% of the primary reference level shall be recorded.
1
~
11.2 For the radial gauge hole or periphery examinations, all indications which exceed 50% DAC shall be recorded.
1
UT-V-417 Rev. 3 NOTE:
Geometric reflectors in the flywheel shall be verified by physical measurements and need not be recorded.
12.0 REPORTING INDICATIONS 12.1 It shall be the responsibility of the Level II or level III individual certified in ultrasonic examination re review, evaluate the disposition all recordable indications to determine their reportability requirements.
Previous data shall be made available to the reviewer / evaluator for appropriate indication disposition.
12.2 Reportable indications or other indications determined to be significant by the ITS Level II or level III individual shall be reported to the operating company in accordance with ITS PM Procedure 3-4.
4 7 of 9
i UT-V-417 l Rev. 3 )
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT Southern Nuclear Operating Company l
Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Report UT-V-Form 015 Plant / Unit:
RCP Flywheel No:
Isometric Drawing No:
Procedure / Revision / Deviation:
Couplant Batch No:
Sheet No:
Transducer Periphery Exam Gauge Hole & Keyway Exam l
Serial No:
Size:
Frequency:
1 Equipment Instrument:
Frequency:
Damping:
Serial No:
Rep. Rate:
Reject:
j Cable Type:
Cable Length:
I Calibration / Examination i
Keyway Corner Screen Range:
% FSH dB:
Screen Div:
NI __ NRI RI 1
Bolt Hole Region Screen Range:
dB:
i Screen Div:
NI NRI RI Periphery Screen Range:
dB:
Screen Div:
NI __ NRI RI l
Remarks:
Examiner /SNT Level:
Examiner /SNT Level:
Technical Review:
Non Technical Review:
Figure 417-1
UT-V-417 Rev. 3 Vogtle Reactor Coolant
. Pump Flywheel O-O~
o o
o E
D Oe e
r o
o e
O Oe e
l l
i 1
9
. O i
E C
o O
O o
O e
o 3/4" x 3-3/4" S
1-3/8" x 5" E
1-1/2" x 3-3/4" 9
1" x 10" O
2" x 1-7/8" 3" x 10" Figure 417-2 9 of 9
m
~
=-.
MuCICar ceu NuCtsAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE 7209.24.
Revision No.
Title ' '. + <
- O ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEELS Responsibic Office Applicability / Scope 5381 This crocedure is applicable at any site
~
Effective Date This document is within QA Plan Scope
,X_, Yes _ No Safety Reviews Required
._,X._. Yes _ No 08-15-95 List of Effective Pages
?Plu23 Revision P_ggg Revision 1.0 0
El 1 0
f 2.0 0
E21 0
TbI~ k 3.0 0
E31 0
L 4.0 0
E41 0
5.0 0
ES 1 0
6.0 0
E6-1 0
1 7.0 0
E71 0
8.0 0
- ~.
9.0 0
10.0 0
11.0 0
g p,,}
e.s i
j 12.0 0
M EN
' ' ' \\
13.0 0
COW ; :
COPY _bO.
s
,./
This procedure replaces 6100-QAP-7209.24.
Sonature Concurnno Organizational _t_le:nent Date
~~ Originator QWuj lix, NDE/ISI Specialist 7 -J 5 ~9 5'-
Level til g ;g, gg~
~
g((y y oncurrec.
/
14Tl
////
{pproved
. (,,)[,4rM-[f-r Chemistry /Matenals Director f// /5>
(V/
1.0
Nuclear a -u-5361.NDE-7209.21 ISI/NDE MANUAL
~
Revision No.
TW O
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels DOCUMENT HISTORY Revision Summarv of_ Chance Date O
Original Revision. This procedure replaces 6100-QAP-08 15 95 7209.24.
1 I
i 1
2.0 4
a n.
Number g
g"]
GPU NUCLEAR ISt/NDE MANUAL S361.NDE.7209.24 Ti@'
' ' ~ ~
~~ ~
' REvisi6n No.
0 Ultre' sonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels TABLE _.0F CONTENTS 1.0 Cover Page.....
2.0 Document History..
. 3.0 Table of Contents.
4.0 1.0 P_URPOSE
. 4.0 2.0 APPUCAD1LITY/ SCOPE 4.0 3.0 DEFINITIONS..................
4.0 4.0 PROCEDURE.........
4.0 4.1 Personnel Certification / Qualification 4.0 4.2 Material /Eauipment......
6.0 4.3 Prerequisites 6.0 4.4 Calibration.
,. 9.0 4.5 Examination.
11.0 4.6 Reporting......
11.0 4.7 OA Records....
12.0 5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES.
12.0
6.0 REFERENCES
I 13.0 7.0 EXHIRITS....
1 1
l l
5 3.0
~
~
h g']-'
Number GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAt.
5361 NDE-7209.24 Revision No.
Title 0
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 1.0 PURPOSJ 1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to describe the techniques for manual ultrasonic examination of TMI 1 Reactor Coolant pump motor assembly flywheels.
2.0 APPUCABILITY/S_ COPE 2.1 This procedure is applicable to all certified GPUN and contractor personnelassigned by GPUN to perform manual ultrasonic examination of reactor coolant pump flywheels.
2.2 The requirements of this procedure delineate the manual ultrasonic techniques to detect.
locate and dimension indications in the reactor coolant pump motor assernbly flywheels in accordance with Reference 6.2 3.0 DEFINfTIONS 3.1 None.
4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Personnel Qualification and Certification 4.1.1 GPUN personne.1 performing examinations, to this procedure shall be certified in accordance with Reference 6.3.
4,1.2 Contractor personnel performing examinations to inis procedure shall be qualified and certified in accordance with the Contractor's written practice which has been approved by GPUN or they may be certified in accordance with Reference 6.3.
4.1.3 At least one member of the examination crew shall be certified t.evel ll UT inspector or higher.
4.1.4 The examination crew should demonstrate practical prof aiency in applying the technical requirements of this standard to a GPUN UT Level lit.
4.2 Material / Equipment 4.2.1 Flaw detector 4.2.1.1 A pulse echo ultrasonic flaw detection instrument capabic of Generatsng frequencies from 1.0 to 5.0 MHZ shall be v ' 9ed. The instrument shall contain a stepped gain control calib sed in unn> of 2db or less, and shall be accurate over its useki range to 20% of the nominal amplitude ratio which will allow comparison of
' indications beyond the viewable portion of the CRT.
4.2.2 Search units 4.2.2.1 Angle beam and straight beam search units shall be single element with a nominal frequency of 2.25 MHZ. Other frequencies may be 4.0
E NucIrr
,,,,u ct.,,,
ISI/NDE IVLANUAL.
5361-NDE 7209.2-t.-..
Revision No.
~ Title 0
Uttrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels used to overcome variables caused by material properties and for purposes of evaluation of indications. Use of other frecuencies shall be approved by a GPUN UT Level ill and recorded on Exhibit 1.
4.2.2.2 Examinations shall be performed utilizin0 a 45o beam angle for flywheels #1 and #4 from the top and bottom surfaces respectively.
4.2.3 Angle beam exit point / angle verification 4.2.3.1 Prior to performance of examinations the exit point of the search unit wedge (angle beam) shall be verified utilizing a standard !!W block or mini.llW block. This verification shall be performed daily prior to any examinations being performed.
4.2.3.2 Prior to performance of examinations, the actual beam angle shall be determined utilizing a carbon steel llW block or mini IlW block. This shall be done to verify that the beam anQle is within the required range of t o of the nominal angle of the search unit wedge. This verification shall be performed daily prior to any examinations being performed. The actual angle and nominal angle of the search unit wed0e shall be recorded on Exhibit 1.
4.2.4 C!oaxial cables 4.2.4.1 Coaxial cable assembly shall be of any convenient length not to exceed 50 feet.
4.2.5 Couplant 4.2.5.1 Any GPUN approved couplant, such as Ultraget 11. which provides intimate contact required for the transmission of high frequency ultrasound shall be acceptable for use. Use of couplant shall be as required by reference 6.8.
4.2.5.2 The minimum amount of couplant should be utilized to prevent damage to the motor windings.
4.2.5.3 Couplant shall be removed from the flywheels after completron of the examinations.
4.2.6 Calibration standard 4.2.6.1 The pump motor assembly flywheels have calibration holes as shown in Exhibits 3 and 4. These hoics may be utilized for the initial calibration if directed by a GPUN UT Level lit. Flywheel Calibration Standards TML 370 (Flywhee! #1) and TMI 371 (Flywheel #4) shall be used to er,tablish the sweep range of the instrument and DAC curve. To establish the primary sensitivity level for examination. the transfer method, which is outlined in para 0rach 4.4.3.6, shall be performed when using Calibration standards.
5.0
Nh (LPUNUCLEAR ISl/NDE MANUAL S361-NDE-7209.24 Revision No.
~~
T* tie r
O Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 4.3 Prercouisites 4.3.1-Surface preparation 4.3.1.1 Surfaces to be examined shall be clean and free of foreign material which could interfere with the performance of the examination or conduction of sound energy into the part.
NOTE Precautions shall be taken to prevent loose parts from falling ir to motor flywheel assemblies whenever access is gained to the 1
flywheels.
1
]
4.3.2 Examination records 4.3.2.1 Baseline and subsequent examination records should be available for review.
4.3.3 Maintenance and Operation Preparation 4.3.3.1 Operation of the flywheel motor lift pumps shall be coordinated with the control room. The motor lift pumps must be energized before the flywheels can be rotated.
4.3.3.2 The oil drip pan should be removed for access to the lower flywhccl.
4.4 Calibration
~
4.4.1 Instrument calibration 4.4.1.1 instrument calibration for screen height, horizontal and amplitude control linearity shall be in accordance with Referer.ces 6.4.
4.4.1.2 For instruments and search units, maintenance, caltbration and performance characteristics shall be as required by reference 6.9.
4.4.2 System calibration 4.4.2.1 Calibration shallinclude the complete u?trasonic examination system Any change in search units shocs, couplantr,, cables, ultrasonic instruments, recording devices or any part of the examination system shall be cause for a calibration check. The calibration shall be performed on flywheel calibration standards and the transfer method identified in paragraph 4.4.3.6 shall be performed.
4.4.2.2 The maximum reflector response. during calibration, shall be obtained with the sound beam oriented essentially perpendicular to the axis of the calibration reflector. The centerline of the search unit 6.0
ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE.7209.24 Revision No.
Tm 0
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels l
shall be a minin.um of 3/4* from the nearest edoc nf the calibration l
standard. Rotation of the sound beam into'a corner formed by the reflector and the side of the block may produce a higher amplitude signal at a longer beam path; this heam path shall not be used for calibration.
4.4.2.3 The temperature difference between component to be examined and the basic caiibration block shall not exceed 25eF.
4.4.2.4 The transfer method as describec elsewhere in thk. procedure may be omitted by a GPUN Level 111if there is reason to Question the reliability of the results or if uncbrninable.
4.4.3 45o angle beam calibration 4.4.3.1 Calibration shall be performed on Calibration St dard TMI-370 for flywheel #1 and TMI-371 for flywheel #4. Side dnlled hoics (SDP) are present in each flywheel as identified in Exhibits 3 and 4; however, only the 1/2T SDHs shall be utilized for the transfer method.
.=
NOTE Calibration may be performed directly on ne flyvwhcci but only as directed by a GPUN UT Level 111.
4.4.3.2 To determine the 45o angle beam swr:ep calibration on fivwheel *1, utilire Calibration Standard TMi-370 and place the bottom netch at the 4.2 screen position and the top notch at 8.4. The instrument sweep is now calibrated to represent 10" of metal path.
4.4.3.3 On Calibration Standard TMI-370 for Flywhcci #1, estabbsh a OAC curve by acjusting the gain to set the bottom notch s gnal at 80%
2 % FSH at screen position 4.2. Without changing gain. peak the i
top notch signal at screen position 8.4 and mark the location on the screen. Plot a DAC curve by connecting the peak signal locations (marked on the CRT screen) with a straight line and extrapolate through the full examination range. Note the Gain setting (dbl on Exhibit 1.
4.4.3.4 On Calibration Standard TMI-370, locate the 1/2T SDH and establish a signal between 50% and 80% FSH snd note the signal height and gain setting (db) on Exhibit 1.
4.4.3.5 On flywheel #1, locate the 1/2T SDH by scanning adiacent to the edge of the flywheel (i.e.1 to 3 inches) as the flywheel is being slowly rotated or by visually locacng the holes between the flywheel face and the motor housing or both.
7.0 1
____.-x _. _
m GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE 7709.24 Revision No.
Tetic O
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels l
4.4.3.6 The transfer method shalf be used to note the difference in Oain Idb) between the response received from the 1/2T signalin the calibration standard and the 1/2T signalin the flywheel and add or subtract the difference to the reference level established by the bottom notch. This level shall tie primary reference level and the difference shall be noted on Exhibit 1.
NOTE j
Other transfer methods may be utilized such as the two :w3*ch i
unit techniques with the sound opposing each cther, but on v ;ir directed and approved by GPUN LTT Level 111.
4 m
To determine the 450 an0 c beam sweep calibrat on on Flywheel #4, i
4.4.3.7 utilize Calibration Standard TMI-371 and place the 1/2T signal at screen division 3, the 3/4T at 4.5 the bottom notch at 6 and the 1 1/4T at 7.5. The instrument sw+sp is now calibratcd to represent 20* of metal path.
4.4.3.8 On Calibration Standard TMI 371 for trywheel #4, estabhsh a DAC curve by adjusting the gain to set the 1/2T signal at 80%
5% FSH at screen position 3 and mark its position on the CRT. Maximt?e the response from the 3/4T and 1 1/4T SDHs and mark their positions on the CRT Note the gain setting tob) on E.xhibit 1, since this reference level will be utilized for the transfer method on the flywheel. Connect the marks with a stra cht line and extrapolate t
through the thickness beinD examined.
4.4.3.9 Locate the bottom notch signal on Calibration Standard TMI-371 at screen division 6. Increase or decrease the gain to set the peak ci this signal to the DAC curve line. Note this Dain setting (db) on Exhibit 1.
4.4.3.10 On flywheel #4, locate the 1/2T SDH as identified in paragraph 4.4.3.5 for flywheel #1. With the gain settinD and si;;nal height from the 1/2T SDH in paragraph 4.4.3.8, utilize tne transfer methoc as out. lined in paragraph 4.4.3.6 to determine tne db dif feren a between the 1/2T SDH in flywheel t!4 and the *.'2T SDH resporde on Calibration Standard TMr371.
4.4.3.11' Add or subtract the db difference established in paragraph 4.4.3.10 i
to the gain setting established in varagraph 4.4.3 !!. This 05 n setting shall be primary reference level.
8.0
GPU NUCLEAR Tatie ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361.NDE 7209.24 Revision No.
tRtrasonic Examination of Reacter Coolant Pump Flywheels
~ _ _.
O 4.4.4 System calibration confirmation 4.4.4.1 The sweep range and primary DAC curve r. hcl 1 be checked a verified:
i At the beginning of each day of exnminat en.
At least every four (4) hours during performance of examinations.
If any component of the test system is changed (i c instrument, transducer, coaxist cable, etc.).
Atter any change in personrici.
At the completion of tne examinatio. to wn:ch the calibration applies.
If the operator suspects any ma! function of the UT svste m.
in the event of a power loss.
4.4.5 Calibration changes t.4.b.1 ff any point on tne OAC curve nas decreased 20% of its A new calibration shall be performed and recctd ampletude, examination area (s) shall be re-examinei voided 4.4.5.2 If any point on the OAC curve has increased more than 20%
amplitude, recordable indications taken since the last valid of its calibratinn and their values changed cn the dat l
4.4.5.3 ff any point on the DAC curve has than 10% of the sweco division reading, correct the sweep 3ved cabbranon and note the correction on the appropriate data sheets range recordable indications are noted on the data sheets, tnose data
. If j
the examination areas shall be re-examined 4.5 Examination procedures 4.5.1 Examination of base material for laminar type reflectors.
4.5.1.1
- 4 and the bort holes on flywheel #1 shall be sca longitudinal 10 degrec} search unit to detect drscontinuities wn h with a beam examination. (See Exhibit 7)may interfere with the tra ic 9.0
_ u-
~
n NumbIr
{ gy CPU NUCLEAR ISl/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE 7209.24 Revision No.
Trde O
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels NOTE The requirements of paragraph 4.5.1.1 apply only when there is a reason to Question sound penetration such as excessive loss of back reflection or existence of abnormal geometric reficctnts which dampen.
4.5.2 General requirements.
4.5.2.1 All angle beam examinations shall be performed at a scanning sensitivity level at 2x (+ 6 db) greater than the cahbrated reference sensitivity level.
4.5.2.2 Scan speeds shall not exceed six (6) inches per second. Scan the exposed areas within each access port prior to moving the flywheel to the next adjacent area for each systern calibration.
4.5.2.3 All angle beam examinations shall be performed in two directions (i.e. beam directed essentially clockwise and counter clockwise around the flywheel bore regions and bolt holes nr. depicted on Exhibits 5 and 6).
4.5.2.4 Beam angles other than 45o may be utilized as directed and approved by a GPUN UT Level III.
4.5.3 45o Angle Beam Examination 4.5.3.1 On flywheel #1, the top surface is accessit.-le through accCss ports 1 through 3. The area of intercst for the top fiywneelis the inside bore region which includes the keyway and all accessible areas surrounding the four (4) bott holes (Reference Exh. bits 5 cnd 6).
4.5.3.2 On flywhee! #4, the bottom surf ace is sccessible through one access port. The area of interest for the bottom flywheel is the inside bore region which includes the keyway.
4.5.3.3 For both Flywheels #1 and #4, the examination reautrements for the inside bore region and keyway are identified on Exhibit 5. Exhibit 6 delineates the requirements on flywheel #1 tar ev. amination of the areas surrounding each bott hole.
4.5.3.4 For the inside bore region. Keyway and the areas surrounding the bolt holes, scanning shall be performed on a tangential line or on a line perpendicular to the flywheel and bolt hole radii. The scan width (w) shall be as identified in Exhibits 5 and 6. The minimum overlap of the search unit shall be 25% of the scarch unit width.
The search unit shall be oscillated a minimum of 150 in each direction for each parallel path.
10.0
n
~
MNucl"~r
""*~
GPU NUCLEAR Title iSI/NDE MANUAL 5381.NDE-7209.24 Revision No.
~
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pumo Flywheels O
. NOTE Due to access restrictions and surface area limitations, the Limitations and restrictions shall be documented on the Examination Data Sheet, Exhibit 2, or a Umited Examination Sheet.
J 4.5.3.5 450 angle beam examination of flywheets O ed #3 is not p unless the flywheels are disassembled.
4.5.4 Evaluation / Interpretation 4.5.4.1 Indications showing a signal amplitude response equal to or g inan 20% of the reference response shall be investigated to r
determine their origin (geometric or non-geometric).
is determined geometric, it need not be recorded If an indication 4.5.4.2 Evaluation of indications shall be made at the ref erence level and in accordance with the rcQuirementa 4.5.4.3 Non-geometric indications showing a signal amplitude respons be recorded on the data sheet. equal to or greater than 50 4.5.4.4 depth, length, signal amplitude and location.Each 4.5.4.5 In order to determine depth and length of a flaw techni ues, as delineated in Reference 6.7, may be required, flaw Q
4.5.4.6 Calibration and examination resuits shall t;c documented on th l
applicable data sheets Exhibits 1 arid 2.
46 Reporting i
4.G.1
\\
The distribution of NDEllSi data shall be peric'.?.ed in accoidance l
6.5.
i with Reference j
4.7 OA Records 4.7.1 All calibration and examination results shall be recorde applicable, and are considered permanent GA Records.
and 2, as 4.7.2 All forms must be totally filled out as applicable th'en signed day the examination was performed. There shall be no blank s&ac s and Jared for the after completion, if there is no information available for o particular s e on any form space shall be filled in with "N/A".
e,the i
11.0
-~
g, f';f N s n..t w:
GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE-7209.24 Title Revision No.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0
4.7.3 Errors on data forms sha!! not be covered or eradicated with white-out (liquid paperl. Any error which may occur shall be crossed out with a kne, initialed and dated by the person making the chanDe. All forms shaft be filled ot.r: with black ink.
4.7.4 Record retention and transmittal shall be in accordance with P. frence 6.5.
5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 Responsibilities are as defined earlier in this procedure.
6.0
. REFERENCES 6.1 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section V, Non-destructive Examination, Article 5, 1986 Edition, No addenda 6.2 TMI 1 Technical Specifications Section 4.2.4 6.3 GPUN Procedure 5361-ADM 7230.01, Qualification and Certification of NDE Examination Personnel 6.4 GPUN Procedure 5361-NDE 7209.17, Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity 1
6.5 GPUN Procedure 5361-ADM 3272.03, Control and Processing of NDE Data G.6 GPUN Procedure 5361-SPC-7230.26, Evaluation of Recordable Indications 6.7 GPUN Procedure 5361-NDE-7209.10, Uttrasonic Sizing of Planar Haws 6.8 TMI Administrative Procedure 1104 280, Mixed Low Level Radioactive Warito Control Program 6.9 GPUN Procedure 5361 NDE-7209.18, Calibration and Maintenance of Nondestructive Examination Equipment 6.10 TMI Administrative Procedure 1068 Controlled Consumable Materi:&,
12.0
=~
.n
~
(UCle@r GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE 7209.24 Title Revision No.
Ultrasonic Exammation of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0
7.0 EX141 BITS 7.1 Exhibit 1 UT Calibration Data Sheet (Typical).
7.2 Exhibit 2 - UT Examination Data Sheet (Typical).
7.3 Exhibit 3 - Configuration of Flywheel #1.
- 7. '-
Exhibit 4 - Confi0uration of Flywheel #4 7.5 Exhibit 5 - Scanning Reavirements for flywheel #1 and 4 inside bore region and keyway 7.6 Exhibit 6 - Scanning Requirements for flywhccl #1 bolt hole region 7.7 Exhibit 7 - Straight beam scan requirements for laminar reflectors 9
13.0
_ s- -
n m.-
UDl$Q Number GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361.N DE.7209.24 Title Revision No.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor CoDiant Pump Flywheels O
EXHIBIT 1 l
UT CAUBRATION DATA SHEET
. TYPICAL.
ENuclear cosibration sh.t ce, s, l.me:
Iaa
-t. s.
lLevet Pnar.
. trenet:
SSN:
g,ramrace l 'sonawa.
'"'dat:
SW M.
Pret:
Eawe' S'enature.-
- - - ~....
Instrument Make...
MW g
j, _
so estrument 80 Numbe<..__
g i
1 No. M h. Cmes Pte,
. Gem
?*
g Congstml Puhre Duration Coorse.
I I
Maka Batch a Darnpeg i j Off.] On be -
+
t4 -
L! Dual T'._..
l'J Pwe Ecteo Uncal
~
+
4 i
$/N:
- Cat Owe neoention Rate meniver 2'
Se l
Cd Standart!
Cd Dhc11on Voitagn h***'"CY tm in 'mimi situm mt :fft 19? *tm g A,w g u g,
Op Don -
s C Cec. O w SN U""
s,se
- Scm. _
Coene Dhusesv Date Hours hW Thietanss Svetem Chad g
- O N em Range C fullwswo O Rr aw b mus.'
Dear O He +i O iw w Temp
.F Dw +/ 2 Vew ny.
O roi.
1 2 3 4 s Screen Depth '
e.
O Dth r 8.0. #
l t
Type srie Oiber Instrurnent Settries Deen i Hours i
t sortmo Value meseew
% FSH I hehee
% FSH inches
% FSH Mcties Angle Mode _
M M*
l l
I i
i
~~
leses6s l
l l
Tadmar R-w Re,nerks:
Reviewed By
(.evel
- _ Cete -
NDt2* fo9 ts!
,{.;
- C'
.y*
,.,p-r,**
E1 1
~
MNucle'^r
~~
GPU NUCLEAR ISt/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE-7209.24 rige Revision No, Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheets O
EXHIBIT 2 UT EXAMINATION DATA SHEET _-
TYPICAL-Nuotsar Ultrasonic Examination Data Sheet Page _ of. _
Loc = Won-COC JTML1 CTML2 NDE Regves Data Shast No.
Class:
l trere Tasa Denoption:
\\ Task No.:
} Dale-Como. Desc.:
l Syssem:
l W-cac.;
ProcedurwRav.:
l Drawrq NoJNv Te.t Sur,.<,r i Two
!um-W Exam,n.r S,, nan,..
enne io Lw:
Emanwar Segnature Pnnt l0 Level:
Scorrang Directkm: OCacurrverenauf C Arud l Leuted Scea Cyes CNo, CalShoot CalSheet I Cal Sheet:
Weed Joint Wed ProMe At99:
A*:
I; Weu 6 Weed Width:
Tane Start Mrs Tnne Start:
Mrs.
Tnne Start Mrs.
A Tnne Srogn Mrs.
Time Sere:
Mrs. I Twne Saao:
Hrt.
Straos Ona fatace Two m
Teng.:.
F Temp; F
Temp.:
F q
BM Hat Weed CL Haz.
BM Danac Date-i Date:
S/N I
A TS 8O M%
W L ' Fonmardes Backward Er4 L End L R8A F0 10 n
n eu a i a
Man Max Two Two Poet 1 Poet 2 eee Ia d
g se ae 0
W D
CC W
D~
W D
W
~CC W
CC ru c f am I
t 'l m
a e
WC e
WC WC akI ap 1
N e
Ac p
W p
p W
W I e
ee o
m I
t I
n e ra p
h h
h a
}
l l
I I
Techrneaf Rewour Decosmort 45 Revuour pr.
CISI CRecordnete LM CN C"'
ER Number NDE Request #:
Dese:
CNonreenvert I
a.aos or ea O
h E21
,+
.a _.,--,
w-N GPU NUCLEAR ISl/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE 7209.24 Tido Revision No.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels O
EXHIBIT 3 j
CCNFIGURATION_OF FLYWHEEL #1 1
a i N --- -
a,
, [,.
iT*S=*H:
- = ~.
~
?
,,, =,,,,,,,
an
.- _ - _ J.
f I
N
's
.e
/
t<
,j s
j s
j s
,.e s
),g. - -yl fl
\\
i Iy
$h g
(
's,,.-
/
dd s
f
~.
/,
tr
'\\
x I
M i
_m.
\\
- x.,
s-x p
r s
V
- ~
.--- n L
k% R Df;.e %-JW
~ T Wh4S># *et :D T
t-
/v
{
==,
n,--
FLYWHER, #1 E3-1
Nueleer
" *~
GPU NUCLEAR ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE-7209.24 Tree Revision No.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Puma Flywheels O
EXHIBIT 4 CONFIGURATION OF FLYWHEEL #4 4' +
- L
~
+
_.,Jh. T, s
/
s
- ' M J i.,
[ lN,,
.e s
,g 1
-~,
\\,
\\'.,s A
i l /
's,.
,//
iI i !
%y.
.*. i ma,. ~
d
/
s i
.c.
\\
e,.
[.l.
Pse meemJer ais sur i.
'I i
\\ G" l..
~ ~ = = ~
)
\\ l\\
on. % m 6me een
\\
l,
l
\\
/
x
/
'*/
/
W
. Vf,,,o,.,
- ", 1 i
lf r
a i
[
[
i I
g I
[Jr i
"N
~
3 i
k.,
f e.
j
[__
-vamene t
FLYWHEEL #4 I,,
.' I '.
-~
e=sess fhmasses aus et Dune tus Caperyl na aar SA
.3 se r uma Mi (WI EA 1
sm.-
o.--<
.+
.m m-Nualeer
~~
,,,,oc,,
ISI/NDE MANUAL 5361 NDE-7209.24 Rovbion No, M8 o
Ultrason)c.__Examinagon of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels EXHIBIT 5 SCANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR FLYWHEEL #1 AND #4 INSIDE BORE REGION AND KEYWAY
_ 2) 1
(
(D s.u.Y rd-l
=
3 a
s,c.
907.
90* W i
out.r Diameter E***
L*7*51 ~ C )
"e Inner g,,,,
D'8****'
(1 ef 6) s
.laner bore and Foreward/Baskvard Scan Scan Sean Distance Vidth(V)
Direction Eeyvay __
('.) Flywheel #1 3.5"(1/2Y) to 7"(!v11 'v')
la 3608 cv & Ccv
- 12) Flywheel de 0" (surface) to 8.A"(1/2v) 1" 360# CV & CCW m..
ES-1 l
n E Nuch"'~r
~ =-6 <
GPU NUCLEAR ISl/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE.7209.24 Title Revision No.
Uttrasonic Exarnination of Reactor Cociant Pumo Flywheels O
EXHIBIT 6 SCANNING _ REQUIREMENTS FOR FLYWHEEL #1 BOLT HOLE REGION we 1.J>**6 cat g l'aor i
g
~
y de nos 41 gg 4Ae e
-or l err e
f
..i b
- l d
3.85" k
ss
- y..
see. off s
Auf Section A*A
's l
- Lae r
Z~
- eres s
s L604 Dems raew
\\
l
, w ~ s v. w ~
s
,w j
o N
9 S. t!.
900
)
(2i,
g,.;
_ (1) m.
f W
i i
Foreward/Backwar4
$can Sean Sc1: Mole Sc ar. Dis t ar.ce Vidth(W1 Otrection (1) 3.5" dia.
3.$"(1/V) to 7"(ry11 've) 1" M 90 c'.* & CO*J s'
l.63" d14.
3.5"(1/:V) to 7"(ru11 *v')
3.9 3600 CV & cc.:
- CTI Scans 1 & 2 may be perfereed simultaneously ift both CW 6 CCV directions.
{ ^T g Number
~'
GPU NUCLEAR ISf/NDE MANUAL 5361-NDE 7209.24 Title Revision No.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels O
EXHlBIT 7 STRAIGHT BEAM SCAN REQUIREMENTS FOR LAMINAR REFLECTORS Straight Beam for Laminar Reflectors (all procedure requirements apply except when superseded by this exhibit).
1.0
.CAU_BRATION 1.1 Calibrate the screen range on the calibration standard or other simdar metal rt.andard.
1.2 Select a direct rea'd screen range which will produce a back reflection of greater than 40%
but less than 100% full screen sweep from the maximum anticipated examination thickness.
1.3 Couple the search unit to the calibration standard arid calibrate the screen range by use of the sweep and delay controls.
1.4 Couple the search unit to the part being examined and adjust the snitial back reflection to 80% FSH. Adjustment of the gain controlis permittec' durin0 examination in order to maintain the back reflection response.
2.0 RECORDING 2.1 Record all areas giving indications equal to or Dreater than the remaining back reflection.
2.2 Recording of straight beam laminar type reflectors requires recording the locations of all four sides of a rectangle which would contain the indication extremities at the rcquired recording level.
2.3 Record alllaminar indications which produce a response equal to or greater than the remaining back reflection. These dimensions and locations will be used to determine areas of interference with the angle beam examination.
2.4 Record alllaminar indications where a continuous loss of back reflection exists along wrth a continuous indication in the same plane. These dimensions and locations will be used to determine acceptability of the component for continued service.
3.0 SCAN SENSITIVITY 3.1 Adjustment to the scan sensitivity may be riecessary and sha!! be considered when recordable laminar reflectors are noted in order to maintin an acceptable back reflection.
E7-1 TOTAL P.22
APPENDIX D SAMPLE FLYWIIEEL MATERIAL TEST CERTIFICATES m:\\2537w.wp01b-011596 D-1
om
-W v
.f 3
A IIGI4 Ot&TRUCTIVE TEST REPORT rite: swo,oneen SI P352.tf 2.
ou.A,u.ty c.o.n t not m
c. min MACHAFLUX HA RDHE SS TE5'fi ULTRASONIC ZYCLO
/
~ _ -
C.C.:
is 5 4 C 'W'U's n 35 N $
k .
- 1 \\b b.
C.C.
c.c., Mr. C\\d se n u c-C.C.:
.. c 1,..
o.........
- ' ~,,c..........
' 'i
- s
- N ~ G " c' LJ.c e'au
,4e z c:sy.nrn-c., N s 4,
- e. 4 ic ev 9w1 o
.. o...
, e m.c Fly W4 EE L A Eq.
l......o9cLecknt o # 4e4 a s A ia t., x. s s,la,_jaee_<-lc.m.
i.
~~
5 i n. lied.o 4 s y e, p, d u l f ci - 1 s. u l.
na
}
- i.34 5 hore d m d a t. k e.
t k <.a
, a n.vh < :,La.s:,
gGE2. >.Y-7 z.
l i
i
. l
- l f,' C
_ a_'.
_t d. _ l _,y__
....., a o.,
2 - >V-7
-j 1
jono.
An e
e 6
e
- f. ;, i 9
I
j l
- LUKENS STEEL COMPANY
'i NON.DESTRUCilVE TE5flNG REPORf INSPECTION DEPARTMENT
, g,g e,gg g, - - -. - -. _. - 3.,g
.I l
g
.. u.59,.1.-57107-1 -----
- g /f y,f p 8
.__;_. y 4 g
,n
' y,]M;-gD-?9t :a. S cL L, coa ua uas.t u.z._m m.,
.t m,
ECUIPe!NT Uste
-' -- --~i 2$b32
- ~~ c vetani 1
I SSAP d. WATER
. 5'.'C '"r>
. **ansovo 11 12.25 Ada A
""it, ai r.
't ' 'G8
~rs oo l
,,,e ce sum 2
'- ~
c
~~ ---*
- r r, c,..ce s*h*y 100 $ se i
' n W.c :crs riist a':,t,4np-so,.s
- - " se,
-200 P An---
g,,g i
/.t OD D3
. nun s,,;, h/ -$.
... 2 LIh5& 74 1/: -
L 1f,t-uan -
~.
1 utts sstne
~
.e
_. Pl44/- 2 A J
,,rg, 1
g j
af i
3 i
g
.V 4-
- p l
j f
8 i
19 l
t
. +. _ ~
i l
l i
i
...-..3..-4 8
i 9.
.~. m _..
.. w..__.. _.--
6
.=
t
}
4 a
i
[
I i
..y_
_.. p q
i i
i r
l 4
I l
_ _ l..-
l 1
l
.g
...g
._ g..-e
_6 l
t l
I i
I r
c I.
. i.
3 W
w l
l
{
i P
l t em et *
.I gus '. :*** * ***t a6oid IS CCae:C f TO T *t -I' t 1.....
3-a.
.- I
^
t$....
bW e
-.-__.~-.-_-.m- - - - - -
_____________----.-----_7 s
l3 j
y.,
/
y' LUKENS STEEL COMPANY 12-31 71
""" 8587-07-14 ".
~
mcnasse.
o.n.
co.
- Westinghouse Eloc. Corp.
TEST CERTIFICATE
- " " " " ~
IaA Purch. Espt.
ar. o. E. Stepp
,g,,,yJJc 7VA
.,u o.oo uo.
mio.u, o.
z.pittsbursh, Pa.
15112 57808-1 10-F7-66404 nr 1M 371 DD
- QFM*ATIONS A-533-67 or. a class 1 3*2. by sales mer me o.r. '
-,c
, m-CH E MIC AL_ ____ANALY5i5 esa mut No.
r.
I a.
m l
5 4
y 20 1 32 lolo 020 ;
24 47 51 Ela.c. E.G.P. V.I.P. Steel c9(479 Rm if. A. c-U.
P.- '(',O r
C. '-
u -- '
-w j.3 73
,v #-2
=
4 (N
_m pl?_ <W '. r--:7 g-Jf.
i
.&[--
.C----- _
,- _ L___L_ _
,l
'"" ! y.p d Y o* y, "S l 3
a
' ' ^
8 8 5 C '"" o "
-9
{
l I
g7.i T 67 j 711 77 1-5" x 8-2/4 In x 65-1/2 ao i
i 638,865 28 cp479 3
g673t880 27 79 l
TI,646i g1 2g 174 I
I d
SL 667!
2 179. L 81 l 74 1 79
(.
l l
CL, e
a\\
169)'{,./1700*
1 kr. per Lach min. and air < tools sa F. f.e., ele.1 hr Lnch.
D l
h 5.a.n.d tssts heated,%
5:
\\
a soo
. re 12
..se, m e h.1 1.,I l
I
.I C.
<15. 4,,a 1l-n
., o.sa i
,.,.u.,..
.u 1.. sao-r.
.pyt I
I
-)
i i
dh.
.:d
~ ^
w.h c,;
ih. ohm r om or. corr.ce os coneoin.d in eh. r.coras or ist, cm.
L.
,g.
v 4
.y....
- e-s -,..p y.-
o33g
.g-o l
=
E F.
i, o
.,. E 3
m z
s
- o A
aE
- n. h:., $ ( g.
=
e, y,
.n B.
a it ??
5 l
o.
n a
3
.a v
~.
E 4
sa e
o
,a t.
B, 4
(
9
~
w z
o O
d d
z n
k, h t
k
' EE e
- or av c
h,5_ u sr 89 G
n _a h
o g b
E lg m*
m Z
5 d
a a. ie v
>w e
gan m 2r o
g.
=
z2 e
aS Eh !3 5 a
I g 5.-
E E
m 82 E
=
._, o k
6 m
^NZ d
d
-4 a
L-mQ
.y 1
zm a
n l wQ o
.e.
act b
Q, Iz\\?
'i T N g *t o
d o
z z i
a
, - - - ag g
5 2
T 3 [t Ra a
5 2 8
~
a 8g e-ju =g-2Vy g a s
s e
a n a e xa i
=
2 1
2-g s-u y,
y s.
gl a
u 1
o g
O
/@ ij l)i i i
s e
. T *. -
?"
. L;:122$'Esk.:o.$k:d.fL g
g
^-
- t
g^',,
.'..:,[
i o
3 fN?jD Cje
. l, I
\\
t 4
7 BA
,Ag 2
a 7
ss s
/
2 e
n m
~
u U
a $
5 o
.S u
3 v
9 m
.M 3 t
?
S a
L
.Sg a.
6 c
5 Cg r
a l
d c
B.
p t
J, n
5 r
x u
s o
u n
W n
t o
r i
- l. n'o p
m D
n o
o 2
H m
a z
s E
s.
re M
. 5 i
t t
e -L a
6 c
-r o 1 s
c.
c.
L h d c
c A
e o
er C
a e
T c
n
- a. M hAK t
Y S
e e
D r
G E
wP >.
T e
R d
O 0
P s
E d
R q
s 3
o S
9 u) to n
k e.
T v
R z
C k
a w O
.. W e
P c A O
b a
s E
6 w
R d
L d a
a
. L e
T a
E c
s
. a.d S
o T
ub M d.
s
- a. n i
n s
E o
e s
o V
s I
s n.
UEs T
O c,
C v
og 1
t u
"r.
.mq a
m R
u s
SN T
g N N hp w d s
L A
,o a
.4 q 8
,l, O
A a
N My I'
t c
E f-c # r.
t s
T e
c.
c.
4 A
y.
"f".
v c
c epn i
a G
D V
?
y':
- l!
[J l
1 h
f:
s } Jl.lI f
.7,;,.
. m.m.m ! -
Tp..r..w.,w..y.,a.i e ra c. -g. xp 3 ',<'.
,.w y n y y9 g:q? g j_ W Y-uup [g%,'.
m,.
t 9
y _
q.:sg.,
9
. g,. :,... g a
g..~'
a e
g.-
g-s r
s z
i ii n
.4 R
d.
g.
e e
-o i
9
- g. ' 3 s
n u
=
. cl t s 0
n s
c b
A e
.k a
s ao 4
g
_~
3 cf
' 3!
=
s x
M
<c I.,
i m
in e
m a
s.
.m
______________a_____
o m-o i.
u, s. 4 s
y
=
.4o.-
s ej~
s
,W g
Z u.
O 51',h -
g
.g
,m
- t
.g e-c.-----ya_ g ___
-g g
\\
e i
d' il
=sE'- a r4 4 2 a
v.
c4
,a 2
o$
5 e
u u
.o....
x m
=
D 2
N O! N rqN-rs c N
y ]
h7[flN g'
a p.
g u,
~M 3
1 u
~
I T3 M
3 03 8.
- C oo s
b U
O' M*
b I
4 m d'- a n
\\
N 4. N s
.. 'o es e
O e
L CJ IntnNJ) ft, fra e 4 NWWW
- O oE 000 ano.u_,o4 g
- \\
\\ ssN NM T.
E ci e t,t o
a-5
.a e
cinst e
o I
cuO a
s c
Nr),N
,EM bl
\\o go* wwww 1
m o
68 i-y
,y.,
88.1d _u; e
e4 o
y
\\
- 5 0 0b '..i"!
[*
19
.1 n-e a
E t: s -
s u.
m
{5 th*n 4$ k' S k s
..-.a c1 9 in y
'8yf% [yf4 x
ya p
g'-
L li.{u.h%.h.ke uGK;c. y ~t 2. '&
a
~g c
e e
n Y!,
8 7
t a
' 5 u 7. h.
y m
uus u-
=
f~ {.
E.
jl h+'r. nhll,:
i l
4
..b yM 1
, ' ", u. qcgt s.
i s'
s.
1 J,j
- U:
y
~
' T s *.
.si.
,C gJ.Vf v
R e
O-1 R
~
P E-h E
~
R-T I
o A
G-6.h o.
W 1
~
3 s, ~ :e
' N T
M
.'f.
6 A
t I
,w,.X J
T D
,a m S-C P
O d
E t
b s a
Y.
R 0 mo t A P
S, M
E.
~
e n
a
.t e
t a
- /
V s
l n
T 4
A o r e
I n c o 1
g C
5 u t n
L w
n u
a a
U..
7 or y
, l R
c a r
, w 1
y T
S-E 7,
D
'D i
O t.
1 K~
N 3
2 4
/
O
~
3 N
9 asn~
5-A W
3 5
)u 1
P 3
1
'%.n'6 o
1 7
2
/.
r 3
6 s
E oM 0e S
3
. p nS nI 1-:
M 9
moA u C
r S i
C t
e t
r t t 1
A I
A n
o T
fcE mg c
L 3
E u
u R
5 N
t l
i A
r a
a i
FW D rt ut 4
t.
YE F c o
i i
r r O ur e
1 t
Y,W nC oS = = m 2
i NM T
s t
o s
m.
3 AT P R M
1 O A p
I
'C P C
E l
B p -
s
'E D
- 2., -
o N
E TN R
2 f
l
~-
f S
SO 1
G 1
1 7
N*-M NI (f.
A 4
T
~
tA E
Q 9
7 KC L
4 f Q u.
UE z.6 h-E S
P tl /
L P 5 3 V
S
- o. P 3-S 3
5,A '
m o
n 5
A s N/ /
N N
1
- n0 ndr e
Y c
~
I a
A e1 u
c B
e t
t a
o
- r r
o t
. u o u O~
w r
a t
2r M p.
n n o r T 5
c O
c i s o C 5
uT M
c O.
t t
s n c ur e N
t A
i uS t
ro A A A e 5 uF us r-t $
T a
M oA r a v N
[-
I c
W s
T S
E S
E g,
H T -.
O qu T
T C.
ts"e a
O r*
c C *u u
s i
t vF OE I
S L AE S
(O
^
IIN
~
TA A
H E TG "I
Y D E
WL o
TW r
R o
EO.
t c
. CN 4
a y(
e sY n
o' cf>M:'r t
aM o
i t
s' e
1 n
Mr U
Io 5.-
.f f.6 P lC x ;< s.
o
.s 't.
-I
..y
>p3 tjnp-
[ c (-
)~
f
~.
9 I*
l t
.ll 1ll1l'
1 l%
.w.
- c. f1 1;+*. ~. f~
~
< ryrod"s.-
LUl3N5 STEEL CQtTPAtH.
C&'alict Gr cdie u.,- ao-w..,.... ? - l
~
'~
- ' ' % *C '
u, I. 'llentinghouse Elec. corp.
COANSVWit, P& 19329.
an. 1-11-72".';-
'd'e3537-07-14
?:
.*s'
- ..?
g4 *
"F -
'g TEST CEnilF!CATE
?.
" ".g,.g. g- '
'~~
^
Fur., kpt.
g,
- 7. pjg,,
m,,,,o,e, c,,,,,,,,,,
Mr. G.
m,. Stepp l
.,c E. Pittcburgh, Pa.
15112 57107-1 10-PV-47470 MP.1572. DH P.
MoreaNe..Nr133 E.
I
.c u ne m
- t.-533-69A Gr. B CL 1 Mod. by Sales Order h1 g.
~ '
m M _ Q IC ' c"Ne "
-- 2.,m_ _
b i
7 7140.
11 C
u.e P
5 I
Ce to t4 c.
mo V
Yi(YT XMY YYrlY EY Y'i ' R AR TC PTR CESS
/i 53 V.I.?. St4e1 F.0 7.
Electric i
C94%
22 11i.30 007, c15 22
'57
- 3 i
i i
j i
i I
t l
c i
-e l
l I
ei i.
I I
l
'- 9
%g, e
s l
y s
iri l
l
_4 _._._i i
I l
l l
3 L
PH YSIC A L PROPERTIES
=
i-~ a,.
. u, i =.<. !,c 7l X W.
7
'x $ V-Watch l
DESCRIPTION t'- f:-
F-wuds
~*
' 'unt r40.
l s.
5 e.
f e
, ' '5
.x
+)o*P-2.--.in8.L {
r.
s 8
i h8 - l l
e l
c;426
/;
21, rx 6?di 417
?h
! 137 7
s 52 i 54 i
2-B" x 8-1/h In x 75-1/2 OD 7.S. 187 l pL 666t i
- 01 :
i 23 1192 l
1 I
P;; E?ly E63
! L 1196 1 70 I 73 i
BL 7pfr 926 ;
25 192 i
i i
TX F,65E 886 d 2?,
187 T
33 i LB l
45 2-25 e '_'L6c,3i 905.i P6 ! 183 I
I 2i'! 107 l'
4[g,.#
i hx 734j 950 '
l D.
'pL 715j' 925 e 'l 192 L
92 j E3 1 102
/
4,3, l
M /p[8 1
I 2inerand[ tests l1cated;l1653-17",0 d, helli 1 t
- r. per inch E.in. ahd water g lenched y
O e
to 533*T., then ter.parpd 111:h*F.3 hl helb 1 b r. pertnch m'Ln. an s air cool ed.
1 126D l
l l
I ig,[
hl I
%ein/
h l
3 Rince ar.d jtectr. istress relieked by, heati g to 1100*F., held I h r. per inc t
- e
=in. a nd furnace' c >cle 3 to Eb3 *';. l l
b,
-c.
,,).
8
.r N
,j1.
Wi heretrf certify ty above figures are correct es contained i.n the records of the company.
y
.jf.g W.c.h$M$YR.5?%$R}$$%MMWti ' ' :.m.b.45h??W
~
- n..
- a 0 ~j. u..
-.v. a.
9 g.,., g.
.,,g, ;,.,
.e
.q. #
8 :
'%, c.
..?:. e,.:~..'e i.g. s.
.*t.
s.g.t.-
n
.,a g
- c..
- g.Q 7+,.- gg:- A.. ',
4l t-l l
r-i
,f;,.
e.4 a
.i::e..: :
M
..:> e s,
'm :~-
~
w x,.. e' ri?{.!) 3 n:. ' F/
.f g.
j
' Ib S
..d T
9' O
[
k, Yh? hf.'\\
Y kl' bY
" 6. >'.h,.4
. >l b
' yi.
1 L.
4.
(% Q
.;.;..U'
..s.- t.
e i
.J
~
g y..
.a3 m.n
-.... g u
.f * :. g..,w,&r..:- w
. e.+.
J 5y.
v..
8
... s.-
n.,....; p h 9
,3 Qw..
s 3 %
.:m
.u? q,,. m
. ; o.i..
..,; ab g.,, i
. x.,
.. n
.e,
e,,
+.;r e.., ~
g 1
.w al;..
.g as
. s. u g
- U 1 s
- s..i. r :
- 3.,
.-Q;nRl !' g ii i c.1 1
E "'
't k! !
E 5
L 5,.N 2
,.5
.... i.
a
- n..
,ae...g a
.4. y::
Ry
- la.
-i; Q. li
- .-Q.V
=
3.;p.E m
n, 3
.9.v.v.s a.
- .c
. w p.
S.eT.
I' ve' 3;#
W,. :,
,: E n
1 e
t o
.:.3.
e t
. /,
a 1
w m.'y.z g #, 4 2 a.,
h
=}
Q gl l%
ga 3,.h -
yl
- N
=
e d
,.). ;
o o
g
,, t.,..s.v.,.
8 V7.r.A..
E...
a 3
v m
.w.,:r
- a..- :
,.?
- 4.,
R p
y, q.s k.:s.g. ~
g.lw..-
f...
e
(..,,.. r al t.,.
e.
..,,. ~
,8.'....-
3,, h..
- f.....
,5-
..;,r. :
g i.: ;. ?
- e..
B d.F..':' ).).
c.: ;';
E [.;g.).,?m
-v.V.a.=..
. l.; p z, y,. ;;u.
., s
- ,} ;.
-f
~-
l.i,,A,y
(<
l y...
v.
u.
..t
- .1; :....;.?:,n.
t..
o.
x
.yn.m A.
a sf
=-
..:.... n y.
r.
k.
,. h. d' Is
.,a 4 ( s h M M...
- p i
.g..j., g. ji.g.M,,
.q,
i
,1 l
s g
'., Yg-m.A. 1 ' ' -
cwW --
- . i
- ..
q;>,s h:V
}
- e n
y,,.ll
,E. qe... '.
' k.' -
~
.y
. 4.. -
b
- n..
'.4.-
. ;f
.\\] ')g t2 f'
^
n_
y,
_/p V
o
.?
0 p
t s/s n
s e
u 4 RA A G
i y
W u
O 1
'K r'
s
. a
/
S l
/
/
Z S
- b s
E M
N 05 V e
/
/
D R
8 4
c g
8 c
f T
A Af 9 e
a ar H
a o
E# C b
A-0 9
I J
on
/
t t
58
/a n
I e
X c
U 1
b n
L 6
o F
o
'A A
2 e
M cS o
C
~
1 es 8
H A
M [
s G
s e S 2
1 s
E m
W 4
v L
A
^
R a
D e
2 s.
e T
c.
c.
b N
R 8 6 0
A c
c 00 T
1r a
t
~-
T C
E E f r
d
,~ 5 N
S e
E o
Y P
Y, s 7 t
7 i
E A
1 3
n
_h S
A 9
o t.
P s
S a
?)
G g
A
/
s O
l.
4 A' s
L A
n f
C i
L L
T Y
A R
Z t
E a
O 4 t O
e
~
P E
1 I )
..Q E
E e
m u
8 L
t t
P R
0 L
H
- l. i l
.. i.
.P. :~.
P K+.:.,'?;.'.M..e...
E e T
5 U
S C
S r
c f C
~
E C
T I
'a N
a e
$;p,.'.
r
.t.
e O
w y
?
s 2'['@.. -
V s
S 0
i u
d d
./
T m.m I
A
=
j k
RI 0 L
R
. s 'rp' h".';;:-
'?.
C=
T 2
e L
O D'1 E
U r. r=
ONi T T-f a
- a. h.
R 4
R.
U $
o s
kt
- l. -.
Tas Y
e i..? {. $ !,,
Scve f
E A
6
,a t
e E
.. ?.
..'ifg.*:=.p:' '.i..,
O n e=
e M
, n O
s um T
. i
~.
C n,
N
,e r.
N h.,. _
- . D a s O u* r t
S
. i b.
de
.a e
A
.T. l*
q.L$1'($9-e E
. n.f.i. :.
t P'
I T
D
!.s5j
.e
[j r
1.5
~
1 11I1I
N
' M.,,
p...,
.s..
.,._, 3
}.~*.. *, )
Qgs$.g Q; j q ',* g_y'.,. ;.L g
?
U" " - ~u.
_LUlGN5 STEGL Co?.*2AIEf
- : ~ M -
"'*'k' 4
we. l'-11-72. :
" ".ooS6 07-l %.s;.d F.E ruec,./s. -
s-
- * ** * * * * *'s
. *.. 4... %.-
~ CoastSvatt PA.19770 g.,e3'*(estinghouse Elec. corp.
' * - C
LRA Fur. Dept.
gA..y J 3.(,. 7N. -
....:, ','s
' i.
TEST CERTIFICME
?-
~
.N.
au o.oen,e.
euuo ra.
Mr. G. E. Stepp E. Pittcburgh, Pa.
15112 57107-1:
10-PV-47470 MP.1572. DR g g g/pg.fJ g f !..
g a
...,g,
.,2
,,,. M.-
~
esrEcificAnows..
j.
A-533-69A Gr. B CL 1 Mod. by Sales Order,
</J g.g.
'g
/
.K
- u.,a, m-,- O y o ca t h
m m BAsTc PRCCH E @gri CHEMICAL A N ALY$l$
y attr iu- =
c m
P 5
c=
1 5.
N.
c.
ao v
xm m nry t.
/
/
/
J l
/
j,
- y
- I 6
22 1.30 097 015 22 57 :
53 V. I. ;?. Sthel P.G. ;?.;
Electric.g (e. 947:
,
- 2.
l e
.~-
w: ut
(.s{s,
J4' 1
3.t.;,
~
t
..C.'Z i.. -
r 1
I l
. c..p:. W.x e oN*.Q.ts f-
.. e l
l j
4 7
c'
,.p.
g '. {
y W - f.j, 3
g j
t v
gd l
g,4 -.'.
e l
i j
PHYSIC AL PROPERTIES M
,J(y,f, -
- -'T i
' >ah l
. 2.c i y
Se.. hY NO-
.',{
y.
Q lr p,pgg4 ggqep; D E 5.C a I P T 1 O N "*..
an e,n 4-
,'S M
I g
..r j
g i
i h8 l
.I i
1 y
i l'X EM 017. she l 107137l752 1 54 I
I.C~:i':L6 2A 2-8" x 8-1/h In x 7.5-1/2 OD 3
I mL666{9018 28 e :
l i
~ ~,'. ;
I 6-c u
.26d 23
' 192 i
i s
e
{
l bi f5El 26'j 25 '/j 192 L
136 1 70 'I 73 /
.,.i 9
I i
~
v l 137 T
38
- E3 i
45 i 2-2a yX CCf.: Ef'! : 2?-
in.6cgi 905 ! PS
' ' 33,
I l
((f.p.,D (,
i E-X 73'1l 950 l 211
' 107 l I
- ~
bL 715; 925 21: l 192 iL 92 E9 102 hf sin:n cr.d tents h.catcd 1653-7*.iG
., heli 1 h. per' inch itin. af.d water a lenched jk F/p 2
. ' t,., -f.33*r.,i timen b.e 'ptir)0 Her."F., hl hel 3 1 h)r. perinch :.jtn. anp air cool ed.
CO g4
,g, p.
1260 i.
%c
.S i
e.
l l
l l
'@Cl9tnSM vingr ard cctnptrecnreliehdby!henti g te,1100*F., hc)d 1 hr. per inc g
a
. 71,... E nd furnace' co0le}! to 600*?. j l
j j
I s
8 r.).
,t y$ herebt certify the abovs l'igsres are correct as contained in the records of the company.
y
.z.f...,.
-s., r... : m : nr.~
-w -
y-.
~.9, Q ify;.~;.ei ;.q., z 7.;;.. :g:.a.5 g:..;px,3;;)..;;.,;;-;gjyp N#-M 'y+ - w' " }.'"*
-d.
LUKENS STEEL COAIPANY '.,- ~
C i^*Y'W
- C " #- W ~S.i e p....
- c..
NON-DESTRUCTIVE. TESTING REPORT INSPECTION DEPARTMENT.;9,..s :4 3... >. g.a...:e.
s -
y p.
77... p..
.....-;.; w. 4.g w
g., cu.. stows i
wu omota No.
nee rts v.
su re.
- .~
~.
.I L %*';.'
95971L M1M 1 agnf &cayn '
k.*'-
.,.o,,.,y,~.,-
p C 1
wust
~ ~
sencmcAnoN
.) p
_dfTrf A-533-49A GR. 8 CZ.1 CODE CME: 2338 btTEreo. Pkoc.s_4 '- N k
,f Cusrown No.
o,,w Nr usfo P.b. 10-T1-47471 SffRRf Ud 715 # 31
~
l'<
i I'
- t. 4-CoNSIGestD TO SEACM UNIT m et3yyog COUILANI Y 3. ;. '
stacius N N *2 3 b q
wn.co SOAP 6 W.TEDii h Awta40s
( y.
T.aANsouCea 97g- * -- --
o=o us.
rves or sUnrACa-+- -
.;- l Yvre or noos
[:.
1 rsn*f, A A
,, 2 g.re.
z INsPECTOn$ NAw AQUAL8pCAilCN5 SIZE
--e
-aws=.y wu.su.
,9 Ah*'.^< f to FTrss GS_1/2 on y p h. rp y z h
~~
-. C 9)$2-Q.';I Y A f V;:'.- -;c Q gl,.'ff...
. 2
.e. ty s l
- .~;.*..
s
- . ;. ;;.,. ;g_
- J...
s k
7 Q,,[.9,QQ;
'f '.'
14 '
.' U.
fE.' hj f-j'
.' _~ 7-
- ..Q
- '; j'F.?,Q,.
^.
[/.' *
'..T. fi.p[h4
- fi m
PK J
'r
.k.
cn....
sv.,.
M.'.%,
' y.,'
f-n.
,s w km
- .sey
. :, '-~.> ~
,, P d.
-Qw L.
g,,
..t;.
- ., =. 3 be?
~
.~
- . '.,o.. *
.gf.'.,*. f,-
g Q
- i. %,c g4
$.s.,
c,-
4
- e. g
[fs n
~.
2
-f, l._
yd 5
l
~*J,i v
l U
W
.f.
3J 1
~
.2
=
.a
.', l N-
.)
~
..y
{A %
t~
%g
{
- 2... ;3
- s..
.rt
~. =
.r.
ss f
'.[
8 MEuBY CERTIFY TMAY 785 ABOVE 85 COsaECT TO THE BEST
~,
.~.
4-ur <nowucos ano anuer.:. dea s 01. Sc,.. G:~:.u..._...: : u r. n..
.'.. C 1 3.^ :-A :
....i...,, Q. :.
...,.. /..-
,.2.-
. : e
- 5... **.Y?.&jk:a.p,...,,...f.h
.".s.$INI'hN','O'%?:
-e
-x
~.
c
-.n...;1[7.
.{' " %f.h*l...i.'W.%'N'?.'l$.,h.$C.'. :
hI hkl.
N Q M.'.'
.L.. s.;.
7" ^u*'**06
- d. ' -
.p e.
l$
,..',.y i -
G t-
~
e s-gWw" n-e ;. > '.
~
0
.2
.?
0 El.e, f,
8 f
u G
~
7 G$ 0 e
/
a, s
K.
a n
G s
J, A
i
/s.
p O S 9
?
2 7=.
F L
[s y.s.~
S
- b S
E
~
,~
f E
v I{
d>e Y
$ z-N D
0
~
R 0
W~s.
~~e 4
or 3
E A
T O
T
-.~-
r s/
( e.
i H A
f>"~
A E
o C
e.*
i E S, e
P to P
s
/
5*
r s'.
C s
o U
M' n
t/
f/Q f^
f e
X r
n L
o F
r.s~ -
A D
e M
.= _
e @s w
o C
2 s
b) n p
M $
as A
s G
h a
N s f l
k : ~~
r.
s t
a e..:
m [.
r
.?
n o
Y. ~ E.
l i
7,a.,
s.
g, T
c.
c.
g.
b
- 5.L'@
t N
f.
s A
c c
e
.'y:.. ~ -
o j E
R l g a
T W...N.
72 E T
E C
?}
E c-.s N
S Y
S i
P D
v b M. '..
E E
T 1
Y R
- h D
.A e n
~
O s
"J P
p E
L, R
9 9
D, k
O
- V. '
v y
F V,~
L t
t G
T Y
o R fg
/ k S
R Z
e "e
O t
m.
P R
t IE
..y N.
n A'~
y E
o L
a e
R P
y T
e
/
U f
e P
L, h SE 3
S f
~
T IC
/
2
)
~
t N
2 E s u
e
[.
0 vG s
0 r
- w...
- 'u. :'. ? a. T n. m V
a 0
I AR i'~
.. 'l 3
v r
w, : y: _$..
4 Co.
T C
E 1
R 6
h.9+
nm D
Uro L
V D
R Q
l Rur U
r C'
N N Toe O
Sc.
Mw t
l E
e
- Q%y.<~rO.u En
.. &.t5 *;.
S
- f a
f se m
C a
D O
- c. D.}N t
~T N
a r
t a.
s t
- p;
- . W.\\.-
t Ou.Mc.
T
., j;-
r c*
N }b-A D-1-
U.= f+x..,. g l.
- .., h.
l$I i: ;!.l
- e.$
.. F-i f*
[I
- lv'k D'..
iI%
s,
..;:,: /.
's%
=:a.,?.
i sf l
l
,t\\
\\
ss-Mi~
gy~_
w..-
..N N-C'i
. ' 7;-
.).'-
i:..
s.
U f'..;C t
. ~ T '. -
di ['y'us;.J.l EP * ' 't ?9 94 Q*
fi':[' :
.,.ja
'~
.-.t.'
. S' # *.
'g, i..
y,.-
.Q.55.
-i.
[9 :.
MEM7E3TRUCTIVE TEST REPORT
. '.. y
.. _,4 eg eraury contmot
'I ['
SHOP ORDER _g) p3g7ML es.seeme=sess rosne assse
,, g FILE:
.t g
- ,l TESin ULTRASOMIC ZYCLO DYE PENETRANT asAGNA FLUX ffARDNESS 8
~. _. _
-4
' C.C.r is S 1 C. MA n 35 S
C.C.:
k
I-
\\ A h(.
f, '
4-
.. C.C.:
E.
F' D 10 N b b*
C.C.:
PURCse/LSE OttOER peo.
SU PPLIE R T.
SEC 7 804 DR Apf4G no.
H E A T 8e0.
FostGamG sec.
~
F1 'io N 4 4C LO.< e',3 s
,y p z. 4,, rc. p,rn -
C 'i*'
S 1 _ ic ev 97ai o
.. r a R..
e.94va c4 l.
F L
._t v 4 G E L A 3,5% e J'
e.O.s.
- e f,. am,, )o V d
- e. ci,< e k s0 'IB A na 3
k.n-l;__nn~cisa_$acc. < L ou,+ l '? m in Jicel.oo s F 4 P.du.. l. 2 - u - 7 t f 9.315' bore d is Ain ha. sbca.sc i.id t-iti w
- 6 8 r 2 Y !
i ( i -j .i .I 1 ^ ) ~DA NC. k(![u ..,0,,.O.. 0... ). - > 7> 2 i 1 C =- W --- y
oya f1<V
- . _1' I
.' fJj. .v4 [ - h c=c .y .i ,. s
- s..
O 2 'b-c. f' ' ?* Q m. .5 e s n 's g$ l2 O a o J ' . L. m fa s a b .? a e { d c P 'f 4 R s
- C E
n. m D o n i r ~ R m. I e 1 ~ O 4 P 'o 0 D n _M
- e2
+ S t i o a 2 i_ E s E a M s. L e s o 8 E . s l -r ) aA s y' _;- c. c. 2 hA W*... c c Ae n., c a c c M lRK e c m e G mR* '. cP 2 _g n d. m' j-i. s 9 s s s i s o s f %, 'c. e A i s o m e T l . R ., K ]. ka O c u ).!- P c, L e e E a mO e d d a. R n L l n T e S o v s i d E T } u e t. n v d y .f E w s l.d e t . :g W.m d. A c n s CR e. m O 1 Tt a os .3 4 1 O 1 UTe n "r. r N 8, o a TOM. 4 'f. e .N N 2 n.A cw 5Ce a s n no O m is a H U,n a . I' S.s m ' c. c A J c c .. =..L A w 1 c a, D 3x. 'j.,.y.*! lf jl u l y3. 18
t x,f.UTf2$'.. .~: ?.}]f. n '..'i '4'G.'; -\\t ' y. W ~. .ss:.m. f,.Q.J. 1 ;p..- .m-. a.. -. :i-q.y.::. ~,..,..;
- 7...,
.;'~~~. ....( .. e.g.. g ~ h-n
- t-
!q q 3 k (. ".. 'N .g g N s ~ = na v 3 ....s., w a .w5 A .e =M y g = 4 u .c q. E w w n uy.e yn' q r N^ '. . f'y l l g 5 k f, ' ~ I t u% e n a ~ a !7 g0 ( .h d. I gy ce .. i,' '. y y lk T f b o y ..w g 5
- a. a
- n
..r a e l M a (c(, B $(g = ro .3 i 7 tn ?,- 5 s u (D ? 'b.. n. A l CA $. '* 0 l l T,y' co w c,. - g T g $p g s o J 4 .fi.
- g 4
.c tJJ Y ! c'. e 0 d v t.t) s .y.;... ;. - s. t; a v u ,5 ~d .y n s i. }M
- i- ~~u %
n.i.&.'.:H, '.< y,4 '. s o u 7 s a f <7 3.,q!j:). S g n m a !m s C f +w-V y% ' r,?.Rh :r.a.,..' l8lE n;.v.n : 4, :.-:. 1 g n .~~ o s g-s.3 C ly9 p. % 't ? F p
- , k **-.;
e
- t z g g,.
. a L t, p *i o s. \\ .s. o,. .g ;.' l s +4 i:: a' '(kI e .s~ y
- a.-d,ad
.%. O i.:4 e i.: /., '..:,,.;.; g;.g.' ',,. ' ] . L ' %* *.
- n' Ws *!W
,,] 4..:. :-
Q]b N3E !OR FLWHEELS Shop Ordsr A$f97d PT per Bl.350UJ or plate praor to assembly. I Ne dr.f[y S D ~78 P.O. [d f).",13 7 Ht. No._ O S 3 4 /" 4 Insp.&Date_ PT per 805GU0 of plate prior to assembly. l~ br+ dw 4-/ 9 -7A P.O. f6 42 ~ 23 A Ht. No. R/ 7 / 7 - 4 Insp.&Date u / PT per 30500J srter first machining. T fe,, by: P / f-7 A n n,) d OB Insp. &Date 1 / PT per SO50U3 arter keyway. /Ib //-/8-7,9 Insp. & Date UT per 8051VL of finished flywheel. Ins}. & Date I kr*n n Si /,*rd /J -l - 78 x OA & Original documents are en file at *!! 1 RAD East Pittaburgh, Penne. 15112 9 w. I h
~J- .my,, LUKENS STEEL COMPANY 4-11-78 nu wo8587-07-99
- 3. WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP.
coAtesvitts.ra ns2e cog 3,gy,,, qual. ASSURANCE DEPT.-2GA TEST CERifFICATE EAST PITTSBURGH,- PA. Icil2 .utt onoen so. cusi,we, p o 54173-1 PO92-238 lMP 4776 DD x 2/10 -.. -,.ci.m.,e m wo u c=o c, = =u.c w oc. a = = w m m.,o.m WEST PDS-10310CR REV. N 77 A-53? GR. B CL. 1 ~ /rf6'.f /b seno its: , woaaoon.rity rest CHEMICAL ANALYSIS (( MELT NO. C MN P S Cu 5t Hi Cn Mo V Tr i At XXIX UA3it-PROCf3S D1717 .20 1.33 .011 .002 .25 .68 59 VIP STEEL ELEC i i i e i D j l i i l N PHYSICAL PROPERTIES l $' !,',; ,,E gXXXXi .,,,4 w,c,3 i MACTtJRE I MELT NO f '6 " A-lXRX*X V-NOTCH +700F, ! APPEAR ANClj DE5CRIPTION ---~ i LOC. 5 5 HEAR B1717
- 4 701
- 925 23 T
156
- 160
- 166
,99-99-99 2-5" .-1/2 10 x 66 oD 719 !964 26 LATERAL EXF'ANSIOtt IN INCHES l .096 :.098 :.098 I l t !172
- 166
'lSO '99-99-99, LATERAL EXPANSIOtt IN It)CHE S l .096 ;.099 :.098 l lTRAt4SJ DROP WEIGHT TEST PER E:208 (SIZE P3) J,?O*F.; EXHIBIT O BREAK k flDT IS +$0'r. OR "ELO4 l i l RINGS At4D ITESTS HEATED 1625-16750r., HEL.D 1/2 HR. PER If4CH MINj AtlD iEMPERjD 1260*F., HELD './2 HR.* PER lt:CH M t4. Af40 l WATER QUEt4CHED, THEN j RELEASED BY Q.C. WATER QUEt!CHED.. \\ &Q90 K I c r -t RINGS AND TESTS STRES!, RELIE;VED BY HEATi t4G TO 1100-1150oF., HEl.D 1 HR. TO SEC.- MATEJEVICH DATES W j w PER INCH NIN. AND FURtl ACE CCOLED TO 6005 F. { I INSP. N. I 1 we hereby certify the obove information is correct. 8.Ch.C M m
l i IUKENS STEEL COMPANY I NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING REPORT l INSPECTION DEPARTMENT J wstgy,a c-autt osoia o T rver n t care ~1 .f_.,..fs * = . a a c. Aa#4 L ,f( '.. sg/c, 4 /p ; snc.o.:a:c~. k h / <1 ~ ~ ~ 5^~I -./.sA$~JJ._$ d Q l ?-) ll';rY7 //l##" c'E.:2'YW*yd,' ) . /Si/2 l'[ANf,? - 2.]t' jr 9'o :8kyrf-p.c,sysos l eo,,,,o,, l i~n~co $1"H, Zeox JZG,r.. f,$"& .,,,,s ~nn cn ed & & C _; \\ ' ' = ~ q,, j",.',;,,,, 3,"g y,y y=' y = 7aspqm.
- y" ".,,*.
. g, -... p, 4_, g ,,,,, y o v. g a r d r s y d, r/'. # a -y s' - __g [;y;o-.., '~ i - ~. ~~ j l t t -- - g -- - F- .. L_. t_.. _ i _.. _j . :3. ~ i l
- i j
l I .. + 4. _..;_ __; 4..____ _ .._ __ i %.',l l 1 i i 8 i i l l . _.___q' i s i ._y + - - i i l l i 1 I i .____ I _q l i i l t -. g ? I 1 3 I i l I I l ..._ _ j... ]' y* i \\ j p___,__.._. 4_. _ _ i l c 4 i 7'. ~ l T. ~j - ~ ~ -F io , m, i. ci.u.v i~.i rm..o,,ve g.s a.p y g... o.. ~ o. u o o..~ o..,. 7, _,_.~.....m. 3 .I
3 LUKENS STEEL COMPANY 2-24-78 ru wo8587-07-99
- nan, 3 o WESTINGHO'JSE ELEC. CORP.
coatesviL1a. PA. tW - cONSGNEE. QUAL. ASSURANCE DEPT.-2GA TEST CERTIFICATE p'hfj,,7(, EAST PITTSBURGH, PENNA. mm cepenno. ccusTom e.o. e p2-2p MP 22378 w c 15112 52345-1 l = ~ =~ ~ a w ,,,,. am ~~ ~ -,. -.,n WEST PDS-10310CR REY. H 7" A-533 GR. B CL. 1 BfMD TIST HOMOCENflTY ftST CHEMICAL ANALYSIS __ MLT NO. C MN P S Cu Se No Ca i Mo V Te At ^^4 UAdit PMuttdd D5301 .18 1 30 .013 .005 .22 .65 !.55 VIP STEEL ELEC. PHYSICAL P R O P E R T I E_S_ _ __t2Rr_. imeacts rmi u, = u,,- yo , =,, 2-8"" V+7 0* F. APPEARANCE: D E SC RIP TIO N MtT NO. 5 SHEAR D5301 4 729 950 24 T 142:143 i147 99-99-99 1-7.5" x 6 5 ID x 73 OD 707 925 25 L 147:150
- 148 19-99-99 LATEf;AL EX4ANSIDA IN Ir lCHES T.090:.088 j.089 L.090{.093 :.091 TRANS DROP FEIGHT TESTS PER E; 0SCS1 ZE P-D 0 +20*F.,
EXHIBIT NO DREAK. l N.D.T. IS +10'F.{0RBEyOW. I RINGS Ai4D TESTS HEATEC 1625-1675'f'., HEL.D 1/2 HR. ER IN H MIft, APID WATER QUEi CHdD, THEf4 1 EMPERE D 12IiO'F., HELD 1/2 HR) PER 1 NCH M1 N. AtJD WATER QUEt iCHED. i i REi. EASED BY Q.C. 11001150*k.,HEL D 1 HR. TO SEC. - X'# < RINGS AND TESTS STRES! RELIE VED BY HEATING TO PER hCH NIN. Al-D FURf-IACE COOLED TO GOT F. { INSP.N. M ATEJG':CH DATES ? c g w s o.1 V1 ..~<.~(,. %% te% the Obove inbtion is Correct. s uranosw e h n. ..e
0435 hlf \\. : 1[ 4~ g 3, q O \\ \\ N E f~j r. i; t n\\ = N.m 3 1 h t. ri ff e g. ,g ag s 2 8 _= = red%. d s u a. N. ,.y i \\ 3
- s. 5 y
z o i .,s\\
- N
\\ [ = (2 k h 4 N A IN Q s h% =x.M- .d\\ ( .:g h s-s! x 2 .Mf -% g 5 e e t M kI 95 5 -22 : h GN o 1 QC 4 4 \\ g ,t .n s. y ,y g $(w. -Q .*9 s N. Ys s y 2 ,1, N q p g i b % 4 Kp h sE E N2 % c .& g% %'@% T h.s T p ~~ .3 ,c._ _g s i.':: iy%g
- y I d P-r s
g c. .vN v. ~~ s \\s
- 94
-!!l o
- t y.
k 0% 1! . fi - gk N C,.y'.Dh h5 [$ q{ s - ~~ ~ $5
- .; p
~ v4.,. {z. 4",) lf. d.y h. \\d [- ' %a %t i {g :Y R }N 1 'd?x +!. } 8 I
- 1 q
- 3. b
=
}.s NUE FOR FLYWHEEIS I i Shop Order [7[8[f PT per 8050ID of plate prior to assemb37 P.O.} 74* G 74 ut. No. A 7fd) */ kop.kDate Y~b tbs 3 }/')l#Y0 / PT per 8050UD of plate prior to assemb27 Nbn P.O. }7 'T* G f e Ht.No. A13~03 ~ / kap.kDate y //*/7-FQ el l PT per 8050UD after first machining. losp. LDate fon Y. b $n b /D d#ff d.T 2 \\ / / l PT per 8050UD arte-keyvay. hop. k Date Yp v f$o 3 ~) f* 1'l i UI per 8051VL of finlahed r2yuheel. f b~ a a f i L Yl dv -_F.1 1"'" f / key k Date / / e Original d:cuments are on file at 'S IRAD East Pittsburgh, Penna. 15112 l
i i 1 GWtC'*E*'M?"MV% %Q5&%Q2&Gfg ' ~ *i 94.WST. LUKENS STEEL COMPANY 9-10-80 ma woa58f207-11 i ELEC. CORP. coatsevamm. tens ' QUAL. ASSURANCE DEPT. TEST CERTIFICATE j -u o m cusro== ca 39437-1 P179-980 HP 9480 VS l L9880 3/6 - x- .=c - - -- l WEST PDS-10310CR REV. P 78 A-533 GR. B CL. 1 ASME CODE SECT. III SUB NCA N-1160 8/4/01 { en e test ioectuary trst CHEMICAL ANALYSI5 i ( gn _ r l Cu $t Ni Ct ~ Mo V Ta At ^9.... m ab_ _ ,RM A7503 .19 1.31 .014 .008 .27 .67 57 VIP S" EEL Ell.'C. l i i i Y M i I PH M1 CAL P R O P E R T I Egg MEIT NO.-; . m'** 3,[ '7 S % aA XMM V +70' E APPEARANCl; DE5CRIPTION
- LUC, 4 5HLAR A
'g, i i A7503 1 757 950 24 T 86
- 86
- 70 70-70-70 l-8" x 7 ID x 66.75 ou i
('...~ 724 924 24 L 130
- 115 117 80-80-80 l
LATE tAL EXf'ANSIOld IN INCHES T .056 :.061 :.062 t (\\ .084 :.089.l.090 [ A =.. 3)FR0hTOPhDOTTOM OF RING 9 +20'F. EXHIBIT NO BRLAr., TRANS. ) ROP WEIGHT RESTS 'ER E2 )8 (SI EE P-i g4 grnqin of.= 990.!. RINGS AND TESTS HEATEa 1625--1675' =., HE.D 1/ ? HR. PER INCH MIN. AND giga kEl Lhh5 I P U
- NC
(
- QUENCHED, THEN FEMPER ED 122 )'F.,
HELD 1 '2 HR, PER JNCH HJN. ANI) WATER QUENCHED. c; PER INCH 4IN. A.1D FURL IACE COOLED r0 800 'F. TO SEC. 8- :_ -3! RELEASED BY Q.C RINGS AND TESTS STRES i RELI EVED D'f HEAT ING T0 1100j1150'f., HEl_D 1 HR. u! i l'. INSP.n. nrocvien DAT((f2k_ f
N
- 4. s
.y y a' i j l j i i ib w a w, i Q :; ,v. nN.9 g a -o S O 2.ij -:s n, r q %s I( g K id,~ l E I .!['! is \\. K 0 gn d, i i r j x! 4., s I E !N t I; g ,ky ksv .h ~ tJi = k h ~ m w,s v., s -j s _5 e N E *3 s y 8S
- 't.
M r-7 f. >='g:~g. s' < iE h MJ O t. z i s c g .t \\ \\ ~@4( .N J N a. L s', e i ', ' w# O (g u. v S' l IEEZ Q M ! i p1. y Q-4 @ i 4 -w -fE!gdR h-J NW lsh v se (j> s s e \\- L ~ y 4 x f 19-{)d. II Ir! L L s, %.t. s 5s g- }E 3
- @n o
~ -(q-c e. s, ..,3 s ':.l7;:N 5i Q'
- j. I,.,
i.v !a .s. s
~
- 5 M syd M " W W W [ W Q $ & f W i.? " f _
LUKENS STEEL COMPANY 9-10-80 rue.c8587-07-11 ~ {lh}hfEST. ELEC. CORP. coatssvaat en.tesse AL. ASSURANCE DEPT. TEST CERTIRCATE l mu cepen un cusionare e a 39438-1 P179-979 MP 9480 VS L9880 3/7 7 N s_ % am e.e sun. r 7 WEST PDS-10310CR REV. P 78 A-533 GR. B CL. 1 ASME CODE SECT. III S 14'NCA N-ll60 8/4V81 [ 7 Se e its? Honnoctwr Yv ttst CHEMICAL ANALYSIS ( _f MRT NO. C MN P 5 Cu 5e Nr Ca Mo A 'T k AL - CAS ma a b t tu r. a S A7503 .19 1 31 .014 .008 .27 .67 57 VIP S FEEL ELEC. f dUS ' [V i P H Y,}J C A L P R O P E R T I E $_, _... !..WLT NO. ~," 7, 3 ",[ ',,T h V +708F RANC i D E S C RIP TIO N % aA LOG j % SHEAR 1 757 950 24 T 86 ! 86 !70 70-70-70 1-8" x 7 ID x 76 5 00 !A7303 724 924 24 L 130 l115 l117 80-80-80 LATE RAL EXPANSIO}4 IN I (CHES T .056 :.061 l.062 -i L .084l.039'.090
- 3) FROH TOP,h; GDTT TRAf15.
DROP WEIGHT TESTS PER E2 08 (SI ZE P- )H OF RING 0 +200F. EXHIBIT I40 BRLAK. RINGS AND TESTS HEATE ] 1625-1675 F., HE L.D 1/ 2 HR. DER !?kH MIN AND y,$T-t 7 .p,,p e ,r
- g-
- QUENCHED, THEN TEMPERED 12200F.,
HELD 1 /2 HR PER ' INCH M,'IN. AN) WATE gyg),gg[g [ g g,,,,,,,,) QUENCHED. RELEASED DY Q.C. RING AND TESTS STRESS RELIE /ED BY HEATI 4G TO 1100- 150*F., HEL ) 1 HR. PE I INCH MIN. AND FJRNACE COOLE3 TO 8 000F. g gg' y ) INSP.N. MATZ EVICH DSIl /A; e r i /c hereby certify the above information is correct. ,,,,.a. x_ =
{ Cx3 4-T R ~ I U v [ N% r /2.w
- ~*
7 P E R ..- / /.s G / N ,d ~ I e.o f y. o. T s o S r
- G
~ E Nlx. t T c t L e m .n ,A E M, m., i. V c r. 4 N s I w w T A D e C t O c g' P4 4 r H b u "c.'MH w ! r o lF R T 'n S f l~ g E $/ C N r S / // H .y N d 6 e g. f fo 8 C l g i W f' o f Z WNM
- r. #
l$ -h. m 2 '- / ./ w Ca,,>w o a T up t I ~5"7~h o C N c u A m.A'f e m . YE t ,G 1-rr o U m u i A a p. e A A c G e ATR i <i e .N . M,,,L PM m c f,e h m O A w y-g 9 . C P 'W' E g L . ID c. x 7 t 4 E l p TN A S e F c SO mgo,g l. h. ._- 2 I N . NIT sb 9 [~ /* t }& E 6 KC t UE y 7 ~f s.g Y E P "b @/,- { S ei M E N y.w j A ~ .b,0 e) ~ I m s a o mc,.r$ N.. .. Y' w / / i))r, N rc c, r A a s se r n r q s i 5 1 l b n 5" O 'f f, k~ ad E e*f ;% 1g -} 4,. 5 s E. 9 aA lA E V,. W O,i ~- ii. W., """"?p;. Y tfio f ~ IA, o m2b Hi Tc o Y m""' l u F o , 0. / a. l uA2w?gf t .). c~ to .,y" o Wf.;xd~c t E c~ f. . C': t .. L t a - m"t s. s m i, .., -. 9 H o so /j l c .l l 1, l l}}