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Forwards Info on Section 19.9 Re COL License Info,Including Specific Procedure for Unisolated RWCU Line Break, Confirmation of RWCU Operation Beyond Design Basis & event-specific Procedures for Severe External Flooding
	ML20099A299
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	06/30/1992
From:	Duncan J; GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Kelly G; NRC
Shared Package
ML20099A263	List: ML20099A273; ML20099A280; ML20099A287; ML20099A299; ML20099A308; ML20099A316; ML20099A319;
References
	NUDOCS 9207290089
	Download: ML20099A299 (11)
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RW,S)' 92_ lMl2AM_ $l lh."MAf AtV W.W-8 .4 . W 19.9 COL LICENSEINFORMATION As the NRC staK review and the PRA was being completed,- a resiew was conducted to determine actions wh!ch will be completed by the COL applican t. -

The section represents the results of that review.

19.9.1 EVENT SPECIHC PROCEDURE FOR UNISOLATED RWCU UNE BREAK Although very unlikely m occur (Subsec' ion 19E.2.3.3), an unisolated reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) line beak could lead to significant consequences..

Attempting to control RPV water level in the normal range could lead to a continuous .

coolant outflow through the break since the RWCU suction nonle and the RPV drain line connection to the suction line are below the normal RPV level; Severe reactor building flooding in the long term and eventual depletion of ECCS water wurces could result if the break could not be isolated. .

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Since this is a very specific event, it wasjudged not appropriate to complicate the p symptom. based Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs)with actions toLmitigate the o

event. - An event specific procedure will be developed by the COL applicant using the following guidance:

L 1.- If an RWCU break or leak occurs (as indicated by RWCU room sump levels.

temperature indication, radiation level) and ' successful automatic or manual -

p isolation does not occur (as indicated by_ lack of closed indication on' at least one of the two RWCU isolation valves), the following actions should be taken. :

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l 2. Scram and depressurize the RPVif these actions have not occurred automatically. Attempt to close the isolation valves from the main control -

room. Close the drain line globe v.!ve from the main control room. Control-1941 n ;

, -JUN.30'92 Ll;1241 GEflVCLEAkAW O. cur i . . iv reactor vessel water level in accorciance with the EIG if at least one of the l isolation valves is cloud, if this is not the case, the level should be controlled between the top of the active fuel and 18 inches above the top of the active. ]

fuel if drain line closure is not successful. (The RPV drain line connects tc- !

l the RWCU suction line at this elevation). If drain line closure was successful, control water level between the top of the fuel and 5 feet above the top of the - i fuel. (The RWCU suction line is about 6 feet above the top of the fuel.) Use the temperature compensated fuel zone and wide range water level indication and pumps which can be throttled (CRD, RHR, condensate

- pumps).

3. When practical, enter the RWCU room' and/or the containment and affect the necessaiy repairs.

19.9.2 CONFIRMATION OF RWCU OPERATION BEYOND DESIGN BASES RWCU can be used to remove decay heat under accident conditions by bypusing __

the regenerative test exchangn as noted in section 19.3 'Ihis causes the nonregenerative heat exchanger totemove additional heat. However, this could Icad to exceeding the design temperature limits of the' RWCU nonregenerative heat exchanger and some portions of the piping of the RWCU and the reactor building cooling water (RCW) systems.

When the design of the RWCU and RCW systems (including piping and support structures) is completed, the COL applicant will confirm that if the RWCU P operating in this heat removal mode, the following areu do not experience excessive damage due to operating outside their design basis temperature values:

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1. The RWCU nonregenerative heat exchanger.

2. 'Ihe RWCU piping downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger.

3. The RCW piping downstream of the nonregenerative heat exchanger.

4. The feedwater piping downstream of RWCU injection.

.a 19.9.3 EVENT SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR SEVERE EXTERNAL FLOODING Internal flooding is addrened in Appendix 19Q. Plant and site specific procedures will be developed by the COL applicant for severe external flooding along the following lines:

1. Close the watertight door between the turbine and service buildings;

2. Sandbag the external doors to the following:

a. Reactor building,

b. Control building,

c. Service building, d .- Ultimate heat sink (assumes that the service water pumps would not be Gooded.),

e. - Diesel generator fuel oil trarder pits, and

f. Radwaste building; S. Plug the diesel generator room floor drains to prevent backflow; . _

4. Place a ladder to the roof of the control building for entry and egress by boat:

5. Shut the plant down; and

6. Use power from the diesel generators if offsite power is lost.-

19.9-3 l

L, JVli. 30' ' 92 11:13 4) u WGLtM' Aenr< .~r .e4 Any undeeground passaget between buildings would not be affected because they are required to be watertight. _ Any leakage through the sandbags and exterier_ walls would be channN to the buement storage areas by the internal flood control system.

Safe shutdown could be maintained indefinitelyin this condition.

19.9.8 CONFIRMATION OF SEISMIC CAPACITIES BEYOND THE PLANT ,

DESIGN BASES The seismic margins analysis usumed seismic capacities for some equipment for which information was not available sIt is expected that these capacities can be achieved,

, but confirmation must be deferred to the COL applicant when sufficient design detail is available. The actions specified in Section 19H.5 will be taken by the COL applicant.-

19.9.9 Pl.ANTWALKDOWNS A plantwalkdown to eek seismic vulnerabilides will be conducted by the COL applicant in accordance with EPRI NP-6041 m n'oted in Section 19H.5.

Similar walkdowns will be conducted by the COL applicant for internal fire evenu and for internal flooding events.

i 19.9.10 CONFIRMATION OFIDSS OF AC POWER EVENT !

The COL applicant will confirm the estimate of the loss o' AC power ewmt (Subsection 19D.5.1.2.4), address site-specific parameters (as indicated in the' staffs .

licensing review basis document), such as specific causes (e.g., a severe storm) of the loss of power, and their impact on recovery of AC power in a timely fuhion).

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19.9.11 PROCEDURES AND TRAINING FOR USF. OF AC4NDEPENDENT WATf2 INJECTION SWITM Speelfic, detailed procedures will be dewtoped by the COL applicant for the use

> the ACindependent water injecdon system to provide vesselinjecdon and drywell spray. Training will be ; :luded in the COL applicant's crew training propam.

l 19.9.11 ACT. IONS TO AVOID COMMON CAUSE FAILURES IN TIIE ESSENTIAL MULTIPLEXING SYSTEM (EMUX) i To reduce the potential for significant EMUX common cause failures, (see Subsection 19N.4.12), the COL applicant will take the following actions:

1. To eliminate remote multiplexing unit (RMU) miscalibration as a credible source of EMUX common cause failure, administrative procedures will be cistabilshed to perform cross <hannel checking of RMU c.utputs at the main control roo n safety system logic and control instrumentation, as a final check point of"MU calibration work.

2. To prevent any unidentified EMUX faults / failure modes (e.g., an undetected software fault) from propagating to other EMUX divisions, so tnat such unidentified faults are clicctively eliminated as a credible source c(EMUX common cause failure, the plant operating procedures will include the appropriate detalled procedures necessary to assure that the ABWR plant operations are maintained in compliance with the goveming Technical Specifications during the periods of divisional EMUX failure.

These will also include the appropriate symptom based procedures to assure that adequate core cooling is maintained in the hypothetical event of an entire EMUX system failure.

19.9-5

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19.9.13 ACTIONS TO Mrt1 GATE STATION BLACKOIJT EVFNi$

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[ lt wu necessary to make sewral tasumpdons in the aucument of plant i

I perfonnance tmder stadon blackout condidons as noted in Subsecdon 19C.2.1.2. The i following actions will bae taken by the COL app!! cant:

.L Cordirm that the rainimum condensate storage tank volume in 1530 cubic meters.

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, 2. Develop battery 1cw. ling proHles to denne appropriate load shedding --

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during stAtton blackout to insure that RCIC can be operated for at tent 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . .it is expected that compliance with COL license information i item 8.S.4.16 will satisfy this need.

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5. Perform analyses to conftrm that RCIC room ternperature will not exceed ;

equipment design temperature without toom cooling for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

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4. Perform analysca Io confirm that contro1 room temperature will not exceed equipment design temperature for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months vithout room cooling.

19.9.14 ACTIONS TO REDUCE RISK OF INTERNAL FLOODING In the unlikely event of significant ficxxiing from internatiources (addrened in -

Appendix 19R) such as the suppression pool, condensate stor*. gc tank, or fire water.

system, acdons will be completed by the COL applicant to ensure that the following can -

be perfonned to midgate flooding in the tu*bine, control, and reactor buildings.

19.9 6-

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1. Training on isolation of potential flooding murces,

2. Pump trip and valve isoladon capability of potential unlimited flood sources should be operable at all dmen.

3. Sizing of floor drains must be adequate to accommodate all potential flood ratel.

4. Procedures for maintenance of watertight integrity of buildings and rooms:

cepecially during shutdown condidons.-

19.9.15 ACr10NS TO AVOID LOSS OF DECAY HEAT RFMOVAL AND MINIMIZE SHVfDOWN RISK To reduce the potential for losing shutdown decay heat removal capability -

(addressed in Appendix 19Q), procedures will be prepared by the COL applicant for the following:

l. Recovery of failed cperadng RHR system.

2. Rapid implementation of standby RHR systems if the initially operating RHR system cannot be restored.

3. Ensuring that instrumentadon associated with the following functions is kept s available if the system is not in maintenance: .' '

- RW isolation valves-

-- ADS HFCF 19.9 7-u-

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e LPFL RW water level, preuure, and temperature RHR system alarms OG s

defueling interlocks Flood detection and valve / pump trip circuits ]

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4. Une of attemate means of decay heat remoni using non-safety grade :

equipment such as reactor water cleanup, fuel pool cooling, or the main Condenser, i

5. Use of ahernate means for inventory control using non nfety grade ettuipment such as ac independent water addition, CRD pump, and main feedwater and condensate, t

6. Recovery from loss of offsite power.

7. Boiling as a means of decay heat removalin mode 5 with the RW head removed including anilable make up sources.

8. Conducting suppression pool maintenance, especially as it relates to reduced availability of ECCS suction sources.

9. Fire / flood watches during periods of degraded safety division physical integrity. -

10. Ensuring that the physical barriers of at least one safety division are intact at -

all times.

19.9 8.

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11. Fire fighdng during shutdown.

12. IJae of remote shutdown panel while the plant is shutdown.

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To reduce other risks during shutdown, procedures will be prepared by the COL apphcant for the following:

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1. Firefighdng with part of the fire protection rystem in maintenance, 1

2. Outage planning uilng guidance from NUMARC-91-016, y

3. Use of freeze seals, RIP and CRD replacement.-

19.9.16 PROCEDURES FOR OPERATION OF RCIC FROM OUTSIDE THE J CONTROLROOM in the PRA fire analysis (Subsection 19M.6.2) creditis taken for operation of RCIC .

from outside the control room. The COL applicant will develop procedures and conduct training for iuch RCIC operation.

19.9.17 ECCS TEST AND SURVETLLANCEINTERVAIE The test and surveillance intervals asumed in the PRA are documented in Tables 19D.61 through 19D.611. The COL applicant will develop a plan and implement I procedures for identifying signillcant ' departures from these assumptions.:

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ML20099A299

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