ML20098E029
| ML20098E029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | West Valley Demonstration Project |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1992 |
| From: | Lindbergh B, Schiffhuaer C WEST VALLEY NUCLEAR SERVICES CO., INC. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-32 WVNS-SAR-004, WVNS-SAR-004-R07, WVNS-SAR-4, WVNS-SAR-4-R7, NUDOCS 9206010199 | |
| Download: ML20098E029 (367) | |
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Records Management d Fmm Ext, 4074, MS 52 Lener # . HF:92:0582 cite tiay 22, 1992 Sme:t Controlled Distribution of WNS-SAR 004, Revision 7, Supernatant Treatment System Module D To Distribution ec: Original, MS 50B Attached is WNS SAR-004, Rev. 7, S-epernatant Treatment System Module D, which has been assigned to you under controlled distribution. Destroy or mark superseded your current copy and replace fith the attached. Copies made fror., a controlled document are to be marked UNCONTROLLED before distribution. To acknowledge receipt of these documents, sign, date, and return the attached controlled distribution receipt acknowledgement to the ; undersigned by June 5, 1992. ' F"r your convenience, a self addressed, stamped envelope (off site re,cipients only) has been provided. For on site recipients, a return address has been placed on the reverse site of the controlled distribution receipt acknowledgement; fold and place in the mail. If you have any questions regarding this distribution, please centact the undersigned. Thank you for your cooperation. WB. E.WW . LSN % Lindt ". g@ cords Processc/r Records Me r ement
'Je s t Val' ' .iuclear Services Co. , Inc.
BEL Apprc ed: %*
- C. M. Schif fhayig, Manager
Attachment:
As stated above 1 PRC0153.R12
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l . c { Cw 9206010199 PDR PROJ 920402 ' 31-32 PDR &_ W -_
g 3 l WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT l SAFETY ~ ANALYSIS REPORT WNS SAR-004 REV. 7 l i l .. SUPERNAi!.dT TREATMENT SYSTEM i ' Controlled Copy No. SAR:0000863.RM L
West Valley ae"-- -"" ="-=4 Revision Number 7 Demonstration Project i l Revision Date 05/06/92 J t SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR SUPERNATANT TREATMENT SYSTEM J. J. PROWSE, M. A. SCHIFFHAUER SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
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REQUIREMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW MET BY REFERENCED DOCUMENT: EL 90:0137 DATED: Aucust 6. 1990 HAZARD CLASSIFICATION:. Moderate fDOE Aceroved D" 90:0811) l~ \,_/ APPROVALS: + [E D. C. Burns, Vitrification In-Cell Engineering Manager, Data f Al . & lb b t D. C.'Heens, IRTS Engineering Manager, Date l l& tr e e 4)t/w R..E. Lawrence, Vitrification Projcct Manager, Date l { l PA10~J~, WVNS Radiat! ion and#n/h R.' A.-Humphrey Chairm Safet ittee, Date West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. wv-11so, Rev. o P.O.m W SAR:0000863.RM West Valley, NY 14171-0191 DOE Approved: DW:92:0546 WV-1816, Re. 1 Date: April 17 1992
- .. . - - - -- - ,. = _ . _ - . . -
WVHS SAR-004 Rev. 7
- /h' RECORD OF REVISION \J PROCEDITRE If there are changes to the procedure, the revision number increases by one.
These changes.are indicated by placing a heavy vertical black line located in the - right-hand margin adjacent to the sentence or paragraph which was revised. Example: The ((dllhj in the text indicates a change. Revision On Rev. No. Description of Changes Page(s) Dated l
,m.
0 Original All 1 2 Major revision to reflect a new All operating approach und redesigned pumps and equipment.- km 3 Incorporate editorial changes 43, 79, 132, in review of Rev. 2 136, and Tables 9.1-1, 9.2-5, 9.2-6 and 9.2-7 4 Reflect changes in operating 62, 90, 91, protocol for supernatant sample 92 pneumatic transfer system Engineering Release #1429 8/88 5 Per ECNs #2716, 2716A, 2607A 76, 137, 138 4/89 A-1 A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, Addendum 1 6 Major rewrite to incorporate the All 9/91 Sludge Mobilization and Wash System and Addendum 1. O WV-1807, Rev. O SAR:0000863.RM Page i __ _ _ _ . __ . . . _ . . _ _ . - . _ _ .- - _ . . -~
WNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 (
\ I
_- RECORD OF REVISION _(CONTINUATION SHEET) l Revision.on Rev. No. Description of Changes Page(s). Dated F 7 Per~ECN No. 4850 4-17, 4-27 05/06/92 6-6, 6 14, 6-15, 9-12, 9 13,-9-14, 9 15, 9 23, 9-24,-9 25, 9-26, 9-27,9 28 s l-j. 4 l-l -. I 1, i l L l-W-1807a, Rev. O SAR:0000363.RM Page 11 I
WNS.S AR.004 Rev. 7 f TABLE OF CONTENTS 2A92
. . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv LIST OF TABLES .
LIST OF FIGURES . - . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii D.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY , . . . . . . . 1-1 D.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 D.1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 D.1.3 GENERAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 D.I.4 IDENTIFICATION Of .'. GENI 3 AND CONTRACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 D.1.5 STRUCTURE OF THIS SAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 1-5
. . . . . . . . 1-5 D.1.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER/NEW TECHNICAL INFO..MATION REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 D.2.0
SUMMARY
SAFETY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2-1 (" D.2.1 SITE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( D.2.1.1 NATURAL PHENOMENA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 D.2.1.2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING THE SAFETY ANALYSIS . . . . . . 2-1 D.2.1.3 EFFECT OF NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION AND HILITARY FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 D.2.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF NORMAL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 D.2.3 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT FROM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 D.2.4 ACCIDENTS , . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 D.2.5 NONRADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
'D.
2.6 CONCLUSION
S . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 REFERENCES FOR-SECTION D.2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 D.3.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 D.3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF WVDP ENVIRONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 D.3.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MILITARY FACILITIES . . . . 3-1 D.3.3 METEOROLOGY . . . . .. . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 D.3.4 SURFACE HYDROLOGY . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 SARiO000863.RM Page 111
l 1 i l WNS .S AR.004 Rev. 7 h
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TABLE OF CONTENTS fcentinued1 Pace. D.3.5 SUBSURFACE HYDROLOGY , . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 D.3.6 GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 D.3.7 SITE ECOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 D.4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4-1 D.4.1 PURPOSE OF THE STS AND SMWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . D.4.1.1 STS FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- 4-3 , D.4.1.1.1 SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 D.4.1.1.2 SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION FILTERING AND COOLING . . . . . . . . . 4-3 D.4.1.1.3 ION EXCHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . .. 4-4 DECONTAMINATED SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION COLLECTION AND TRANSFER . 4-4 D.4.1.1.4 SPENT IEOLITE DISCHARGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 D.4.1.1.5 D.4.1.1.6 MOBILIZATION PUMPS- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 4-6 D.4.1.1.7 . MOBILIZATION PUMP CONTROLLERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ' D.4.1.1.8 MOBILIZATION PUMP SUPPORT STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 D.4.1.1.9 PUMP ENCLOSURE BUILDINGS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 FEEDS TO THE SMWS AND STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 D.4.1.2
.D.4.1.3' SMWS AND STS PRODUCTS AND BY-PRODUCTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 D.4.2 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SAFETY CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-9 D.4.2.1 USE OF ORIGINAL FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 NEW FACILITIES AND STRUCTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 D.4.2.2 D.4.2.3 CODES AND' STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
'D.4.3 SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . 4-12 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
-D.4.3.1 PROTEOTION BY MULTIPLE CONFINEMENT BARRIERS AND~ SYSTEMS . . . . 4-12 D.4.3.2 D.4.3.3 PROTECTION BY EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENT DESIGN AND SELECTION . . 4-15 D.4.3.4 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17 D.4.3.5 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 SAR:0000863.RM Page iv l
WNS.SAR.004 - lmp
- r. Rev. 7 V~ TABLE OF CONTENTS fecntinued)
Page
. 4-21 D.4.3.6 FIRE AND EXPLOSION PROTECTION . ... . . . . . . . . . .. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 D.4.3.7 RADIOACTIVE WASTE HANDLING AND STORAGE
.. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 4-22 D.4.3.8 INDUSTRIAL AND CHEMICAL SAFETY D.4.4 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS .. . . 4-23
. . . 4 D.4.5 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION AND DE('OMMISSIONING
. . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . , , 4-27 REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.4.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 D.5.0 STS AND SMWS FACILITIES DESIGN 5-1 D.5.1
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION OF THE STS AND SMWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 D.5.1.1 LOCATION AND FACILITY LAYOUT
. . . . . . . . .. . . 5-2 D.5.1.2 PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE STS AND SMWS
. . . . 5-3
-D.5.2 FACILITY MODIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION FOR THE STS AND SMWS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 D.5.2.1 MODIFICATIONS TO ORIGINAL FACILITIES
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 D.S.2.1.1 MODIFICATIONS TO TANK BD-1
. . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 D.S.2.1.2 MODIFICATIONS TO TANKS 8D-2 AND 8D-3 5-9 D.5.2.2 NEW FACILITY CONSTRUCTION . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PIPEWAY . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 D.S.2.2.1 VALVE AISLE . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 D.5.2.2.2 D.5.2.2.3 STS SUPPORT BUILDING . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 5-10
-D.S.2.2.4 WASTE TRANSFER SYSTEM . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
. . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 D.S.2.2.5 STS HV AND PVS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 5-12 D.S.2.3 STRUCTURAL SPECIFICATIONS D.5.2.3.1 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO TANK BD-1 FOR THE 5-12 STS . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l 5-12 D.5.2.3.1.1 DESIGN CRITERIA . . . . . . . - * - - - - - * * * * * * * * *
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 D.5.2.3.1.2 DESIGN OF CONCRETE SHIELD STRUCTURE
. . . . . . . . . 5-14 D.5.2.3.1.3 CONCRETE TANK BD-1 VAULT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS 5-15
- f. D.5.2.3.1.4 STEEL TANK 8D-1 MODIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i l
\ SAR:0000863.RM Page v
WVNS-SAR.004
~ g Rev. 7 i
) TABLE OF CONTENTS feontinued)
Pace
=
f D.S.2.3.2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF THE " MODIFICATIONS" TO TANK BD-2 FOR THE 5-15 ; SMWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D.5.2.3.2.1 DESIGN OF THE SMWS STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
. . . . . . . . . 5-16 D.5.2.3.2.2 CONCRETE TANK BD-2 VAULT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS 5-17 D.5.2.3.2.3 STEEL TANK BD-2 MODIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.S.3 STS AND SMWS SUPPORT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 VENTILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 D.5.3.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 D.5.3.2 MONITORING AND LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS ENVIRONMENTAL-MONITORING' SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 D.5.3.2.1 D.5.3.2.2 ON-SITE EXPOSURE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19 D.5.3.2.3- PROCESS CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19 D.5.3.2.4 LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20 D.S.3.2.5 CONTAINMENT METAL CORROSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-23
- D.5.3.3 AUXILIARY POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-25
\ D.
5.4 DESCRIPTION
OF SERVICE AND UTILITY SYSTEMS STS BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . 5-25 D.5.4.1 MAJOR COMPONENTS AND OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . 5-27 D.5.4.1.1 D.5.4.1.1.1 AIR SUPPLY UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-27 D.S.4.1.1.2 DUCTWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-27
. . . 5-28 D.5.4.1.1.3 INLET FILTERS AND DAMPERS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . s 5-28 D.5.4.1.1.4 HEATERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.S.4.1.5 EXHAUST FANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-28 5-28
'a s " .4.1.1.6 EIRAUST FILTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.S.4.1.1.7 DISCHARGE DUCTWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-29 D.S.4.1.2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTROL INTERFACES BETWEEN CLEAN AND5-29 CONTAMINATED AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D.S.4.1.2.1 AIR FILTRATION- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-30 5-31 D.5.4.2 WTFVS ( -: SAR:0000863.RM Page vi [
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u WNS SAR.004 VN Rev. 7 4 -:-
- \.f TABLE OF CONTENTS f continue,41 PJL91 D.5.4.3 COMPRESSED AIR . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . 5-31 D.S.4.4 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY POWER SUFPLY . . . . . . . . . 5 -D.5.4.5 WATER SUPPLY . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . 5-32 D.5.4.6 STEAM SUPPLY . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . . . 5 SANITARY FACILITIES . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . 5-33 D.S.4.7 SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS AND ALARMS ....... . . . . . . . . 5-33 D.S.4.8 D.5.4.9 FIRE PROTECTION SYS*EM . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . 5-34 D.5.4.10 MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . .. ...... . . . . . . . 5-35 D.5.4.11 COLD CHEMICAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . 5-35 REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.S.O . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . 5-36 D.6.0 STS AND SMWS PROCESS SYSTEMS . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . 6I
. . . . . . . . . 6-1 D.6.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . .... .2 SLUDGE WASHING . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . 6-1 D.6.1.1
/ 6-3 D.6.1.2 PREFILTRATION AND COOLING . . . . ....... . . . . . . . .
{
. . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 D.6.1.3 ION EXCHANGE FINAL FILTRATION . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 D.6.1.4 DECONTAMINATED SLUDGE WASH SOLUTIONS COLLECTION AND TRANSFER . 6-6 D.6.1.5 D.6.1.6a --SPENT ZEOLITE DISCHARGE AND STORAGE ..... . . . . . . . . . 6-7
. 6-8 D.6.1.6b SPARGE LINE ADDITION FOR ALTERNATIVE ZEOLITE DISCHARGE METHOD SAND FILTER DISCHARGE.. . . . . ......... . . . . . . . 6-11
, D.6.1.7 D.6.1.8 FRESH ZEOLITE FILL . . . . . . ............ . . . . 6-11
. . . . . . 6-12 D.6.1.9 IDENTIFICATION OF ITEMS FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS CONCERN
. . . . . . . . 6-13 D.6.2 PROCESS CHEMISTRY AND' PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY PRINCIPLES D.6.2.1 ION #10 MANGE MEDIUM . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . 6-16 6-18 D.6.3 MECHANICAL PROCESS SYSTEM . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . .
COLD CHEMICAL RECEIVING, HANDLING AND TRANSFER . . . . . . . . 6-18 . D.6.3.1 6-18 D.6.3.2 FRESH ZEOLITE. LOADING . . . . . ....... . . . . . . . . . . 1
- j. SAR:0000863.RM Fage vii l:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS feontinued) Pace SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION TRANSFER AND RANDLING . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 D.6.3.3 DECONTAMINATED SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION TRANSFER AND HANDLING . . . 6-19 D.6.3.4 LOADED LEOLITE TRANSFER AND HANDLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 D.6.3.5 D.6.3.6 SLUDGE MOBILIZATION PUMPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 D.6.4 CHEMICAL FRDCESS SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 D.6.5 PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 D.6.5.1 WATER RECYCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 D.6.5.2 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATIOF AND CONTROL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 D.6.5.3 SYSTEM AND COMPONENT SI ARES D.6.6 CONTROL ROOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24
. 6-25 D.6.7 STS AND SMWS SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.6.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 D.7.0 WASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT
,m 7-1 D.7.1 WASTE MASAGEMENT CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
( ') Q ,/ 7-1 D.7.2 RADIOLOGICAL WASTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 D.7.3 NONRADIOLOGICAL WASTES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 D.7.4 GASEOUS WASTES 7-3 D.7.4.1 STA PVS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7-4 D.7.4.2 'dTFVS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5 D.7.5 LIQUID WASTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 D.7.6 LIQUID WASTE SOLIDIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 D.7.7 SOLID WASTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.7.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 l D.B.O RADIATION PROTECTION
! D.B.1 ENSURING THAT OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURES ARE AS LOW AS 8-1 REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 D.8.1.1 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 D.8.1.2 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS (x Page viii
(_,) SAR:0000863.RM
l VVNS.SAR.004 Rev. 7 E[ (- TABLE OF CONTENTS fcentinuedi Pace , (
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 D.8.1.3' OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 8-3 D.8.1.3.1 PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8-4 D.8.1.3.2 CONTROL ROOM AND UTILITY FACILITIES . . . . . . ... . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4 D 8.1.3.3 SUPPORT SERVICES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4' D.8.2 SOURCES OF RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVITY CONTAINED SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 D.8.2.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5 D.8.2.2 AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY SOURCES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6 D.8.3 RADIATION PROTECTION DESIGN FEATURES STS AND SMWS DESIGN FEATURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 D.8.3.1 8-7 D.8.3.2 . SHIELDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8-8 D.8.3.2.1 PIPEWAY AREA (CONCRETE SHIELDING) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 D.8.3.2.2 VALVE AISLE (STEEL / IRON SHIELDING) 8-9 D.8.3.3 VENTILATION . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.8.3.4 AREA RADIATION AND AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY MONITORING 8-10
^d' INSTRUMENTATION , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.8.4 ESTIMATED ON-SITE DOSE ASSESSMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 D.8.5 HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12 D.8.6 OFF-SITE DOSE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
. 8-13 D.8.6.1 EFFLUENT MONITORING PROGRAMS- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-14
- D.S.6.2 ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE CONTRIBUTION
. . . . . . . . . . 8-14 D.B.6.3 ESTIMATED EXPOSURES FROM AIRBORNE RELEASES
.--. 8-16 D.8.6.4 LIQUID RELEASES . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.8.0 . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 D.9.0 ACCIDENT SAFETY ANALYSIS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 D.9.1 ADNORMAL OPERATIONS . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 D.9.1.1 LEAK IN STS COOLER / CHILLER SYSTEM D.9.1.2 REPLACE FAULTY (LEAKING) BLOCK CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY-(EXAMPLE OF 9-2 CONTACT MAINTENANCE IN VALVE AISLE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l b SAR:0000863.RM Page ix
. _ m _ _ .-. . _- . - . _
s WNS SAR.004 Rev 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS (centinu25d f.ASLR D.9.1.3 STICKING (" HANG-UP') OF A SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION ANALYTICAL 9-3 SAMPLE IN THE PNEUMATIC TRANSFER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . i l D.9.1.4 CESIUM-BREAKTHROUGH TO TANK 8D-3 (POTENTIAL BREAKTHROUGH OF
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 HLW TO THE LWTS) l
. . . . . . . . 9-7 D.9.1.5 FAILURE OF TAftK GD-2 SUPERNATANT TRANSFER PUMP l D.9.1.6 FAILURE OF A W JOR STS PROCESSING COMPONENT IN TANK 8D-1 9-8
.(EXAMPLE: IC.a MCHANGE COLUMN) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 D.9.1.7 MOBILIZATION PUMP FAILURE SPARGE LINE . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 D.9.1.8-D.9.1.9 INADVERTENT ACID ADDITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 D.9.1.10 FAILURE TO DUMP AN ION EXCHANGE COLUMN CONTAINING TI-TREATED 9-14 ZEOLITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.9.2 ACCIDENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15 D.9.2.1 . ACCIDENTS ANAL' TIED D.9.2.2 -SOURCE TERMS' . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 5 D.9.2.3 RADIATICN-DOSES . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
)
%./ ' 9-22 D.9.2.3.1 RADIATION 000ES 'M 'IHE PUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.9.2.3.2 RADIATION DOSES TO WORKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 D.9.2.4 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
. . 9-28 D.9.2.5 POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE EXCURSIONS AND EXPLOSION D.9.3_ IMPACT-OF DESIGN BASIS NATURAL PHENOMENA EVENTS AND OTHER 9-29 EXTREME LOADS'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.9.3.1 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
~
D.9.3.1.1 WIND LOADS TORNADO . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 D.9.3.1.2 D.9.3.1.3 TORNADO MISSILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32 D.9.3.1.4 SEISMIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 SNOW LCADING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 D.9.3.1.5 9-33 D.9.3.1.6' INTERNAL PRESSURE LOADS .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 D.9.3.1.7 THERMAL LOADS . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
/
\,
SAR:0000863.RM Page x
. - . - - , . . ~, - ~
WNS. S AR.004 r Rev. 7 i Y U. TABLE OF CONTENTS feontinued) Phae D.9.3.1.8 SOIL PRESSURE LOAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 D.9.3.1.9 DYNAMIC SOIL PRESSURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 D.9.3.1.10 PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT LOADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 D.9.3.1.11 CONSTRUCTION LOADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36 D.9.3.2 LOAD COMBINATION CRITERIA . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37 D.9.3.3 ASSESSMENT OF CONFINEMENT BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38 D.9.3.3.1 ANALYTICAL METHOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39 D.9.3.3.2 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39 D.9.3.3.3 ENGINEERING JUDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40 D.9.3.4 FAILURE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40 D.9.3.4.1 CR1TICAL LOADING CONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40 D.9.3.4.2 r. ODES OF FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'9-42 D.9.3.4.3- BARRIER B'EHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 9-43
-D.9.3.4.4 SAFETY FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . 9-44
.s D.9.3.4.5 LEAKACE*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45 D 9.3.5
SUMMARY
- STS AND SMWS BARRIER INTEGRIT*' ANALYSIS . . . . . . . 9-46 ,
REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.9.0 . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49 D.10.0 CONDUCT OF STS AND SMWS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
. D.10.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 D.10.2 PREOPERATIONAL TESTING AND OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 D.10.2.1 - ADMINISTRATIVC PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING THE TEST PROGRAM . . . 10-2 D.10.2.2 TEST PROGRAM DESCR.*PTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 D.10.2.2.1 PHYSICAL FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . 10-3 D.10.2.2.1.1 PIPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 D.10.2.2.1.2 WIRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 D.10.2.2.1.3 POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 D.10.2.2.1.4 MOTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
(- ( A SAR:0000863.RM Page xi I l l
* +- a%--- -, ---w s.%---- ., , - , - - - - - - - , - - - + - - - w- -.- ,,,,- wr-+ +wes -v ----w ,- ---- ,v+- + rw -- -- y-
WNS.SAR.004 O- Rev. 7-( v.J TABLE OF CONTENTS fggntinued) Pace VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-10-4 D.10.2.2.1.5 D.10.2.2.1.6 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 i D.10.2.2.1.7 PROCESS COMPONENTS . . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 l 1 i D.10.2.2.1.8 INTERFACE SIGNALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 D.10.2.2.1.9 RADIATION MONITORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4
, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 D.10.2.2.1.10 COOLING SYSTEM D.10.3.2.1.11 CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 D.10.2.2.2 PROCESS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 D.10.2.2.2.1 PRELIMINARY TESTING .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 D.10.2.2.2.2 RIMOTE HANDLING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 ;
D.10.2.2.2.3 INTEGRATED TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 D.10.2.3 - TEST DISCUSSION . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 D.10.2.3.1 PIPING TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 ) D.10.2.3.2 WIRING TESTS %). 10-7 D.10.2.3.3 MOTOR TESTS . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.10.2.3.4 VALVE TESTS . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 D.10.2.3.5 PROCESS COMPONENTS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 D.10.2.3.6- PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 D.10.2.3.7 ZEOLITE BATCH TANK TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 PNEUMATIC SAMPLE TRANSFER S'aSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
'D.10.2.3.8 0.10.2.3.9 RADIATION MONITORS . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 10-9 D.10.2.3.10 ION EXCHANGE COLUMNS. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.10.2.3.11 FILTRATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9 D,10.2.3.12 COOLING SYSTEM . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 . 10-9 D.10.2.3.13 OPERATIONAL TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 D.10.2.3.14 SLUDGE MOBILIZATION PUMPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-D.10.3 TRAINING PROGRAMS . . . . .- . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10 x SAR:0000863.RM Page xii
g-: i WNS.SAR 004 Rev. 7
-r
[ )t TABLE OF CONTENTS f cent inued), 1 PDae l D 10.3.1 SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS OF THE SMWS OPERATOR QUALIFICATION ! PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 10-10 l
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 D.10.3.2 OPERATION PREREQUISITES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1.1 D.10.3.3 TRAINING RESOURCES
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 D.10.3.4 TRAINING CONTENT OUTLINE
. . . . . . . . . . 10-16 D.10.3.5 QUALIFICATION VERIFICATION / DOCUMENTATION ETAMINATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16 D.10.3.5.1 DOf.tMENTATION . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16 D.10.3.5.2 10-17 D.10.3.5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10-17 D.10.3.6 REQUALIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19 D.10.4 NORMAL STS/SMWS OPERATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19 D.10.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.10.0 . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 10-20 OPERATIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 D.11.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 12-1 D.12.0 QUALITY ASSURE CE l -_
!I D.12.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGPRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 t
I = D.12.2 IMPLEMENTATION
. 12-4
! REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.12.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L l i ( SAR:0000863.RM Page xiii
_ . . _ _ _ .m _ _ _ _ i WVNS SAR.004 {} r.J . Rev. 7 LIST OF TABtES D.l.3-1 Proposed Wash Cycle Flow Summary D.l.1-1 Current (1990) Structure of the West Valley Demonstration Project Safety A.talysis Report D.2.3-1 Summary of STS and SMWS Abnormal Operations D.2.4-1 Summary.of STS and SMWS Accident Analyses D.4.3-la STS Confinement Barrier Summary D.4.3-lb Confineaent Barrier Summary for Sludge Mobilization Wash System D.4.3-2 SMS Confinement Barrier Analyses References D.4.4-la Safety Classification of Important Structures, Systems and Componento Associated with the Supernatant Treatment System D.4.4-lb Safety Classification of Important Structures, Systems and Components Associatsd with the Sludge Mobilization and Wash System D.S.1-1 Location of Major STS Components D.5.2-1 Penetrations Made in the Roof of Tank BD-1 /'~'i D.5.2-2 Engineering codes / Standards for STS D.5.2-3a' Design Codes and Standards for STS Confinement Systems D.5.2-3b Design Codes and Standards for STS Structural Systems D.5.3-1 STS Leak Detection Systems D.S.4-1 STS Utilities Requirements D.6.2-1 Chemical Compoultion of Titanium-Treated IE-96* Zeolite D.6.5-1 Process Instrumentation D.8.2-1 Metal Concentrations in Wash Solutions D.S.2-2 Maximum Radionuclide Concentrations D.8.3-1 STS Pipeway Walls - Shielding Analysis D.8.3-2 STS Pipeway Roof - Shielding Analysis D.S.3-3 STS Valve Aisle - Front Wall - Shielding Analysis D.8.3 STS Valve Aisle - Side Wall - Shielding Analysis D.8.3-5 STS Valve Aisle - Roof - Shielding Analysis D.8.6-1 Maximum Normal Operations Air Releases \s SAR:0000863.RM Pago xiv
VVNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 LIST OF TABLES feoncluded) D.9.2-1 Accident 1 - Tank BD-2 Roof Collapse - Direct to Environment - Ground Release D.9.2-2 Accident 2 - Pipe Leak - Direct to Environment - Ground Relea - D.9.2-3 Accident 3 - Valve Aisle Pipe Leak - Through PVS - Ground Releasr D.9.2-4 Accident 4 - Ti-IX column Over-Pressurization - Through PVS Ground , Release D.9.2-5 Accident 5 - HEPA Fire-Elevated Pelease D.9.2-6 _ Fissionable Material Inventory for Tank BD-2 and Maximum Envelope for Ion Exchange Columns D.9.2-7 Summary of Criticality Evaluation for the Zeolite Column of SMWS 3 D.9.2-8 Physical Description of Zeolite Column D.9.2-9 K,gg for a 1.0 kg 239 Pu Sphere in the Center of the Zeolite Column D.9.2-lO T4rr for a 22.5 cm Pu Sphere in the Center of the Zeolice Column 239 D.9.3-l_ Sludge Mobilization in Tank 8D-2 Confinement Barrier Vulnerability Assessment for' Extreme Natural Hazards j g D.10.1-1 Minimum Shif t Hanning Levels for Operation of the ntPS i i l' i l-l: l I. t l O x./ SAR:0000863.RM Page xv
WNS . S AR.004 Rev. 7 LIST OF FIGURES 3
~
@TE[]lFfigiijifare"iocat'e{[at]!is"esd"'of f thaYdocument in fnumeriesil order 2 D.4.1-1 Sludge Mobilization Pump D.4.1-2 Tank Risers for Sludge Mobilization Pump Access D.4.1-3 Tank 8D-1/8D-2 Plan and Clevation Above Internal Gridwork D.4.2-1 STS Process Facilities D.4.2-2 STS Shield Structures D.4.3-1 STS System Layout D.5.1-1 Relationship of STS and SMWS to WVDP Site D.5.1-2 Sludge Mobilization Pumps and Supernatant Removal Pump Location Plan View i D.5.1-3 Tank 8D-2 Section: Elements of the Sludge Mobilization WL*
D.5.1-4 STS Facilities Layout D.5.1-5 Supernatant Treatrnent Processing Flow Diagram Modified Structure of Tank BD-1: Locatio- of STS Process Components D.5.2-1 D.5.2-2 Remote Installation of Pumps in MLW Tanks D. 5.2 -3 S2S Pipeway and Suspension of STS Cotaponents into Tank BD-1 D.S.2-4 The STS Valve Ainle D.L.2-5 STS Support Building, Valve Aisle, and Pipeway El = 28 m (92 ft) D.5.2-6 STS Support Building, Valve Aisle, and Pipeway El = 32.6 m (107 ft) D.S.2-7 STS Support Building Elevation D.5.4-1 Schematic of STS Ventilation System, El = 28 m (92 It) D.S.4-2 tschematic of STS Ventilation System, El = 32.6 m (107 ft) D.6.1-1 P&ID: STS Filtration and Cooling Section D.6.1-2 P&ID: STS Ion Exchange Sheet No. 1 D.6.1-3 P&ID: STS Ion Exchange Sheet No. 2 D.6.1-4 P&ID: STS Final Filtration and Storage D.6.1-5 P&ID: STS Zeolite Fill and Sluice Section D.6.1*6 P&ID: STS Venting and Chiller section SAR:0000863.RM Page xv1
7 l WNS. SAR.004 j Rev. 7 ! [-):
.% ,/ . l LIST OF FIGURES fcontinuedi l
SMWS P&ID, Shest No. 1 of 10 i D.6.1-7 1 D.6.1-8 SMWS P&ID,. Sheet No. 2 of 10 ! D 6.1 '9 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 3 of 10 D.6.1-10 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 4 of J.0 D.6.1-11 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. S of 10 D . 6.1-12 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 6 of 10 D.6.1-13 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 7 of 10 D.6.1-14 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 8 of 10 D.6.1-15 SMWS P&ID, Sheet No. 9 of 10 D.6.1-16 #MS P&ID, Sheet No.10 of 10 D . 6.1-17 Sparps Line Addition for Alternative Zeolite Discharge Method 1 D.6.6-1 ST3 Con';rol Panel , D.6.6-2 VGS Building and SMWS Control Room D.7.4-1 Combined PVS/WTFVS Schematic D.7.4-2 Flow Diagram for the STS Permanent Ventilation System D.7.4-3 Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System D.B.3-1 shielding Model - STS Pipeway Area D.P.3-2 shielding Model - STS Valve Aisle 239 Pu D.9.2-1 Ke n Versus Sphere Radius for 1.0 kg D.9.2-2 Ko rt Versus 239Pu Mass-'in a 22.5-cm Sphere . D.10.1-1 IRTS_ Organizational Structure SAR:0000653.RK Page xvil
VVNS-SAR-004 I' Rev. 7-b ACR%TMS AND ABEREVIATIONS d .- Angstrom (10e centimeter) , ACI. American Concrete Institute I AEDE Annual Ef fective Dose Equivalent AISC American Institute of Steel Construction ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANSI American National Standards Institute APOC Abnormal Pump Operating condition ARM Area Radiation Monitor ASERAE American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers Bq Becquerel c Centi, Prefix for 10-2 C coulemb
'C Degrees Celsius CAM Continuous Air Monitor cc Cubic Centimeter CEDE Committed Ef f ective Dose Equivalent cfm Cubic Feet per Minute CFR Cod 9 of Federal Regulations ci Curie
~Cs Cesium
= CSS Cem2nt solidification Sistem
/O- -Cv Column volume (,I CY Calendar Year DB Dry Bulb DBE Design Basis Earthquake DBEQ Design Basis-Earthquake DBT Design Basis Tornado DC Drum Cell-D&D Decontamination and Decommission DEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservatior DF Decontamination Factor DOE Departmont of Energy DOP Dioctyl phthalate DOT Department of Transportation EDE Effective Dose Equivalent EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPE Emergency Protection Zone [()t SAR:0000863.PJi Page xviii
- =
UVNS SAR 004 Rev, 7 l ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (continued) I
'F Degrees Fahrenheit '
ft Feet G Giga, Prefix for 10' g Gravitational Acceleration Constant ) g Gram gal- Callon gpm Gallons ~Per Minute h Hour HEPA High Ef.'iciency Particulate Air HLW High-level Radioactive Waste hp Horsepower HV Meating and-Ventilation HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning ID DOE Idaho Operations Office IEEE _ Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IES Illuminating Engineering Society in Inch IRTS. Integrated Radwaste Treatment System IWP Industrial Work Permit k Kilo,-Prefix for 103 keff Effective Neutron Multiplication Facter
-(,
r)\ - L lbs Liter pounds LLI. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory LLW Low-level Radioactive Waste LLWTF Low-level Waste Treatment Facility (O2 Plant} 1pm Litaro Por Minute LWTS Liquid Maste Treatment System
.a Micro, Prefix for 10
m meter m Milli, Prefix for 10'3 M- Mega, Prefix for 10' MCC Motor Control Center mol Mole MT Metric Ton n Nano, Prefix for 10" i Ne sodium NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory OSR Operational Safety Raquirement oz ounce
-tD( ,/_ SAR:0000863.RM Page xix
i VVNS-SAR-004
. ,n Rev. ?
( -
.\
. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (continued) ;
l p Pico,' Prefix for 10-12 Peta, Prefix for 10 15 ) P " P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Pa PascalPC Partition Coefficient pcf Pounds per Cubic Foot PLC Programmable Logic Controller PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory psf Pounds per Square Foot psi Pounds per Square Inch
.p sig Pounds per Square Inch Gauge PSO Plaau systems Operations Pu Plutonium PVC Polyvinyl chloride PVS Peruanent Ventilation System QA Quality Assurance-QAP . Quality Assurance Proceduren QAPP Quality Assurance Program Plan QMM Quality Management Manual
. Roentgen rem Roentgen Equivalent Man rpm Revolutions per Minute RWP Radiation Work Permit s Second
~' SAR Safety Analysis Report scfm- Standard Cubic Feet-per Minute SMS Sludge Mobilization System SMWS Sludge Mobilization and Wash System
-Sr Strontium STP Standard Temperature and Pressure STS Supernatant Treatment System Sv Slevert T Tera, Prefix for 10 12 Ti Titanium TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TR Technical Requirement TVS Temporary Ventilation System UBC Uniform Building Code UL Underwriters Laboratories V&S. Ventilation and Service Building VF Vitrification Facility VOG Vossel Off-Gas System Page xx
) SAR:0000863.RM
.VVNS SAR 004 ,
. - .s l Rev. 7
\ %}
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (concluded) W Watt wtt Weight percent WTF Waste Tank Farm WTTVS -Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System WVDP West Valley Demonstration Project-WVNS West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc.
.WVPP West Valley. Policies and Procedures y Year
( ~ 's SAR:0000863,RM' Page xxi
VVNS-SAR-004 p - -- Rev. 7 ( D.l.O INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY D.l.1 INTRODUCTION This Safety Analysis Report (SAR), WVNS-SAR-004, Volume III, Part D, Supernatant Treatment System (STS), was prepared to meet the requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order DOE-5481.1B (U.S. DOE, 1986), Idaho Operations Off*ce (ID) Order ID-5481.lA (U.S. DCE-ID, 1989), and West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. (WVNS) Policy and Procedure WV-906, Rev. 8 (WVNS, 1990). Further introductory information relating to the WVDP Act, ancillary tasks and supporting activities that must be accomplished may be obtained from Section A.l.1 of Volume I of the Project SAX (WVNS-SAR-001). Former PUREX reprocessing activities generated high-level radioactive waste (HLW) that is stored in Tank BD-2. This HLW is separated into an alkaline supernatant and sludge. It is the task of the WVDP to convert the HLW into borosilicate glass for ultimate storage in a federal repository. (The preliminary SAR for the Vitrification Facility (VF), in which the HLW will be converted into borosilicate glass, in wvNS-SAR-003.) In order to accomplish i
\ this mission pretreatment of the HLW is neccesary.
The pretreatment is performed by the Sludge Mobilization and Wash System (SMWS), analy ed in this SAR, and the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System (IRTS) which consists of the STS, analyzed in this SAR; the Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS), described and analyzed in WVFC-SAR-005, Volume IV, Part H; the Cement Solidification System (CSS), described and analyzed in WVHS-SAR-008, Volume IV, Part G; and the Drum cell (DC), described and analyzed in WVMS-SAR-007, Volume IV, Part K. The SHWS will remove the interstitial salto and salt crystals from the PUREX sludge by mobilizing the sludge with tho'eludge mobilization pumps and using dilute caustic solution to suppress actinide solubility while dissolving the salt and salt crystals._ However, salt and salt crystals are deleterious to the performance of the VF's melter; in order to adequately wash the sludge, four wash cycles may be necessary. The resultantiliquid, the sludge wash solution, will be processed by the IRTS. The washed sludge will be stored in Tank SD-2 until it is used as melter feed to the VP. (Os_s/ SAR 0000863.RM Page 1-1
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WVNS SAR-004 The SMWS consists of the caustic solution,-which will be added to Tank 8D-2, j and sludge mobilization pumps. The sludge mobilization pumps are' suspended from a pump support structure above Tank BD-2. The STS has radiologically decontaminated approximately ,0% of the alkaline supernatant remaining from PUREX reprocessing activities. The term "supernatant" specifically refers to the liquid portion of the HLW remaining
-in Tank BD-2 from PUREX reprocessing activities and not to sludge wash solution as defined above; however, when used to describe equipment, the term is synonymous with sludge wash solution. Radiological decontamination of supernatant, specifically cesium, was achieved through the use of ion exchange raterial or zeolite,.Ionsiv IE-96". The STS will continue to use Ionsiv IE-96* for the removal of cesium from the sludge wash solution; however, zeolite treated with titanium may be used, as necessary, to additionally remove plutonium and strontium. The plutonium removal may be necessary in order to meet the U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission's requirements for stable low-level radioactive waste (LLW) form disposal. The LLW form produced by WVNS is described and analyzed in the CSS SAR, WVNS-SAR-008, Volume IV, /~' Part G.
N)) The STS consists of a floating suction pump, suspended in Tank 8D-2, a profilter, e chiller / cooler, up to four ion exchange columns in series, and a post filter, all contained within Tank 80-1. D.l.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION The WVDP site is located in a-rural setting approximately 50 km (30 mi) south of Buffalo, New York, at an average elevation of 400 m (1,300 ft, on New York State's western plateau. The-plant f acilities used by the WVDP occupy approximately 63 hectares (156 acres) of chain-link fenced area within a-1,350 hectares (3,300 acres) reservation that constitutes the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC)4 The communities of West Valley, Riceville, Ashford Hollow and the village of Springville are located within 8 km (5 mi) of the plant. Several roads and one railway pass through the site, but no human habitation, hunting, fishing or public access is permitted on the L WNYNSC. 3 SAR 0000863.RM Pag = 1-2 l i l l l l
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VVNS.SAR.u04-Rev. 7
-The STS is-located and the SMWS will'be located in the Waste Tank Farm (WTF)
(Figure D.S.1-1). ' Radioactive. components (i.e., profilter, chiller / cooler, ion exchange columns, and postfilter) are located within the HLW Tank BD-1
-(Figures D.5.1-2, D.5.1-3, D.5.2-5 through D.5.2-7) and the SHWS (i.e.,
supernatant removal pump,. sludge mobilization pumps) are 'ocated within HLW . , Tank'8D-2 (Figure D.4.1-2). e There'are several important design considerations to ensure the safety of the system. These are described in detail in Section D.8.1.2. The most important-are that'the HLW tanks are maintained under' negative pressure, that structural barriers have been. designed such that the confinement of liquid HLW will~not be compromised by any credible design basis event, and that redundancy in critical aspects of_the. operation is used. An example of the redundant nature of the operation is the ventilation systems.. Both of the ventilation systems
,used by the STS contain redundant ventilation trains and are connected to emergency backup power.
Additional design considerations can be found in Section D.4.0. Operational
? 7
- considerations are maintained by administracive and procedural control as
\ described in Section-D.8.1.3. Also, Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) and Technical Requirements (TRs) are presented in V me VI, Part M.11 of the Project SAR.
-D.1.3 GENERAL. PROCESS DESCRIPTION F -A simplified description of the overall WVDP. activities is presented in.
Section A.1.3 of Volume I and-includes those processes required for NLW i . handling.and vitrification.. The combined SMWS and STS processes presented-in this volume will provide the means to wash soluble salts-from the HLW sludge L waste in Tank 8D-2 and treat the wash solutions such that the effluent wash l'r water can be concentrated in the LWTS facility'and made into a cemented waste L
- form in the CSS facility.
I i :-The SMWS is equipped to_ add a dilute caustic solution to the HLW Tank BD-2. h: Once the dilute: caustic solution is added,.a series of five long-shafted centrifugal pumpsLare used-(Figure D.4.1-1) to agitate the tank contents and-suspend the settled solf.ds. These SMWS mobilization pumps will mix the solids and added solution, accelerating dissolution of salt crystals. The exact if Page 1-3 SAR OOOOS63.RM i . l
. - _ ~ . . ,. .- -< j WVNS SAR-004 Rev. 7 duration of mixing will be datermined by sampling the liquid periodically and tracking the change in salt concentration in solution. After the salt concentration has leveled off, the mixing will stop and the solids will be allowed to settle.
After the solids have settled below the floating suction of the STS Wash Solution Removal Pump (50-G-001), wash solution tratisfer to the STS f acility < can begin. As a precaution to solide carcyover to the ion exchange columns, a prefilter (50-F-001) is installed between the-transfer pump discharge and the column batch feed tank (50-D-001). This prefilter is a 0.5 pm (s000 A> sintered metal crossflow filter. The STS process was designed to operate continuously using three ion exchange columns. During continuous operations, one column is off-line to recharge the ion e.7hange media while the others are on-line. However, it can be operated as a batch system and up to four columns used. The processing of wash solutions is planned to be perform 3d in a batch or bleed and feed mode. Approximately 150,000 L (40,000 gals) will be processed weekly. As an aid'to the efficient loading of cesium onto the ion exchange zeolite, the filtered sludge wash solution can be diluted with water and cooled via a brine solution in a shell-and-tube heat exchanger to as low as 6*C (43*F).
.Also, depending on the need-to reduce the plutonium contant of the wash solution, titanium-treated zeolite may be used in place'of some or all of the usual IE-96" zeolite. The Titanium-treated zeolite will remove Plutonium from the_ wash solutions. The issue of criticality control is. addressed in l
l Section D.9.2.4. To reduce the salt content of the HLW washed sludge to a level acceptable for future vitrification, a total of four wash cycles is tentatively planned.
- Table D.1.3-1 provides preliminary estimates of the volumes of caustic wash solutions and wash water that will be used in the sludge washing process. If
~
indicated, additional wash cyclen-will be performed or the quantities of wash solution and caustic will be adjusted '.o meet the end goal. L I l
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D.1 4 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS soc +. ion A.1.4 of Volume I identifies the agents and contractors responsible fc c .mplementing the WVDP. The relvsionships between WVNS and agents and co .ractors is illustrated in Figure A.1.4-1 of Volume I. D.3 5 STRUCTURE OF THIS SAR The concept of this modular SAR is explained in Section A.1.5 of Volume I. The structure of the SAR is patterned after NRC Regulatory Guide 3.26. See the Table of Contents, which reflects this pattern. Since it was published as Table A.1.5-1 of Volun,e I in June, 1985, the format of the WVDP SAR has evolved as required by changes in Project milestones. As originally conceived, sludge mob 111tation, washing and transf er of all HLW (loaded zeolite, THOREX and washed sludge; was to be included in Part E, Volume III, " Sludge Mobilitation System (SHS)". Becauso of revisions to the Project schedule, it has not been feasible to follow the orig.nal outline for the Project SAR (Table A.1.5-1). The current plan is to isnue a separate {"' s_- module, Part E of Volume III, to cover the HLW transfer operations. A copy of the current structure of the Project SAR is provided in Table D.1.5-1 and will be added to volume I during the scheduled routine update. Structaral changes in response to revisions in Pro $ect milestones are anticipated. D.1.6 REQUIRENENTS FOR PURTHER/NEW TECHNICAL INFORMATION The S?S will use a newly developed ion exchange mat rial, Titanium-treated zeolite. Testing has been performed by WVNS and Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to ensure applicability and reliability of the material (Bray, 1990). This testing bracketed the propoord operating conditions, which included flow-rate, temperature, and pH. Fhysical integrity of the Titanium-tree'ed ion exchange material will be verified by the manufacturer for each bicch of matt, rial through wet attrition testing. This testing is being performed as part of the quality assurance requirements of s -lity level C material. A/ s SARA 0000863.RH Page 1-5 1
WNS SAR 004 es Rev. 7 (x/I REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.1.0 Bray, L. A., Frank T. Hara, and Thomas F. Katmierezak. December 1990,
" Evaluation and selection of a Process to Remove Plutonium f rom West Valley High-Lossi Waste Sludge Wash Water," Draft C.
G ( v) SARt0000863.RM Page 1-6
WNS.SAR 004 Rev, 7 Table D.1.3-1 j PROPOSED WASE CYCLE TLOW StTHMARY Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4
% ,g ,, , . L (gals) L (gals) L (gels)
L (Dets) 32.000 8.100 8,100 8.100 20% Caustic Solution to Tanh 802 (3.500) (2150) (2150) (2150) 2 4 000 932.000 M2.000 M2,000 Caustic (Alution eveter to Tank 80 2 (TO.500) (262.000) (262.000) (262.000) 6 + 23/ min 8 23/ min 8 23/ min 8 23/ min Flow rate to STS from Tank 80-2 (2 6/ min) (2 6/ min) (? 6/ms 4 (2 6/ min) 8 23/ min 0/ min 0/ min 0/ min STS Dilution Water Flow F.ste (2 6/ mini Flow rete to Tank 8D 3 15 45/ min 8 23/ min 8 23/ min 8 23/ min (4 12/ min) (2 6/ min) (2 6/ min) (2 6/ min) 2.063.000 1,003.000 1,003.000 1.003.000 Tota! Volume to LWTS (545.000) (265.000) (265.000) (265.000) O i l i l I SAR0000863.RM Page 1-7 l l l
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WVNS.SAR-004 r Rev. 7
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TABLE D.1.5-1 CURRENT _(19901 STRUCTURE OF THE WEST VALill DEMONSTRATION PROJECT SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WVNS SAR Volume Title Fart Desionation I 1:foject Overview and General Information A 001 II Existing Plant and operations B 002 III High-Level daste Vitrification TBD 3 e Vitrification Facility 3 C o suferr.atant Treatment System 2 D 004
- SMS and HLW Transfer E TBD IV Warte Management, Storage and Disposal e High-Level Waste Interi:a Storage F TBD e Cement Solidification System G 008
- Liquid Waste Treatment System H 005 e Size Reduction Facility I 010 e Lag Storage Facility J 009 e Disposal Area Operations K 006 & 007 V Final Decontamination, Decommissioning L TBD and Waste Shipv7nt VI Operational Safety Requirements M NA
'xO)
Notes:
- 1. SARs for the Vitrification Facility (Part C) r.nd High-Level Waste Interim Storage (Part F) to be combined into one document.
- 2. Includes a revision for che Sludge Mobilization and Wash System
- 3. Preliminary SAR f or the Vitrification 1.ility is SAR-003 l
l l t SARt0000863.RM Page 1-8 l
VV!1S SAR 006 m Rev. 7 (} D.2.0
SUMMARY
SAFETY ANALYSIS A summary of the safety analyses performed for the STS and SMWS is presented in this chapter. Additional details on these analyses and supporting systems analyses can be found in appropriate sections of this and other volumes. D.2.1 SITE ANALYSIS D.2.1.1 NATURAL PHENONENA see section A.2.1.1 of Volume I. D.2.1.2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING THE SAFETY ANALYSIS The STS is located within the WVDP wast.e tank f arm (WTF) . The major processing components of the STS that are in radioactive service are located within the spare RLW Tank BD-1. The sludge wash solution is transferred from HLW Tank BD-2 through the valve aisle adjacent to Tank 8D-1 and on to the components in the spare HLW tank. The !?S support building, adjacent to the valve aisle at the northwest perimeter of Tank 8D-1, contains the STS control room, cold sperations support, and utility services. Ventilation for contamination control is provided by the Permanent Ventilation System (PVS) and the original WTF Ventilation Syrtem (WTTVS). The WTF is at an elevation well above potential flooding. The SMWS will be located within the WTF. The major processing components of the SMWS in radioactive service are located within HLW Tank 8D-2. The Ventilation and Service (V&S) building is located at the tiorth perimeter of ' Tank BD-2 and will contain the SMWS support equipment. Ventilation for contamination control is provided by the WTTVS and t!.e STS PVS. The hypotheticai accidents analyzed are, therefore, associated with the HLW tanks, HLW aludge mobilization and washing, and the ventilation system functions. Airborne radioactivity resulting from one of these accidents coul6 be released directly to the environment from the HLW tanks, from the PVS in the WTF, or through the WTFVS which exhausts through the main process plant i SARt0000863.RM Page 2-1 s_s/
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k'VNS-SAR 004 !) - si s/c - sccidental liquid releases of radioactive material to the env ronment i vi"? ,.cermined not to be credible for the SKWS as determined by confinement barrier integrity review (Gates, 1991). Major loads associated with site-specific, design basis natural phenomena (e.g. , tornados and earthquakes) have been analyzed with appropriate margins of safety. See Table D.4.3-1 (Gates, 1986). Other site-specific loads (e.g., high winds or snow loading) were also explicitly included in the design criteria, but were typically subsumed by other, more controlling loads and their associated margins of safety. The site's topographic setting renders the likelihood of major flooding not credible, and local run-off and flooding is ade* 2ately accommodated by natural and man-made drainage systems in and arounu the WTF. Weather conditions such as rain, freezing rain, and snow are circumatences that must be accomnodated during the construction and installation phases of the STS and SMWS. These conditions are, of course, common at the WVDP and the various Project departments are accustomed to dealing with them. Construction
'~' S setivities are routinely conducted within weather enclosures. Operations that
_,) have a potential for the airborne release of radionuclides are typically conducted within containment tents which also afford protection from foul weather. Finally, when inclement weather precludes a particular activity, the Radiation Safety, Industrial Safety, and Construction Management Groups will secure that activity and wait for more appropriate conditions. For further information concerning site characteristics refer to Section A.3.0 of volune I. L' . 2 .1. 3 EFFECT OF NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION AND MILITARY FACILITIES There are no nearby industrial, transportation, or military facilities that affect the safety of the Project Operations. See Soetion A.2.1.3 of Volume I for further discussion. D.2.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF NORMAL OPERATIONS Both on-site and off-site dose assessments were performed in order to determins the radiological impact of normal operations (Section D.8.0). The () SAR0000863.RM Page 2-2
WVHS SAR 004 (m Rev. 7
'(v) dose to on-site personnel is from work in areas of elevated external radiation levels (gamma levels) relativa to background. Operations will . sot normally be conducted in areas subject to airborne or surface contamination. The annual collective occupational dose (Section D.8.4) was estimated to be less than 3 person-esv (3 person-rem).
To estimate the off-nite dose, the airborne pathway and indirect liquid releaua to the environment from the STS and SKWS were calculated. Most of the radira-tive mrterial released via the airborne pathway will be exhausted from the WTrVS through the main plant stack. Small airborne releases will also occur from the PVS in the W7T during mobilization pump installation. The AIRDOS-PC (AIRDOS-PC, 1989) dispersion code was used to estimate the atmospheric transport and diffusion of radioactive particulates. The resulting concentrations were coupled with dosimetry models to estimate the dose to off-site individuals. The dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual was calculated to be 500 nSv ts0 prem) per year (Section D.8.6.3). The liquid release would be from normal routine lagoon discharge after treatment in the LWTS and Low-Level Waste Treatment Facility (LLWTF), Eloo (}
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referred to as the 02 Plant. The resulting concentrations of the decontaminated wish water solutions were used in conjunction with the LADTAP-II (LADTAP-II, 1980) liquid release model to calculate the effective dose equivalent. These doses are reported in Volume IV, Part H (WVHS-SAR-005). D.2.3 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT FROM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS Abnormal operations are events that could occur from malfunctions of systems, operating conditions, or operator error. Abnormal events are only of consequence for those systems in the STS and SMWS that process, control, or confine radioactive material. The abnormal events considered (Section D.9.1) are of little consequsace to workers and do not result in a significant release of rrdioactive or hazardous matarial to the environment. STS and SHWSabnormaleventsispresentedinTableD.2.3-1. 1 I D.7,4 ACCIDENTS r Five hypothetical bounding accidants associated with operation of the SKWS and i STS were analyzed (Section D.9.2). These accidents scenarior analyzed were ! [ T N- SAR 0000863.RH Page 2-3 1 I
VVHS SAR 004 I h Rev 7 b chosen based upon a screening process that involves identifying the highest consequence conditions for each of the major components of the system. cor,-equence is proportional to the concentration of the radioactivity or the total radioactivity contained within the component, the mode of failure, the path of release for the source term (direct to the environment or through a filtered ventilation system), and the release height. In other words, the initial conditions, within physical boundaries, for each of the major components is set to maximize the off-site dose, given an accidental failure of the component. Those components that are representative of others and Lepart a larger consequence are then chosen to bound the system. No weight is given to the probability of failure, mode of failure, or initial conditions. All bounding analyses are of a deterministic nature and are considered to be the worst case. The first accident assumes the collapse of the roofs of the vault and HLW Tank BD-2, exposing the tank contents to the wind and resulting in a high evaporation rate of radioactive material directly to the environment. The second and third accidents involve spills of sludge wash water solution. The > fourth accident covers overloading and ultimate over-pressurization of an ion j'_, \ exchange column due to the inability to remove the loaded zeolite. The fifth accident involves a High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter fire within the WTrVS with the release assumed to occur from the main plant exhaust stack. Confinement barrier integrity review (Section D.4.3.2) indicates that accidental release of liquid HLW directly to the environment cannot occur with less than six times the design basis earthquake. A summary of STS and SHWS accidents is presented in Table D.2.4-1. D.2.5 NONRADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS This SAR doos not specifically address nonradiological hazards associated with the SMWS and the STS. Nonradiological accidents are not considered because of the low toxicity and volatility of chemicals used. The only hazardous material directly associated with the SHWS and the STS in dilute sodium hydroxide. The hazards associated with the handling and storage of this chemical are specifically evaluated in WVDP-096, " Safety Assessment of WVDP HaEardous Substances." SAR 0000863.RM Page 2~4
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WVNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 D.
2.6 CONCLUSION
S This SAR was prepared to meet the requirements of DOE-ID Order 5481.1A,
" Safety Analysis and Review System for DOE-ID Managed Activities," DOE Order 5481.1B, " Safety Analysis and Review System," and WVHS Policy and Procedure WV-906, " Safety Review Program." The analysis indicates that the STS and SMWs can be operated safely as designed. The STS and SHWS have been designed to reduce hazards to acceptable levels by instrumented control of the process and by conducting operat ..., remotely within sealed and shielded multiple containments, conservative assumptions lead to an estimated worker collective dose of less than 3 person-cSv (3 person-rem) per year from normal operations, in keeping with the philosophy of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and the requirements of DOE Order 5480.11, " Radiation Protection for occupationa.
Workers." calculated doses to the maximally exposed off-site indisidual and operating personnel were determined for normal, abnormal and accident conditions. The bounding doses calculated for the maximally exposed off-site individual are 700 nSv/y (70 prem/y) for normal operations and 8 mSv (800 mrem) for accident conditions. Abnormal operations are expected to have inimal impant to off-site individuals. The bounding doses calculatJd for operating personnel are 3 person-cSv/y (3 person-rem /y) for normal operations,
- 0.5 person-cSv (0.5 person-rem) for expected abnormal operations, and 15 cSv l
(15 rem) for accident conditions. calculated doses to the maximally exposed off-site individual were determined ' >oth normal and accident conditions. For routine operation, the doses are well within the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, and ID order 5400.5, " Radiation Protsetion of the Public and the Environment." l l l t I
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WVNS SAR.004 Rev. 7 sm, l I REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.2.0 AIRDOS-PC, 1989 United States Environmental Protection Agency, " User's Guide for AIRDOS-PC, Version 3.0," EPA /520/689-035, December 1929. l Gates, 1986 Dames and Moore, *8D-1 teolite Mobilization System Confinement ! Barrier Integrity Review," Subcontract No. 19-CWV-21511, Task 10, December 1987. Cates, 1991 Dames and Moore, "8D-2 Sludge Mobilization Wnsh System Confinement Barrier Integrity Review," Subcontract No. 19-CWV-21511, Task 10, April 1991. LADTAP-II, 1980 Cak Ridge National Laboratory, " User's Manual for LADTAP-II - A Computer Program for Calculating Radiation Exposure to Man from Routine Release of Nuclear reactor Liquid Ef fluents," NUREG/CR-1276, May,1980. i WVDP-096, " Safety Assessment of WVDP Hazardous substances," Rev. O, December 1990. O
's-SAR OOOO863.RM Page 2-6
WNS-SAR 004 Rev. 7 fable 0.2.3 1
/'
SUMMARY
OF STS AWD SW$ ABWoeMAL OPERATIONS e On Lite Collective Co t e ' A '**I ( s - Detection Method Possible Cease C s person-rem) Aree radiation structuret Isoiste, Decreased Leak in STS Minimal operating monitor stars' failure; pressure decontamlnat e, Cooler / Chill and repair or efficienri er Systein gradient failure replace coot er/ch t L ler
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0.C08 Visual Cosket or velve Eemote repair or Decreased > Replace operating Faulty inspection; seat fatture replacement efficiercy (Leeking) instrm ented Block stores in the connector control rcu:n Asses @ty Sticking C.24 Fallure to Loss of vacutsn vacuum reversal; increased transfer ("Mang Up") receive senple at during transfer removal of pipe tiee for secotes destinetton or a alsalig e t section from the valve of e lhese siste to the Wash of the transfer system tubing analytical afste Solution Analytical Sancte in the PneunetIC frensfor Systes
$ ample eN Reduced lon Return solutions Decreased Ceslun Minlast operating Breakthrough analysis enchange through recycle efficiency Lines for rework efficiency to Tank 8D 3 in STS f elture mode inability to Falture of 4.5 Loss of fluid Mechanical efficiently flow, high solids failure dependent Tenk 80 2 transfer sl @ e Supernatent or abnormal pressure wash solution to Transfer 17$
, Pu@ irdications in the control roam Process Hechanical Reptoce or sis downtime Falture of 0.5 kajor STS instrumentation failure of repair surport Processing and sterne st4 port twipnent or equipnent of lon exchange Conponent in Tank 80 1 colum seat fatture; Reotace or Possible deley in Mobilization 0.5 Contemination in performing $Hws pus Failure pmp huute; No mechanical repair current ftow; fellere mobillsation operations y tacessive current put; instatt flow spare wobilization ysv aupture or memote removat snability to use sparge Line 0.5 trability to gas replacement sparge line; sparge colum; depttssurization therensed general of the sparge of sparge line possible decrease line in column radiation eres efficiency from exposure rete; remainin9 heet; Lou pressure inability to use storm or back- cotum O pressure eterm _ SARt0000863.RM Page 2-7
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WNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 : Table 0.2.4 1 SteetAlt1r 0F STS AAD SMWs ACC10DT ANALYSTS On alte Off she Accident f ,, Detection Method Possible Cause n rom)- rem) 0.8 Visua! Greater than 6 Erecton of Worst case Tank 8D 2 15 tmos the Design - containment accident; waJte Roof and Vauft Basis Earthquake over tank, if and off-site Collapse of 0.1 g possible; surface soil evacuation of contamination; nearby serious delay in residerits; WVDP activities transfer of HLW to spare HLW Tank 831 if available 0.3 t.eak detect >on - Mechanical Disoontinue STS downtime HLW Transfer 5.6 alarm in pipe failure HLW transfer; during Pipe Ibpture chase provide derentamination between Tank containment; . 8D-2 and Tank utilize spare 80-1 transfer line Spill of S!udge < 0.001- << 0.001 koa radiation Mechanical Oscontinue . STS downtime monttor alarms failure HLW transfer; during Wash Solution replace or repair decontamination in Valve Asie failed and replacement component or repair y non Exchange 0.004 < 0.001 Effluent monttor inab!Itty to . Aemove roolite 6TS downtime starm remove heat from from column during repair or Column over. decay due to through bottom replacement of pressurtration reduced column dump valve, if lon exchange flow - possible column Outside ignit;on Use of fire Replacement of HEPA Riter - NA < 0.001 Fire alarm system source suppression HEPA fitter Fire equipment , SAR:0000863.RM Page 2-8 _. . . . . ,- _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _.. . . . ~ . . _ _ _ _. . ,
WNS SAR-004 Rev. 7 D.3.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS Site characteristics potentially affecting the WDP as a whole are detailed in Volume 1 Section A.3. Site characteristics affecting the STS and SMWS are described below. D.3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF WDP EN" IRONS See Section A.3.1 of Volume I for a general site discussion. There is no effect on STS and SMUS operations from geography and demography of WDP environs. D.3.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPGATATION, AND MILITARY FACILITIES See Section A.3.2 of Volume I for a general site discussion. There is no effect on STS and SMVS operations a::; a result of these site characteristics. D.3.3 METEOROLOGY Design characteristics associated with system component installatior. (i.e., adding sludge mobilization pumps to Tank 8D 2) did not consider site meteorology. The installation of pumps or any other component into HLW tanks would not be performed during any extreme meteorological event (e.g., high winds , heavy rain, or major snow storms) . These conditions would be included in operation-specific procedures. Site characteristics affecting the design and operation of the SMVS have been considered (e.g., the pumps will be housed in heated weather enclosures). See Section A.3.3 of Vohtme I for a general discussion of meteorology around the WDP. SAR:0000863.RM Page 3 1
, , - + _ , . _ _ - . . . . _ _ . . . - .- _. .- , . _ . _ _ . . _ . . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . - . ._
WNS . S AR. 004 Rev. 7 g D.3.4 SURFACE HYaROLOGY See Section A.3.4 of Volume I for a general discussion of surface hydrology around the WDP. Surface hydrology chcracteristics tid not affset the STS and SWS . design. D.3.5 SUBSURFACE HYDROLOGY See'Section A.3.5 of Volume I for a general discussion of subsurface hydrology around the WDP. Subsurface hydrology characteristics did not impact the STS and SWS design. D.3.6 GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY See Section A.3.6 of Volume I for a general site discussion. Soil conditions and site seismic criteria were used in both the original design of the STS and ('] U SWS as well as structural review evaluations. D 3.7 SITE EC0140Y See Section A.3.7 of Volume I for a general discussion. There is no effect on the STS and SWS operation as a te. ult of site ecology. SAR:0000863 hd Page 3 2
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Rev. 7 L.Y D.4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA D.4.1 PURPOSE OF THE STS AND SMVR The HLV remaining from PCREX process operations at Vest Valley are contained in Tank 8D 2 and consist of a precipitate (sludge) and an alkaline supernatant. The primary objective of the STS is to reduce the volume of HUW, which will be solidified on site into borosilicate glass, the terminal waste form. The volume of the terminal waste form can be reduced by a factor of approximately six if .he radioactive species (primarily "7Cs) contained a the supernatant and sludge wash solutions can be separated from other compounds dissolved in the supernatant. ("'% The STS will remove the sludge wash solution from Tank BD-2 and decontaminate
-- it (remove the strontium, cesium, and plutonium) to a level that will permit the decontaminated sludge wash solution to be sent to the LVTS and then to the CSS for solidification in cement as a LLW. The STS uses a separation process with a cesium-specific zeolite to ion exchange cesium from other species dissolved in the sludge wash solutions and, when needed, a Ti-treated zeolite to retain the plutoniumi The system is to be located on the WTF with the major process components in radioactive cervice housed in TankBD 1. Details for the UWTS can be found in Volume IV, Part H (WVNS-SAR 005). Details of the CSS can be found in Volume IV, Part C (WVNS-SAR-008) .
Deco, amination of the supernatant and sludge wash solutions will be done in two phases. The first phase, which has been completed, decanted the supernatant with minimal disturbance of the sludge layer. This phase primarily separated cesium from the other salts in the supernatant. The second phase, sludge washing, purposely agitates the sludge to remove the salts from the sludge so they may also be decontaminated. Decontaminarion of A (,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-1 1 1
- . ~__ -. . . -. . - . _ . .~.,. - -.- .
i I VVHS SAR. N6 Rev. 7 O% the sludge wash solution will separate plutonium and strontium.in addition .*.o cesium. , I Washing of the sludge consists of adding dilute caustic solution to Tank (4 2 l and mixing it with the settled PUREX sludge. Mixi.,g will be accomplished by using a' series of mobilization pumps to be installed within Tank BD 2 (Tigure D.4.1-1). These pumps are long shafted centrifugal pumps that extend into the ' tank through access sleeves called risers (Figure D.4.1 2). Tank 60 2 and its vault were modified to create additional access risers (Figure D.4.1 2) for the installation of sludge mobilization equipment. Details of the modifications, equipment used, and method of installation can be found in
" Safety Analysis Report for Remote Riser Installation and Penetration of Tank 8D-2" (Brown 1986). ~ Structural modifications to these original structures were analyzed by various engineering design organizations to verify the structural integrity of the tank and its vault (Tank Roof Analysis (RockweII.
/N 1984); Vault Roof Analysis [Rockwell, 1985); BD 1 Tank Vault Top Slab
'- Evaluation (Ebasco,-1986); and Vault 8D 1/8D 2 Finite Element Analysis
[Ebasco, 1990). In addition to these analyses, an assessment and evaluation of the reserve capacity of the tank and its vault were performed (Cates 1991) under design basis loading conditions. The SMVS consists of the mobilization pumps thamselves, the pump support structure of steel trusses on concrete piers, and spread footing foundations that support the 15 m long pump column over the Tank 8D 2 vault. Variable speed controllers will be used to control and monitor the pump operation. The mobilization pumps installed to mix the sludge and the dilute causti.9 solution will be run intermittently for approximately five days per wash. After the sludge and dilute caustic solution are mixed, the pumps are shut down and the solids are allowed to settle. Once the solids settle, the STS supernatant feed pump, which is a floating suction pump, is used to transfer the sludge _ wash solution to STS for decontamination. This process will be repeated approximately four times to adequately wash the sludgo. h(,,s .-- SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 2
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WNS SAR 004 7- Rev 7 ( The. radioactive species retained from the supernatant and sludge wash solution processing will be temporarily stored as loaded teolite (ion exchange media) at the bottom of Tank 8D 1 under a water cover. It will ultitt.acely be blended with the sludge remaining in Tank 8D 2 and the acidic THOREX wastes from Tank 8D-4-for use as melter feed. : i Details pertaining to STS design presented in this and subsequent chapters of this SAR module are based on the most recent STS design criteria (Carl, 1985), Pump Support Design Criteria (Ebasco, 1985), Remoto Riser Installation Design Criteria (Schiffhauer,1986), Sludge Mobilization Waste Removal System Design Criteria (Schiffhauer, 1990), and the Tank BD 1 and 8D 2 Vaste Mobilization J Pump Equipment Spec!fications (Schiffhauer, 1987). D.4.1.1 STS FUNCTIONS
- The major processing functions of the STS are summarized below and are
~
described in detail in Section D.6,0. A schematic of the STS process is presented in Figure D.5.1-5. D 4.1.1.1 SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION TRANSFER A vertical turbine pump in Tank SD 2 is to be used to decant the sludge wash solution from Tank 8D 2 and transfer it in a buried pipe conduit through the valve aisle to the supernatant prefilter. D.4.1.1.2 SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION FILTERING AND COOLING l The sludge wash solution is filtered to remove suspended fines (sludge l particles), and cooled from approximately 90'C (194'F) to as low as 6'C (43'F) for optimum processing conditions. The prefilter and supernatant cooler are ! located within Tai.k 8D-1. The STS chiller, which supplies the cooling fluid (salt solution) tt =.he cooler, is located in the STS support building. SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-3
WNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 D.4.1.1.3 ION EXCHANGE Following filtration and cooling, the sludge wash solution is passed through up to four in series ion exchange columns containing zeolite. The majority of the cesium plutonium, and strontium dissolves,in the sludge wash solution, transfers to the zeolite. The ion exchange columns are located in Tank 8D 1. D.4.1.1.4 DECONTAMINATED SLUDCE WASH SOLUTION COLLECTION AND TRANSFER Following ion exchange, the decontaminated sludge wash solution is filtered to remove suspended zeolite fines and collected in a holding tank (Tank 8D 3). Following sampling, it is transferred to the LVr5 Tank SD-15B (exiting) and on to the evaporator for concentration, if necessary. The decontainf nated sludge wash solution is transferred to the CSS where i- is incorporated into cement as low level vaste. O , D.4.1.1.5 SPENT ZEOLITE DISCHARCE The loaded ion exchange medium (zeolite) is, discharged from the ion exchange columns to the bottom of Tank 8D-1. The discharged zeolite vill be stored under water cover at the bottom of Tank 8D-1 for ultimate transfer to the ; vitrificati.on process for use as melter feed. Following discharge, the ion exchange column is recharged with fresh zeolite, chat is radiological?'; clean. D.4.1.1.6 MOBILIZATION PUNPS Lon5 shafted contrifugal pumps are supported from 15 m (50 ft) long segmented, tubular stainless steel columns that house the pump drive shaf t. The mobilization pump s are positioned at the bottom of the tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 approximately 30 cm from the tank floor and have two opposed nozzles. These pumps provide agitation by using the fluid in the tank to resuwend the spent zeolite in BD 1 and the sludge in 8D 2. The pumps operate at u flow rate of i O SM@M Page 4-4
WNS SAR-004 Rev. 7 2300 1pm (600 gpm) out of each nozzle and are continuously rotational speed of 0.5 rpm. rotated 360
- at a motor which is housed outside the tank.Each pump is operated with a 110 kW (1 Jet impingement loads from a plugged pump nozzle (e g jet force generated by the pusp under abnormal
., the worst hypothetical operating conditions) were spplied analytically to the pipe column support fer then ta k roof system. The force Benerated by one nozzle having all the flow dischargi ng from it (i.e.,
one of the two nozzles plugged) has been calculated to gbe(468 the nozzle. 212lbs) k at The structural connections at the bottomgure D.4.1-3), designed to stiffen the tank roof, consists of 4 of the tank (Fi diameter (A36) staybolts welded to the tank floor on 15cm (1.5 4.n) c:a (6-in) diameter pads that are attached to s, series cf 2.5 cm (1-in) thick A283C plates. These plates support an 1 beam in which 20 cm rest. (8 in) diameter sched l u e 80 pipes The 20 cm (8-in) pipes are attached to the tank roof O . scenario it has been assumed that the 212 kg (468 lbs) is directed perpendicular to a plate. As a worst case stress in both the plate and staybolt.This scenario was used to estimate the staybolt was used in the base analysis. In addition, the plate with a single The stiesses in the staybolt are the governing stresses and are 681 of the allowable ir, the calculation. conserv ti a ve Typically the bottom structure is supported by as many es five staybolta and the nearest plate is 46 cm (18 in) away from a jat . In all cases the places that are in close proximity to the jets have a mini It is also important to note that the puir.p jet can not dirmum of three staybolts. during operation. ectly impinge a plate Although there are approximately 70,000 expected ng operati cycles during the life of the Project, issue since the actual stresses are not high enfatigue of the structure is not an ough to warrant this consideration, h SAR:0000863 RM page 4-5 p__ __ - -- B
VVNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 The vot t cese georcetry between a mobilization pump nozzle streata and the vertical p2 ate fin;. (gridwr:rk nee.bers under the horizontal column support ~ bearns at the bottom of the tank) showed a margin of safety against yielding of the plate cr_its supporting staybolts much greater than four times the abnorisal jer impingement loadin6 Collapse or failure of a single staybolt and supporting fin would have uo influence on the overall vertical load + , carrying int er,rity of tho eclumn and its supporting beam system. All of the
- plate fins and U.aybolts under a single column would have to be sheared out by the impingiag put::p nettle stream to cause a local :oof column collapse. None of the nozzles can apply a load sufficient to cause a corrplete column collapse
- under the worst case scenario. Thus, this mode of potential failure has been shown to be highly improbable.
- Cyc11c fatigua failure of the tank roof column support system is also unlikely considering tha very low stress levels induced in the structural system under normal operating conditions.
The analysis of the abnormal Operating condition of the sludge mobilization pumps has been described by Gates (1991). D.4.1.1.7 MOBII.IZATION PUMP CONTROLIIRS The mobilization pumps are operated from a 110 kW (1$0 hp) adjustable frequency invertor drive. These controllers will allow the pumps to be operated over a range of 900 rpm to 2,000 rpm. The controllers are housed in a separate building known as the V&S Building,. Using variable speed drives allows the puups to be sof t" started at a reduced speed while maintaining a constant torque. O- SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 6 0 1 ey -e.m -,eg--e,--a..,- r n-, y , , . , wew,-n-w----.w-w ,e ,wwe
WNS - SAR-004 Rev. 7 Q D.4.1.1.8 MOBILIZATION PUNP SUPPORT STRUCTURE The pump support structure consists of steel trusses on concrete piers and spread footing foundations. The complete mobilization pump arsembly is supported off the external steel truss above the 8D 1 and D-2 vaults. None of the mobilization pump loads are imparted to the top of the original tank or its concrete vault. A Unitorm Building Cede (UBC) static seismic load analysis was performed for the design. e. niecrence gap between the pumps (pump column) and waste tank structures (tank access risus on 8D 1 and 8D 2) was not establisned for seismic purposes. The gap was established as a result of construction tolerances. Althob5h the bacis for seismic loading used in the design of the mobilization f pumps, support structures, and the tank access risers was a UBC Static lateral U] loading, an independent dynamic interaction analyris was performed (Cates, 1991) to evaluate the clearance gap under a 0.1 g Design Basis Earthquake using the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 response spectra and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping values. The results of the analysis indicate that impact may occur between the tank 8D-2 riser and the M 1 pump column at earthquake motions slightly 3reater than half the Design Basis Event. However, no failure of the pump column or surrounding tank riser will occur until earthquake motions exceed four times the Design Basis Event. The Tank 8D-2 M-1 riser is the one original riser on the tank used for the SMVS. Impact between the pump column and the pump access risers installed for the SMVS was shown not to occur until motions exceeded the Design Basis Earthquake. D.4.1.1.9 PUMP ENCIDSURE BUILDINGS l Heated, fiberglass buildings containing the required utilities for I'mp operations enclose each mobilization pump. The buildings protect the pumps
~
SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 7 L 1
l: WVNS SAR 004 / ) Rev. 7 V from the outdoor elements and also provide freeze protection for the utilities. D.4.1.2 FEZDS TO THE SMVS AND STS There are to be six major feeds to the SKWS and STS: e Sludge wash solutiens froin Tank BD 2. (The chemical and radiological characteristics of sludge wash solution are presented in Tables D.8.2 1 through D.8.2 2).
- Chemical additives for p!! adjustment when nece:sary. (See Section D.6.4.)
e Fresh zeolite as a batch process feed to the ion exchange columns. e Demineralized water for sludge wash solution dilution, zeolite rinse and sluice, and cooling.
- Air to push sludge wash solution out of the ion exchange column.
- Dilute caustic for sludge washing to Tank 8D-2.
D.4.1.3 SMVS .ND STS PRODUCTS AND BY-PRODUCTS The three products of the SMWS and STS process are decentaminated sludge wesh solution, which will be transferred to the UWTS, the loaded spent zeolite discharged to the bottom of Tani BD-1, and the washed PUREX sludge that remains at the bottom of Tank 8D-2. Byeproducts include radiologically contaminated post-filter media and filter backflush, rinse and sluice waters ( km ),) SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 8
l WNS SAR 004 Rev. 7 (which are processed in the STS with subsequent sludge wash solution flows), cold aeolite fines as a backwash and contaminated air treated by the PVS and l i the VTFVS. Detailed discussions of these vaste streams can be found in I Section D.7,0. D.4.2 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SAFETY CRITERIA D.4.2.1 USE OF ORIGINAL FACILITIES
-Consistent with overall WDP philosophy, original equipment and facilities have been used to the extent practicable for the STS and SMVS. Original equipment and facilities are those that existed at the West Valley site before !
the WVDP. The major STS processing components in radioactive service are located within the original spare HLW Tank BD 1. Following ion exchange within Tank 8D 1, the decontaminated sludge wash solution (cesium, strontium and plutonium removed) will be fed to original Tank 8D-3, from~which batch O, transfers will be made to the LVTS. The ion exchange medium (zeolite) will be discharged as needed from the new ion exchange column to the bottom of Tank 8D 1, which will function as a temporary storage reservoir for this material until it is transferred to the VF via 8D 2 for use as melter feed. The zeolite mobilization pumps in tank 8D 1 are used to help redistribute the zeolite at the bottom of the tank clearing STS operations. The major SMWS processing components will be located within HLW Tank SD 2.
-Following sludge mobilization and washing within Tank BD 2, the wash solutions will be fed to the STS. The washed PUREX sludge will retsain in Tank SD 2 which will function as a temporary storage reservoir for this material until it is transferred to the VF for use as melter feed.
During SMWS and STS operations, the original VTFVS will continue to provide ventilation for contamination control and air treatment support for Tanks 8D 1, 8D 2, C'-3, and 8D 4. SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 9
VVNS SAR.004 Rev. 7 ( ) D.4.2.2 NEV FACILITIES AND STRUCTURES In addition to the original facilities described above, operation of the STS required additional new facilities which included:
- STS support building, located on the northwest perimeter of Tank 8D 1, which contains the STS control room, fresh zeolite and water tanks, STS c. hiller and utility services (cold operation support).
- Valve aisle, located between the support building and TankBD 1, which is a shielded (steel) structure in which remotely operated valves and related instrumentation are located.
f),
- Shield structure (pipeway), which is a concrete and steel A2 structure erected on top of the Tank 8D 1 vault. It provides containment and structural support for the upper portions of the STS processing components, which are suspended from it and into Tank 8D-1, and far the pipe runs between the valve aisle, these components, and the tank itself.
- Ventilation and Service Building, which houses the mobilization pump motor controllers and support electrical feeds as well as the PVS.
- The STS Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) and the PVS provides ventilation and heating to the STS support building and exhaust air from the valve aisle and pipeway. The heating, air conditioning and air supply components are located inside the STS Support Building. The
,-~
h SAR:0000863.RH Page 4-10 l
' " " "'-'rry w
WNS-SAR 004 49 V Rev. 7 PVS is located in the V&S Building near Tank 8D 1 on the VTF.
- Pump support structure, which carries the loads of the SWS mobilization pumps and its support equipment.
Figure D.4.2-1 provides a simple schematic of the STS and SWS that identifies major new facilities and significant modified structures. D.4.2.3 CODES AND STANDARDS Both the STS and SWS Design Criteria were based on DOE Order 6430.1 General Design Criteria. The INEL Architectural Engineering (AE) Sttadards Manual has been used as the " Primary Guidance" for /,E design and preparation of specific task design crit.eria. The AE standard is a supplement to 6430.1 and contains more detailed design criteria specific to DOE-ID facilities. The criteria in this manual are based on applicable DOE Orders, including DOE-ID supplements, and on the national consensus codes and *andards. Codes and standards that are being used in the design and construction of SWS and STS facilities (new and modified) are discussed in Section D.5.2.3 and summarized in Tables D.S.2-2 and D.5.2 3, a and b. Information on loads and their combinations that were used to assess the integrity of STS structures under design basis loadings and severe natural phenomena events and the results of these analyses are presented in Section D.9.3. Additional information on the design of STS and SWS structures and confinement barriers can be found in Cates, 1986, 1927, and 1991. j SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 11 i [
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VVNS SAR 004 fh Rev. 7
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D.4.3 SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEMS D.4.3.1 CENERAL The STS and SKWS hr.s been desigt.ed to allow for safe operation. Control of radioactivity is the primary safety concern. Specific safety protection systems are described in the following subsections. D.4.3.2 PROTECTION BY XULTIPLE CONFINEMENT BARRIERS AND SYSTEMS The major STS processing components that are in radioactive service are located within the HLV Tank 8D-1. STS processing components consist of the ion exchange columns, supernatant feed tank. sluice feed tank, supernatant cooler, prefilter, postfilter, and sluice water feed pump. Figure D.4.3-1 provides a schematic of these components. All components of the SMVS that are in radioactive service are in HLW Tank BD 2. Any leakage that could result { from failure of these components would be contained within the tank. The tank itself is contained within an approximately 61 cm (2 ft) thick concrete vault. The tank atmosphere is maintained under negative pressure relative to surrounding areas by the WTFVS to ensure air leakage is into, rather than out of, the tank. This exhausted air is processed and filtered by the WTFVS as described in Sections D.S.4.2 and D.7.4. Processing components suspended within the tark are structurally supported-by a steel structure erected above the tank vault with the loads transferred into , the ground via the vault substructure, and pipeway structure or spread footers. The pipeway provides secondary containment for the top portions of the STS components suspended in Tank 8D 1 and for piping runs between the components of the STS and the valve aisle. The thielded (steel) valve aisle provides shielding and containment for remotely operated valves and associated STS instrumentation. The valve aisle
) SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 12
l WNF-SAR 004 Rev. 7 contains shield windows and manipulators for remote service of th9se valves. Control of these STS operations is directed from the control room located in the STS support building with selected local control (e 3., for zeolite batching). Piping used to transfer the sludge wash solution from Tank 8D 2 to Tank 8D 1 f is double valled and contained within a buried steel conduit. The piping runs are laid to maintain a gradient such that any leakage froin the priinary pipe would be drained and collected in sumps and would be returned to the tanks. Table D.4.3-la identifies the specific primary confinement barriers and associated support barriers for each major structure / component in the STS. The table follows the sequence of sludge wash solution flow from Tank 8D 2 to the STS processing components suspended in Tank 8D 1. Structural and design considerations for these barriers are presented in Section D.5.2.3. Table D.4.3-lb summarizes the impet of a number of scenarios upon the integrity of the various confinement barriers related to the SMVS and identifies the backup that prevents either a vapor or a lis.uid barrier breach. The existing nuclear fuel reprocessing plant constructed in the mid 1960s at West Valley was designed to the 1961 Uniform Building Code. This facility predated DOE /NRC development of seismic design criteria for non reactor " nuclear facilities. The designers conservatively selected the Uniforn
-Building Code Seismic Zone 3 (the highest seismic zone for carthquake design) as the basis for earthquake design at West Valley.
When WNS took on the responsibility for decommissioning the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and removing the high level nuclear wastes from the storage tanks, it was accepted by the WPO that the existing facilities would not be upgraded to existing seismic design standards (Ploetz, 1989). However, where new facilities were constructed on existing facilities, or adjacent to existing facilities, all new construction was to be designed in such a inanner as to not diminish the seismic capacity in the existing structures. SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 13 l 1
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ --
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d VVNS SAR 004 Rev. 7
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Furthermore, safety related facilities involved in the storage, transfer, and , processing of low or high level nuclear we a were to be designed in the initial stages of Project development to the current Uniform Building Code with varying levels of importance factor which depends on the degree of the safety required based on the potential risks from seismic failure. (Table 3 1 from the STS report illustrates the types of seismic importance factors employed in the various confinement barriers constructad adjacent to and over I tank 8D 1 as part of the STS process.) t As the Project evolved from a research oriented test facilit) to a production-oriented low-and high level waste decommissioning facility, seismic standards following DOE 6430.1 Suidelines were developed using probabilistic site. 1 specific studies to araess the appropriate ground motion for the design basis event. The design bas;s event selected for design of safety related facilities has a return period of approximately 1,000 years for a peak Ground acceleration at the 84th percentile of 0.lg (annual frequency of exceodance of 10~3). Response spectra for the Design Basis Earthquake was selected from NRC Regulatory Guide 1 60 and thr. associated damping values from Regulatory Guide 1.61. All major structures, process vessels and pipin6 serving as primary barriers for the high-level nuclear waste storage, transfer, or processing have bcen designed or reviewed under the Design Basis Earthquake, as eiti.er part cf the original design or part of the confinement barrier integrity review. Most of these analyses have involved dynamic rather than pseudo dynamic analysis. Analyses were performed to essess the integrity of SKWS and STS confinement barriers under various design basis conditions (manmade and natural phenomena). Table D.4.3-2 lists the general references used for the confinement barrier integrity analyses. The primary confinement barriers will survive extreme environmental loading (e.g., design basis earthquake and tornado events), without structural failure and leakage of HLW wastes into the I SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 14
WNS - SAR-004 / g\ Rev. 7 environment because there is sufficient reserve capacity inherent in the original construction as woll as in the conservative design of the construction. Any structural modifications to the original underground s*.. rage tanks were reanalyzed to verify that their structural integrity was not compromised. The loadings and combinations that were considered and the results of these analyses are summarized in %: tion D.9.3. Additional information on the design of STS and SMVS confinement barriers and on the barrier integrity ana'.ysis can be found in Gates, 1986, 1986b and in Gates, 1991, respectively. D.4.3.3 PROTECTION BY EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENT DFSIGN AND SELECTIGd All equipment and instrumentation for the STS and SMVS were selected and purchased in compliance with the WVNS Quality Assurance Program described in Section A.12 of Volume I. The quality levels of the individual components for the STS are presented in Section D 4.4 Specific examples of safety V protection provided by equipment and instrumentation design are as follows:
- Because the STS is a remote operation designed for minimum access, it is heavily instrumented. Most controlled
- parameters have at least two sensors of dissimilar operating principles or an alternative instrument detection system that can be used in the event of failure of one sensor.
- The mobilization pumps are the or.ly major operating components of the SMVS and are contained within the Tank GD 2. The pump system is designed to permit semi : emote removal and replacement.
- The process equipment systems of the STS are designed to be fail-safe in the event that faflute of a primary control device occurs.
O Page 4-15 -(/ SAR:0000863.RM
WVNS-SAR 004 Rev. 7 [h w/
- Key process variables of the STS are monitored. Those variables that could affect the safety of operations have both an audible alarm and an illuminated face plate on an alarm panel. Examples of these process variablos are: high differential pressure across the supernatant prefilter; low flow of wash solution to the supernatant feed tank; supernatant feed tank high high-level; temperature, both high and low, of the v.sh solution to the ion exchange columns; high radiation alarm on the supernatant cooler brine return line; high temperature in each ion exchange column; high radiation alarm on each column discharge; high radiation en post filter discharge and feed to LWTS for monitoring decontaminated wash solution; radiation monitors on ventilation stack discharge lines. These alarms are shown in figures D.6.1 1 through D.6.1-6. A graphic display
(N is used on the control panel (control room) to minimize \ '-) operator error.
- Key SHWS equipment variables will be monitored. Those variables (i.e, pump motor amperage, Tank 3D 2 liquid temperature, WTFVS off-gas temperature, pump seal water pressure, low flow to pump columns, pump enclosure terperature) that could affect the safety of operations will be wired to automatically shut down the mobilization pumps if a component fails.
- STS has sufficient instrumentation and controla such that it can be monitored and shutdown from the centralized control panel.
- During off-line operations review and recording of an STS column temperature and pressure readings will provide early )
a SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-16
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hhifiQEhBB616ME6d cHIEulkfibsi}thit isppi:iitithisyE6s16si6H" Hie ~giVihiih yicsijplRJpi2JQ Design criteria and operating constraints in the STS process eliminate the possibility of a criticality during the sludge washing operation, as discussed in Section D.9.2.4. Opsrh t%6halyssfe ty!RehuifemehelIRT57123 fo fBe rlylTRTIRTS! 12Q1HEss31sisthfdb6ditibEi]f6[6psist16DsTEhe;11461dZfeKd;froslTsn(BDT2 E5"'tNeiid65siahis
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.(ssN/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-17
WVNS.SAR-004-Rev. 7 (O) m,,- D.4.3.5 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION Radiological protection systems consist of those facilities and equipment that ensure the confinement of radioactivity and the control cf general exposure rates. These systems have been designed to provide peritive confinement of radioactivity. The major radiological protection systems inherent in the design of the STS and SMVS include the following:
- The containment and shielding provided by Tanks 8D-1, BD-2, 8D-3 and their vaults.
- The shield structure (pipeway) erected above 'he BD-1 vault.
- The shielded valve aisle.
- The VTFVS and PVS,
[] N ]
- Radiation and radioactivity on-line monitoring systems and analytical support systems.
- Pipiag and pipeline conduits.
- The positive hydrostatic pressure maintained in the soil embedment external to the tank vaults.
The major radiological protection systems of the SHWS, in addition to those which already exist as part of the STS,-include the following:
- Shielding is provided by the water-filled mobilization pump support column.
. (3 \s,) SAR:0000863.Rh Page 4-18
WNS-SAR 004
/^\ Rev. 7 N,]
- No routine occupancy of the pump enclosures 1.s expected during normal operations.
Shielding has been installed (valve aisle, shield structure) to maintain radiation exposure A1 ARA. The design objective is to limit exposure rates in any full time occupancy area to 65 nC/kg h (0.25 mR/h). Radiological areas for the STS and SWS have been est.ablished, per WDP-010 " Radiation Controls Manual" requirements, as follows: Process - Equipment normally in radioactive service, accessible only after decontamination (e.g., valve aisle, pipeway, etc.). No occupancy is expected during normal operations. These are Controlled Areas posted as High or Very High Radiation Areas. No occupancy is expected during normal operations.
\-- Support - Systems that are normally not used in radioactive service, and/or services accessible during normal operations for controlled periods (e.g., operating aisle in front of the valve aisle, zeolite and water tank area). These are High Radiation Areas or Radiation Areas. Intermittent occupancy is expected during normal operations.
Control Room and Utility Area - Remote controls and equipment never used in radioactive service, accessible at all times (routine occupancy'during normal operations). These areas are Low-Level Radiation Areas. The SWS design objective was to limit exposure rates in any controlled occupancy area to $645 nC/kg-h (2.5 mR/h). During mobilization pump installation, the radiation dose rates may exceed 645 nC/kg h (2.5 mR/h). D Page 4-19 (Q SAR:0000863.RM
WNS - SAR-004
/N Rev. 7
- ( )
Directly over the Tank 8D-2 access openin.,s_the radiation dose tate may be >39 pC/kg-h (150 mR/h) while the shield plug is removed from the riser. However, radiation protection controls and procedures and ALARA principles will be maintained through the use of semi-remote installation techniques. The process system itself shall act as the primary confinement for radioactivity (processing components, valves, piping, and tanks). Ventilated and monitored secondary confinements are designed to inhibit, contain, and eliminate possible contamination (in pipe runs, valve aisle, pipevay, and satpling ports). In order to minimize the potential for contamination by leaks, the systems designed to routinely carry process liquid are hard piped and welded. Valves, pumps, and other sources with a high probability of contamination are enclosed by ventilated and monitored secondary confinements O A goal of radiological protection design is to prevent the backflow of radio-activity into normally nonradioactive systems and areas through nonradioactively contaminated chemical and instrument lines. For those chemical and instrument lines potentially exposed to process pressure, means of isolation (e.g., block and bleed valves) or check valves have been incorporated to prevent pressure transmission to normally nonradioactive systems. An additional design feature of the STS that enhances control of radioactivity is a dynamic graphic display on the control panel (control room) to minimize operator ec,'t. This display provides operators with real-time information regarding systein statut.:. SAR:0000863.PJf Page 4-20
VVNS-SAR 004 Rev. 7 [~'}
'w D.4.3.6 FIRE AND EXPLOSION PROTECTION The STS has fire detection, alarm, and suppression systems commensurate with needs as determined by the VVNS Radiation and Safety Department. Fire protection systems are installed, maintained, and tested in accordance with the requirements of DOE-ID Order ID 12044, " Operational Safety Design Criteria Manual." Information relating to fire protectiot. systems for the STS can be found in Section D.5.4.9. A telephone is located in the control room, the operating aisle (val.ve aisle operation area) and in the V&S Buf1 ding. An intercom system connected to the 812 System (emergency all-page) is also installed. A discussion of the potential for temperature / pressure excursions within the STS is presented in Section D.9.2.5.
D.4.3.7 RADIOACTIVE VASTE HANDLING AND STORAGE
,rS From the perspective of secondary waste management, the STS and SMWS have been \ l x/ designed as a self-contained closed system. Secondary waste streams are reused whenever possible and/or returned to Tanks 8D-1 or 8D 2. Specific examples of the " closed" nature of the STS and SMWS process are provided belew:
- The supernatant filter backwash is returned to Tank SD-2.
* -Ion exchange column backwash and rinse effluents are returned to Tank 8D-1 for rework by the STS.
- The decontaminated supernatant post filter sand will be dispensed to Tank BD-1 if recharge is necessary (see Section D.7.27
- Potentially radioactive sluice water solutions are sent to Tank 8D-1 for reuse.
j3 Page 4-21 Q SAR:0000863.RM l l
WVNS SAR-004 /T Rev. 7
)
v e The fluid or sludge wash solution never leaves Tank 8D-2 during agitation to wash the sludge. The STS design philosophy includes the capability for remote removal and replacement of failed equipment. Should components previously in radioactive service require replactment, they will be overpacked as required upon removal before being transferred for waste disposal. The SMVS design includes the capability of semi-remote removal and replacement of failed pumps. Should radioactively contaminated pumps require replacement, they will be decontaminated and overpacked as required upon removal befors being transferred for waste disposal. Air exhausted from STS facilities is treated by the PVS, Details pertaining to this system can be found in Sections D.S.4 and D.7.4 f~g
-- Air exhausted from Tanks SD-2 and 8D-1 is treated by the WTFVS. Details pertaining to this system can be found in Sections D.5.4 and D.7.4 Additional details pertaining to the nature and handling of STS radioactive wastes can be found in Section D.7,0.
D.4.3.8 INDUSTRIAL AND CHEMICAL SAFETY The administrative coctrols for industrial and chemical safety implemented for the STS and SHWS are presented in the WVNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (VVDP-011). Additionally, the relevant requirements for industrial and chemical safety contained in DOE ID Order ID 12044, " Operational Safety Design Criteria Manual" have been incorporated into STS and SKWS procedures and facilities. The STS and SKWS design also incorporated relevant requirements from ID Appendix 0550, " Standard Operational Safety Requirements" into operating procedures. The effects of a potential chemical accident (the () 7-~w SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-22
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 J[. /-~} inadvertent addition of a caustic-into the ion exchange system) is. discussed in Section D.9.2. Cold chemical process systems are discussed in Section D.6.4. The dilute caustic solution will be shipped in federal /NYS Department of Transportation authorized truck tank crailers, each having a capacity of approximately.19,000 L (5,000 gals.) or smaller sized tote tanks having a capacity of approximately 2,100 L (550 gals.). The container ~1n vnich. caustic is shipped may in turn serve as the temporary storage tank on-site in compliance with federal EPA /NYSDEC Chemical Bulk Storage Regulations (6 NYCRR). If the Caustic Truck Tank Trailer shall be emptied over an extended , period of time, it shall be positioned within the Caustic Storage / Truck Unload / Transfer Station at the WTF. The Caustic Storage / Truck Unload / Transfer Station will consist of a graded base (to include a sand everlay), concrete traffic barriers, and secondary spill containment within the traffic barriers.
.n
'- Recognizing that major or even minor spills could result in hazurcs to UVDP personnel, the public, and the environment, the VVDP has implemented an Oil, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasures Plan (WVDP-043, November 1989). This operating plan reviews in detail release flow paths, sources, system design, and the containment of possible spills or releases as well as prevention, preparedness, response, and notification procedures. Specifically, the plan conforms to the requirements of 40 CFR Part 112 and Part 151 (proposed), both dealing with facil!. ties having a potential for hazardous substances releases.
D.4.4 . SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS l. l The UVDP Safety C1'assification System, which complies with DOE Order 6430.1A,.
"Ceneral Design Criteria," consists of three safety classes listed in decreasing order of importance: Safety Class A, Safety Class B, and Safety l '.- (s,)~ SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-23
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 Class C. Class N is not important to safety in comparison to Ssfety Classes A, B, and C. These four. classes are defined as: Safety Class A - Structures, systems, and components whose failure to-function as designed could cause an off-site. effective dose equivalent in excess of 25 cSv (25 rem). Safety Class B - Structures, systems, and components whose failure to function could cause and off-site effective dose equivalent in excess of 0.5 cSv (0.5 rem). Safety Class C - Structures, systems, and components whose failure to function could cause an on-site effective dose equivalent in excess of 3 cSv (3 rem). 1
- f-si Class.N - Structures, systems and components not important to k-- safety (specifically, radiological _ safety as defined above).
Table D.4.4-la presents safety classifications ~for the structures, systems, and components associated with the STS. Table D.4.4-lb indicates the safety classifications for the structures, systems, and components associated with the SMWS. The criteria and procedures used to determine safety class designation are presented in Section A 4.4 of Volume I. Since the dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual as the result of any credible accident considered for the STS or SHUS does not exceed 5 mSv (500_ mrem) annual effective dose equivalent (AEDE) (see Section D.9.2), none of the structures, systems or components require a Safety Class A or B. ( ~ SAR:0000863.RM' Page 4-24
WVNS SAR-004 Rev. 7 Because the primary function of the STS is to process HLW, any item whose failure could result in workers coming into close contact with radioactive process streams requires a safety classification of C (since the potential would exist for a worker exposure in excans of 3 cSv [3 rem]). Components and facilities that function as confinement systems for MLV and ventilation systems that confine radioactivity require Safety Class C since failure of these compor,ents could result in the loss of tadioactive materis' confinement. Additionally, instrumentai: ion systems whose function is to monitor, measure and/c control radioactivity or radiation levels also are designed as Safety Class C since their failure could result in undetected exposures. All other items are classified N. D.4.5 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING The STS and SMWS have been designed in a manner to facilitate eventual O decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). Specific design details include the following; e System components installed in origina'. HLW tanks have been designed to permit semi-remote removal and replacement such as, ion exchange columns, pumps, and filters, e Installed in the Tank 8D-2 access sleeve are a series of spray nozzles that can be used to flush a mobilization pump as it is renoved from the tank. j e Components in accessible areas (valves and instruments) shall be either subject to contact maintenance or modular replacement following remote decontamination via flushing of vessels, equipment, and pipes. L L/ O SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 25 i
VVNS-SAR 004
-k Rev. 7 I I LJ
- Pumps, valves, and associated piping connections are designed to minimize " collection pockets" for ease of decontamination, naintenance and replacement.
- All componente and lines are capable of handling a wide range of decontamination fluids.
- The material of construction is 300-series stainless steel to minimize incorporation of contamination into surfaces.
- Pump volutes are fitted wi+~ n volute flush line that allows flushing out the volute, impeller, and pump suction screen.
l (/
\_
l l l l l l
,r ~ .
Page 4-26 (s-) SAR:0000863.RM
WNS - S AR-004 Rev. 7 REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.4.0
~
' Brown, 1986 S.:H. Brown, April 1986. " Safety Analysis for Remote Riser Installation and Penetration of-Tank 8D 2 "
Carl,-1985' D. E. Carl. ." Design Criteria for-the Supernatant Treatment System," WNS-DC-013_. December 1985. Ebasco, 1985 Ebasco Services,.Inc., " Pump Support Structure Design
- Conditions." WNS-EBAR-735 and 735A. February 1985.
.Ebasco,-1986_ Ebasco Services, Inc., "STS 8D-1 Tank Vault Top Slab Design Evaluation. " - L WNS/W50, 1986.
Ebasco, 1990 Ebasco Services, Inc., " Vault SD-1/8D-2 Finite Element Analysis
. Rebar Verification." WNS/W55, ESAR-1324, .and 1324a.1990.
Cates, 1986 Dames land Moore, "8D-1 Zeolite Mobilization System Confinement
' Barrier Integrity Review." Subcontract No.19-CW-21511. Task 10, December -
1987. Cates, 1986 = Dames and Moore, "STS Confinement Barrier Integrity Review." Subcontract No.19-CW 02840, Amendment No. 22, June 1986. b Gates, 1987 Gates, W. E., "8D-1 Waste Mobilization Pump Confinement Barrier Integrity Review." December 1987. Gates, 1991 Dames and Moore, "8D-2 Sludge Mobilization System Confinement
' Barrier Integrity Review." Subcontract No.19-CW-21511, Task 10, April, 1991.
PiicissGT199,2Mjf.5tf6kssiEMa(@l992[(FB]92j 0061HZ"Fau1lt1Tr e s" fRITR3
. $TSjl2jyg -
' -~ Rockwell, ~ 1984 Rockwell, " Tank BD 2 New Risers 12, 24, and 36 Inch Diameter, Stress Analysis Evaluation." SD-RE-TA 003, Rev. O, 1984. Rockwell, 1985 Rockwell'. Internal Letter from W. V. Smith to D. V. Scott,
" Wast Valley Tank Riser installation." 65620 WWS-8, 161 (ZW:86:0020), August
-1985.-
Schiffhauer, 1986 M. A. Schnfhauer, " Design Criteria, Remote Riser Installation System." ' WNS DC-026, Rev. O, June , 1986. Schiffhauer, 1987 M. A. Schiffhauer, " Tank 8D-1 and 8D-2 Waste Mobilization Pump Specifications." WNS-EQ-202, Rev. 4, February 1987.
'SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-27 - -~' -- - -~. _ __ _ ,, , _ _ ,
WNS SAR 004 Rev 7 ( \ L Schiffhauer, 1990 M. A. Schiffhauer, " Design Criteria, Sludge Mobilization Waste Removal System." WNS-DC-046, Rev. O, Draf t J , 1990. WPP-Oll , 1989 West Valley Demonstr tion Project, " Industrial Hyg'ene and Safety Manual." Rev. 11, June 1989. (h \_- o Page 4-28 tj sAR:0000863.RM
\
S SAR-004. [ t TABLE <' '].3-10 7
~- ) .
STS CONFINEMENT BARRIER
SUMMARY
No. Geructure or Function Primary Barrier Support Barrier Component lA Tank 8D-2 High-level waste storage Carbon steel tank Negative internal
-- supernatant and pressure via waste sludge tank farm ventilation system Reinforced concrete Positive external vault and steel liner pressure provided by pani hydrostatic head kept at a constant level by'l pump feed
- I Soil excavation in tight Water saturttion of clay clayey till to prevent seepage (pump supplied)
IB Transition from Penetration of steel Steel puxap column Tank 8D-2 to Pump tank top and vault roof Pit Carbon steel riser Negative internal pressure via waste tank farm ventilation system Reinforced concrete tank Positive external vault and steel liner pressure provided by pan i hydrostatic head kept at a constant lavel by pump feed Soil excavation in tight clayey till SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-29
i- .
. TAB .'3-123 , SiSAR-004.-
~
- , . i:7J ' ~
-STS CONFINEM IER
SUMMARY
b a v'- L No. .' Structure orL . Function (, Primary Barriert . Support Barrierj
. Component, .
~
2A - Supernatant Pump- ' Supernatant transfer., Single wall. stainless. !. and Pit' steel pipe and pump . i [ Pump pit w'ith liner -Negative ? internal (steel changer or- p.ressure.via waste reinforced concrete)1 tank farm ventilation , system- p 4 Soil backfill and tank.' excavation'- , 2B Transition.from' Penetration of pump pit - Double wall stainless. j Pump Pit to Conduit, wall- steel pipe (dual i barrier) ,
- Bulkhead
- 3A' High Level Waste Supernatant transfer Double wall stainless (HLU) Transfer steel pipe
- (dual-Conduit barrier)
Stainless steel conduit i Pegative internal' pressure via'new STS. ' ventilation system, Soil excavation and i backfill-(5-foot minimum i- cover) - 3B Conduit Transition Penetration of pipeway. ' Double wall stainless , to Pipeway of STS wall steel pipe'(dual Building barrier) Bulkhead .:; 9 t SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-30 t i 1
-- -- . *s.4-%+.
TASLE 3-13 SAR-0041.. O BTS CONFIN ___aaTKn SUI 9tARY
.17 7-
~No; Structure or.- . Function .PrimarycBarrier Support Barrier .
Component 4A Fipeway of STS Passageway"for all hot , Double wall stainless Building (radiological) flows of- steel pipe (dual STS' process barrier): Reinforced concrete Negative internal' pipeway.of STS building pressure via new STS with epoxy-coated catch ventilation system basin and stainless steel lined sump piti t' Partial soil embedment , 5A Valve Aisle of STS Process flow control' Single wall stainless steel pipe and valves-Steel and reinforced Negative internal-4 concrete box pressure via new STS~ ventilation syrtem 4 Valve aisle backwall i bulkhead R-inforced concrete Negative internal- ! ,c-eway of STS building pressure via new STS with epoxy-coated catch ventilation system l basin and stainless steel lined sump pit 4 Reinforced concrete Negative internal-lower level'of STS pressure'via new STS' buildingt ventilation system Partial soil'embedment 4 i SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-31. l
.m
TADLE '.3-10 MS SAR-00A
/'N 7
] _,
S_TS CCNFINEMEN ARRIER SUMhRI
-7 No. Structure or Function Primary Barriasr Support Barrier Component 5B Valve Alsie to 8D-1 Penetration of expansion Double wall stainless Shield Structure joint between STS steel pipe (for high Through Pipeway building and 8D-1 shield pressure raw structure supernatant) or single wall pipe for c-cher process flows 1 6A Shield Structure Confinement barrier for Doulbe or single wall Over Tank 8D-1 STS process vessels stainless steel pipes Reinforced concrete Negative internal i shield structure and pressore via new STS '
tnak vault with epoxy- ventilation systes coated floort Soil backfill and tank j excavation 6B Upper Portion of STS processing Stainless steel pipes STS Process Vessel in Sbleid Structure Over Tank SD-1 Vessel shield plug with Negative internal gasket plus reinforced pressure sia new STS concrete shield ventilation system structure and vault roof with epoxy-coated ficor t Soil backfill and tank excavation one-inch expansion joint Negative internal with rubber water stop 2 pressure via new STS ventilation :ystem SAR: 0000863.PJi Page 4-32
S SAR-004 TABLE .3-10 (] .7 (_,/ RRIER
SUMMARY
STS CONFIKEME
,.c .-
Function Primary Barrier Support Barrier No. Structure or Component Stainless steel pipes Carbon steel riser 6C Transition from Penetration of sleeve with flexible Shield Structure reinforced concrete rubber boot. Negative into Tank 8D-1 vault roof and steel internal pressure vin ! tank top waste tank farm i Positiva external ver.tilation system Reinforced concrete tank vault and steel liner pressure provided by pan hydrostatic head kept at a constant level by pump feed Stainless steel process 7 Botton ?ortion of STS processing vessel STS Process Vessel in Tank 8D-1 Carbon steel tank Pegative internal , pressure via waste tank farm ventilation Jystem Ke , forced concrete tank Poattive external vat c and steel liner pressure provided by pan t hydrostatic head kept at a constant level by i pump ieed l Soil excavation in tight Partial soil embedment clayey till 8 Tank BD-1 Storage of cesium loaded $ Same as Tank 3D-2 zeolite Penetration of pipeway Bulkhead 9 Pipeway Transition to Conduit to Tank wall. Single st'dnless SD-3 steel pipe l SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-33 l . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
\ TALLE' .3-le' SAR-0041 4
[& STS CONFIN _ n_nTra SinglARY
- 7L.
.No. Structure or Function Primary Barrier Support Barrier- .
. Component.
10A low Level Vaste Transfer of Single wall stainless Transfer Conduit decontaminated. = teel pipe supernatant to' Tank Vaults 8D-3 and 8D-4 Stainless steel conduit Negative internal pressure via waste , tank farm ventilation system . Soil excavation and backfill 10B Conduit Transition Penetration of Tank Single wall stainless to Tank 8D-3 Vault for 8D-3 and 8D-4 steel pipe through 8D-3/8D-4 . Tank Vault 'So11' excavation backfill 11 Tank 8D-3 Temporary storage of Stainless steel tank 2 Negative' internal decontaminated pressure viaLeaste supernatant tank farm ventilation ll system i Reinforced concrete vault with Soil excavation in tight stainless steel pan clayey till 12 Decontaminated ' Transfer of Single stainioss steel Supernatant decontaminated pipe soil excavation Transfer T: ping supernatant from Tank from 8D-3 > Tank 8D-3 to Tank 35104 35104 _ SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-34
.1g,,
SAR-004-D _ (TABLE ;3-16l .. <
~' . jl
.STS CONFIM M IER'
SUMMARY
ik t. FitDNOTES 4
' l. . Highest bar:ler reliability for seismic.
.2. Raw supernatant flows _into a doubis wa11' stainless steel' pipe'from the valve ~ aisle backwall,'through the pipeway-(lower portion'of STS building)'into the shield' structure on top;of.8D-1 Tank Vault. .As the pipe transitions from the pipeway.
- to the; shield : structure it' passes through. a building separation ~ joint . (e.g. , expansion' joint) .
- 3. Decontaminate'd-!supernatant flows in;.a single'sall. stainless. steel pipe;from the. final process component'(vessel) through r .8D+1 shield! structure,'pipeway,' valve. aisle and back to pipeway before it exits'the.STS building. :All.barrlers:in this
pathway have previously been defined.' , 4 '. Decontaminated supernatant lis transferred via ' tank roof pump pit and piping to'. underground Tank 35104 (Ligaid~ Waste : Treatment System). P
)
I i i l ! SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-35 i: _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , m . . .
m. O '
' TABLE (~'N3-lb
' (j i.'/~~3
~
jf. ; -SAR-004 CONFT1EMENT BARRIER
SUMMARY
FOR SLUDCF, MOBILIZATION AND UASH SYSTEj! h
' Primary Barrier Support Barrier Component
( Structure of Function Tunk 8D-2 Storage of Sludge and Carbon steel tank Negative internal Supernatant from PUREX pressure via WTFVS process Reinforced concrete Positive external vault and steel liner pressure provided by pan hydrostatic head kept at a constant level by pump feed Soil excavation in tit it Water saturation of clay clayey till to prevent seepage (pump supplied) Transition from Tank 8D- Riser penetration Column steel riser Negative internal 2 to top of vault roof through steel tank top sleeve pressure via WTFVS Negative internal and vault roof, pressure via WTFVS passageway for pump and pump column Reinforced concrete tank Negative internal vault and steel liner pressure via WTFVS pan Soil excavation in tight Positive external clayey till pressure provided by hydrostatic head kept at a constant level by pump feed SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-36
'~
4 TABLE .3-lb S SAR-004 LJ .7 CONFINEMENT BARRIER SUMMATY FOR SLUDGE MOBILIZATION AND WASH SYSTEM Structure of Function Primary Barrier Support Barrier Component Transition from top of Riser enclosure of pump Carbon steel riser Negative internel vault roof to seal ring column penetration pressure via WTFVS plate through soil cover over tank vault roof 40" diameter steel None casing 96" diameter steel None culvert Concrete / grout fill None between casing and culvert Soil backfill and tank None j excavation in tight clayey till Transition from top of Riser enclosure of pump Carbon steel riser, Negative internal seal ring plate to column penetration expansion bellows, pressure via UTFVS bottom of bearir.g plate carbon steel riser spray on spray chamber chamber Upper and lower bearing Seal for pump rotating Carbon steel upper and Negative internal plates assembly lower bearing plctes pressure via WTFVS Upper bearing plate, Cap for riser enclosure Carbon steel rotating Negative internal split support spacers, and vapor seal for bearing, split support pressure via WTFVS and pump mounting plate penetrating pump support spacers, and pump column mounting plate Pump column and shaft Fluid barrier and Stainless steel pump Positive internal water seals structural support for column and upper and pressure of 50 psig and pump and pump drive lower mechanical seals 40 f t of water column shaft on drive shaft pressure. SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-37
TABLEf.3-lb S..SAR-004f,
- v. \.,- _
.7 CONFINEMENT RAnmTER
SUMMARY
FOR SLUDGE MOBILIZATION AND war #_ SYSTEM: i ammi
'i Structure:of; Function- Primary' Barrier Support Barrier- Componenti Shield plug- Temporary. closure for' carbon' steel plug with Negative internal riser. sleeve .- concrete and steel plate pressure via WTEVS' shielding
- Greater barrier reliability for seismic loads' .
**- Pump column and seals are a barrier to migration of high level radioactive liquid wastes up the rotating drive shaf t to the pump upper mechanical seal.
i i SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-38
WVNS-SAR-004
~
Rev. 7 _ ( '} . N./ TABLE D.4.3-2 SMS CONFINEMENT RARRIER ANALYSES REFIIRENCES ACI. 1956. Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concreie, 318-56, American Concrete Institute. ACI 301-81. Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings. 1981 revtsion. AISC. 1980. Manual of Steel Construction: American Institute of Steel Construction,-Inc., 8th edition.
. ANSI /ASME. 1981, 1980. Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refining Piping: ASME Code Committee for Pressure Vessel Piping, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, No. B31.3.
ANSI. 1982. Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures: ANSI A58.1, Section 6. API. 1962. Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage and Refining. American Petroleum
-Inntitution, No. 650.
ASCE Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee. 1980. Structural' Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plant Facilities: American Society of Civil Engineerc, ASME. 1983. Roller and Pressure Veseal Code ANSI /ASME Section VIII, Division I. Barnstein, L. S. 1965. Investigation of Atotaic Waste tisposal Vaults at the
-(x,_-
n} - Atomic Waste Disposal Plant, at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development and Authority. Nussdaumer, Clarke, and Velzy, Inc. Barnstein, L. S. January 1966. Report on Restoration of Atomic Waste Vaults at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and, space Development Authority. Nusadaumer, Clarke, and Velzy, Inc. Bechtel. 1963. Construction Specifica Lons. Becker, D. L., and'C. DeFigh-Price. 1983. Evaluation of West Valley Neutralized Wasts Tank,: Photographic Video Television and Ultrasonic Measurement Inspection Record. Rockwell International Publiestion RHO-RE-ST-8P. Brown, S. H. December 1985. Safety Analysis Report for Modification to Tank 8D-1 and Installation of STS components and Zeolite Removal Pumps. Memo HE:85:0258, S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. Brown, S. H. April 1986. Safety Analysis for Reinote Riser Installation and Penetration of Tank 8D-2. l /~'N l'k,_) SAR:0000863.RK Page 4-39 I
~
~
WVHS-SAR-004
/~'h Rev. 7
( ): TABLE D.4.3-2 SMS CONFINEMENT BARRIER ANALYSES REFERENCES (continued) Dames & Moore. July 15, 1985. STS Building, Augured Cast-in-Place Pile Design, West Valley Nuclear Services Company, Inc. Duckworth, J. P. August 19, 1976. Examination of Corrosion Coupons on the NFS High-Level Storage Tanks, 8D-2 and 8D-4. Memorandum from Duckworth to Oldham. Ebasco Services, Inc. 1986. STS Design Calculations, West Valley Nuclear Services, West Valley Demonstration Project, WVNS-2388. Gates, W. E. August 15, 1986. STS Confinement Barrier Integrity Review, West Valley Demonstration Project, for West Valley Nuclear Services Company, Inc. Lawrence Livermore Laboratories. May 1978. Seismic Analysis of High-Level Neutralized Liquid Waste Tanks at the Western New York State Nuclear Service Center, West Valley, New York. No. UCRL-52485. Savannah River Laboratory. 1981. Internal memorandum from J. E. McAllister, D. A. Crowley, and W. W. F. Yau to D. A. Ward: Stress Analysis of 'inste Tank Cooling coil Supports Due to Slurry Jet Impacts. DPST-81-600, July 23, and Addendum 1, October 1. Savannah River Laboratory. MarrS 29, 1982. Internal memorandum from A. W. Wiggins to J. F. Ortaldo: Jnt Impact Force Studies (Jet Impingement Forces on Colling coil Structures in High-Level Liquid Waste Storage Tanks caused by Slurry Pumps). DPST-82-472.
,-s Seed, H. D., and R. V. Whitman-. June 1970. Design of Earth-retaining / ) Structures for Dynamic Loads: Proceedings of the ASCE Specialty Conference on
(.,/ Lateral Stresses and Earth-Retaining Structures, Soil Mechanics and the Foundation Division. UBC. 1961. Uniform Building Code International conference of Building Officiale (ICBO). UBC. 1982. Uniform Building Code: Irternational Conference of Building Officials (ICBO). UBC. 1983. Uniform Building Codes International Ccnference of Building Officials (ICBO). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - CRD-C572-74. June 1, 1974. Corps of Engineers Specifications for Polyvinylchloride Water Stop, Povised. U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guides 1.60 and 1.61. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1982. Safety Evaluation Report on a Dormant West Valley Reprocessing Facility, Docket No. 50-201. West Valley Demonstration Project Safety Analysis Report (WVDP SAR), Volu x I, Section A and Volume III, Sections C and D. West Valley Nuclear Services Company, Inc. Technical Advisory No. 23 (19-29924). Load Test of Expansion Joint by Professional Services Industries, Inc. l m SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-40 ( l
. . . . - _. _-_- - _ . .- .- --. - . . ~ . . . - - ~ . - . _.
l l 1
-.- -- TABLE D.4.4-la WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPOWENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUPERNATANT TREATMENT SYSTEM Comoonent or-System Safety Lervice Quality Class Class Level i
STRUCTURES N IV N
- Sheet Metal Building C IV C
- operating Aisle / Controlled Area
- High-Level-Waste (HLW) Tank C III C Vault (8D-1)-
- - -Liner / Sump in' Structure above C III C Modified Vaalt (8D-1)
HLW **'ank Vault (FJ-2) C III .C
'HLW Tank Vault (sD-3) C III C
- Connecting Underground Pipe C IV C Containment (Tank SD-1 to Tank-8D-3 and BD-4).
- -Connecting Underground Pipe C IV C Containment (Tank 8D-1 to Tank 8D-2) '
- - Shield Wall-in Valve Aisle-(VA) C III C
- ' VA Maintenance Door
- VA Shield Window- C III C
- VA' Floor Liner / Sump C III C
_Pipeway (epoxy coated) C h) C
- III
%,_ C III C
-SUPERNATANT PROCESSING
- High-level Waste (HLW) Storage Tanks C III C
- HLW Tank-BD-1 (Modifications to provide tank access) C III C
- HLW, Tank 8D-2 (Modifications to provide tank access) C III C
- HLW Tank BD-3
- Supernatant' Processing Tanks
# -Supernatant Feed Tank N IV N 4 -Sluice / Lift Water Tank N IV N
* -Fresh Water Tauk N IV N 4- Break Tanks N IV N i
SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-41 m w y e , , , c - , - - -
- -,v,, --
,~. . . . . - . . . . - _ . . . - , . - . .- - . , _
Ju I-1 TABLE D.4.4-la WN S-SAR- 004
-=
\
Rev. 7 . a (Continued)
- SAFETY CIAsSIFICATION OF IMPORTANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AFD. COMPONENTS _ ASSOCIATED'w1TE THE SUPERNATANT TREATMENT SYSTEM Commonent or System Safety ' Service - Qgh~
C_ lass Gig.EE - Level
- Pumps
- Supernatant Pump, N III N
- Supernatant Feed Pump -C IV N
- Sluice / Lift Water Pump C IV C
- Sluice Water Recycle Pump C IV N
- Fresh Water Pump- N IV C
- Decontaminated N III C Supernatant Transfer Pump
- Cooling Fluid Transfer N IV N-
- Break Tank Pumps' .N IV N
- Eeolite Distribution C. III- C Pumps
- Heat Exchangers
- Supernatant Cooler. N III C
- Chiller -N III C
-* Air Cooled Condenser N III C 9
- [( - - Filters 8' 'Supernatant Profilter N III C
- Decontaminated N III C
-Supernatant Profilter
- Material Handling System
- VA Crane. N IV N
* '. Operating Aisle Crane N IV N
* ' Mobile Cranes-(as needed) N IV N
- VA Manipulator
* .VA Transfer Equipment - N -- 2.II C
- Eeolita Handling- N IV N
- Fresh Zeolite Fines N IV N Removal N IV N
- Process Piping
- Supernatant C III C
*- Decontaminated C III C Supernatant
- Chemical Addition N IV N
~4 Remainder E IV N SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-42
e TA M E 4.4-la WVHS-SAR-004 * (x) q) Rev. 1 (Continund) SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF IMPoRTANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS NfD COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITF THE SUPERNATANT TREATHENT SY.6TCH comoonent or system Safety service Ouallt.y Class pl.ran Level
- Valves e Supernatant C III C 8 Utility C III C
- Decontaminated C III C Su;wrnatant e Full-port Ball Valves (IX Column Discharge) N III C
- Eeolite Jumpers
- III C Chemical /Ecolite H IV N Addition. N
# Remainder C III C Process Valve Manifold / Hacks r\ - i- Ion Exchange Columns N IV N
/
HONITORI)iG SYSTEMS, CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTATION C IV O
- Area Radiation Honitors Akthorne Ptrticulate Monitors C IV C e Continuous Air Monitors e Effluent Honitors
- Ventilation Monitoring System C IV C and Alarms
- Supernatant Sampling System C IV C
- PLucess Radiation Monitoring C III C
- Communications hquipnent N IV N
- Lighting (VA) N IV N h SAR:0000863.RM Page 4 !,2
. . . .- .__ _ ._ _. = . . _ - - .- - . _ - . - - - - - . _ . _ _ _ -
l TABLE D. 4. 4- Za WVNS-SAR-604
-s Rev. 7
( j (Continued) SATETY CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTART STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS Mp. COMPONENTS ASSOCI ATED WITH THE SUPERNATANT TREATHENT SYSTEM Servico Duality Comoonent or System E3fety G.Lagg .C1aea Lay _t1
- Electronic Systems and Controls III C
- VA and Critical Apparatus C in other Locatiens N IV N
- Controlled Area N IV N
- Remainder
- Pneumatic Instruments and Controls C III C
- V.4 and critical Apparatus in other Locations N IV N
- Controlled Area N IV N
- Remainder N III C
- Inetrument Racks
[ - Instruments and Sensing C III C ( Elements (operational)
- VA and Critical Apparatus in other Locations h
- Controlled Area N IV
- Remainder N N IV UTILITIEF AND SUPPORTING SYSTEMS
- Electrical Power Systems C III C
- Valve Aisle Supply IV C C
- operating Aisle and controlled Air Supply C IV C
- Control Panel C IV C
- Hotor Control Center C IV C
- Conduits and Trays C IV C
- Utility Air (pumps / sumps) C III C
- Instrument Air (operating valves) C IV C
- Recycled Condensate Evaporator IV N N N
- Demineralized Water N IV
- Fire Detection and Protection N IV N
- Safety Shower and Eyewash Page 4 44 i
( SAR:0000863.RM
- 1. .
l TABLE D.4.4-la WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 (Concludedj SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS R COMPoKENTS ASSOCI ATFD WITH THE.JUPEP. NATANT TREATHENT SYSIIM Component or Svetem Safety Service Qgabj;.y GIARJL h kfXR1 H IV H
- Lightning Protection C III C VESSEL VENT SYSTEH HEATING AND VENTILATION (HV) SYSTEM III C
-Ducting and Dampers C C III C ~ Blowers III C -Exhaust Filtration C NOTE: At boundaries between items of differing Safety Classitication, interfaces appropriate to the higher Safety Class must he provided.
O ,
.4- _ .. ._ _ .
i t WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 : TABLE D.4.4-1b SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTANT STRUCTURES, NYSTENW AFD s'aa8"OIfENTS ASSOCIATED WITE TEE SLUDGE MOSILIZATION AND WASS SYSTgg comoonent or system Jafety service ouality Class Class Level I PUMPS ! C III C
- ' Sludge Mobilization Pumps C III e
- Elet tchel Support Equi}went IV N STRUCTURES N
- - Pump Weather Enclosures
- Pump Support Structure C III C ,
- Tank Access Risers C III C i
- - Pump Spray Chambers C III C 1
SLUDGE WASH SOLUTION PROCESSING
- Ti-treated zeolite C III C k
?
a j- SAR:0000863.RM Page 4-46 p '~
I WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. *J
/b O D.S.0 STS AND SMVS FACILITIES DESIGN D.5.1 SUr.'HARY DESCRIPTION OF THE STS AND SMVS D.5.1.1 LOCATION AND FACILITY LAYOUT The STS and the SMWS, are located within the VVDP VTF. Figure D.5.1 1 shows the location of STS and SMWS structures and facilities in relationship to the VVDP site.
Radioactive operations of tne STS are to be conducted within the modified structures of HLW Tanks 8D.x, 8D-2, md 8D 3; in a pipeway and valm aisle adj acets to Tank 8D-1; within interconnecting pipe conduits underground; and
. within the Ventilation Systems. The major STS processing components that are in radioactive service are located within the modified structure of spare HLW Tank 8D 1. The PVS .tas been erected on the Tank Farm in the vicinity of Tank 8D-1 and housed in the V&S Building.
Sludge washing operations of the SMVS will be conducted within the modified structures of HLV Tank 8D 2 on a support truss that spans the tank vault and is within the VT7 Figure D.5.1 2 is a plan view of Mobilization Pumps in Tank 8D-2 and Figure D.5.1-3 is a cross section view of the Mobilization Pump in the 8D 2 modified structures. The major SMVS processing components that will be in radioactive service will be located within and above HLW Tank 8D 2. The electrical support equipment for the SNWS is housed within the V&S Building.
-STS nonradioactive support operations are conducted in the STS Support Building, located at the northwest perimeter of Tank 8D 1. this building houses the STS control room and various cold operations and utility services required to support STS operations. Table D.S.1-1 lists the location of major STS components and Figure D.5.14 shows the layout of the STS facilities.
O h SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-1
.- - _ . - - _ ~ . - . - . . - - - - ._. . . - - . -
1 WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 8MVS nonradioactive support operations will be conducted in the V&S Building, located at the northwest perimeter of Tank 8D 1. This building will house the SMWS control room and various motor controllers for SMWS operations. D.5.1.2 PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE STS AND SMVS The primary objective of the STS is to pretreat the HLW presently stored in Tank BD 2. The HLW stored in Tank 8D 2 has physically separated into a liquid phase salt solution (supernatant) abova a semisolid sludge. Volume reduction will be accomplished by removal of the cesium contained in the supernatant and interstitial liquid in the sludge, allowing disposal of decontaminated supernatant and sludge wash solution as LLU. Within the STS the supernatant has been and the sludge wash solutions will be
" decontaminated" into a salt solution of relatively low radioactivity that will be transferred to the LWTS for volume reduction and ultimate incorporation into a cement matrix. Toe cement will be disposed of as a LLU ~
(see SAR Vo!ume IV, " Low Level Class B and Class C Radioactive Waste Handling, Storage, and Disposal Operations for the Radwaste Treatmet.t System Drum Cell"). The primary objective of the SMVS is to mix the settled PUREX sludge with dilute caustic solutions. The es:irting STS will treat these solutions using the same equipment used to treat the supernatant except that the composition of the ion exchange material will differ. The majority of the cesium and a fraction of the plutonitun and strontium originally contained in Tank 8D 2 and dissolved in the supernatant or dissolved from the sludge during sludge washing vill be loaded onto an inorganic zeolite within the STS ion exchange system and will be stored at the bottom of Tank 8D 1. The loaded ion exchange medium (zeolite) will ultimately be transferred from Tank 8D-1 to the VF for use as melter feed blended with SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 2
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 the washed sludge remaining at the bottom of Tank 8D 2 and the THOREX waste from Tenk 8D 4. Section D.6,0 presents detailed discussions of STS and SMVS Process Systems and Operations. Figure D.5,1 5 is a schematic diagram of the STS Process. The LAre site boundary, exclusion area, restricted area, and layout / location of site utility supplies are noted in Section B.5.1.2 of Volume II. STS utility supplies are directed from the main plant with local control exercised from the STS Support Bu!1 ding or from the SMVS Mobilization Pump Enclosure Buildings, as appropriate. The STS PVS exhausts effluent air from a small 10-mecer stack (33 ft) located on the UTF. Section D.7.4.1 presents a detailed discussion of the PVS. The original WTFVS, which will continue to supply ventilation to Tanks BD 1, 8D 2, 8D 3, and BD 4 for contamination control during STS operations, exhausts through the main processing plant stack along with exhausted air from other Project activities. Section D.7.4.2 discusses the WTTVS. D.5.2 FACILITY MODIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION FOR THE STS AND SMVS D.5.2.1 MODIFICATIONS TO ORIGIN'.L FACILITIES Modifications have been unde to the HLW tanks and their vaults in order to install STS cnd SMWS equipment. The major procet sing components (nonpump) that are'in radioactive service are installed within Tank 8D 1 and the STS valve aisle. The supernatant and decontaminated supernatant transfer pumps are installed in Tanks 8D-2 and 8D 3 respectively. The sludge mobilization pumps will be installed in Tank 8D 2. On-site development and testing using a one-sixth scale model (Schiffhauer, 1987) has shown that the sludge can be resuspended and removed from the tank bottom, as demonstrateo for HLW at other DOE facilities, using multiple mixing pumps.
) SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 3 i
WHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 v Rockwell (1984) conducted a static analysis for Tank BD 2 to substantiate the adequacy of the tank roof when two of the steel roof rafters were cut for remote installation of the mobilisation pump risers. This analysis demonstrated the adequacy of the modification to the tank under gravity loads. A dynamic interaction analysis between the steel tank, interconnecting pump access risers and concrete vault was not performed. However, dynamic analysis by Lawrence Livermore Laborstories (1978) indicated horizontal relative movement at the tank roof under twice the design basis earthquake would be relatively small., _ Furthermore, considering the very low relative stiffness associated with the risers as compared to the entire tank and its surrounding vault, engineering judgment would conclude that little transfer of force and thus insignificant interaction effects would be induced in the tank due to riser attachment. The risers are not anchored laterally to the tank vault but are permitted to slide on a steel pipe casing, thus isolating them from forces that might have been produced by the relative motion between the steel tank roof and the vault roof under earthquake conditions. A separation gap of 25 mm is provided for construction tolerance requirements around the risers
' installed for use in the SMVS. This gap will also accommodate relative movementa that might be induced in an earthquake. Cates (1986 and 1991a) has shown analytically that the pump access riser welded at the top of the tank could withstand four times the design basis earthquake before rupturing.
D.5.2.1.1 MODIFICATIONS TO TANK 8D-1 Detailed. discussions of the methods and safety aspects of the necessary modifications to Tank 8D-1 are presented in Brown (1985a). A summary of facility modificatior.s for the ST* is presented in this section. Modifications have been made to the spare liquid waste storage Tank 8D 1 for the operation of the STS and future zeolite removal operations. Major process components of the STS are located within Tank 8D 1, and the tank is used as a SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 4
WVNS-SAR-004 i s, Rev. 7 \ storage reservoir for the loaded zeolite (ion exchange material) produced by the STS process. Tank modifications were made for the installation of the zeolite woollization/ removal pumps that will be used to slurry the loaded zeclite and the supernatant postfilter sand (see Section D 7.2) from the tank bottom and transfer it to the Vitrification System. On site scale model development testing have also shown that the zeolite and the postfilter sand can be resuspended and removed from the tank bottom as had been demonstrated for !!LU at other DOT facilities. The modifiestions to Tank 8D 1 included the following major steps and activities:
- Excavation to expose a portion of the tank vault concrete roof.
- Penetration of the vault roof.
- Removal of rafter sections from the tank roof and installation of
( crors channel beams.
- Installation of riser assemblies between the vault and tank roof.
These risers are carbon steel and are velded to the tank roof. a Penetration of the tank roof within the riser assemblies.
- Installation of STS compotients and zeolite mobilization pumps.
Tank 8D 1, like 8D-2, is a reinforced carbon steel vessel, approximately 8 m (27 ft) high by 21 m (70 ft) in diameter, with 20 cm (8 in) channels on 38 cm (15 ir.) centers skip welded to then and Wash System vessel is fully contained within a 61-cm (2-ft) thick reinforced concrete vault. The modifications to Tank 8D 1 were necessary for the vessel to be usad as a secondary containment for the supernatant treatment system and to permit zeolite removal for melter feed. For both purposes, holes were cut ,O Page 5-5 ( ,/ SAR:0003863.RM
.. . - - - . - .=- .- = .. . - - . - .
'l:
WVHS-SAR-004 fT& Rev. 7 through the vault and roof of Tank 8D 1. The holes cut for the STS /10) house the major process components that are in radioactive service. The holes cut t for zeolite mobilization and removal (6) will be for the zeolite mobilization pumps. The tank penetrations required for the installation of the STS and for the two zeolite pumpo located in the STS area were performed manually. The remaining penetrations for the zeolite mobilization and removal pumps were cut remotely to gain experience for riser installation in Tank 8D 2. Figure D.5.2-1 depicts the locations of STS component and zeolite mobilization pump (WVNS aluice pump) penetrations made in the STS area of the Tank 8D 1 roof. Table D,5.2-1 provides pertinent information regarding these penetrations and is keyed to Figure D.S.2-1. The vault roof is cut above each required tank penetration. Cuts were made one at a time. Vault holes were made with a water jet cutter (manual) or a concrete coring device (remota). After all vault holes were cut, tank top modifications began. Risers from the { tank top through the vault were installed one at a time. First, the steel tank roof was modified by installing channel beams between the rafters after the rafters were cut so that the integrity of the roof framing was not compromised. Then, rafter portions in the area of the penetrations were remeved and weld preparations made at the tank top. For ali penetrations except the five zeolite pump iccations not in the STS area-locations M 2, M 3, H 6, M-7, 6 M-8-(see Figure D.5.2 1), thece activities were done menually by workers within the vault on the tank roof. The riser assemblies were lowered through the vault hole and welded manually to the top of the tank. STS penetrations were used as a two part riser sleeve and boot arrange. ment with the lower portion (boot) welded to the tank roof. For the five pump penetrations outside the STS area (see Figure D.5.2 1), the one piece riser was_ welded directly to the tank top. Welds were then g,,/ SAR:0000863.RM page 5 6
_ _ . - . _ . - - . . . . . - - . - - - _. - _ _. .__- - - - . .~ - . I l WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 inspected, the roof cut, a shield plug installed, and riser installation continued at the next vault hole. Once all risers were in place and welded to the tank roof, cuts were then made into the tank roof. The welded riser assembly ensures that once the tank roof has beca penetrated, there is no communication between the tank coutents and the vault. The Tank Farm Temporary Ventilation System (TVS), which has been replaced by the pVS, maintained downward air flow through the open riser and into the tank through the roof cut. Only one tank roof penetration was open at a time for short periods. Safety and environmental aspects of the TVS are addressed in Brown (1985a). Design and operation of the TVS is discussed in Schiffhauer (1985). Cutting the five penetrations outside the STS area for the zeolite mobilization / removal pumps included the same basic steps as the STS penetrations, but it was.done remotely. A boom crane was used to lower a turntable mechanism down through the riser to the tank roof. The turntable O was used for b sth velding and cutting. A closed circuit TV system was used to monitor these activities. Demonstration of the remote techniques at Tank 8D 1 was useful in preparing for the installation of the risers on the roof of Tank 8D-2 for supernatant and sludge removal. Figure D.S.2 2 illustrates the remote riser installation technique and use of the remote turntable for cutting and welding the tank roof. Once all penetrations were made in the tank roof, the installation of STS procesa components began. The components were suspended in the tank from a structural steel lattice is supported by the reinforced members that are in turn supported by the concrete pipeway walls. The major components installed within Tank 8D-1-include the supernatant pre and postfilters, cooler, feed tank, zeolite columns (4).-sluice water tank, and the various pumps (see Table D.S.2 1). During equipment installation only one tank penetration was opened SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 7
WVHS-SAR-004 g Rev. 7 f b at a time. The structural analysis performed for Tank 8D-1 modifications is described in Section D.5.2.3.1. D.5.2.1.2 MODIFICATIONS TO TANKS 8D-2 AND 8D-3 The supernatant transfer pump now installed within Tank 8D-2 will transfer sludge wash solution to the STS. Cutting of the vault and tank roof and installation of the riser and pump assemblics were done remotely as previously described for the zeolite mobilization removal pumps installed in Tank 8D 1. The discharge piping extending out of the tank and through the vault roof was enclosed on the vault roof by a steel lined pump pit (concrete or steel) which
.provides a secondary containment interface with the Waste Transfer System (HLW conduit - see Section D.S.2.2). Additionally, in a similar remote manner, sludge mobilization pumps will be installed within Tank 8D-2 for the mobilization of the HLU sludge in the tank. Detailed discussions of the safety and environmental aspects of modifications to Tank 8D 2 for installation of accesa users and equipment are provided in Brown (1986). The modifications to Tank 8D-2 included the following major steps and act tvities:
- Excavation to expose a portion of the concrete tank vault roof.
- Coring of the vault roof.
- Removal of rafter sections from the tank roof and grinding of the roof top.
- Installation of riser assemblies between the vault and tank roof.
These risers are carbon steel and are velded to the tank roof.
- Penetration of the tank roof, e Installation of a shield plug or SMUS mobilization pumps.
The decontaminated supernatant or wash solution transfer pump, which transfers the LLU salt solution from Tank 8D 3 to the LkiS, was ir. stalled in Tank 8D-3. As ignk 8D-3 never contained HLV, its radiological environment was similar to that of Tank 8D 1 (relatively low compared to Tanks SD-2 and 8D 4). SAR:0000863 RM Page 5-8
WNs-sAR-004 nov. 1 (m ); Therefore, this installation was tone manually like the STS components installed in Tank 8D 1 as previoucly described. This pump discharges through a steel-lined pump pit constructed on the vault roof secondary containment. D.5.2.2 NEV FACILITY CONSTRUGTION in addition to the previously described modifications to the original HLW tanks, the following new structures vera erected for the STS: D.5.2.2.1 PIPEWAY A concrete and steel " shield structure" pipenay) was erected oa top of the Tank 8D 1 vault and structurally supported by the vault sides. Concrete pilings nupport the valve aisle and STS support building. The pilings are 17 m (55 ft) deep. p) t
The outer walls of the pipeway are formed by a curb with support columns to allow for piping runs. These retaining walls and columas support the The etructural members that span between them and support the STS equipment.
walls and columns also support the concrete roof and structural beams. Figure D.S.2-3 shows the pipeway above the 8D 1 vault with the STS components susp nded from the vault roof /pipevay floor into the tank. The upper portions of the STS components suspend 3d from the shield structure The epoxy extends floor (vault roof) are sealed with water stops and epoxy. over the riser lips. This prevents communication between STS fluids that may leak and the Tank 8D 1 vault. Any leakage into Tank 8D-1 from the components will be identified by routine analysis of Tank 8D 1- process water samples. Leakage into the_ shield structure above the Tank 8D 1 vault will result in increased concentrations of rac'ioactiv. material in the STS PVS off-gas and l will therefore be detected by the STS Effluent Monitoring System. l l /#'\ Page 5 9 l Q SAR:0000863.RM l
wvHs-sAR-004 Rev. 7 Os D.5.2.2.2 VALVE AISLI l A shielded Valve Aisle constructed at the northwest perimeter of Tank SD 1 contains remotely operated valves and associated instrumentation. The Valve Aisle also contains shield windows and manipulators to permit remote operation and replacement of components. The shielded walls and roof of the Valve Aisle are constructed with 30 cm (12 in) of steel. The Valve Aisle provides secondary containment of HLW piping and valves between the Operating Aisle in the STS Support Building and Tank 8D 1. The Valve Aisle is shown in Figure D.S 2 i. Any leakage into the Valve Aisle or the pipeway behind the Valve Aisle back wall is collected in a common sump located near the back wall of the Valve Aisle. Level indicators in the sump detect any liquid buildup and activate a pump to transfor the sump contents to Tank 8D 2. Any leakage onto the top of Tank 8D 1 will enter Tank RD-1 via the radwaste drain. D.5.2.2.3 STS SUPPORT SUILDING Attached to the Valve Aisle is the STS Support Building, which contains auxiliary support systems and equipment for operation of the STS. This structure houses the fresh water and zeolite storage tanks, associated delivery systems, control room, HVAC equipment, and utility services. The building is maintained as a radiologically " cold" area. The orientation / layout of the pipeway, Valve Aisle, and STS Support Building relative to Tank BD 1 is shown in Figures D.5.2 5 and D.S.2 6. The support Building is shnwn in Figure D.5.2 7. b.5.2.2.4 VASTE TRANSFER SYSTDi Transfer pipelines carrying HLV and decontaminated supernstant or sludge wash
-solution are enclosed as described below: ~
g ,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 10
WVHd-SAR 004 Rev. 7 e Sludge wash solution between Tanks 8D 2 and dD 1 via a pipe conduit, the pipeway, and valve aisle.
- Decontaminated sludge wash solution to/from Tank BD 3, from/to the STS pipeway, and to Tank 5D 15B.
Secondary containment is providad for pipelines carrying 11LV. Piping carrying sludge wash solution between Tank 8D-2 and the STS is double walled stainless steel contained within a stainless steel conduit pipe. Leak detection is aiso provided for these lines. Piping carrying decontaminated sludge wash solutions between the ion exchange columns and Tank BD 3 is contained inside a stainless steel conduit pipe which provides double cantainment. Seismically designed concrete or steel shield valls provide secondary containment for all piping within the Valve Aisle and Pipeway areas of STS. After confirmation of its activity level, decontaminated sludge wash solutions will be transferred between Tanks BD 3 and 5D 15B in the LVTS in a single wall stainless steel pipe. Portions of this piping are direct buried and contained within a 25 cm (10 in) polyvinylchloride pipe (hazardous vaste containment) with the remainder located inside of a nonseismic concrete culvert. All other utility (nonradioactive) piping within STS is single walled. At a future date, loaded zeolite will be transferred from Tank 8D 1 to the VF along with HLU sludge from Tank 8D 2 and HLW T110 REX waste from Tank 8D 4 The design and safety analysis of this piping will be addressed separately in the SMS HLV Transfer SAR. (Table D.1.5-1). D.5.2.2.5 STS HV AND PVS l A heating and ventilation system (HVAC) was constructed to suppote. STS operations. The STS PVS is located in the Tank Fara near Tank 8D 1. The SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-11 l
WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 remaining components such as air . supply units and temperature control , equipment are located within the STS Support Building. This sys*em supplies : fresh air to the occupied areas of the STS Support Building. Air is exhausted to the environment from a stack located in the Tank Farm following treatment by the PVS. The STS HVAC System and the PVS are described in detail in Sections D.5.4.1 and D.7.4. Tanks BD-1, 8D 2, 8D-3, 8D 4, and the major STS and SHVS components suspended in Tank 8D 1 are normally vented by the original VTFVS (see Sections D.5.4.2 and D.7.4). D.5.2.3 STRUCTURAL SPECIFICATIONS The WDP is being implemented through use of existing technology and standard engineering procedures to the maximum extent feasible. Thus, existing nuclear and commercial indust.. codes and standards can be used to guide the design, construction, and installation of various systems associated with the Project. The chcice of construction materials, design approaches, and construction methods are well tested and have been used in many uther nuclear facilities. This provides a high degree of confidence that structures / systems will behave in a predictable manner. Engit.eering codes, construction codes, and standards applicable to the general design and operation of the S1S are listed in Table D.5.2-2. Applicable design codes for each of the major STS and SMUS confinement barrfars (see Section D.4.3.2 and Table D.4.3-1) are provided in Tables D.!.2-3a and D.5.2 3b. D 5.2.3.1 STRUCIURAL ANALYSES OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO TANK 8D-1 FOR THE FTS D.5.2.3.1.1 DESIGN CRITERIA , [ The American Concrete Institute (ACI) Standard 318 77, appropriate loads and loari combinations from ACI 349, the UBC Zone III, and importance factor 1.0 SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-12 l' ,
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 for seismic load definition were used in the analysis and design of the reinforced concrete portions of the 3D 1 tank top modification and vault. The American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code was used in designing the structural steel elements of the structure. The loads considered in the design and/or analysis were dead loads, live loads, thermal loads, seicmic loads (applied as horizontal static load to both above ground structures and as part of the cynamic soil pressure loads for below ground structures), : static soil pressure, equipment and piping loads, h;ydrostatic loads, and construction loads. The analysis performed by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL 1978) was used to . prorate and verify the calculated dynamic soil pressure. The soll pressure establir,hed for 0.1 g seismic ground acceleration was translated into an equivalent static force using a Mononobe-Okabe formula. D.5.2.3.1.2 DESIGN OF CONCRETE SHIELD STRUCTURE O The loads and load combinations described in the previous paragraph were ; utilized in the design of the steel and concrete structure. The steel framing system wss designed to carry the in-tank components and pip'ng loads and. transmit them to the shield structure's concrete walls tLrnugh embedded _ plates. The load then is applied to the vault valls and interior concrete columns through the reinforced concrete walls. The roof of the shield structure is made up of cast in place slabs and removable panels supported by - the frame and walls. Traditional statics analysis methods were utilized in .- the design of both reinforced concrete and structural steel members. O S .- raEe 5 u 8 a P w-w-. .
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WVHS-SAR-004
/' Rev. 7 i D.5.2.3.1.3 CONORETE TANK 8D-1 VAULT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS I
The Tenk 8D-1 concrete vault was analyzed for the following purposes:
- Haintenance of the vault integrity as a rest.lt of the loads from the shield structure (i.e., dead loads, STS components and piping loads in conjunction with other pre existing loads);
e Verification of vault structure integrity subsequent to the removal of concrete cut outs for the STS components and; e Haintenance of vault integrity under a concrete bucket drop during construction. The loads delineated above were utilized in the analysis, including the buoyant uplift due to hydrostatic pressure. These loads were applied to the vault in several different combinations and entered into the Stardyne Static Finite Element Analysis computer program. The computer output was reviewed and the most critical stress elements were then used to verify the vault reir!orcement and stresses within the concrete. As a result of the vault's floating during the original construction period, the vault ceilii.g and bottom underwent stresses that caused cracking (see Section D.9.3.2.2). This crack pattern was mapped by Bechtel. It was factored into the vault analysis and resulted in the imposition of allowable load limits during the construction phase (during and after. cutting holes in the vault roof for the STS components). Soil properties used in the analysis were verified by performing additional borings and sample testing.- In summary, based on the assessment under the load conditions and combinations discussed above, the Tank BD-1 vault integrity will be maintained and vill comply with ACI-318 during construction and operation. SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 14 __ . . . _ . - _ - - , . . =
, . -- .~ - - - . . . _ - . . . - _ - - . - . - - - - - - - ---
1 l WVNS-SAR-004 i Rev. 7 D.5.2.3.1.4 STEEL TANK 8D.1 MODIFICATIONS Since the steel roof girders were not cut and loads on the channel rafters i l after cutting were locally transferred to the roof girders, the steel tank as l 1 a whole was not reanalyzed dynamically or statically. The aquipment suspended I inside Tank 8D 1 is structurally isolated from the carbon steel tank roof. The steel liners (risers) connecting the carbon steel tank with the concrete vault contain a flexible ' boot" to maintain tank and vault isolation at all times. In summary, this structural nodification approach did not cause additional stress on the original steel tank. D.5.2.3.2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF THE " MODIFICATIONS" TO TANK 8D 2 EOR THE SNWS D.5.2.3.2.1 DESIGN OF THE SMWS STRUCTURE The loads and load combinations described in Section D.5.2.3.1, Ebasco (1985) and Schiffhauer (1986) were utilized in the design of the steel and concrete structures. The steel truss framing system was designed to carry the pump loads and transmit them to the ground. Dynamic loads from the operation of . the mobilization pumps were also analyzed. The mobilization pump operating l frequencies are approximately 30 Hz (1800 rpm). Startup frequencies could he as low es 10 Hz under transient conditions. The pump support structure was specifically designed to act as a relatively stiff platform under lateral l
- seismic loads to minimize the potential of pump column impact with risers and l
tank bottom obstructions (Ebasco, 1986). Furthermore, to minimize resonance l i with the pump operating frequencies, a 10 Hz separation was provided as the L design objective of the suppott structure. Independent dynamic analysis of the pump support structure and its flexible foundation system (Gates, 1991a) shows that the fundamental translational modes of the truss in the horizontal SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-15 l
wvk:2sAR '"' 7-,s Rws 7 [ v and vertical directions are on the order of 2.5 to 4 Hz. Horizontal translation perpendicular to the longitudinal axis (e.g., transverse translation) has a natural frequency of 2.5 Hz. Thus, a separation becween the fundamental truss frequencies and the operating frequency of the motor has been provided that exc.eds the design objective of 10 Hz. Higher modal flexural frequencies of the truss in its fu..damental transverse and longitudinal modes are in the range of 4 ta 5 Hz, still well below the operating frequency of the pump motors. No reatrictions have been imposed on the operating frequencies of the pumps to minie; s recenst:e that might result from multiple pump operations. The riser loads are applied to the vault roof. Traditiona2 analysis methods were utilized in the design of both reinforced concrete and structural steel members (Ebasco, 1986), D.5.2.3.2.2 CONCRETE TAUK BD-2 VAULT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS The Tank BD 2 concrete vault was analyzed to verify that vault integrity would Oy be maintained with the loads from the new access risers and subsequent to the G renoval of concrete cutouts for the SMUS pump components (Rockwell, 1985). Detailed documentation of the concrete tank vault flotation during construction along with mitigative action has been documented by Barnstein (1965 and 1966) (Gates, 1991): An extensive-program of soil investigation was carried out using a series of shafts under the tank vaults to identify the state of cracking in the vault slabs as well as the voids that had developed under it. These materials were removed and the entire tank area was grouted and brought into a relative level alignment, slightly twisted out of original tank orientation. The loads used in the analysis included the buoyant uplift due to hydrostatic pressure. These *:, ads vs c pplse; to the vault in several different combinations and oncered into the Stardyne Static Finite Element Analysis computer program. The computer output was then reviewed and the most critical (O,/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-16
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 fd stress elements used in verifying vault reinforcement and stresses within the concrete (Ebasco, 1986). Soil properties used in the analysis were verified by additional borings and sample testing (Gates, 1986). Design standards used in the analyses can be found in the references used in Table D.4.3 2. In summary, based on the assessment under the load conditions and combinations discussed above, the Tank 8D 2 vault integrity has been maintained (Ebasco, 1990, 1986a). D.5.2.3.2.3 STEEL TANK 8D-2 MODIFICATIONS The tank top was analyzed assuming the steel roof girders had not been cut and a maximum of two channel rafters had been cut. Ite steel t ne as a whole was reanalyzed statically. The steel risers connecting the carbon steel tank were pulled in tension and supported on the vault, this results in the same roof loads as existed before modificaticns. In summary. chis structural modification approach does not cause additional stresa on the e,riginal steel tank roof (Rockwell, 1984). D.5.3 STS AND SMVS SUPPORT SYSTEMS D.5.3.1 VENTI 1.ATION Operation of the STS is supported by two separate and independent ventilation-systems: the STS PVS and tna original UTFVS. These two systems are described in detail in Sections D.5.4.1 and D.5.4.2, respectively. ,
'The PVS provides fresh air and temperature control to occupied areas in the STS Support Building and exhausts air for contamination control from the STS Valve Aisle and pipeway through the STS PVS stack. Major components of the SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-17
__. - ~ _ _ . _ - _ . - - - - _ _ _ WVHS-SAR-004 [ \ Rev. 7 PVS are contained and protected from the weather in a metal building located on the Tank Farm near Tank 8D 1. The STS PVS is additionally described in Section D.7.4. The original WTFVS will continue to exhaust air for contamination control from the HLW tanks (8D 1 through ED-4) during normal STS operations along with the off-gas from the STS processing components suspended in Tank 8D-1. Following off gas treatment (sea Section D.7.4), the exhausted air is combined with effluents from other Project sctivities and monitored at the Main Processing Plant Stock before to release to the environment. D.5.3.2 MONITORING AND LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS Operation of the STS is supported by various monitoring and leak detection systems for process control and to ensure that on-site and off site exposures to radiation and radioactive materials are maintained ALARA. These systems \ are described in this section and in detail within other sections of this SAR. as noted. D.5.3.2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SYSTEMS Effluent releases from the operation of the STS are monitored via the existing on-site and off site monitorin5 Program that has been in place since the inception of the WDP in 1981. This program is described in Section A 8.6.1 of Volume I. Hinor modifications have been made to this program to meet the specific monitoring requirements associated with operation of the STS. Detail? end results of the WDP on'6oing monitoring program are available in at. x e. mrts. It is envisioned that the current program will be continued 1f 9 3 .il the WDP is completed. SAR:0000863.RN Page 5-18
wvNs-SAR-004 Rev. 7 The PVS, located in the Tank Farm near Tank 8D 1, is locally monitored by an additional effluent sampling system similar to that used for continuous monitoring of exhausts from the original UTFVS at the Main Processing P1 .t Stack. The specifics regarding instrumentation and methods used to continuously monitor radioactivity in airborne effluents from the STS are described in Section D.8.6.1. D.5.3.2.2 ON-SITE EXPOSURE CONTROL The Health Physics and Radiation Protection Programs for the STS is the same as for other Project activities and is operated in accordance with the requirements of the WNS Radiological Controls Manual, WDP-010. Workers are individually monitored for external radiation exposure via thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) that are exchanged and analyzed on a routine basis. Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) and Continuous Air Monitors-(CAMS) are appropriately located within occupied areas of the STS support building and the 76S Building, which provides audible and visual alarms should external radiation levels or airborne radioactivity levels exceed preestablished set points. The Health Physics program for the Project is described in Section A.8.5 of Volume 1. Additional information on radiation detection instrumentation for worker protection during STS operations is presented in Section D.8.3.4 , D.5.3.2.3 PROCESS CONTROL ! Radiation monitoring instruments (on-line monitors) are also used in the STS to monitor'the radioactivity within contained systems such as pipes and vessels. During system on-line operations readouts of these devices are SAR:0000863.RH Page-5-19 I t
WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 continuously monitored in the STS control room. Alarm indications are provi: led on an annunciator panel in the STS control room if preestablished limit.s are exceede.d. Additionally, the Pneumatic Transfer System is used to routinely extract process samples for off-line analysis from the valve ai::le. These samples are remotely removed from the process and transferred to the analytical cell in the main processing facility for various radiochemical analyses. Analyses of process samples, used in combination with the radiation monitors, ensure that radioactivity is not transferred to systems / areas not intended to receive such material. Monitoring and sampling systems and procedures for STS process control are described in detail in Section D.6.7. Radionuclide concentration limits and related process monitoring requirements are discussed in Volume VI. TR-IRTS-5. LEAK DF.TECTION SYSTEMS O D.5.3.2.4 In addition to the environmental and radiation monitoring systems previously described in this section, several leak detection systems are used in the STS to identify leakage of process solutions. A liquid level detection system exists (as NFS, Inc. original equipment) in both the Tank 8D-1 and 8D-2 pans to identify leakage from the HLV tanks. (An examination of the vault / pan / tank design makes it clear that the pans function more to facilitate leak detection than to serve as secondary containment. This latter function is served by the concrete vaults.) Leaked fluids can be returned from the pans to the tanks via pumps. The immediate area surrounding HLW Tanks 8D 1 AND 8D.2 has a series of water monitoring and injection wells. These wells allov measurement of groundwater level and water sampling for radioactive contamination analysis. Monitoring SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-20 (- l l . -- . - ~.
. - . - . ~ - . -- _
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. */ %./ and trending on these many wells has indicated uniform groundwater levels between wells and no radioactive contamination has been discovered. l Current 1) per a SOP, a monitoring well within the WTF area is monitored for groundwater level, three times daily, and radioactivity, weekly and prior to pumping otat of groundwater. 1 The groundwater level surrounding the vaults is maintained at a minimum i elevation (above the bottom of the 8.2 m (27 ft) HLV Tanks) of 7.6 m (25 ft) by way of a level indicating controller which allows water to be injected into wells. The 2,300,000 L (600,000 gals.) working capacity of each HLV Tank corresponds to a 6.7 m (22ft) height, which is lower than the minimum ground water elevation. Since at least 1982, no water injection has been necessary to maintain this minimum groundwater level. This is due to the hisi ground water table at the site. WVNS is forced to pump ground water out of a dowatering well and sump from underneath the vault to maintain the ground water level within a desired range (7.6 m [25 ft) to 10.3 m [34 ft]). The frequency of pumping depends on the seasonal climatology; however, the well is typically pumpe etween one and four times per month throughout the year. The carbon steel pan in the 8D 2 vault has been tested, and it is apparent that a leak axists that allows water to pass between the pan and vault. The pan itself cannot, therefore, be considered as either containment. or as a full range adjunct to the detection system for leaks from Tank 8D 2. However, the liquid level detet- in system in 8D 2 continues to be a viable detection system for potential tank leaks whose rate of outflow exceeds that of the pan or whose volume would be large enough to register on the pan level detector. The pan contents in the 8D-1 vault are still isolated from the vault. When water is pumped from the pan, the vault level does not change. The water that does collect in the pan is analyzed for radioactivity. SAR:0000063.RM Paj,e 5 21
-I l
)
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 If either tank were to leak, the vault and silty till soil around the vault provide the containment t prevent leakage to the accessible environment. , Vater can be injected around the outside of the vaults to maintain a piezometric potential greater than the level that would exist if the entire contents of either Tank BD 1 or SD 2 were released to their respective vaults. The head on the outside of the vault would cause the leakage to be from the i outside to the inside. The water on the outside of the vaults also keeps the silty till wet and highly impermeable (very low migration rates - 10** cm/s) to water flow. A review of the ir.jr: vion well water addition records for the past year has shown that no water needed to be added to the system. This is indicative of the " tightness" of the soils in which the tanks are situated and of the fact that natural infiltration is typically sufficient to maintain the desired degree of soil saturation. A review of the Tank 8D 1 and BD 2 pans aample records indicate water does infiltrate into the pans. No records are kept as to the volume of water pumped from the pans. The level instruments that exist in each vault have high level alarms that are set to keep this water off the bottom of the vaste tanks. (} (/ A large seismic event, in excess of the design basis event, could hypothetically rupture the tank and the vault. However, the inward , piezometric gradient and the highly impermeable nature of the surrounding soils make the release of HLV to the accessible environment highly unlikely. The high clay content and over consolidated nature of the surrounding, undisturbed silty till are, in effect, a highly durable " bathtub" for the BD-1/8D 2 vault complex. Since much of the water is effectively " locked up" in the clay fraction of the till it is highly unlikely that it could be lost during a seismic event. Furthermore, even if water in the system were to be lost or head differentials were to equilibrate, additional water could easily be added to the system. This could be accomplished via the injection system or,.failing that, through the standpipes that surround both vaults and are in direct hydraulic communication with the gravel layer that underlies the vaults. ( SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-22
._. _ __ __ ____m __ _ __ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _
l WNS- S AR-004 Rev. "I Leakage in the valve aisle /pipeway areas will be collected in a sump. Actuation'of a pump will return fluids to Tank BD 2. A level alarm in this sump identifies the leakage condition. Additionally, a leak detection system is installed within the annular space between the double walls of the STS transfer piping. Leaked fluids will be returned by gravity to Tank BD 2. The transfer conduit between Tank 8D 2 and STS is connected by a drain to Tank BD 2 in the event that the double walled pipe leaks into the conduit. A summary of leak detection and mitigation capabilities for the major structures / barriers of the STS is presented in Table D.5.3-1. All operating procedures for transferring liquids require that the start of the transfer process be monitored to ensure that corresponding volume increases and decreases occur as expected or that the transfer can be secured immediately. 3 Mobilization pump seal performance will be routinely monitored to determine if any contamination is migratin6 into the pump column. D.5.3.P 5 CONTAINMENT METAL CORROSION WNS has a program in place for monitoring and control of corrosion in carbon steel HLW Tanks SD 1 and 8D-2.
. Tank wall thicknesses of Tanks 8D-1 and 8D 2 were last measured in 1982 using ultrasonics. There was no evidence of thinning of the tank walla through general cerrosion. Visual inspection of internal and external tank surfaces indicated loose surface scale and pitting. The design corrosion allowance for these HLW tanks is 6.4 mm (0.250 in). .SAR:0000863.RM Pa6e 5 23
1 l WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 v Tank 8D 3 is a stainless steel tank used as a temporary nold tank for decontaminated slud[< vash solutions and has never been used to contain HLU. Therefore it has never been inspected. l
}
Tank 8D 4 is also a stainless steel tank since it contains an acidic THOREX waste. Inspection of corrosion coupons, which were removed in 1987, indicated minimal thinning (i.e., at least an order of magnitude less than that in Tank BD-2 0.003 mm [0.12 mils) total of corrosion over a 7.5 year time span). The _ design corrosion allowance for the stainless steel HLW tanks is 1.8 mm (0.07 in). Corrosion is controlled in carbon steel HLW Tank 8D 1 by the addition of corrosion inhibitors (i.e., caustic for pH control and sodium nitrate). The carbon steel HLU tanks were stress-relieved by heat treatment af ter
-fabrication. However, it is difficult to say today what the stass condition is because of-the effects of differential settlement. Nevertheless, stress corrosion cracking has-never been observed in corrosion coupons removed from eithet Nnk 8D 1 or 8D 2.
The corrosion resistant stainless steel tank is relied upon as a passive means of controlling corrosion in Tank 8D 4. The low corrosion rates observed support this approach. D.5.3.3 AUXILIARY POWER Requirements for au.iliary power for the STS and SMVS are necessary for maintaining vital services, including lighting, ventilation and menitoring systems. The operational safety requirements for auxiliary power distribution to the STS are described in Volume VI Section M.11. STS electrical systems l are discussed in bection D.S.4.4. l SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 24 r l l
- _= _ .-
WVNS-SAR-004 gg Rev. 7 i i Should a power outage occur during STS operations, the STS would be shut down and would not be restarted until complete system control and normal power is restored. The SKWS would shut down durin6 a power outage; however, the VTFVS would con 11nue to provide tank ventilation since it is on auxiliary power. D.
5.4 DESCRIPTION
OF SERVICE AND UTILITY SYSTEMS D.5.4.1 STS BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATIcii SYSTEM The 1"Ts li&V rystem is designed to provide area temperature control, a minimum differential pressure, and a minimum average air velocity. The system is also designe$ to prevent airborne contamination in ^Joutinel, occupied areas by routing ventilation air from areas of low contamination to areas of higher contamination potential. A minimum differential pressure of 15 mm (0.6 in) water column is maintained between routinely occupied areas and potentially contaminated areas. Inlet air is filtered, and if necessary, cooled or heated () for personnel comfort. Control of contamination within designated areas is accomplished by maintaining these areas under negative pressure relative to " cold" areas, using an air lock or contamination control tents that allow entry into contaminated areas (considered abnormal events-see Section D.9.1.2), and ensuring that negative pressure and ventilation flow will continually be maintained between clean and potentially contaminated areas. The area differential prev.e ranges maintained with reference to the atmosphere are (values in standard atmospheres (inches of water column)); e Control room 0.0 cc +0.002 (1.0)
- Zeolite / fresh water tank areas 0.0 to +0.0002 (0.1)
_\ (' ~ SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-25
,p -m . i.; wVNS-SAR-004-Rev. 7
~_e'~Area' external to valve aisle- 0.002 (-1.0)'to -0.0015 ( 0.6): l
;(Operating misle); ,
t
~ . , , ~
- e- Pipeway/ cop of=8D 1 tank -0.007-(-3.0)-to -0.006_( 2.4) e: Valve-aisle = 0.007 (-3.0);to -0.006 (-2.4)
During normal uperations, . air -flows from the supply fan through a filter to
- the fresh w, ster / zeolite area-from which air is directed to the operating area- ,
in front of the Valve Aisle. The control room has a separate HVAC system that draws from:the outside air. Operating- areas are protected by fire dampers between floors.- Approximately _1.98 m /s (4,000 cfm) _ of ventilation air is directed from the
'eperating aisle to'the valveJaisle and into the pipeway. Air leaving the
; operating aisle passes through a roughing filter, HEPA filter, and tornado-
- ' damper. . Air = leaving the pipevay to the PVS passes-through a butterfly valve.
-Air ic w+* routed directly to a train consisting of roughing and HEPA filters
-(pe; , r.< i e s , .- Jae of two trains (parallel, redundant) will always be -
opetA % m . The ;entilation air then flows to exhaust blowers; both-are pows rw by electricity. - One is maintained as a backup designed- to start automatically if the primary blower fails. An auxiliary power supply '
'(electric) is provided to these-blowers.
-Major HV' components (PVS blowers) are designed for contact maintenance.
I Temporary containments and/or increased air flow will be used to maintain contamination control should maintenance-operations be necessary involving-the
- pipeway n the valve aisle.
During_ shutdown cf the supply air system for either maintenance or because of failure. gravity dampers in the zeolite / fresh water area will open to allow SAR:0000863.RM Page 5 26 L r r
w dS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
.-u/') . continuous ventilation, although'without mechanical temperature control of the air. The STS Billding HVAC floor plans are shown in Figures D.S.4-1 and D.5.4-2.
D.5.4.1.1 MAJOR COMPONENTS AND OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS D.5.4.1.1.1 AIR SUPPLY UNIT The air' supply system consists of an air inlet damper, coils with bypass damper, heater, prefilter, filter, blower, duct work and controls. The system is designed to maintain inside air temperature, based on outdoor design conditions of 31'C (88'F) dry bulb and 22*C (71*F) wet bulb for summer and -17'C (2*F) dry bulb in winter: Area Inside Air Temperatures Summer (max) /Vinter (min)
^(3
' "( Control Room 26*C (78'F) DB/20'C (68'F) DB Zeolite / fresh water area 36'C (97*F) DB/18'C (65'F) DB Valve Aisle 44*C (111*F) DB/21'C (70*F) DB Pipeway/ cop of tank 54*C (130*F) DB/21'C (70*F) DB
,The air supply unit is sized to deliver 2.1 m /s3 (4,550 cfm) of heated and filtered air to the building.
D.5.4.1.1.2 DUCTWORK Air is distributed from the supply to the opercting areas through ductwork constructed according to standards of the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineera (ASHRAE). i SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-27
. - - ~ ..- . - . - -. - _ - - - . - . - . - - - - . . - . -
~7 li WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 4 ,
Ductwork=isiconstructed.from 304 or 304 L stainless steel and galvanized steel
- material =. _
D.5.4.1.1.3-INLET FILTERS AND DAMPERS
+
Lair enters =the! control room and fresh water / zeolite areas through separate filter and damper assemblies during normal operations.
-D.5.4.1.1.4 HEATERS Outside air under low ambient temperature conditions is preheated by the air-
~ handling unit coils, which provide air temperature control. Local unit heaters provide-the final. space temperature control, Unit heaters are
;provided with individual limit' thermostats for automatic control. A manual switch is provided with every heater to allow for manual operations if .
-required.
,~9_
). ,
.D.5.4.1.5 EXHAUST FANS'
.The exhaust fans (PVS blowers) provide the system draft and are rated for 100%
flow capacity-of the HV system with all the filters at the changeout pressure - drop. BothTeihaust-blowers. ara electrically operated. The backup will automatically activate if the primary _ blower-fails or if primary power is-
- lost.
,- - D.5.4.1.1.6 EINAUST FILTERS
. Ventilation air flows from the'pipeway and HLV pipe conduit and is exhausted
-- through a roughing filter and two sets of HEPA filters in series (see Figure.D.7.4-1). The filters are housed within'the air treatment system'and
.are' connected with a heater and mist eliminator. HEPA filters are contained
!by a-housing constructed of stainless steel. Provisions have been made to DOP O -SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-28 e es- y-ev -e ,y---- , ,w
-w -.c -e-- g 4 c -rm -,p---w_ - . - . 7-t-. -a- , . - -.m 4
WVMS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 test the installed filters.before the system begins operating. -The differential pressure is measured across each filter holder in the RV system. The primary filter holder has local low /high pressure alarms that sound a trouble annunciator in the control room. A remote trouble alarm in the STS control room would alert operators of a problem with the PVS. D.5.4.1.1.7 DISCHARCE DUCTWORK Following off-gas treatment, the ventilation air has parsed through the blower and discharged through the STS PVS stack (see Section D.7.4). Air is continuously sampled to assess radioactive material releases (see Section D.8.6.1). D.5.4.1.2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND C01GROL INTERFACES BETVEEN CLEAN AND CONTAMINATED AREAS
/~'\ Should it be necessary, temporary containment enclosures will be provided for b entry into contaminated treas and will be-maintained under negative pressure to ensure that air flows from clean to contaminated areas.
The air supply unit runs continuously, supplying temperature-controlled outdoor' ventilation air through a filter to the zeolite / fresh water areas. Filters and valves are installed in the transfer ducts between the fresh water / zeolite area and the operating aisle work arot. A separate air supply unit operates in a similar fashion for the control room. Thermostats control space temperature for the two supply systems. Fire dampers (ventilation system) and fire doors (1.5 h minimum rating) will isolate-the zeolite / fresh water area from the Operating Aisle in the event of a fire in the STS Support Building. The PVS dampers are designed to fail safe The ! in the closed position in the event of loss of utility air pressure. SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-29
+P-?,
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
~. _
84; -backup blower will automatically come on line should primary electrical power-
- be lost =or the primary PVS blower fail.
D.5.4.1.2.1 AIR FILTRATION For protection ~of; personnel,1 filter systems are provided in the following locations'in the intake:- e'- Lcw-efficiency filters in the outdoor air intake section of-the air supply fan; e- inv efficiency _ filters in the transfer air ducts connecting the
. zeolite / fresh water area with the operating aisle; e HEPA filters located in the transfer air ducts connecting the-operating aisle work area to both the valve aisle and_the pipeway;
-e Low-efficiency filtere located in the air intake of the control
' room supp1y fan.
All' filters are -replaceable and _ each filter bank is provided with pressure
-differentia 1' indications ~for: resistance measurements and~to-identify
- replacement. intervals.
Air leaving contaminated areas is filtered in the'PVS by two sets of _HEPA
' filters after passing a. mist eliminator.. heater, and rcughing filter to entrap
. moisture and particulates. HEPA filters are in'a housing.to provide _ i
. contamination control during changeout. Filters will be changed with bag out/ bag in procedures. The differential pressure is measured-across each filter holder in the PVS system. The primary filter holder has local low and hi 5h-pressure' alarms that sound a general trouble annunciator-in the STS control room.
l'
. SAR:0000863'.RM Page 5-30
4 - . . . . ._ . . _ WVNS-SAR-004 7- ~- Rev. 7 ( k_/ - In response to low /high differential alarms, the parallel and redundant filtering train will be automatically activated. This redundancy ensures continuous.and adequate air-filtration and treatment should filter failures occur. D.5.4.2 WTFVS The original WTFVS will continue to provide routine ventilation to Tanks SD-1, 8D-2, 8D 3, BD-4, new pits on these tanks, and the STS process vessels that are suspended in BD 1 during STS operation. Section B.5.4 and Figure 3.5.4-6 of Volume II (WVNS SAR-002) provide additional information on the WTFVS. Air is removed from the tanks at approximately 0.07 m3 /s at standard temperature and pressure (STP) (150 scfm) and is passed through a condenser and knock out drum. The air is then heated before passing through a HEPA filter coupled with a blower. The filter and the blower have a redundant, (N parallel system as a standby in case of-failure. The exhaust lines are d - connected _to the main plant stack. Before release, the exhausted air is , monitored to ensure radioactive releases are being maintaired ALARA. (See Sections D.7.4 and D.8.6.1 for descriptions of the UTFVS and Monitoring Program.) D.5.4.3 CONTRESSED AIR Utility air and instrument air are required by the STS to operate instruments, control valves, and pumps. This air is supplied from either the main plant system (described in Section B.S.4.3 of Volume II) or from the air compressor located on the V&S Building. The STS is designed to fail-safe during loss of air pressure. Air requirements for the STS are presented in Table D.5.4-1. SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-31
\, .
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [} Q) D.5.4.4 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY POWER SUPPLY The primary and emergency power systems for the VVDP are described in Section B.5.4 of Volume II. Electrical power for the STS is supplied from the main plant utility services (480 volt, three phase), to a motor control center (MCC). From the MCC, the power is distributad to the STS equipment and control paneln through conduits embedded in STS facility floors and walls. Normal electrical power requirements for operation of th9 STS are 190 (255) to 200 kW (270 hp). The STS is designad so that all valves and equipment fail safe in case of electrical power failure. The SMWS will require 370 (500) to 560 kW (750 hp). Thc SMVS will shut down (pump stop) in a fail-safe condition in the case of electronic power failure.
*~- . -
Auxiliary power backup is supplied to lighting, ventilation, and monitoring systems. Back-up power is provided to the STS by automatic switching to a diesel generator with sufficient stored fuel for eight hours of continuous operations. Specific requirements for STS auxiliary power requirements are addressed in Operational Safety Requirements found in Part M of Volume VI. Electrical power requirements for the STS are presented in Table D.5.4-1. D.5.4.5 WATER SUPPLY The plant water supply and the plant demineralized water systems are described in Section 5.5.4.5 of Volume II. These provide water for the STS and are supplemented by the water supply from the STS fresh water tank in the STS Support Building. Water requirements for the ST5 are provided in Table D.5.4-1. Mobilization pump seal water is supplied from the plant utility water supply system. Seal water pressure and flow are monitored at the pump, g~) i s SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-32
WVNS-SAR-OO4 r- Rev. 7 l
\.)
D,5.4.6 STEAM SUPPLY A steam line frcm the plant main steam supply is provided to the STS. Steam is used intermittently to blow down instrument probes in the Level / Density Indicating System. D.S.4.7 SANITARY FACILITIES Operators can.use the facilities within the main process building. D.S.4.8 SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS AND AIARMS The STS is provided with instrumentation to monitor flow, pressure, fluid levels, temperature, and radiation levels to ensure system operations are controlled and system limitations are not exceeded. Major STS equipment is operated remotely from control panels located in the control room. In-the event of abnormal conditions, the process equipment can be manually shut off,
-[% /
Safety related systems (e.g., ventilation system) are designed to achieve a safe condition automatically should off-normal conditions occur (i.e. , dampers close, backup fan starts, etc.) or redundant systees are activated. Automatic controls for all subsystems are provided with manual override capabilities. The STS has instrumentation and controls to allow the system to be started, The control panel operated, monitored, and shut down from the control room. is equipped with a dynamic graphic display to reduce the likelihood of
. operator etror. The instrumentation indicates or alarms (or both) abnormal c
-and undesirable conditions that could adversely affect system or equipment During
- performance or inadvertently affect interfaces with other systems.
l emergency conditions, external communicationa can be through the plant
. telephone system.
1 l SAR 0000863.RM Page 5-33
WVNS-SAR-004
/T nev. 7 ~,/
Examples of safety related a,ystems that provide alarm indications in the STS control room include: e Ventilation System differential pressures e Radiation Monitoring Systems e Effluent Monitoring Systems e Leak Detection Systems e Pneumatic St.aple Trant.for System
-e Fire Protection System (Sectr c D.5.4.9).
D.S.4.9 FIP2 PROTECTION SYSTEM A fire in the STS or SINS is considered highly unlikely. The valve aisle and the pipeway are constructed of concrete and steel and the liquid supernatant is. nonflammable. The only potential fire hazards are the electrical wire insulation -grease in the pump motors, the sample vials and sample transfer
" rabbits," and the small amount of wipes used during sample collection, which
'" shall be kept in fire-resistant containers. None of these is a high risk fire
. hazard.
The STS has fire detection equipment, alarm systems, and suppression systems commensurate with needs as determined by WNS Radiation and Safety. This includes fire' extinguishers, emergency exit lighting and a Halon* syrten in the control panel. Additionally, fire suppression 3 systems have been installed in the operating aisle and in the PVS Building. Fire prevention and fire fighting procedures for the STS are in accordance with existing WDP procedures (see Section B.S.4.4, Volume II).
'WNS maintains a highly reliable alarm detection system through a semi-annual site fire detection and alarm system inspection. In addition, the services of a Fire Protection Engineering firm are subcontracted annually to do a thorough survey of the WDP Fire Protection Program. This serves as an audit of the i
l ! /3 Page 5-34 () SAR:0000863.RM l
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [%J}. VVNS systems and programs to ensure compliance with the " improved risk" level of protection required by DOE. The VVDP Fire Protection Plan is contained in Chapter 5 of " Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual" (VVDP-011). D.5.4.10 MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS The STS has been designed for remote operation. All equipment not required to be located in radioactive process areas is located in " cold" areas to permit contact maintenance. Contact maintenance will be performed on equipment previously used in radioactive service only after efficient decontamination in accordance with existing VVNS procedures (VVDP-010. " Radiological Controls Manual"). Where this is not feasible, equipment is be remotely removed and replaced. All equipment and piping in radioactive service is drained and flushed to reduce radiation levels before any personnel enter process areas such as the N valve aisle or pipcaay. Instruments are designed to permit isolation for [~'Y
'N-' periodic maintenance. STS equipment and components are arranged, located, and shielded to minimize radiation exposure to plant personnel should maintenance be necessary.
STS design considerations for equipment / component decontamination were additionally discussed in Section D.4.5. Potential effects of maintenance activities in the valve aisle are discussed in Section D.9.1. D.5.4.11 COLD CHEMICAL SYSTEMS The STS cold :hemical systems are described in Section D.6.3.1 (Cold Chemical Receiving and Handling). l l (3 Page 5-35 () SAR:0000863.RM
WVNS-SAR-004 REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.5,0 Barnstein, 1965 L. S. Barnstein. 1965. " Investigation of Atomic Waste Disposal Vaults at *he Atomic Waste Disposal Plant, at Ashford, New York, for the_New York State Atomic and Space Development and Authority." Barnstein, 1966 L. S. Barnstein. January 1966. " Report on Restoration of Atomic Waste Vaults at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority." Brown, 1985a Memo HE:85:0258, S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. December 19, 1985. " Safety Analysis Report For Modifications To Tank 8D-1 and Installation of STS Components and Zeolite Removal Pumps." Brown, 1986 Memo HE:86:0097, S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. May 1986 " Safety Analysis Report for Remote Riser Installation and Penetration of Tanh 8D-2." Dames and Moore, 1986 Dames and Moore. Letter ZW:86:0092, V. F. Mercurio to R. R. Borisch. May 1986 " Spread Footing Design Parameters for Pump Foundations for Tanks 8D 1 and 8D-2." Ebasca, 1985 Ebasco Services, Inc. February 1985. " Pump Support Structure Design Conditions," WVNS-EBAR-735 and 735a. O Ebasco, 1986 Ebasco Services, Inc. 1986. " Design Review Calculations for Zeolite Mobilization 8D-1 and Sludge Mobili::ation 8D 2 Pump Support Structure ( for West Valley Demonstration Project." WVNS/W60. Ebasco, 1986a Ebasco Services, Inc. 1986. "STS 8D-1 Tank Vault Top Slab Design Evaluation." WVNS/W50. Ebasco, 1990 Ebasco Services, Inc. 1990 " Vault 8D-1/8D-2 Finite Element Analysis - Rebar Verification." WNS/W55, EBAR-1324 and 1324a. Gates, 1991a Dames and Moore, April 1991. "BD 2 Sludge Mobilir.ation System Confinement Barrier Integrity Review." Subcontract No. 19-CW-21511 Task 10. Cates, 1991b Memo FB:91:0173, W. E. Gates to C. J. Roberts. August 1991.
" Technical Review Group Response."
LLL, 1978 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. May 1978. " Seismic Ar 21ysis of High-Level Neutralized Liquid Waste Tanks at the Western New York State Nuclear Service Center, West 7 alley, New York." UCRL-52485. Rockwell, 1984 Rockwell. 1984 " Tank 8D-2 New Risers 12,24, and 36 Inch Diameter, Stress Analysis, Evaluation." SD-RE-TA-003, Rev. O. SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-36
WNS-st: -004 Rev. 7 [ }
\_)
Rockwell, 1985 Rockwell. Internal Letter from W. W. Smith to D. V. Scott, August 1985, " West Valley Tank Riser Installation." 65620 WS-85-161 (ZW:86:0020). Schiffhauer, 1985 Schiffhauer. September 1985. " Design Criteria For the Temporary Ventilation System. "WNS -DC- 02 7 . Schiffhauer, 1987 M. A. Schiffhauer. June 1987. " Scale Model Equipment Testing." DOE /NE/44139-36. ( SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-37
WVNS-SAR-004 9[- ,_'Y Rev. 7 N_) TABLE D.5.1 1 LOCATION OF MAJOR STS COMPONENTS Process Components Original Tanks BD 2, 8D 2 and 8D 3. (Radioactive Service) Process Valve Aisle Valve Aisle adjacent to Tank 8D 1. Interconnecting Piping Valve Aisle, above original Tank BD-1 and in new Waste Transfer System (shielded pipe containment) communicating with the LWTS Tanks 8D-1, 8D 2, 8D-3, and the Vitrification Facility. Auxiliaries and Controls STS Support Building in the WTF. (Nonradioactive Service) STS PVS Ventilation Building in the WTF.
~
Pipeway/Shie1d Structure Between STS Support Building and
- - Tank 8D-1 and above Tank BD 1 vault.
l l SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-38
wsS-SAR-004 f( D Rav. 7 TABl.E D.5.2-1 PENETRATIONS MADE IN THE ROOF OF TANK 8D-1 Hole Purpose / Approximate Installation Desienation Descriction Opening Size Method n (ft) C-001 STS IX Column 1.3 (4.3) Manual C-002 STS IX Column .1.3 (4.3) Manual C-003 STS IX. column 1.3 (4.4) Manual C-004 STS IX Column 1.3 (4.4) Manual D 001 STS Supernatant 1.6 (5.2) Manual Feed Tank D-004 STS Sluice Feed 1.6 (5.2) Manual Tank E-001 STS Supernatant 1.1 x 0.6 Manual Cooler (3.5 x 2) F-001 STS Prefilter 1.1 (3.5) Manual F 002 STS Postfilter 0.9 (3) Manual G-004 STS 8D-1 Pump 0.8 x 1.2 Manual (2.5 x 4) M2 Zeolite MOB 0.7 (2.3) Remete Pump M-3 Zeolite MOB 0.7 (2.3) -Remote Pump M-4 Zeolite MOB 0.7 (2.3) Manual Pump M5 Spare Pump 0.7 (2.3) Manual M-6 Zeolite Pump 0.7 (2.3) Remote M-7 Spare Pump 0.7 (2.3) Remote M-8 Zeolite Removal 0.7 (2.3) Remote Pump i f~ l t% SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-39 l
WVNS-SAR-004 [~ Rev. 7 t V TABLE D.5.2-2 ENGINEERING CODES / STANDARDS FOR STS
' Vessels ASME Section VIII, Division I, 1983 Edition (Vessels were built to code
-but not "U" Stamped (National Board Stamp))
Piping ANSI B31.3, 1980 Edition Symbcis for Velding and AUS A.2.4-79
. Nondestructive Testing Dimensions and Tolerances ANSI Y 14.5, 1973 Edition Effluent and Process Control' ANSI N 13.1,'1969 Edition ANSI N 42.18, 1974 Edition Structural. AISC Eighth Edition International Conference of Building Officials (IC/0), UBC, 1982 Edition Ventilation Handbook ERDA 76-21, Nuclear Air Cleaning Structural Velding AUS D1.1, 1980. Edition
(' s) Sm / . National Electrical Code, Electrical / Instrumentation ANSI /NFPA 70 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) National Fire Codes ANSI Standards National Electrical Manufacturers Association _(NEMA) Standards-
. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standards Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) Standards and " Product Directories) Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) Lighting Handbook DOE 6430.1, " General Design Criteria Manual," 12-12 83 l l L- - SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-40 i
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 _'A ( TABLE D.5.2-2 ENGINEERING CODES / STANDARDS FOR STS (continued) Department of Labor, " Occupational Safety and Health Standards," Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 1910 Electrical and Electronics Craphic Symbols and Reference Designations, ANSI /IEEE Y32E National Electric Safety Code, ANSI-C2 Instrumentation Society of America. ISA-S5.1-73 Instrumentation complies with ISA Recommended Practices
.t"~x
( j' Jachined Surfaces ANSI B46.1, 1978 Edition Shell-and-Tube Heat Exchangers ASME Section VIII, Division 1, 1983 Edition, and TEMA, Class C, Sixth Edition, 1978, With Addenda Through 1982 Material Specification ASME Section II Nondestructive Examination (NDE) ASME Section V Qualifying Welders and Velding ASME Section IX Procedures Architecture "INEL Architectural Engineering Standards," US DOE - Idaho Operations Office, Idaho 1211s, Idaho, Pe . 3. June 15,1982 Overations1 Safety Desien Criteria Design dangal. ID-12044, US DOE - Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho-7-~5 N SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-41
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
. f) .
.'s j TABLE D.5.2-2 ENGINEERING CODES /STANDAPDS FOR STS (continued) ,
Quality Assurance ANSI-ASME NQA-1-1979 Tr.nk 8D 1 or 8D-2 UBC, Zone 3, I.F. - 1.0; Horizontal Structural Additions only Pipe Chase Tank SD-1 UBC, Zone 3, 1.F. - 1.0; to Valve Aisle Equipment Support - Equiptaent ANSI A 58.1 Suspended in Tank 8D 1 or BD-2 (including skirts) STS Building Below-Grade UBC, Zone 3, I.F. - 1.0; Structure Process' Piping (8D 2 to SD-1; 8D-1 WVNS-DC 013 to SD-3; SD 1, 8D-2 not including SD-3 to 35104)~
;/
f
\.
l SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-42 l f I 1
WVHS-SAR-004
,, Rev. 7 j j _-
%/ TABLE D.5.2-2 ENGINEERING CODES / STANDARDS FOR STS (concluded) Equipment supports - not suspended UBC - no seismic load in Tanks 8D 1 or BD-2 Metal Building NYSBC, 97 mph wind, 40 lb/ftasnow Equipment (including equipment No seismic load suspended in Tank SD 1 or BD-2 and the Valve Aisle o v
)
SAR:0000863.PJi Page 5-43 l
..l li i
WVNS-SAR-004 i RSv. 7 ) TABLE D.5.2 3a y3-DESICN CODES awn ST AWDARDi FOR S'f S CONFINEMENT SMTEMS { ; Seismic Foot-Structure or h21g
- Confleement Cenfinem mt Barrier Des 19n Code or Standy i! Factors Certon steel tank API 650 (1961 version) None Tank 80 2 Reinfoaced concrete tank vault 19?1 U8C 2=111 (2) 1956 ACI, Building Code Requirements for R/C, 318 56 Soll excavation and backfitt Bechtel construction specifications -
1963 Risar Carbon steet riser 1982 UBC ANSI B31.3, 1980 2=3 (3) IF=1.0
' 40" diameter carbon steel casing 1982 U8C ANSI B31.3, 1980 i=3 IF=1.0 concrete / Grout Filt ACI 318-77 None Expansion Beltows ANSI B31.3, 1980 None Carten steel AISC 8th Edittor 1980 None
- Riser Spray Charter Bearing Plate 1985 USC Z=3 AISC 8th Edition 1980 IF=1.5
- Pupp Colum Stainless Steet 1985 U8C Z=3 Puvp Colum ASME Section vill IF=1.5 WNS EQ 202, Rev. 5 None I
[]/
\
Fluid Seats
mhletd Plug Carbon Steel Pipe ANSI B31.3, 1980 None (1)- - Tornado wind are missile loading was not a design requirement for the SMVS f acility.
(23- Seismic zone, 2=111, of the 1961 uniform Building Code (Usc) is slightly different frcun the 1982 and 1985 USC, 2=3. (3)_ - Design codes and standards for the Renote and Manuat Riser Penetrations of Tank 80 2 are referenced in WNS-DC-026, Rev. O. June, '986. (4)' Design codes and standards for the Pup Colum are referenced in WNS EQ 202, Rev. 5, October,1990. C
'i s
SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-44
WVNS-SAR-004 R3v. */ TABLE D.5.2-3b -(,~,) gllLQW C00t$ AND STAWOARDS FOR STS STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS
\'"f Seismic Font-J g ee Structure! C e t Desion Code and Standard 'eetor(1) HE,3 M03 Puiss Purp, Colunut & Motor 1985 USC 2=3 (2)
!=1.5 Steet AISC 8th Edition 1980
- Welding AVS Section 01.1 ASME Section Vill, V, IX Steel Pipe, Valves and AWSI, B16.5, 316.11, B16.34, Fittiras B31.3, 1980 Edition Purp Support Structural System 1985 UBC Z=3 2tructure (fruss & !=1.5 Footings)
Steet Truss A!SC 8th Edition 1960 (3) ASW D.1.1, 01.84 ANSI A56.1 1982 t=1.07 Exp=C
- Concrete ACI 318 71
- Footings Dames & Moore,1986 Foundation Rec e .
[ *')) Tornado wind and missile leading was not a oesign requirement for the S WS facility, i )
\~32) Design codes and standards for the Studge Mobilization Pwps are referenced in WWS E0 202, Rev. 5, October 1990.
(3) Design codes and standards for the Studge Mobilizadon Purp Suport Structure are referenced in WNS ESAA-735. 735A and 534. O V SAR:0000863.PE Page 5 45
WVNS-SAR-004 [,-.,] Rev. 7 (/ TABLE D.5.3-1 51S LEAK DETECTION SYST N Structure Neture of Detected By Mitication jarrier ink Tanks 3D 1 and 80 2 Tant leaks into leak detection Can pum fluids f rom vault syrtem in vault pan pan /veult back to tank; ean ptso fluids to other identical tank / vault system. Supernetant Ptinp - Leak from Transfer Major leak detected Gravity drain inte Pit, Top of Tank 80- piping (single well by low pressure / low Tank 8D 2 2 in pit) into pit flow alarms in STS control room HLW Transfer Conduit etLW Transfer piping Leak detection Drain pipe in (do@te walled system in annular co W it; gravity within cor
- lt) space between pipe drain back to Tank teoks into conduit walls SD 2 Vapor detected by STS Off Cas Treatment s/ stem effluent 'Itoring system Pipeway/ Valve Aiste Transfer piping or Valve Aiste sum has Pu:p actuates in valves leak into high fluid level response to high pipeway or valve alarm fluid tevet in sunp' siste returns fluids to
- f. m Vapor detected by Tank 80-2
/ \
STS Off-Gas
) Treatment systeu effluent monitorin2 system Ccemonents in Tank Fluids Leak from Laboratory analysis Return fluids to 80 1 convenents into tank of sluice lift water Tank 80-2 f or rework by STS DF across IX system Lv:-tine radiation test then adequate; monitors supernatant transferred to Tank 80 3 LLW Trar'sfer ConckJit LLW Transfer within Lest detection PLrp to Tank 80-2, leaks into conduit system in annular if nerded space t im
\
f Page 5-46 d SAR:0000863.RM
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
. [ s) \,_ /
TABLE D.5.4-1 STS UTILITIES REQUIR5MENTS Utility- 712w Preseure fosic) Service Instrument Air 300 scfm 105- Pumps, Valve Operatore Utility Air - 50 se'm 100 Utility Station Demineralized 40 gpm 40 Fresh Water Water Tank ,
~ Recycle Water 15 gpm 40 Break Tank Plant Water 25 gpm (ea) 50 Utility Station Electrical 190 to 200 kW Pover at 480 V, 3 phase steam supply Intermittent 150 Blow-down-Instrument Sensing Lines 13 t d %)
O
\,,/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 5-47
WVNS-SAR-004 _fs Rev. 7 - (%,} -
-D.6.0 STS AND SMVS PROCESS SYSTEMS D 6.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION The SMVS and STS processes have been designed to remove sulfate salts from the HOW sludge in Tank 8D-2. In general, the process involves adding dilute caustic solution to the 8D-2 tank and mixing. The sulfate salts dissolve into the wash solution. Subsequently the wash solution will be pumped from Tank 8D-2, filtered, diluted with water as desired, and cooled in a shell-and tube heat exchanger. The wash solution will then be directed through up to four columns of ion exchange zeolite for decontamination of cesium. As needed for plutonium removal from the wash solution, a titanium treated zeolite can be combined with or replace all the usual zeolite to provide decontamination of both plutonium and cesium. The decontaminated wash solution will then be pumped to LWTS for concentration and subsequent cement waste form production in CSS.
(~;) The following sections describe the individual portions of the combined SMVS and STS processes. D.6.1.1 SLULGE WASHING The SMWS portion of the process provides the equip 7 ant to add a dilute caustic-solution to the HLW Tank SD-2. As found-in laboratory testing with actual sludge, water by itself dissolves some Pu and U as well as the sulfate salts. It has_ been determined experimentally that by adding a dilute caustic solution to the sludge the dissolution of Pu and U is greatly reduced (Bray, 1990). Once the dilute caustic solution is added, a series of five long-shaf ted centrifugal pumps will (Figure'D.4.1-1) agitate the tank contents and suspend the settled solids. The exact duration of mixing will be determined by SAR:0000863 RM Page 6-1 i
)
l I i WVNS-SAR-004 (, _) Rev. 7
- \j sampling the liquid and tracking the change in salt concentration in the wash solution.
During the agitation, a significant amount of energy will be transferred to the HLW tank contents from the five mobilization pumps. A temperature rise is expected until the energy input is dissipated via evaporation of water from the liquid surface. Calculations indicate the maximum temperature expected in the tank is 95'C. Once agitation is stopped, a temperature decrease to the previous radiogenic temperature of 60'C is expected. After the salt concentration has leveled off, the mixing will be stopped and the solids allowed to settle. Solids settling times, as determined in the laboratory, are approximately 3 5 m/ day (10 - 15 ft/ day). The actual settling of solid; will be tracked using in tank equipment: density
' indicators placed at different tank heights and a buoyancy probe that will give an accurate (25 cm, 12 in) indication ef the level of the solids / liquid ,(~'N interface. %)
After the solids have settled about 30 cm (1ft) below the floating suction of the STS Wash Solution Removal Pump (50-G-001), wash solution transfer to the STS facility can begin. A floating suction is provided to minimize the potential that sludge would be picked up during operation. Pump and suction are both supported from the vault roof and located inside Tank 8D-2. Pump capacity is 150 1pm (40 gpm) at 653 kPa (80 psig) discharge pressure with l', (5) - 30 1pm (8 gpm) mininum flow rate.
-Provisions have been made to allow for remote flushing and removal in case of pump failure. (Replacement of a failed pump is discus:ed in Section D.9.1.5).
The sludge wash solution shall be decanted and pumped at temperatures as high as 90*C (194'F) to the prefilter (50-F-001) in Tank 8D-1. O
\ ,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-2 l
+- +-v ---yw yw+ - y - e v w wp-g -y e yv w yew-y
._ .__-,. . _ , - __ .. _ . . . m.-_ , %. .
95 4 sd ? y: WVNS-SAR-004 Rev . - $x[}\ -- p>, >
. D. 6.L 2 ' PREFILTRATION AND C00LINC Sludge wash solution containedJin' Tank 8D-2 may be filtered through a sintered
~
metal ~ filter', depending on suspended solids loading, and must be cooled before processing. . Filtration is provided to provent process. contamination by sludge
'particulates' suspended in the sludge wash solution (see' Figures D.~5.2.1 through D.5.2.7. for the location and arrangement of equipment). Additionally, filtration removes some insoluble strontium and plutonium present in thw
- suspendediolids contained in the sludge wash solution. The filter is-1 designed for's flow forward rate of 23 1pm (6 gpm) and 1.0 pm particle
. retention with recirculation of-excessiflow back to Tank 6D-2.- It is capr'le of being back-pulsed . (blown.back)1with filtrate to clear particulate accumulation'on the porous tube filtering surface. Air pressure is used-to
~
~ blow back the filtrate from a reservoir located downstream of the filter. The
. liquid; removed during back pulsing will contain the solids filtered from the sludge wash solution and 'will:be transferred back to Tank.SD-2 s Precoating_of the filter _by use of~ filtrate recycle will be required to obtain a clear:
} : filtrate. E7nstrumentation to. measure pressure drop is provided. ' Provisions have bee.f made for remotely flushing the prefilter. The supernatcnt feed tank
~(50-D-001), installed in Tank BD-1, is provided to collect-filtered sludge
, wash solution. The tank serves as an intermediate collection and feed tank to feedLsludge wash _ solution to the ion exchangeJprocess. (Tank capacity is-
.6,400 L'[1,700 gals).)
LT he; filtered sludge wash solution may be-stored in the supernatant-feed tank,
;which provides about' five. hours of hold-up based on 23 1pm (6 gpm) undiluted
= sludge wash solution feed processing rate through the ion exchange columns. A h . water line an- static mixer have been provided for sludge wash solution I' idilution' . Previous STS operation identified water dilution as.one means to-h- Lachieve efficient cesium loading on thecion exchange zeolite. . Depending on--
the concentration of salts in the_ wash solutions, water dilution may be used during sludge wash processing at the discretion of the operating staff. The l(_/- !SAR:00008'63.RM Page 6-3 l
WNS-SAR-004
,m,
)
Rev. */
. (J ' supernatant feed tank also is attached to a chemical addition line that can be used .::o add decontamination or pH adjustment chemicale. No chemical additions via this port are planned at this time.
Sludge wash solution ready for ion exchange processing will be cooled to as low as 6'C (43*F) with chilled coolant (salt solution). The isolation chiller, which supplies.the chilled coolant to the cooler in Tank 8D 1, is located in'the STS building. The sludge wash solution will be pumped by the canned centrifugal pump (mounted in the valve aisle) through the cooler (50 E-001) to the cesium removal (ion exchange) columns (50-C-001, 50 C-002, 50-C-003, 50-C-004). Pump capacity is 98 1pm (26 gpm) at 760 kPa (95 psig) discharge pressure with net forward flow rate of 231pm (6 gpra). D.6.1.3 ION EXCHANGE
-After filtration, dilution (if desired), and cooling in the shell and-tube
( heat exchanger, the wash solution will be passed downward through one to four Y ion-exchange columns in series. Column size is 1 m (3.4 ft) in diameter x 4.4 m (14.5 ft) in height. Selection of the STS confi 5uration will depend principally on the salt solution concentrations of cesium, plutonium, and sodium as well as the-number of fully functional columns available and the zeolite consuq tion goals. The STS process was designed to operate' continuously using three ion exchange columns. During continuous operations one column would be off-line to recharge the ion exchange media while the others would be on line, However, it has been routinely operated as a batch system and usually three to four columns were used. Previously, the STS was operated with IE-96* zeolite used to retain cesium from the HLW supernatant. With all other things constant, the lower the temperature the greater the ion exchange capacity of the ion exchange material
- /^g U SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-4
1 WVHS-SAR-004
,y Rev. 7 ; i 'O - for cesium. It was also found that' dilution wiCa water allowed increat,ed loading of cesium onto the zeolite ion exchange material. Nominal operating ranges for key parameters include:
Temperature 6*C to 40'C Flow Rate 2 gpm to 8 gpe Dilution 0% to 300% Depending on the need to reduce the plutonium content of the wash solution, titanium-treated zeolite may be used in place of some or all if the usual IE-96* zeolite. The Ti-treated zeolite will remove Pu and Sr from the wash solutions in addition to removing Cs. The operating parameters for the
-titanium-treated zeolite are expected to remain the same aa the base IE-96*
zeolite. Continuous on-stream activity monitoring is provided to detect bed exhaustion [~') and final-product activity. Samples of the decontaminated wash solution will
'O be taken to ensure that an appropriats process decontamination factor (DF) is achieved (see D.6.7). Any column from the series may be taken off line and
-its zeolite dumped and replaced. It is expected that the lead ion exchange column will approach breakthrough at nearly the same time that the final product activity begins to approach the operational limit.
When any zeolite bed is determined to need zeolite replacement, the wash solution at the top of the column will be flushed back to Tank 8D-2 with water. The zeolite will be sluiced with process water to the bottom of Tank BD-1. In the event that normal zeolite sluicing is prevented by valve malfunction, a dip tube installed in the ion exchange columns alls a back sluicing of zeolite to Tank 8D-1. Alternatively, the sludge wash solution may be blown back to Tank 8D-2 with air. The blowback is accomplished with 20 psig air and is complete when the decrease in column pressure indicates the liquid has been displaced. The air supply to the column being inadvertently [' SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-5
WVHS-SAR-004
- f ~s Rev. 7
[ left on would be noticed in shift readings or, eventually, in a high pressure alarm on Tank 8D 2. , 4 Following a final rinse (also discharged to nk 8D 2), the column will be recharged with fresh zeolite. A normal charge of zeolite is about If?' liters of zeolite, although an addizional cap of zeolite of more than 400 licers may be added an needed. 1 i D.6.1.4 FINAL FILTRATION Decontaminated sludge wash solution exiting the last column in series will be filtered to remove zanitte fines that could recontaminate the process. This I filter is a sand bed type that may require periodic changeout of the filter medium. Instrumentst a n and valving are provided to ensure a clear decontaminated sludge wash solution. Sand bed removal and flushing will be , done remotely. The spent sand will be discharged to the bottom of Tank 8D 1. O D.6.1.5 ')ECONTAMINATED SLUDGE VASH SOLUTIONS COLLECTION AND TRANSFER n Filtered and decontaminat4d sludge wash solution will be fed to the original underground HLW Storage Tank 8D 3. This Tank serves as both intermediate storage (53,000 L [14,000 gals]) and as a sampling Tank. Continuous on stream activity monitoring and periodic sampling ensures that decontaminated sludge , wash solution transferred to the LLW CSS has been decontaminate ( to meet specifications (hoe Section D.6.7). A recycle line to Tank 8D i allows additional decontamination of the sludr,e wash solution if required. l Decontaminated sludge wash solution will be transferred to the LWTS from Tank CD 3 in batches. Batch transfer from Tank 8D 3 to underground Tank 5D 15B JIM 52fsid' .TahkE( 57]000J1ril1510003als ]) W111MImpproxiinatelyT38iOOO11/ba tch Il93ERE?$pis(( batch). P ge 6-6 m - , _ . . ~~-
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 -V D.6.1.6a SPENT Z30 LITE DISCHARCE AND STORACE The current method of spent zeolite discharge is discussed in Section D.6.1.6 b. After a column is exhausted (confirmed by sanpling the effluent from the ;ead column or by reaching allowable throughput dictated by criticality control), it is valved off from the process. The bed is prest.urized from the top with air to purge contaminated sludge wash solution (!'.300 L [1*00 gals)) back to Tank 8D 2, leaving a wet bed of zeolite in the column. The column is filled and rinsed with water via the rinse / sluice water pump. The column rinse effluent is also directed to Tank 8D 2. After rinsing, the bed can be backwashed and expanded with water. Subsequently, the lift water outlet valve is shut while the bed solids outlet valve is opened to sluice the spent zeolite bed to Tank 8D 1. The column is
. hen rinsed '"inse water to Tack 8D 1) to wash any residual zeolite from it.
The bed solids outlet valve is closed and fresh zeolite is then loaded into the empty column via the zeolite batching tank (50 D-002). An alternate method of removing zeolite from the ion exchange columns is provided in the event. that the dump valve on the bottom of a column fails. Zeolite would be sluiced out through a dip tube located inside the column and then through a pipe directly to Tank 8D 1. The pipe is entirely contained within the pipeway. An isolation valve on this pipe between the ion exchange column and Task 8D 1 would be manually opened using a reach rod in the event it were necessary to sluice out a column using this method. Computer modeling of the zeolite pile in Tank BD 1, performed by Battle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, has indicated only a l'c (2'F) probable increase in tempercture under the zeolite pile. The temperature ( Iference is small due to significant convective fluid flow through the zeolite pile
. produced by radiolytic decay heat of the cesium 137-laden zeolite.
SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-7
. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ . - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._
WVHS-SAR-004 r.ev. 7 This modeling and the discussion of results is documented in a Battelle PNL , i letter report of March 1991, " Reactions of flydroxide and Nitrite Ions with IE 96* Zeolite " by L. D. Anderson. D.6.1.6b SPt. ROE LINE ADDITION y0R ALTERNATIVE ZEOLITE DISCHARGE METHOD Zeolite discharge from the ion exchange columns has been performed using the installed dump valves, at described in Section D.6.1.6a of this SAR. l{owever, failure of the dump valve on one ei the four columns has caused that columr. to be temporarily inoperable-and has raised concerns abrut the reliability of the dump valves on the three remaining columns. Because failure of a dump valve was anticipated during detailed design, an alternate method of discharging zeolite from tlo ion exchange columns was developed for use on all four columns. The alternate method involves pressurizing the column with air and charging water back throua,h the botrom Johnson screen, thus creating a zeolite / water slurry. The slurry is then discharged into Tank 8D.1 through o previously installed dip tube called the "J" nozzle with its inlet at the lower end of the column. Concern over failing to remove all of the zeolite and leaving a heel of zeolite in the bottom of the column below the "J" nozzle inlet has led to design of an air sparge to ensure that the zeolite remains in slurry during sluicing operations. Air is supplied to the air sparge through . , a stainless steel flexible hose with an cxternal connection outside Tank 8D 1. The following paragraphs address the design and installation of these sparge lines to the ion exchange columns and the safety issues related to their use. Use of the "J" nozzle itself was previously-analyzed. Each air line consists of a 13 mm (0.5 in.) 0.D. schedule 40 stainless steel pipe that enters Tank 8D.1 through an original riser, where it changes to a stainless steel flexible braided hose leading to a flange attached to the dump
.. valve on the bottom of the column. A fitting extends up from the flange a short distance into the column. The fitting is designed to ensure that any
. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-8
l I WVNs-SAR-004 Rev. */ zeolite that has settled on tne bottom is resuspended during sparging. The end of the fitting includes an orifice or screen to prevent zeolite fines from entering and migrating back up the sparge line in a ruantity that would plug i it. The zeolite mobilization pump risers in which the sparge lines are installed (M4 and spare riser H5) penetrate the concrete pipeway roof and concrete tank vault roof and connect to the Tank 8D 1 steel roof. The operating station for the sparge line system is approximately 1.5 m ($ ft) above grade level in the waste tank farm controlled area. The air line operating st e ions for each sparge system include a filter, an isolation valve to isolate the entire system, a three way valve to supply the stop valve actuator, an isolation valve to isolate the sparge line only, and an isolation _ valve to isolate the pressure sensor and low pressure alarm (F16 ure D.6.1-17). From the operating station, the line extends down to the riser and enters the riser 1.8 m (6 ft) above the pipeway roof. Inside the riser, each line has two check valves and an air operated stop valve installed in the vicinity of the tank vault roof. The air line to actuati this vm1ve is separate from the sparge line but is attached to and runs ale nBeido tSe sparge line. A single air line supplying both the sparge air and valve actuation air is used to ensure that any loss of air supply pressure during sparging will also cause the stop valve to close. During operation, one line provides air for sparging the column. The second line provides air from the three-way valve to the stop valve actuate This second air line does not contact sludge, wash solution or Tank 8D 1 contents or air and thus does not have_a potential to become radioactively contaminated. The valve actuator is mechanically coupled to the air-driven operator so that it is impossible for liquid to reach the operator air line. Indication of proper sparge system operation during sluicing is provided by two methods. The first method requires monitoring the sparge airflow rate during sluicing to ensure that air flow is maintained. The second method requires installation of a sealed detector in the STS pipeway with a radiation detector SAR:0000863.RM page 6-9
I WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. "I to monitor radiation increases resulting from zeolite passing through the piping between the J nozzle on the ion exchange colutan a.id Tank BD-1. When the sparging, process has been completed, the three way valve is depressurized by venting to the atmosphere, thus shutting the air operated stop valve and isolating the sparge line. The sparge line is then isolated from the air supply and lef t pressurized to 170 kPa (10 psig) greater than the ion exchange column operating pressure to preclude any possibility of backflow into the sparge line. An installed pressure sensor provides an alarm on decreasing residual sparge line prss.-tre approaching the ion exchange column operating pressure.
< Installation of this equipment within two of the s: are Tank 8D 1 risers required removal of the previously installed riser shield plugs. The initial need for the shield plugs was to reduce radiation levels in the pipeway during riser installation and STS construction. Radiation levels at the riser top are generally low (5 pC/kS h p 0 mR/h]) due to the geometry of the riser opening and the existence of the concrete vault roof and gravel backfill.
Also, the cosium loaded zeolite in the bottom of Tank 8D 1 is shielded by approximately 2.4 m (8 ft) of water. Replacement of the shield plugs with a sealed cover on the riser top to prevent entry or spread of contamination provides an equivalent level of protection to personnel. A total of four sparge systems (one per column) have been installed using two Tank 8D 1 risers. Two airlines (one for sparging the column and one for operating the stop valve) are installed per column spargo system. Installation within Tank 8D-1 used a remotely controlled arm to reduce exposure of personnel. The highest radiation level observed has been 5 pC/kg-h (20 mR/h) at the riser top with the shield plug removed. This does not present a significant problem for equipreent installation into the riser. Contamination control was provided through use of a containment tent over the riser hile the equipment was being installed. A scaled cover was placed over
.D V SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-10 1
WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 the riser top following installation and ventilation was provided as normal through the VTFVS. During installation, ventilation was provided by the STS l PVS through Tank 8D.1 to ensure minimum 0.67 m/s (125 linear ft/ min) of air flow throughout the riser. During installation, air entered through a roughing filter in the containment and flowed through the riser to the tank, exhausting th.ough two banks of HEPA filters. When installation operations were secured the riser opening and remote arm were covered with a temporary closure to reduce air infiltration. As installation of equipment through these risers did not require opening of the riser to the pipeway, no additional ventilation or modification of STS ventilation was required. Total radiation exposure to workers during P -*al.lation of the sparge lines is was ; less than 1 person cSv (1 person rem l D.6.1.7 SAND FILTER DISCHARGE
'Ihe sand filter has been designed to be disch: red in the same manner as the columns. (See description in Section D.6.1.6. Spent Zeolite Discharge). It
- is anticipated that the sand will be discharged only once before final D&D efforts. However, discharge of sand into Tank 8D-1 may be performed during STS operations if eesium loaded zeolite fines break through the postfilter. The postfilter would then be recharged using the appropriate valve box. D . 6 .1. 8 - FRESH ZEOLITE TILL , Fresh zeolite (shipped in 208 L [55 gal.) drums) is loaded into a water filled batching tank. It is then backwas'. ; d to remove fines. After fines are removed, fresh zeolite is charged into the columns as a water slurry. Batching is a hands-on operation, so fresh water is used to slurry zeolite to the columns. Since contamination is present in the columns, all slurry and sluice water is. discharged to Tank 8D 1 or 8D 2 and is a source of secondary waste, which is recycled within the STS. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 11 l
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 D 6.1.9 IDENTIFICATION OF ITEMS FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS CONCERN The radioactive nature of HLU in the STS and SMVS requires that processing be achieved with minimum radiation exposure to operating personnel and maximum protection to the environment. The major items of safety analysis concern are:
- Ensuring the confinement of radioactivity (e.g., maintaining ventilation to and negative pressure on Tanks 8D 1 and 8D 2).
- Maintaining the release of radioactivity in compliance with AIARA and below the limits specified in DOE orders (e.g. , maintenance of HEPA filtration on ventilation systems; effluent monitoring program).
- Avoiding nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., implementation of OSR.IRTS-10),
- Avoiding cross contamination between radioactive and nonradioactive systems.
- Hinimizing the risk of accidents through proper design, construction, and adherence to policy and procedures.
- Preventing temperature rise to damaging levels in off-line ion exchange colwnns.
The STS is remotely operated and maintained because of the high radiation levels of the material being processed. Occupational doses are maintained AIARA through the use of shielding and administrative and procedural controls. All continuously occupied areas have been designed to mai'itain dose rates below 65 nC/kg-h (0.25 mR/h). (Design and operating considerations regarding SAR:0000863.Pi. Page 6-12 l
.~, _ . _ _ _
WNS-SAR-004 f- Rev. 7 safety protection are presented in Sections D 4.3 and D.B.I.) Proper safety precautions for maintenance activities are specified in Radiation Work Permits (RUPs) and Industrial Work Permits (IUPs) as appropriate. The major mechanism for ensuring the confinement of airborne radioactivity is the STS IN AC System. This system maintains process areas at a slight negative pressure relative to the surrounding areas to ensure that air leakage is into, rather than out of, potentially contaminated areas. Two exhaust blowers are provided for this oy2 tom. Both are driven by an electric motor. Each is connected to both the normal and auxiliary power supplies. Effluents from the site are monitored to ensure that releases are in compliance with applicable DOE guidelines. This monitoring program is described in Section D.8.6.1. D 6.2 PROCESS CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICAL CPFYISTRY PRINCIPLES O The principal goals of the combined SMVS and STS processes are to remove soluble salts from the HLV sludge in Tank 8D.2 and decontaminate the wash solutions to a level acceptable for processing in both LVIS and CSS. The main decontamination effect that must be achieved is the reduction in the cesium level in the wash solutions. Regulatory limits (10 CFR 61) do not require any cesium removal before creation of a cementad waste form for disposal. Operational limits have been set on the STS effluent that provide AIARA protection to the operating staff in the downstream LVTS and CSS facilities. The process limits associated with the STS ensure that the following criteria are met: SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 13
WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 1
- 1. W.tste produced shall meet (TR;IRTS;5) the qualification of the Process Control Plan. I
- 2. STS shall meet the Drurn Cell acceptance criterion of less than or 1 equal to 5.5 pCi/mL of D7Cs in LWTS concentrates used to produce the l final vaste form for storage in the Drum Cell, and a final product concentration of less than or equal to 68 nci/g in the final vaste form, if the waste is to be solidified in the CSS (TR IRTS 5). j i
3E U,ndild t e dlfs10d ge T ka shZ s o16t i on sha11;h uve j 4nlal pha ' Pui c 6ne ss t ra t i on 7 6f]1es#1thi6:0:25 pC1/m1/infths;first'Unchlepele and10.1 ]C1/mL'in phWirimmin16g" 3: wash' cycl e s;' _(OSRj 7RTSjl 2 )) 4'.'f"Less;tharCll ML7of l undi10ted Ti;Indge :washTsoldtf onlihd111be' p roces sed thr60~grahy[ibn~' exchange ~Bolum6Tcontiaining;TGtreated"isolits between TiEWestidfiE611tisdischirges during~thiTfirstja'shlepcis1(OSREIRTS; t 12)?ites's!thanT3,fML of;nndi16ted1s16dg61washisolbtion sha115 be processed'ithrodghianyElonTexbhange" column?containing Ti-treated
~
soli ts;bstwe sh; Tiltre atedl zeolitsidischstge s l dur ing Lthe"reni ning13 pishEbycleil(OSR TRTSil2)flh;oweveQifjs;Ti'-treat'edTzso11tiefc61umn'is haed EihTthsf fits t~ uashicycis?and' Eontihdealto :bu~ussd"in? subsequent 9ssh[6feleistheR2;51 times the~volums;prodessedithrough the^co10mn fr6mithelfijft! wasW7ey)1e"must~bsTisc10ded*ai partiof'theT3iML;volpme limit] fo rithi~ r e ma 161sig?3]is sh??ydi si!T(OSR31RT Sil2 )l.TThi' fir s t[ w a sh hfeleiconcsntration lisi ris W 5 timisigreater'thanTthe~iemathf6g thresfandieUstIthsreforFlb M eightid[ucc6rdinglyl Previously, the STS was operated with IE 96* zeolite for the retention of cesium from HLU supernatant. With all other things constant, the lower the temperature the greater the ion exchange capacity of the ion exchange material for cesium. It was also found that dilution with water allowed increased SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 14
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 ['N \
'~') loading of cesium from HLW supernatant. Nominal operating ranges for key parameters include:
Temperature 6*C to 40*C Flow Rate 2 gpm to B gpm Dilution 0% to 3001 Sludge. washing will dissolve the sodium sulfate crystals known to be present in the HLW sludge in Tank 8D-2. Laboratory testing has also shown that some fraction of the uranium and plutonium may dissolve during the sludge washing depending on the caustic concentration. Washing sludge without caustic has shown significant quantities of both uranium and plutonium in the wash solutions. The Kef process for maintaining a low Pu content in the wash solution is hydroxide molarity ;iHjTanW8Dj2',2Wactivil~chntrol[ program',!(OSR;1RTSy12) ( ). WWCogthutiWelsampl!tifahd;messurement'orithe;N~concentratibn~Cis'the Tanh 8Di23psh])61u e ionlpillibelus so ?toHgGi~de[c aus e 1[ add i e ionsito1Ta nki SDi2Eto ISpEI55E.Ty61hbi11 @ZQWfashie $ps f1si6tEEnjeTind t'na te dT th a tlths;; fat b bf @Vys@ds!6bnsumpt'i6tQiiispproKisatisif394'JpmoM0!r/iEllsf. ,7Thisfresults
'ifsifsdu'c tioW6 f?pF f pom"a ppf 6xisa t419312;'6301033C1/st)1t6"1V 7 N12Ehci/pMJigjppf6fIsa e ay 370JayCdasit oIab's o rptLi6hlo fi c:arb6n'di6 kid.c ff6Dhi[35g(miopii;5 If sufficient plutonium is determined to be present in the sludge wash solution, then the normal ion exchange material (Ionsiv IE.96*) will be replaced partially or in full with titanium treated IE-96*. The Bate 11e-Pacific Northwest Laboratory proprietary coating produces an ion exchange media that retains plutonium and strontium while keeping .41most all of the cesi;am affinity of the parent IE.96* zeolite. The retention of plutonium and strontium is thought to be adsorption by the titanium material deposited on t '
( SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 15
-, - .- ~. - _ - . _ - - . . .- . ~_ - - -c wus-SAR-004 - [.4 Rev. 7 the zeolite. Typical titanium levels in the zeolite are 3 6 wt1 of the anhydrous zeolite, expressed as T10a.
Regulatorf limits (10 CFR 61) dictate < 100 nC1/g of TRU in the cemented waste form from the CSS. The use of titanium treated reolito in the STS will depend on'che level of plutonium in the Tank 8D 2 wash solution as well as the consumption rate of the solution in the CSS waste form. Recent sludge wash analyses show that with the high level of caustic established in Tank 8D 2, the level of plutonium is sufficiently low (< 0.03 CL/mt) to obviate the ne d for titaniw.trested zeolite. D.6.2,1 ION EXCHANGE h*EDIUM After evaluating currently available ion exchange materials and using experimental data with process constraints taken into account (e.g., pH level, temperature, pressure, and flow rate), the inorganic ion exchanger IE-96* ( (Linde Ionsiv IE-96* synthetic zeolite) was chosen for cesium recovery because of its high sorbtion rate, DF values, exchange capacity, and compatibility with glass formers for borosilicate glass (Pope, 1985). Synthetic zeolite (IE 96") is an alkali metal sodium alumina silicate of the chabazite structure (Na20
- AL2 03 Si 0 2) in the mixed ionic form of Na+,
Mg", Ca". 1E.96* is'a molecular sieve which is used because its small and uniform pore structure can absorb small molecules and exclude molecules larger than the pore opening (pore opening 370 x 420 pm [3.7 x 4.2 A]). 1 l h SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 16 L u b - . - - .- . , - . . .. - _-_
i WVNS-SAR-004
,s Rev. 7 (u-} The performance of the inorganic teolite IE.96* is dependent on temperature, salt concentration, flow rate, Na/Cs (sodium / cesium) feed ratio and pH levels as demonstrated below:
Process Parameters Dgpendency s Teuperature Lower temperature [6*C (43*F) design) will enhance Cs recovery Salt Concentration Lower concentration of salt will enhance cosium recovery. pH levels pH level will be <13 to enhance cesium recovery. Flow rate Cs loadings are enhanced by lower flow rates. Na/Cs mole ratio Cs loading is enhanced by lower Na/Cs mole ratios in the feed. The Ti-treated zeolite is a newly developed ion exchange material for Pu and Sr removal. Physical dependencies were detercined by PNL using batch (T distribution tests. It was determined that Sr and Pu extraction efficiencies increase with both temperature and pH increases, while Cs removal efficiency decreases with inersaced temperature and pH. Further, the percent loading of titanium on the zeolite decreases the Cs extraction efficiency slight!y at weight percents greater than 1.0. A multi-tiered supplier qualification program is in place to verify the capability of a vendor to prepare the Ti-treated zeolite. Part of the qualification work includes stability and handling tests. Product availability and practicality are the net result of having determined that a vendor is capable of producing the Ti-treated zeolite per the procurement specifications. Table D.6.2-1 shows the chemical composition specifications for the Ti-treated ion exchange medium. Page 6-17 () SAR:0000863.C i
WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 D 6.3 XECHANICAL PROCESS SYSTEM D.6.3.1 COLD CHEMICAL RECEIVING, HANDLING AND TRANOTER Zeolites are delivered in 208 L (SS gal.) drums and handled by operators trained to handle these materials. Safety equipment that includes rubber gloves, goggles, and respiratory protection equipment, as necessary, are worn during these operations. Additionally, portable eye vash stations are available in the STS support building. Muterial safety data sheets are maintained in the Project files and will be filed for all chemical agents. Safety considerations for chemical handling are in accordance with the WNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WDP 011). The use of chemical additives for process pH and hydroxide molarity control is discussed in Section D.6.4 D.6.3.2 FRESH ZEOLITE LOADING Fresh zeolites are fed to the STS process as a water slurry. Dry zeolite (from drums) is transferred to the zeolite batch tank located in the STS 3 building, using a pneumatic system to transfer zeolite into the 0.03-m (1-f t') capacity hopper. The hopper empties directly into the batch tank. The batch tank is only used for fresh (nonradiological) zeolite. D.6.3.3 SLUDGE VASH SOLUTION TRANSFER AND HANDLING Removal of sludgc wash solution from Tank 8D 2 is accomplished by the vertical turbine pump 50 G 001. Sludge wash solution is pumped to the prefilter at approximately 90*C (194*F) at a design flow rate of $151 1pm (40 gpm) with sludge wash solution in excess of the 23 1pm (6 gpm) through the prefilter being returned to Tank 8D-2. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-18
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 D.6.3.4 DECONTAMINATED SLUDGE VASH SOLUTION TRANSFER AND HANDLING The decontaminated sludge wash solution will be stored in original underground stainless steel HLW Tank BD 3. This tank provides intermediate storage for the LWTS. In the event that the sludge wash solution is not suf ficiently decontaminated, (analyzed before transfer from Tank SD 3 to the LVTS) it will ba recycled back to Tank BD 2. Sludge wash solution will be continuously fed into Tank 8D 3 from the postfilter. Once a sampic is analyzed to verify adequate decontamination, the contents of Tank PD 3 will be transferred in batches to Tank SD-15B of the LVTS. While awaiting sample analysis and during transfer to Tank 5D 15B the on line radiation monitor on the inlet of BD 3 shall be monitored to verify that the sludge wash solution has been sufficiently decontaminated. D.6.3.5 IDADED ZEOLITE TRANSTER AND HANDLING / '\ The radioactive species separated by the process will be stored on zeolite covered with water for an extended period of time in Tank BD 1 before delivery to the Vitrification System. The loaded zeolite will be at less than 60*C. The storage system consists of the BD-1 tank, a sluice water tank, a sluice water pump, and zeolite distribution pumps. The zeolite distribution pumps (55-G-006, 55-G 007, 55 G 008, 55 C 009, 55 G 010) are 110 kW (150 hp) centrifugal pumps that are mounted in the M 6 and M 3 riser in Tank BD 1, respectively. Approximately five of these pumps will be installed. These pumps have been sized to operate at low pressure and hi S h flow rate. Under normal opetating cor.ditions, struchiral integrity will not be compromised by damage to tank internals (Gate:, 1987). The zeolite mobilitation pump is located just above the bottom of Tank 8D 1 and is supported from a 15-m (50-ft) tubular steel column that houses the pump-to motor drive shaft. The pump motor is located on the external truss b
\s,/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-19
._ . _. - _ . _~ _ _
WNS-SAR-004 O Rev. 7 U above Tank 8D 1. All pump, column, drive shaft, and motor loads are carried by the independent external truss. The pump does not remove materials from the tank but serves to redistribute the zeolite over the bottom of the tank. The pump discharges.2,300 1pm (600 gpm) from each of the two nozzles, which spray in opposite directions while the entire pump assembly rotates about the vertical support column at 0.5 rpm. The puy has been sized to operate et low pressure and high flow rate. Under normal operating conditions, the pump and its supporting elements (e.g., column, drive shaft, motor) will not produce added vertical loads on the original tank vault roof or internal steel tank. Nor will the jet impingement load from pump nozzle under normal operation compromise the structural integrity of the tank internal support structure (column supports) or breach the tank wall or bottom barriers (Cates, 1987). O D.6.3.6 SLUDGE MOBILIZATION PUMPS V A series of 15 m (50-ft) long mobilization pumps identical to the zeolite distribution pumps will be installed at strategic locations within Tank 8D 2 # (Figure D.4.1 1) through access sleeves (risers), before sludge washing. As described earlier, the mobilization pump has been sized to operate at low pressure and high flow rate. Under normal operating conditions, structural integrity will not.be compromised by damage to tank internals (Gates,1987 snd 1991). The pumps are located just above the bottom of Tank 8D 2 and are supported from a 15 m tubular column that houses the pump to motor drive shaft. The pump motor is located on the external support truss above Tank 8D 2. All pump,-column, drive shaft, and motor loads are carried by the independent external suppcrt truss. The mobilization pumps do not remove marbrial fren,the taak, but serve to resuspend the settled sludge from the bottom of the tank. These pumps will provide agitation.by using the fluid in ' the tank to resuspend the sludge. The pump and its supporting clernents will SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 20
.s.
F
'L WN S-S AR-004 Fev. 7 not produce added vertical loads on the original tank vault roof or internal steel tank. Nor will the jet impingement load from pump nozzles under normal operation compromise the structural integrity of the tank internal support structure or breach the tank wall or bottom barriers (Cates, 1991). The pumps i
have two opposed nozzles at the bottom and discharge at a ficw rate of 2300 1pm (600 gpm) from each nozzle. The pumps will have a rotational speed of 0.5 rpm. Since all the electrical and mechanical rotating equipment requiring service are external to the tank, all purp maintenance (i.e., greasing bearings, oiling motors) is performed by conventional means. D.6.4 CHEMICAL PROCESS SYSTEMS The SMWS will add dilute caustic to Tank 8D 2. The caustic is expected to be commercial rayon grade caustic soda solution produced by the mercury cell electrolytic process. The dilute caustic is handled by conventional means , (i.e., tanks, tank trucks, metered pumps, drums) by operators trained in i handling this material. Safety equipment that includes plastic coveralls, rubber gleves, and goggles are required to be worn when working with these n.hemicals . Emergency eye wash stations will be available in the dilute caustic transfer areas. The dilute caustic solution will be discharged from storage (storage is described in Section D.4.3.8) by pressurization of the tank trailer with conditioned plant air or +1ectrically powered er truck tractor-engine powered
~
pump. In either case, the dilute caustic addition will be volumetrically batch metered. After the dilute caustic addition is complete, the pipeline will be flushed with nater. The caustic is expected to enter Tank 8D-2 through an existing spare 5-cm (2 in.) pipe in riser N12, unless an alternative riser is determined to be more advantageous. The dilute caustic will free fall from the top of the tank / riser into the tank. Alternatively, ' the additions may be made via'a pipeline that extends down beneath the tank liquid level to minimize caustic aerosol carryover into the WTFVS. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 21
, _ . , __ ~ . , _ . . . . _ _ . , _. _ . . _ , - . - _ . _ _ - - - , _ _ _ . - _ . _ . _ _ . _ - . .-
WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 D.6.5 PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEM D.6.5.1 WATER RECYCLE The water recycle subsystem provides water for backflush, dilution, ion exchange column rinse and for equipment decontamination, should maintenance or removal of equipment in radioactive service be required. The source of water is the secondary waste water at the bottom of Tank 8D 1 or demineralized water, depending on need and availability. The system is remotely operated via valves and block connectors in the valve aisle. D.6.5.2 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM The STS control pcnel provides the principle method of process control for the STS/SMVS. A supporting control cystem used is the laboratory information management system (LIMS). The information management and control strategy for the STS/SMVS is implemnted using the STS control panel in conjunction with the associated local control panels, process actuators, instruments, and other monitoring aquipment. STS control panal and LIMS are designed to operate independently without loss of function if the other panel fails. There are no interconnections. From the STS control panel the operator can remotely monitor all major aspects of_the system. For emergencies, the process pumps can be manually shut down with the emergency stop button in the STS control panel and restarted through the normal startup sequence by the operators. The control panel provides for safe operation with an alarm system that alerts the operators of any abnormal condition. Various electrical interlocks additionally ensure safe operation during STS processing. The P&ID's show the instrumentation and control I l ( Page 6-22 SAR:0000863.RM L l
l ' l WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 features associated with process control, process monitors, alarms, and their-interrelationship. The P61D's apply during normal and abnormal operation, and during accident conditions. The redundancy of the control approach is evident by inspection of the P6ID's. A summary of major process instrumentation for the STS/SMWS is found in Table D.6.5-1. The operator is able to monitor process conditions through panel mounted instrumentation. This includes a panel mounted graphie display flow diagram. Primary functions of the computer and control systems are summarized below. STS Control Panel and Associated Local Control Panels
- Implement' automatic regulation of key process evolutions
- Monitor procedures initiated by the operator to ensure that the p
v process is placed in a safe operating condition
- Monitor operations (data collection is by manual means)
- Provide interfaces by which operators interact with the process
- Assist with orderly shutdown when requested by the operator
- Honitor the STS/SMVS plant c.nd ensure continued safety of the plant when operations are suspended Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS)
- Assists in operation of the analytical facility SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-23
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
- Maintaina records of samples from receipt to disposal
- Records and transa* ts results of swple analyses +o the VAX D.6.5.3 SYSTEM AND COMPONENT SPARES Due to the single use nature of the STS process and the finite operational period expected (<10 y), problems associated with major component failure due to factors such as fatigue and corrosion, are exper:ted to be minimal.
Therefore, maintenance of on site spares for most major STS processing components in radioactive service is not deemed necessary. However, spares for selected components particularly susceptible to failure, i.e., pumps, valves, and jumpers are maintained on site as backups. Additionally, for equipment not in radioactive service, vendor recommended spare parts are stored on site for selected equipmerit. D.6.6 CONTROL ROOM [}
\
^
Figure D.6.6-1 presente the STS control room panel layout. The control room location within the STS building is shown on Figure D.5.2 6. The SMVS control room will be located in the V&S Building (Figure 6.6 2), which is located in the UTF. The SMWS Control Room consists of a series of variable speed controllers for the mobilization ptunps. Also included in the control room are the motor starters to the mobilization pump rotating assemblies. All pump monitored operating variables are mounted on the variable speed controller doors. Because'the STS and SMWS can be operated independently at csfferent times, separation of the control rooms will not impose difficulties in coordinating processing of sludge wash solutions. SAR:0000863.RH Page 6-24 r
WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 D.6.7 STS AND SMVS SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES Capabilities for complete radiochemical analysis of STS solutions are continuously provided to monitor and control the STS process control and to ensure the confinement of radioactivity. This is accomplished by two independent Analytical Support Systems: an On-Line" Radiation Monitoring Systert. and the "Off-Line" Pneumatic Sample Transfer System (lab analysis). The On-Line Radiation Honitoring System provides continuous, real time analysis of the radioactivity within enclosed systems (piping, vessels). camma scintillation detectors (on line monitors) installed within the process continuously monitor radioactivity and will signal alarms in the STS control room should significant deviations above/below preset levels occur. The detectors have been appropriately selected and/or shielded tuvrovide the necessary range of sensitivities. In addition to this on line system, samples of sludge wash solution, decontaminated sludge wash solution and various process solutions will be i routinely extracted via remote techniques from sampling ports in the valve I aisle for complete radiochemical analysis. The sample is extracted from the process stream using established sampling procedures to ensure a representative sample has been taken. Using manipulators, STS operators will ey. tract process samples (up to 50 mL [1.7 oz]) into a sample vial. The vials will be remotely placed into a transfer vessel (known as a " rabbit") which will be pneumatically transferred from the valve aisle to the Analytical Cell of the main processing plant via the Pneumatic Transfer System. Alternatively, vials could be manually transferred in appropriately shielded containers if necessary. The rabbit will be remotely placed by a manipulator into the slide ring within the valvo aisle. An electronic signal will be sent to the Analytical Cell indicating that a sample is ready to be transferred. A vacuum system activated by the technician at the analytical misle will transfer the rabbit SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 25 l V i I
4 I WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 to a receiver boy in the Analytical Cell. The vacuum system will be capable of pulling 100 m /h of air thr Th the scrder box. Upon receipt, a " received" 3 signal is sent to the operator the STS Support Building. Once received in the Analytical Cell, samples will be diluted and aliquots will be extracted for various radiochemical analysis. Photoenlis, located throughout the length of the Pneumatic Transfer System piping, will track the movement of the rabbit. The major components of the I Pneumatic Transfer System are constructed of 304 L stainless steel. The transfer system piping has been designed to maintain exposure at any routinely accessible surface to 65 nC/kg h (0.25 mR/h) averaged over any one hour period. Operating procedures have been developed for operation of the Pneumatic Transfer System and for interfacing with the plant analytical laboratory. The consequences and miti6ation of a processing sampit becom'.ng " stuck" in the (n transfer system piping is discussed in Section D.9.1.3. Similarly, to monitor and control the STS it.teg? ated process and to ensure the confinement of radioactivity, complete radiochem! cal :;.. opes of sludge wash solutions will be provided through two independent Analytical Support Systems: an "On Line" Radiation Monitoring System and the "Off-Line" (laboratory analysis) Pneumatic Sample Transfer System. The STS Run Plan will specify the sampling plan to be used by operations. This provides the minimun. sampling frequency to be used for each sample point during routine operations and periods of water recirculation. The limits for sample results and the r appropriate actions required to control the process are containnd within STS procedures. WNS has a well equipped analytical laboratory to support the STS and SE*S. The facilities include: five analytical hot cells for the preparation or isotopic separation of radioactive samples; one analytical hot laboratory, G SAR:0000863.PJi Page 6 26 1 =
, ..y ._ _ . .
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 equipped with six fume hoods, for the preparation or separation of radioactive samples; and three glove boxes for the handiing of high activity alpha samples. In addition to adequate facilities, the analytical laboratory uses the following analytical equipment: ICP MS; ICP AES; three N Type high purity intrinsic germanium photon detectors; planar high purity intrinsic germanium photon detector; four ultra lou background alpha / beta counters; single chamber, low background, alpha / beta counter; four silicon charged particle detectors; liquid scintillation counter; laser fluorimeter; atomic absorption, ion chromatograph; and other comn.on analytical equipment, , All aqueous radioactive laboratory wastes are returned to Tank 8D-2 via the hot lab prime hood or the hot cell drains. All organic radioactive laboratory waste is collected in approved satellite accumulation areas and turned over to Vaste Management for proper disposal. All solid radioactive waste is double begged.in drums and turned over to Waste Management for compac' tion and proper disposal. , SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-27
1 WVNS-SAR-004 Rev.-7 REFERENCES FOR S'CTION D.6.0 l Anderson, 1991 L. D. Anderson March 1991 . " Reactions of Hydroxide and Nitrate Ions with IE-96* Zeolite." l Cates, 1990 Dames and Moore. April 1991. "8D 2 Sludge Mobilization System i confinement Barrier Integrity Review," Subcontract No.19 CW 21511, Task 10. l Pope,1985 Pope, J. M. , D. E. Carl, L. Bray, L. Holton, and B. Wise, f
Selection of a Reference Process for Treatment of the West Valley Alkaline Waste": Presented at American Nuclear Society International Meeting on Fuel Reprocessin5 and Waste Management, Jackson, Wyoming, August 26-28, 1984."
l l Rykken, 1985a L. E. Rykken. October 2, 1985. " Properties of STS Solutions." HI:85:0199 (Revised for use in Design Criteria - WNS DC-013). Cates, 1987 Cates, W. E. December 1987. "8D 1 Waste Mobilization Pump Confinement Barrier Integrity Review."
%d, SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 28
' * ~ m-, e .+ . , , -. , , _ _ ,
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 Table D.6.2 1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF TITANIUH TREATED IE.96* ZEOLITE COMPONENT ANHYDROUS VEIGHT PERCENT l TiO2 (from treating) 23.0 56.0 TiO2 (frotn zeolite) 50.485 Total Chloride 50.020 Fe 03 54.85 A1 03 $18.9 Ca0 61.46 Mgo $0.97 Na20 26.31
+
. Kao
$1.46 Sio + A103 + Na20+K0 2 h87.3 All others $1.94 O
P 9 y-- - -,.,4,... ~m,-----.
.. . _ . . - . . . ~ - . .- . . - -. ._ .
i i i \.sl ' WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.6.5 1 l PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS) SECTION: Supernatant Filtration and Cooling INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURES Liquid Level HLJ cank BD 2 Monitor liquid level for process control. Supernatant feed tank 50 D 001 All instruments equipped with high level alarms except tank BD 2. Valve aisle sump Tenk 50 D 001 and the valve aisle Process line secondary sump level instruments have low containment level alarms. Tank 50-D 001 high level alarm is /N interlocked with supernatant feed (_,) pump 50 G 001 to shut off the pump rnd prevent overfilling D 001. Temperature Supernatant cooler Monitor and control temperature of 50-E-001 inlet and supernatant and bcine cooling outlet medium for proper process operation. Brine chiller 50 E-002 inlet and outlet There are high and low temperature
' alarms on the brine chiller effluent and on the supernatant cooler eff t uent.
SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-3C a 9
/h '
s WVNS-SAr 004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.6.5 1
.IBOCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS)
SECTION: Supernstant Filtration and Cooling INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURES l I Flow Supernatant line tank The supernatant and water flow Su-D 001 instruments are an integral part of process control. Demineralized water ,, line to tank 50-D 001 The dilution of suparnatant with water controls the salt and cesium Bubbler probe lines to concentration. tank 50 D 001 The water flow instrument and the 50 D 001 bubbler probe flow instrument are equipped with low
/. flow alarms.
Pressure Inlet and effluent to These instruments serve process Supernatant filter 50- control functions such as F 001 monitoring differential pressure across the supernatant filter 50-Discharge of feed pump F 001, pump operation and tank 50-G 002 pressure. Tank 50-D 001 Alarms of high differential pressure at:ross the filter and low pressure on pump 50 C-002 discharge are provided. l i l-l l SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 31 O
(3 v WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.6.5-1 (continued) PROCESS INSTRLMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS) GECTION Ion Exchange INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURES Liquid Level Column vent / air These conductivity level pressurization line on instruments indicate the jumper in STS valve aisle columns are full of liquid; no variable level reading. Temperature- IUpper, middle and lower Monitor column temperatures area of the ion exchange at three levels. columns High temperature alarms are provided as warning signals to take steps to prevent -(-
'the zeolite from becoming excessively hot due to radioactive decey heat.
Pressure Inlet feed line to the Monitors column pressure columns on a valve aisle which can indicate fouling jumper of the zeolite. Radiation Detection Column bottom outlet Used for control of the effluent line process by monitorir.g and limiting the radioactivity of the column effluent liquid in the line. These instruments are oquipped with-a high radiation alarm and a warning alarm normally preset at a lower level. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-32 O
e l 1 l' v/ WVNS-SAR-004 i Rev. 7 TABLE D.6.5-1 (continued) PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernat nt Treatment System (STS) SECTION: Ion Exchange 1 INDICATOR l LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURES Flow Sluice /liftwater header Monitors the flow of sluice to all columns water to the columns during regeneration of the column. O i i 1 1 L SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-33 \ u
,n.
WVNS-SAR-004 nev. 7 TABLE D.6.5-1 (continued) PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STa's _ SECTION: Final Filtration and Storage INDICATOR LDCATION FUNCTION /TEATURE ~~ Liquid Level Decontaminated Monitor tank liquid level, supernatant collection also provide secondary method tank BD-3 of determining flow rate through STS system. Instrument equipped with high and low level alarms. - Pressure Inlet and outlet lines to Monitor inlet, outlet, and the decontaminated differential pressure across supernatant filter 50 F- the filter to indicate
,- 002 on jumpers in the STS fouling or p14681"S-( valve aisle - inlet and outlet linked to read differential across filte..
Flow Outlet of the filter on a Monitor and control the flow jumper in the STS valve rate through the ion . change aisle, columns and decontaminated - supernatant filter. This instrument is connected to a flow totalizer, which measures the total flow. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6-34 n v
' - ~ ~ ~ -- _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I 1
'v/
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 . TABLE D 6.5-1 (continued) PROCESS INSTRlMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS) SECTION: Final Filtration and Storage INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURE Radiation Detection Outlet line of filter 50 Monitor radiation levels of F 002 on jumper in STS the lines. valve aisle. Both instruments are equipped Discharge line of with a high radiation alarm decontaminated and a warning alarm normally supernatant pump 50 G-007 preset at a lower level. on jumper in STS valve aisle. The high radiation alarms are interlocked with auto valves to redirect or stop flow in the event of alarm.
- (~ 1 - %J - The high alarm on filter 50-F-002 effluent changes the position of a three way valve which delivers flow to tank 8D-3 to deliver flow back to tank 50 D-001.
The high alarm on the discharge of pump 50 G-007 closes the discharge valve to the liquid waste treatment-system (LUTS), i. SAR:0000863 RM Page 6-35 [~'T t/
ly,+)-
\ /
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.6.5-1 (concluded) PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM:- Sludge Mobilization and Wash System INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION / FEATURES Pump Speed Pump motor N N.rol panel Measures freqE icy to. indicate in PVS building pump speed during sludge mobilization. Ampelage PumpmotorcontrolpanellMonitorsamperagetoindicate in PVS building relative' pump operating conditions. Time Pump motor control panel Indicates the time the pump in PVS building has been operated.
~
i- .(')_ Individual pump enclosure Monitors the pump column for (, Radiation radioactive contamination.- Detection High radiation activates the external pump enclosure visual alarm and horn. Temperature Individual pump enclosure Mont.ars pump enclosure temperature to detect abnormal conditions. High and low temperature activates the external visual alarm and horn. SAR:0000863.RM Page 6 36 f3
WVNS-SAR-004
,~3 Rev. 7 l }- \_ ,:
D 7.0 VASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT D.7.1 VASTF. MANAGEMENT CRITERIA Criteria for the management of radioactive waste generated by the VVDP are described in the VVDP Long Term Radioactive Waste Management Plan (VVDP 019). The guiding principles followed in the preparation of this plan are:
- Minimize all waste generation, o Provide as much flexibility as possible in designed facilities to accommodate future uncertainties (e.g., liquid and solid waste volumes, storage, process equipment),
e Segregate uncontaminated from contaminated waste as early as possible to minimize additional storage, disposal, and transportation j ) requirements. \~ ,) e Minimize occupational exposures, o Minimize costs,
- Protect the worker, public health, and the environment, and;
- e. Conform to applicable DOE Orders and guidance from other regulations provided by Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), NRC, and New York State.
D.7.2 RADIOLOGICAL VASTES From the perspective of liquid radiological waste management, the STS has been designed as a self-contained, closed system. All liquid radioactive by-m ( ,)
, SAR:0000863.RM Page 7-1
aL
- a;
-p j!V WVNS-SAR-004 I Tev. 71
, product streams-generated by STS processes is returned to Tanks 8D 1 or 8D-2
' ~
for-rework (as sludge wash solution feed) or for reuse within the STS (see ,
- Section'D.7,5) ' Only the decontaminated sludge' wash solution collected in
" : Tank- 8D-3, which is - considered an STS product, leaves the system (to the LVTS) Eduring the operational phase of the STS.
~
Solid radioactive. wastes' generated from normal STS operations potentially include spent roughing and llEPA filters from the WTFVS and/or PVS and-the possibility of failed components, which would be remotely removed-from
- radioactive service and overpacked before- disposal. These solid wastes are disposed of according to existing WVNS Procedures, which are prepared to
- comply with applicable DOE-Orders.
-The loaded spent-zeolite discharged to Tank 8D-1 is considered an STS product.
-The only other solid radioactive waste.that may be generated by the STS will.
the spent sand from the Esupernatant postfilter. This sand may also be
/"'I ' discharged to Tank 8D-1 along with the spent zeolite stid would ultimately be
\-" : transferred'to the vitrification process Co. use as melter feed.
D.7,3 NONRADIOLOGICAL WASTES-The only nonradiological wastes expected to be generated by the STS or SMUS will be nonradioactive,. nonhazardous wastes from cold operations in the supportibuildings. D.7.4 GASEOUS WASTES
. Operation of the'STS and SMUS will generato gaseous radioactive wasces treated i by two separate and independent ventilation systems: the STS PVS and the original WTFVS. The basic characterirtics of air treatment for those two
-a, stems-is described in this section. The schematic drawing of the sludge 1
l g,) .SAR:0000863.RM .Page 7-2 i i
-. . . , - , y * , , ,,--y - .---n-- , - - - - , +
I! WVNS-SAR-004
-,N. Rev. 7 .(%J )-
wash' process flow (Figure D.5.1-5) shows these two existing ventilation systems. D 7.4.1 STS PVS The STS PVS provides contamination and temperature control to the STS support building, valve aisle, pipeway, and components suspended in Tank 8D-1 and is schematically depicted.in F16ure D.7.4-2. Outside air is supplied to the operating areas of the STS support building from separate supply fans.
.. Recirculation air (0.7 m3 /s at STP (1500 scfm]) is provided to the control-room-and approximately 2.3 3c /s' at STP (4800 scfm) is supplied to the fresh zeolite and water tank area on the second floor. Leakage of approximately 3
0.05 m8 /s at STP (100 sefm) is expected from the control room and 0.5 m /s at
- STP (1000 scfm) from the fresh zeolite and water area. The operating area in front of the valve aisle receives approximately 1.8 m /s3 at STP (3800 scfm) from the zeolite area. This air is then directed to tha valve aisle or into
-the pipeway/ shield structure on top of the TankBD 1 vault. An infiltration of 0.09 m3 /s at STP (200 sefm) enters the pipeway from the tank farm piping trenches. The resulting approximately 1.9 m 8/s (4000 scfm) is then exhausted
- to the STS PVF dir treatment system where one of two parallel (identical
-standby) air cleaning trains processes the exhaust air. Each train passes the exhausted air through a mist eliminator, heater, roughing filter and two sets of HEPA filters in series before release to the environment. This system is also connected to an emergency backup power generator. The exhaust air is sampled contin musly and monitored by continuous air monitors. Gross alpha / beta and~ tritium are analyzed weekly in the-WDP Environmental LLaboratory. In addition, weekly- gamma isotopic analyses are performed if -
gross activity rises significantly. Weekly filter. samples are composited quarterly'and analyzed for specific radionuclides of interest. During mobilization pump installation, exhaust air from Tank 8D-2 will be
-handled through the PVS. Approximately 0.3 m3 /s at STP (550 scfm) of D i r
V SAR:0000863 RM Page 7-3
wvNs-SAR-004 Rev. 7 L[u) t ventilation air is pulled through Tank BD.2 to the PVS during a typical mobilization pump installation. This air flow is requir6J to be through a riser access opening in order to comply with the minimum capture velocity acroza any opening in the WTF HLW Tanks. The minimum capture velocity is 0.64 m/w (125 ft/ min). D.7.4.2 WTFVS The oriSinal WTFVS will continue to provide routine ventilation to Tanks 8D-1, BD 2, 8D-3, and 8D-4 during STS and normai SMMS operations. The UTFVS is an existing facility constructed in the early 1960s as part of the original reprocessing plant. This ventilation system was not seismically designed or qualified to a DBE. If this equipment does fail and/or on-site backup power is lost during a seismic event, the negative pressure on the HLW Tanks will be lost. dovever, a loss of a negative pressure does not necessarily result in a backflow out of the tanks. Some draw is maintained on the PLW tanks even when (h the WTFVS is not operational as a result of natural convection and operation
\'~/ of the main plant ventilation system to which the HLW Tanks exhaust.
The STS process off-gas from the components suspended in Tank SD-1 are vented into Tank 8D-1. Details pertaining to the design and operation of the WTFVS are presented in Section B.S.4 and Figure B.5,4-6 of Volume II. Air is 3 removed from the tanks at approximately 0.07 m /s (150 scfm) . This is supplied by leakage from many-openings in the system. The Tank 8D 1 and Tank 8D-2 off-gas passes through a condenser to remove water vapor. The Tank 8D-3 and 8D-4 off-gas is passed through a caustic scrubber and then joins the flow from Tanks 8D-1 and BD-2. The air stream then passes through a knock-out drum and demister to remove entrained liquid. The condensate is returned to
-Tank BD-2 while the noncoudensibles pass through a heater, then through a single HEPA filter and blower. Both the filters and the blowers have redundant spares connected in parallel to provide continuous exhaust in the event of off-gas equipment failure. This system is also connected to an Page 7-4
(_/- SAR:0000863.RM
WVNS-SAR-004 [s- Rev. 7 emergency backup power generator. Following off gas treatment the exhausted ~ air is combined in the plant stack with effluents from other Project activities. The exhaust air is campled continuously and monitored by continuous air monitors off-line. Gross alpha / beta and tritium are analyzed weekly. In addition, weekly gamma isotopic analyses are performed if gross activity rises significantly. Weekly filter samples are composited quarterly and analyzed for specific radionuclides of interest. The filter and blower are paralleled with identical standby units. The exhaust line from the blowers connects to the main process plant stack. A basic schematic of the VTFVS Off-Gas Treatment System is shown in Figure D.7.4-3. During sludge mixing, each mobilization pump will add approximately 90 kW (120 hp) of heat to the Tank 8D 2 contents. The total heat input rate to the tank,
-with five pumps running, is approximately 450 kW (600 hp). This is in addition to the 50 kW (70 hp) generated by radioactive decay of the remaining unwashwd sludge. Assuming that all the heat generated by the. pumps produces
(T - water vapor, approximately 1,000 L/h (4 gpm) of vapor would pa'ss through the
\- # . WTFVS. -Since the condensers.have a-design capacity of 4,700 L/h (21 gpm), the water vapor generated from the sludge mixing operation should be condensed efficiently.
D,7.5 LIQUID WASTES As indicated in Section D.7.2, liqutt radioactive wastes resulting from STS operation are returned to Tanks 8D-i and 8D-2 for rework or reuse within the STS. The condensate from off-gas treatment, sluice, and backwash waters from ion exchange operation is returned to Tank 8D 1 for reuse as STS process water. The prefilter backwash /retut i and ion exchange rinse solutions are returned to Tank 8D-2 for rework as-sludge wash solution feed. Fluids collected in the valve aisle and/or pipevay sumps are transferred back to Tank
-8D-2 for rework.
) SAR:0000863.RM Page 7-5 i
j
,- _ _ ~_ .-_ _ . . .
WVNS-SAR-004 3(::) All other process solutions are continuously recycled through their respective closed loops (e.g. , sludge wash solution feed recycles through the supernatant
- feed tank, refrigerant between' cooler and chiller, fresh zeolite backwash). >
D.7.6. LIQUID WASTE SOLIDIFICATION The SMWS-will produce a sludge wash so'ution that will be delivered to the
- STS. ' The chemical-composition of the_vash-solutions will be slightly
-different from the1 chemical composition of the supernatant. Once the wash solutions are-decontaminated through the STS, the. solution will be transferred 9 to :the- LWTS evaporetor for concentration. The concentrated decontaminated wash solutions will then >be-incorporated into a cement waste form for ultimate disposal. -Since the-wante composition of the wash solutions differs from the composition of the supernatant,,a new cement recipe will be developed and tested for certification.as a_ Class C-LLW. The qualification and certification of the vaste form will require a new process control plan for
.th'e CSS that will' control the quality of the product.
See Section C.7.6 of' Volume III and Sections G.7.6 and H.7.6 of Volume IV for further details concerning integration of the: SMWS into these afstems. D.7.7 SOLID WASTES The- only~ solid radioactive vastes potentially - generated by the STS will- be espent roughing and HEPA filters:from the PVS, failed componente that would be remotely removed from' service and replaced,.and materials used within the
-valve aisle such as wipes and sampling needles. The handling of the vastes
- will be in accordance with implementing procedures for the WVNS Radiological
-Controis-Manual (WVDP-010) and WVDP Waste Management Plan (WVDP-019).
A T e .
WVNS-SAR-004
/'N Rev. 7 The only other solid wastes expected to be generated are nonradioactive, nenhazardnus vastes, and zeolite fines from cold operations in the STS support building.
In addition to these wastes generated from normal STS operations, the only wastes potentially generated from the SMWS will be the mobilization pumps. The handling of these wastes will also be in accordance with implementing procedures for the WNS Radiological Controls Manual (WDP 010) and WDP Waste Management Plan (WDP-019) I: l (V- SAR:0000863.RM Page 7-7 I 1
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\.
REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.7.0 VVDP-010; 1989 West Valley Demonstration Project. 1989. " Radiological controls Manual." Rev. 3. WVDP-019, 1990 West Valley Demonstration Project. 1990. "Long Term Radioactive Waste Management Plan " VVDP-019, Rev. 8. , Y ' (j
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D.8.0 RADIATION PROTECTION D.8.1 ENSURINC THAT OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXFOSURES ARE AS LOV AS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE D.8.1.1 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS See Section A.8.1.1 of Volume I. D.8.1.2 DESICN CONSIDERATIONS The most important consideration in maintaining exposures ALARA is to ensure the control of radioactivity:
- The SMWS components that will be in radioactive service will be remotely operated and will be located within Tank 8D-2.
- The tank atmosphere is maintained under negative pressure relative to surrounding areas to ensure that air leakage is into, rather than out of, the tank.
SMWS structural barriers important to the control of radioactivity have been designed such that the confinement of liquid HLU will not be compromised by any credible design basis event.
- Radioactive liquids are transported between tanks and components via remotely operated and instrumented valving and piping systems.
- Remotely operated valves are contained within a shielded valve aisle which contains shield windows and manipulators.
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- The shield structure (pipeway) erected on top of the Tank 8D-1 vault provides secondary containment for the upper portions of components suspended in the tank and for piping runs between the components and the valve aisle.
e Remote control of STS operations are monitored from the control roor located in the STS support buildin5 The control room contains a graphic display providing operators with real-time information regarding system status, e The STS is highly instrumented. Remote indicating radinlegical instruments are used extensively to monit.or process conditions Jrd to provide verification that systems are operating within design conditions.
- The potential backflow of radioactivity into normally nonradioactive systems and areas through cold chemical and/or instrument lines will be prevented via block and bleed val es.
Additional mitigative design meas,~es include: e Use of solid state electronic instrumentation and control equipment to provide high reliability, a Use of redundancy in critical aspects of the operation.
- Ability to monitor and control the process remotely and to identify leaks remotely from the control panel within the control room, o Equipment design to enable remote replacement of failed components if necessary.
O \ SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-2 1 I l
1' WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [~'} D.8.1.3 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS in conjunction with design considerations, administrative procedures and controls are key considerations in ensuring that the radiation exposure of operators are maintained ALARA. STS operations and control will be exe:cised from the control room within the STS support building. This facility is maintained as a non-radiological area. The SMWS Operations and Control will be exercised from both the V6S Building and the Tank Farm area itself. Administrative and procedural control is maintained in accordance with the WVNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WVDP-011), the Radiological Controls Manual (WVDP-010) and specific STS Standard Operating Procedures (see Section D.10.4). The STS Operator Training Program is discussed in detail in Section D.10.3. (o)
' A fully instrumented control panel including graphic display is provided to operators with real time information regarding system status, leaks, deviation from normal operating parameters, etc, Audible and visual alarms indicate when expedient operator responses are required to correct abt.ormal conditions.
Shielding of workers from piping and valves in radioactive service is provided by the valve aisle and shield structure (p.peway) 65 nC/kg h (0.25 mR/h) for full time occupancy. Manipulators and shielded viewing windows are incorporated into the design of the valve aisle. D.8.1.3.1 PROCESS Equipment normally used is accessible after sufficient decontamination, as determined by WVbP-010 and implementing procedures. Occupancy of process ( SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-3 1 1
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Y" ) areas under abnormal operations is performed in accordance with WDP-010 and implementing procedures. D.8.1.3.2 CONTROL ROOM AND UTILITY FACILITIES Remote controls and areas never used in radioactive service are accessible to perronnel at all times. Administrative and procedural control are maintained in accordance with the WNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WDP 011, 1989), the Radiological Controls Manual (WDP-010,1989) and specific SMVS Standard Operating Procedures (Section 10.4). Operators are provided with a comprehensive training program, commensurate with the requirements of the DOE ~ 5480 series, by the Training and Operations Engineering staffs. The STS Operator Training Program is discussed in detail in Section D.10.3. Additionally, OSRs establi:h and maintain process parameters within the design and safety limits for SMVS operation (Section M.11.0 of Volume,VI). O D.8.1.3.3 SUPPORT SERVICES Systems and equipment that are normally used in radioactive service are accessible-to personnel only for controlled periods. Administrative controls for access are based on data provided by radiation monitoring instrumentation and/or radiological survey. The operating aisle (in front of the valve aisle), chiller, and fresh zeolite and water tank area. etc. are examples of
" support service" areas.
D.8.2 SOURCES OF RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVITY D.8.2.1 CONTAINED SOURCES The process feed stream from the SMWS to the STS is sludge wash solution from HLW Tank SD-2. The metal concentrations in the respective wash solutions are SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-4
t
,_s, W:NS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
( /-} 3_ listed in Table D.8.2-1, The estimated maximum concentrations of radionuclides are listed in Table D 8-2 2.
. he total volume of wash water to be processed is approximately 4,000,000 L through the STS, LUTS, and CSS.
Approximately 400,000 L of wash water will remsin in HLW Tank 8D-2. l When the first column reaches the " breakthrough" condition, (i.e., the zeolite C is maximally loaded and the column extraction efficiency becomes reduced to an undesirable-level) or the STS is shut down following completion of a batch run, the column is remotely valved out of the process. The loaded zeolite within the colt.mn is then sluiced to the bottom of Tank 8D-1 and the column-is
~
recharged with fresh zeolite, and is then available to be valved back into the process. The maximum loading of a Ti-treated zeolite column is shown in Table D.9.2-4. 5 The multiple confinement features and shielding aspects of the SMVS and STS 2 design preclude personnel from coming into contact with radioactive materials j .during normal operations of the SMWS. Specifics of the STS design can be
-found in Jection D.8.3.1. The sludge mobilization pumps are bottom voluted; therefore the HUW will never leave Tank 8D-2 during the washing operations.
No personnel access to the valve aisle or pipoway above the tank vault should be necersary. D.8.2.2 AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY SOURCES The STS support building is vented by its own heating and STS PVS, Clean air is supplied from outside the building. The facility is maintained as a nonradiological area and therefore negligible concentrations of radioactive material are expected in areas occupied by operations personnel. Ventilation for the STS system maintains airflow frcm regions with low potential for airborne radioactivity to areas of potentially elevated activity. Thus, the air supplied to the STS support building exits into and through the valve O) (_ SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-5
1: WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 O aisle and pipeway and ultimately passes through several stages of roughing and HEPA filtration prior to release to the environment. Under normal' conditions, clean air within the STS control room and utility areas is exhausted into the valve aisle. Airborne radioactivity in occupied areas is expected to.be low. However, continuous airborne radioactivity monitors are-located within the STS support building to alert pers nnel quickly of ventilation system abnormal conditions by sounding audible alarms if elevated levels of airborne contamination occur. The major source of airborne activity would be from filtered, dilute, wash water vapor. The on-site effects from this source are minimal, as the release point is the main
. plant stack (60 m). Thus there would be negligible impact to personnel in the control room and aisleways. At a minimum, continuous airborne samplers are located in the fresh zeolite and water tank area and in the access area (operating aisle) in front of the valve aisle. Airborne radioactivity levels are expected to be less than 0.1 times the derived air concentration (DAC) for h .h all radionuclides under normal and expected abnormal conditions within normally occupied areas of the STS ar.d SMVS control rooms. The release of i airborne radioactivity to the environment is discussed in Section D.8.6.3.
D 8.3 RADIATION PROTECTION DESIGN FEATURES Radiation protection features basic to the design of the STS and SHWS are dedicated to maintaining A1 ARA radiation exposures to members of the general public and work force. Effective control of radiation exposures depends primarily on design features that provide adequate shielding from all sources of radiation, provide for reme.Le operations and maintenance, containment of l radioactivity within the process, proper ventilation, effluent control, and overall monitoring and surveillance to verify design controls. These physical design features, plus strict adherence to the operational requirements given in WVDP-010 " Radiological Controls Manual," provide effective radiation j control. l' r Page 8-6 SAR:0000863.RM
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(w/ D 8.3.1 STS AND SMVS DESIGN FEATURES All HLW handling and processing for STS and SKWS occurs v'*.hin shielded containment structures. Valves are remotely operated r sin the shielded valve aisle. A highly instrumented control room, including visual display and visual / audible alarm systems, enables STS and SMWS operators to control the process from a remote location. Equipment and components in radioactive service have been designed for remote removal and replacement should failure occur. Variable speed motor controls for the sludge mobilization pumps are located in the V6S Building, allowing pump operations to be performed from a remote location. Occasional activities at other locations within the STS support building (fresh zeolite area, operating aisle, utility and support services) will be for short periods of time. These areas are not expected to contain radioactive materials under normal operating conditions.
\
N_ Ventilation for heating and cooling is provided to the STS Support Building by a separate system referred to as the STS Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HVAC). This fresh air is routed from the control room (radiologically cold area) to the utility and support arecs of the building (no expected radioactivity areas). The building exhaust is routed through the valve aisle and pipeway. This air is then treated by the PVS before being released to the environment. Air cleaning components of the PVS include a mist eliminator, roughing filter, and two HEPA filter banks in series for particulate removal before discharge. Details of the STS HVAC can be found in Section D.5.4.1 and details of the PVS can be found in Section D 7.4. D.8.3.2 SHIELDING Radiation shiciding analyses were performed to determine the required shield-ing for the STS valve aisle and pipeway between the valve aisle and Tank 8D-1
/y 8
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(Ebasco 1985a, Ebasco 1985b, O'Ahoofe, 1985). The areas of concern include the external regions-of the walls and roofs of these structures 65 nC/kg-h (0.25 mR/h) in any full' time occupancy area. Calculations were performed using the computer code QADMOD, a point kernel gamma ray shielding code (Radiation Research Associates, 1979) provided by ORNL. The version of the code used for these calculations has been verified and approved for use as a shielding design code at WVNS (Peterson, 1984). The calculation method used by this code involves representing a volume-distributed source of radiation as a number of point isotropic sources. The distances through all regions traversed by line-of-sight from the point sources are computed for each receiver of interest. Energy dependeat exponen-tial attenuation factors and energy dependent buildup factors are determined from the computed distances through the regions and the characteristics of the mate.iais within each region. These factors are then applied to calculate the
- j' -direct gamma ray exposure rate and the exposure rate with buildup. Build-up L takes into account the exposure rate from unscattered plus scattered gamma rays.
D.8.3.2.1 .PI?EWAY AREA (CONCRETE SHIELDING) The STS pipeway model used in the analysis is depicted in Figure D.8.3 1. The
" source" was= assumed to be a rectangular region, 17.7 m (58 ft) x 3.3 m (10.8 ft). The source region was assumed to be 15 cm (6 in) from the roof and front wall and 30 cm (1 f t) from the side walls. The source region was ihomogenized taking into. account the relative-volume fractions of the piping material (stainless steel), source medium (assumed to be water at 1.0 g/cc) and air. This was determined to be an adequate and c uservative approach L since the final piping arrangement was not yet known at the time of the analysis. The source concentration (supernatant) was taken to be 230 MBq/mL (6210 pCi/mL) of cesium-137 (Ebasco, 1985a). Tables D.8.3-1 (walls) and f%
(,,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-8 I i
li WVNS-SAR-004
,p Rev. 7 D 8.3-2 (roof) present the results of the QADMOD code analysis for various concrete densities. To meet the design criteria of $65 nC/kg-h (0.25 mR/h), a 91 cm (36 in) concrete thickness was installed for the pipeway walls and roof.
D.8.3.2.2 VALVE AISLE (STEEL / IRON SHIELDIFG) The valve aisle model used in the shielding analysis is depicted in Figure D.8.3 2.. The " source" was_essumed to be a actangular region, 1.5 m (5 ft) x 1.8 m (6 ft) x 1.5 m (5 ft) located 15 cm (6 in) from the side and front walls and approximately 2.7 m (9 ft) from the roof. Source strengths of 76 (20), 189 (50), and 379 L (100 gal) of supernatant were used in the calculations. The source region representation was similar to that used for the pipeway analysis. Tables D.8,3-3 (front wall), D.8.3-4 (side walls) and D.8.3-5 (roof) present the results of the QADMOD evaluation for the three' source strengths. The valve aisle walls and roof are built with a 30-cm (12-in) thicknese of steel to meat the design criterion of 665 nC/kg h (0.25 mR/h), This analysis also assumed a source concentration of 230 MBq/mL (6210 pCi/mL) mCs . The maximum sludge wash solution concentration is expected to be <61 MBq/mL (1640 pCi/mL), which is well within the shielding design limits. D.8.3.3 VENTI 1ATION The STS PVS (described in Section D.5.4.1 and D.7.4) provides fresh air to the operating areas of the SMWS and STS support building and ventilation for contamination control to the valve aisle, pipeway, and components in Tank 8D-1. Air flowing through the STS facilities is from regions having a low probability for airborne radioactivity to areas having a potential i airborne contamination. Specifically, the air flow sequer.ce is from the l l-control room to fresh zeolite and water area to the operating _ aisle (occupied
-areas of increasing contamination potential) and then into the valve aisle and l- to the pipeway (unoccupied areas which could contain airborne radioactivity from piping / valving leaks, etc.). Air is exhausted from the pipeway and A
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L ,' treated via a mist eliminator, heater, roughing filter, and 2 HEPA filters to remove entrained radioactive material before release to the environment through a short (10 m) stack. The STS effluent monitoring system (described in Section D 8.6.1), in conjunction with pressure drop measurements across the filters, provides operating data regarding the potential loading of these filters. If replacement of filters it, necessary, vaste disposal of snent filters will be in accordance with the requirements of the WVNS Radiological Control Manual (WVDP-010). Personnel doses from this operation are noted in section D.2.4. Tanks 8D-1,.8D-2, and 8D-3 will continue to be vented via the original WTFVS, (See Sections D.5.4.1 and D.7.4 for details pertinent to the Off-Gas Treatment System.) D 8.3.4 AREA RADIATION AND AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION rm Continuous radiation monitoring capabilities are provided to warn of
;U i An ARM and a CAM are located undesirable trends and/or abnormal conditions.
in the fresh zeolite dispensing area and in the manipulator operating aisle (minimum of two arms and two cams for each area). Radiation monitoring is connected to emergency backup power. Area radiation monitors provide an audible alarm when a preset exposure rate is reached. These instruments can be operated in the useful range of 26 nC/kg-h (0.1 mR/h) to 2.6 mC/kg-h (10 R/h). Continuous airborne monitors sample air through a fixed particulate filter at flow rates greater than 0.001
- m3 /s (several efm) and will alarm when a preset count rate is reached. These instruments use open window GM detectors, which are ssnsitive to both beta and gam.a activity.
Radiation monitoring instruments are also used in the STS to monitor the radioactivity within contained systems (pipes, tanks) and to ensure that 73
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radioactivity is not transferred to systems / areas not intended or designed to safely receive such material (utility lines, cold systems). Radiation monitoring for process control is discussed in Section D.6.7. D.8.4 ESTIMATED ON-SITE DOSE ASSESSMENTS Operation of the STS and SMWS will require personnel to work in areas where radiation levels are higher than background and thus incur radiation doses. The maximum annual collective occupational dose associated with SMVS would result from continuous operations and is estimated to be approximately 3 person cSv (3 person-rem) vased on the following assumptions:
- Normal operation of the .<MVS in conjunction with STS would require nine to ten operators (three per shift, thres thifts/ day) with routine system shutdowns fer ten days between wash campaigns, resulting in approximately 5 person-ws /y (100 person mrem /y). Areas f'~'} occupied by personnel on a full-time basis were La.ig'ned to maintain s
'# radiation exposure rates $65 nC fwg-h (0,25 mR/h).
- Pump installation will require five person for a total of 80 bours to install all five sludge mobilftstion pumps. It is expected that this will result in apprr.ime+.ely 1 person-cSv_(1 person rem).
- Buoyancy probe measurements to detarmine sludge settling-is expected to involve two persons for 8 hours for each of the four washes. It is e:timated that this will result in approximately 2 person-mSv (200 person-mt.3) of exposure for all washes combined.
- No signifir.a.it radiation dose to individual workers is expected from maintenance activities such as HuPA filter changeouts (<l/y) and mob.lization pump maintenance. Therefore, it is estimated that all maincenance activities would result in approximately 1 person-cSv/y l
(,, SAR:0000863.RM Page 8 11 6
WVHS-SAR-004 jq ;. Rev. 7 _( .s / (1 person-rem /y). Circumstances requiring workers to be in proximity to components in radioactive service and contributing any significant dose are considered " abnormal events" and are discussed in Section D.9.1.
- SMWS operations on HLW Tank 8D-2 will not require full-time occupancy and access to this area is limited and controlled. Therefore, this operation will contribute no significant radiation dose (approximately 5 person mSv [500 person-mrem) for the entire SMWS operation).
Actual routine operation of the STS during sludge wash solution processing compared to the STS supernatant processing will probably result in somewhat
- lower occupational annual doses because the sludge wash solutions are expected to be lower in activity than the supernatant. The WTF has both physical and administrative entry controls. .O U . D.8.5 HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM The STS is operated in compliance with the requirements of the WVNS Radiological Cortrols Manual, WVDP-010, and DOE Order 5480.11. The WVNS Radiologival Controls Manual specifies the requirements for radiation protection of occupational workers, unborn children, students, minors, and on-site members of the public as required by DOE Order 5480.11, Section 9.
The health physics program for the STS is the same as for other Project activities. The health physics program for the Project is discussed in Section A.8.5 of Volume I. g ') _
*s_ /- SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-12
- - . . - . - . .. . - . _ - ~ ~ . -
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-#~*\L -Rev. 7 D.8.6'0FF-SITE DOSE ASSESSMENT D.8.6.1-~ EFFLUENT MONITORING FROGRAMS
- Effluent releases from the operation of the STS and SMVS will be monitored via the existing on site and off site monitoring program which has been in place since~thr inception of_the WVDP in 1981. This program is described _in Section~A.8.6.1 of Volume I. Minor modifications will be aade to this pregram, if needed, to meet the specific monitoring requirements associated with operation offthe STS and SMWS. Details and results of the WVDP ongoing monitoring program are available in annual reports. It.is envisioned that the
< current program will be continued by. DOE until-the UVDP_is completed.
- The original,WTFVS will continue.to supply ventilation needs to Tanks 8D-1, 8D-2, 8D-3,;and-8D-4 during STS and SMUS operation. This system exhausts into the main process-building stack. Effluents from the UTFVS will continue to be monitored at the stack along with effluents from other -Froject activities as described in Section B.S.4.1.2.2 of Volume II. The WTFVS is described in Sections D.5.4.1 and D.7.4.2.
V'entilation air exhausted from' the STS' support building is released at the STS
- PVS stack located at the WTF The PVS is described in Section D.5.4.1 and D.7.4.1. Monitoring eq2ipmentLfor the PVS also is located at the tank farm.
Al probe is:used t? withdraw sample gas which passes throughia sampler, an alpha particulate monitor, _ and a beta particulate monitor simultaneously.
- These contirnous air particulate monitors provide alarm indications in the_STS
-buildin6 control room, should radioactive particulate levels-in the-exhaust fair exceed preset levels. _ The sampler media- is screened weekly: for gross radioactivity and quarterly composites of the glass fiber filters are analyzed a- :for specific isotopes,-including gamma-emitting radionuclides, strontium-90,'
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u WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
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u andieransuranics. Flow and count-rate sensors'will activate.a backup vacuum i Lpumpfand various alarms if equipment 1 failures occur. This system is provided
-with~ auxiliary backup _ power. ,
D.8.6.2.= ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE CONTRIBUTION
'See Section A.8.6.2 of Volume I.
- D,8.6.3 ESTINATED EXPOSURES TROM AIRBORNE RELEASES
.The major effluent _ resulting from operation of.the SMVS and STS during washing will be filtered, dilute, wash water vapor. lit is assumed that 1,000,000 L'of
? wash water vapor _will-_ leave Tank 8D-2:during-the washes, that approximately
'970,000 L will return'to the WTF from the condenser,.and that the partition 1 coefficient (ratio =of_radionuclide concentration in liquid to that in the-vapor) will be 1000. LIn-addition,'the following radioa-tive DFs are used:
, condenser. - DF - .30; l bank HEPA filters, - DF - 1,000 (ANSI-1980) . These assumptions lead to an- overall. DF for radioac*!vity. for the WTFVS, including the;parcition coefficient, of 3 x-10 . Further, approximately 70% of the wash 7
-solution will1bo removed = and processed by the IRTS between each wash. Based
.on _the above assumptions,_ it is -calculated that 185 MBq (5 mci) of.137Cs will
-be released from the main stack, resulting in a maximum individual off-site effectivei. dose equivalent from all radionuclides <of_700 nSv.(<70 prem) annually as determined by AIRDOS-PC (AIRDOS-PC, 1989; WVDP-065). Table
- D.8.C-1 lists the total airborne release' of each' of _ the- major radionuclides
.for the SMWS.
-During mobilization pump installation, exhaust air from Tank 8De2 will be handled _through the PVS. The PVS consists of two parallel air cleaning trains, one"of which is an identical, dedicated spare, that process the' Lexhaust air. Each train will' pass the exhausted air through a mist eliminator
'(DF-- 30), heater, roughing filter, and two setsoof HEPA filters in series SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-14 y T--W ,9.~,y .- - p.- % q -- -_. - - o
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-(DF - 1000 x 100) before release to the environment, kith a partition coefficient of 1000, the resultant PVS DF is 3 x 10' The PVS exhaust air is monitored before release to the environment by an effluent sampling system similar to that at the main plant stack. Approximately 0.3 m /s3 at STP (550 scfm) of ventilation air is pulled through Tank 8D-2 to the PVS during a typical mobilization pump installation. Assuming dry air is pulled through the tank and exits seturated, the resultin5 radioactive release, assuming pump installation will take nine months, is 148 kBq (4 pCi) of 13'Cs, resulting in an offsite maximum effective dose equivalent from all radionuclides of <10 nSv
(<1 prem) annually as determined by AIRDOS-PC. The STS valve aisle equipment vents to the PVS. However, the releases of radioactive material from the STS are expected to remain low because the PVS exhausts air only from the STS support building, which contains very small quantities of airborne radioactive material, and from the valve aisle and pipeway in which the radioactive material is completely contained within enclosed valves and piping. During calendar year (CY) 1989 when supernatant was being processed, the total release was less than 7.4 mBq (0.2 pC1). Nonetheless, the exhaust air from the PVS will be monitored as described above. After the wash solutions are decontaminateo in the STS, the solutions are transferred through a 5-cm (2-in) double-valled underground stainless steel 4 pipe to'the LWTS where it.is concentrated by evaporation. The off-gases from the evaporator are vented to the original Vessel Off-Gas (V0G) system located in the former reprocessing plant. The V0G system consists of a condenser, a knock-out drum, scrubber, cyclone, heater, .c2PA filters, and exhaustern. Exhaust _ air then passes through a second HEPA filter bank before discharge via the main stack. Releases from the V0G system would be at least 100 times less than the release from the PVS due to the extra bank of HEPA filters. This effluent release is monitored by the main stack monite:Ing system.
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( D 8.6.4 LIQUID RELEASES With respect to liquid radioactive wastes, the SMW5 and STS will be operated as a closed, self-contained system. There will be no direct release of liquid radioactive material to the environment from the normal operation of the SMVS (Section D.7.5). Additionally, the potential for release of liquid HLW to the environment under design basis accident conditions is considered not credible (Sections D.9.2.5 and D.9.3). There will be liquid releases from the Lk7S as a result of concentrating the decontaminated aludge wash solutions. Approximately 4.000,000 L of wash solution will be removed from' Tank 8D 2 end proce a ed through the IRTS. The LWTS will discharge approximately 2,500.000 _. of evaporator overheads or condensate. The remaining concent: ate will be incorporated into a cementod solid waste form in the CSS. The radioactivity concentration in the ISTS feed is the activity of the decontaminated wash solution produced by STS. The decontaminated wash solution is volume-reduced in the LkiS by evaporation. The vapor passes through a high-efficiency condenser and the condensate passes through an ion exchange bed before release to the interceptors and Lagoon 2. From Lagoon 2 the liquid is procer. sed by the LLkTF and ultimately discharged to the environment via Lagoon 3. Discharged liquid from the LWTS is sampled and the concentration of radioactivity is determined before discharge. The acceptance criteria for release to the interceptors is that the concentratior of radioactivity must be less than 185 mBq/mL (5 x 10-3 pCi/mL) (not including tritium). Operation of the SMVS will produce LUTS evaporator overheads that easily meet this criteria. Indirect liquid releases are expected from the LkiS. The estimated total radioactivity assumed to be celeased in liquid effluent (LWTS condensate) is discussed in Part H of Volume III. SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-16
i I l l WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [v} REFERE0CES FOR SECTION D 8.0 AIRDOS-PC, 1989 United .ctates E o .ronmental Protection Agency. December 1989.
" User's Guide for AIRDOS-PC, Version 3.0." EPA /520/6-89 035.
ANSI,1980 - American National Standards Institate. July 1981. " Guidance for Defining Safety Related Features of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities." ANSI N46.1-1980. Brown, 1985a S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. December 19, 1985. " Safety Analysis Report For Modifications To Tank SD-1 and Installation of STS Compor,ents and Zeolite Removal Pumps." HE:85:0258. Brown,1985c Brown S. H. November 5,1985. "Frojec ied Radionuclide Reloases for Normal Operations of the STS Ventilation System." HE:85:0223. Car;l, D. E. 1990 Carl, D. E, to M. A. Schif fhauer September 1990. " Heat Removal Rate from 8D-2 During Sludge Mobilization." Ebasco, 1985a Ebasco Services, Inc. May 16, 1985. Ebasco Approval Request
#EBAR 479 with attachment. "STS Valve Aisle Shielding."
Ebasco, 1985b Ebasco Services Inc. May 21, 1985. Ebasco Approval Request t,,_,'} DEBAR 484 with attachment. " CTS Shielding - Pipeway Area (Wallt and
\_ / Ceilings)."
Kranz, 1985 Kranz, P. B. April 3,1985. Memo to C. J. Roberts
" Sludge /Supernatant Transfer Piping Radionuclide Content." HH:85:0068.
O'Ahoofe, 19fi O' Ahoofe, K. A. July 23, 1985. "Supernatant Treatment System Pipeway and Valve Aisle Shielding Analysis" July 1985. Transmitted by memo FB:85:0176 R. Keel to R. R. Borisch. Peterson, 1984 Peterson, J. M. December 1984. " Verification of Computer Codes QADMOD-C, ANISN, GGG, AIRDOSE-EPA (IBM version)." WVNS-MRC-0698, 0706. Radiation Research Associates, 1979 "QADMOD G, a Point Kernel Gamma Ray Shielding Code"; Radiation Shielding Information Center, Oak Ridge, TN.
-CCC-196.
Rykken, 1985a Rykken, L. E. October 2, 1985. " Properties of STS Solutions." HI:85:0199 (Revised for use in Design Criteria - WVNS-DC-013). Rykken, 1985b Rykken, L. E. February 5, 1985. " Revised 8D-2 Sludge Composition." Memo to Dr. W. H. Hannum. HI:85:0019.
,m,
's ,/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-17 l-
WVHS-SAA-004 Rev. 7 ) Rykken, 1965c Rykken, L. E. Ju'., 1985. Personal Communication with S.11. i p own. Saha, 1985 Saha, A. K. April 17, 1985, "RTS Waste Stream Data Sheets." Memo to distribution, llE:85:0011. Schif fhauer, 1985 Schiffhauer, M. A. October 1985.
- Tank BD 1 Temporar;.'
Ver*tilation System.a WNS DC 027. Schiffhauer, 1990 Schiffhauer, M. A. Februaty 1990.
- Tank 8D 2 Purex Sludge Wash Material Ba.ance." EL:90:0020.
WDP, 1990 West Valley Dernonstration Project. 1990. "WDP Long Term Radioactive Waste Managernent Plan." Rev. 8. WDP 019. WDP, 1989 West Valley Demonstration Project. May 1990. " Environmental Monitoring Report." WDP-010, 1989 West Valley Demonstration Project. 1989. " Radiological 3 Controls Manual." Rev. 3. VVDP-011, 1989 West Valley Demonstration Project. June 1989. " Industrial Hy&i eno and Safety Manual." Rev. 11. Paillace , E. R. , J . J . Ptowse , and i. Yuan. Detober 1990. O VVPP-065, 1990" Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project Activities. " Rev. 2. WDP 065. SAR:0000863.RM Page 8 18 l
\
l WVHS-SAR-004 s Rev. 7 TAB 1.E D.8.2-1 METAL CONCENTRATIONS IN VASil SOLUTIONS Major First Vash Second Vash Third Vash Fourth Wash Metals ug/mL ur/mL ur/mL ug/gL. A1 4.9E+01 4.9E+01 3.2E+01 1.7E+01 La 2.4E 01 8.0E 02 2.0E 02 1.0E 02 Ca 3. 5 E+' A 3.2E+00 3.3E400 2.3E+00 l Cr 6.9E+01 2.5E+01 6.8E+00 1.8E+00 Hg 9.7E.01 6.6E.01 3.9E 01 3.6E 01 Mn 9.0E 01 2.7E 01 9.0E.02 1.9E 01 Ho 2.0E+01 7.3E+00 2.1E+00 5.8E 01 Na 2.8E+04 1.0E+04 3.1;+03 1.3E+03 ( \ .\ SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-19
WN S-S.*tP- 00 4 Rev. 7 ( i
)
h
' t_/
TABLE D.8.2-2 }tAXIMUM RADIONUCLIDE GONCENTRATIONS ( Nuclide First Wash lecond Wash third Wash fourth Weth Conc. 6onc. Oonc. Conc. Sq/L (Cl/L) Bq/L (Cl/L) Bq/t (Cl/L) Sq/L (Cl/L) H3 9.29E+05 (2.51E 05) 2.43E+05 (6.56E 06) s.35E+04 (1.72E 06) 1.66t+04 (4.40E 07) C 14 1.64E*06 (4.43E 05) 4.29E*05 (1.16E 05) 1.12E*05 (3.03E 06) 2.93E+04 (7.91E 07) Fe $5 1.42t+03 (3.84E 08) 3.71E+02 (1.00E 08) 9.71t+01 (2.6?E 09) 2.54E*01 (6.86E 10) Co 60 1.48t+05 (3.991 06) 3.86E+04 (1.04t 06) 1.01E+04 (2.72E 07) 2.64t *03 (7.12608) NI 63 1.02E*07 (2.76E-04) 2.67E+06 (7.22t 05) 6.98t+05 (1.k91-05) 1.83E+05 (i.nt Dc; tr 90+ 4.18E+07 (1.13E 03) 1.09t+07 (2.95E 04) 2.85E+06 (7.71E 05) 7.46E-95 (2.0?! 05) Tc 99 1.90E+07 (L13E 04) 4.96E*06 (1.34E 0#) 1.30E*06 (3.50E 05) 3.39b05 (9.15E 06) to-106 1.04E+04 (2.81E 07) 2.71E*03 (7.34E 08) 7.10Ed2 (1.92E 08) 1.85E+02 (5.01E 09) Eb 125 2.68t+06 (7,24E 05) 7.00E*05 (1.89t 05) 1.83E+05 (4.95E 06) 4.78E+04 (1.29E 06) Te 125m 6.01E+05 (1.62t 05) 1.57t+05 (4.25E 06) 4.11t+04 (1.11E 06) 1.07t+04 (2.90E 07) rm I 129 2.51E+03 (6.80E 08) 6.57E*02 (1.7BE 05) 1.72E+02 (4.64E 09) 4.49E*01 (1 21E 09) Cs 134 3.03E+07 (8.18E 04) 7.91E+06 (2.14E 04) 2.07E+06 (5.59t %) 5.41E*05 (1.46E 05) Co 137+ 6.06E+10 (1.64E+00) 1.5BE+10 (4.28E 01) 4.14E+09 (1.12E 01) 1.08E+(9 (2.93E 02) Pm 147 8.75E+05 (2.36E 05) 2.29E+05 (6.18E 06) 5.97t+04 (1.61E 06) 1.56E*N. (4.22E t Om 151 1.69E+04 (4.58E 07) 4.43E+03 (1,20E 07) 1.16E+03 (3.131 08) 3.03E*02 (8.18E 09) Eu 154 1.53E+05 (4.14E 06) 4.00t+04 (1.08t 06) 1.05t+04 (2.83E 07) 2.73E+03 (7.391 -08) Eu 155 2.08E+04 (5.61E 07) 5.43E+03 (1.471 07) 1.42E*03 (3.84E 08) 3.71E*02 (1.00E 08) U 233 7.11E+04 (1.92E 06) 1.86E+04 (5 A2E 07) 4.85E+03 (1.31E 07) 1.21E+03 (3.43E 08) U 234 4.26E+04 (1.15E 06) 1.11E+04 (3.01E+07) 2.91E*03 (7.87E 08) 7.6tt+02 (2.06E 08) U 235 9.29t+02 (2.51E 08) 2.43f+02 (6.56E 09) 6.35E*01 (1.72E 09) 1.66t+01 (4.48e10) U 238 8.75E+L3 (2.36E 07) 2.29E+03 (6.iBE 08) 5.97t+02 (1.61E 08) 1.56t+02 (4.22E 09) Pu-238 1.84E+07 (4.96E 04) 4.80E+06 (1.30E 04) 1.25E+06 (3.39E 05) 3.28E*05 (8.86E 06) Pu 239 3.55E+06 (9.60E 05) 9.29E+05 (2.51E 05) 2.43b 05 (6.56E 06) 6.34E+04 (1.71E 06) Pu 240 2.68E+06 (7.24E 05) 7.00D05 (1.89E 05) 1.83E+05 (4.95E 06) 4.7BE+04 (1.29E 06) Pu+241 1.74E+08 (4.72E 03) 4.56E+0/ (1.23E 03) 1.19E+07 (3.22E 04) L 1?E+06 (8.42E 05) Am 241 3.83E<35 (1.03E 05) 1.00E+05 (2.701 06) 2.61E+04 (7.06t 07) 6.83E+03 (1.85E 07) Am 243 2.73E+04 (7.39E 07) 7.14E+03 (1.93E 07) 1.87E+03 (5.05E 06) 6.88t+02 (1.32E 08) Cm 244 1.09E*05 (2.95E 06) 2.86E+04 (7.72E 07) 7.47E*03 (2.02E 07.1 1.95E+03 (5.28E 08) 0 g% SAR:0000863.RM Page 8 20 l
1 WVHS-SAR-004 Table D.8.3 1 STS PIPEVAY,,,XALLS - SHIELpING ANALYSIS (91 a 136 in) Thicknesses of concrete) SUPERNATANT ' AM . 230 MBq/mL (6210 pC1/mt) 33'Cs SOURCE Concrete Density . c/ce nC/kc.h (mR A0 . 2.24 123 (0.477) 2.33 o2.7 (0.243) 2.50 25.0 (0.097) 2.85 2.8 (0.011) 3.00 1.0 (0.004) > 3.20 0.26 (0.001) O V SA1:0000863.RM Page 8 21
. = - .. _ _ _
l WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 Table D.8.3 2 STS PIPEVAY ROOF - SHIELDING ANALYSIS (91 cm [36 in) Thicknesses of Concrete) SUrERNATANT STREAM . 230 KBq/rnt (6210 pCi/inL) 1"Cs SOURCE Concrete Density r/ee nC/ke h hnR/h) 2.24 116 (0.450) 2.35 58.6 (0.227) 2.50 23.2 (0.090) 2.85- 2.58 (0.010) 3.00 1.03 (0.004) 3.20 0.258 (0.001) O S-0000ee3.- rese e.22
. _ - _ . ~ . .__---___._...m__.--____. _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _. _ _ - . _ _ . . _ _ _ .
l WVHS-SAR-004 ' Rev. 7 Table D.8.3 3 STS VALVE AISLE - FRONT VALL - SHIELDING ANALYSIS (30 cm [12 in; Thicknesses of Steel) , 76, 189, 379 L (20, 50, 100 gals) @ 230 MBq/mL (6210 pci/mL) D'cs SUPERNATANT SOURCE Front Vall pSv/h pSv/h pSv/h* - em (in) 16._L 189 L 37.9 L 30 (12) 5.900E 01 1.480E 00 2.950E 00
?
SOURCE GEOMETRY: (1.5 a (5 ft) X 1.8 m [6 ft) X 1.5 m [5 ft]) i
- 1 pSv/h 0.1 mrem /h O
O eix: 000eees.xx r se e.2>
. ___ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ - - . . . _ _ _ _ . - _____ _ m-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev, 7 Table D.8.3 4 STS VALVE AISLE - SIDE VALL SHIELDING ANALYSIS (30 cm [12 in) Thicknesses of steel) 76,189, 37/ L (20, 50,100 gals) @ 230 MBq/mL (6210 pCi/mL) "'Cs SUPERNATANT SOURCE Side Vall pSv/h pSv/h pSv/h* , J em (in')_ li_L 189 L 379 L l 5.600E 01 1.420E 00 2.830E 00 l 30 (12) 1 SOURCE GEOMETRY: (1.5 m [5 ft) X 1.8 m [6 ft) X 1.5 m [5 ft])
- 1 pSv/h - 0,1 mrea/h 1
O l-I t I
- i L.-
SAR:0000863,RM Page 8 24
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. w
WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 Table D.8.3-5 STS VALVE AISLE ROOF - SHIELDING ANALYSIS (30 cm (12 in) Thicknessem of Steel) 76, 189, 379 L (20, 50, 100 gals) @ 230 MBq/mL (5210 pC1/mL) ur cs SUPERNATANT SOURCE Roof pSv/h pSv/h pSv/h* cm (in) li_.L 1.61_k 379 L 30 (12) 2.400E-02 52.980E-02 1.180E 01 SOURCE CEOMETRY: (1.5 m [5 ft) X 1.8 m (6 ft) X 1.5 m (5 ft])
- 1 pSv/h - 0.1 mrem /h O
SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-25
i WVNS-SAR-004 / 7- Rev. 7
)
L.) MAXIMUM NORMAL OPERATIONS AIR RELEASES TABLE D.8.6-1 Nuclide V0G L'T FVS Effluent Effluent Bq (Ci) Bq (CL) H3 1.25E+12 (3.38E+01) 9.02E+10 (2.44E400) C 14 2.21E+12 (5.97E401) 1.59E+11 (4.30E+00) Fe 55 6.38E+02 (1.73E 08) 4.60E+00 (1.24E 10) _. Co 60 6.63E+04 (1.79E-06) 4.77E+02 (1.29E 08) Ni 63 4.59E+06 (1.24E 04) 3.31E+04 (8.93E-07) Sr-90 3.75E+06 (1.01E-04) 1.35E+05 (3.65E 06) Tc.99 8.52E+06 (2.30E 04) 6.13E+04 (1.66E 06) Ru 106 4.66E+03 (1.26E 07) 3.36E401 (9.08E 10) Sb 125 1.20E+06 (3.25E-05) 8.66E+03 (2.34E 07) Te-125m 2.70E+05 (7.30E 06) 1.94E+03 (5.26E 08) 1 129 3.39E+09 (9.16E 02) 2.44E+08 (6.59E 03) Cs-134 1.36E+04 (3.68E 07) 9.79E+04 (2.65E-06) Cs-137 2.72E+07 (7.36E 04) 1.96E+08 (5.30E 03) Pm 147 3.93E+05 (1.06E 05) 2.83E+03 (7.64E 08) ( ) Sm-151 7.61E403 (2.06E 07) 5.48E+01 (1.48E 09)
'\ / Eu 154 6.87E+04 (1.86E 06) 4.95E+02 (1.34E 08)
Eu 155 9.33E+03 (2.52E 07) 6.72E+01 (1.82E 09) U-233 3.19E+04 (8.63E 07) 2.30E+02 (6.21E 09) U 234 1.92E+04 (5.18E 07) 1.38E+02 (3.73E 09) U 235 4.17E+02 (1.13E 08) 3.01E+00 (8.12E 11) U-238 3.93E+03 (1.06E-07) 2.83E+01 (7.64E-10) Pu-238 1.03E+06 (2.79E-05) 5.94E+04 (1.61E 06) _ Pu 239 1.99E+05 (5.39E-06) 1.15E+04 (3.11E 07) fu 240 1.50E+05 (4.06E-06) 8.66E+03 (2.34E 07) Pu-241 9.80E+06 (2.65E 04) 5.64E+05 (1.53E 05) Am 241 1.72E405 (4.64E 06) 1.24E+03 (3.34E-08) Am 243 1.23E+04 (3.32E 07) 8.84E+01 (2.39E 09) Cm 244 4.91E+04 (1.33E-06) 3.54E+02 (9.56E 09) (% k,,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 8-26
WVNS-SAR-004 fx Rev. 7 ( )
'wl D.9.0 ACCIDENT SAFETY ANALYSIS D.9.1 ABNORMAL OPERATIONS Abnormal events are events that could occur from the malfunctioning of systems, operating conditions or operator error. Abnormal events are only of potential consequence for those systems in the STS and SKWS which process, control or confine radioactivity.
Some possible abnormal events are not discussed either because they do not pose a radiological or industrial hazard or because the effecta are similar to or less than the abnormal events described below. In the hazardous materials spills evaluated in VVDP-096, " Safety Assessment of WVDP Hazardous Substances," a major spill sufficient to escape off site is tiot considered credible. Recognizing that major or even minor cpills could result () in hazards to WVDP personnel, the public, and the environment, the VVDP has implemented an Oil, Hazardous Substences, and Hazardous Wastes Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasures Plan (WVDP-043, November 1989). This operating plan reviews in detail release flow paths, sources, system design, and the containment of possible spills or releases as well as prevention, preparedness, response, and notification procedures, Specifically, the plan conforms to the requirements of 40 CFR Part 112 and Part 151 (proposed), both
-dealing with facilities having a potential for hazardous substances releases.
D.9.1.1 LEAK IN STS COOLER / CHILLER SYSTEM The sludge wash solution must be cooled to optimize the ion exchange process. This is accomplished by passing the sludge wash solution through a heat exchanger (supernatant cooler) within Tank 8D-1. The cooling fluid is a salt solution supplied from the STS chiller located in the STS support building. l The salt solution is cooled in the chiller.via an organic refrigerant loop. p)
\_- SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 1 I
l t_ ,
. _ _ - ._-_ - - _ --.=_. . - .
WVNS-SAR-004
~'N Rev. 7 (d Structural failure of the cooler heat exchanger could result in sludge wash solution coming into contact with the salt solution in the chiller / cooler loop. This failure could bring sludge wash solution into the STS support building, contaminate the chiller, and possibly result in increased exposure to workers if undetected.
This event is considered highly unlikely since two independent faj?ures would be required. The structural barrier provided by the heat exchanger between the sludge wash solution and salt solution must be breached, and the pressure gradient maintained between these two fluids, which would normally force salt solution into the sludge wash solution (rather than vice versa), must become reversed. Should sludge wash solution enter the chiller, the local area radiation mor.itor in the vicinity of the chiller would initiate an alarm, indicating the presence of abnormal levels of radioactivity. The cooler and chiller could be isolated, repaired, decontaminated, or replaced with minimum radiological effect on operating personnel. Radiological controls would be in accordance with the Radiological Controls Manual (WVDP 010). D.9.1.2 REPLACE FAULTY (LEAKING) BLOCK CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY (EXAMPLE OF CONTACT
~
MAINTENANCE IN VALVE AISLE) The STS has been designad for remote operation and maintenance. Highly auto-mated and instrumented control systems have been incorporated into the STS design (see Section D.4.3.3). The STS has been designed to accommodate remote removal and replacement of major processing components in radioactive service should an unexpected failure occur. l However, should a major leak develop in a block connector assembly (mates piping together in the valve aisle), it may be necessary for personnel to enter the valve aisle for repair / replacement of the failed assembly. This s,,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-2 l l
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 w, event is considered unlikely due to the extensive cold testing, checkout and j nondestructive examination procedures that were performed before STS hot operations to ensure proper construction and installation of this and similar STS hardware. Furthermore, if a leak should develop, it could probably be stopped by installing a different type of gasket or valve sealant using remote manipulators without entering the valve aisle. Should this event occur, the leak would be quickly detected by visual. inspection (from the operating ares in front of the valve aisle) and/or by instrumented alarms in the control room identifying fluid collection in the valve aisle sump. The STS process would be shut down and the valve aisle piping / valves drained of fluids (returned to Tanks 8D-1 or 8D 2). Every component in 8D-1 can be workeo around in some way via the valve aisle at the expense of operating efficiency but not at the expense of decontamination factor. Soae cutting, velding, and replacement activities could be Jone remotely. , Calculations indicate that it would require two persons working 40 hours in an area of 26 nC/kg h (0.1 mR/h) to remotely replace a faulty block connector assembly. This remote work would be performed under background radiation levels (less than those analyzed) because of the remote manipulators avullable in the valve aisle. This would re:sult in a collective dose of 80 person-nSv (8 person mrem). The off site radiological consequences of a major sludge wash solution spill in t's valve aisle are discussed in Section D.9.2.
-D.9.1.3 STICKING (" RANG-UP") 0F A SLUDGE VASH SOLUTION ANALYTICAL SAMPLE IN THE PNEUMATIC TRANSFER SYSTEM Samples of sludge wash solution and other process solutions of 50 mL (1.7 oz)
-at 61 CBq/L (1.6 Ci/L) are required for analysis of .ystem function. These A
.SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 3
- -- - .-_ -_.. - -- - -.- - ---- ..~ . ._. - -.-
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 samples Are remotely extracted from sampling ports in the valve aisle and sent via an automated pneumatic transfer system to the analytical chemistry cell of the main process plant. The liquid sample is transported in a plastic vial contained within a transfer " tube type" case known as a " rabbit." A total volume of about 50 mL (1.7 oz) of supernatant is required for each analysis. Transfers may be 15 mL (0.5 oz) in volume, in which case three-separate samples must be sent, or a single 50 mL (1.7 oz) sample may be sent in an identical rabbit. Spacers or shims are placed inside the 50 mL (1.7 oz) rabbit in order to accommodate the smaller 15 mL (0.5 oz) sample vials. Loss of the system driving force (vacuum) during transfer or a misalignment of the transfer system tubing could result in the sample stopping somewhere between its origin (STS) and destination (analytical chemistry cell). Portions of the pneumatic transfer system piping run through potentially occupied areas of the main process plant. O Sample transfe; requires coordination / communication between the sender (STS
-Operator) and the receiver (Analytical Chemistry Technician). The receiver must electronically initiate the transfer. Photocells located throug,hout the transfer system tubing follow the movement of the sample through the system.
Should a stoppage occur, it would be quickly detected by t..e receiver (no sample receipt despite a "sent". signal from the STS). The Eeneral location of the stuck sample can be identified by the photocell data and pinpointed by " radiation survey of the transfer system tubing. The exposure rate from a 15 mL.(0.5 oz) sludge wash solution sample through the stainless steel transfer system tubing is estimated to be approximately 1.3 pC/kg-h-(5 mR/h) at 1 m (3.3 ft), and is 3.9 pC/kg h (15 mR/h) at 1 m (3.3 ft) from a 50 mL (1.7 oz)
. sample.
SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-4
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1 l WNs-s AR-004 Rev. 7 Revertal of the system airflow is expected to dislodge the sample and return it tc its origin (STS). However, if this does not free the sample the coction of pipe in which the sample is stuck can be located (up to 3.9 pC/kg-h
'15 mR/h) at 1 m [3.3 ft]), isolated, and removed, if necessary, to recover the sample. The system also has audible alarms that will sound if a sample becomes stuck.
The relatively staa11 sample size (low exposure rate) in combination with limited access to the affected area where the sample is stuck will minimire exposure to any personnel in the vicinity. Shielding of the affected pipe scetion during removal / repair and strict adherence to WNS policies and procedures vill control the exposure of workers involved in the actual cutting of piping (if necessary) and the removal of the sample. It is estimated that it would require two persons working eight hours in an area of 3.9 pC/kg h (15 mR/h) at 1 m (3.3 f t) from 50 trL (1.7oz) sample to O remove a sample stuck in the pneumatic transfer system, This would result in a collective dose of 2.4 person mSv (240 person mrem). D.9.1.4 CESIUM BREAXTHROUGH TO TANK SD-3 (POTENTIAL BREAK 1HROUGH OF HLW TO THE LWTS) As the zeolite in the STS lon exchange system becomes fu2y loaded, extraction efficiency is reduced. Reduced extraction efficiency con also occur due to mechanical effects such as channsling (liquid forming flow channels in the ion exchange media, resulting in shorter residence time in the bed and rec'uced contact with the ion exchange surface area). Channeling can result from cesium remaining in downstream ion exchange columns beating the zeolite between batch processing. Reduced ion exchange efficiency due to either loading or mechanical effects may result in the decontaminated sludge wash solution stream containing higher cesium concentrations. This SAR:0000863.Pfi Pat .s
WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 l fi { condition is known as " breakthrough." Failure of STS analytical support nystems (see Section D.6.7) could result in high concentrations passing j through the ion exchange system and into the decontaminated sludge wash solution collection tank (8D 3). (From Tank 8D 3, the normally decontaminated solution is transferred in batches to the LtTrs.) The breakthrough condition would normally be quickly identified by analytical samples routinely extracted from the process and by on line radiation monitors located between the ion exchange system and Tank 8D 3, and between Tank 8D 3 and Tank 35104 (LVTS collection). However, sudden postfilter failure or ion exchange column failure, on line monitor failure and/or analytical sample error could result in unusually high (>185 mBq/mL [5 pC1/mL]) concentrations of cesium passing into Tank 8D 3 and being transferred to the LVTS. This unlikely event would require the failure of a column or postfilter and the failure cf at least two on line monitors to detect the cesium levels as well as an analytical error. . O All transfers to the LWTS are "onitored and sampled when received, no significant personnel exposure would be expected from this ab'.ormal event. However, the transfer of off specification, os.contaminateu sludge wash solution into Tank CD 3 and/or subsequent transfer to the LWTS would require transfer back to the STS for rework of these solutions and potential process dioraption of ti.e STS And LWTS. Additionally, the receiving vnssels (Tanks 8D-3 and 35104) might require flushing and decontaminating to minimize the contamination of future transfers of decontaminated sludge wash solution and/or other LLW solutions. This event, i.e. , cosium breakthrough, is a variation of an anticipated operating event; systems are in place to recycle j the liquid. t Because the IRTS is a remotely handled system, this abnormal event would
~
require flushing and decontaminatin6 of LLW solution and would result in a negligible collective dose. SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-6 l
I WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 T D.9.1.5 FAILURE OF TANK 8D-2 SUPERNATANT TRANSFER FUMP The removal of sludge wash solution from Tank 8D 2 is accomplished by means of floating suction pump. Damage to the pump could result in total pump failure or the transfer of undesirable quantities of sludge particles to the STS in Tarik 8D 1. Under either of these circumstances, the pump may need to be replaced. High solids, loss of fluid flow, or abnormal pressure indications in the STS control room would quickly alert operators to the problem. Depending on the nature of the pump failure, adjustment of this flow rate (e.g. , reduced flow rate and/or no recycle) could fix a pump performance problem. Depending on the specifics of the failure, it could be more desirable to remove the pump assembly and replace it. This would be done remotely and, therefore, no significant radiation exposure to personnel would be expected [ from the extraction and replacement of the failed pump from Tank 8D 2. (Radiological effects on workers involved in remote installation of equipment into Tank 8D-2 is discussed in Brown, 1936). Con. col and minimization of worker dose from the contaminated pump would be accomplished in accordance with the waste management requirements of the VVNS Radiological Controls Manual. A hatch on the supernatant pump pit un the Tank 8D 2 vault would need to be opened to provide access to the failed pamp and to insert the replacement pump. During the period of time this hatch is open (several hours), increased ventilation would be necessary to maintain airflow into the open hatch and tank. The ventilation would be stallar to that which was in place for the original installation of Pump 50 G-001, a proven method with which WVDP personnel have experience. The additional off site radiological impact (dose). above that projected in Section D.8.6 for normal operations of the STS and SMUS would be small. . SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-7
l 1 wvNs-sht-004 nav, 1 ('~') V It is estimated that five persons votking 40 nours in an area of 645 nC/kg b (2.5 mR/h) would be needed to repair or replace the Tank BD 2 supernatant transfer pump. The analyzed exposure rate assmues adequate decontamination of the supernatant transfer pump and the installation of nobile shielding prior to pump removal from Tank 8D-2. This results in a collective dose of 5 person mSv (500 person mrem). D.9.1.6 FAILURE OF A MAJOR STS FROCESSING COMPONENT IN TANK BD 1 (EXAMPLE: ION EXCHANGE COLUMN) Circumstances similar to those noted above (detection, corrective action) and potential conseq..ences of the failure of any major piece of STS processing equipment in radioactive service within Tank BD 1 would be expected. For illustrative purposes, the failure of an ion exchange column resulting in the need to replace the component, is described in this section. Deviations from normal operating conditions are quickly detected by normal (^^) process instrumentation and alarms in the STS control room. For purposes of the ion exchange column example, the most likely failures include: 1) malfunctioning of the mechanical arm or bottom column plug, which could result in a sludge wash water leak into the bottom of Tank BD 1 (solution un top of the loaded zeolite would require rework) or inability to damp (remove) spent zeolite; 2) failure of the Johnson screens, which could result in zeolite contaminating the decentaminated sludge wash solution outflow (Section D.9.1.3); 3) Failure of the sparge line, resulting in a sludge wash water leak into Tank 8D-1. In all cases, the column would be inoperable. However, it would not necessarily need to be replaced. During component removal and replacement (in Tank 8D 1), additional ventilation beyond that which could be provided by the WTINS would be required to maintain airflow from the pipeway through the temporarily open riser and into the tank. This additional ventilation would be provided by the STS PVS (3 SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-8
\ ,)
WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 'l under similar circumstances as described in Section D.9.1.5. .he shot: term increase in vaste tank farui affluent releases through the STs PVS during the few hours required will not be significant relative to off site radiological impacts for normal STS operations (see Section D.8.6). The major impact anticipated, should such an event occur, would be STS down time until the component has been replaced (one to two weeks). It is estimated five persons working 40 hours in an area of 645 nC/kg h (2.5 mR/h) would be required to correct this abnormal event. The exposure rate analyzed assumes use of the mechanical arm installeo in Tank BD 1 to perform the necessary repairs, which is in keeping with the experience gained during installation of the bottom dump valves on the ion exchange columns. The dose rate in the area of the mechanical arm is less than 26 pC/kg h (100 mR/h). This results in a collective dose of S person-mSv (500 person mrem). D.9.1.7 MOBILIZATION PUMP FAli.URE O The replacement of major processing components in radioactive service should an unexpected failure (i.e., a mechanical seal failure) occur will be accomplished by semi remote means. Any failure severe enough to require replacement of a mobilization pump is considered unlikely because of t' . extensive testing, check out, and nondestructive examination procedures that will be performed before installation. Also, replacement of a failed mobilization pump may not be necessary as spares'could be inst 11ed in a spare riser with the failed pump
. remaining in place; it also may be possible to continue sludge washing with the remaining pumps.
During component removal and replacement in Tank 8D 2 additional ventilation would be required to maintain airflow through the. temporarily open riser. The additional ventilation would be provided by the PVS. The short term increase SAR:0000863.FJi Page 9-9
_ -- . _- . _~ - - .- . .-- - = = - - .- - . - - - - - . WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 l
, in VTF effluent releases throagh the PVS will not be significant to off site doses.
The major effect anticipated should such an event occur would be SMWS down. time until the component could be replaced or repaired. I i It is estimated that five persons working 40 hours in an area of 645 nC/kg h 1 l (2.5 mR/h) would be needid ta repair or replace a mobilization pump. The analyzed exposure rate assumes adequate decontamination of the sludge mobilization pump and the insta11stion of mobile shielding prior to pump removal from Tank BD 2. This would result in a collective dose of 5 person. mSv (500 person mrem). D.9.1.8 SPARGE LINE Compressed air from the STS utility system is used to supply air to the sparge line. The normal air pressure in the STS utility system of 790 kPa (100 psig) is less than the ion exchange column design pressure of 1.8 MPa (250 psig) and is also less than the 1.1 MPa (150 psig) design pressure of the STS process piping. Therefore, there is no potential for over pressurization of the ion eFahange column. Ruptu.e/depressurization of the sparge line during zeolite discharge would not cause a significant problem because discharge through the "J" nozzle valve would continue and backflow through the sparge line would be unlikely. Rupture /depressurization of the sparge line below the installed check valves and air operated stop valve during routine on line supernatant processing ' would result'in backflow of sludge wash solution through the sparge line. However, as the rupture /depressurization would have to be below the check valves to permit backflow, the backflow would be within the confines of Tank 8D-1 end its riser anc below-the level of the concrete tank vault roof, SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 10
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 (} Therefore, no release to the envitonment would occur. No increase in external radiation exposure would be experienced. Backup of activity through the spar $e line to the final isolation valve l located outside of the riser penetration is not credible because it would , require failure of the air operated stop valve and the two ball. check valves. This event would also require a loss of system back pressure accompanied by either improper operator response to the low pressure alarm or failure of the back pressure alarm. /.nalysis of the safety impact of back leakage indicates that the sparge line can contain 1,600 mL ($1 oz) of-sludge wash solution in the 3 m (10 ft) of line from the concrete vault roof up to the operating station. Movement of zeolite into this section of the sparge line would be minimized by an orifice or screc' in the fitting. The sludge wash solution was conservatively assumed to contain 122 GBq/L (3.3 ci/L) cf Isr cs (only the 0.662 MeV gamma from the 187 Cs daughter 287*Ba is of consequence). This would result in a line source containing $9 GBq (1.6 C1) 287Cs (187'Ba) per 91 cm () (3 ft) of length. Due to the shielding from the concrete vault roof, only the material in the 1.5 m ($ ft) of piping up to grade level and the 1.5 m (5 ft) of line from grade level to the operating station adds significantly to the resulting dose at the operating station. The calculated exposure rate would be 194 pC/kg h (750 mR/h) in the general area (1 m [3.3 ft) from the line). While this would be a significant exposure rate, recovery from an accident of , this magnitude would not represent shielding or engineering challenges beyond those experienced during previous site decontamination operations. No credible accident can be identified that could result in a release of
-radicactive material outside of the STS system to the environment. Release of radioactive material would require the piping outside of_the riser to be ruptured while a simultaneous not credible accident occurred, resulting in backflow'of activity'beyond the air operated stop valve and two check valves to the point of-rupture.
l-1 SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-11 I l
. . ~ _ . _ _ _ _. _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ ..._ _ _ _ _ __
I wvns-SAR-004 c Rev. 7 ( L The ion exchange column zeolite heel that remains after the sparge line is used, does not pose a safety concern. The zeolite remaining is below the discharge point for the ion exchange column. Therefore, retention of j radionuclides is minimal. In addition, the thinness of the heel (approximately 15 cm [ 6 in) height and 23 cm [9 in] radius) makes the heel critically safe. Residual radioactive contamination of the heel is not expected to result in any safety impact to the STS. 69Il292,7TNADyf.RTENT'; ACID lA')DITION yidlapifn))f Taxi's tinf prob sdars s7ssaJbbntr61.si(OSREI.RTS .1Es ould;; bijhis tulic ed
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bydroxidelconesnr% sion"6f.0.032:M"(comparabicito"the' current condition 71n;the 1 tank)y l l l N6Trostihe~ soUtceTis"available1to supply Tank 7D 2 with ~ concentrated ~AclE If[hoVs9eglthe' working; volume ;of[ Tank ~7D 2 l(aboutE 20,000'11ters);was at ;pH 3
~(Smithp1992)Tandfrorwarded 'to(TankT8Dl-l2;f the fhydroxide? content'of ' ths , s10dge EsshlsordtioW7w'6hid'bi~afreeted'b)fless han10J2C t " Anyfchangefinlura61um and J p16tiohiusllevelR inTthefw a sh~'s slu t ion 'w6didl b e ?ne gli gibis; The[6thirZentry;pointf f or'fchemicals wodid l be ;during "tho ' nextl9ycle' off sludge yajhlhg[Alth6Ubh]ths' thhker;tr6ck;with;20 fvtt;' caustic soldtf oiFL's iridepehasnrif.issmpisdisnd 'vsrif thd byl both"thejvendor .'and: the WNSL laborat6ry (Pet';]approvediproc_edure)Citilslassumed' for;thisl example that a' 20lst! nitric ppid solut!1oniislinadvertent y;added".at' l thRstart;,of fthe .next' ' sludge vash 5EclCI.t[islthefAVsGsed' thatlwateFf additi6nsf are performed 1 as31anned; ~ and tha tin 6Tsaripl es T6 f;the ~t ankisre itake a bi f o re Tpro c e a a ing" s o16ti ons " through"'STS ,
Bsssd jd3ydr6xid(Leonsuspti on shown (dd r ing ' the firs t sludge l va sh~ cycle 11n TaMDlEjhWR0pp]iters 'of ahl1dffd11oved' bfl17h1111on~11tersTof~ wash ^ vat 6r 96uldidf6[thKhjdr6xidifleVsij to!0:004;Ml1(theoretica11yfhearLpH 11'.6)l.( From kludgsMish"Expitimentsiis theliaboratoryfasdjthe; firs el sludge [ wash 1: cycle Tin TangD}2Ef tlis?istisated7th'atithis EhangeTis hydroxideTwosId W& shit"inlan pl@fM@Vs13fy1371Ci/sIf 6fyaih~so16ti66[(Mahanef[ ? 992)}.P T6tal f fi ss ile plut6niuis!idll ~sil116KL11teis;of ~s61GeloE;tWpsis"throughTST$ vodid'bs ab6ut 3303rsssZwhibhlis[ve11?belosltheTmaxisum?afe"sassidiscussed~in?Section Dj912;N; 1 l InllthsfYemainisE3yashTcyc1FsEthere ;iafless"thani18/ f g5o of ffissils; pistonium in?s616tibhgassumingll31MITof1s'olution"to be' processed).Tatithefalphsfpinto61um {phestiatiorP11mitiof10.JJCi/61((OSR 1RTS'12)~. ?Freshicadstic"solutib614111 pp[addjd?j{[th{ptyrCoffeash~ sludge jadf 69cle? %The?secidsntal?dddittoiiof s6idTwsdidllreidl.t'Ein'an?1Ecreakeibf(approxisatelyMISL g" fiis11F~ plutonium SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 13 I
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@pntign6[M%tiss~regliidd? in10SR11RTS {122 D.9.0 ACCIDENTS D.9.2.1 ACCIDENTS ANALYZED Five hypothetical, bounding accidents were analyzed in detail for the STS and SWS and are discussed in the following sections:
These accidents are:
- 1. Collapse of the Tank 8D 2 roof.
- 2. Rupture of the transfer pipeline between Tank 8D 2 and Tank 8D 1; sludge wash solution spill.
(~ 3. Spill of sludge wash solution within the valve aisle.
- 4. Inability to remove loaded zeolite from an ion exchange column.
- 5. HEPA filter fire.
Accidents 1 and 2 assume a severe external event has caused major structural damage. Such an event would require at least six times the design basis natural phenomena postulated for the WDP and the resistance of SMVS confinement barriers to the associated loads. Nevertheless, these scenarios are presented to illustrate boundary case ant.Jyses. Conservatism (including a safety factor of 2 on exnacted sludge wash inventories) was incorporated into all five accident analyses to provide a consequence envelope for the SMVS. Radiological consequences were analyzed for-airborne pathways only. The accidental release of HLW in liquid fotu from STS/SMWS facilities to the environment has been determined to be unlikely ( V) SAP.3000863.RM Page 9 15
WNs-sAR-004 Rev. 7 either as a result of internes 11y induced / man caused events or as a result of
. design basis natural phenomena (earthquake, tornado) events (Section D.9.3).
WNS has evaluated the generation and accumulation of hydrogen in the HLW Tank 8D 2 and concluded that it is highly improbable that hydrogen gas could accumulate to its lower flammability limit of 4.65 volume percent. The hydrogen generation rate for Tank 8D 2 under low salt conditions has been calculated to be 0.06 L/s (Prowse, 1991a). Tank 8D-1, though similar, generates much less hydrogen. At this rate of generation, Tank 8D 2 would require, under equilibrium conditions, an air ventilation flow rate of only 1.5 L/s (3 scfm) to maintain the hydrogen concentration below the 4.0 volume percent limit. If the nominal flow rate of 50 L/s (100 scfm) were completely stopped the time required to achieve this lower flammability limit would be l fourteen days. 3 The induced fan blower servicing these tanks is part of the WNS plant crJtical systems and as such not only has an alarm in the control room for an immediate response to failure,-but power to this unit is also supplied by an , emergency electric generator system. All of this equipment is operated under OSR-CP 3 (ventilation) and OSR GP 5 (emergency power), which document the requirements to ensure the fan blower's continued high availability. Even if the ventilation system failed to operate, or was damaged by a common mode failure, there would be no immediate concern of a hydrogen explosion. Within a short time, much less than fourteen days, a portable ventilation fan with , its own electric generator would be installed to provide w to 470 L/s (1,000 scfm) of tank ventilation. In summary, because of the proven reliability of the installed ventilation system with its back-up provisions, and as a result of the time available for the substitution of an alternative system, a hydrogen explosion in the HLW Tanks has not been evaluated. SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-16
WVIIS-SAR-004 l Rev. 7 The concentration of hydrogen in the off gas from the HLW tr,nks is continwusly monitored. The amount of hydrogen present in the off gas has always been very itw (i.e., less than detection limits 0.1 volume percent). The lower flammability limit for hydrogen in air is 4.65 volume percent. Through continuous sweeping (ventilation) of the tank vapor space and continuous monitoring, WVNS ensures hydrogen levels much less than 1 volume pe rc e'it (Ploetz, 1990). D.9.2.2 SOURCE TERMS l The source terms (quantity and distribut. ion of radionuclide species released to the environment) used in the accident analysis depend on many factors, including the quantity and type of radioactiva material available, ventilation i conditions, and the performance of engineered and administrative barriers. Tables D.9.2 1 through D.9.2 5 summarize the nature of the radioactive material and the nuclide distribution used in the analysis for each hypothetical accident scenario. . All major radionuclides (those contributing
>0.1% of the total CEDE) were used in the dose calculatis is . In the collapse of the Tank 8D 2 roof (Accident 1) and the sludge wash solution spills (Accidents 2 and 3), the radioactive material source has not been decontuninated by STS. The loaded zeolite itself is the source of radioactive material in the accident involving the ion exchange system (Accident 4).
Radioactive particulate trapped in the filter medium is the radioactive material source for the HEPA filter fire (Accide at 5). All five of these hypothetical, bounding accidents result in the off-site release of radioactivity. The released material would probably be in the form of an aerosol or particulate. A two-hour release is assumed as the basis for calculating maximum site boundary doses following accidents because it will be possible to control the SAR:0000863.RM Fage 9 17
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev, source and/or remove any potentially exposed individuals within that time. In addition, this duration provides conservatism in selecting a value for the relative dispersion (x/Q) of airborne releases. These values are calculated using measured noteorological parameters as input to the PAVAN (PAVAN, 1982) computer code. The maximum y/Q value that would be exceeded only 40 h per year for a release of 0 2 h duration-occurs at the boundary 2.4 km from the plant in the northern sector. For a release of duration of two to eight hours, PAVAN predicts a relative dispersion lower by a factor of two. Therefore, the estimated fence +1%ne dase for a four hour release would be the same as for a two hour release at the same rate because of the greater average dispersion during the longer time interval. At the location of the nearest residence (1.4 km in the NW sector), the two-hour dispersion factor is less than the maximum fence-line value by a factor of six. In the sector in which the maximum zero to two hour dispersion factors occur, only one residence is within 2 km, four homes are within 3 km, and a total of. eleven are inside 5 km. The total population in all atxteen sectors within the 5 km radius is estimated to be 1,243 perr ns. The actual site boundary is easily accessible for surveillance-or, for most of its , length, passes through rough, inaccessible terrain where a person would be extremely unlikely to be loitering. Of the five accidents described as bounding scenarios (see Tables D.9.2-1 through D,').2-5), numbers 1 and 2 are not credible and were described in order to emphasize the inherent safety of the operations. Accider.t 1 (collapse of tiie HLW tank roof) would require an earthquakt. six times the design basis c,f 0.1 g. 'Even this noncredible accident would result in a two hour dose of less I than 8 mSv (800 mrom) CEDE at the nearest residence. The dose from all other accidents would be significantly less. Accident 2 (rupture of the pipeline
.between 8D 2 and BD-1) also requires extremely improbable events, including L greater-than design basis natural phenomenon and blockage of natural downhill L
drainage back to 8D 2, Accident 3 (valve aisle leak) could conceivably result SAR:0000863.PE Page 9-18
WV!1S-SAR-004 Rev. 7 in a release of longer than two hours duration; aowevir, it would result in a much lower dose than Accidents 1 or 2 and be subject to effective operator intervention to reduce the scope of radioactivity with.a two hours. Accident 4 (ion exchange column overpressurization) is considered to be highly unlikely and would result in much lower doses t' nan Accidents 1 and 2. The duration of release is much shorter than two hours for this accident. The dose from accident 5 (HEPA _' ire) would be less than 5 pSv (0.5 mrem) regardless of the duration of the release. Because of the relatively small doses predicted from credible accidents, there is no-recognized emergency protection zone (EPZ) nor has an off site evacuation plan been developed. For the accidents involving evaporation of solutions (Accidents 1 3), airborne affluents are estimated by assuming a .elease partition coefficient (PC)
.(ratio of concentration in liquid to that in vapor phase) of 1,000 for nonvolatile compounds (ANSI,'1981). Radiochemical analyses of condensate overheads indicates a PC of 50,000. In the accident involving the overpressurization of an ion exchange column of zeolite (Accident 4) and the HEPA filter fire (Accident 5) the radioactivity is released directly into the WTFVS. No credit is taken for plateout within systems.
For the tank- roof collapse accident (Accident 1), it is assumed that the , occurrence of a severe earthquake greater than six times the design basis (0.1 g) causes the roofs of the tank and vault to collapse, exposing the entire surface area of the radioactive material contents to the atmosphere. This results in a high svaporation rate of radioactive material from the tank (4,000 L/h [18 gpm). -The evaporation rate was calculated by assuming that the su'; face of the liquid was at 90'C (194*F), level with grade, and the entire surface area of the tank was exposed to a 5 m/s wind at zero percent absolute humidity. These exceptional assumptions exceed the consequences of any splashing and subsequent physical material spread to the environment that may occur during the collapse of the roc!s. The evaporated sludge wash solution SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-19
l WVNS-SAR-004
,, Rev. 7 / )
NI is assumed to be released directly to the environment without passing through any HEPA filters.
\ ' For the spill of sludge wash solution from the pipeline betweeti Tank 80 2 and Tank 8D-1 valve eisle (Accident 2), it is assumed that a severe natural phenomenon ruptures the pipeline (double walled pipes) releasing the liquid into the conduit systea. It is further assumed that the PVS experiences mechanical or structural N age. Evaporation of sludge wash solution occurs directly to the atmosphere i v. che dama6eo conduit sysco without filtration.
The engineered slope of the pipeline and trench will drain the spilled h material back into Tank 8D 2. (This has been ignored for a m ni,arv:tive analyses.) (
\
For Accident 3 (spill of sludge wash solution within =he valve aisle) it is assumed that a complete valve failure occurs that covers the floor vi the valve aisle with sludge wash water. (Although spilled fluids would be
/ returned to Tank 8D 2 via the valve aisle sump / pump system, th'is !.se been '
*] ignored during the two-hour release period.) The PVS will pass air exhausted from the valve aisle through c condensor aui two HEPA filter banks prior to release to the environment. A W of 100,000 is assumed for this arrangement (ANS1, 1981). For Accident 4 it is assumed that the inadvertent addition of concentrated caustic solution, which may need to be used ii small amounts for hydroxide molarity control, (sbe Sect. ion D.6.4) or precipitation of aluminum due to a pH drop across a column causes the physical characteristics of the zeolito to change to a " mud.* This makes it impossible to remove the zeolite from the column as the zeolite mud plugs the column outlets. (Note: Other scenarios can be postulated, including failure of the dump valves with similar results, i.e., zeolite cannot be removed from the ion exchange column.) The plugged outlets also make it impossible to maintain a flow of fluid through the column to cool the zeolite. It is assumed that the zeolite has been loaded with cesium beyond normal ion exchange capacity of the zeolite bed (assumed column inventory of approximately 15 PBq [400,000 Ci] m Ct.) at the o
SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-20
WVJs-SAR-004 [T x.J Rev. 7 time of this accident. Under these conditions, it is estimated that the decay. heat could u?timately overpressurize the column resulting in a release of approximately 1% of the zeolite. (Nate: The time period required for decay heat to raise the column temperature to 100'C [212*F] is estimated to be
>75 h). Credit for the PVS has been taken as described for Accident 3.
The fifth accident considet .ne effects of a HEfA filter fire 11: the WTFVS. It is assumed that the HEPA I'ilters will be changed out when the radioactive material loading results in an exposure of 2.6 mC/kg h (10 R/h) at 35 cm (1 ft). Analysis shows that 37 CBq (1 Ci) of 137Cs uniformly distributed on a HEPA filter vill result in ar exposure rate of 361 pC/kg-h (1.4 R/h) at 350 cm (1 ft) from the filter face (Peterson, 1985). -Thus, the filter is conservatively assumed te contain 280 CBq (7.5 Ci) of 137Cs before changeout and this is the condition assumed at the-time of the fire, Activity of other nuclides'en the filter is assumed to be distributed according to the radionuclide distribation presented in rable D.9.2 5, HEPA filters ara made of fire recintant material that chars rather than burns, and it has been conservatively calculated that 1% (ANSI, 1981) of the radionuclides on the loaded filter uould be released. The total radioactivity loaded on the STS PVS filters is expected to be less than the WTFVS tilters since the latter will contatti filtration from Tank 8D-2 exhaust, (Radioactive material teleased through the STS PVS is expected to be small under normal operating conditions. See Section D.B.6.3). The HEPA filter fire dercribed above is, therefore, considered a bounding case for HEPA filter loading relevant to SMVS accident analysis. D.9.2.3 RADIATION DOSES-4 Assumptions for calculating radiation doses to workers and the public are presented in VVDP-065, " Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley _ Demonstration Project Activities." In brief, the maximally exposed individual during an accic>snt is assumed to be at the point on the perimeter where the SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-21
l 4 i l WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. */ largest airborno concentration of radioactivity would occur. The radioactivity concentration is based on the maximum sector y/Q. The external and internal dose conversior factors are taken from DGE/EH-0070, " External Dose Rate Conversion Factors for Calculation of-Dose to the Public," and DOE /EH-0071, " Internal Dose Conversion for Calculation of Dose to the Public.." These dose factors are consistent with DOE Order 5480.11. Unit dcse conversion factors are from a unit release (e.g., Sv/bq { rem /Ci]) of each isotope, as discussed in WDP 065, and are used to calculate the total co; Nctive dose equivalent (CEDE). The total CEDE from a release is deterun. waing the component doses received from each isotope in the 4rce e dose conve:rsion factors are in accordance with DOE O D.. ADIATION DOSES TO THE PUBLIC Using the source terms indicated in Section D.9,2.2, the projected dose to the maximally exposed off site-individual is presented in this section for each of the five SMUS hypothetical accident scenarios previously described. The meteorological dispersion and dose calculation methodology used is described in detail.in " Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project ' Activities" (WDP 065,1990) . For the HEPA filter fire (Accident 5), unit dose conversion factors for a stack release were used because it was postulated that these releases to the environment would occur through the main process plant ventilation stack. For all other accident scenarios, a ground level release (s10 m) was assumed to estimate weteorological dispersion. Only those nuclides contributing greater than 0.1% of the dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual were included in the dose assessment. This was determined by multiplying the individual nuclide source term
. /' ' Page 9-22 7
SAR:0000863.P3
wvns-SAR-004
/ h Rev. 7 IV~ (Bq [Ci]) by the appropriate dose conversion factor (WVDP-065, 1990 Sv/Bq
[ rem /Ci] rel ased) to determine the. dose contribution for the indisidual radionuclide. Tables 9.2-1 through 9.2-5 present dose estimates for the significant radionuclides released for all accidents. The worst case hypothetical accident is calculated to result in a CEDE of 8 mSv (800 mrem). D.9.2.3.2 RADIATION DOSES TO VORKERS Postulated SMVS Accidents 1 and 2 involve releases directly to the environment and are considered to be the worst case scenarios for Tanks 6D-1 and 8D 2 re spec *.ively. In no accident scenario is it considered credible that fundamental structural barriers are breached. .There would be no direct external exposure of workers to HLW in an uncontrolled situation. (Mitigative measures and response actions would be accomplished in accordance with VVDP 010, " Radiological
/n% Controls Manual" and therefore potential external exposure would be controlled V within WVNS limits.')- Accordingly, the postulated effect on on site personnel i from the SMWS accidents evaluated here is limited to inhalation (internal) exposures to the airborno release.
Tables D.9.2-1 through D.9.2-5 present the estimated CEDES to an on site individual who remains continuously at 100 meters from the point of release for two hours during the accident. Since for Accident 5 (HEPA filter _ fire) the releases ara elevated (main plant stack), the effluent plumes would not be l, expected to reach ground level within WVDP boundaries. Thus, no on site i radiological impacts are assigned to this event, i l ._ t D.9.2.4 NUCLEAL CRITICALITY l pgsfQ@$lyysMQ{jMtQfMjQMjjy[eyn1p{Qjfs]Ciljipfl.1M920$vfg -
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The criticality- safety evaluation for the - SWS operation was performed O considering the major vessels and components with significant usable volumes 3 U (e.g., Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2, ion exchange column, prefilter reservoir, postfilter). The safe concentrations or. total mass of plutonium were
' determined for each major component and/or vessel in the. SWS- process
-(vessels / components ali filled to capacity). The sludge wash solution was conservatively assumed' La be *Pu in water. Uranium'is not a criticality concern because of the- small fissile mass that will be resident in the columns
;during the' processing of-sludge wash solutions. Table D.9.2-6 presents the total-fissionable waterial' inventory of the sludge in Tank 8D-2, the soluble
' mass of the first wash solution, and maximum ion exchange column inventory at f
- cesium breakthrough for the first wash. To provide a conservative assessment, the effect'of other nonfissile isotopes and-neutron poison materials in the sludge wash solution and sludge vere ignored in the calculation.-
-. Suspension of the sludge in Tank 80 2 by the sludge mobilization pumps was specifically analyr.ed (Caldwell, 1990). The analysis indicates that under y
i . SAR:0000863.PJi Page 9-24 l~ i-i: t i
1 - L+ ! i WVHS-SAR-004 N Rev. 7 [d' . . _ .. .
. conditions of homogenous mixing, as is ~ expected during SMWS operations, an ,
inventory lof plutonium and uranium ten times that found in Tank 8D-2. is
; critically safe. :Therefore, Tank 8D 2 can be considered critically safe under >
- normal and expected Labnormal conditions. ,
fjf6p)Mjjig@yg36htr61{i{snhiiicid in Tank BD-1 by distributing the loaded ion exchange material'over the tank bottom.. This is assured'through the use of zeolite mobilization pumps installed in Tank 8D 1. Tests on zoolite distribution within Tank 8D 1 have'been performed using a one sixth scale model (Schiffhauer,'1987) and the results indicate that the zeolite pile is (effectively distributed by operating the: mobilization pumps. These pumps.will
-be operated during and/or following each discharge of zeolite from STS ion
. exchange' columns. This will provide adequate mixing and distribution of zeolite.
Ihy?Ref11j[Q1RiEtiinsiEIT1 lisfsMEs@'pfifill&fJIs;30$]EiCJ140J1iiE1EnjL. _ sysy1E@HEiEE6?Ri"d6TdIMtstgthifiE6(iQth3TiiipfissitBIy616mEMiniBIIs
' is#3hEGiE9EiM55#isiGB!ssEiMailitM6slibMIEat#1EaIV.tri#a
- REEMHM1?iThEi!!fl1MEEEEMiBWrip!EN!EGMMMBiD 1MNffiUMsKKFisse'etggainyrasagpligifggggggh4F; Testing'indicat'es that-the Ti. treating does remain intact on the base-zeolite.
Vet attrition tests have been performed on the Ti-treated zeolite with very little (less than 2%) .of the titanium being removed. Column testing of Ti-treated :t.eolite indicates that the column effluent is not measurably higher
- in' titanium than the influent. In aadition, further wet and dry attrition tests are) planned on pilot-scale and. production-scale Ti-treated zeolite to
/[
-demonstrate the stability oflthe treatment. Additional column testing will' include' analyse's for-titanium in both the feed solution and the effluent to e .
.' demonstrate material stability.
D {W SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-25 J'. l=,; +, -.. ,- . - -. . ..- . . - -.
l W NS-S AR-004 J Rev, 7 'O. - (. The allowable safe fissile material concentration for the entire SM'S process was established based on the vessel or component having the minimum critical concentration (i.e., the most restrictive vessel). It was determined that approximately 1.0 kg of 2nPu loaded onto Ti-treated zeolite within an ion exchange column in a sphere, radius 22.5 cm, would result in an effective multiplication factor (k,rt) + 20 - 0.95 (Caldwell, 1990 and Yuan, 1990). The ion exchange column is the most restrictive vessel. However, it should be noted that based on currently available Tank 8D 2 inventory data, nuclear criticality-during the entire SMWS operatiu under normal and abnormal operating conditions isMstTeisilibl((PiowseR1992). Ab6BEislis~feutiffsssaisEsdy).thlhucls dr}~6ritiEali tyfie fityjife[aisified] in sjeti#@IDRITIE4hdMj9?1'{10( The zeolite column of the STS will remain suberitical under normal or accident conditions if the mass of fissile Pu (2Pu + auPu) is limited to below 1.0 kg inside the column. A summary of the calculations that support this conclusion [' is given in Table D.9.2-7. This evaluation was made using the KENO V code and various cross section data sets compiled at the Argonne National Laboratory's 1EM mainframe computer systems (Yuan, 1990) and independently verified using TWODANT compiled at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Cray mainframe computer system (Caldwell, 1990). All differences between calculations 1 model and the actual configuration are conservative (i.e., result in an overestimate of korr). The dimensions and materials used for the KENO-V calculations are given in Table D.9.2-8. The heel remaining from ion exchange column sparging (see Section D 6.1.6.b) will remain critically safe during normal and accident conditions. The mass of Pu which could accumulate on the. heel is very small. The current heel is not Ti-treated zeolite. Additionally, calcula; ions indicate that a cylinder of 20 cm (8 in) height and radius of 23 cm (9 in) in the center of an ion exchange column uniformly loaded with 1.0 kg of Pu-239 is suberitical (Yuan, 7 Page 9-26 (._ SAR:0000863.RM-
g- , .._
, 7. .
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.t
':(-
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WVHS-SAR.-004 q TS Rev.L7<
'! .f ' -
" f 1991) .gQylisdKys'sTEnkTpis sujysussisMiEE6Et'Ifssit;ifeTsyhis EEEouTd]'E6fiby -
WifdIMEMOVD875EIURMEMiMMMIITh6*G19,90R p The!k.tr.for several configerations of plutonium loaded zeolite inside the
; column wasicalculated using'the KENO-V Monte Carlo Code. KENO.-V was used. ^'
bi ause ofeits universaliacceptance in nuclear criticality safety calculations. The cross section sses used for nuclides are also given in Table:D.9.2-8. -Most of the cross section date used are the Hansen-Roach
- 16-group cross 4section set.
~
In 'all cases calculated, thc. 23'Pu was assumed homogeneously distributed .in
'the' interior volume of the sphere'or cylinder.
' Kerr factors .were caleulated- for various sizes of 1.0 kg 23'Pu. loaded spheres 4 in.the center of the ion exchange column. A. 239Pu-loaded sphere in.the center:
" ref theLeolumn is:-the optimum geometry with the highest k.gr for a fixed amcunt:
- of j8'Pu ' retained. The results of these calculatians are tabulated in h : Tab 1ID.9.2-9. The k.tr is : plotted versus the radius of the sphere for each case ih Figure D.9.2 1. These results show'that'the highest k.gr occurs for a -
radius of about 22.5 cm.' To evaluate the limiting 23'Pu mass inside the - zeolite _ column,nadditional calculations were performed with the-same-geometric-configuration but varying the mass of 23'Pu in the sphere. Results of these
~ additional calculations'are tabulated in Table D 9.2-10 and plotted in Figure D'.9.2-2. It is concluded from this figure thatLthe limiting mass'of
'239Pu:inside:the zeolite column.is-about 1.0 kg if.keer + 2a is not to exceed 0.95.
The WDP La extensively reviewed DOE Order 5480.5, Chapter 11. " Nuclear (Criticality Safety Element s;"- ANSI 8.1-1983,j" Nuclear Criticality Safety in. Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors;" and ANSI 8.3-1986, L".Critica11ty Accident. Alarm System."' This review,-. coupled with criticality assessments and laboratory analysis of the1 soluble fissile mass in Tank 8D-2,
~
4
~
SAR:0000863.RM1 Page 9-27 9
- ;- , ,n,- ,., , , ,~,,
,q-WNS-S AR-004
- \.
Rev. *1
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demonstrates that criticality monitors for STS ion exchange columns and the spent zeolite in Tank 8D 1 are not required bsEauss3hy[ahndal[probhbt:11;ty3f NM35E36th$$iNEiISE.IE518.s;ns s ocihisdlyith[0SPJ1RTS}i2[(Pf 60sql992 Eahd
> E faE# N G aili6 K 6 O h E #ifa c tiI1Fis M in 10W D.9.2.5 POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE EXCURSIONS AND EXPLOSION The design operating conditions for the STS and SMWS process will produce well defined pressure and temperature loads that are adequately covered under normal industrial process codes. (See Section D.5.2.3 for a discussion of structural specifications, engineering codes, construction codes, and applicable standards.) Internal pressures and temperatures (piping, vessels, etc.) will be considerably less than those normally associated with nuclear power plants.
The. highest temperatures and pressures- expected within the STS. process under normal operating conditions.will be associated with the transfer of sludge . .)
% wash' solution between Tanks 8D 2 and 8D-1. Before cooling, the sludge wash solution and return lines (Streams #1.and #3 of Figur- D.5.1-3) will involve temperatures of 80'C (176*F) - 90'C (194'F) and operating pressures of 550 kPa
-(80 psi) - 690_kPa (100 psi). The double walled piping that will carry the sludge wash solution was been designed to 1.0 MPa (150 psi) and was pressure
~
tested at 1.6 MPa (225 psi). Tanks 8D-2 and 8D 1 were designed to be self-boiling tanks; however, they
.never contained enough vaste heat to boil. In mid-1980 a temperature profile through the 8D_2 sludge was'obtained through in-tank measurements. The temperature at the bottom layer of sludge was measured at approximately 98'C (209'F) while the liquid was at approximately 89'C (193*F). The only potential for system temperature excursions will Se associated with decay heat from the loaded zeolite (in ion exchange columns as discussed in Accident 4).
Temperatures inside Tank 8D 1 will be controlled via evaporative cooling and
/
(}/_ SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-28
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [ the tirFVS to maintain relatively low temperatures for these materials.
-Ptolonged operation-of the sludge mobilization pumps will cause Tank 8D 2
.. temperature-to rise until the rate at which evaporated water vapor carries away heat through the ventilation system balances the rate of energy input (Winger, 1991). The design heat removal capacity of the condensers is about
-five times the load that this operation will impose. The volumetric capability of the off-gas ductwork is similarly oversized. The conditions potentially leading to an accidental temperature excursion associated with loaded zeolite and projections of radiological impact are discussed in Section D 9.2.2.
Evaluations have been made regarding the potential for a hydrogen explosion resulting from radiolytic decomposition of the HLW in Tank 8D 2. Samples collected from Tank 8D-2 have not shown the presence of organic material and The gas samples collected from the tank have consistently been <1% hydrogen. evolution rate of hydrogen in the tank is small relative to the steam production rate, and accordingly the creation of an explosive mixture within the tank is not considered credible (Prowse. 1991a). However, hydrogen . concentrations within ventilation system off-gas lines are monitored during STS processing. D.9.3 IMPACT OF DESIGN BASIS NATURAL PHENOMENA EVENTS AND OTHER EXTREME LOADS l An investigation was performed to assess the structural vulnerability of STS confinement barriers unA r a variety of loads (external and internal, natural and manmade) under a variety of service environments (Dames & Moore, 1986). The scope of this investigation included:
- Identification of confinement barriers for preventing or limiting the release-of radioactive materials.
SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-29 1 I
N WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [Y L # Assessment of the performance of the con nnement barriers under loads. These loads include the design basis seismic and tornadic event, internal loads from accidental temperature or pressure excursions, manmade (construction) loads and normal operating loads.
- Assessment of the performance of the confinement barriers under loads in excess of the design basis events in order to estimate the inherent safety factors and limits against ultimate failure.
- Assessment of leak rates from the confinement barrier ander design basis loads.
.The STS confinement barriers have been previously defined in Section D.4.3.2 and Table D.4.3-1. Each confinement barrier of the STS has been designed to meet a building code or standard consistent with the construction materials used and the level of safety associated with this form of construction. These design codes and standards are presented in Tables D.5.2-2 and D.5.2-3.
[d]
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This section presents a summary of the Dames & Moore study regarding assessment of various loading conditions, with emphasis on extreme load conditions and the reserve capacity or safety factor egainst ultimate failure. D.9.3.1 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS The following design basis events have been used to assess the structural vulnerability of each of the primary barriers. Some of the design basis loads
- vere not used in the design of the facilities if not specifically required under the building codes or standards of construction (see Tables D.5.2-2 and i D.5.2 3), but were nevertheless analyzed for impacts to the primary barriers.
l Effects of earthquakes have *ueen a design consideration in all of the map. reinforced concrete structures. Effects of tornado winds and missiles were ' -\j(} SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-30
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not considered as a Jesign requirement, yet the consequences of these events have been determined through subsequent analysis. Additional information on design basis natural phenomena events for the VVDP can be found in Volume I, Section A.3.6 and A.4.2. D.9.3.1.1 WIND LOADS Design basis winds consist of a 100-year event with a design wind velocity of 145 kph (90 mph) with peak gust velocities of 190 kph (115 mph). (See Section A.4.2.1, Volume I.) The ANSI importance factor has already been included in this design wind velocity. Wind pressures from this event are analyzed using the method specified in ANSI A58.1, 1982, Section 6 with Exposure Condition C. D.9.3.1.2 TORNADO
~~h The design basis tornado has the following characteristics:
[j
\,
- Ma::imum Wind Speed 260 kph (160 mph)
- Rotational Speed 180 kph (110 mph)
- Translational Speed 80 kph (50 mph)
- Radius of Maxinum Rotational Wind 46 m (150 ft)
- Total Pressure Drop 2.4 kPa (0.35 psi)
- Rate of Pressure Drop 1.0 kPa (0.15 psi)
The design basir for the site-specific tornado is developed in Section A.4.2.2, Volume I. The total tornado load (w s) consists of three components:
- Tornado wind load (V,);
- Tornado differential pressure load (W,); and
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'\._./ e Tornado missile load (W,) . The total tornado load is determined by the following combinations: Us - W. Ws - Wp We - W. Vs - W. + 0. 5Wp Wg - W. + W. Us - W. + 0. 5Wp + W. Each structur or component of the STS confinement barrier was reviewed for the most severe of the above combinations. The applied pressure loads are determined using the criteria in ANSI A58.1, 1982. The gust facters are taken as unity. ( 1 D.9.3.1.3 TORNADO MISSILE The-design basis tornado missiles include the following:
- Timber plank, 10 cm (4 in) by 30 cm (12 in) by 3.7 m (12 ft) weighing 63 kg (139 lbs).
- Steel pipe, 7.6 cm (3 in) in diameter by 3 m (10 ft) in length weighing 34 kg (76 lbs).
The impact velocity of the plank is 140 kph (85 mph) while the velocity of the pipe is 80 kph (50 mph). The design basis for these missiles is provided in Section A 4.2.4, Volume I. (Note: The impact velocity for the steel pipe is defined as 103 kph (64 mph) in Section A.4.2.4, Volume I, although c 80 kph (50 mph) impact velocity <ts later specified in Volume III, Section C.4.2.4 -
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Vitrification Facility. The 103 kph (64 mph)-impact velocity was originally ascribed to a 320 kph.(200 mph) maximum wind speed tornado by Mcdonald, 1981. This was later reduced to 80 kph-(50 mph) as more realistic for the 260 knh (160 mph) tornado. Regardless, this difference has virtually no effect on the large safety factors associated with tornado missile penetration of STS structures indicated in Table D.9.3-1). D.9.3.1.4 SEISMIC The site-specific design basis earthquake has been selected based on probabilistic assessments of the earthquake exposure (see Sections A.3.6.1 and A.4.2.5, Volume 1). This event has a peak horizontal ground accolt: ration of 0.1 g, and a vertical component of two-thirds the horizontal (e.g., 0.067 g). Design review response spectra and associated damping values are in accordance with the NRC Regulatory Guides 1.60 (USNRC, 1973a) and 1.61 (USNRC, 1973b). D.9.3.1.5 SNOW LOADING (
- Design basis snow loads for a 100-year event were taken as 4 kPa (80 psf) .
(See Section A.4.2.6, Volume 1). D.9.3.1.6 INTERNAL PRESSURE LOADS All of the primary building ventilation barriers have been design 6d for a negative (partial vacuum pressure) condition. These internal pressure loads are a result of the use of ventilation systems required for temperature and contamination control (STS PVS and WTFVS - see Sections D.5.4 and D.7.4). The following typical pressure differentials and asc.ciated pressure loads are expected to be maintained during normal operations. L /'
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PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (Negative Atmospheres PRESSURE LOAD EACILITY fin of Water Columnl) (Pa) (nsf5 Operation Aisle, STS- 0.002 - 0.003 (0.6 - 1.0) 144 - 239 (3 - 5) Building Valve Aisle 0.006 - 0,007 (2.4 - 3.0) 527 - 670 (11 - 14) Pipeway/ Shield 0.006 - 0.007 (2.4 - 3.0) 527 - 670 (11 - 14) Structure Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 0.009 -.0.01 (3.5 4.0) 766 - 910 (16 - 19) D.9.3.1.7 THERMAL LOADS Thermal loads associated with facilities are:
- 38'c (100'F) for locations on the interior face of the building; and
/ \
).
- 13'C (55'F) for protected environmental locations on -the exterior of R./
the building. The as-built temperature for both steel and concrete is 7'C (45'F) . D.9.3.1.8 SOIL PRESSURE LOAD Vertical dead load of soil fill on top of attuctures-is taken as 256 kg/m3 (125 pef) . ,- <- s Page 9-34 SAR:0000863.RM l
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p WVNS-SAR-004 Rev, 7 l/] Lateral snatic soil pressures for passive and active conditions are determined using the following equivalent fluid densities (Dames & Moore. 1983): TYPE OF SOIL PRESSURE INCLUDING VA'lER EXCLUDING VATER Passive Soil Pressure 492 kg/m3 (240 pef) 369 kg/m3 (180 pef) 7_ .ictive Soil Pressure 164 kg/m3 (80 pcf) 41 kg/m3 (20 pef) D.9.3.1.9 DYNAMIC SOIL PRESSURES Design soil pressures for the design basia earthquake (0.1 g horizontal and 0.067 g vertical) are based on at-rest conditions in the soil. The at-rest soil pressures are computed from an equivalent fluid density of 184 kg/m 3 (90 pcf) considering soil and water combined, or 61 kg/m 3 (30 pef) for soil only.
/ The effects of surcharge on the soil from future adja:ent buildings, t] '~' backfilling, or construction loads are added to the static soil pressure load.
SL. tic and dynamic soil loads are additive. D.9.3.1.10 PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT _ LOADS The loads derived from the processes and equipmenc are divided into dead loads and live loeds. Dead loads include the weight of structures and structural components, equipment, piping, walls, partitions, platforms, conduits, cable trays, and all other static gravity loads, Water or other fluids contained within the equipment or piping is also considered a dead load. The unit-
. weights used in establishing dead loads for the typical materials .includo the following:
- Reinforced Concrete 2.40 g/cm3 (150 pef)
*- Structural Steel 7.84 g/cm3 (490 pef)
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- Vater 1.0 g/cm3 (62.4 pef)
Live loads include floor and roof area loads, crane loads, lay-down loads due to temporary placement of movable equipment or structures, equipment handling loads, and vibratory and impact loads from equipment and other processing loads. Design basis live loads are as follows:
- 7 kPa (150 psf) for all floor areas where equipment is not located.
- 4,536 kg (10,000 lbs) concentrated load located at any position on the floor in addition to the uniform live load of 7 kPa (150 psf).
- A 5 MT (5 ton) forklift on the STS building floor at Elevation +32.6 m (+107 ft).
O D.9.3.l.11 CONSTRUCTION LOADS Load limits on the construction modification to Tanks 8D-1 and SD-2 included the following:
- 227 kg (500 lbs) concentrated load in cutting through the reinforced concrete vault lid.
- 51 MT (50 ton) crane at 3 m (10 ft) from the edge of Tank 8D-1 vault at Elevation +30.5 m (+100 ft).
- Pump riser installation load of 4,400 kg (9,700 lbs) (zeolite removal
- Tank BD-1) and of 5,262 kg (11,600 lbs) (waste mobilization - Tank 8D-2) on vault roofs.
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WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 ( ) \/ e 5 kPa (100 psf) uniformly distributed live load on vault roofs.
- 1,814 kg (4,000 lbs) concentrated live load with minimum spacing of 3 m (10 ft) between concentrated loads on vault roof.
e 454 kg (1,000 lbs) concentrated moving live load on steel Tanks SD 1 and 8D 2. D.9.3.2 LOAD COMBINATION CRITERIA The following nomenclature is used in this section to designate the various loading conditions used in the design review of the barriers under severe environmental conditions: U - Required section etr:ngth for reinforced concrete to resist design loads based on strength methods of design; {
'- ' S - Required strength for structural steel based on elastic desi a methods and allowable stresses; D - Dead loads or related internal moments and forces; L - Applicable live loads or related internal moments and forces:
T- Applicable thermal loads; H - Soil pressure load consisting of two conditions: H.t.cte and H d3munic ; W - Applicable wind loads; x
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\ l v Us - Design basis tornado loads; E,,, - Design basis seismic loads; and P. - Internal pressure loads.
Since the waste tank farm portion of the Vest Valley site is not subject to flooding, flood design loads have not been included. Reinforced concrete structural integrity under extreme environmental load conditions was reviewed for the following load combinations: U - 1.0 D + 1.0 L + 1.0 H,sti, v 1,0 E,.. + 1.0 H e 3, + 1. 0 T. + 1. 0 P.
-U - 1.0 D + 1.0 L + 1.0 H,sti, + - 1,0 To + 1.0 Vs + 1.0 P.
'O Ths folloving load combinations were used for steel structures under extreme environmental load conditions:
S , - - D + L + H,t.st, + E . + ' Hoynami, + To + Po S - D + L + H,s st, + Vs + To + P.
-D.9.3.3 ASSESSMENT OF CONFINEMENT BARRIERS
-Three'separato methods of barrier vulnerability assessment were employed in
.this investigation. These included analytical, experimental, and judgmental procedures, j -:
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WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. ~1 D.9.3.3.1 ANALYTICAL METHODS Two methods of analytical review were used: review of existing designs and independent confirming analyses. Design documents prepared for the construction of the STS facilities and modifications to Tanks 8D 1 and 8D 2 were collected and reviewed. These documents included the structural calculations, design drawings, specifications, and design criteria. Vulnerability of the confinement barriers was-assessed under code specift design load levels. To assess.the vulnerability of the confinement barriers under extreme
-environmental conditions such as earthquake and tornado, independent static
-and dynamic structural analyses were performed for critical confinement barriers. In the case of Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2, such analyses had been conducted by LLL as part of a previous barrier vulnerebility assessment (LLL, 1978). In the case of the new construction (e.g., STS building and shield C' . structure over Tank 8D-1). Dames & Moore prepared simple analytical models for V' computer analysis.
D.9.3.3.2 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS Experimental evidence through direct testing or documentation of past his toric' performance provided insight into the vulnerability of the barriers under extreme load conditions. Examples included the accident that occurred during construction of Tanks 8D 1 and SD-2, which provided insight into the ultimate strenSth of the tank vault under flotation, followed by partial foundation settlement (Barnstein 1965 and 1966). Pressure tests (CB&I Specifications, 1966) and corrosion inspection of Tank 8D-1 (Duckworth,1976) provided data on the strength of the original tanks. Tests of the waterstop between the STS building and the shield structure over Tank 8D 1 provided data on the cyclic strength of this critical barrier between the two structures. SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-39
l WVNS-SAR-304 / _' Rev. 7 D.9.3.3.3 ENGINEERING JUDGMENT In some instances, detailed analytical or experimental investigations could not be justified to assess the ultimate strength or failure loads of the confinement barriers. In these instances, engineering judgment, based on the past observed performance of similar structures under similar extreme loads and environmental conditions, served as a basis for assessment. In other cases, past engineering experience in the design and failure analysis of similar loading conditions provided the basis for estimating the barrier vulnerability. D.9.3.4 FAILURE ANALYSIS D.9.3.4.1- CRITICAL LOADING CONDITIONS There are four basic load regimes that have been considered in the design, [x) L./ construction, and operation of the STS facilities. These are the following:
- Construction or man-induced loads;
- Operational loading, such as temperature, pressure, dead load, live load, etc.
- Abnormal operating conditions or accidents, such as temperature / pressure excursions; and
- Extreme environmental loads, such as earthquake and tornado.
Construction or man-induced loads present an environmental risk only in the modification of Tank 8D 2 that currently stores the high-level wastes. Stringent limitations have been imposed on any loads that might impinge upon the reinfor:ed concrete vault or steel tank that serve as confinement barriers (m) \_,/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-40
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Rev. 7 to-these HLW. Structural barrior reviews have been performed by several design and analysis teams to verify the integrity of these confineeent barriers under construction operations (Ebasco.-1986; Rockwell, 1984,
- Rockwell, 1985 ; Brom, 1985a; Brown, - 1986) .
Operational conditions for the STS facility produce well A 'ined loads that are adequately covered under normal process industry safety codes. Internal pressures and temperatures are significantly lower than those normally associated with nuclear power plant operations. Abnormal operating conditions or accioents, leading to the breaching of a confinement barrier, do not appear to be credible (see Section D.9.2.5). The process does not generate a high tenperature or pressure source that could lead to vessel or pipe rupture, nor does it represent a potential threat from missile impingement or penetration ecmmonly associated with high pressure and temperature processes.
.tp)-
The. potential that Tank Vaults 8D-1 or 8D-2 might be dislodged due to runaway groundwater intrusion has already been demonstrated during the construction of these vaults (see Barnstein, 1965 and 1966). With heavy overburdens and precautionary measures to monitor and control groundwater levels around the
' vaults, tha potential that thic. type of accident would occur is relatively remote. However, this potential risk exists whether the STS process is constructed or not.
l' Extreme environmental cor.ditions, such as a tornado and earthquako, have not l-been directly addressed in all facets of barrier design for the STS process. The only structural barrier that has been consistently. designed for earthquake throughout the STS process facilities is the reinforced concrete structures that rarve as the second line of defense. The primary barriers (piping and
.vesse ts) ' generally have not been designed for earthquake.
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w-WVNS-SAR-004 Extreme tornado wind' and missile loads have not been directly addressed as a design consideration. Ervironmental loading from tornado is moderate, in contrast to many sites. The massive shield walls'and soil overburden used for radiation protectitn serves as a direct form of missile protection. In summary, the critical loads for assessment of confinement barrier vulnarability are the extreme environmental conditions associated with earthquake and tornado. D.9.3.4.2 MODES OF FAILURE tae support barriers or backup systems identified in Table D.4.3-1 (e.g., negative or positive internal or external pressures) may be lost following extreme environmental conditions such as earthquake or tornado. This is based on past experience in which process equipment that has not been designed-for earthquake malfunctions either.because of mechanical problems o,r because of-
. /~'\ the loss of electrical power. For purposes of barrier vulnerability V -
assessment, it is' assumed that. the active support barriers, such as negative pressure supplied by electrical and mechanical systems, will fail under extreme environmental conditions. Failure modes for the primary confinement barriers-are summarized in Table D 9.3-1. Under extreme earthquake conditions, typical failure modes for steel process piping and vessels may include cracking, tearing at welded seams, or rupture. Both vapor and fluid may breach these _ confinement barriers under each of the failure modes.
.For reinforced concrete vaults and shield ~ walls, cracks may develop during the
. earthquake'that will close after the earthquake, leaving little opportunity for leakage and radiation exposure. If the cracking is excessive, permanent dislocation may result, providing a path for vapor and fluid to breach the l.
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'V. . barrier. Under extreme conditions, the concrete may crush and ultimately lead
~
to barrier collapse. For extreme earthquake load conditions outlined in Table D.9.3 1 for Tanks 8D 1 and 8D-2, column failure and progressive roof collapse is identified as the ultimate failure mode for the reinforced concrete tank vaults. For soil backfills and overburden, extreme earthquake failure modes take the form of cracking, differential settlement, and permanent distortion. Pathways for liquid flow through the cracked soil media may develop. Under extreme earthquake, large relative motions between buildings and adjacent components may cause rupture of water stops and interconnecting conduits or piping. In summary, Table D.9.3 1 identifies the various forms c' .'ailure th,t the primary barriers may experience and also idenrifies the mitigative action or i backup barrier that will prevent release of either vapor or liquid HLW to the environment. D.9.3.4.3 BARRIER BEHAVIOR The behavior of confinement barriers under varying levels of extreme i environmental loading has also been identified in Table D.9.3-1. Various L stages of barrier deterioration and modes of failure have been associated with
- levels of extreme event loading to describe the progressive failure scenario.
Both engineering judgment and analytical or experimental data have been used
-in arriving at these' barrier performance scenarios.
l-Perhaps the most significant element of the barrier vulnerability assessment i; is the recognition of interplay between barriers under extreme environmental f .. loading. For example, if structural walls that support piping and vessels L l' dislocate under earthquake motions, not only have the walls failed as a l SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-43 r l
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% ))- barrier, but in dislocatin5, they may also breach piping or vessels attached to the walls, thus violating an interior higher level barrier. .An example of this is the potential lateral dislocation of the concrete walls of the shield structure that could lead to pipe support frame collapse and vessel or pipe rupture. Another example is the potential dislocation of Tank 8D-2 on its perlite support blocks, resulting in tank vault column damage and ultimate vault roof collapse. In this case, the interaction of one barrier system with a second barrier system leads to the mutual failure of barriers (e.g. , tank and vault) . A third example is the soil / structure interaction that takes place between the STS building and the shield structure on top of Tank Vault ED-1. Under earthquake motions, these two independent structures m4.y affect each other, inducing stresses in the PVC water stop that could ultimately lead to its failure. Under extreme earthquake pounding between these buildings, the s nonseismically designed piping that traverses the expansion joint between [Q t these structures may also rupture, leading to a double barrier failure (e.g., water stop and piping). D.9.3.4.4 SAFETY FACTORS 1 As shown in Table D.9.3-1, there is generally a relativety large safety factor between the design basis environmental loading and the ultimate failure capacity of the barriers. In most instances, if one of the barriers in the system has a low safety factor, then another concentric barrier has a significantly higher safety factor. For carthquake, there are no significant weak links in the reinforced concrete structures that provide the secondary barrier for the STS process. Tests have shown that the PVC water stop between the STS building and the shield structure has sufficient deformability to accommodate the calculated 78 k_ s SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-44 1
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 , deflections produced between these buildings under extreme earthquake conditions, Thus, the water stop has been shown to be an acceptable alternative to the more traditional flexible membrane expansion joint. The piping system is too complex to fully assess its safety factors -individually. Instead of a rigorous analysis of the entire piping system, individual-lines, judged to be critical based on process specifics and - engineering experience, -were modeled and computer-analyzed to assess failere modes and safety factors (e.g. , high pressure lines carrying sludge wash solution). The weakest link in the piping system appears to be in the section that crosses the expansion joint between the STS building through the valve aisle and pipeway into the shield structure over Tank 8D-1 (e.g. , differential movement between structures causes pipes to rupture). For tornado loading and tornado missiles, there appear to be no weak links in the reinforced concrete buildings and their interconnecting underground , P ii P ng. D.9.3.4.5 LEAKAGE 1For the design basis earthquake and tornado, there appears to be no credible failure mode that will lead to leakage through existing reinforced concrete barriers of the STS process facilities. (Leakage, in this case, refers to the flow of liquids.)- Gaseous or vapor leaks may develop if the support barriers (e.g., negative internal pressure) are lost due to an earthquake or tornado. The potential source terms and radiological consequences associated with airborne pathways under these extreme conditions are discussed in Section D.9.2. SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-45
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SUMMARY
- STS AND SMVS BARRIER INTEGRITY ANALYSIS The primary STS confinement barriers have sufficient reserve capacity, due to the inherent safety factors associated with this type of construction, to survive extreme environmental loading (e.t., design basis earthquake and tornado events) without structural failure and leakage of HLM into the environment.
The primary confinement barriers of highest reliability under earthquake and tornado _ loading are the reinforced-concrete vaults and chambers that enclose the STS process vessels and piping. These buildings and tank vaults have been designed to higher structural safety standards than required for life safety by local building codes used in the design of industrial process plants in New York State. The radiological shielding requirements for these structures generally resulted in greater reserve strength than found in conventional industrial plant building design. The margin of safety against failure of the reinforced concrete barriers is conservatively estimated at 2 to 4 times the design basis earthquake. The least predictable element in the building barrier is the PVC water stop between the STS building and the shield structure on Tank Vault 8D 1. Tests and analysis _ indicate the water stop has an estimated safety factor of 3 or greater against rupture under an earthquake. In terms of the internal piping and vessel systems that confine the sludge wash solution in its path of processing, the connecting piping between the valvo aisle, pipeway and shield structure appears to be the most vulnerable under earthquake. The safety factor appears to le on the order of three. Extreme tornado winds and missile loads are not a significant safety consideration for the massive shield walls and roofs of the STS process facilities. l-' SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-46 L~ l l l l-
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'f $- Rev. 7 U The primary SMVS confinement barriers have sufficient reserve capacity, due to the inherent safety factors associated with the original construction as well as the conservative design incorporated in new construction, to survive extreme environmental loading (e.g. , design basis earthquake and tornado events) without structural failure and leakage of high-level radioactive liquid wastes into the environment.
SMWS abnormal operating conditions do not appear to represent a rignificant threat to the integrity of the existing confinement barriers in Tank 8D-2. The primary confinement barrier of highest reliability under earthquake and tornado loading is the reinforced concrete vault that encloses Tank 8D-2. The radiological shielding requirements generally result in structural sizes and wall thicknesses that are larger than normally required under conventional
' industrial building design codes, As a result, the margin of safety in these
. structures against failure under extreme environmental loading is higher than
~'
\ .one would normally expect in conventional construction.
-[G The margin of_ safety against failure of the steel tank and concrete vault.
- which serve as the first and second line of confinement barrier for the HLW, is conservatively estimated at six times the design basis earthquake and more than 10 times the design basis tornado. Thus, there is little potential for leakage of the high-level radioactive liquid waste into the environment under extreme environmental loading.
The-margir of safety against poter ami vapor released to the environment is on the1 order _of.0.5 t'o 1.5' times the . sign basis tornado and 1.5 to 4 times the design basis earthquake, assuming the WTFVS is nonoperational. The most vulnerable link in the systems appears to be the flexible bellows connection that serves to accommodate lateral and vertical movements of the mobilization pump support structure cbove Tank 8D-2 and the tank access riser. , !~ O
\_,/
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{ WNS-SAR-004 Dev, 7 [~ REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.9.0 ANSI, 1981 American National Standards Institute. July 1981. " Guidance for Defining Safety Related Features of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities." ANSI N4o 1-1980. ANSI, 1982 American National Standards Institute. 1982. ' Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures." ANSI A58.1. Barnstein, L. S. 1965. CInvestigation of Atomic Vaste Disposal Vaults at the { 4 Atomic Vaste Disposal Plant, at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority." Nussbaumer, Clarke, and '.'elry , Inc . Barnstein, L. S. January 1966. " Report on Restoration of Atom.c Vaste Vaults at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority." by Nussbaumer, Clar?:e, and Velzy, Inc. Bru m , 1985e S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. December 19, 1985. " Safety Analysis P. sport for Modifications to Tank 8D 1 and Installation of STS Components and Zeolite Removal Pumps." Memo llE:86:0258. Brown, 1985b S.11. Brown to R. R. Borisch. October 16, 1985. " Radiological Releases from the Penetration of Tank BD 2." Memo HE:86:0211.
/ Brown, 1986 S. H. Brown to R. R. Borisch. May 21, 1986. " Safety Analysis Q] Report for the Retroce Riser Installation and Penetration of Tank BD 2," Memo HE:86:0097.
Caldwell, 1990 J. T. Caldwell. October 1990. (TB:91:0129). " Criticality Safety Analysis for VVNS Sludge Tonks and Related Processing Equipment." Dames & Moore D. ~ . Murphy. September 1983. " Suppl mental Consultation Report on Gaotechnical Investigatio,i on the Proposed Compcaent Test Stand, kost Valley D.amonstration Project." Dames 6 Hoore Frojut # 108 05 108 23. Damec f- Moore Dames & Moore. Jura 1986. "STS Confinement Barrier Integrity Review ' Subcontract No. 19 CVV-02840 Amendment No. 22. 7 Dames & Hoore Dames & Moore. October 1990. "8D-2 Sludge Mobilization System Confinement Barrier Integrity Review." Subcontract No.19-CW 21511, Task 10. Duckworth, 1976 Duckworth, J . P. August 19, 1976. Memo from Duckworth to Oidham. " Examination of Corrosion Coupons on the NFS High Level Storage Tanks 8D 2 and 8D 4." Ebasco, 1986 Ebasco Services Inc. 1986. "STS Design Calcu14. ions, for West Valley Nucicar Services, Vast Valley Demonstration Project' (w/ ) SAR:0000863 RM :e 9 48 i
=: ( ,
l WVNS-dAR-CD4 ("'T sev. 7 b Crunabach, 1982 Grunebach, C S. November 23,1982. " Purchase Order No. 59-FVV 66036, Final Report - Analysis of Supernatant Samples." Keel and O'Ahoofe, 1985 Keel, R. and K. A. O' Ahoofe. July 2,1985. " Allowable Fissile Haterial Solttion Concentration for Liquid Transfers." FB: 8s:0150. Memo to C. J. Roberts. LLL, 1978 Lavrence Livennore Laboratories. May 1978. " Seismic Analysis of High Level Neutralized Liquid Waste Tanks at the Western New York State duelear Service Center, West Valley, New York." (UCRL 52485)
' Mcdonald, 1981 Mcdonald, James R.1981 " Assessment of Tornado and Straight Wind Hazard Probabilities at the Western New York State Nuclear Service Center, West Valley, MY."
PAVAN, 1982 Pacific Northwest Laboratory. November 1982. " PAVAN; An Atmospheric Dispersion Program for Evaluating Design Onsis Accidental Releases of Radioactive Materials from Nuclear Power Stations." NUREC/CR 2858, PNL 4413. Peterson, 1985 Peterson, J. M. February 8,1985. " correlation of Exposure Rate with Ladionuclide Inventory on a Loaded HEPA Filter." Memo to C. P. Bliss. HE:85:0016. Ploetz, 1990 Ploetz. D. K. August 27, 1990. " Assessment of Hydrogen (T Nl Generation and Chemical Reaction in the HLW Tanks at the VVDP." Letter report to T. J. Rowland. WD:90:0877. l' Prowse, 1991a Prowse , J . J . April 23,19 F .
*eneration in Tank 8 D 2 during SMWS Operations." Letter report te . Roberts. TB:91:0085.
Prowse, 1991b Prowse, J. J. September 25, 1991. " Detection of a Hypothetical criticality in Tank 8D-1." Letter report to C. J. Roberts. FB:91:0202. Rockwell, 1984 Patel, A. K. Rockwell Internationa'. Hanford Operations. August l 1984. " West Valley Tank Roof Analysis." SD-RE TA 003, WVSXB420. l Rockwell, 1985 Rockwell International Hanford Operations. August 21, 1985. l
" West Valley Tank Riser Installation." RI Memo 65620 WWS 85161. W. W. Smyth l to D. V. Scott.
1 L Rykken, 1984 Rykken, J, October 18, 1984. Technical Advisory to l J. R. Carrell, TA Nu-i t .; HI:84:^029. Rykken, 1985 Rykken, L. E. October 2, 1985. " Properties of STS Solutions." Memo to distribution. H1:85:0119.- (A) .SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 49
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 USNRC, 1973a United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. "Desi6n Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.60. Winger, 1991 Uinger, P. C. June 1991. "Use of Existing WTF Off-Cas System for Sludge Washing," letter report to D. J. Harvard, CG:91:0006. USNRC, 1973b United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. " Damping ' Valves for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.61. USNRC, 1982 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commist. ion. January 1982.
"Sufety Evaluation Report on the Dormant Vest Valley Reprocessing Facility."
Docket No. 50 201. _ USNRC, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. January 1982.
" Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook." NUREC 1320.
VVDP-010, 1989 West Valley Demonstration Project. 1989, " Radiological controls Manual." Rev. 3. VVDP-065, 1990 Faillace, E. R., J. J. Prowse, and Y. Yuan. October 1990.
" Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project Activities." WVDP 065, Rev. 24 fuan, 1991 Yuan, Y. C. October 1991. (FB:91:0012). " Criticality Evaluation:
Sludge Wash and Mobilitation System - Zeolite Column." Yuan, 1985 Yuan, Y. C. August 1985. " Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project Activities." HE:85:0164 , SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-50
I i I l WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.9.2 1 Accident 1 Tank 8D 2 Roof Collapse Direct te Enviro.aent - Cround Release First Wash Vater Solution Evaporation Rate (L/h) 4.00E403 , Accident Duration (h) 2.00E+00 Partition coefficient 1.00E+03 (for non volatiles) Total Off site EDE (cSv or rem) 7.97E 01 Total On site EDE (cSv or rem) 1.50E+01 Nuclide First Wash Release Max. Ind. Max. Ind. Off-site Conc. Rate CEDE CEDE Contrib. Off site On site C1/L Ci/h cSv or rem cSv or rem Pu 238 4.97E 04 1.99E 03 4.30E 01 8.09E+00 53.99% Cs-137+ 1.64E400 6.55E+00 9.97E 02 1.87E+00 12.51% Pu 239- 9.60E 05 3.84E 04 9.22E 02 1.74E+00 11.58% Pu-241 4.72E-03 1.89E 02 8.88E 02 1.67E+00 11.15%
'Pu 240 7.24E 05 2.90E 04 6.95E 02 1.31E+00 8.73%
1.03E 05 4.14E 05 1.01E 02 1.91E 01 -1.27% O Am 241 Sr-90+ Cm 244 1.13E 03 2.95E 06 4.51E 03 1.18E-05 2.78E-03 1.50E 03 5.23E 02 2.83E-02 0.35% 0.19% ,
- Those nuclides which contribute >0.1% of ths Maximum' Individual CEDE
** 1 Ci -_3.7E+'_0 Bq
+ Includes the contribution from the daughter isotopes P
l l wvss-SAR-004 TABLE D.9.2 2 Accident 2 Pipe Leak Direct to Environment - Cround Release 4 First Wash Water Solution l Le a't late (L/h) 1.50E+03 Evaporation Rate (L/h) 1.50E403 Accident Duration (h) 2.00E+00 Partition Coefficient 1.00E+03 (for non volatiles) Total Off site EDE (cSv or rem) 2.99E 01 Total Du site EDE (cSv or rem) 5.62E+00 Nuclide First Wash Release Max. Ind. Max. Ind. Off site Conc. Rate EDE EDE Contrib. Off site On site Ci/L C1/h cSv or rem cSv or rem
~
Pu 238 4.96E 04 7.45E 04 1.61E 01 3.03E+00 53 99% Cs 137+ 1.64E+00 2.46E+00 3.74E 02 7.03E 01 12.51% Pu-239 9.60E 05 1.44E 04 3.46E 02 6.51E-01 11.58% Pu 241 4.72E 03 7.07E 03 3.33E 02 6.27E 01 11,15% Pu 240 7.24E 0.i 1.09E 04 2.61E 02 4.90E 01 8.73%
/~'\ 'Am 241 1.03E 05 1.55E 05 3.80E 03 7.14E 02 1.27%
k_ji s Sr 90+ 1.13E 03 1.69E 03 1.04E 03 1.96E 02 0.35% Cm 244 2.95E 06 4.43E 06 5.63E 04 1.06E-02 0.19%
*- Those nuclides which contribute >0.1% of the Maximum Individual CEDE
** 1 Ci - 3.7E+10 Bq
+ Includes the contribution from the daughter isotopes
l WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.9.2 3 Accident 3 Valve Aisle Pipe Leak . Through PVS Ground Release First Wash Water Solution leak Rate (L/h) 1.50E+03 Evaporation Rate (1/h) 1.50E+02 Accident Duration (h) 2.00E+00 Partition Coefficient 1.00E+00 (for volatiles) Total Off site EDE (cSv or rem) 7.56E 06 Total On site EDE (cSv or rem) 1.42E 04 Nuclide First Wash Release Max. Ind. Max. Ind. Off site Conc. Rate EDE EDE Contrib. Off-site On site ci/L Ci/h cSv or rem cSv or rem C 14 4.43E 05 6. - L 03 6.57E 06 1.24E 04 86.96% I 129 6.80E 08 1.ceE 05 8.64E 07 1.63E 05 11.43% H3 2.51E 05 3.77E 03 1.12E 07 2.10E 06 1.48% O
- Those nuclides which contribute >0.1% of the Maximum Individual CEDE
** 1 C1 - 3.7E+10 Bq
+ Includes the contribution from the daughter isotopes Note: a DF of 3x10' was used for non-volatile species per ANSI-N46.1.
- Condensor DT-30
- 1** HEPA DF-1000
- 2"d HEPA DF-100
- Partition Coefficiei.t PC-1000 SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-53
WVHS-SAR-004
-s
/ T Rev. 7 TABLI D.9.2 4 Accident 4 Ti IX Column Over Pressurization Through PVS - Ground Release Maximum Loaded Ti IX Column Non volatile Fraction Release 1.0%
Non volatile Dr from PVS 3.0E+06 Total Off site EDE (cSv or rem) 1.89E 04 Total On Site EDE (cSv or rem) 3.56E 03 Nuclide STS Accident Max. Ind. Max. Ind. Off site Ti Column Release EDE EDE Contrib. Maximum Oft site On site > C1 Ci cSv or rem cSv or rem
~~
Pu-238 2.33E+02 7.78E-07 8.43E 05 1.59E 03 44.53% C 14 7.9BE 02 7.98E 02 3.94E 05 7.47E 04 20.83%
, Pu 239 4.52E+01 1.51E 07 1.81E 05 3.40E 04 9.55%
Pu 241 2.22E+03 7.39E 06 1.74E 05 3.27E 04 9.20% Pu 240 3.41E+01 1.14E 07 1.36E 05 2.56E-04 7.20% Cs 137& 4.00E+05 1.33E-03 1.01E 05 1.91E 04 5.35% ['T
~
I 129 1.22E 04 1.22E 04 5.1SE-06 9.75E-05 2.74% i--) H3 4.52E 02 4.52E 02 6.70E 07 1.26E 05 8.56E 06 0.35% 0.24% Sr 90+ 4.43E402 1.48E 06 4.55E 07
- Those nuclides which contribute >0.1% of the Maximum Individual CEDE
** 1 Ci - 3.7E410 Bq
+ Includes the contribution from the daughter isotopes Note: C-14,1 129, and 11-3 are assumed to be completely released to the environment. .,
s (~'N (,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 54
l l WVNS-SAR-004 TABLE D.9.2-5 Accident 5 HEPA Fire Elevated Release Cs on Filter Ci -7.5 - 10 R/h @ 35 cm Volatile Traction Release 100% Non-volatile Fraction Release 1.01 Total Off. **e EDE (cSv or rem) 4.33E 04 Nuclide Filter Release Max. Ind. Off site Activity EDE Contrib. Off site Ci Ci cSv or rem
~
Pu-238 2.27E 03 2.27E 05 2.34E 04 54.001 Cs 137+ 7.50E+00 7.50E 02 5.42E 05 12.52% Pu 239 4.39E 04 4.39E 06 5.02E 05 11.58% Pu 241 2,16E 02 2.16E-04 4.83E 05 11.15% i Pu-240 3.31E 04 3.31E 06 3.78E 05 8.73% t.m 241 4.73E 05 4.73E 07 5.51E 06 1.27%
/
-(,,). Sr-90+ 5.17E-03 5.17E 05 1.51E-06 0.351
-Cm 244 1.35E 05 1.35E 07 8.17E 07 0.19.
- Those nuclides which contribute >0.1% of the Maximum Individual-CEDE
** 1 Ci - 3.7E+10 Bq
+ Includes the contribution from the daughter isotopes Page 9-55
( SAR.0000863.RM l i
l WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 (~j'N \ TABLE D.9.2-6 FISSIONABLE MATERIAL INVENTORY FOR TANK SD-2 AND MAIIMUM ENVELOPE FOR ION EXCEANGE COLUMNS Max. Soluble
- Total Fissionabie Fissionable STS Mass Hans for Fissionable in Tank BD-2 First Wash Max. per Col.
Nuelido o o o U-233 720 270 0.4 U-234 660 250 0.3 U-235 41,000 16,000 21 U-238 2,300,000 1,000,000 1,300 Pu-238 370 14 3.9 l Pu-239 27,000 924 260 l Pu-240 5,700 187 52 l Pu-241 640 28 7.8 l Am-241 20,000 4.1 0.0 Am-243- 25,000 5.0 0.0 cm-244 200 0.0 0.0 i
- Assuraes Ce breakthrough af ter processing 375,000 L (100,000 gals.) of undiluted sludge wash solution at an alpha plutonium concentration of 0.73 pci/mL. The maxtmum column is analyzed as an ion exchange column containing Ti-treated zeolite and envelopes non-treated zeolite usage.
i .
t
/ SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 56
1 WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
'"')
. (V . TAPLE D.9.2 7 SUKMARY OF CRITICALITY EVALUATION FOR TIIE ZEOLITE 00LUMN OF SMVS Radius & Length Z(cylinder only)
-Geometry & Composition (cm) of Pu 239 K.eifective to Retained Vol.
0.44 kg of Pu.239, Pu R-22.5 (hemisphere) 0.38137 1 0.00161 uniformly distributed
'in the hemisphere 1.0 kg of Pu 239 R-45.5 (cylinder) 0.66491 1 0.00305.
Pu uniformly distributed Z-20 , in the cylinder 1.0 kg of Pu.239, R-23 (cylinder) 0.89920 A 0.00464 Pu uniformly distributed Z-20 in the cylinder 1.0 kg of Pu 239, optimum R-22.5 (sphere) 74748 1 0.00505 geometry, Pu uniformly O distributed in the sphere
-SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 57
. .. - - - - , - - - . - - . ._ . . . . . _ - - . - _ _ . . ~ . . . . . ... _ _ . _
WVHS-SAR-004 TABLE D.9.2 8 PHYSICAI. DESCRIPTION OF ZEOLITE COLUMN Description of A Zeolite Column Radius (R,cm) length (Z,cm) l 45.50 (ID) 400 l 46.77 (OD) 402.54 Mat, rial Compositions and Atom Densities for KENO.V Calculations Material Density Vol. Free Nuclide Atomic Density Cross.Section g/cc atom / barn.cm Source Zeolite 1.75 0.4 Si 0.00440 XSDRN (SiO2: 62%, A1203: 18.9%) A1 0.00156 Hansen Roach
.(Na20: 6.31%, Fe2O3: 4.85%) Na 0.00086 Hansen Roach (TiO2: 4.0%, Ca0: 1.46%) K 0.00013 Hansen Roach (K20: 1.46%, Mg0: 0.97%) Te 0.00040 Hansen Roach Ca 0.00011 GAM.2 Ti
(} (,,/ H5 0.00031 0.00010 CAM.2 XSDRN O 0.01300 Hansen Roach Water 0.9982 0.6 H20(X(E)) (KENO.V) Hansen Roach 304 S.S. 7.9 1.0 SS (KENO.V) Hansen Roach Plutonium 17.7 ... Pu.239 Varies Hansen Roach Page 9-58
) SAR:0000863.RM
, - . . - , . ., .r - ... .
WN S-S AR-004 Rev. 7 TABLE D.9.2 9 Km FOR A 1.0 KG mPU SPHERE IN THE CENTER OF THE ZEOLITE COLUMN Geometry Radius,cra K. effective to Sphere 15 0.84061 1 0.00884 Sphere 18 0.91868 1 0.00542 Sphere ?L 0.94102 0.00525 Sphere 21 0.94186 i 0.00547 Sphere 22 0.94615 1 0.00479 Sphere 22.5 0.94748 1 0.00505 Sphere 23 0.94612 0.00445 Sphere 24 0.93074 1 0.00470 Fphere 26 0.91059 1 0.00419 Sphere 30 0.83864 1 0.00367 O SAR:0000863.RM Page 9 59
WVNS-SAR-004 TABLE D 5.2-10 Krrr FOR A 22.5 CM *FU SPHERE IN THE CENTER OF THE ZEOLITE COLUMN M u 239. Kg K-effectiare to 0.8 0.88818 i 0.00436 0.9 0,91380 1 0.00503 1.0 0.94748 1 0.00505 1.1 0.95440 i 0.00517 1.2 0.98249 1 0.00482 O SAR.s000863.RM Page 9 60
R f-h WVNS-Sh!i-004 Rev. 7 t TAALE D.9.3-1 SLLOGE MOBILIZATION IN TA41C PID-2 CONFILEMENT 8A#RifR WtNERABli.ITY ASSESSMENT FOR EXTREME w Vt*AL MAZARDS Intensity" Mitigative Actim oe Structure or Confinemer Basis of" of Event or Backup Syste=a or Co m t Barrier Failure Moda of Barrier Assesswnt .. Loed Beckte Berrier Footnote Tank 8D-1 or Carbon steet tank Uptift and crushing of pertite insulation Anotysis, >2 m DBEQ Tank veutt ard pen (tiquid and Tank BD-2 blocks ~ Possible tank t w ture engineering vapor borffer) judpent j Tank slides on pertite blocks, lepects Anetysis, >4 m DBE0 innk veutt and pen (ti mid and (S) roof stoport cettens engineering vapor barrier) jodpent , Tank motions tend to interior vault Engineering >6 m DOE 0 Tank vault and pan (tivid (3) i cotum ard roof cottapse judgment, barrier) erproximate analysis Rtpture of tank sidewett caused by Anotysis, >4 m 08EQ Tank vault and pen (tIquid and fracture of pum cotten et tant top engineering vmor berrier) ! Jt 3gment Collapse of tent roof cotten d>e to psp Anotysis, 4 m APOC Tank vault ord pen (tiquid and lopect with cotum stgports engineering >6 m DBEQ vepor berrier) Jta$gment Rtpture of cerbo steel tenit betters tise to Engineering >6 m DBE0 Loss of primary liquid end cettepsing shield plug its3gremt, veper berrier. Tank veutt steel enetysis >3 m DBT tin w pen provide tiquid eruf varer berrier. ! Tornado niissile pmetrates tank roof Anetysis, n10 m DBT Tank veutt and pan (ti mid engineering berrier) jud e t
' Reinforced concrete Locet flesurel Cracking of weit frers Analysis, >2 m CBEQ Soit ewcevetion e'd positive (4) tank seult end steet teteret soit-vault action, re tenkege engineering hydrostatic pre m re (l % id Linee pen ;t+wnt berrier) (vault es veper berrier)
Sheering of wells et foundation set, Analysis, >4 m 08E0 Soll escovstion (liquid Ieekage inwerd develops engincering berrier) judgmmt toof of vault cettepse Anotysis 15 m DBEc Seit e=cavetion (tity.sid (3; . engineering berrier) itssgmmt SAR.3000863.RM Page 9-61
'\ ']
' V \s ,, / ' WVriS-SAR-004 ... /
R;v. 7 1A8LE O.9.3-1 (conti ved) SLLDCE M081LIZAf t0N tu TAE 80 2 CoelFtWEMENT Bast!Et WLNERA8tttTY #$$ESSMENT FOR ENTaEMI NATLRAL MAZAfDS Intensity
- Mitigative Action or Sesis of"' of Event or Sackup Systeo er Structure or Confinement 8errier Felture Mode of Berrfer Assessent load Beckto Barrier Footecte
_ronconent Tornado missile penetration of vault roof Anotysis, >>10 m Def Steet tank barrier engineering jtuigment soit escevation in Cracking or clayey tttt, teekege Engineering >6 x 08E0 Mene (5) tight eteyey titt judgment selnforced concrete (Previously detailed) veutt and tiner pan soit excavation in (Previously detailed) tight clayey till Engineering >12 x 08EQ 40* diameter steel casing (6) Transition from Carbon steel riser Tear, rtsture provides licpid barrier top of vault sleeve jts3pment roof to seat ring ptete 40" diameter steet Shere, rteture Engineering >12 x DsEn Concrete / grout fitt (tiquid (6) casing judywnt barrier) Solt backfIit and Crock Engineering :5 x D6EO mane tank excavation judgment Aretysis, >12 m 08E0 Vapor berrier is lost, carbon (6) Transition from ' Carbon steel riser Sheer, tear mgineering >3 x D8T steet tank provides liquid top of seet sleeve ring plate to jts$gment berrier bottee of bearing plate on spray chamber Enr---8,n let tows Teer . Test, enetysts, >2 x 08E0 vepor barrier is test, certon (6) engineering 3.5 to 1.5 m steet tank provides tiquid
}~sigment D8T ber*ier Carbon steet riser Teer, rteture Engineering >12 x DSEQ Vapor barrier is lost, certen (6) spray che e judgnent >1.5 x 08T steet tank provides liquid barrier Upper and tower Carbon steel bottom $ bear or yletd fler se bolts, break seat, Engineering >3 DEEQ Carbon steel tank ord riser (6) bearing ptete ':sek veper judgment (liquid barrier) bearing plates SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-62
) f) ('~~hi
\d) -( V; - wvus-san-co4 g;y, 7 gd TABLE D.9.3-1 (continued)
SLIDGE P'081LIZATION IN TANIC 2D-2 CONFlWEME47 BARPIPR VULNER481LITY ASSEStieruf F'1R EXTRE*8E NAftFAL MAZAaDS Intensity" Mitigative Action or Structure or Confina :rit Basis of" of Event or 8 tkte System or Corponent .1ers;er Foiture Mode of Berrier Assessment load lachte Berrier Footnote Upper tearing carbon steel bearing, field flenge botts tese veper intrier Engineering >5.5 K DBE Carbon .teet tanks and riser plate, split and split styport jtz$gemt, (ticpJid berrier) stipport specer, specer garp er>unting e*wlysis erwi purp ptetes metsiting ptate Ptyp cottrn end Steintess steel perp Crock p.rp coltrn, toose internet fluid Engineering >1.5 x DBEQ Loss of operationet liquid (6), shaft seat cotten and fluid pressure judg e t berrier on ptsp drive shef t (T) seats on drive shaft onty, carbm steet tank provides liquid barrier At Riser M-1 Ptry coltrn inpect at top of tank at riser (no Analysis >0.5 x DBEQ failure). Ippect tank roof stoport cetten et bottaus of tenk, ptrp cotten Analysis >15 m DBEQ Steet tank berrier feiture At Risers M-3 Psep cottrn lepect at top of tenk (no failure) Anetysis >1.2 x DirEQ and >-6
*epect et bottm of tank, pin cotten An6tysis >T x 08EQ Steet tank berrier felture At Risers M-4, Ptrp cotten impact et top of tank (no feiture) Analysis >1.2 x D8EQ M-5, M-7 leoset et bottom of tenk, ptry cetten Anotysis >13 a DREQ Steet tank ' m ier felture At Riser M-2 Ptrp cottsn inpect et top and bottom of tenk, ptsp Anotysis >1.1 DBEQ Steet tank berrier cotum f elture ,
Shield Plug Cerban steet plug Cottepse of plug through riser sleeve Analysis, >6 R DBEQ Loss of vapor berrier, carbon (6) with concrete and into tank engineering >3 . OBT steel tank provides liquid steet ptete shielding itzigemt berrier Rupture of carbon steal tank bottcss chse Anotysis, >6 m DBEQ Loss of primary liquid and to coltepsing shield plug engineering >3 a D8T vapor berrier. Tank vault and jWgment steet tIner pen provide tIquid and vapor berrier. Trtms cott.pse o ,tenk vault roof Anotysis, >4 m DBEQ No toss of berrier -- tank engineering vault roof reasins intact judgment SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-63
. rs /m WVNS-SAR-004 U
)
R0v. 7
~
TA8LE D.9.3-1 (concluded) k SLtSCE MOBILIZATION IN TAMK 80-2 CONFINEMENT SAGRIER WLNERASILITY ASSES $stui FOR EXTREME NATt,9AL MAZARDS Intensity"' Mitigative Action or Bes' ,of"' of Event or Backsg> System or Structure or Confinement Berrier Failure Mode of Garrier _ ,Aetecsment toad Sackte 8errier Foo*Mte Conconmt Ptssp Support Tank vault ro>f Shear botts et truss su m ort Anstysis >2 x 03EQ No toss of 1,a er - tank veutt roof remains ir. fact Structure Truss collapse on tank vault Analysis, >4 x 08EQ No toss of barrier - tank vault engineering roof remains intact judynent (1) 8 asis of vulnerability assessment may be thr e t analysis, experleent31 tests or engineering Jtsigment based on experience. (2) Intensity is expressed as a multiple of the design basis event as defined in cates, 1986 (section 3.2)- D8EQ = Design 8as!s Earthquake OST = Design Basis tornado APOC = Abnormal Ptssp Operating Condition (3) Falture of tank barrier leads to falture of vault cottam and roof. (4) Leakage of positive h W rostatic pressure inward should be minimat. (5) Motion of tank is judged to exceed the flexurnt strength of the riser and its welded connection to the top of Yank 80-2. (6) It is asstaned that the WTFVS does not remain functional daring the extreme earthquake and tornado environment. (7) Loss of water pressure in the pt.rp cottsm dse to the leakage through the cottsm casing will be detected and the ptep motor shut down automaticatty. This migration of radioactive liquid up the pep drive shaf t would not be possible. The primary barrier remain intact. t i a i SAR:0000863.RM Page 9-64
" T
__ _ ._. ._ _ . . . . _ . ____...__m__ . . . _ _ . - _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ s J wvHS-SAR-004
.D.10.0 CONDUCT OF STS AND SMVS OPERATIONS The STS and SMVS will undergo an Operational Readiness Review in accordance with VV 368 before start up.
D.10.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE The SMVS v111 be operated by the same organization that operates the STS today. The IRTS consists of four major subsystems: 1) the STS, 2) the LVTS,
- 3) the CSS, and 4) the DC. The operating organizations for the STS and SMWS, LUTS, and CSS report to the manager of IRTS Operations. The IRTS Operations, Manager reports to the manager of Plant Operations who in turn reports to the WVNS President and General Manager. The operating organization for the Drum Cell reports to the. Waste Management Operations Manager who reports to the Executive Vice President and Deputy General Manager who in turn reports to the VVNJ President and General Manager. Engineering support for IRTS Operations is provided by the manager of Process Control Engineering who reports to the
~
[' , IRTS Operations Manager. The shift manning levels for operation of the STS/SMVS as defined in Table D.10.1-1 are valid even though the control rooms are in two different
- buildings because the STS and the SMVS not operated concurrently. Operational
' plans for the SMWS call for washing the sludge followed by several-days of settling, sampling, and analyses before the sludge wash solutions are processed through'the STS.
The minimum manning level for each IRTS operating shift broken down by subsystem is summarized in Table D.10.1 1. With_the exception of the sludge mobilization pumps and the caustic addition equipment, the SHWS hardware is virtually identical to the STS. STS operators will be trained in the operation-of the sludge mobilization pumps and the l () SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-1 e 1
,~ _ , _ _ , _ _ . _ . ,_ = _ _ . _ . .
- , . _.-.____._____.__.--...._._.___.____...m _-..m. _._
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
- ()
caustic addition system. The STS operators will also be trained on the contents of the SMVS Run Plan which will provide a process overview as well as the process sampling plan necessary for processing the sludge wash solutions. ; The training will be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the SKWS operator qualification program described in Section 10.3 It is planned that the current shift manning used in the STS will be extended to SMVS operations. The IRTS organizational structure is shown in Figure D10.1 1. See Section A.10.1 of Volume I for a general WVNS organizational structure discussion. D.10.2 PREOPERATIONAL TESTING AND OPERATION D.10.2.1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING THE TEST PROGRAM All procedures and instructions for conducting the test program and for evaluating, documenting and approving the test results will be developed, (} reviewed and approved in accordance with WVNS Policies, Quality Manual, and implementing-procedures. Hazards associated with the testing are evaluated in accordance with WVNS policies and proceduros and the safety review programs. Such reviews are conducted in accordance with VVNS procedures and consist of ;. independent safety reviews, Radiation and Safety Committee reviews, or
' Operational Readiness Review Board r.5 views.
D.10.2.2 TEST PROGRAM DESCRIPTION The test program-for the STS and SMWS will verify that the installation was accomplished in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared for that purpose- and that the system operates as designed to rettee the volume of HLW contained in Tank 8D.2 consistent with STS and WVDP design objectives. The
. preoperational test program will culminate in a formal readiness review that will be approved by DOE before STS start-up.
Page 10 2 SAR:0000863.RM 1 n~, .,e,r ,,- , << ,,-,-en c,m, ec.,--- ,,w.m , ,,- - , , - , , , r- , --w,- - - - - - , e,< r
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 The test. program for the SMWS will verify that the mobilization pumps were installed in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared for that purpose and that the system ope ~ates as designed to mobilize the PUREX sludge in HUW Tank 8D 2 and according to WVDP design objectives. The preoperational test program will culminate in a formal readiness review that will be approved by DOE before SMWS start up. D.10.2.2.1 PHYSICAL FACILITIES All mechanical and electrical components, including piping and wiring, will be tested during installation to ensure proper installation and operation. D.10.2.2.1.1 PIPING All process piping systems were hydrostatically tested and nondestructively examined in accordance with ANSI-B31.3 requirements. O D 10.2.2.1.2 WIRING Electrical wire was spot-checked for installation and continuity.
.D.10.2.2.1.3 POWER Control panels, electrical outlets, MCC,= welding receptacles, etc. were tested to ensure the presence of proper AC power.
D 10.2.2.1.4- HOTORS Motors were tested for proper operation and correct rotations.
-SAR:0000863 RM Page 10-3
,N- e-e , -e .,m-- w v- - r , --,e- v ,,--eaw-& we--y w+w w w.~ , w- - - ,- -r--,-i,a 3q-,w---- , -- --y--v i w
. - _ - . . . . . - _ - - _ ~.- - -_- -. .-=
WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 LN/(] D.10.2.2.1.5 VALVES
. Solenoid valves and actuators were tested to ensure proper operation of automatic valves and limit twitches.
D.10.2.2.1.6 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION Switches were_ tested for prepar operation. Flow switches, level switches, ' level sensors, and thermocouples were functionally tested and calibrated. D.10.2.2.1.7 PROCESS COMPONENTS Process components / vessels were hydrostatically tested in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section VIII or individual equipment specifications. D.10.2.2.1.8 INTERFACE SIGNALS All required interface signals between control panels from different systems were tested to ensure proper-operation. D.10.2.2.1.9 RADIATION MONITORS Operation of-on-line process monitors, continuous air monitors, and area radiation monitors was checked. Alarm signal functions were checked. D.10.2.2.1.10 COOLING SYSTEM Isolation between cooler and chiller loops was verified.
.s,,f- SAR:0000863.RM Page 10 4
W,NS-SAR-004 Nov. 7 D.10.2.2.1.11 CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTS Control room instruments were tested in the control panel fabricator shop. Field testing was via loop checks during cold operations. D.10.2.2.2 PROCESS OPERATIONS The STS was fully tested using zeolite and water to ensure operation of the system as designed. A surrogate supernatant was also used during cold testing _ and check-out. D.10.2.2.2.1 PRELIMINARY TESTING The components of the STS are operated manually and automatically from the control panel using plant water initially to ensure proper operation of all subsystem components, i.e., Filtration system (preliminary and final), Supernatant Feed, Cooling System, Ion Exchange. Decontaminated Supernatant Collection, and Transfer and Fresh Zeolite Fill. This testing included the flushing. D.10.2.2.2.2 REMOTE HANDLING SYSTEM Test manipulators, Air locks, Zeolite Sluicing Systems, and all other mechanical equipment were tested for proper function. Interface With Other Systems: the STS has been tested to verify proper interface with the LVTS, Ventilation System, Analytical Cell, and Utility Services. SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-5
1 l WNS-S AR* 004 i O Rev. 7
.N)
D.10.2.2.2.3 INTECRATED TESTING The final test was a continuous integrated test of the entire system: 1
- Continuous feed of surrogate supernatant into the feed tank. l
- Continuous processing of surrogate supernatant through the ion exchange column (s). ,
- Batch feeding of surrogate decontaminated supernatant from collection tank (8D-3) to LWTS after sample verification.
- Batch feeding of fresh zeolite into the ion exchange columns.
D.10.2.3 TEST DISCUSSION
/O D.10.2.3.1 PIPING TESTS t
Purpose Confirm that the piping systems as installed are leak tight. Response and Acceptance Criteria - Process _ piping was tested in accordance with ANSI B31.3 requirements. D.10.2.3.2 WIRING TESTS l ! Furpose - Confirm that there are no breaks in the electrical wiring. 1 1
. Response and Acceptance Criteria Electrical power and instrument wiring were spot checked for installation continuity. Control circuits were functionally i verified. Power cables were meggered and each connection inspected. -
1 1 f% SAR:0000863.RM Page 10 6
- _ _ . . _ _ ~_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
li l WNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 D.10.2.3.3 MOTOR TESTS Purpose - Confirm tho' motors are wired properly. Response and Acceptance 6 .terion Each motor in the system was bump tested to verify rotation in the correct direction and at the design rpms. D.10.2.3.4 VALVE TESTS l Purpose - Confirm correct operation of each valve. Response and Acceptance Criteria Each valve was operated from a manual switch and solenoid valves adjusted to regulate automatic valve response-rates. The. acceptance criterion was a valve response in the correct direction (open/close) in the required time, D.10.2.3.5 PROCESS COMPONENTS Purpose - Confirm that process components have been built and installed properly. Response and Acceptance Criteria - All process components / vessels were tested in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section VIII or the equipment specifications, current checkout procedures, and for proper funct bnal operation. D.10.2.3.6 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION TEST Purpose - Confirm correct operations and connections of each inserstment loop. Response and Acceptance Criterion - Each instrument loop was checked to [ confirm correct connections. . Loops were then operated to check performance SAR:0000863.RM. Page 10 7 I i
. - . .. - - -._ =_ - . - -
RVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 (~.}
%/
and response. Acceptance and response cri+.eria varied with specific instrumentation and applications.
~
u 10.2.3.7 ZEOLITE BATCH TANK TESTS i Purpose - Adjust actuators to ensure proper operation. Response and Acceptance Criterion The zeolite in the batch tank was sluiced to an empty ion exchange column. Acceptance criterion was meC by the ability 1 to sluice to.the empty column at a rate compatible with column devatering l rates. D.10.2.3.8 PNEITr!ATIO SAMPLE TRANSFER SYSTEM Purpose - Confirm correct operation of the system. Vere met by the ability to remotely send ['T Response and Acceptance Criteria 4 samples to the Analytical Cell, including proper transmission and receipt of signals by sender and receiver and sample tracking enroute by the photocells. D.10.2.3.9 RADIATION HONITORS Purpose . Confirm the adequate response of radiation menitors. Response and Acceptance Criterion - Acceptance criterion was met by adequate response (alarm signal at designated set point) to appropriate check / calibration sources of known activity, concentration and/or exposure rate. SAR:0000863.RM Page 10 8
. - . _ . _ ~. _ _. _ . . . . . .
. _ _ _ _ . . - _ _m-_ .- __ _ _ _ _
l I' WVNS-SAR-004 1 Rev. 7 D,10.2.3.10 ION EXCHANGE COLUMNS l Purpose - Verify the proper operation of the ion exchange columns. Response and Acceptance Criteria - Acceptance criterion was an extraction efficiency of 99.9% of the cesium based on scale model tests and a zeolite sluice out efficiency of 99.99%. _D.10.2.3.11 FILTRATION SYSTEM l Purpose - Verify proper performance of the supernatant pre- and postfilters. ) Response and Acceptance Criteria - Acceptance criterion was met by the ability to remove.99% by weight of particles having a size greater chan 1 pm (10,000 A). Verification was by scale model tests. I) D.10.2.3.12 COOLING SYSTEM Purpose - Verify ability of cooling system to reduce surrogate supernatant temperature. Response and Acceptance Criteria - Achieved by monitoring temperature of surrogate supernatant feed to ion exchange. Het if cooling system can reduce temperature of surrogate supernatant to less than 10*C (50*F) at a surrogate supernatant feed rate in the range of 225 (1) - 680 L/h (3 gpm). D.10.2.3.13 OPERATIONAL TESTING Purpose - Confirm the ability to operate the STS as a continuous process, f Response and Acceptance Criterion - Het by. achieving an uninterrupted flow f rate compatible with the capacity of the CSS to receive and solidify _ SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-9 l.
. . ~ - . - - . - .- - - - . _ . . - . - -- . -
1 i l l WVHS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 decontaminated supernatant and to produce decontaminated supernatant and loaded zeolite exhibiting characteristics consistent with laboratory scale results and design criteria. D.10.2.3.14 SLUDGE MOBILIZATION PUMPS i Purpose - Verify the proper installation and operation of the sludge mobilization pumps in Tank 8D 2. 1 Response and Acceptance Criteria After final assembly, each mobilizaticn pump has been extensively tested: minimum six hour performance run test, hydro tested, and seal leak test. After tank installation, the pump motor and I its centro 11er are run through a series of tests and sre fine-tuned with ; critical operating frequencies locked out. Pump seal water low pressure and l high flow switches checked to verify equipment interlock functions are . operational. I D.10.3 TRAINING PROGRAMS D.10.3.1 SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND COALS OF THE SMVS OPERATOR QUALIFICATION PROGRAM The overall objective of the qualification program is to provide qua)ified personnel to operate the STS and SMWS safely in such areas as equipment operation, process flows, control instrumentation, Radiological / Industrial Safety, and emergency response in accordance with DOE Order 5480.5 " Safety of Nuclear Facilities" and DOE order 5480.20 " Personnel Selection, Qualification Training and Staffing Requirements at DOE Reactor and Non Reactor Nuclear Facilities." Qualified personnel will be provided by training and testing operator candidates who meet the prerequisites for the qualification program, h-LI SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-10 1
wvns-SAR-004 P.e v . 7
\V ]l /
The STS and SMVS Qualification Program vill fulfill the specific needs determined for personnel to operate the facility and process in a safe and efficient manner. At the completion of the training / qualification program the operator shall be eble to:
- Explain the theory and function of the system process, equipment, and controls for generation of an acceptable procuet.
- Perform the normal modes of opere*. ion for the STS and SMVS Standard Operating Procedures and OSRs.
- Detect abnormal or emergency conditions using the inst:rumentation available and visual monitoring of the componentr..
- Hitigate emergency situations using appropriate procedures and (V] bring the system to a sefe shut-down mode.
- Demonstrate sufficient motor skills to operate manipulators and related mechanical process equipment proficiently.
e Operate the facility safely in accordance with DOE Order 5480.5 and DOE Order 5480.20. The contents of the training program for specific operations of the STS and FMVS are based on a needs analysis u;ing presently available information (SAR, Design Criteria, Process Narrative, and P& ids). VVNS management also assessed the cognitive and physical demands upon operators of controlling the process
- a. s equipmen:.
l n I Q SAR:0000863.RH Page 10 11 l l
i WNS-S AR-004 Rev. 7 ,v) D.10.3.2 OPERATION PREREQUISITES Person.el selected and assigned to the STS and SMVS Operations group will possess, as a minimum, a Plant Systems "B" Operator Qualification. Such personnel _will have completad training in the follovir.g prerequisites: 1
- Radiation Worker Training l l
- Respiratory Protection Training
- Procedural Compliance Training
- Quality Assurance Training
- Radioactive Materials Handling Tralning
- Lifting and Handling Training
(}
- Nuclear Criticality Safety Training
- General Plant and Chemical Safety
- General Plant Emergency Plan and Procedures Successful completion of a "B" Qualification in Plant Systems danotes the documented tref ning of personnel in areaa relating to radiological and nuclear safety, adainistrat-tve policies and procvduren , emergency actions, ir.dustrial health and safety, and areas of process control relating to instrumentation, plant cortrenents , and survei.llance. ieollowing a minimum four-month training period, a comprehensive writter- cxamination and walkthrough are administered before the trainee is considered fully qualified to perform the duties associated with the position. A passing grade of 80% is the minimum
/ N k._,) SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-12
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 Verification of training is made by a cognizant manager
- .3airement.
following a finding that the candidate's proficiency is satisfactory af ter completion of the training program and receipt of a satisfactory statement of the trainee's passing grade of 80% or greater. Currently this qualification is a prerequisite to "A" operator training positions for the Main Plant, LWTS, STS, CSS, Vitrification, Vaste Management, and Radiological Projects. D.10.3.3 TRAINING RESOURCES The UVNS Training and Development Department 1.- sve the responsibility for overall coordination and documentation of tr- a fication program. The department aill employ the experti - of the IRTS Engineering Group to provide classroom instruction on the basic *.heory, process concepts, subsystems, components; and procedures thct comprise the STS and SMVS **ocesses. This training will be supplemented by tne use of vendor prepared materials related to basic functions of valves , pumps , instruments, process controllers and/or / other vendor material specific to the STS and SHUS systems. Further training
} ~'
reference material and information on the WVNS and Training Procedures, Temporary Operating Procedu es, Standard Operating Procedures, TRs/OSRs, and applicable Occurrence Reports will be kept in the Training Resource Center. Training and Development Department personnel will develop the qualification standard and training aids and videotape lectures. Training vill also provide instruction, tutorial activities and operator qualification guidance. D.10.3.4 TRAINING CONTENT OUTLINE The following outlines the fundamentals of the Qualification Stana .d for Supernatant Treatment System (STS) Operator "A"* A. Basic System Knowledge
- 1. STS Qualification Program Introduction
- 2. Process Concepts and Control Introduction
( ,) SAF 0000863.RM Page 10-13
WVNS-SAR-004
-Rev. 7
.3. Instrumentation Diagrams and Symbols
- 4. Programmable Controllers *
- 5. STS Motive Devices
- 6. ST5' Theory and Interfaces
- 7. Master - Slave Manipulator Operation Techniques
- 8. Operation of Valve Aisle Job Crane B. Operations
- 1. Liquid Transfer from BD-2 to D-001 (Feed '"ank)
- 2. Processing from D 001 8D 3
- 3. STS-LUTS-Process Interface 4 STS Ventilation Systems
- 5. Utility Service / interface with Main Plant
- 6. STS Air Compressor 7-. STS Instrumentation and Controls O 8. Auxiliary Cenerator - Description, Operation
~
- 9. STS Alarm Responses
- 10. _ Sample Transfer to Analytical Lab
- 11. - WTF Operation and' Surveillance C. Plant Safety
- 1. Operational Safety and Technical Requirements
- 2. STS Fire Protection D. Emergency Plans and Procedures
.The following outlines the fundamentals for the WTF/SMWS Operator "A" Qualification Standard:
A. Operations
- 1. Corrosion Coupons 4 -
a e 10-14
WVNS-SAR-004 Y Rev. 7
\j Valve Aisle Equipment Installation / Removal and Housekeeping
~
2.
- 3. Mechanical. Arm-
- 4. Dump Valve Air Sparge and "J" Nozzle
- 5. Mobilization Pump Installation
- 6. DOP. Testing and Filter Changeouts for PVS and STS
- 7. Hydrogen Monitoring System
- 8. Zeolite Mobilization
- 9. Sludge Mobilization and Wash System
- 10. 8D-1 Chemical Addition
- 11. Tickle File Card System B. Ceneral Plant Safety and Emergency Procedures
- 1. Fire Brigade Training
- 2. SAR (STS/SMWS)
- 3. Emergency Transfer of HLW Tanks
-Bcth the STS and SMUS Operators Qualification Standards include both knowledge
[d-' end skill objectives. Supervisors oversee the on-the-job training program, which requires demonstration of proficiencies set forth in the qualification standard. ~ As required in DOE Orders 5480.5 and 5480.20 on-the-job training wi11'contino to pr. ovide personnel with familiarity in all aspects of the position.- Such training includes normal procedures, emergency actions, radiation' control practices, location and function of the pertinent safety
. systems, configuration control procedures and TRs/OSRs. Continuous training-on new material is injected into both the qualification program and the required annual requalification program. Included in this program in the ongoing job training which is specific to performance of job skills.
p SARiO000863.RM Page 10-15
WNS-S AR-004
-s "'
y D.10.3.5. QUALIFICATION VERIFICATION /DOCUKENTATION D.10.3.5.1 EXAMINATIONS Before becoming a qualified SMWS Operator, verification is required to ensure that the stated learning objectives and skill objectives have been achieved. The stated objectives will be used in the development of the following evaluation methods: A written examination' covering all aspects of the qualification program with a passing grade of 30%.
=An_ operational walk-through examination performed by SMVS Engineering, Training-or Supervisory personnel with a passing grade of 80%. Existing and/or organizational entities (i.e, engineering, training, and supervisory
_ personnel) have been established to support SMVS operatior.s. D.10.3.5.2 DOCUhlNTATION The qualification program shall be documented in sufficient detail to permit. independent evaluation of the scope of the. training program. Procedures specific to training are found in VV-538, and the Training Policies and Procedures . -. Documentation for each module of the training program will include identification of performance goals, a..d objectives. A qualification standard will be kept for each trainee that documents all significant steps of training. SAR:0000863.RM. Page 10-16 i
m WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 [N -) D lC.3.5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE QA reviews operator compliarce with procedures and that operators are trained to perform the activity for which they are responsible. This is done as a regularly scheduled QA function but surveillance frequency or schedule is unknown to Operations personnel. Periodic QA audits are performed on the Training and Development Department where qualification standards, training materials, and classroom presentations __ are subject to surveillance. Content of training media and presentations is reviewed for con.pliance with quality requirements. D.10.3.6 REQUALIFICATION . DOE Orders 5480.5 and 5480.20 state that " Retraining and reexamination shall be required at least annually on all procedures for handling abnormal nuclear [ ~'} facility conditions and emergency situations relatice to the employe's h assigned responsibilities, and at least every tso years on all other subjects in which the fissionable material handler, operator, or supervisor is expected to be' proficient." The reexaminetion program will be designed to review yearly:
- Changes to procedures;
- Modifications to equipment;
- Subject matter not reinforced by direct use (e.g., fundamentals and operation of seldom used equipment and procedures); and
- All procedures for handling abnormal nuclear facility conditions and emergency situations.
(G s_ / 1 SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-17 l
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 I^D% x) The requalification program will provide for maintaining current knowledge and skills of the applicable operators. The requalification program will be conducted every two years and will include but not be limited to:
- Equipment-and Plant Modifications;
- SARs and OSRs/TRs; e operating Procedures; e Occurrence Reports, accidents, or near misses which occur locally or elsewhere if appropriate; e Changing sources of radioactivity, criticality potentials or other potential environmental hazards;
(^^) e New outlooks or methods regarding the ALARA concept; and N~s] e lafety (fire , personnel injury, etc. ) . Drills on abnormal or emergency procedures will be incorporated into the continuing training program. The drills will be used to assess the operators' knowledge of the procedures to follow in emergency or abnormal operating conditions. The drills will be as realistic as possible without endangerin5 property or personal welfare. Additional information on the STS Operator Training and Qualification Program can be found in McKenzie, 1986. l f'N Page 10-18 L ( ,/ SAR:0000863.RM I
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
-fQh.
D.10.4 10RMAL STS/SNWS OPERATIONS The STS/SHWS will be operated using procedures prepared, implemented, reviewed, revised, maintained and approved per the requirements of the WVNS Policy and Procedures Manual and in accordance with DOE Orders, direct',ves, regulations, and guidance necessary for the operation of the VVDP and conduct of personnel. Review and revision of procedures is in a controlled fashion. The cognizant manager or designee forwards the procedure to appropriate reviewers-for approval or comment. If a procedure affects only those activities in the department, approval minimally ic.;1udes cognizant staff and department manager, the Quality Assurance Manger, and the Project Records and Publications Manager. However, if the precedure imposes requirements upon other-departments, those department managers are required to review the procedure for cpproval. rq.
)
D.10.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING
'An emergency plan has been developed for the WVDP. This plan is described in Section A.10.5 of Volume I. Operation of the STS/SKWS will not require any modification to the procedural requirements of this plan. Specific emergency response provisions to deal with STS/SMWS contingencies will be developed in accordance with the existing emergency plan.
SAR:0000863.RM Page 10-19
WVNS-SAR-004 7 Re'r . 7
-( N REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.10.0 McKenzie, 1986 McKenzie, S. P. March 25, 1986. "Supernatant Treatment System Operator Qualification Program.'- Transmitted via WNS memo EC:86:0023.
'J. C. Cwynar to-Distribution.
O I-l
.- SAR:0000863.RH Page 10-20 l
1.
l WVHS-SAR-004
. [,,.'k Rev. 7 \ ~- /
TABLE D.10.1-1 Minimum Shift Mannine Levels for Ooeration of the IRTS Operators Shift Subsystem "A" "B" Supervisor Encineer STS/SMWS .2 0 1 1 LWTS 'l 1 1 1 CSS 2 1 1 1 DC 2 1 1 1
.t v - () sAR:0000863.RM Page 10-21 l
P l f'
WVNS-SAR-004 -[f~,} Rev. 7 ~ N,,/ ' D ll.0 OPERATIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS The OSR section of this volume has been deleted in its entirety. The following list of OSRs/TRs apply to the STS and S!G7S and can be found in Volume VI: u .- WDP Identifier Title / Contents 0$R-CP 1 WDP Airbor;4 Radioactivity Release Limits 0$R GP 2 Radioactivity Content of Liquid Effluents Reletsed f rerr the WDP OSR GP-3 Building and Vessel Ventilation Systems Operability OSR CP-4 Ef fluent and Vrr'iromental Monitoring OSR GP 5 WDP Emergency Power ReqJirements TR GP 9 Control of Pl.mt Equipment Function and Configuration 0$R-GP 10 Airborne Effluent Monitoring System Operability [m
'u)
I TR GP-13 Evacuation Alarm and Emergency Paging Syst u Operability TR GP-15 Fire Brigade and Emergency Response Team Training
?R GP-16 Plant fire Protection Systems
- OSP-IRTS 1 Maintenance of Carbon Steel High Level Wattu Tank Integrity 0$R IRTS 3 Maintenance of Spare HLW Storage Capacity TR IRTS Depressurization of STS for Maintenance
-TR !RTS 5 r . Process Limits NR$IRT51}$ IIS2F"d E.egriforneAte
=====
k) SAR:0000863.RM Page 11-1
i WVNS-SAR-004 jN Rev. 7
\ )
D.12.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE The Quality Assurance Program implemented for operation of the Supernatant Treatment System (STS) and for construction and operation of the Sludge Mobilization / Wash System (SKWS) forms part of the overall WVNS Quality Assurance Program. The QA program requirements and implementing procedures are prescribed in a controlled document hierarchy that inel ades the VVNS Policies and Procedures (WVPP) Manual, the Quality Managereent Manual (QHM), and Quality Assurance Procedures (QAP). These VVNS datuments conform to and translate the requirements of ANSI /ASME NQA-1 and DOE 5700.6B into a graded system for Quality Assurance applied to the systems, structures, components, and operation of the STS and SMVS. D.12.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Organization charts and their descriptions for construction and operation of the STS and SHWS d, noting lines of responsibility, authority, and (~'}
\' -
communication are provided in part D.10.1 of this SAR. An described in this referenced section and in the QMM, the personnel responsible for verifying conformance, auditing, inspecting have the organizational freedom and authority to perform these functions without undue external influences imposed on them. D.12.2 IMPLEMENTATION Section A.12.2 of Volume I discusses the implementation of the Quality Assurance Program based an DOE ordtc 5700.6B, DOE-ID order 5700.6C and the eighteen criteria of ANSI /ASME NQA-1. As these standards are revised, the WVNS Quality Assurance Program is updated at customet direction to address changed requirements or add new ones. Currently the QA program conforms to , the 1986 edition of NQA-1. [~) (j SAR:0000863.PJ4 Page 12-1
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7
]
-All of the policies, piacedures, and instructions required to implement the QA program have been produced and are in effect. Audits by outside agencies and on site personnel are scheduled by procedure, and conducted to assure the implementation of the QA program.
The WNS. QMM addresses the descriptive requirements of those Quality Assurance program elements required by NRC Regulatory Guide 3.26. As described in the WNS Quality Assurance Program Plan (WDP-002), the QA program applied to the STS/SWS is a graded. system. Section D.4.4 presents il information concerning the safety classifications which are used in conjunction .with the service classes to define the qualicy levels. Table D.4.4-1 presents safety class, service class, and quality level for the structures, systems and components associated with the STS and SWS. The criteria and procedures used to determine quality level designation and the classification of structures, systems and components.are presented in detail fT,, in Section A.4.4 of Volume I. No credible S WS equipment failure is expected to result in a loss of STS or SWS operating capability for a period in excess of six months or a radiation
. exposure.. resultant from repair / replacement in excess of 50 mSv/y (5 rem /y) and therefore, no STS or SWS structure, system, or component.is designated as
- Service Class I.
Structures, sys* ems and components assigned-Service Class II are so designated L since their. repair / replacement could result in a loss of SWS operating capability.of one to six months and/or a radiation exposure to repair / replace of-1 5 cSv (1-5 rem). No STS or SWS structure, system, or component is so designated. Service Class III is assigned to those structures, systems or components whose
. repair / replacement could result in a loss of operating capability of one to SAR:0000863,RM Page 12-2
WVNS-SAR-004 ' Rev. 7 [}
~ (./
four-weeks and/or an exposure to repair / replace of up to i rem. The SKWS mobilization pump support structure, mobilization pumps, and support equipment are so designated. The STS valve aisle and HLW-tanks are examples of this designation. Structures, systems and components _which by r.ature are reliable, normally available, and compatible with their required service based on a history of proven industrial performance are assigned Service Class IV.
'Whenever practical, equipment / component spares will be maintained on-site to minimize impac; on operating capabilities should failures occur (Section D.6.5.3)
-Section A.12.2 of Volume 1' discusses the implementation of the Quality Assurance ProtJam based on DOE Order 5700.6B, DOE ID Order 5700.6C and the eighteen criteria of ANSI /ASME NQA-1, 1986.
bu g G
WVNS-SAR-004 Rev. 7 s REFERENCES FOR SECTION D.12.0 DOE 5700.6B U.S. Department of Energy, " Quality Assurance," September 1986. NQA-1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities," ASME NQA-1-1986, September 1986. QMM West Valley Nuclear Services Quality Management Program, April 1990. VVDP-002 VVNS Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP), April, 199 -_ a O ( b SAR:0000863.RM Page 12-4 t
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