ML20097G694
| ML20097G694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1984 |
| From: | Boyer V PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8409200080 | |
| Download: ML20097G694 (40) | |
Text
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 23O1 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 V S. BOY ER ER. VICE PRESIDENT NUCLE A R POWE R September 17, 1984 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut Division of Licensing U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Peach Eottom Atomic Power Station Fire Pros ction Modifications }rogress Report
REFERENCES:
(1)
Letter from J. W.
Gallagher to D. G. Eisenhut, dated February 25, 1983 (2)
Letter trom V.
S. Boyer to D.
G. Eisenhut dated September 16, 1983.
(3)
Letter from V. S. Boyer to D.
G. Eisenhut, dated December 2, 1983 (4)
Letter from V. S. Boyer to D.
G. Eisenhut, dated May 16, 1984
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Philadelphia Electric Company, in the reference (1) letter, proposed to submit Peach Bottom's Fire Protection Modifications Progress Report every four mcnths starting in May, 19G3.
This letter includes: (I) the fifth Modifications Progress Report (Attachment 1) ; (II) an update of the penetration sealing program; (III) an update of the fire damper program including a schedule exemption request and a 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, fire barrier exemption request; and (IV) a section addressing miscellaneous fire barrier concerns.
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1Mr. Darrell G.;Eisenhut;
~ September 17, 1984 Page 2 LI.
. Modification Progress Report A comparison of the attached-Modification Status Report and the previous Modification' Status Report, dated May-1984,
-reveals that-ten modifications have been completed and-three c
- expected completionLdates-have been changed.
These changes are due either to the inability to provide specific equipment outages (Mod'1029A); delays in obtaining equipment (Mod 1029U); or unavoidable construction delays (Mod 1309, Text-Section III).
The outages have been difficult to 6-obtain since(some sof the equipment serves both units in both
- the operating and shutdown conditions (i.e., shutdown cooling valves, HVAC equipment).
Obtaining qualified circuit breakers (Mods.1029J, K, L) continues to be a concern.
Modifications'requi. red to implement the alternative shutdown requirements have been added to the Progress Report.
- . II.. Penetration Seal Program III.M A.
-A total of 6150 penetration seals through 342 fire
-barriers -have been or are in the process of being upgraded.
B.
Unit.3 barriers are essentially complete.
Approximately 2% of the penetrations remain to be sealed.
The renaining work is composed of clean-up. items consisting ofEthe following:
1 (1)
Seala requiring an outage to perform the work, particularly high voltage conduit seals.
,E (2)
Seals' associated with. fire dampers which remain to be upjraded.
N
.(3)
Miscellaneous items including closing of
-nonconformances identifiedLduring inspection, accessibility problems'due to high' radiation, and particularly difficult installations to: engineer.
A roving fire watch has been instituted'in accordance with Peach Bottom Technica1' Specifications until the
) -
barriers.are completed.
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_-Mr. Darrell G.LE sen ut September 17, 1984 Page 3 C. (Unit'2 barrier penetration seals are 95% complete.
Work 11.s expected.to be completefprior to the end of the current refueling. outage.
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D.
Penetration 1 Seal Deviations (PSDs) -.The reference - (3)
. letter-briefly. described:our mechanism to control deviationstfrom approved' seal details.
A sample penetration seal. deviation. form.was also' transmitted.
Enclosed for-your information are several examples of completed penetration ' seal deviation: forms (Attachment
~
- 2).
The deviations reflect.both deviations ~from accepted seal designs and situations where 3-hour
. qualified penetration seals were not required to provide an acceptable fire barrier.. Each of the deviations is considered.to be minor. :In accordance with Generic Letter 83-33~,.each of these deviations has been evaluated to' verify.that the_affected fire barriers provide :a fire resistance - that' exceeds the. fire loading in the-area.
We have enclosed the penetration seal:
. deviation index (Attachment 3) that has been1 compiled to
- date.
At the'conclusionLof the penetration seal upgrade program, the completed penetration seal deviation package - will be - forwarded. to the - NRC L for. information.
III. HVAC Damper Program:III.G.2
- A.-[TheLinstallation of three-hour. qualified dampers in
-ventilation ducts penetrating' safe shutdown' barriers 11s conti:4uing. -The following' tabulation provides a' status of. the : fire damper ' program:
Unit 3 Unit 2' Common Total'.
43 44-57 Qualified 11 6
15 4
Complete 2
'4 12 Exemption 17 20 22
-To Do 13 14 8
fAs' stated in the reference (3) letter, several obstacles 4
C arose during damper installation'that have impacted the
~ damper upgrade program.
9 i
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bMr.:DarrellSG..Eisenhut' September 17, 1984
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Page 4 Q..:V 1.-
l Unforeseen problems with contamination of ductwork 7"
has almost doubled installation time.
Ductwork lwhich-serviced very low level radiation areas has
<become slightly contaminated over the years.
Work
.in some of these ducts now requires not only Anti-C
' clothing,'but also^the use of portable HEPA filter units-and enclosures around the work area.
- 2.
.The increase.in damper installation time has necessitated re-evaluation of critical equipment-HVAC outages to verify that sufficient cooling is provided to assure continued equipment l
operation / availability.
In'some_ cases, portable
-_ ventilation equipment is necessary.
3.
Similarly, our evaluations have revealed that outagestare required for several areas because we cannot assure-critical equipment. availability during. operation without ventilation to that equipment.
Additionally, productivity has not' improved _as
-expected.
The lack of improvement is attributable 3
to the _ uniqueness of each installation caused not so'auch-by-the ductwork/ damper installation requirements, but by-the interferences associated
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with'each installation.
Therefore, we hereby request, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, an ' exemption. from our
'previously transmitted-completion ~date of September 15, 1984.
Our proposed schedule would be to complete No. 3 unit damper-installations in the same time frame as the-Unit No. 2 and Common dampers, namely,_by the'end of the' current No. 2 Unit refueling outage..
In accordance with plant
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Technical Specifications, an hourly fire watch:has c
been established for ' those Unit No.- 3 fire barriers which: require dampers.
Our installation effort continues to be concentrated in Unit No. 3.
.As accessibility'in high radiation areas becomes available or outages occur,Jthe dampers will be completed.
Twenty-one-locations have been identified where
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B..
installation of' fire dampers in heating and ventilating penetrations through safe shutdown barriers would i '
adversely af fect ' safeguard ' systems.
SMr. Darrell G..Eisenhut
- Septembe r. 17, 1984 Page 5 11.
' Pursuant.to Section 50.12 of the Commission Regulations,;we' request an exemption from the
-requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section
~.III.G.2,: requiring separation of cables and equipment.and associated non-safety circuits of
-redundant' trains by a fire barrier having a three-hour ratiu.
s The following numbers address the dampers listed in
' Attachment'4.
T a.
Nos. 1, 2, 21, 22 - Inadvertent closure of a damper in the supply or exhaust ductwork of the outboard main steam isolation valve room could'cause a Group I isolation (i.e., MSIV closure) and a resultant reactor transient.
The temperature monitors utilized.for steam leak detection have caused Group I'isolations in the past when.the ventilation system has been shutdown due to reactor building
'isolations.
MSIV closure at power is one of the severest reactor transients, yet it is of-primary _importance:that we detect a genuine steam leak; therefore, no modification to the temperature monitors is contemplated.
For the above reason, we request an exemption from the requirement of installing a three-hour rated fire damper in the supply and exhaust ductwork. -This same fire area contains 386 square feet of unrated blowout panel as well as an open labyrinth to adjacent fire areas forLsteam" pressure relief.
These concerns are detailed in Section IV.d of this letter.
b.
Nos.-3-12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27 - Each one of these penetrations is associated with
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the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS).
All are 24" circular duct except No. 27 which is a 36" carbon steel exhaust pipe from the SGTS fans.
Each of these dampr locations is ~ in one of two main exhaust lines to the SGTS.
One line is from-the refueling floor, and the second line is from the teactor building.
The reactor building-is separated from the refueling floor by a sealed hatch.
Each of these lines 'is a main feed, and inadvertent closure of.any damper would jeopardize secondary containment capability in the event of a reactor building isolation.
The concern is compliance with single failure criteria, t
Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut September 17, 1984 Page 6 1.e., defeating SGTS with a single damper failure.
The duct is too small to insert two dampers side-by-side because of system friction losses.
(Single failure would thereby decrease flow but not defeat the system.) A second alternative would be to install new sections of duct at each barrier penetration location which would parallel the existing ductwork and serve as a bypass in the event a damper failed closed.
Though this is a viable approach, the cost and time associated with providing new bypasses would be extremely high.
The job would consist of adding 17 bypass ducts; core boring through reinforced concrete floor slabs and walls as thick as three feet; evaluating each of these walls and floors for structural irttegrity before core boring; engineering design to avoid existing plant interferences; and scheduling and monitoring all work activities to assure we have an operable SGTS system.
Plant Technical Specifications require both units be shutdown and no fuel movement if one branch of SGTS is out-of-service for over seven days.
The fire loading on opposite sides of the affected barriers is a maximum of 41 minutes; however, as evidenced by Attachment 4, the combustible loadings are generally considerably lower.
Little, if any, transmission of smoke should occur through the ductwork.
In the event of a fire, the SGTS should not be running because it is only used for Reactor Building isolations caused by various plant unusual events.
Therefore, based on the significant safety concern, the low combustible loadings in the areas and the minimal chance of smoke transmission, we request the exemption.
c.
No. 18 - This particular damper location does not affect a safeguard system; however, duct construction and fire loading support an exemption request.
This is an 18" carbon steel pipe which supplies ventilation air to the torus, the duct is hardpiped from the barrier to the torus.
Any smoke transmission
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J' "Mr. Darre1113. Eisenhut September 17, 1984 Page 7 to the torus, which is one-half filled with E
3; water, would be inconsequential.
The likelihood of a fire in the torus is extremely remote based on'the' minimal combustible loading of cables acsociated with lighting nnd valves.
Based on the above,- we request an exemption for this barrier.
2.
The following dampers are not qualified to a 3-hour rating,-but provide adequate fire barrier protection for the fire area loadings.
(See )
a.-
Nos. 13, 14, 15 - Each of these particular ducts contain 2 fire dampers in series which are rated at 1 1/2 hours each.
The dampers are similar in construction to those identified-and described in reference (2).
These dampers are located in the floor of a
.ductchase exiting the chemical laboratory.
The fire loadings are minimal;.09 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> in the chemical laboratory, and zero hours in the ductchase.
The installed dampers'are more than adequate to meet Generic Letter 83-33 requirements for fire area boundaries.
b.
Nos. 25, 26 - As indicated in Attachment 4, the ducts between the' identified barriers contain 1 1/2 hour rated dampers located outside the walls on each side of the damper.
These dampers were ~ installed outside the wall because of existing equipment interference in the area.
The fire loadings on each side of the barrier are minimal'and the " duct" is manufactured of schedule 40 steel.
The installation is sufficient to meet the
- required fire barrier resistance.
IV.
Fire Barriers - III.G.2
-A.
. Water Curtain - Mod 1029U A water. curtain has been installed in the west corridor of the Units-2 & 3 Reactor Buildings elev. 135 separating the north and south ends of each building.
Each system will be modified so that the primary method
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September'17, 1984
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MrJ Darrell G..Eisenhut Page 8 s
l of. deluge. system actuation'is automatic.
Cross zoned
. fixed temperature heat detectors will be installed on each side of the water. curtain.
The systems can also be
. activated using the manual break-glass control stations located.in the stairwell adjacent-to the fire area and also from an electrical remote station in the Reactor y
Building' Stairwell.
Smoke detectors are already in service :Ln the vicinity of the water curtains.
Unit 3 water curtain automation is hindered by equipment
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unavailability and will be completed as soon as
-possible.
Unit 2 will'be completed by the end of the current refueling outage.
This reflects a change in our expected completion date on the Mod Progress Report transmitted -with reference (4).
B.
Fire Doors We are currently in the midst of an extensive fire door review and upgrade program.
Fire doors in safe shutdown
= barriers were reviewed to assure compliance with U.L.
and-NFPA-requirements.
The majority of problems identified were screw holes or small punctures in doors and door frames.
There were also instances where U.L.
labels had been removed from qualified fire doors.
Documentation is available.to substantiate the ratings
.of these doors.
Two doors were identified which were not purchased to i
U.L. requirements. - Doors Nos. 305 and 356 are located at elevation 165.in the Control Structure Fan Room and separate that room from the M.G. Set Ventilation Supply
' Fans.
The door and frame construction as shown on the applicable vendor' print.is 16 gauge hollow metal, equal to the. labeled doors.. 'The door installation, jams and heads are identical to the labeled doors, as 'is all door i
hardware.
The combust 101c loadir.) on each side of the barrier is minimal,.0 hr. and.5 hr.
Therefore, the b
existing doors.are suitable for the installation and are in accordance with the fire barrier guidelines identified in Generic Letter 83-33.
C.
Gratings in Fire Barriers The Alternative Shutdown capability Assessment transmitted with reference. (2) identified soveral exemptions and their bases.
Section 7.2.1 presented the bases' for a III.G.2 exemption for fire areas 05 and 12, the Torus Compartments.
Page 7-7 incorrectly identified i
4 1
4 Mr. Darrell G.;Eisenhut September 17, 1984 Page 9 m
theLsize of.the, steel gratings provided for: torus access and-pressure relief as 101 square feet each.- In reality, Lthese gratings ~ are 50 square ' feet and. 40 square feet,
.respectively.
The sizes, though substantially larger Lthan originally reported, do not alter the basis for the exemption; request detailed in Section 7.2.1.
LAdditionally,_this same section failed to identify an 87 square foot grating which is located between the-Torus
- Room and the Neutron Monitoring' Rooms, El. 135, (Room Numbers 210, 255).
The fire loading in the Neutron Monitoring Room is.04 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> consisting of cable
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insulation and jacketing.
The Neutron Monitoring Room walls. and penetrations,, though' they are not safe shutdown barriers and were not part of the penetration seal upgrade program, are sealed and of a construction to provide radiation shielding.
It should not af fect the bases detailed in the exemption request.
- D.a Elowout Panels
- Fire areas 208 and 254, the outboard MSIV Rooms, are each provided with. a. total of 386 -square feet of blowout panel and also~are open to the adjacent Reactor Building
. general accesc areas by.an open labyrinth (see Attachment
- 5).
The blowout panels 1and 'open labyrinth are provided
- for steam venting in the. event of a high energy line break. - The blowout panels.have.no-fire rating.
One panel'and also the labyrinth vents from the MSIV Room (fire loading.02 hrs.) to the. Reactor Building general access area, El. 135 ft. (fire loading.68 hrs.).
The e
second panel vents into the Moisture Separator Area of the Turbine Building (fire loading.41 hrs.).
The i
labyrinth ~ vents vertically approximately 10' otf the floorritherefore, there are no clear openings at grade elevation to,the adjacent fire-area.
The only equipment inside the MSIV Rooms required to operate are the injection valves for the RCIC and HPCI w
. systems (Methods A and B, respectively).
There is also a steam supply valve for the RCIC system within the area; however, it is normally in its correct operating position.
r The RCIC or HPCILinjection valves are operated during the initial phases of the safe shutdown.
Once these valves are in their operating position, there is no requirement to operate them further.
The valves cannot be caused to operate spuriously from the MSIV Rooms.
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- Mr. D2rroll'G. EiC3nhut.
Saptember 17, 1984 Page 10
.Forfal fire-initiating-inside the MSIV rooms', Method C
. (June 1982 submittal) is used to safely shutdown the plant.-.The fire loading within the room is not sufficient to breachithe blowout panels or to escape the labyrinth.
For a fire initiating outside the MSIV rooms, Method A or B- (June 1982 submittal) is used,
. depending upon the specific location of the fire, to safely shutdown the plant.
The requisite valve operations inside the MSIV rooms will be performed prior
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to.the barriers being breached.
Therefore, pursuant -to Section 50.12 of the Commission Regulations, we request an exemption from the requirements of.10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requiring separation-of. cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a
. fire barrier having.a 3-hour rating based on the overriding nuclear, safety concerns;.the fact that the affected equipment in the MSIV Rooms operates early in the shutdown scenario and no spurious actuation in the room can effect valve positioning; and the relatively low combustible. loadings, particularly in the outboard MSIV Room.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
' Attachments cc:
A.1t. Blough, Site Inspector NRC Document Control Desk
y bOGET MO3. Go-217
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40-272
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Page 1 of 14 September, 1984 a
PBAPS Fire Protection Mod Progress Report
- Revised to Account for Proposed Alternative Shutdown System (ThisLReport Supersedes the May, 1984, Report) fR;y: 2-ROO means '" Unit. 2 '- End of Next Re fueling Outage" N/A - Not-Applicable n
4-Expected Mod' Description Status Completion' Dates Mod. No.
-Rercute ZD2Q1024K and Reroutes 2-EOO 1029B
>ID2Q1027B=then in progress.
'Cn:Cpsulate in Fire No encapsulation
' Eon] 4-4C.
necessary.
'En:Opsulate 3 Encapsulation 2-EOO 1029A rCCCways in Fire complete except Bon 3 4-4C - 2A2D855 for a_short IA2M001, EA2D417 section of 2A2M417 delayed due to design difficulties.
Short sections of ZA2M001 and
-2A2D855 associated with a Junction Box are also incomplete.
.Rercute 2D201024K in
' Reroute in 2-200 1029B Firo' zones 6-5E progress.
.and 6-5G.
Fix EA3Q1827A (reroute Complete Completed 1029B in' Fire-Zone 11-12C).
En2cpsulate Raceway encapsula-Raceway 1029A 333M002 in-tion complete.
completed.
cFiro sone 11-12C.
J-Box to be J-Box -
encapsulated.
12/31/84
'En cysulate ZA2M417; complete Completed 1029A 333D002 in Fire Bona 11-75.
a m..
m a
r Page 2 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
Enc ~psulate conduits Encapsulation 2-EOO 1029A ZA2B1249, ZC2B1247 complete. for End ZA2B143 in Fire ZA2B143. ZA2B1245 Zo20 50-78A and ZC2B1247 must be rerouted before encapsulation.
Reroute complete; encapsulation in progress.
EnTTpaulate conduits Complete Comple ted 1029A ZC3B137, ZC3B150 and JunStion Box J17 in Fira Zone 50-78A.
En~Tpoulation 1/2 SSA Complete Completed 1029A Ra3 ways in Firo Zone 50-78B.
En psulate ZB3D1802A, Complete Completed 1029A B cnd ZD3DD01E in Pira Zone 31-118.
EnETpsulate ZD3DD01E Corple te Comple ted 1029A in Fire Zone 32-119.
Rel~cate battery chargers Complete completed 1029C 3BD03 & 3DD03, then 1029A cnC paulato ZB3DD01E in Fire Zone 32-120.
Enizpsulate OG0311 Complete Completed 10291.
End ZA2AG121B in Pira Zone 35-122.
Rud: sign 2A1706R -
Complete Completed 1029A
.nTTpsulate OG0311 and ZA2AG121B in Firo Zone 37-124.
Redesign 2A1603R -
Complete Completed 1029D nD:poulate ZB2BD01E in 1029A Fira Zone 32-125.
Relocate battery charger Relocation 2-E00 1029C 2DD03, then complete 1029A cn:cpaulate related Encapsulation bles in Fire in progrens.
Zona 39-126.
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i Page 3 of 14 September, 1984 i
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Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
En;:psulate Complete Completed 1029A 2A2A1505A in
_ Fi n Sone 40-127.
En:cysulate IB2D1802A, Complete Completed 1029A
.E cnd 282BD01E in Firo zone 41-128.
En0:psulate 2A281249, Reroute complete.
2-EOO 1029A 2A28143 and 2C2B1247 Encapsulation in_ Fire Zone 50-130.
in progress.
(Due to the high t; '
level of radiation during operation in Fire Zone 130 and the length of the runs of ZA2B1249 and 2C2B1247 (250 feet),
this modification must be done during an outage.)
' Red 3 sign Complete Completed 1029D l~
Cables 2A1603J, K, L, 2A1706J, K, L -
'in Fire Zones43-132,144-133, o
45-134 and 46-135 cs required.
EnOCpsulate ADS /CS Complete Completed 1029A ec;; ways in Fir 3 zone 11-147.
Upgrade penetration seals-Approximately 9/15/84 1110 to required ratings as-5900 seals are for Unit #3 pr0viously committed in complete of an except for
-correspondence from estimated outage sealn J. C. Gallagher to 6150. total.
and misc. clean-up D.-G.
Eisenhut,-
Clean-up items items.
d3tCd: 10/14/81.
remain on Unit 2-EOO
- 3 (see body of letter).
Remainder are No. 2 Unit to be complete i
by end of outage.
1 Page 4 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Datos Mod. No.
Change the settings on Complete 3-Completed 2-1029G thJ following 4kV in Unit 3.
2-EOO 3-102911 circuit breakers:
Unit 2 design Unit 2-152-1505, complete.
152-1705, 152-1806; Awaiting bus Unit 3-152-1505...
outage. Bus 152-1806.
outage scheduled during unit outage.
Ch:nge the settings on Complete 3-Completed 3-102911 thJ 480V load center in Unit 3.
2-EOO 2-1029G circuit breakers:
Unit 2 Unit 2-1013..
1322; design Unit 3-1212... 1114.
complete.
Awaiting bus outage. Bus outage scheduled during unit outage.
Replace the following Qualifica-First refueling 2-1029J,'i 480V motor control center tion of outage or planned Common-magnetic-only circuit motor control outage that lasts at
- 1029K, br :kers with thornal centers which least 60 days, com-3-1029L magnetic circuit breakers:
house breakers mencing after 6/1/84.
Unit 2-3671..
2851; is complete.
Breakers otill not Common-4955, 5055, 6131, PECo was work-qualified.
Unit 3-3851..
6033.
ing with (AJ previously committed Westinghouse t
in correspondence from in order S. L. Daltroff to D. G.
to obtain Eic:nhut, dated qualified J:nuary 12, 1983.)
breakers.
Westinghouse abandoned their qualification program. PECo is seeking alternatives.
Add new ground overcurrent 50% complete.
2-E00 1029M rJ1 ys to the following Awaiting bus 4kV circuit breakers:
outage to Unit 2-152-1606 and comple te 152-1709.
remaining insta-11ation. Bus outage scheduled during unit outage.
Page 5 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Nod Description Status Completion Dates Mod No.
Replace the existing Design 2-EOO 1029N ground overcurrent relays complete.
for the.following 4kV Relays i
circuit. breakers:
ordered.
Unit 2; 152-1606 and Delivery 152-1704.
being expedited.
Add eight-hour battery Complete Completed 1029R power supply capability (Alternative to the Emergency Lighting shutdown System'in the following system design lo20tions : Main Control will add Room, Remote Shutdown additional P n31s, Cable Spreading areas.)
Room (selected locations),
Pour Emergency Switchgear Rooms, HPSW Pump bays and the fifth bay in the'DG Building.
Pr0 vide a water' curtain Complete Completed 1029U in the west corridors of rocstor building, elev.
135; Units 2 and 3.
Sy3 tem Automation
. Design in 2-EOO cf Cater Curtain progress 3 - To be 1029U in the West determined based Corridors of on equip.
rOO3 tor building, delivery.
I Olate'the corridor Comple te Completed 10295 behind the emergency suitchgear rooms.
Provide dikes for Complete Completed 1029T Emergency Load Centers on elevation
-165, Units 2 and 3.
Prcvide smoke detectors Complete Completed 1029W in Fire Bones50-78A and 50-82 since the soncs'have a fixed combustible loading cnd no existing. smoke d3t:ction system.
Attcchm:nt 1 Pcg] 6 cf 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
Pr; vide smoke detectors Comple te Completed 1029W in Fire Zones 2-70,11-72E, ll-72F, and 11-74 cinco the zones have a fixed combustible loading and no existing smoke detection system.
PrCvide lino type heat Completo Completed 1029W det:ctors in cable tray in Fire Zone 29-108 since the area has a fixed combustibio loading and no Cxisting fire det ction system.
Provide smoke detectors Completo Completed 1029W in Firo Zones 26-76 and 22-77 due to the possibility cf transient combustibles in these zones.
Rorruto conduit ZD2D785 Complete Completed 1029D Cut 0ide of Firo Zones50-78D and 50-78W Enc ^psulato ZA2A1506A Complete comple ted 1029A in Firo Zone 50-131.
Enr:psulato raceways Encapsulation 2-E00 1029A ZA2M165 and ZA2M166 completo except in the north half of for short sections Firo Zono 6-511.
associated with a junction box. Awaiting equipment outage to completo encapsulation.
Equip. outage scheduled during Unit outago.
Attcchm:nt 1 Pcg3 7 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
enc psulate raceway Encapsulation Next system 1029A 283P315 in the south Lcomplete except outage of h:1f of the Fire for a short sufficient 2:no 13-13H..
section associ--
duration.
ated with a junction box.
Encapsulation of junction boxes is outage work due to blocking require-ments.
l s'
Rercute 201019B, F Design 2-EOO 10298 cnd encapsulate new complete.
sono 5-5H.
Rercute ZB2Q2074A Design complete.
2-EOO 1029B No encapsulation necessary.
,Rercute=2A285944A Design in 2-EOO 1029B from Fire Zone progress.11-728.
Install,a single
. Complete Completed 1029W cooke detector in the drywell access hatch areas of 1
both units, Fire soncs 6-22 and'13-28.
Th3 detectors are t3 be'tled into existing loops on 135' of the Rs Bldgs.
En0:psulate 2D2P219 Complete Comple ted 1029A
- in Fire Zone 4-6.
Ens psulate ZA2LO75 Complete Completed 1029A la Fire Zone 5-7.
.En psulate 2D3 LOO 4 Complete Completed 1029A in Fire Zone 12-15.
L
Attcch: nt 1 Pcg3 8 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Datos Mod. Po.
IC tall a singlo Completo Completed 1029W smoke detector in Fira Zone 11-65C.
ThJ detector la to be ti d into the existing loop on 91'-6" of the Radwaste D1dg.
Install 90 3-hour 35 dampers 2-EOO 1309 r tad fire dampara remain to be 3 - End of Unit in HVAC ducts installed.
2 Outage pen trating fire Design is barriors.
85% complete.
Inctall battery charger Installation 2-E00 dependent 1029D rc n-tio foods.
In progress.
upon equipment Th Co croon-tio foods
- delivery, will bo encapsulated El required.
Enc ~psulato ZA2M416 To be rorouted 2-E00 1029A in Firo Zono 6-5H.
to avoid encap-sulation requirements, roroute in progrena.
Enc ^poulato cablo Completo Completed 1029A ZD2D3983A in Firo Zon] 30-125.
Roccute ZD3D409 Donign 2-E00 1029A in Firo Zono complete.32-119.
En Tpoulato ZD3M149 in Comploto Completed 1029A,e Pira Zone 31-110.
Encrpaulato ZD3M149 Comploto completed 1029A l
in Firo Zone 33-120.
Rol cato D and D Rolocation completo.
2-E00 1029B Diccol Gonorator MCC Encapoulation f
dn an identified in design in thJ body of the lettor.
progrono.
Th:Co foods will be Cn:Epoulated an required.
Enc:paulato ZC3D401 Comploto Completed 1029A cnd ZC3D482 in Firo Zon] 34-121.
e Attcchment 1 P g3 9 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
En? 'psulate ZA2D841 Comple te Completed 1029A iD Fire Zone 35-122.
EnTTpsulato ZC3D481 Ocmplete Completed 1029A and ZC3D482 in Firo Zone 36-123.
Enr^psulato ZA2D841 Completo Completed 1029A in Firo Zone 37-124.
EnT~psulato ZC2A484 Complete Completed 1029A 13 Firo Zono 48-144.
Roriute 5 cabloc in Design complete.
2-EOO 1029D Fira Zone 6-5H -
Installation ZC2B3814A; 2C201228A, D; scheduled.
ZC201230B, C.
Rorcuto ZC2Q1228D Design complete.
2-EOO 1029B r~:d ZC201230D in Installation Fir? Zone 6-5J.
acheduled.
Rorzute 4 cables in Unit 2 2-EOO 1029B Fica Zone 25-72A -
design 3 - Next ayatom outago ZC201221D; ZC2Q1230D completo of aufficient Z13Q1227D; ZD3Q1229D
& installation duration.
ochedulod.
Unit 3 completo except for circuit switchover.
Rorzuto 5 cables in completo 3 - Next system 1029B Fira Zono 6-13H oxcept for outago of sufficient ZD3D3952A; ZD301227A, B; circuit duration.
223012290, C.
switchover.
Rorluto ZD301227B Comploto except 3 - Noxt syntom 1029D End ZD301229D in Fire for circuit outage of Zona 6-13J.
owitchover sufficient duration.
F Attcchment 1 P ga 10 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No.
Rercute 12 cables in Unit 2 design 2-EOO 10298 Fira Zone 28-78H complete and 3 - Next system (C:ble Spreading ' Room) installation outage of scheduled.
sufficient duration.
Unit 3 complete except for circuit switchover.
'Rercute 6 cables in Unit 2 design 2-EOO 1029B Firo Zone 29-108 complete &
3 - Next system (Main Control Room) installation outage of sufficient scheduled.
duration.
Unit 3 complete except for circuit switchover.
Inctall 2 addi-Complete Completed 1029W ti:nal smoke d t:ctors in Fire Zon] 50-78A to pr vide area cov0 rage.
ATERNATIVE SHUTDOWN MODIFICATIONS Provide new panels to Design in 2-EOO (86) 1351A be catablished as the progress.
altornative control stchions for the B and D sOfeguard channel diOcel generators.
Est:blish alternative Design in 2-EOO (86) 1351A controls and indication progress.
fCr the B&D safeguard ch:nnel diesel generators Ct new panels identified cbove.
PrCvide alternative Design in Unit 3 work 1351A control and indication progress.
3-EOO far 4kv circuit breakers 20A1606, 2A1807, 30A1606, Unit 2 work Cnd 30A1807.
2-EOO (86) l
Attcchm nt 1 PCg2 11 Cf 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Datos Mod. No.
Pr vide alternative status Design in Unit 3 work 1351A indication for 4kv circuit progress.
3-EOO br:Thers 20A1601, 20A1608, 20A1801, 20A1808, 30A1601, Unit 2 work 30A1608, 30A1801, and 2-EOO (86) 30A1808.
Pr; vide alternative bus Design in Unit 3 work 1351A voltage indication for 4kV progress.
3-EOO bra 20A16, 20A18, 30A16, Unit 2 work cnd 30A18.
2-EOO (86)
PrCvide a linear heat Awaiting 2-EOO (86) 1351B dat:ction system in approval of the cable trays in fire mod via SER CrDa 25.
from the NRC.
Pravide encapsulation Identification Unit 3 work 1351C cf circuits as required of oncapsu-3-EOO far alternativo shutdown lation nooded Unit 2 work mod:/ capability.
is in 2-EOO (86) progress.
Prcvide alternativo Unit 2 2-EOO (86) 1351D control and breakor equipmont is EtStua indication involved with f r the 4ky circuit mod. Design bracker for the B to be safiguaru channel ESW started.
pump (20A1603).
Provido a now panol to Unit 2 work.
2-EOO (86) 1352A
- st:blish an alternativo Design on hold control station for the until Unit 3 U21t 2 HPCI system. The work la complete.
new panol will also houso
- quipment for modo 1352B, 1352G and 1352H.
Est:blish alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352A controla and indication Doulgn on hold f:r the Unit 2 HPCI until Unit 3 system at the panol work 10 completo.
identiflod above.
EDt:blish alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-COO (86) 1352D di: gnostic instrumenta-Donign on hold tion for Unit 2 until Unit 3 citornativo shutdown wock in comploto.
cystems at the Unit 2 HPCI ACS.
r~
attcchment 1 P go 12 of 14 September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Datos Mod. No.
Pr vide alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352C control and breaker Design on hold Etztus indication for until Unit 3 for the 4kv circuit work in complete.
br:Jker for the Unit 2 B safeguard channel RHR pump (20A1602).
Pr; vide isolation of Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352C control circuits for Design on hold Unit 2 RHR valvos that until Unit 3 Jannot be subjected to work is complete.
spurious operations.
Pr vido alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352D control and broakor Donign on hold Etztus indication for until Unit 3 the 4kv circuit breaker work la comploto.
fEr the Unit 2 B nafo-g Drd channel HPSW pump (20A1607).
Pr;vido alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352E control and breaker statuo Donign on hold indication for Unit 2 until Unit 3 4kv omorgency circuit work in comploto.
br:Ekers 20A1605 and 20A1806 that food 4kv/480v load contorn.
Pr;vido alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (06) 1352P DC power foods for Donign on hold control and motivo until Unit 3 power for Unit 2 work in comploto.
11t rnativo shutdown Eystems.
Provido alternativo Unit 2 work.
2-COO (06) 13520 controls for throo Donign on hold Unit 2 nafoty rollof until Unit 3 VDivon (SRV'o) at the work in comploto.
Uzit 2 HPCI ACS.
Est blish Unit 2 Unit 2 work.
2-COO (86) 1352H Eltzenativo procona Donign on hold monitoring instrumonta-until Unit 3 tion at the Unit 2 work in comploto.
HPCI ACS.
AttcShnent 1 I
Pcg3 13 cf 14 Septembe r, 1984 l
Expected Med Description Status completion D&tes Mod. No.
.PrCvide emergency ~
Unit 2 work.
2-E00 (86) 1352I
~ lighting for-Unit'2 Design on hold Cit 0rnative control
-until Unit 3 Ct:tions and routes work is complete.
access and egress.for the ACS's.
r Pr; vide a-new panel Design in 3-EOO 1353A to Cstablish an alterna--
progress.
1 Etive control' station f;r the Unit 3 HPCI system. The new panel
~ 0111 also house equipment for mode 13538, 1353G, and 1353N..
Est:blish alternative Design in 3-EOO 1353A controls and indication progress.
.f;r the Unit 3 NPCI cy; ten at-the panel
'ide;tified above.
prCvide alternative-Design in 3-EOO 13535 diagnostic instrumenta-progress.
tion for Unit - 3 01tornative shutdown cystems at the Unit 3
- M I ACS.
i Provide alternative Design in 3-EOO 1353C I
control and breaker progress.
st:tus indication for the 4kw circuit breaker f;r the' Unit 3 D safe-
. guard channel RNR pump
-(30A1802).
Pr vide isolation of Design in 3-ROO 1353C control circuits for progress.
Unit 3 RNR' valves'that
-cannot'be subjected to spurious operations.
Provide alternative' Design in 3-E00 1353D oontrol and breaker in progress, st;tus' indication f r the 4kw circuit breaker f;r, the Unit 3, o safe-1 guard channel NPSW pump L
(30A1804).
i l
I Att:Chment 1 PCg3 14 cf 14 t
September, 1984 Expected Mod Description Status Completion Dates Mod. No, i
Provide alternative Design in 3-E00 1353E control and breaker status progress.
Indication for Unit 3 4ky emergency circuit brc:ker 30A1605 and 30A1806 that feed 4kv/480v load centers.
PrCvide alternative Design in 3-EOO 1353F DC power feeds for
- progress, control and motive
-power for Unit 3 citarnative shutdown systems.
Pr vide alternative Design in 3-E00 1353G controls for three Unit progress.
i 3 cafety relief valves (SRV's) at the Unit 3 MPCI ACS.
Est:blish Unit 3 Design in 3-E00 135311 citcrnative process progress.
monitoring instrumentation Ct the Unit 3 HPCI ACS.
PrCvide emergency Design in 3-200 1353I i
lighting for Unit 3 progress.
cit 0rnative control stations i
. and routes of access and egress for the ACS's.
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s Penetration Seals L.ocation: ll.su.W 2 9 b klls 1 Amth hobs.llow l/st&t. < tensse E O a Z. u '
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' ' ^ *
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50-A18
,,g g PSD # _Ot (g Welimical Fngineering Olvinton l'enet rat ion bal Deviat ion Form reach Rottom Atomic Power Station Unita 2 & 3 D,1te 7.30- Fd/
Penetration Seats 1.ocatton:
Condition prior to Upgralos 7L.s<
EU. sed n y )t K.w dev<as.<~sLt.<UrA ~.lAu Luall ea W.su..g c<,.d.
4 iatt. n we tt... t-ea6&a,yt,jalw br$A4) (vtL 4-sesbt Descriptton of Upgradeel<Yrk*bst[ t$e /kPY. jtlau dies DJ,lbl.* Wrld
- PeratrallonScalI (gg,t j fo yll'$ Llg1)tesku LucL42 1%*'.
r< *s.t t e
)t s.,.,
t.htub c)b(>,
Juntifieation:
Y Coha& t0 site t 44'Adbitt $1J fjo han,ytlg.,y xx,etu.',s(La f9 d A d [ [44 ) h ' k Ot4,th,d M M. 6 .) b (a t.nnluluku hw.a ) 4 b, a. cd, uk & p Rinco Pen ration 1.D. Nos.: ( g; YdAb [6D 0(d(e (M'e d4 suaind, a t ,,9, o,#m.,/ngs,/ Ofd_3 unrov..i av, clo/ hts /0711v.o; L
2 TE Y ' <.b ou ;Y et b O 'J ut cD_. (C<)u b ']l Th o " o GL, j Lt 1dv fv bo<u3 an diwntetaf p.obA. rl-cita w ak udau p L Wav, ca ma 4 & fiLaw ou k ogym%& mdL w 5 y W g& pxatosaaz.D L La. Lu L L J ( a f'); ~ &uddM nce s,<2a/d a-pfn~. m ~, & a%pq,,1cd und 6 g g suoswa e % uLit & ~ % p m,
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2 (- A-A CONDUli B'8 (< A d'"2 h /B ARRIER. I '.: '.'- ~ MET AL F ACE PL ATE / J N -j/ JUNCT 10N BOX
- '.::f, y
j' ) 7> B-B ^~^ " f MIN. M AX. SECTION B-B SECTION A-A JUNCTION 00X NOT DET AIL-66 PENETRATING BARRIER l INSPECTION ACCEPT / REJECT CRITERI A
- 1. VERIFY THAT THE SIDE OF THE BARRIER OPPOSITE THE SIDE DFSIGNATED DETAIL-66 ON THE COM-PUTER SCHEDULE CONTAINS NO UNACCOUNTED FOR CONDulT WITHIN A 5 FOOT RADIUS' OPPOSITE THE JUNCTION BOX.
l
- 2. VERIFY THAT THE JUNCTION 1]OX COVER IS SECURE-LY F ASTENED 'IN PL ACE.
i i p ,,,o,,,.m n-m-w as-e-- r==wv-~wvm-w,-e-+-==-w ---www= me---m-+--w -mv,e-r -e-- --,--w----m-v~ew-v
4 . 84/08/15 ' P SiD. '964 'LISTINS ' ' PAGE 1 csa nsa:ss Irew w. PENET . EXIST SEAL' A SIDE SEAL 8 SIDE SEAL <DATE C REMARKS CORAD BISCO D W,. tm. !!Q,% DESCRIPTION SEAL TYPE Ept1PLETE E FM. RB3-165-ST22-W-1 OF 1 4004 6" X 6" Ete. OPEN F' DNP ~ DET. 66 N.S.R. PSD 066 10011 J-DOX - RB3-165-ST22-W-1 OF 1 4004A 3/4" C OPEN F DNP DET. 66-N.S.R. PSD 066 10012 RB3-135-252-E-3 0F 3' 2034 6" X 6" F DET.'66 DNP -N.S.R. PSD 066 10761 PARTIALLY EliD. JUNCTION BOX RB3-135-252-E-3 0F 3 2034A 1" C OPEN F DET. 66 DNP N.S.R. PSD 066 13762 RB3-135-252-E-3 0F 3 20348 .1" C OPEN. F DET. 66 DNP N.S.R. PSD 066 10763 RB3-135-252-E-3 OF 3 2034C 1" C 'OPEN F DET. 66 DNP' FI.S.R. PSD 066 10764' RB3-135-252-E-3 0F 3 2035 6" X 6" EMB. DET. 66 DNP H.S.R. PSD 066 10795 JB RB3-135-252-E-3 0F 3 2035A 3/4" C OPEN ' F DET. 66 -DNP N.S.R. PSD 066 10796 RB3-135-254-1-N-1 0F 1 1025 4" X 4" JB F DET. 66-DNP N.S.R. PSD 066 10854 l i I,
- t M
M
MEET N6 60- SW ATfM_RM9]T 1 60' A endix A PSD # o 3(, Mechanical Engineering Division 2 Penetration Seal Deviation Fonn Peach Bottom Atcmic Power Station Units 2 S 3 Date: 8 8'/ Penetration Seals 77at Il aM M44b Location: bd hN'eb i wam. Condition prior to Upgrade: %M k %c so.pk. au pra - e a} a " a w Description of Upgraded Penetration Seal: 0 0 tification: % Ua) & Qh Y - - uw -ypes & w & ya. t M he ffL4L.k'.L _nfg & & g %%w di & g M g(p) - cesw u M )MA W f$?.. Bisco Penetration I.D. Nos.: b GC-127-A- So il 1 G C. - III 30o 3 DG C. - 127-A - 3o i z - D G C. - 12 7 6 - S o o #-l bG C - 127 - A - 3o s3 DG E - 127-c. - l o si ~~ bG C - I2.7 h ' b0 l A % C - 177 - C - 50 'h BC,C - t z.7 Boo z. bG c _ i z7-c - 3o 46, Prepared by: 4U # #I' Approved by: C004 /z2/sy Approved by: (le & j1 Sh CJG/bls/07138402 f,.
i 2cf;L .%AtJne L (cnJ'): Pso " o n o W(e4 n Ludp> A % & jndt)6 h faba k gu<h a 1a gxA &>uldLv. gen. % f M &sbb-aM fk-Auud.ug L abo m f~~e6 A & Aeab1wt1 gM. w ha.p% n op M Lwl aaa A e y_ u rj M agg2u~ b lt-Mahd f M h d witk &. rL-p % a h ns % g. ptut p&g % pobL, et a of M cA - g Q 4 Lw a to onw-a M at a g pgr*2 I li Aza-eA ~1Ac $aulw. WW -Q_AA evulaA-a & A A _r ~ n t g_ -. :&& L p -. -. y . _ N A h __. . m q -. - h & H 16 &vvawat % e w s-@ A t.ab.C -M W pukJ>@L W m d<ad; & % qabL b & eu u % fa,u ap lt. @ & cGud .Q mMu a_ M M sg go.65/Cu. M M.), p CLc w 4AL abm, Tk wia pu&>.awsa y y. u ,w,e-m caa aes run a y s, m _ =, _ -1
a I NOTE. NUMBER OF PIPES VARIES. B ARRIER A / 1/4" I C ( ' -) I /8" STL PL A,TE, [ _2 M A'A' y kfSF4M i ~ EF ~ _\\ GROUT 24" SHROUDED CARD 0X LINES (NON-HERMETICALLY SEALED) DETAIL - 69 i INSPECTION ACCEPT / REJECT CRITERI A - 1. VERIFY PL ATES ( TOP AND BOTTOM ) ARE INT ACT AT B ARRIER. 2.. VERIFY SOUNDNESS OF GROUT AT D ARRIER AS BEST AS POSSIBLE. REJECTION FOR L ARGE / DEEP VOIDS OR LOOSE AND CRUMBLY CONDITION I I I + l r
TXXXI::.T NoS. 50 e799 (GALutwcu1-3 L* So.21P ' PAGE -1 August 21,1984 10$0 AM .) P.S.D. INDEX PS0
- DET.*
DESCRIPIl0N, LOCATION, REMARKS, ETC. ENGR. DATE 1 PSD-001 MECHANICAL PENETRATIONS WITH WELDED ANNULAR CJG ANCHORS SEALED WlIH 12' & CERANIC FIBER. ) PSD-002 GROUT AND KAWOOL SEALS. CJG e PSD-003 Et1PTY CONDUlTS WITH OR WITHOUT PLUGS. CJG . PSD-004 CONTitJUOUS CONDUIT AND CONDUlTS >S FT.FRON BARRIER. CJG l PSD-005 '39 FIRE SEAL ON ONE SIDE ONLY FOR INTERNAL CONDUli SEALS CJG WITH ACCESS < S FT.FROM BARPIER. J.- PSD-006 CONTROL ROOM FLOOR SEALS. CJG PSD-007 STAtOARD GROUT SEALS i.e. ( >8' & GROUT) CJG PSD-008 *40 GROUT SEALS IN HOLLW BLOCK WALLS. CJG PSD-009 '39 MECHANICAL PENETRAT10NS UPGRADED WITH 3 HOUR RATTED CJG L!tJK SEALS. PSD-010 - 3 W CERAt11C FIBER AND POLYURETHANE FIRE SEALS. CJG e PSD-011 ELECTRIC.AL BUS DUCT. CJG PSD-012 KA0 WOOL SEALS BEHiND CARD READERS. .CJG PSD4)13 ' R.T.V. SEALS BEHIND DOOR FRAliS IN TE DIESEL GEN. BLD. CJ6 0 'PSD-014 EQUIPt1ENT ACCESSHATCES. CJG
- PSD-01S ELEV.116*-O' R.H.R. Rti. EATIN6 & VENTILATION OPENINGS.
RSS PSD-016 '67 JUNCTION BOXES FOR FIRE ALAllt1, PULL SylTCHES EMBEDDED K11t1 8-16-64 IN THE BARRI'iR WITH CONDUlT AND NOT PEETRATING THE e - BARRIER. PSD-017 *68 - f1ECHANICAL PENETRATIONS WITH BOOT & FIBER ON ONE SIDE Kritt B-13-64 ii AND NON-FIRE RATED LINK SEAL S ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE. PSD-018 '70 WELDED STEEL PL ATES BOTH SDES & BARRIER BCR PSD-019 *71 WELDE0 STEEL PLATE ONE SIDE WITH GROUT OR CELLULAR BCD CONCRETE ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE. PSD-020. POSI ACCIDENT sat 1PLING SYSTEt1 (PASS) PENETRATIONS. Kriti t PSD-021 St'.0KE AND HOT GAS SEALS FOR CONDUITS. CJG PSD-022 FB' (. ERAT 11C FIDER FIRE SEALS WITH FLEXIBLE BOOT SEALS ON Krir1 0-20-04 riA?ARDOUS SIDE ONLY. Utili 2 & 3 PHR ROOMS ONLY. PSD-023 CiPA!!!C FISER FIPE EEAL G WITHOUT BOOTS EITHER SIDE. KP21 ~ -p e
r y PAGE-2 August 21.1984 - 10:00 AM P.S.D. INDEX ). PSD" DET." DESCRIPil0N.10 Call 0N, RfMARKS, ETC. ENOR. DATE c g PSD-024 *04 INSTPut1ENT TRAY ENCAPSUL ATMe IN lNSUL AllC*i TO ALL(r# Kiiri 8-20-04 FLEXIBLE BOOT INSTALL ATMJ UtilT 2 ?. 3 ISOLATION VALVE P00r15. I PSD-02S CERAMIC FIBER SEALS WITHOUT FLEXIBLE BOOT SEAL ON EITTER Kf1M SIDE Cf THE BARRIER. UNIT 3. Rd0r1453. PSD-026 *72 C AULKING CPACKS IN BLOCr WALLS. BCR PSD-027 *73 SEALING INSTPUMENT TRAYS WITH CERAti!C FIBER & CAULK. BCR PSD-028 '74 3' 0F GDOUT & S' 0F CERAttlC FIBER. BCR PSD-029 '7S SEALING CARDREADER PENETRATIONS WITH 790 CAULK. BCR PSD-030 SEALING BLOCK 00T WITH 12"(tilN) 0F CERAMIC FIBER. Kriti ' PSD-031 *76 HOLLOW t1ASOfiRY BLOCK FILLED WITH SF-20. BCR PSD-032 OPEN. ASANDONED THREADED P!PE. Kr1M .PSD-033 *77 CAULK AROUND l-BEAM POCKETS BCR PSD-034 OPEN ENDED.(ONE SIDE) ABANDONED PIPE OF WELDED CONTRtX.- Kriti TION. ( PSD-035 878 SEALING CONDUlTS WITH 0.2. BUSHINGS. BCR I t PSD-036 869 SHROUDED CARDOX LINES.(NON-HERMETICALLY SEALED) Kt1H 8-20-84 i - PSD-037 *83 PIPE SECTION PEETRATING BARRIER. CAPPED OE S10E, Krti 8-21-64 s' VALVED 0N OPPOSITE SIDE. PSD-038 *79 CHICO USED AS A FIRE OR St10KE & HOT GAS SEAL. BCR PSD-039 '80 St10KE & HOT GAS SEAL ON SIDE b 5 FT. iN LIEU OF FIRE SEAL BCR DUE TO ACCESSIBILITY. PSD-040 COAXIAL ALS AND SHIELDED CABLES. Kriti PSDM)41 HVAC WITH LESS THAN 3 HR. RATED FIRE DAt1PER. RSS PSD-042 HEAVY GAUGE METAL HVAC DUCT WCGK WITHOUT FIPE DANPERS RSS THROUGH THE FIRE BARatER. PSD-043 ANNUL AR SPACE AROUND P!PE SEALED WITH 12' CF AND NON-KMt1 RATED LINK SEAL DUE TO SHIELDING PIPE OBSTRUCTIONS 00TSIDE BARRIER ON B0TH SIDES. PSD-044 ANNULAR SPACE AROUND PIPE SEALED WITH 12' CF DUE TO GUARD Kriti PIPE 005TRUCTICf3 OUTSIDE BARRIER, ON BOTH SIDES. PSD-04S *01 (NTf pNAl CC*.Luli SE ALED WiTH GPOJT AND UPGP ADED WITH CF BCR PSD-046 CEPAfilC FIFER FIRE SE ALS WITH FLEXIBLE BOOT SE ALS ON THE KNf1 HAZARDC#JS %E MLY. UtilT 3 PHR FLOOR. ELEV 135'-O'
r PAGE August 21,1984 10:00 Ali 'p P.S.D. INDEX PSD* - DET." DESC!tlP110N, LOCAll0N, ret 1 ARKS, ETC. ENOR. DATE - p_. PSD-047 *02 TWIN I-6E Af1 V0lD. BCR - PSD-048 '84 ' If45TRuf1ENT TRAY ENCAPSULAT10N IN INSUL ATION TO ALLOW Kriti a FLEXIBLE BOOT INSTALLATION IN ROOM 447. PSD-061 861 POWER RECEPTICLE's NOT PENETRATING THE FIRE BARRIER. Kriri 8-6-84 PSD-062 ' *62 LIGHT RECEPTICLES i;0T PENETRATING THE FIRE BARRIER. KNr1 8-6-84 PSD-063 *63 CONDUITS WITH CABLES NOT PENETRATING THE FIRE BARRIER. Kt1M 8-6-84 PSD-064 *64 CONDUlTS W/0 CABLES fl0T PENTRAT!!1G THE FIRE B ARRiER. Kriti 8-6-84 r PSD-065 *65 OPEli ENDED CONDUITS WITHOUT CABLES NOT PENETRATING KMM 8-6-84 TiiE flRE BARRIER. PSD-066 '66 ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES EMBEDDED IN THE BARR!ER WITH KMf1 5-6-84 CONDUlr BUT NOT PENETRATING THE FIRE BARRIER. e -PSD-067~'67 FIRE ALARM PULL BOXES EMBEDDED IN THE BARRIER WITH KMt1 CONDUITS NOT PENETRATING THE FIRE 6ARRIER. e F 5 4
I. -1~ %C1ET ' N05. SO-bYM _ 4, ATr/Cl*9NT 4 So-F7? s .. & ) *S% e. s i !p Svnt-sm Trv at-irm nf net-A4 sa nf het-FireelpindiDgS_.m.ReasonJKEx_Es}ption Request 1. MSlv Tunnel Supply North Wall-Main Steam 36" x 20"- O.02 hrs. 'A' side Inadvertent closure of.the fire Unit 3 Pipe 'Ibnnel, Unit 3 0.68 hrs. 'B' side damper could cause a tenperature Elev. 135' rise in the tunnel, creating a possible Scamcondition. 2. MSIV 'Ibnnel Exhaust South Wall-Main Steam 28" x 32" 0.02 hrs. 'A' side Inadvertent closure of the fire Unit 3 Pipe 'Ibnnel, Unit 3 0.53 hrs. 'B' side danper could cause a tenperature Elev. 135' rise in the tunnel, creatire a possible SCRAM condition. 3. Drywell Exhaust Floor-C.R.D. Equipnent 24"# 0.53; hrs. 'A' side SGTS Unit 3 Area, Unit 3, Elev. 0.18 hrs. 'B' side 135' 4. Refuelirg Floor Exhaust Floor-C.R.D. Equipnent 24"g
- 0. 53 ' hrs. 'A' side SGTS Unit 3 Area, Unit 3, Elev.
0.18 hrs. 'B' side 135' i 5. Drywell Exhaust-Floor-Operating Area 24y 0.35 hrs. 'A' side SG'IS i Unit 3 Unit 3, Elev. 165' O.53 hrs. 'B' side
- 6. I Refueling Floor Exhaust. Floor-Operating Area 24"g 0.35 hrs. 'A' side SG'IS Unit 3 i
~ .Un t 3, Eley. 165' '0.53 hrs. 'B' side I
- 7. 'Drywell Exhaust, North Wall-Reactor 24"#
0.10 hrs. 'A,' side
- SGTS
~ Unit 3 bunp Punp Roan Unit 0.11 hrs. 'B' side i 3, Elev. 91'6"
- 8. ~ Refueling Floor Exhaust. North Wall-Reactor 24"5 0.10 hrs.
'A' side SGTS Unit 3 Surp Punp Roan Unit 0.11 hrs. 'B' side 3, Elev. 91'6" i
- 9. IDrywell Exhaust North Wall-Stairway 24"#
0.15 hrs. 'A' side SG'Is i Unit 3 22 Unit 3 Elev. 91'6" 0.05 hrs. 'B' side 1 + 1 e ee - wrem-e
m Q -q ' REDO 98FFT 4 - _ _... - -..... ft 2 O. ? i i U 1 HVF Sym&mn Tev=aFirm of nu t- ' Mi m nf n W Fire TmM4yns,_, Reaso.n_for,Exemp. tion Reauest m w 1
- 10. Refueling Floor Exhaust North Wall-Stairway 22 24"A j
Unit 3 Unit 3 Elev. 91'6" 0.15 hrs. 'A' side SGTS ~ O.05 hrs. 'B' side t
- 11. Drywell Exhaust Unit 2. North Wall-Core Spray 24"#'
O.12 hrs. 'A' side SG'IS Pump Room Elev.'91'6" 0.05 hrs. 'B' side Udt2 3 4 j
- 12. Refueling Floor Exhaust North Wall-Core Spray 24"#,,
0.12 hrs. 'A side SG'Is j Unit 2-hap Roan, Unit 2 0.05 hrs. 'Bt side i Elev. 91'6" \\, i
- 13. Chemical Lab Exhaust West Wall-Switchgear 16" x 28" 0.09 hrs. 'AI side Dampers, 2@ 1 hrs.areintheduct,l 1
Unit 2 Rcon Duct Chase Obstructions prevent the installation l ~ but are outside of the fire barrier. e J Unit 2 Elev.165' of the dampers within the barriar.
- 14. General Exhaust Unit 2 West Wall-Switchgear 12" x 28"-
0.09 hrs. 'A' si& Dampers,-2@ 1h hrs are oversized and, Rocm Duct Chase Unit therefore not approved by Under-2 Elev. 135 writer's Tahnratories. i t i
- 15. Radiation Chenistry West Wall-Switchgear 18" x 28" 0.09 hrs. 'A' si&! Dampers, 2@ l hrs. are oversized and, j
Iab Supply, Unit 2 Roan Duct Chase Unit therefore not approved by Under-i 2 Elev. 135' writer's Iaboratories. i. s t f j
- 16. Drywell Exhaust Unit 2 Floor-C.R.D. Equipnent 24"g
'0[52 hrs. 'A' si& t SGTS j Area, Unit 2 Elev. 0.18 hrs. 'B' side 135 l. 1
- 17. Refueling Floor Exhaust Floor-C.R.D. Equipnent 24"g 0.52 hs. 'A' side SG'Is Unit 2 Area, Unit 2, Elev.
0.18 hrs. 'B' sid's 135'
- 18. l Tonts Supply Unit 2 Floor-C.R.D. Equipnenu 18"#.
0.52. hrs. 'A' sida Duct.is schedule 40 velded pipe. I Area, Unit 2, Elev. Sch. 40 0.18 hrs. 'B' sid<a I 135' 19. Drywell Exhaust Unit 2 Floor-Operating Area 24"# 0.34 hrs. 'A' side SGTS i Unit 2, Elev.165' O.52 hrs. 'B' sidit i l I
ATDCMENT 4 ,~ D303 . _ gypc syne, rm=+ inn of Duct Size of Duct Fire _ Load g g _ aeason,fy Exspon Request 20.-Refueling Floor Exhaust Floor-Operating Area 24"# 0.34 hrs. 'A' side SGTS Unit 2 Unit 2, Elev. 165' O.52 hrs. 'B' side
- 21. MSIV Tunnel Supply South Wall-Main Steam 35" x 21" 0.00 hrs. 'A' side Inadvertent closure of the fire Unit 2 Pipe 'Ibnnel Unit 2 0.61 hrs. 'B' side damper could cause a teriperature Elev. 135' rise in the tunnel, creatirg a possible SCRAM condition.
- 22. MSIV Tunnel Exhaust North Wall-Main Steam 28" x 32" 0.00 hrs. 'A' side Inadvertent closure of the fire Unit 2 Pipe 'Ibnnel Unit 2 0.57 hrs.
'B' side damper oculd cause a tanperature, Elev. 135' rise in the tunnel, creating a ~ possible SCRAM condition.
- 23. Drywell Exhaust Unit 2 South Wall-Stairway-24"A 0.05 hrs. 'A' side SGTS 19 Unit 2 Elev. 91'6" 0.05 hrs.
'B' side i
- 24. Refueling Floor Exhaust South Wall-Stairway 24"#
0.05 hrs. 'A' side SGTS Unit 2 19 Unit 2 Elev. 91'6" 0.05 hrs. 'B' side e
- 25. Equipnent Cell Exhaust East Wall-Spent Resin 18" 0.03 hrs. 'A' side Duct contains two 1 fire dampers, I
i Camon Tank accm, ccmnon Sch. 40 0.02 hrs. 'B' side one on either side of the barrier. ] Elev. 91'6" Since dampers are not within the { barrier, they are not approvcd by i Underwriter's Laboratories. { i 26.! Equipnent Cell Exhaust East Wall-Spent Resir 18" 0.03 hrs. 'A' side ' Duct contains two 1 hour fire Camon Tank Rocm, Ccmnon, Sch. 40 0.02 hrs. 'B' side danpers,ione:cneither side of the Elev. 91'6" barrier. Since dampers are not I within the barrier, they are not I approved by Underwriter's Tahnratori$s. 27.f STGS Exhaust CcmnonFloor-Waste Surge 36"# 0.06 hrs. 'A' side SGTS 1 Tank Iban, Camon Sch. 40 0.03 hrs. 'B' sido Elev. 116' i e a i
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