ML20097D672

Proposed Tech Specs 15.3.10 Re Control Rod & Power Distribution Limits

ML20097D672
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/08/1996
From:	WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
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ML20097D670	List: ML20097D669 ML20097D672
References
NUDOCS 9602130124
Download: ML20097D672 (38)

Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REOUEST 170

)

DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT LICENSE CONDITION

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Technical Specification 15.3.10, " Control Rod and Power l

Distribution Limits," currently contains Limiting Conditions for

)

Operation and surveillance requirements necessary to ensure core suberiticality following a reactor trip, a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical rod cluster control i

assembly (RCCA) ejection, and an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

The various parts of this section contain Limiting Conditions for Operation in the following areas:

TS 15.3.10.A Bank Insertion Limits TS 15.3.10.B Power Distribution Limits i

TS 15.3.10.C Inoperable Rod Cluster Control Assembly TS 15.3.10.D Misaligned or Dropped RCCA i

TS 15.3.10.E RCCA Drop Times Technical Specification Table 15.4.1-2,

" Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests," contains surveillance requirements to maintain the status of the equipment and systems so as to assure safe operation.

9602130124 960200 PDR ADOCK 05000266 P

PDR i

a TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REOUEST 170 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES This Technical Specifications change request proposes to modify Section 15.3.10 and 15.4.1.

These changes are being proposed to improve the clarity of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications oy providing improved guidance for plant operators. The proposed changes are as follows:

1.

In order to provide clearer and more logical organization of the Technical Specifications requirements, we propose to divide Technical Specification Section 15.3.10 as follows:

TS 15.3.10.A Shutdown Margin TS 15.3.10.B Rod Operability and Bank Alignment Limits TS 15.3.10.C Rod Position Indication TS 15.3.10.D Bank Insertion Limits TS 15.3.10.E Power Distribution Limits TS 15.3.10.F At-Power Physics Tests Exceptions TS 15.3.10.G Low Power Physics Tests Exceptions TS 15.3.10.H RCCA Drop Times 2.

Revisions to existing specifications TS 15.3.10.A.3 and TS 15.3.10.A.4, concerning shutdown margin requirements, are proposed.

The proposed specifications would require operators to initiate boration to restore shutdown margin within fifteen minutes should shutdown margin fall below a required limit.

These proposed specifications, renumbered 15.3.10.A.1 and 15.3.10.A.2 respectively, are consistent with LCO 3.1.1 and LCO 3.1.2 of NUREG-1431.

3.

In order to simplify the existing requirements concerning shutdown and control rods, we propose to include all the applicable existing requirements in TS 15.3.10.B, " Rod Operability and Bank Alignment Limits."

This proposed section would contain all of the specifications regarding the operability and alignment requirements for shutdown and control rods.

The specifications currently contained in TS 15.3.10.C, " Inoperable Rod Cluster Control Assembly," and TS 15.3.10.D,

" Misaligned or Dropped RCCA," would, for the most part, be replaced by the guidance in LCO 3.1.5 of NUREG-1431.

However, we do propose to maintain a portion of TS 15.3.10.D.1, in this proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.

This specification allows a 24-step misalignment when bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps or less than or equal to 30 steps.

Additionally, a period of up to six hours would be allowed to conduct troubleshooting necessary to make an operability 1

determination.

This is consistent with guidance contained in existing Technical Specification 15.3.10.C.2.

4.

We propose to rewrite Specification 15.3.10.C to address the rod position indication system and the bank demand indication system.

These proposed specifications

incorporate requirements currently contained in TS 15.3.10.D.3.a, along with requirements included in LCO 3.1.8 of NUREG-1431.

5.

We propose to supplement the existing requirements for shutdown bank position.

In addition to the existing requirement from TS 15.3.10.A.1, including the applicable footnote, proposed specification TS 15.3.10.D.1 will also include the required actions of LCO 3.1.6 of NUREG-1431.

6.

We propose to supplement the existing requirements for control bank insertion limits.

In addition to the existing requirements from TS 15.3.10.A.2, including the applicable footnote, proposed specification TS 15.3.10.D.2 will also include the required actions of LCO 3.1.7 of NUREG-1431.

7.

We propose to delete TS 15.3.10.A.5 concerning critical rod position. The proposed specifications TS 15.3.10.D.1 and TS 15.3.10.D.2 adequately address the condition of Specification 15.3.10.A.5.

8.

Existing TS 15.3.10.B.1.b requires that, following a refueling shutdown and prior to exceeding 90 percent of rated power and at effective full power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps using the moveable incore detector system shall be performed.

We propose to remove this specification from TS 15.3.10 and relocate it to TS Table 15.4.1-2,

" Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests," Item 33.

9.

We propose to relocate TS 15.3.10.B.1.b(1) & (2) into the basis section for TS 15.3.10.

These two items simply provide information concerning the measurement of hot channel factors.

10.

Existing Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.1.c is being split into proposed Specifications 15.3.10.E.1.b and 15.3.10.E.1.c.

TS 15.3.10.E.1.b proposes to revise the actions that must be performed should F (Z) exceed the limit Q

of Specification 15.3.10.E.1.a.

These proposed actions provide clearer guidance than the existing specifications and are consistent with the guidance in LCO 3.2.1 of the NUREG-1431.

11.

Proposed TS 15.3.10.E.1.c revises the actions of existing Specification 15.3.10.B.1.c that must be performed should Fba exceed the limit of Specification 15.3.10.E.1.a.

These proposed actions provide clearer guidance than the existing specifications and are consistent with the guidance in LCO 3.2.2 of the NUREG-1431.

12.

TS 15.3.10.E.2 proposes to modify the actions of existing Specification 15.3.10.B.2 that must be performed should the

1 axial flux difference exceed the limits specified in Figure 15.3.10-4.

These proposed actions incorporate guidance in LCO 3.2.3 and SR 3.2.3.1 of NUREG-1431 as a supplement to j

the existing requirements.

13.

TS 15.3.10.E.3 proposes to modify the actions of existing Specification 15.3.10.B.3 that must be performed should the indicated quadrant power tilt exceed two percent.

These proposed actions incorporate guidance in LCO 3.2.4, SR 3.2.4.1, and SR 3.2.4.2 of the NUREG-1431 as a supplement to the existing requirements.

14.

TS 15.3.10.F proposes to add at-poirer physics tests exceptions to the Technical Specifications.

The current Technical Specifications in Section 15.3.10 simply state l

that certain specifications are not applicable during physics tests.

However, they do not describe the conditions that must be satisfied during testing or the required actions that should be performed if these conditions are not met.

Additionally, this is an improvement over the existing Technical Specifications because the existing specifications do not provide distinction between low power and at-power physics testing.

The proposed specification incorporates guidance that is consistent with LCO 3.1.9 of the NUREG-1431 for rod group alignment limits, bank insertion limits, axial flux difference, and quadrant power tilt.

15.

TS 15.3.10.G proposes to add low power physics tests exceptions to the Technical Specifications.

The current Technical Specifications in Section 15.3.10 simply state that certain specifications are not applicable during physics tests.

However, they do not describe the conditions that must be satisfied during testing or the required actions that should be performed if these conditions are not met. Additionally, this is an improvement over the existing Technical Specifications because the existing specifications do not provide distinction between low power and at-power physics testing.

The proposed specification incorporates guidance that is consistent with LCO 3.1.10 of the NUREG-1431 for rod group alignment limits and bank insertion limits.

A daily requirement to perform a shutdown margin calculation during low-power physics testing is also proposed for addition to Table 15.4.1-2, Item 34.

16.

TS 15.3.10.H, which replaces existing Specification 15.3.10.E proposes to add required actions should RCCA drop l

times not be achieved.

If the reactor is critical, the associated RCCA would be declared inoperable.

If the reactor is subcritical, the reactor would be required to be maintained subcritical.

17.

Revisions to the bases section are also proposed.

The revisions will supplement the existing bases section by incorporating portions of the NUREG-1431 bases, as

p applicable, associated with the LCOs and surveillance requirements being proposed for addition or as modified.

l i

l

1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REOUEST 170 SAFETY EVALUATION 1

INTRODUCTION Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the licensee for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, is applying for amendments to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-24 and DPR-27 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

The amendments propose to revise Technical Specifications Section 15.3.10, " Control Rod and Power Distribution Limits," to improve clarity of this section.

Additionally, the guidance contained in

)

i the Westinghouse Owner's Group Improved Standard Technical l

Specifications (ISTS), NUREG-1431, Revision 0 was used to aid in t

l improving the specifications that were not clear.

l EVALUATION i

Technical Specifications Section 15.3.10, " Control Rod and Power Distribution Limits," ensures core subcriticality following a reactor trip, a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical rod cluster control assembly

(' CCA) ejection, and an R

acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Shutdown Margin Shutdown margin requirements must be satisfied during all plant l

conditions.

Should these requirements not be satisfied, operator action must be initiated promptly in order to correct the situation.

At Point Beach Nuclear Plant, operators would borate, l

as necessary, to restore the shutdown margin.

However, there is currently no time limit specified for this required action.

We propose to add an action statement to the Technical l

Specifications that would require operators to initiate boration within fifteen minutes to restore shutdown margin requirements.

The proposed time period is consistent with the time limit in NUREG-1431 and would allow an adequate period of time for an operator to correctly align and operate the systems and l

components required for boration.

This proposal is considered to be more restrictive than existing Technical Specification Section 15.3.10 requirements, because of the inclusion of the 15 minute l

time limit.

Rod Operability and Bank Alignment Limits The addition of operability requirements for shutdown and control rods is proposed.

The operability of shutdown and control rods is one of the initial assumptions in the safety analyses that assume rod insertion following a reactor trip.

When one or more rods are determined to be inoperable (i.e. untrippable), there is a possibility that the required shutdown margin may be adversely affected.

It is therefore important to ensure that shutdown margin requirements are satisfied.

If the shutdown margin is less than the required limit, boration must be initiated and continued until the shutdown margin is restored.

A one-hour time

1 limit is proposed to accomplish this action.

The shutdown margin must take into account the worth of the untrippable rod, as well as a rod of maximum worth.

The one-hour time limit is consistent with NUREG-1431, and it is more restrictive than existing Technical Specification requirements.

If shutdown margin cannot be restored, plant personnel would be required to place the plant in a condition where LCO requirements are no longer applicable.

Therefore, the plant must be placed in hot shutdown within six hours.

This proposed time period allows the operators to shutdown the plant in an orderly manner.

Rod misalignment is an initial assumption in the safety analyses that directly affects core power distributions and assumptions of available shutdown margin.

Should a misalignment condition occur, the proposed actions would require that operators restore the misaligned rod to within alignment limits within one hour.

However, if the misalignment condition cannot be corrected within this time frame then the shutdown margin is verified within one hour and the thermal power would be reduced to 575% reactor thermal power within eight hours to ensure that shutdown margin requirements and ejected rod worth requirements are preserved.

A period of eight hours is proposed for this power reduction.

This time period is consistent with the existing Technical Specification requirement.

The time to verify shutdown margin did not previously appear in the PBNP Technical Specifications, the proposed one hour time limit is consistent with NUREG-1431 Standard Technical Specifications requirements.

Continued operation with a misaligned rod would be allowed if Fo(Z) and F$m are verified to be within their limits.

When a control rod is misaligned, the assumptions that are used to determine the rod insertion limits, axial flux difference limits, and quadrant power tilt limits are not preserved.

Therefore, the limits may not preserve the design peaking factors, requiring that Fg(Z) and Ffm be verified directly by incore mapping.

These proposed revisions are consistent with the requirements of NUREG-1431 and would impose more restrictive requirements than the existing Technical Specifications.

The provision to subsequently increase power above 75% with the rod misalignment has been retained in the proposed specifications.

This provision requires that an analysis to determine the hot channel factors and resulting allowable power level.

Additionally, the existing specifications allow a period of six hours to conduct the troubleshooting as necessary to make an operability determination when an RCCA will not step on demand.

This provision has been retained and does not change how Point Beach Nuclear Plant is being operated.

If a determination cannot be made within six hours, the applicable rod shall be declared inoperable and the subsequent actions required for an inoperable

rod shall be taken from that point in accordance with the applicable Technical Specifications.

Rod Position Indication As stated above, the operability of shutdown and control rods is an initial assumption in all safety analyses that take credit for rod insertion upon reactor trip.

Maximum rod misalignment is an initial assumption in the safety analysis that directly affects core power distributions and assumption of available shutdown

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margin.

We propose that requirements be added to the Technical Specifications concerning the operability of the rod position indication system and the bank demand position indication system.

These specifications are being proposed because rod position indication is required in order to assess rod operability and misalignment.

The proposed specifications for the rod indication systems are consistent with the requirements in NUREG-1431 and would impose additional requirements on the operation of Point Beach.

Bank Insertion Limits During power operation, the shutdown banks are fully withdrawn from the core and control of reactivity is by the control banks.

The associated control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time and assume the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn.

If the shutdown banks are not fully withdrawn, prompt operator action is required.

Point Beach's current Technical Specifications do not specify any required actions should such a condition exist.

We propose that the operator be required to verify that the shutdown margin is within limits within one hour or initiate boration to restore the shutdown margin within one hour.

Additionally, the shutdown banks shall be fully withdrawn within six hours.

If these actions cannot be performed, the reactor would be placed in hot shutdown within the following six hours.

These proposed actions and their associated completion times are appropriate for the significance of maintaining this safety function and place additional requirements on the operation of Point Beach.

Similarly, we propose to add requirements to the Technical Specifications concerning operator actions should control bank insertion limits be violated.

These actions would be identical to the actions required for the shutdown banks except that the operator would be required to restore the control banks to within limits within six hours.

These proposed actions and their associated completion times are appropriate for the significance 4

of maintaining this safety function and more restrictive than the existing Technical Specifications requirements.

Power Distribution Limits The purpose of power distribution limits is to ensure that an acceptable core power distribution is maintained during power

l operation.

If Fg (Z), the height dependent heat flux hot channel factor, o r F"gg, the nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor, exceed their limits, we propose additional required actions.

The proposed additienal actions would delineate specific operator actions that must be performed, including power reductions and readjustments of reactor protection system setpoints.

These additional actions improve the Technical Specifications by making them more prescriptive and hence clearer.

These proposed additional actions are consistent with NUREG-1431.

The limits on axial flux difference ensure that the axial power distribution is maintained in the core.

Should the axial flux difference exceed the limits of TS Figure 15.3.10-4, we propose I

operator actions consistent with those contained in the current Technical Specifications.

The proposed specifications, however, are being rewritten to more clearly define the required operator actions.

l The quadrant tilt limit ensures that the gross radial power distribution remains consistent with the design values used in the safety analyses.

Should quadrant power tilt exceed two l

percent, with thermal power greater than or equal to fifty l

percent of rated thermal power, we propose the following i

prescriptive actions:

We propose to reduce thermal power 22 percent from rated thermal power for each one percent of indicated quadrant power tilt.

This proposed action is l

consistent with what is currently performed at Point Beach.

We have also proposed to add several actions to the Technical Specifications that are not currently performed at Point Beach.

The addition of these new actions are consistent with guidance contained in NUREG-1431.

This proposed specification differs from the current Technical Specifications in that it is only applicable when thermal power is greater than fifty percent of rated thermal power.

This specification is not applicable $50 percent of rated thermal power because there ic either insufficient stored energy in the fuel or insufficient energy being transferred to the reactor coolant to require the implementation of a quadrant tilt limit on the distribution of core power.

The limitations placed on Fg(Z) and F"gi will still ensure that core power distributions are maintained within design limits.

The reports required by the existing Technical Specifications for reporting a quadrant power tilt that was not corrected, exceeding the design hot channel factors, or having undetermined hot channel factors within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, are no longer considered necessary and appropriate reports to the NRC would be made under l

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 50.73, if required.

The monthly surveillance requirement for hot channel factors has been relocated to TS Table 15.4.1-2.

This change is t

f 1

l administrative only and does not alter the surveillance requirement.

Physics Test Exceptions The primary purpose of at-power and low power physics tests exceptions is to permit relaxations of existing specifications to allow the performance of instrumentation calibration tests and special physics tests.

The current Point Beach Technical Specifications do not identify the plant conditions that must be maintained during at-power or low-power physics testing.

We propose to add two sections to the TS 15.3.10 to delineate which requirements may be suspended during at-power and low-power physics testing.

These specifications will also delineate plant conditions that must be maintained during the performance of the physics testing, as well as actions that must be performed should any of these required plant conditions be violated.

These two proposed sections will enhance the Technical Specifications because they will provide guidance to plant operators in an area where none currently exists.

Additionally, a daily surveillance on shutdown margin during low power physics testing is being added to TS Table 15.4.1-2.

This surveillance will establish appropriate monitoring of shutdown margin during low power physics testing.

These proposed specifications are also J

consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1431.

RCCA Drop Times The drop times for RCCAs shall be no greater than 2.2 seconds from the loss of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry.

TS 15.3.10.H is being revised to identify the actual plant conditions when the actual drop tests are performed.

Additionally, the revised specification will include required actions should a drop time exceed 2.2 seconds.

These required actions are identical to what is currently being performed at Point Beach.

Technical Specifications Basis Finally, this change request also proposes to modify the bases for Section 15.3.10 of the Technical Specifications.

The modifications to the bases will incorporate information associated with the new proposed additions.

These modifications will improve the existing bases and provide background information for the new section.

Also, the information being added to the bases is consistent with bases information in NUREG-1431.

Conclusion These proposed changes provide appropriate limiting conditions for operation, action statements, allowable outage times, and surveillance requirements for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications for the Control Rod and Power

Distribution Limits.

Therefore, safe operation of PBNP continues to be assured by these proposed Technical Specifications changes.

_ - - -. ~.. -. -

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REOUEST 170 "NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION" In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a), Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Licensee) has evaluated the proposed changes against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the operation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendments does not present a significant hazards consideration.

The analysis of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 and the basis for this conclusion are as follows:

1.

Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical Specifications change will not create a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probabilities of accidents previously evaluated are based on the probability of initiating events for these accidents.

Initiating events for accidents previously evaluated for Point Beach include: control rod withdrawal and drop, CVCS malfunction (Boron dilution), startup of an inactive reactor coolant loop, reduction in feedwater enthalpy, excessive load increase, losses of reactor coolant flow, loss of external electrical load, loss of normal feedwater, loss of all AC power to the auxiliaries, turbine overspeed, fuel handling accidents, accidental releases of 1

waste liquid or gas, steam generator tube rupture, steam pipe ruptgre, control rod ejection, and primary coolant system rupcures.

The consequences of the accidents previously evaluated in the PBNP FSAR are determined by the results of analyses that are based on initial conditions of the plant, the type of accident, cransient response of the plant, and the operation and failure of equipment and systems.

This change request proposes to improve the clarity of the requirements concerning shutdown margin, rod group alignment limits, rod position indication, bank insertion limits, power distribution limits, at-power physics tests exceptions, and low power physics tests exceptions.

The proposed changes do not affect the probability of any accident initiating event, because these Technical Specification requirements do not control any factors that could be accident initiators.

These Technical Specifications establish the requirements that provide the limitations on the initial conditions, transient response of the plant, and operation and failure of equipment and systems.

The proposed changes establish the appropriate limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and allowable outage times that will continue to ensure that the results of the accident analyses are not changed.

Additionally, there is no physical change to the facility or

its systems.

Therefore, the probability and consequences of any accident previously evaluated is not increased.

2.

Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical Specifications change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

New or different kinds of accidents can only be created by new or different accident initiators or sequences.

This change request proposes to improve the clarity of the Technical Specifications requirements contained in Technical Specification Section 15.3.10.

The proposed specifications will clarify the existing Technical Specifications where identified by re-wording, supplementing, or replacing existing requirements.

There is no physical change to the facility or its systems.

Therefore, a new or different kind of accident cannot occur, because no factors have been introduced that could create a new or different accident initiator.

3.

Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical Specifications change will not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margins of safety for Point Beach are based on the design and operation of the reactor and containment and the safcty systems that provide their protection.

This change request proposes to improve the clarity of the Technical Specifications requirements contained in Technical Specification Section 15.3.10.

The proposed specifications will clarify the existing Technical Specifications where identified by re-wording, supplementing, or replacing

)

existing requirements.

There is no physical change to the facility or its systems.

Section 15.3.10 of the Technical Specifications provides the requirements that limit the i

operation of the reactor and establish the operability requirements for reactivity control by the control rod system.

The proposed Technical Specifications changes continue to provide the appropriate limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and allowable outage times that ensure the applicable margins of safety to protect the reactor are preserved.

Therefore, no reduction in any margin of safety has been introduced.

15.3.10 CONTROL R0D AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS Acolicability Applies to the operation of the control rods and to core power distribution limits.

Ob.iective To insure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.

Soecification A.

S:nk != rtion Limit, Shll11MINAkGl$

M. The shutdown margin shall exceed the applicable value as shown in

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If an RCCA does not step in upon demand, up to six hours is allowed to determine whether the problem with stepping is an electrical problem.

If the problem cannot be resolved within six hours, the RCCA shall be

=::=d B6Elsir*d inoperable until it has been verified that it will e

step in 5F V6ijld drop upon demand.

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j}EyffEihT6ME66E^ifiEff)7tRitilh'ifsWGia6iiH9iisRih essiids!th.R~ip_p11e,.ib_e_sa_10Fis..snh6,isn_ii n_i_fi g_ure 15g110121 08 4 l IMEvjyiiA3igh5sigiirggitniggtdiggiiggig boratig; $571 EI5IEhI63}i3EEEEEMEl MErgigstilgiaysasperatiiaMIFaTetIWiEKHalti desj regggrforagthelf#6]1erj teacliopj; 4 li)EMtEiWI3silKssiBNifffiItEiGKslihEWanfaiFilii exceeds 1theaa licable halussasishown ' niFi ure j marg _i,10,E2ie. pp rat.i t.h.,i,s._l_eni_! h_ss_Re,_is_t ~^ ".m hi"_ _td6_ER 15_i3.,1 -, w ixon* l m___ t RHD-. {@7dMit6J5fifRh6hfifi33siBisilijMf6EflhifCtj i E*flt@hpgMf3helgtdppelijg lj)MiflEWIT4She.fiffons :and!Yis~Tilit^iHTE6iiiiiTiff5H ti.m.e.sY. W h9Atf2,a___hs..f. ~fne_t"_. ' M h. otii._h.n..t_do.ii,n_in h .A m m m i X3)EmiiisMtysigshiffiiaDjIdityiiWMHIEMiighMHf(65 jfj~mwingiact,ionst thi ~ - li)~T'Jxit6'in one,6o,_sur veriffsthit~,the shit'dow,,_n mar,w.sgin, m -s .y exceeds,the' applicable value as shown in Figure 4 i 15.3.10-2; E within one hour restore-the shutd6G6 i ^ " ^' ~~ ~ ~ " ' " '~"' " ~ ' ~ ~~ ^ ' ~ ' "" A n _by;borationi, margin 1; 6.,.c).isWi,c...E.w,hT,m.;.w..R.y.wy. if IWsG.Fi.<.v.3 .n..<,y f.c..w,w, 5..F h,..i.w.mo..w O iBifsih s .c taisi i.nM.w.w t im w c e,.s - w -,..x.w,e . waya l {g7RsdTBHkTA&nmentWhliHi 4 1 ) XI }'EiflfGiIII6sihTditifiiilsidithitT6TiTf63IliUI6tfiifthli i fgniiiintilimitsnindithbiindisitinaisilignsaiintBiiWitIFsisi E{ausidsbyliis1 functi6n t siW{odipsii tien 1 ~ Ndsfifist6Fe yh M bditoj thjplid innijMilimit M Ejpel(od ~ j thelf9Eowinnactiensi i (i)H WitEliisssIE6EFIiiiEiffitKifftbifshifd6EdiiiiiMr6 InicebdilthshyplidibleNilui$inshownisi n3D guri 1513s10:2n g jithini M houd d stdfelthM shutd6@ marginibyjorationi 3 8tlQ l IEBZWI t6fsEilihtIh3EFilibiiEiBW6iill35EiMM pecentigfgratediti!arg}jpoweg{ i 'IEp"iverfrysth~itithirsEstd6EnreisFi'iW;ii~isartthe c 'ppklicib}eNilusiaighoiis}js1[igurijl5;3J103[siici Per8wehnhourst AE Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. j

v. .e k ~F.,tssh,i.ng@,; -.mh. www.eumywwwi..sfy.y.:,nthmtmm a . d mM.y v - u - .i. s a u.. ww., an. . im_eas.w ~. wa.l,r.mw.uwf-n .our ues.to Z),i,a-._ th st,ver. its9 wu in~r11 ~ - ~_reiv ~~ ma,.,~ma J ~Lo_ur$mh<ehdee606 wee.otk+Movee 2A -n s._iwi"t_' MtW W s M MMMe n "1 n n. W~ ~ times 'are' act, met,'.ho_in hot 4 s_hutdo.w_n wit If_the. bo_ve _act _ ions _a_nd. _ i _ated _ con @. _tfe_n i ~a assoc e .f_oll_owing_' s_ix_h_ours s. s B J <<c g gl*a*to.v.a.v..ers't..w>nyerbmeewmecene<^t..lmac$y M*owmveemwyiet"husawwmb'.a*eewee g g+wedu.ymp, w ncreas.f:e erma pcWer r o su sequen.-: todywthu.q'.vs: aboveR$g/;< ee.AgN.s v.e A y sy n. ermals >o"wer.;u-;p:yithg/,t'he$ W e sys 3percentpofags p gw d..et_efninRths.n t%bnesstEpsffdrefshisnilysMt3h. hxiiti#iirod?htsal'i 2 M - oiri cordance2WithWS allowabl-u er p ws

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E.<.;.3<?I..O T.s..o,4w .x ev - w w/ w ) ^(2)"WitThass been~ditiiiiWGeftKat'morelhan one, rod ~TFEst 1 '1rithinial ignment111mits < and 'the si sal iennentst are not' biGy haused'hy malfunctioning ~' rod ~~ position.~ Indication.'p~erform the. i -w -~ ~ fo_llowing_a_ct_io_ns_:-- s(w)gJem1 thi n,q,muvmw + v one ho<fAwa(/u.gww.wur verify thunati.4 qme thwruehye e s utd wys/m (unwy,u,i n.y u f l a own marg exceeds:the applicable;yalue-as;shown in; Figure 2 inargi15.3.10-2;bo.B within one' hour restore:the'shutd Q AND n,byu, ration.;- - - - - - ~ ~ - - -~ ~ ~ {< SE,BeWn.v.Ws.e.vfsE.w..t.".d.x.s..i.E.#@y.mu.we.w.wwns.uuu.xm ~ u.a.w.F.! i s ilthihTIE36GM .w. wue .evw uew s -<: P. T. a m.a w = k.i. n D..J P l a. e,6. - =. f.*.m4. u....1 n.. k l o. ,# D P. P.o ). A. A 1 a. n v1.. i j .n... n 1 ,A, m, O P,~P A, L.. 1 1 L.~. , m. m.,. 4..J..a m J.

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b. If =r: th= := RCCa, d:= =t :tep in, :pp:rently d= to cicetrie:1 pr:ble=, th: . i. .. i._..,, _,i=___ch:11 be recti fied er c' carly

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2____2 . u... ; _..._ .r.......... withir :ix h=rs. 3. 90 cre th=,:= i=p:r:ble RCC^. :h:11 be pc =itted durin;; := tai =d r L,_-_ 6.L.. 4 _ n,r P.A, ,J. a m.. m. e U. L. _...44 L. , _,. J a &. .. J.. J. J.._., .m... m.m - m.u. 1 r. A..

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. c, C!T'" RED 95.III0lEIMDICATlDE NOTEi'~' ~ "SiMr'a't'e'strF~ists~TS"15~.3~;10^.C.'11~i,"b',~'6Fc~is ^allswid for each '^" ' '"^ '^$ inoperable r,odjposittopfj$djgL ort jnd each, bank'of demand _ pos,i_tiod Jadicationi 1 I %..em+pDi~r~iw~~Tp^ow-e~r~meww^wdOs. 7B6?~*e~~r~cen~tioQatsd.th:e~.w-~~l,gp~~o^wer.w.wwtheirod-n w iope. p w i rma ts 4ew w ae wwv~~ wgy .g 7 p t'. mDh.=vu...ex.i,o.>pera.<ble..a. - _ _ m.._ _ y s.yue.ws e .s% al. w me s ymw ne. + >.vum. v.w,.w3..b., lcrw.,r ..w. rod. yrw.ssswi. -f,.iww^d:.-ypera e.sd Sp.w cvav.o.m...m h

1. 49.gdg prvasw.wrv.wwwasw:.rv+g.vm.sw on Sv~di. srwwtw.wyew, R.R.I-)ene,mp;de. wete.wwm.v.i.;.n.we+wd_ytw~.sr6w~

f i m- ~;a...; e. r .. x o.;-c.ev aw n;on.etomso eterf~ pos. lo.w vwxv. ra n ca o re ~ 4 ~an>, ino. w st A wo ~ < > + +vuo)~4 + w :w:-mwawxu 5 ..m::: ale + c +r (. 2. bsg once.;enu~~wy.vh. v.- R. +P.o..s.. :, y:.n.;;x;.:.,i..:n; ; v.:..;.s.c. h..,.w.h. ~y,t...h..y wu e s i ft. ;;.y., oc Kus '. g'.te..x..c. o.vxw fd..e.,s.p.o.s..i. tg.yi.w,.sw.pym .pg sw ermoc..o.~u.wp.~ lei. h,p.',ino o sIv.P.::+o..w+st.u~h'.;.h.y.e..r.y. ;o onso - r. ; :. 9 -,e y s -e u l.4 & ..,-.g......g;g ..;. ; : ;.x v.;.,. :- j ct.w.,,.r:o. - It - p m-wre .w t.e.w. e m rm

w.vy.v.. Mw.s-.wy w.w

~ c ,inco.,..,y'ete:ctors,:

1. u wv

- ^ ;d m..m4.s, " w w.w.....w,r,,e.%.. ;m.w.. m. w.>. 4. '(3)'^If 'the 'aboVe ~astisi'~a^M ~ssisEistsd "Haipist'is#' tiinss~"iFi'st ~~~ met *'p.erform,.the. actions,in accordance wi,t,h.TS 15,3.10.B.1,b? ~ v ~ b,.fr.y, I f on+%,w, ~w-w n we or more rods w,,ith,in,sr n nw w sww operable > RPIs hwsrw,ny,been,.,-u. dmin excess s v wwas s mw w move ave ~~~~ ~of 24 steps,in one direction since the last determination,of the"^ .r,od's,P,os,itio,n,Perfo, rm the, followin9~ac.tionsi ~ ~ e ~ v ~~ v (1bj'Within,.fo~u~r h_ours chw ck th_e,p_osition of th_e ro, s with, e d v inoperable RPIs by using excore detectors,:or thermoco6pls's? _or_m_ ova _bl e s_incore de _tect,or,s*, , s y(2)m-lf v. hvime,bomve action,and,asso, cia. ented,,compl,e,.sstion,tnim,e~,w'i s n, ot, w ~~n sw n,. van v nw st a met. perform.t, he^ actions ~ in accordance'wi_th_TS,15.3.10.B.1^,tU, o m e E'.~~~~^If' EihkTdsiM~jissi t'is^"ihd f Est~i ss,~'~f6r^ ~~oss^'s^r~^iiisi sEinksi~'^i s

• ~'^" determined,,to;be'Jnoperable,T perform',th ~se following' actions: '

Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-4 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

i 1 {1F~06E_~ VeWihTftWWfff~ith._itYiT_MPM._f_6_Mihi?I_ff_e^Et_'sdIb_is_ki i aresoperable*. ~ ~ 1 .) Ndl _ _ a i, '(2 70nce per shift _ verify _th_at,the most withdr_a_wn_ro,d and t6_ i e i ~~'least withdrawn rod of the affected banks are s12 steps l ' apart.;except when the' bank demand position is 530 step's 6F 2215 stess. 1In this, case,'once per shift verify that the most witwirawn rod and tho least with, dr_ awn rod of the " i _~ affect,ed banks,are s.24 steps apart; + i ) 3__dM m_e_t_d.h,"*WWWb^"<W{^e:^WMMNt' --'i o.n. t i o."'fNMd,lN Y er.ma ov le.c AWWN#E-sfan_. ass._oc a e rc.omp et on_s l 3 4 A hP_e.r_for.e., s t_h_e._.ra.c_ -~_n.ss i_n ta,cc.ord.a.nc~el_Wi t.h.,_AT5_115 t 3 Y10.c; B. E. b m. ~ m m mm. 2 i. 1 \\ n. u s,.., 4,,. _...a.- n _._ _.a o c. e. n i A a .1 s., ..i... m l a , c.., u. ,~a..,.4.+..... _a4., +-. .mu.

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6. .J...u &.. c. 1 2,,- _ _ = _ &. m. i. e. u. 4 4., u, L m .m .,, ~,....... m r., . - ~,. demand position a d cannot be aligned. hen the bank demand position is n u 6.m..-. o i r. o n. . u... ..1.,... + L~- u, ~- *, u. _ _ 1, c...... ...a ,+-. 4 mr, ... m m ,~. .o .u .....,~ m.. u- ---_4 i ,,,.m. u.. u.,.,. m u.

4..

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.ye ,~,.i. y.es i.ii ..... i 1 u,. u, .2.- _... a _,, t. s. s.., .,~ y, '1 2 To increase power above 75% with an RecA more than 12 steps indicated c. , 4.,_.._,~-.. m u. u. 4.., u.,. o 4 -_ - _,4 .,, 4 6 4..,,., ,m+ .t _ t u... u.,. o -_ - _,a i ......... ~ r, ..m ....... ~ j .. u. s..,.., 4.,., u.~..--. o i e., a.n...-_.,..

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4.. o.

ro m, ~, ..m s..m..~ y is gre ter than er equal to 215 steps, or, less than or equ l to 30 a a .,,. u... ,,-m u...- ,_a, ...a. _,...,,___-.. e. , +,. _, u.~. m - -.,. u....,, a r. ,, ~,............, ~,... .m m y., ~ j .. e. 4 4 4.,. 4, _ A 4..Ag..,...J

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6 2..._. I.,_...... .m.. J-4 6 .~. .., ~,. e 4 .u,~m_---..1., _...u,. ..,._..- 2.s.._-,..,..,\\ u.o,_.,.-__ , ~,,,, .r. .~,, .. ~ .m , u... c.. . c.. - _..,..,. 2 a .,,,._-2,,-

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_-.,r.......~,. .~m r ...., ~,,,.... 3 ..y 1 AD. BANK INSERTION LIMITS 1 l. When the reactor is critical, ,,,m-O b.,u, d..A, O -, h.., m,

b..,,

u, [- he

a. M M

A-

m.. r...

r. m. ..,~ ,~ c= c;c';, the shutdown banks shall be fully withdrawnt Fully Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-5 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4

l i l withdrawn is defined as a bank position equal to or greater than 225 steps. This definition is applicable to shutdown and control banks. I Wi onTsinstTEit i _ Ti_Kf4_61w 6w ~~7_s.E~G._6Ws?. ~~~~ T su.w_._ i A- ._me_w_.-e ce g gx .a re.E-v aw__ih+i*n*t o. n_eih:eweww:~eew.rs.v. w+wwnye ourAv~er.-.f..yt.h%w>fyd_:h*e:gwphevteds.venm%xepvn v w pppl,ipablegyalu:elasis,ownj) Hjgureil.513M0j2.im,,r.-.-.....m:dsw rs u.. own2. marg nt.ex_cee si_th.e_._j m . e.~a m w ggQtithjn;one res.to_reithe_is..h_Ut._down.fm_ar.g_in _b.yA._bor_at. i.._on* silD ~ - wt i m_m b.+?MW1.wns.,wRs, thT i]J.,uew,6sFs7v 0.u.ev@,u i1 11 thdFiRl6.,i,u ss n...f.u.dal.i,,n. san,6,, i.h.;.M....,;+ vm s,.,.,.s;+.w.s m. 6EG. ng;: T a n gM-Woc +.w a s - ww/; l F+W:m:gf EfHeFa6emxewea:e t<i.:eveepewndMywei3Eiifsde<owwowe. lit %iw.ve:we ^1euex.:o>wwaw.w.. a. waw.e. w< ws -.wa~ba;gd,niho,tash,?ac =. onsta ~tas _fo110wingisin,onit,t _s;areino. time ci m ove tcomp-. me a _._._._ _.o_n. _ _ _ni.._e.l..._ _ _.. _ _o._u.t.s.- std w iwithi th h u-2. When the reactor is critical, the control banks shall be inserted no further than the limits shown by the lines on Figure 15.3.10-1. Sception to the in:crtica limit cre c =itted for physic; test +and centr:1 red =crci: :.

• MthisTE6haitlinTi stn6 tibet"di~sFf6F#fhe

~ ~ ~ " ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~' .fo.~116E. ndii^61f5.H.i? ~ %PJWa nJ41'.

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_.o... u'.Wr4v'E. 8 8.ll %I i..%Mw ri.'f' f- #lt%".*.t*h.0% "tN/,"t. h.Q'.%P/h',*.'tP#Jt..."d*. "oYM.'.8 4 /s p d a s4g %Ye,. - wni ma'%%'/.%P/i-.. 'n 'NN.W.*N.*.*/pW u pYsWNu%. . AK n ti,n J. j.l.,,s.,.,.u..,.15 2 3; 10s "*,,..iex..c.e y ss h f witM M oe..vg-i w.a. 4vgW4h... -e..t applic.9abl.: - - + s,.,<.g.;.g.. y. ue rasishow:....e.g. '~^"~^~~~ ' ' ~h. w y.ppsy~~~ . ne our vestd. F6._t._hi_fhWstd.oss_isaf.si_is "lgureb. 6..fsti._ chi"~^~~~ w ~ R..:.seu,.Ma.Wi.t.hTn..=TsfEh~6iiF.iTF.i..~s.w 3.mm f.u.t.:..hi?E..6.HfF61,x.?h. i. hm.:.w.%.me.w.- F t Fi. m wmu isiWt..K.w.E,Wi.ifiiLts! m wf 'x ue ~wam-o neuu.umatwouu .w wuowu wm - seuwu ve<~enggI'f yifi. w<mvbwwy'e.wwww"tr wemvmewwwdw~sswmnwi< set.ysnd de ~^ ~~~ i..s.t i. ~~~w~.%i m~.-umwnw"r.w wnn vt%w~~t3 esa ov ;ac ions;an rassoc omp onIt esia esno ime ~ cwa x -eww-m.-me_h_ut_do_s.n_M.i.t_h_ih_it_he_lfo.1_1 o_Wi. rig _Gui_hd.u. F_W~~' ~~" ~y~ bshinbtn. m.s B(. POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 1. HAFthiEinlifiEEEFI a. Except during icw pcwcr physic; tc:t:,4The hot channel factors defined in the basis men philJ meet the"following limits: F,(2)s -(2

• 50) x K(2) for P> 0. 5 P

F,(2)s5.00xK(2) for Ps0.5 F",<1.70 x [1 + 0.3 (1 -P)] Where P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating, K(Z) is the function in Figure 15.3.10-3 and Z is the core height location of F,.

u..

e.,,..a.... .,. r..., u,,,.. t.... o__. _.., u..., ., _ _ u,.,,. n n _ _ _.-,.- r, -... c. ,, r rcted pcwcr =d et effective full p=cr =cnthly intervel; there efter, p=cr distributic: =cp: c:ing the cvable incer detectcr Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-6 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

.,......... u. ,1 u._..,_..___,,_.u.. .u.

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f. e I _e_xc, v. f i _of, _ecificati n 15 310 E.1, ;,, i...in v

o aw v s satisfi.e.d;.~.tes _ u_ce _,o . n. w t. , _r un_,otil F Z _ limit _s are een a nu v I M Af. e em.vg.".h#wma.w,lyg.w_wwvwagfhvm.w,yb.w.we..wydp.y e.w,temt erma apower2 ast een educed.wdge..ygy.yw.y.v.mswdan i e-wwwau .wwn,w y .1 5.px.~d.+x+fidst,is.~wdkwc-w: wax?1. woo ~Ei.xw.w~Sp.w~rf6.rs.w%wwu.wudws. s heifo116.ww~.siastWn._~s,y?, mmwm -~ - 1513 0i l2b.bi i ~- wis se ~o mwu -v~~ mwmoww w, " i..STMIMww.w,E e.E.no:.: iril'I M6.,.Hig. f,:.::::p d.<u~c^3IE.,tp.T.. Gin..U:n e' fs. "v.xx:.e.,M.p:.+o. +G..iEos%.5~s..% u urs e-s oiv - x:y oxxw # -. 1 w Mw see - hitrip.3y.a:r:

g Neutron; a

ts; tanramount ex a, g.se o g g y-a.:.e s x_? m om .mw wu>w n " 5.g3._. 0_Ewlia*,ommw # . aec_i..c_at_o: y ~ E g 7 utst i -w_m n ucei verpowe ga ye.amperture_J. J it Ri_plse.tpo t.ntsibyj a_niamountioqui val.en_t stolthelpower; m reduc.tionirequ_ir.ed.~#i.n$.. " ficationil_513flo_' Em_ab5 - - ~ n ~ ! ,. nr .,m.: .>.i,. kww., .,v r~.. r; n~, . ~> c n e..:.rw:: a.;.. qv,.,.., 4n: .ws....:.:.,. ,n re to,,na. e.... .v.,,si..o. c.9llncreas ngianylsetpo n ^ e . n muwa w x e,.y _ en,& _fh.... /....:,ymmym,wy4y r.vy. wjp ncreasedipowerfleve. Aprio,.jz.g:

n thsMhaVelbsenkedsssd isodithermilip6MzabovsItheM isi f

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w m w ~2 m lt ower9 _e.r_m.a._~p..~_t Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-7 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

1 USMWiiFIR655$^ reduR@M@syfWfssiffRirgsips@@j D ux.93. P11gh+itrv+.p e;+e,.w.p.w ;c.;nt;.;wWtw+.mm,,.re.8tpe.wwwa i s t oi sstors5 rcent.M.r.m+t,e.w4a.c% uw,rm.%,;* a dithe al Rwmc amw ..m +w w>w..w r.....w w + -w w POW'4. In'^avaddition "to thw,y. va a 4vu mw , ove ac ,v 4 vw ~w v e abwy.ww e,"tio.vwmuyns therfollow,uw~ing 'a.mctio. swswns esha11.Ta.l.wu, be ' perfomed during tho' subsequen; t ' power :escal at ionii fR hQ ~~ so .e.x_ceede._d th_e :1_i.m. it._of;3. pe.cif_icatio. A._.3.10.,. E~,l',a: n 15 -~ m - .' 3)>% Veri.Lf.. h.atsw, >r mvs w,t p al.. v,%s.ithA em m we -.m. -.,s win li itww-s.ithin 24mhour.~~.3 sw s+ s.~. ~-.a Y +,thatwF v iw s .(4),q-Veri exc _i#9 50 ada, ~ithisn11m~its,,.,, io~r, t,o,th,e,l,p> ~ v s n pr r.m.a, ower P_erce_n,t__of _ rat,ed 4_the_r, mal Po,wer,- ~ ,(5)es,, Verify thv. fs i~s withv ~na p nnn we ,eiw.-- v~w in l~im~~i~ts prio, m~to thv,ms.~l.nwnws.w <.erma _ power. , at r exceed.n. g ~7,.5.n reent of rated,r.~he.rm..al' powe.r.X in t ~ -~v ~ - . ~.... ~ ~ n NG- . in s te. 6),L,, Verify,,th t,F,,.6' is:with., limit-withi,n 24,_ h.o.u.,r.s a,f,w r.. a reaching ~t95,.. percent o~f rated: thermal power.4 ~ - --.- - ~ i 7_ *wWO If,m s the(4AN>>% bWWS$WetmANN w g a ove ac

m. et ' be._in._ho_t t, ions a%N, vowejcywe nd'uW<NAWN % <<ev,47. associated +'<co/#^wmple.Ation t%.

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4. L, ~. m n., 6..

L_. .E 1 ..., ~ i ....u,_. . L. Hof6MTh_iTE.,tweierr~aore.sope.r. abl.e.i..nlc. o.r lliM, IE,?d_iff.eliiinli,EW,iiEiiiR3.3, Rid?. . man n when.:...i.od_i f,,w_~en. n w:oy i_s. ;._.7. :.e_ou_ts_soi_ de

fl vnux1

- nt - - es. ha nel sti = ci...t.ns.a%,mw,;tsa.w..x.xsi al eXtha,ta d wg4 / ww : wa ,r c.es r 1 om e,wn ausv ww wn w. imms nm mv yn, - m.e,v, wns wr Duri ng.y wsm.serewnmmm+~. v. power operation wimhnyt.h.nm,wuvsermal. power 450 percen,mnqyt of,r.<n _<<d t ate a.u thermal >ower, the axial flux' difference shall be mairitained' i within tto' limits specif.ie _d in. Figure 1,5.3.10_-4; " ' ' ~ v ~ - ~ - --- -m m m , ~ m m. .m l(1)we>lf,r thwnime ax ale (I<E'~ difference:i~s not~n,itlii~n limits,nmithin.15 nn n v u.- w i w ^ ^ sinutes restore to within, limits; + If this' action and'~ i associated completion, time tis'not met p_erf_orm_the*follWW t 9 a.c.ti o.,w.s,.m uwm nt v . a.,._R_ educe th_ermal_p_o_we_r_unt._ti_t.h_e-_i_a_l_' flu __x di_ffe_,r_ enc _e. i_s ax_ _ within limits;,_ E m v

b. ~Within.three hourstroduce th_erma_l.po_wer,t,o s50,_p9r.c_ent.

m m of rated...~th,,erma.l< po..wer, _ ~ ~ - i bgrympw)If,,'AI t; dss necessary to'vesesrestriu v waxe.ws ver^wwvswwwwvM mwy sv ct thwAw. Awwl yevas wswwwpower to.vys50 Maapercentwwf %A erma M g, mw As o i ~~~' rated thermal power *,'within' the next.four hours' reduce the PowiF Range _Neut_ron Fl_ux_- High Jr.ip_setpoin_ts.to. s,55 p_e_r.<c_ent_; --.. i ~ 4 i "cT"': ' If:^thFil a^6sTs'ed"t'6*istiit'sF th's"Wi s1fi n"di ffei'issWs "" rendered inoperable,1 verify that'the axial: flux differe' ce 13 n ^ ithin : l imi ts : for 'eachloperable "excore, channel,,, once. withinions W hour,andeveryJourthereafterk e meedmvwnwi'49;paward" ~iiy. wmmenm Qua ran t i 3.

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=6 r. r Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-9 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

i,.

tpcint: :h:11 he r:d:::d by the ;;iv: lent of 2% p=r f:r every percent :f ;;:dr= t p = r tilt, d.

Th: =_..=.._=._._. le:r in:tre==t:tien :y:te: =rve: = the pr ........-.,__,i=,:ry ,..J..... . n....,. __ ,,.L..... J.. .m.. r L..._...., L. L..._. . L .J.,.......,,,.._4,.,,. . L. .. L.. ,...J........... _-.-, .4,1,. J.., =:pt:ble =11 5: :::d. Th=: ::thed: inlad: h=d =1 1:ti=, i=r: th:== p1= =ing !ther :==puter er

1 ::10:1: tion: er inecre detector:.

~w,W 0urs,- __m.--- tion,; w_imt.h_thv~ _,mh,- ~_ t_er t. han 56..,-__ t a opera ersa

res

percen ithsihmaW hetisx.csedT2.4sspowe@thetidisai W~"_7.._it;@i.W-...~~1hs._ts._st*^T b ~ h i

f ll i-tio-~st~ ~., G enti A--- ..~ w_o _owJ9 _rac_n.. y+:/g '. "N , ^/ vMw+y Nwev,eSMMyMyJSMt$f. wx4M'M e 'cwawWm..ypx>ewruce?% yaw .W,yNNAN$'eav. N,e Nw egmac ..:n+v 'gM A

ther Tmal

<.v.- h . e" tilty [Wegiforle@Hpgeggofdigdipitedgquad gpow. j t ~ (2)~ W i thii~ 24" h6Wi~"a~~nd~ 6E' "e'iiW~sisii~diji^"ths'r'~a ftE,7~~ri ff' c e e '~^that F' ' and 15.3.1..L_a; flare _ wig)n_,%e_lisits ofJpecificsRo_n w a

3) Upon completi,o_n_of,$p_ecific_atio~A,.n 15 3w10.E.3 (2),,' calib_ rat..

A A .a e _the excore detectors 'This action'shall be completed pyjog h to increasing'theraal power ~above the,, limit imposed _by Specj fication 15,.3 10.E'.3. a(,1),; s (4)^'~ NQ 1 ' Specification, Z)~"ssd F"ba,within 24 hours after'Mich"ind Veriff'thst~F

• • lEsith'16*ths'11siti'"of 5.3.10.E

' rated thermal power, or within 48' hours afterAncreasing thermal power above, the' ilmit, imposed hy;5pecificati_on~ s 15:3.10,E,3.a Fgie -f.y.tsh.qqyavbwggyAwqgy.gwtyiWw.pgy4vu.ydy4AwxAy wwwi.swt..yAYdWgyAyA%N/ e gompl.b.yi/.sW/Ay,g.%tvi. AVMVAYg%WQPN.WggyA%t

1. 3 i eya ov.esac onstan tassoc ons mestareino petKMthIQt.h6f611oWigfouWhdutMiepu(eithe@l[poWetiti ercen o. <farww.ye.~e,d..t.h,w.wm.y..,l f.p,o.es,e.wersw rf irat er a s, i.,.0. w!p:wAu/am.

5a ~; wa w >sm b'y.mgyihv. twasqgeweesdwnwastqsevawaw.w.x.yt~j l~Mw n xanmuncemAv.y.m:pwen.ysi:l.wbvl~in.dpgyr s.i thwivunytumnlysyn nolqu_a ran ipowerg armsgarelava a .p we e gg h u s andreve,r Tit.h_in_a.,l_in.i_ts.._);.1.the./.<c. v twelvelheur.: ras reafte,:r*tke.x.rif ~ ithat.. ". na.araht v.o,:..:r.w.?.9 ve pow..e _il._: ~v.s,> w . ann -s z > .ew nww.m .f.vn i. l ti. .spe.r_o..._rm..w.,n..g,i_ca.._c. u.. a..o_n.s.;y eE. When one power range channel is inoperable and thermal power is ~ owe r,I. x~.w.e = d r=.;.t yfo.--"-- greater than 75% of rated thermal th ~.J ~.m:-w y m - mn. we.r w~w.vuae ch:33., : = f i ::.j = =,;.:.; ' -. a:<.x.. ~- limits b. u.__.er.oa _e,r';;p,Tw$:ble w ve. euz.o.u,rsia _ eve t x xe-m' :: x.w v m,n~we + m v i ~ a < ~ > - ws x w ,o :: %5 55^ y use of th~e movab,er., _ deua r. _antector n .. ve o n e v~ le incore l en. : = per 12 @ TATIPOWe ipnVs W TesisW kiPfidNs ia{eynewe+wy^mn-tpowerdphvenMe. acewd.pv y ct estsdgr hvece~euwwwk.veew+ wee {eme:ew -vemen. sich hy+.< v yb9:wo vw,Mww s wsgameehw.wwwme+vuggMn peu x nwmeg d id u pg Jet rmancej eitequ s.y~s.E.. ww.s.n.EnU. $D.. R~.wnw.shM%n. 3aiep,iM.Evnwe:ian+EaTessem.siW~ishtm/m-a+~.A ~. mi t -- 6Te P iTR fi illB ww avw ~nns. nan ~ m = =~m . + -~ne n Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-10 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

4 spe IVGii13HIH?RMIDW8siElsisFt"tWBiitsi.a.. Ssi661fikati6hB1513?10!EttW IRaynssQM35j3,jpg3fk[AdalW16s!Di ffifence ggjghgPMj]Dity J M %IsuTpiidid M M M i j JETEMDssiiGFJiiistiW^sS5' psMt;^sDitsd,"theniia13ssiH l bT~~ 8tEl "RihisNestFsi Fisi"~~Wi' f TFiF~sitisistFIFs"s~et 4 powsF g i " ~" ' m_a_ximu_m_se_tt_ing',of^90 percent of rated ' thermal ' pow _er; ' " 4i CJWS%$IFsiiffi$(i33@i{ig@_h s_ Tris _ise_tp_oi nt s_K([{ss90i..p_er $$6hfoFphW l 1 P.. ower Ran 1hgp_;h7xge_1N.,eu_tr_o_g l_uxsM _ gare_ tili^d j ppgen

3. "~5'If'the*ih"dt'doisssiiti"'is"iw)'"sitiiis'"ths'lisits'of Spfcif1c'atish

'~"~15.3.'10.A.1; within 15 minutes initiate boration to restore the~ l q shutdown margin;l AND_withinione;hourjuspend; physics l_ tests,excep't'jds] 4 s.~ ~ hour, reduce thermal power!to $85 percent of rated the_rmal; p j within,_one, hour, suspend physics, tests., exceptions,, u 5~If~^thi'P6EiFRasgi~'Niit'Esi~Flix ~2'Hiih~TFii'~iit*pi> lit ~s are gre'~it~iF'~~thid ~' ' 90 percent of, rated' thermal power, within one hour < rest 6re the Power ~ Range < Neutron Flux - High Triosetpoints to s90 percent of rated i ther. mal power 3 within one w.ar.s.ucpend p.hysics tests ex.c.ep.tioss? s ~ - ~ /A W3v sy g AAWv s ugy wn N eNA)( vAe un e As AN NW/.ay y %% uovet vM e t l 6./ / % Ev#^ery: hWeour;pwhril e atye,#A/uA#.WN-power pheWysic#s testss/#,ANurpW,/s s. are, in, p%#Nrogress,,yerify,,,tha/ > 4 ,.th,ermal p.ower is:s85 perc. ent of rated the.r. mal. power. ~ ~ ~ A ) a?Ul'gpWtFPHVsRsWtstFtRtat1Ms g>W %S SM4s p # 1.%_ _Dur% %ing thAWFy , e, pet gra'@WYM%%%%{MVYance ofj7ow power _ph<y">s%#i>c%My.s t,%4 M %ests Lthe)COM $4 F SV &#4%k V f 4 9 VM#4%4WNWA > W#PN P \\/4%V)% Ny 4 Q g a $sieEl fi'citfofi 15 ~.3'.10. 8,""* Rid ~6p~ifa6'il i tf aid ' Baili"A1'linsen't Limit ts : ^ a specification'15.3.10,0,{' Bank # Insertion #Li mi t s *, ^ ^~~ " ' ~ " ~~~^ ^ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ Specification 15410.E,,,"P,owerDistribution;Limiti", l are susire~idid~p"Fsifdid~tisii'13isiit^"RCS~Toop average temperatLiTii greatetth an _the,,mi nimuuttemperature, fop, cri ti cal i tyj ~ '~ i

2. ^ If"thi^sh'stdsin~mi~r~g^isTs~~ sot'"With'1W~t&~s;11EltTsf^$pscificistisi

~ 15.3.10,A, within 15 minutes' initiate' boration to restore the shstd5GH i i inargin; AtlQ within one hour _ suspend physics, tests, exceptions [ ' '^' w 3.~'~"If V6EsF~*ii~^n~6t'Withls'*1isiti,'?spis~th~e^'FictbF~tFip'bisake?s ' famed.iatejyj . lid ?!MT6INiif?R$li.i36p?iii.yIfidiffsiiiEFFififull'iillisiihihif. 6Eiiiiiiiiiiii ,4 g g ~ sver. is41timpeM.i_i_uFi,_ft_biW_it_h_inili.m.._it.sN_E_N_ithis_t3.0.m!a_inut_ei.A-l bs ~~~~~~ m. m W -W pubctjticahg J Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-11 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

i .0 E@. RCCA DROP TIMES

r: tin-t

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ter:Jnd fe WithiRC$-

"isFitsiWgrsilij 1. ?,t :! dis?Iidlii;;;jitiipiFil0ji}f"0}Qi10:$i)MpjMd Mit db ffsi a i lime hobiin(QiGWisifinstM7'the loss of stationary gripper coil voltage to thE2!2 secondi~ffom dashgot, entry. Mth]f[@cjjM@[g@{Mtheg6Mj)Mf6@@ h$0Dkk E E g iEyJ E # H ilii g ? E g g i gt11 M it EE" K S H M iI G M ! H M IE M E N iE M TE !iEff! M D Basis Insertion Limits and Shutdown Marain The rc::tivity 00ntr01 :::::pt i: th:t rc::tivity ch: g : ::c;;p;nying th:nge; in re::ter p:: r Or: ::p :::ted by :: trcl red : tion. Re::tivity ch:nge:

Oci:ted with x:::n, Orrie=, fuel depletion :nd 1:rg: ch:nge: in re::ter

cl:nt t::p:r:ter: ( per: ting t::p;r:tur: t: ::ld :h td::n) cr: ::: pen :ted by ch: g:: in th: 0010b1 b:ren ::::entr tien.

During power operation, the shutdown banks are fully withdrawn. Fully withdrawn is defined as a bank demand position equal to or greater than 225 steps. Evaluation has shown that positioning control rods at 225 steps, or greater, has a negligible effect on core power distributions and peaking factors. Due to the low reactivity worth in this region of the core and the fact that, at 225 steps, control rods are only inserted one step into the active fuel region of the core, positioning rods at this position or higher has minimal effect. This position is varied,basedonapredeterminedschedule,@inordertominimizewearoftheguide

rd: in the guide tube: Of the RCCf,':. RC [ijf@y@ Mids ^]{i{dsj The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time and assume the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn. A 10% margin in reactivity worth of the control rods is included to assure meeting the assumptions used in the accident analysis. Se-a A reactor trip occurring during oower operation will put pliEII the reactor int'o B e hot shutdown : ndition.

Ir 4ddition, the insertion Tliiiit's provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod wcrth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection and provide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors. The specified control rod insertion limits take into account the effects of fuel densification. Tne rods are withdrawn in the sequence of A, B, C, D with overlap between banks. The overlap between successive control banks is provided to compensate for the low differential rod worth near the top and bottom of the core. When the insertion limits are observed and the control rod banks are above the solid lines shown on Figure 15.3.10-1, the shutdown requirement is met. The maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs at end of core life and is based on i the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident. Figure 15.3.10-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 2.77% reactivity at end-of-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown. All other accident analyses assume 1% or greater reactivity shutdown margin. Shutdown mar in calculations include the effects of axial power distribution. One ::y 16sfi?g[ dim 6519iii assume no c ) Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-12 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

1 b. change in core poisoning due to xenon, samarium or soluble boron. If' ths~'sh"utdousif'inafgilt'~reqsipementiTaps sbt ' met ~,' bo' itisn'adst' bsiditi at'id r promptly.v Fifteen minutes is an adequate period:of time for an operator'to correctly' align and start the required systems:and' components'. It is' assume,d that'boration will;be continued;untilpshutdown marg!nfrequirementsfare metf R6846sFEEmfe%is!HF-~WiisFaiEmm~"*~f4EfB Thw+o.pwv@x9.y< bMi h.ywt.Av,4,y(. vgyp, qxpy,..v.wvi.ww.y.wl.wiM. w.w.vav)yhyahay.i. 6ys,.xqww.y.ytadown.g4yn.9w -spww:.y.wfwww.h vapw eropera yq e;g atr ppa ity ic &shu iandicon ro + sgan esactoBtripiaM&imumsFsdinisallinns)ntEisfilisias%itialfissuiiptisniihiths ~ safety?snslysii{ttiattdifssilyisffecissfirii6ssadistfibsti6hsNandiassumptiosE61 shil abl eishutdbwn?sshin@[RCgdfspsppQaissy1Xoffststlos;arig)Dhi1R AYr6disluitsdc6htF6Risissblil(RCCA sonsidepdj6sepabls}((sthe toltagey MsE Easi Ei1Tr ~e We~fFIEsl~~fillsFii~TaiF~cisiiTi'cistF31~Fid W tiiEsiiie~1 noperab1'i'6~F to become misaligned'from:its' group'. ' Control rod inoperability or misalignment, may cause increased power peaking due to' the' asymmetric reactivity distribution" This will also cause a reduction in the total available rod worth for reactor '^ shutdown. Therefore, control' rod alignment and' operability are related to'coFs operation in design power peaking limits and,the core design. requirement,of a ~ z minimum, shutdown., margin.. An inoper:ble red i=pe :: ddition:1 de::nd: 0; the Operator:. The perr.i:MMe number of inoper:ble centr:1 red; i: li=ited t: ::: in order te limit the

gnitude of the oper: ting burden. From operating experience to date, an RCCA which steps in properly will drop when a trip signal occurs because the only force acting to drive the rod in is gravity. When it has been determined that a rod does not drop, extra shutdcun : rgin is g;ined by bcr;tica er by adju: ting

_th_e _do_w_ertio_n l.,i=_il_cu.e_ti_ce.e.n,t.lk_or _t,d. e,t,oni_nc1 w rth cf t..h_he,i,,n_cp.",, f7th. _i_n._' h. ins tt :c f h e '7"_-'. FuFthsF~ekifsWeHai7ndicatsi~thiriohffB1 Fsdi^%Eleh~ shut n mar Bantroitisd!ginsa la oniwi nee 3 t rworthro t e: o 6orsfdp are uisillf^hffected by electrical problems. That is, normally the problem is in the rod control cabinets. If Oper:bility c:nnot be rc:tered, the RCCA will be declared incper:ble :nd ccrrective action can be t hen te cc pen;;te for the assestated reduction in :hutdown ::rgin. If there i: Orc th:n n RCCA affected, :: Orderly :hutd :: wculd bc :terted. Such :n cvelution ::uld h:ve to be-perfor:cd in deliberate ::nner withcut undue prc::ure en the operating pcr:cnnel be::u: cf the unu u:1 techni:;ce te be u;cd tc acc =ad:tc the reactivity change: :::cciated with th: :hutdown. R6dl^d1Hsfif@i EfFsMiiiiiiiS1TsWRCCAiHEF5diWiFsfiidVidDiyIEWifFTEsnfFalfF3d drivelmechanismsf(CRDMs)2REachiCRDMimoVes%itsiRCCAlbndstspg(dingi apprdinatslil5/8 inch) fit {MtimbMbutfatWappinWEiteil(stipQbKiniduts)Idepen .outputifromitheJRod!Contro1Myptem] Ths"RCCA57ifi'~dWidid~iiiishif^ciitFil bi~nks~isdr hit ^d6si~Yshk~s;~~~ ATE 6sii"~cs'dsisti s of two or more RCCAs>that are electrically paralleled to step simultaneously.; A bank of RCCAs consists of one or two group"s that are moved'in staggered fashioni but"alwhys"withis'oss)tep"6f*ea^ch'"otheE 'fa'ch"~idit^h'isf60r"66ntrol" banks 1hd two shutdown ban,ks, Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-13 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

!i.* l When 'one~or^' sore ~ f^ods~' Ars^'det'ermin'ed *ts' b^e'~untF1~ppablif there'li~s^ possibility' i that the required shutdown margin may be adversely,affected. Under these i conditions, it is'important to, determine the shutdown margin, and if it is'lesi than'the required value, initiate boration until the req" ired shutdown margin is 4 restored. The one-hour time limit is adequate for determining the shutdown'" ' ~ ^ margin and, if necessary, for rest' ring the shutdown margin by boration. 15:th13 o situation, shutdown margin verification mus,t,i.nclude the, worth of the untrippable rod,,as.well as;a rod of maximum worth. If the untri' pable' rods ca'5not'b'eFestbfed'to 'in 'o'perable'conditiinl'th'e pli6t, p must be placed in a condition where the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in hot shutdown within six hours.'s ' This allows this plant condition to be reached injan, order)y manner,' without ' challenging,any, plant. systems. 2 Limit's 6n cont'r61 r6d 'ali'ghiient' h'ife^bsih'sitabitihe'd and's11"r~od'Ebiitions'are ^~ ^ ~ '~ monitored and controlled during power operation to ensure that the power,d distribution and reactivity limits defined by*the' design power peaking"an shutdown margin,1imits are preserved., '~~ If the mi'silijnment'~c'onditi'on*can6bt b ' rsadili co'rrected^* th' real"p6wef will bs, i adjusted'so that hot channel factors are maintained, and so,that the requirements on shutdown' margin and ejected rod worth are preserved. Continued operation of " the reactor with a misaligned' control rod is allowed'if Fe(Z) and F" w are verifi'e'd to be within their limits. When a control rod is misaligned, the assumptions" ' that are used to determine the rod insertion limits; axial flux difference limits, and quadrant power tilt limits are not' preserved; Therefore, the limits may not preserve the design peaking factors,and F,(Z)'and F",kmust be verified directly by,incore mappingi Upon dsfectio6' 6f 'a 'phtential probism Eon 6srnini "ons:iF'm6Fs ' rods,^'a' maxiMU'm"pf six hours is provided for troubleshooting activities. Immediately upon determining that one or more rods is' inoperable, the applicable actions in TS 15.3.10,B shall be performed. If'after six hours, an operability determinatio6 has not'yet been made,' the rod (s) shall be declared inoperable and the app ~licabl6 actions, in,TS,15. 3.10.B sha11_be, performe,d[ ~ ^ ~ ~" ~ ~ ~ ' ^' ^ ^ ~ ~~' " ~~ Hinli=cd RCCAS R6Fp6TTEf6nEIW8Teiff6W DiiFihi[56Nif76piFifliHilfliifrilliERh~iNIfiWIpiFdiKf76&ifidithiFiiRidNIFift63 Fodipo si tionii ndi eati ossistsmiand i;thelbankVdemssdip6si tion Ei ndihat'i odisysfemKFi feqUi redstbWes opsrabl eMThe ssisystemsfaFeireq0 i feditoi beidp6pabl sibsbauseithe~ po s i ti on f o ffrod s fmu s ti beids termi ned si sTo rdedtoien sU reit hatirod if al i g hmen ts and "~~ may ? bes vi ol atedii d{t hei event [oQai de s ign { insertion %1imitstarstbeis psakihg$sjicteddod iacci.deht ithIrodspperlatingt imde tec t edn 60t s i delo fjt he lgequ ifedilj mi,t g The various control rod banks (shutdown banks and control banks, A, B, C, and D) are each to be moved as a bank; that is, with all rods in the bank within one step (5/8 inch) of the bank position. Direct information on rod position indication is provided by two methods: A digital count of actuating pulses which shows the demand position of the banks and a linear position indicator (LVDT) which indicates the actual rod position. The rod position indicator channel has Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-14 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

1 1 a demonstrated accuracy of 5% of span (ill.5 steps). Therefore, an analysis has been performed to show that a misalignment of 24 steps cannot cause design hot channel factors to be exceeded. A single fully misaligned RCCA, that is, an RCCA 230 steps out of alignment with its bank, does not result in exceeding core limits in steady-state operation at power levels less than or equal to rated l power. In other words, a single dropped RCCA is allowable from a core power distribution viewpoint. If the misalignment condition cannot be readily corrected, the specified reduction in power to 75% will insure that design margins to core limits will be maintained under both steady-state and anticipated transient conditions. The eight (8) hour permissible limit on rod misalignment at rated power is short with respect to the probability of an independent accident. Because the rod position indicator system may have a 12 step error when a mis-alignment of 24 steps is occurring, the Specification allows only an indicated misalignment of 12 steps. However, when the bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, or, less than or equal to 30 steps, the consequences of a misalignment are much less severe. The differential worth of an individual RCCA is less, and the resultant perturbation on power distributions is less than when the bank is in its high differential worth region. At the top and bottom of the core, an indicated 24 step misalignment may be representing an actual misalignment of 36 steps. j i The failure of i.n LVDT in itself does not reduce the shutdown capability of the rods, but it does reduce the operator's capability for determining the position of that rod by direct means. The operator has available to him the excore detector recordings, incore thermocouple readings and periodic incore flux traces for indirectly determining rod position and flux tilts should the rod with the l inoperable LVDT become malpositioned. The excore and incore instrumentation will not necessarily recognize a misalignment of 24 steps because the concomitant increase in power density will normally be less than 1% for a 24 step misalignment. The excore and incore instrumentation will, however, detect any rod misalignment which is sufficient to cause a significant increase in hot channel factors and/or any significant loss in shutdown capability. The increased surveillance of the core if one or more rod position indicator channels is out-of-service serves to guard against any significant loss in shutdown margin or margin to core thermal limits. The history of malpositioned RCCA's indicates that in nearly all such cases, the malpositioning occurred during bank movement. Checking rod position after bank motion exceeds 24 steps will verify that the RCCA with the inoperable LVDT is i moving properly with its bank and the bank step counter. Malpositioning of an RCCA in a stationary bank is very rare, and if it does occur, it is usually gross slippage which will be seen by external detectors. Should it go undetected, the time between the rod position checks performed every shift is short with respect to the probability of occurrence of another independent undetected situation l which would further reduce the shutdown capability of the rods. Any combination of misaligned rods below 10% rated power will not exceed the design limits. For this reason, it is not necessary to check the position of rods with inoperable LVDT's below 10% power; plus, the incore instrumentation is not effective for determining rod position until the power level is above approximately 5%. l Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-15 Unit 2 - Amendment No. L

i Power Distribution DUFfhjip6Ws^(6piFitT66NihsTilitisTEp6W^($31sfEiSUff6siiM}BQ6sdrintiP6s 1;isifidiSFITS 15:3110 : Ei 2hf Ad aliflun DifferensiganditTSil513 ?10!Es 3 shi chiareidirectly]l ohgSi th1T$il513 fl0!DfM Bknk!!!sssFti6si Lisi ti}~Mii nfilnIf spesifidit16nspi coreRimits[pghpsehdigt@pnpslphip;isplipMda(jif~ ~~'~^-~" The[psFp6 msg 6sRiilltifi6ItWViluisT66MZMEKs9ialihtidsEssdinM HsiEYflu hotf channilifiEtorisi stoM initithsil oEili V([j hsfalohjBh4MxlajihdgM[Q)ipfdhp@piakip~oweFi~densityy~dTheWa10el~of; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ofef ~~ ~ ~ F '(Z))isfagsifuel s rod sl inea8 pbWiMdshiityNisiLainnom16alsfsellipe11 sWahdifi TsidsfinsdTisitEsWiillEGEI1'6Ei1IfsilIF6dDTsisFp6siWdissiEF7diVidadI6i theta tod{di mensionsklThefefopeHFjQ)Els) aimeasu tejj;oQhe@saMfuelfpellstspyeg-~~~~ withinithegeactoticotel FdZBViFiii5fthWis1%TBidiHiWitfsFnsFF6dIF61'56 ink?iissfffinWis61?bsFnuRihB b h angs sii n G ixi al s p' owe 8 d i st ri buti on E i Fo(Z)date figenepa11y^ita ke ii simeasupsdipeFiodicallMusisg;ths ' ~ ~ yMneads_teady]$systenDdThsselmsasuvements tat [c6hd.i tj obsf ~ ~ ~~'~ ~ incoriidetects The EU'rpose'6f'ths"lisiti^ ^oh'FV,"ths ^nu^c1Faf enthilpF~Fise h6t~' hinnel^fa'st'6'r," c is to ensure'that the fuel design criteria are not exceeded and the' accident ~ analysis assumptions remain valid.' The design limits on local and integrated fuel rod peak power, density are expressed in terms of hot' channel factors,'< Control of the core power distribution with respect to these fact 6rs ensurii that' local conditions in the fuel rods and coolant channels do not challenge core ~'^~ l analyzed in the safety, analyses.;either normal; operation ota postulated accid integrity at any location during n F",,, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along a fuel rod to the average fuel rod power. Imposed limits pertain to the maximum F",, in the core, that is the fuel rod with the highest integrated power. It should be noted that F",, is based on an integral and is used as such in the DNB calculations. Local heat flux is obtained by using hot channel and adjacent channel explicit power shapes which take into account variations in horizontal (x-y) power shapes throughout the core. Thus, the horizontal power shape at the point of maximum heat flux is not necessarily directly related to F",,, typi callylinchasesiWithgontfolj banksinsertionf andgypj cally2decFeisesjk FMisisshili(VilliffuiMfaid s hiipitfirnEbink71EsiFfi6n7i6difusMUFnspMF burnup; Mii?h6EidifiElliiiiiiUFibli[butSilinfiFFiediffsiilip6Ws?IdliffiS5fiin"Eip obt ai ned Ni th sthe;!moilabl eii ncoreidetectors system MSpec i fi cal lyM theire sul t sR6' thelthnesFdiniensionalfpouiffdistFibutionisaptiveissalyzedjbyfalc6mputersto~ ~ f de tirmi n e l F%sThi sif actor j i s s cal cul at ed t atil eistimont hl yU liows~ver $d ur:165 directly3ahdic6htinubusi Esbypedjfocejs_sjNikiables " Ax i'al s F1 sd Di f fe re nce! "'!1na t TSil 5:3310 ; E ;32 Qu ad ran ti P6we ~~@'~"~^~~~~~~ il shichiaddr Oc;ign criteric h = 0 been che:cn which crc censi tent with the fucl integrity Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-16 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

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1...

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4.,,

4L. km 4 .mA st,- A 1, 1..m m. - - -. -., m.. .m ,~..~. m q ,m .m .m. .~ f ux required for ::r.ufacturing tolcrancc;. The enginccring factor llow; for j local "criatica: in enrich =cnt, pellet den:ity :nd di:: ter curf ce are cf the .m, mA.-..A m e

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+m m on + m., m .r. .,~ .m. Ih,t has been determined that, provided the following conditions are observed, the ot channel factor limits will be met: 1. Control rods in a single bank move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than 24 steps from the bank demand position, when the bank demand position is between 30 steps and 215 steps. A misalignment of 36 steps is allowed when the bank position is less than or equal to 30 steps, or, when the bank position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, due to the small worth and consequential effects of an individual rod misalignment. 2. Control rod banks are sequenced with overlapping banks as described in Figure 15.3.10-1. 3. The full length c sontrol bank insertion limits are not violated. 4. Axial power distribution control procedures, which are given in terms of flux difference control and control bank insertion limits, are observed. Flux difference refers to the difference in signals between the top and bottom halves of two-section excore neutron detectors. The flux difference is a measure of the axial offset which is defined as the difference in Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-17 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

l normalized power between the top and bottom halves of the core. The permitted relaxation of F", allows radial power shape changes with r~4 insertion to the insertion limits. It has been determined that provided the above f65E conditions I thr ;gh 4 are observed, these hot channel factor limits are meC~In Specification 15.3.10.B(.1.a, F, is arbitrarily limited for p s 0.5 (execpt f:r le: p:: r phy:ic: tc:t:)~. An upper bound envelope of 2.50 times the normalized peaking factor axial dependence of Figure 15.3.10-3 consistent with the Technical Specifications on power distribution control as given in Section 15.3.10 was used in the large and small break LOCA analyses. The envelope was determined based on allowable power density distributions at full power restricted to axial flux difference (AI) values consistent with those in Specification 15.3.10.BE.2. The results of the analyses based on this upper bound envelope indicate a peak clad temperature of less than the 2200 F limit. When an F measurement is taken, a both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be -110 :d for lifeij int'6 Yid 66iiht. Five percent is the appropriate allowance ft a full core *1mif^ takid"With~the moveable incore detector flux mapping systek s.d three percent is the appropriate allowance for manufacturing tolerance. In the design limit of .F",, there is eight percent allowance for uncertainties which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in a design,1,Toisi F 4" 1.70/1.08. The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is eat shfo. (a) Normal perturbations in the radial power shape (i.e., rod misalignment) affect F",, in most cases without necessarily affecting F. o (b) While the operator has a direct influence on F through movement of rods, a and can limit it to the desired value, he has no direct control over F",. (c) An error in the predictions for radial power shape which may be detected during startup physics tests can be compensated for in F by tighter axial o control; but compensat',n for F", is less readily available. J When : ::::er ment ;f F",,-4rveen, experiment:1 crrer =c:t bc lle::d for :nd four :creent i: the :ppr:pri:tc allow:::c for : full cerc ::p t: ken with the

ve::lc incere detceter flux ::pping sy; tem.

Measurements of the hot channel factors are required as part of startup physics tests, at least each full power month operation, and whenever abnormal power distribution conditions require a reduction of core power to a level based upon measured hot channel factors. The incore map taken following initial loading provides confirmation of the basic nuclear design bases including proper fuel loading patterns. The periodic monthly incore mapping provides additional assurance that the nuclear design bases remain inviolate and identify operational anomalies which would, otherwise, affect these bases. M i]Issiih[pa{h6 E {h M @lifijf6?ilif B @ f[ali G @ 6 H6 E j {i)ljThi?insifsFissiiF6f[i6ts1Episkihilfilf6FS9"nief~ahd!fstthsd~hefeifW"infis6 3~shil1E6FHW6Fissid"by hssent%t6?edd6shtif%(nnufastoffhRtblera Pp centjto]j k sugy @ 6 meassrpnentierf6 T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-18 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

~ ;, j '(6)3ThsTliliiiisisiissFsG35thsliff?fissiW6tTchinis1EfiH6Fgg~shsMSiRIE&isisa ydf@*30jein@olicc66htlfpdMjhfpuent%#rsf ~~~~ ~~~ Axial Power Distribution The limits on axial flux difference (AFD) assure that the axial power distribution is maintained such that the Fo(Z) upper bound envelope of FA"" times the normalized axial peaking factor (K(Z)] is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes. This ensures that the power distributions assumed in the large and small break LOCA analyses will bound those that occur during plant operation. Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD monitor alarm. The computer determines the AFD for each of the operable excore channels and provides a computer alarm if the AFD for at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 operable excore channels are outside the AFD limits and the reactor power is greater than 50 percent of Rated Power. QWLdrant Tilt tee ~piGidfistififtElliiftiensuNsith]igKgrospradlig powegdistFi5sffE!if~di al siiisini consistentiwithithsidisignihluesiusedgnythedafetynanalysesM@Precisega .anditededganggaring;powerpenfissy-gt gppiseQistfibstisidseishreiienpl@ tegefsp1g ThilossFdisilfi~'~afiny polit'TilfCs~6sFi~~m~siftii~11iiift~ea~is~t6ifthi"fus1 ~ design criteria aressaintained., Together, specifications associated.with aiial flux difference;" quadrant tilt, and control rod insertion limits provide limits on process variables that characterize and control the three dimensional powet distribution of the reactor'corec ~ Control of these, variables ensures:that'the core operates within the ' fuel' design criteria"and'thatithe p'ower, distribution ^ remainswithin,theboundsiused,jnitheisafetyianalys,es[' ' ~ ' ' ~ ' ' ' " ' ' The excore detectors are somewhat insensitive to disturbances near the core center or on the major axes. It is therefore possible that a five percent tilt might actually be present in the core when the excore detectors respond with a two percent indicated quadrant tilt. On the other hand they are overly g responsive to disturbances near the periphery on the 45 axes. Tilt restrictions are not applicable during the startup and initial testing of a reload core which may have an inherent tilt. During this time sufficient testing is performed at reduced power to verify that the hot channel factor limits are met and the nuclear channels are properly aligned. The excore detectors are normally aligned indicating no quadrant power tilt because they are used to alarm on a rapidly developing tilt. Tilts which develop slowly are more accurately and readily discerned by incore measurements. The excore detectors serve as the prime indication of a quadrant power tilt. If a channel fails, is out-of-service for testing, or is unreliable, two hours is a short time with respect to the probability of an unsafe quadrant power tilt developing. Two hours gives the operating personnel sufficient time to have the problem investigated and/or put into operation one of several possible alternative methods of determining tilt. PhisEITTisfs76c^'soffEI Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-19 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

Th'e pFiksfj'jiU^r^ ose~sff ths ~it"'pbssFand 'lof"p'obe'r^~phisics' testsis^ t5 'pirmit. p ~ relaxations of existing specifications to allow performance of instrumentation _ calibration tests and special physics tests. The at-power specification' allows selected control rods and shutdown rods to be, positions outside their specified alignment and insertion limits to conduct physics tested at power, The power level is limitedsto 585 percent'oferated thermal power and the powersrange neutron flux' trip setWint'is set at maximum of 90 percent of, rated themal,, power. Operation witrthermal power s85 percent sof rated thermal power durin physics tests provides, an acceptable thermal margin when 'one or more of, the^ 'g applicable specifications'is not being met. ' The Power Range Neutron Flux - Hig6 trip setpoint is reduced so that a similar margin, exists between the steady-state condition and the trip;setp;oint that exists during normal, operation',at, rated '~' ' thermal powerg s Ths!16EE6WsF?i^""~iffEif16Hii115ssisiliEfidTd5htFBis^i'HafshstasW6TF6dsTf6 tbs physicsstestsiatilb[wlpokerMIffpoWedekceedsj'tsdipercen positioned [osts 6f EthsirSpsd fiedfalignsentishdji nsertib6M imi tlsts%60ndOEf nucle 6rlinstFumestatiosRddFi6pithespeFformancsiof 1owspowerfphinics?teitsN o n197 ads spt a bl siasti dsti 5 ? tsibpeni thelre astofitfi pibfe~a kers?tol ireventsops riti b6 i o ff t hei reactoN 6siondsi t sides igsil imi tih Elmsedi stelyIopeningit te tresctbrdifj p~s^ b rs ake Fis si l l tshutidoshitheWsactorland ? ppeventispsrati orn o fitheirsac to rio ut s i d 6 fsi t side sig nll i mi t sMIff t helRCS $1 ose s tel co~ laVerage1 temps Fst0 Fsifal l R6el osiths p mi n imdM t empefit drsif6rldpi ti cal i ti R theitsspsrature ishodi d!bs; restbpsd !wi thi n (15 minutesibscassetopefatibswithithstrWacturRriticalisnditempeFethre;bbisWiths^' ~ minimumstemperatureifodchiti6alitiRos1dWiolatstthelasshaptisssifsrisccidshfi analyzed finit hs Es afstyishalysss Es1 fs thstempsfitupeicanhots biliFistofsd isithi st 15 mi n s te s 5 t he? pl in timu sti bes madsli6bdhi ti e al y wi th i nianiadd i ti bsals15 fmi n st e s &~~ Thi stacti onisilliplices t hs?pl anitiWMs a feih6ndi tishii ni an fsFdeFly~imannsEf wi thBsf 'ch s1.1 eng ijig[p1lshtjystsms T *~~"' ~" ~ ^ ~ ~~~^'"'~ ""~^~"~^^~~"' ~ ~~ ~^~~ ~ Unit 1 - Amendment No. 15.3.10-20 Unit 2 - Amendment No. J

1 TABLE 15.4.1-2 MINIMUM FRE0VENCIES FOR E0VIPMENT AND SAMPLING TESTS Test Freauency 1. Reactor Coolant Samples Gross Beta-gamma 5/ week") activity (excluding tritium) Tritium activity Monthly Radiochemical E Semiannually """) Determination Isotopic Analysis for Every two weeks") Dose Equivalent I-131 Concentration Isotopic Analysis for a.) Once per 4 hours Iodine including I-131, whenever the specific I-133, and I-135 activity exceeds 1.0yCi/ gram Dose Equivalent I-131 or 100/E pCi/ gram.") b.) One sample between 2 and 6 hours following a thermal power change exceeding 15% of rated power in a one-hour period. Chloride Concentration 5/ week") Diss. Oxygen Conc. 5/ week") Fluoride Conc. Weekly 2. Reactor Coolant Boron Boron Concentration Twice/ week 3. Refueling Water Storage Boron Concentration Weekly") Tank Water Sample 4. Boric Acid Tanks Boron Concentration Twice/ week and after each BAST concentration change when they are being relied upon as a source of borated water. 5. Spray Additive Tank Na0H Concentration Monthly 6. Accumulator Boron Concentration Monthly Unit 1 - Amendment No. Unit 2 - Amendment No. Page1of4)

~ TABLE 15.4.1-2 (Continued) j 1 leit. Freauency I 7. Spent Fuel Pit a) Boron Concentration Monthly l b) Water Level Verification Weekly 8. Secondary Coolant Gross Beta-gamma Weekly") Activity or gamma isotopic analysis Iodine concentration Weekly when gross Beta-gamma activity equals or exceeds 1.2 pCi/cc ") 9. Control Rods a) Rod drop times of all Each refueling or full length rods ") after maintenance that could affect proper functioning ") b) Rodworth measurement Following each refueling shutdown prior to commencing power operation

10. Control Rod Partial movement of Every 2 weeks ""

all rods

11. Pressurizer Safety Valves Set point Every five years ""

12. Main Steam Safety Valves Set Point Every five years ""

4

13. Containment Isolation Trip Functioning Each refueling shutdown

14. Refueling System Interlocks Functioning Each refueling shutdown i

15. Service Water System Functioning Each refueling shutdown

16. Primary System Leakage Evaluate Monthly ")

i

17. Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel inventory Daily

18. Turbine Stop and Governor Functioning Annually ")

Valves

13. Low Pressure Turbine Visual and magnetic Every five years Rotor Inspection

") particle or liquid penetrant

20. Boric Acid System Storage Tank and Daily (")

piping temperatures 2 temperature required by Table 15.3.2-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. Unit 2 - Amendment No. Page 2 of 45

l TABLE 15.4.1-2 (Continued) J_qs1 Freauency

21. PORV Block Valves

a. Complete Valve Cycle Quarterly (")

b. Open position check Every 72 hours (")

22. Integrity of Post Accident Evaluate Each refueling Recovery Systems Outside cycle Containment j

23. Containment Purge Supply Verify valves are Monthly ")

and Exhaust Isolation locked closed Valves l

24. Reactor Trip Breakers

a. Verify independent Monthly

") l operability of automatic shunt and undervoltage trip functions.

b. Verify independent Each refueling operability of man-shutdown ual trip to shunt and undervoltage trip functions.

25. Reactor Trip Bypass

a. Verify operability Prior to Breakers of the undervoltage breaker use trip function.

b. Verify operability Each refueling of the shunt trip shutdown functions.

c. Verify operability Each refueling of the manual trip shutdown to undervoltage trip functions.

26. 120 VAC Vital Instr.

Verify Energized"" Shiftly Bus Power

27. Power Operated Relief Operate (")

Each shutdown"" Valves (PORVs), P0RV Solenoid Air Control Valves, and Air System Check

28. Atmospheric Steam Dumps Complete valve cycle Quarterly 1

l

29. Crossover Steam Dump System Verify operability of Quarterly each steam dump valve.

Unit 1 - Amendment No. Unit 2 - Amendment No. Page 3 of 45 1

- = _ J. \\ .o 1 l TABLE 15.4.1-2 (Continued)

30. Pressurizer Heaters Verify that 100 KW of Quarterly heaters are available.

J

31. CVCS Charging Pumps Verifyyerability Quarterly pumps.

32. Potential Dilution in Verify operability of Prior to placing plant in Progress Alarm al arm.

cold shutdown. N ES$ 5 53f E 2 N N E O N E $$ M f @ N E M Y NII E S [ E @ N # tioQapslusingiaevable 3ncoreidetiktorfsystem I D N f1 @ }otiphapnel hitoril

34. Sh"ut'd6 sir (MarifhT~",7^,~~'l'Pirfiii?ihitdswiiiiia~rsin?'70illf""

^ eal_culatjoni (1) Required only during periods of power operation. (2) E determination will be started when the gross activity analysis of a filtered sample indicates 2:10gCi/cc and will be redetermined if the primary coolant gross radioactivity of a filtered sample increases by more than 10gCi/cc. (3) Drop test shall be conducted at rated reactor coolant flow. Rods shall be dropped under both cold and hot condition, but cold drop tests need not be timed. (4) Drop tests will be conducted in the hot condition for rods on which maintenance was performed. (5) As accessible without disassembly of rotor. (6) Not required during periods of refueling shutdown. (7) At least once per week during periods of refueling shutdown. (8) At least three times per week (with maximum time of 72 hours between samples) during periods of refueling shutdown. (9) Not required during periods of cold or refueling shutdown, but must be performed prior to exceeding 200'F if it has not been performed during the previous surveillance period. (10) Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days power operation since the reactor was last subcritical for 48 hours or longer. (11) An approximately equal number of valves shall be tested each refueling outage such that all valves will be tested within a five year period. If any valve fails its tests, an additional number of valves equal to the number originally tested shall be tested. If any of the additional tested valves fail, all remaining valves shall be tested. (12) The specified buses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per shift by verifying correct static transfer switch alignment and indicated voltage on the buses. (13) Not required if the block valve is shut to isolate a PORV that is inoperable for reasons other than excessive seat leakage. (14) Only applicable when the overpressure mitigation system is in service. (15) Required to be performed only if conditions will be established, as defined in Specification 15.3.15, where the PORVs are used for low temperature overpressure protection. The test must be performed prior to establishing these conditions. Unit 1 - Amendment No. Unit 2 - Amendment No. Page 4 of 4$

I ,o <.a (16) Test valve operation in accordance with the inservice test requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. (17) Operability of charging pumps is verified by ensuring that the pumps develop the required flowrate, as specified by the In-Service Test Program. (18) Not required to be performed if the reactor is subcritical. (19)~ Required only when the BAST (s)"at~isifffc~tWeffs11'ii6sef sonthly inte^rvals (20) Pe'rfsi1ii'~dEHng gissir~5jiffat' ion following'a refueling shutdown,'a power distribution, map shall' be performed "~' prior to exceeding 90% of rated thermal power. '(21)j[Only;appilcable'during' low power l physics testisis t i l Unit 1 - Amendment No. Unit 2 - Amendment No. Page5of4) -}}