ML20094Q475

Rev 5 to Emergency Action Levels

ML20094Q475
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	08/31/1984
From:	ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML17298B194	List: ML17298B193 ML20094Q475
References
0418M, 418M, NUDOCS 8408200224
Download: ML20094Q475 (86)

Text

. ATTACilMENTl ANPP-30268

- 52

g' 5.0 Progrtm For Effective, Useable Procedure ~s j

The objective of this section is to outline the methed by which PVNGSLcan accomplish the following goals:

(1)

Effectively protect the health and safety of the public.

(2)

P'rovide the PVNGS. operations. personnel with an eff-ective, usable tool to accomplish the first goal.

To~ accomplish these goals, PVNGS has developed a program to ensure that accurate, usable procedures are in place for emergency situations.

This program is outlined as follows:

(1)

Classifications of events

~

(2)

The basis for classification (3)

Development'of EALs/EPIPs (a)

Interface with EOPs (b)

Interface with Safety Functions (c)

Correlation of EOP/SF to classification criteria (d)

Correlation of EALs to NUREG-0654 (4)

Offsite interface (5)

System for developing and maintaining effective EPIPs

+.

The following sections expand on the specifics of this pro (r,am and delineate the thought process used in developing example

{'

EALs related to ROs and safety functions (Tables 5.1-1 through 5.2-4).

As iterated in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.5, Table 5.3-1 evolved from the synthesis of data in Tables 5.1-1 through 5.2-4 an(has been incorporated into {an emergency classification procedure.

~

0 f8 0

O F

~

5-1 (0418M)

Revision 5 August 1984

=j,

'44' g

7

\\

$.1 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

- d 5' 4

~

g The first step in'any anticipated operational-occurrence is E

emergency classification.

Emergency Classification is' divided into four categories as noted in " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Pre-paredness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, Appendix 1.

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) based on indications available in the control room and corre-lated to the emergency classifications are provided to-the

. operator.

EALs are keyed to the safety functions used in Emergency Operating Procedure as well as the ' event specific Recovery Operating Procedures.

This method provides an effec-tive tool to accompl'ish the established goals.

The four emergency classifications including appropriate licensee and state / county governmental agency emergency res-ponse actions are described in the following sections:

e 5 1.1 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT This classification applies to unusual events which are in

~

~

progress or have occurred that indicate a potential degr'adation w

of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive ~-

material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occur.

i In these situations, timo isavaklabletotakeprecautionary~and constructive steps to prevent almore serious event and/or to 55 5-2 (0418M)

Revision 8$

August 1984 PAT

'-$f:N

.QTilc-y

~

mitigateanyconsequencesthatmayobcur.

This event status places ~ the plant in a readiness position for augmentation of onshift resources and/or possible cessation of routine activi-ties.

Appropriate notification to NRC, state and county authorities is made.

5.1.2 ALERT This classification consists of events which are in progress or have occurred that involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Declaration of an ALERT will trigger prompt-initial and followup notification to offsite authorities.

If applicable, updated,

meteorological information, measurement of any radiation release by surveys, and projected radiological effects on offsite areas shall be provided to county and state authorities.

State and county emergency centers shall be activated and a forward con-trol element shall be dispatched for offsite monitoring by ARRA.

The emergency response for an ALERT includes fu[ (a'ctiva-tion of PVMGS onsite and offsite emergency centers.

Assembly and accountability of personnel within the protected area is mandatory for any emergency classified as an ALERT or higher.

The ALERT status is maintained until the event is declared terminated, downgraded or escalahed to a higher emergency classification as warranted by plant parameters.

ff' 3-

~?

5-3 Revision 5 (0418M)

August 1984

- ---- m o

L '.

.,. W gg-5.1.~ 3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY ~

T' n ~~

y

'a. SITE AREA ~ EMERGENCY consists of events which are in progress T;

.or have occurred that involve actual.or~11ke'ly majo'r failures of.

plant functions'needed'for protection of the public.

Any; releases,are not expected to exceed EPA Protective-Action Guide'line (PAG) exposure-levels except near the site boundary.

Consideration of appropriate protective actions,' based on actual s

or projected data, is warranted.

Onsite and offsite emergency centers are activated.

^ssembly and accountability.of. personnel:

onsite are mandatory for a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

-Onsite evacuation is initiated if indicated to be necessary by actual or projected doses.

APS Field Mr;nitoring Teams are

-deployed by direction from the Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC) or the Technical Support Center (TSC)fto ascertain actual dose rates both onsite and offsite.

The station provides prompt initial notification and status updates ~to offsite authorities, including meteorological information, projected doses, and relevant dose rate measure-ments offsite.

~

The State of Arizona Radiation Regulatd y? Agency (Radiological Technical Directorate) dispatches monitoring teams to assess offsite c'onsequences.

If projected doses

,i approach those noted in the EPA PAGs, state / county authorities shall institute appropriate actions for public-protection.

A 1

decision on termination, escalakion, or reduction in the SITE' 1

?

~ AREA EMERGENCY classification based on plant parameters shall be

..y

}

.,9 5-4 (0418M)'

Revision 4 August 1984. ?

y

j '2.2 MM n

[ --

]

communicated to governmental authoriIies.

This communication

~

shall include recommendations as to maintenance of, or changes in, protective actions.

5.1.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY A GENERAL EMERGENCY consists of events which are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with~ potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

There is prompt notification of NRC and appropriate state and county authorities of the GENERAL EMERGENCY status.

During a GENERAL EMERGENCY, resources and personnel are augmented by the activation of emergency centers.

APS Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched on direction from the STSC or TSC to verify projected dose rates both onsite and offsite.

The station shall provide plant status updates.

These updates will include data on radioactive releases, meteorological informa-dion, offsite radiological dose projections and measure ents, and protective action recommendations including affected down-wind sectors to offsite authorities.

A decision on termination or reduction of the GENERAL EMERGENCY class shall be communi-cated to governmental authorities based on a thorough review of the' emergency situation.

Discuskionswithgovernmentalauthori-ties shall include recommendations as to maintenance of, or I

l

.gchanges in, protective actions.

. 9; 5-5 (0418M)

Revision 4 August 1984

{

f6 4'

5.2 BASIS FOR:PVNGS-EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA The-second step of the development process is defining the If basis for classification.

Classification for a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT through a GENERAL EMERGENCY is' based on the pf status of the three main barriers:

fuel cladding, primary coolant ' system boundary, and containment with consideration also given to radiation doses resulting from any offsite releases.

Determining the emergency classification becomes a function of a system based on the failure of, 'cn: challenge to the fission product barriers.

Defining the status of these barriers defines the criteria for classification.

For non-reactor trip events the initial classification is based on such circumstances as (1) noncompliance with a Technical Specification such that the requirement of the LCO 'and/ or associated action requirements are not met within the spec-ified time intervals or (2) external physical conditions which have the potential to damage or disable systems or structures required to maintain the three fission product barriers.

These situations will be upgraded based on the safety systems impacted and the severity of impact per the Shift Supervis r'es

~

p li.

discretion.

5.2.1 FAILURE

" Failure" of barriers is defined in terms consistent with i

NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, "ExamplekInitiatingConditions".

l Some examples of boundary failure are as follows: primary 5-6 (0418M)

Revision 5 August 1984j';,{

j

~.,.

pf.'

iiq RQ2's.

si~

~

4. '

coolant leak of 50 gpm constitutes "5ailure" of the primary coolant boundary (based on charging pump capacity for 2 7;

3 pumps minus minimum letdown); 300 uCi/cc dose equivalent I-131 constitutes " failure"'of the clad (based on release of 1% equilibrium. gas gap equiv'alent I-131); loss of

~

containment integrity as defined in Technical Specifications Section 1.7.

5.2.2 CHALLENCE

~" Challenge" to a barrier is defined as one of the following conditions:

.(1)

Loss of a critical safety function which protects that

. barrier.

(2)

An existing situation which will cause a barrier failure unless successful corrective actions are implemented.

(3)

An initiating event which in all probabil[ty has damaged a fission product barrier but has yet to be verified.

5.2.3 CLASSIFICATION BY BARRIERS a-f 3;.]e The fission product barrier status correlated to event classification criteria ln increasing order of severity provides the bases for implementing guidance provided to the operators.

This correlation is as follows:

5.-

!$i

.Y 3

4

.j 5-7 (0418M)

Revision y August 1984.4'~

-f 9

MhNF ~

$$f.0 aMfhh

]

.w us..

3.1 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 2

1.

No loss of, and no challenge to, a fission 1-product. barrier.

(Ref. Sect. 5.1.1) 5.2.3.2 ALERT 1.

One barrier chalienged; or 2.

One barrier verified as failed.

5.2.3.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.

Two barriers challenged; or 2.

-One barrier verified as failed and one barrier challenged; or 3.

Two barriers verified as failed 5.2.3.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY 1.

Three barriers challenged; or 2.

One barrier verified as failed and remaining two barriers challenged; or 3.

Two barriers verified as failed and the other barrier challenged; or 4.

Three barriers verified as failed 5.2.3.5 BOUNDARY STATUS The fina1 loop in classification based on boundary status is the potential impact of planc systems add -

~

s.

response on the various boundaries.

~~

The integrity of the fission product barriers directly relates to maintaining the following corresponding

~t.

Safety Functions within Technical Specification limits.

'e

=

5-8 (0418M)

Revision #

August 1984

yf

5(

M"

p =- w o ~# a -Fission Product Barrier Related Safety Functions Fuel Cladding. Reactivity Control RCS Heat Removal ' Prima.ry Coolant Boundary RCS Inventory and Pressure . Control Containment Containment Integrity 5.2.4 USE OF BOUNDARY STATUS Using clearly-defined boundary status applied to classifi-cation criteria allows the development of EALs which are independent of event sequences and can be directly cor-related with PVNGS symptom / function based Emergency Operat-ing Procedure (EOP). The correlation of classification . criteria boundary status and PVNGS EOP is provided in Section 5.3. Using this method to classify events provides a direct means to quickly and accurately access the event and take the appropriate actions to prot'ect the health and safety of the public. 5.2.5 UPGRADING OF EVENTS a-Events are upgraded based on boundary st'tus - i.e., the a number of boundaries failed or challenged and projected obfsite dose rates, hp/- 5.2.6 DOWNGRADING OF EVENTS Downgrading of events is based on plant status with all safety functions satisfied and verification of boundary status. Af.r. .. S E-9 (0418M) Revision 4 August 1984 'l -(, .ge.._. .@h.

7 ,o. r. ~,, /'~ ~ .q[ y , e,. l s' '$.2.7-TERMINATING EVENTS q.l- '.An event is considered terminated at the discretion of the ~ ~:: Emergency Coordinator taking into account the following: A) The event has~been downgraded and the anticipated plant response is such that there should be no. ' challenge to any fission product barriers or radiation ~ releases in excess of Technical Specifications. 'B) Present plant conditions are such that there is no possibility of an adverse impact on the health and safety of the general public or plant i personnel. f 5.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FOR CLASSIFICATIOt{, NOTIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS To develop e;ffective procedures for Emergency Classification, the overall EOP philosophy for dealing with an emergency i situation must be understood. This prevents conflicting procedure guidance.

• ~

l l 5.3.1 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE 3rc 2 The Emergency Operating Procedure, designed to mitigate-the m s-consequences of a design, basis event, has been developed by l6 PVNGSLb' aced on CEN-152, CE Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Revt.02, April 1984. The objective of this procedure is to s-maintain safety functions while taking the specific actions l ~~

,g required to mitigate the consequences of the initiating p.

event. c, 5-10 (0418') Revision 5 M August 1984,; {Q _

u.p*,J.,

$'i

-p g' 'PVNGS EOP cnd the correlation to CEN-15'2 is addressed'in the Plant Specific Emergency Procedure Technical Guidelines. This -.t was submitted to the NRC as.part of the EOP procedure' genera-t ~ tion package. An overview of the correlation is provided for reference.- s PVNGS Recovery Operations (RO) Procedures compared to Guide-lines supplied by CE CEN-152: PVNGS Procedures l CEN-152 Differences '1. . Reactor Trip - No difference. This procedure describes the_ actions required when an uncomplicated reactor trip occurs, to prepare for a nor-l mal shutdown or, restart. i 1. Excessive Steam Demand - The CEN-152 Steam Line Break Tniu procedure describes Guideline has been separated the actions required to sta-into two PVNGS Documents; tilize the RCS and maintain one for an Excessive Steam RCS heat removal following Demand and one for a Loss of an excessive steam demand Secondary Coolant since the occurrence or a feed water operator's actions are signif-control failure resulting in icantly different for the two, a MSIS on high SG level. An The differences are addressed excessive steam demand could in the Plant Specific Emer-be a steam line break down-gency Procedure Technical steam of the MSIVs, a fail-Guidelines. ure of a Main Steam Control Valve, inadvertent opening of an Atmospheric Dump Valve, I or failure of the Steam By-pass Control System. N,g;' - l 3. Loss of Secondary Coolagt.- See Excessive Steam Demand. ~- This procedure _ describes the actions required to sta-bilize the RCS and maintain heat removal following a break in the main steam line upstream of the MSIV, a break of the SG vessel, or ?A a break of the feedwater .F lines downstream of the FW + check valves. 3 5-11 (0418M) Revision 4 August 1984.~ . [.h .M -db t

7 n:D: s-g' PVNGS Procedures CEN-152 Differences 4. -Loss of'RCS Flow - No difference. .P This' procedure describes ~ Lactions'necessary to recover the plant following a total loss: of RCS flow. Emphasis will be placed on ensuring that adequate _ natural circula-tion.is present. 5. Loss of Feedwater - No difference. .This procedure describes the actions to be taken for a total loss.of normal feed-l water. A loss of feedwater is defined as system failure upstream of the feedwater check valves or failure of sthe feed control system resulting in low SG level. 6. -SG Tube Rupture - No difference. This procedure describes the actions to be taken to pre- . vent a radioactivity release to the environment and to maintain adequate core cool-ing for a SG tube leak of sufficient magnitude that it causes a SIAS. 7. LOCA - The CEM-152 LOCA Guideline This procedure describes the has been broken down into two actions to be taken to min-PVNGS documents one for a imize core damage and radio-activity releases during a small LOCA and'one for a large LOCA which raises contain-LOCA since the operation actions are significantly ment pressure above CIAS different for the two. The setpoint. differences are addressed in the Plant Specific Emergency Procedure Technical Guidelines. 8. Small LOCA - Same as for LOCA. This procedure describes the actions to be taken to min-imize core damage and radio-activity releases during a LOCA which does not raise containment pressure above jf the CIAS setpoint. t 5-12 (0418M) Revision y August.1984 ih!.' 'l$yh. .:ShN + u

a N g' PVNGS Procedure- ~ CEN-152 Differences 9. Blackout - CEN-152 does not address a j' This procedure describes the Blackout. Consideration of a ~ actions to be taken to main-Blackout is required by -tain core cooling and restore.SER 11/81 Task A-44 Pg. Cll. the plant to a normal opera-ting mode following a loss of offsite power, a failure of'both Emergency Diesel Gen-erators and a Turbine Trip. -10. Functional Recovery No difference. Procedure - The Functional Recovery Pro-cedure will be entered if one of the following exists: a) The diagnostic is unclear b)_ Multiple events occur and the CR staff can not miti-gate the problems c) A recovery operation does not sufficiently handle the situation. The PVNGS RO procedures meet the overall guidance of CEN-152 and any changes in the RO procedures were made to enhance the effectiveness of the Control Room staff. 5.3.2 Safety Functions ~ As previously stated the overall philosophy for' accident mitigation is maintaining safety functions. Safety Functions and their basis are outlined in CEN-152. The PVNGS approach to safety functions is consistant with CEN-152 with the exception that certain shfety functions have been combined to enhance operator response. Safety functions are not addressed by name The criteria.for ensuring proper safety function in the Ros. response is provided for the operators and maintained by procedural design. The procedure that addresses safety functions on an individual basis is th9 Functional Recovery 5-13 (0418M) Revision 9f August 1984 1

=a-Procedure ~. Provided below for clarification is an overview of safety functions compared'to CEN-152-and safety functions c v compared to EOPs-(ROs). 5.3.2.1 PVNGS Safety Functions comoared to CEN-152 l Safety Functions CEN-152 Differences 1) REACTIVITY CONTROL ~-

1) No difference.

This safety function ensures.that the reactorff' is shutdown with suffic-ient shutdown margin. 2) RCS INVENTORY AND PRESS-

2) CEN-152 breaks this URE CONTROL -

into two safety func-This safety function tions, RCS inventory. ensures that a sufficient // and RCS pressure con- // quantity of water, at a trol. All criteria pressure above satura-outlined in CEN-152 are . tion surrounds _the core. met by the PVNGS Emer-This sets the conditions gency Procedure. How-to maintain adequate ever, PVNGS has chosen core cooling. l to combine these safety i functions into one i_ safety function because the instrumen-l tation in'the Control Room cannot separate the two functions. 3) HEAT REMOVAL -

3) CEN-152 addresses This safety function en-this as two safety i

sures that heat is removedlf < functions, core heat from the core to one of removal and RCS heat several'Einal heat sinks. removal. All the criteria outlined in CEN-152 for both func-tions are addressed in ~ the PVNGS Emergency Procedure. Guidance provided.by CEN-152 determines SG 1evel, RCS Tavg and SG pres-sure as indications of Core Heat Removal. For ease of operator 1 response and due to the logic of heat 5-14 (0418M) Revision 5 August 1984

.v. 4L: A Safety Functions CEN-152-Differences transfer,- SG level, RCS Tc, SG pressure subcooling, and core differential temp- -erature are addressed as indications of the single PVNGS Safety Function, RCS Heat Removal. By combining -the two safety;func-tions operators are able to better evaluate the entire: heat removal process as an integrated plant operation. 4) CONTAINMENT-INTECRITY -

4) CEN-152 identifies

'This safety function Containment Isolation, ensure that the contain-Containment Temperature ment is maintained with and Pressure Control, internal conditions which and Combustable Gas do not threaten the struc-Control as separate ture's ability to prevent functions. For ease of release of radioactivity. operator response these safety functions have been combined into one identified as contain-ment integrity. The emphasis is maintaining the contaidment struc-turally as a boundary for containing radio-activity. By addressing these parameters col-lectively, the operator is better equipped to assess containment response without over-focusing on one para-meter. All criteria and immediate actions as defined in CEN-152 are performed in the Emergency Procedure. Items such as Hydrogen buildup are addressed when it is appropriate to do so, as a recovery action, later in the procedure. l 5-15 i f('0418M) Revision y August 1984 a-

Y" ' Safety Functions CEN-152 Differences t 5). INDIRECT: RADIOACTIVE

5) No difference.

y RELEASE - This safety function ensures that.radioactivelf material is not present outside controlled areas in-order to' eliminate. risk to the safety of -the public. 6) VITAL AUXILIARIES -

6) No difference.

1This safety function ensures that equipment necessary to support safe shutdown and the other five safety func-tions is operating as required. 15.3.2.2 PVNGS Procedures Compared to Safety Functions PVNGS Procedures Safety Functions

1) Reactor Trip 1)

Uncomplicated reactor ' trip compromises no safety function; however, in an Anticipated Trans-ient Without'a Scram (ATWS) situation several safety functions could be compromised.

2) Excessive Steam Demand 2)

If isolated, this situa-tion does not compromise a safety function; other-wise this situation could compromise RCS heat removal, RCS inventory and pressure control and, if the situation worsened, other safety functions could be impacted.

3) Loss of Secondary 3)

This situation could Coolant compromise RCS inventory and pressure control and RCS heat removal and, if the situation worsened, other safety functions could be impacted. 5 Revision 5 (0418M) August 1984

~ -y s' ~ ~~ .PVNGS Procedures safety Functions ~ c [,[f 4)~ Loss o'f RCS Flow 4) This situation coulc ~ compromise RCS' inventory and pressure control and, if the situation worsened, RCS heat removal and other safety functions could be impacted.

5) Loss of Feedwater

'5 ) This situation could com-promise RCS heat removal and, if the situation worsened, pressure and inventory control as well as other safety functions could be impacted.

6) SG Tube Rupture 6)

This situation compromises RCS pressure and inventory. control and, if situation worsened, RCS heat removal as well-as other safety functions could be impacted.

7) LOCA 7)

This situation compromi-ses RCS pressure and inventory control and could compromise contain-ment integri'ty, indirect radioactivity release, and RCS heat removal.

8) Small LOCA 8)

This situation compromi-ses RCS. pressure and inventory control and could compromise indirect radioactivity release'and RCS heat removal.

9) Blackout 9)

This situation could com-promise all safety func-tions due to loss of vital auxiliaries. The extent of compromise becomes a function of time to restore one train of vital auxiliaries. 4 L 9 g 5-17 (0418M) Revision V Auguct 1984

n u _ %h 4: 'PVNGS Procedures Safety Functions 1,

10) Non Reactor Trip Events. 10) Classification is based

~y These_ conditions are on the level.of barrier / evaluated in five, event safety function degrada-categories eg: tion. a) Plant conditions a) An Abnormal Operating exist which indicate Procedure is in use a challenge / failure related to degraded of a barrier-but do . fission product barrier not require a reactor such as: trip. Excessive RCS Leak Rate OR SG Tube Leak. b).A physical external b) Security-Threat, Fire, condition exists Natural Phenomena, .that has the poten-etc. onsite l#' tial to damage or-(classification disable systems or upgraded when structures requ-- situation impacts ired to maintain the o:. a safety function). three fission pro-duct barriers. c) Noncompliance with a c) LCO 3/4.5.2 technical specifica-

1) One HPSI pump inop-g tion, such that the erable > 72 hrs and i

requirement of the

2) Plant not in HOT LCO and/or associated STAND BY within action requirements next 6 hrs OR HOT are not met within the SHUTDOWN within specified time inter-following 6 hrs.

vals or reliance on

3) No HPSI operable.

Technical Specifi-cation 3.0.3 d) A situation exists d) Transportation of a ff during which contam-// contaminated individuall ination has been or to an offsite medical' will be transported

facility, from the site.

e) Inadvertent radio-e) Anything that directly active release. impacts integrity of this safety function; ! f level of severity will be determined by d magnitude of release. 5-18 (0418M) Revision 5 August 1984 w -

a 4 ? .1 5;3.3 EAL TABLE' GUIDELINES 'The.following tables provide-the framework for the guid-2 ~ -ance which'will be provided to the operator in the Emer-gency Classification Implementing Procedure. -Tables 5.1-0 provide indications of barrier' challenge or failure. -Tables 5.1-1 thru.5.1-4 correlate the Recovery Procedures to classification criteria and initiating conditions and pro-g vide license action guidance. Examples of typical barrier failure / challenges are listed with each specific event for upgrading the EAL. Tables 5.2-1 thru 5.2-4 correlate safety functions to EALs and provide APS actions and state / county action guidance. e a.3.4 PVNGS EAL Tables Compared to NUREG-0654 To ensure the technical accuracy of tables 5.1-1 thru 5.2-4, which are to be used as a basis for implementing guidance, the following correlation to NUREG-0654 has been made. l 1 5-19 (0418M) Revision 9/ August 1984 ]

1 p

• ~

z, 1, s .+a 4 5'.3.4 NUREG-0654 Criteria Tables 5.1-1 thru 5.2 it .g NUE

1. 1 5.2-1, 2A & 3A i '-

^ .#2 5.2-1, 5 j_

1. 3a-N/A
2. 3b 5.2-1, 2C
3. 3c 5.2-1, 2C
4. 4 5.2-1, 2B, 3B & 3D
5. 5 This is a boundary loss,thereforg' y d

by definition, this is an Alert; i 5.1-2, 6

1. 6 5.1-1, 5 & 5.2-1, 3C
2. 7.

5.2-1, 6

1. 8 5.2-1, 4A
2. 9 5 2-1, 6
3. 10 5.1-1, 6A
4. 11 5.1-1, 6E
5. 12 5.1-1, 6B
6. 13 (a-d) 5.1-1, 6D
7. 14 (a-d) 5.1-1, 6D
8. 14e Systcm design allows for loss of the tt rbine.

Classification l( vould be dependent on subsequent failures.

1. 15 This will be ascertained by doing the safety function & diagnostic l

.. flow charts & determined by the l Shift Supervisor s

1. 16 i

5.1-1, 6C

1. 17 5.1-1, 2, 3 & 5 i

[ 5-20 t (0418M)- Revision.5 i i August 1984 m

o -q si"

j...

.S: 5.3'.4 NUREG-0654 Criteria Tables 5.1-1 thru 5.2-4 Alert' #1a N/A .a ~

1. 1b 5.2-2, 2D5
2. 1c 5.2-2,-2D4
3. 2-5.1-2, 8
4. 3 5.1-2, 8
5. 4 5.1-2, 5; verification criteria for S/G tube leak is given in the appropriate RO
6. 5 5.1-2, 6&7
7. 6 5.2-2, 5
8. 7 5.1-2, 9 & 5.2-2, 6

~

1. 8 5.2-2, 6
2. 9 5.1-2, 4 & 5.2-2, 2
3. 10 5.2-2, 2 & 5.2-2, 6
4. 11 5.2-2, 1 & 5.1-2, 1-2B, 2-2B, 3-2C, 4-2B, 5-2D
5. 12 5.2-2, 5
6. 13 5.1-1, 6A & appropriate sections of 5.2-2
7. 14 5.1-1, 6E & appropriate sections of 5.2-2
8. 15 5.2-2, 5
9. 16 5.1-1, 6B & appropriate sections of 5.2-2

.1-1, 6D & appropriate sections

1. 17 (a-d) 5 of 5.2-2 5-21 (0418M)

Revision V August 1984

- i

.p- ,t ' 5.3.4 'NUREG-0654 Criteria Tables 5.1-1 thru 5.2-4 ' Alert

1. 18 (a-e) 5.1-1, 6D &. appropriate sections of 5.2-2
2. 19-This will be ascertained by doing the safety function & diagnostic flow charts & determined by the Shift Supervisor.
3. 20 5.1-2,.1-1 &_1-2C - ie Rx trip would be initiated prior to Con-trol Room evacuation to the

. remote shutdown panel. e 0 \\ / 4 l l

• O l

5-22 (0418M) Revision d/ August 1984

} W': 1[.3.4'NUREG-0654 Criteria 'M Tables 5.1-1 thru 5.2-4 ~ SAE -#1 5.1-2, 6 & 7 - failure of one y ~ . boundary is an Alert; upgrade would depend on subsequent fail-ure or release.

1. 2 5.2-3, 2C

' #3 ' 5.1-3, 8;

1. 4 N/A
2. 5 5.1-3, 5&8
3. 6 5.1-3, 9; 5.2-3, 6
4. 7 5.2-3, 6

s -#8 5.2-3, 6

1. 9 5.2-3, 1
2. 10 5.2-3, 5
3. 11 5.1-1, 6A & appropriate sections of 5.2-3 & 5.2-4 e

l

1. 12 5.1-1, 6EI& appropriate sections j

l of 5.2-3 & 5.2-4 g l

1. 13 5.2-3, 5

l

1. 14 5.1-1, 6E & appropriate sections of 5.2-3 & 5.2-4
2. 15 (a-c) 5.1-1, 6D & appropriate sections of 5.2-3
3. 16 (a'c')

5.1-1, 6D & appropriate sections of 5.2-3

1. 17 This will be ascertained by doing

~ ..the safety function & diagnostic flow charts & determined by the Shift Supervisor

1. 18 5.1-2, 1-1 & 1-2C - ie Rx trip would be initiated prior to Con-trol Room evacuation'to the remote shut-down panel.

l l 5-23 (0418M) Revision 4 August 1984 i

N:

R

5.3 - 4 ' NUREG-0654 Criteria Tables 5.1-1 rhru 5.2-4 7-

.:n GE .#1 (a & b) 5.2-4, 5

1. 2 5.1-4, 5 thru 8; 5.2-4, 2C & 4A-C
2. 3 5.1-1, 6B & appropriate sections of 5.2 upgrade =is based on a direct progression as indicated in the appropriate tables.
3. 41 5.1-4, 5 thru 8; 5.2-4, :2C, 4A-C

&6

1. 5a 5.1-4, 6 & 7; 5.2-4, 3 & 6'
2. 5b 5.2-4, 6
3. 5c ATWS is classified as an Alert &

if not addressed quickly could result in the-Functional Recovery Procedure being implemented

1. 5d 5.1-4, 9
2. 5e 5.1-4, 6 & 7
3. 6

!!/A

1. 7 5.1-1, A, B,

& D & appropriate sections of 5.2 upgrade is based on safety function status. e

• m 4

0 e 5-24 Revision A/ (0418M) August 1984

M 5.3.5.

Implementing Guidance and Operator Interface -,7 Tables 5.1-1.thru 5.2-4 provide the basis for, and.can be . i! directly correlated to,-Table'5.3-1.which has been developed. using CEN-152 guidance. Based on this guidance, applicable indicators for a.given RO/ Safety Function have been devel-oped to establish a challenge'and/or failure of a1given barrier.. Table 5.3-1 will be incorporated into an emergency-classification procedure. The differences between the aforementioned tables are the following _(1) -Table 5.3-1 provides the operator with explicity-defined parameters that are indicative of a chall-enge/ failure of the RCS vs containment vs clad vs vital auxiliaries / radioactivity release. (2) Table 5.3-1 does not reiterate the verification para- ~ meters of a given RO procedure because they are analyzed and verified in accordance with that proce-dure prior to using the EAL tables. This table provides for complete assessment of fission product boundaries for all RO/SF procedures. ~ l .(3) If, per the diagnostic, the operator implements a given RO procedure, but during classification finds that the initiating conditions are not consistant I 5-25 (0418M) Revision 4 August 1984

l W , r; with that event as substantiated by additional gui-dance that delineates which parameters should not be i challenged for a given RO, he then repeats the diag-nostic evaluation and upgrades / downgrades the emer- . gency classification as necessary - ie, classifica-tion is based on the diagnostic performed using the EOPs and boundary status verification performed using the EPIPs. Table 5.3-1 has been developed from the previous tables to more clearly define barrier challenge / failure and thus expedite analysis and classification while effectively interfacing with the EOPs and other control room activities. 5.4 offsite Accident Assessment The PVNGS has the responsibility to perform a preliminary assessment of the offsite consequences of an incident. Upon event classification, an assessment, including a determina-l tion of the radiation exposure rate by analytical methods, use of field surveys, and estimation of projected integrated dose for different downwind sectors and distances, will be performed. Based upon the results of these assessments, ~ notification to state /counIty authorities of the appropriate emergency classification and any recommended protective actions are made. These actions are directed as a function of interface guidance provided in appropriate EPIPs. 5-26 i (0418M) Revision y August 1984

,N: Activation of the State Emergency Operations' Center (EOC) 7 2 ensures-proper interface between PVNGS/APS and state off-icials. The Arizona Radiation Regulator;' Agency (ARRA)/ Radiological Technical Directorate assumes primary respon-sibility'for confirmatory and continued offsite radiological assessment. This'is accomplished by dispatching state / county Field Monitoring Teams and by analysis of data pro-vided by APS Field Monitoring teams. APS shall deploy Field Monitoring Teams offsite at least until ARRA has mobilized t its Radiological Emergency Assistance Team (REAT). Approxi-- mately three (3) hours is estimated for REAT deployment. Lonc-term offsite' assessments (ingestion pathway EPZ) are the responsibility of ARRA. 5.5 Program for Developing and Maintaining High Ouality l Emergency Planning Implementing Procedures The accidents which might occur at the Palo Verde Nuclear t Generating Station have been analyzed in Chapter 15 of the PVNGS FSAR in terms of severity of consequence. These ~ accidents reflect the design characteristics of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PilR) and are addressed by PVNGS E6Ps and EPIPs. i Development of effective Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures that interface with the EOPs has been an ongoing concern at PVNGS. Efforts to ensure the adequacy of the EPIPs and proper l 5-27 (0418M) Revision 4r l August 1984 t - i..

. 3_ interface with'the~EOPs has been a function of coordinated G j t ' activities between Emergency Planning and Operations per- .g 4 sonnel. This has served'to ensure prompt, accurate classifica- . tion while preventing the operators from performing redundant action _for diagnosing or directing mitigating actions during an accident situation. The technical accuracy of the Emergency Plan Implementing Pro-cedures will be verified as a function of an Administrative Control procedure. This verification will ensure the procedure being reviewed complies with'the Emergency Plan, satisfies the requirements of NUREG-0654 and satisfies the requirements of any developmental reference or license commitments. i To ensure the utility and effectiveness of the classification procedure and the classified Event Implementing Action Pro-cedures, a validation process will be performed. Validation will serve to verify the effectiveness of the procedure to properly classify a given event as well as implement the appro-priate notification and license actions. This will also serve i as a pretest of the adequacy of these procedures prior to the full system test by a site drill. The verification / validation ~ process also provides a method to ensure that the implementing procedure is upgraded as regulations change. Complete testing of the EPIPs and the Emergency Plan is done via drills as outlined in section 8.0. 5-28 (0418M) Revision V August 1984 .n

r -- v Y', .;[ g TABLE 5.1-0 indications of Barrier Challenge /railure 'o RCS CLAD s CONTAINMENT' VITAL. AUn~ILIARIES/ RADIATION RELEASE (1) RVLMS < 50% (voiding (1) ATWS (1) CIAS required but not (1) Loss or orrsite and onsite AC power upper plenum) completed l (2) RCS pressure > 2750 psia (2) Excessive RCS radio-(2) H2 concentration > 3.5% (2) Loss or offsite and onsite AC power activity (> 300 uCi/ by volume for longer than 15 minutes. I gm dose equivalent 1-131) (3) RCS pressure controlling (3) CET > 700" r (3) Containment pressure (3) Failure or safety. systems (both on PZR sarcties > 50 psig tra ins) to actuats when required. - (4) Uncontrolled loss or (4) Plays ica l breach or (4) > 10 gpm prima ry/seconda ry leakage inventory > SO gpm containment concurrent with LOP or, > 10 gpm prima ry/seconda ry leakage concurrent with loss or seconda ry coalant outside containment (5) Violation or Tech Spec LCO or cell-ance on Tech Spec Section 3.0.3 for any or the following essential systems: i ECCS, CNTMT Spray,.Ul timate Hea t Sink, SP, CST /RMWT, RWT, EC, ESS. CR HVAC, ADV, Aux Feedwa ter Operability ( i.e., electrica l power, instrumentation controls and other auxilia ry equipment) shall be main-l tained on the above systems. 'd ey' l l l l l l l (0490M) Revision 4f t August, 1984 .g =

e. 'M c,., g TABLE 5.1-1 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions (I-3. NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (Sheet 1 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recovery Procedure implemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions

• Licensee Action Cuidance 1

Reactor Trip o.No loss of AND no challenge '1.) Rx trip verified o Info rm NRC, State and County - (uncomplicated Rx trip to a fission product barrier. A) Rx power decreasing authorities or nature of un-goes not challenge a usual conditions; no release of barrier and does not .B) Rx trip phase current radioactive materia l requi ring require activation of the indicates orr i cation to NRC is required orrsite response or monitoring E Plan; however, notiri-is expected unless further degradation of' safety systems l per 10CFR 50.72) occur. o Based on the situation, recom-mend that no protective action is necessary or to standby for t ' update, o Augment onshift resources l o Activate STSC at the discre-tion of the shif t supervisor. j o Partially activate CHIC l o Terminate with verbal summa ry to orrsite authorities rol-I loved by written report within 24 hours. -OR iscalate to a higher classiri-- o l. cation. c.;4 y,1 f-L' l i l C-

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress, i

i' ' (0489M) Revision'5 August, 1984 4

- A e .e; < tK,.j i i:g.'; .d. TABLE'5.1-1 Example Emergency Action Levels. (EALs) & Corresponding Actions /I NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (Sheet 2 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recovery Procedure luolemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions 7 2. Excessive Steam Demand o No loss of AND no challenge '1.) Excessive steam demand ~ to a fission product barrier. ve ri fied A) S/G press low prior to MSIS 8) PZR. level _ low i t C) PZR press low D) SIAS E). HSIS I ~ i i l l l ,? ' i': ' ! A i 2 {

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

,,(D489M) Revision 5 August,.1984 . +% O vW..

E

• • I TABLE 5.1-1

~ ' Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) ar Corresponding Actions fl NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT .j (Sheet 3 or 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station ~ Recovery Procedure f oolemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 3. Loss of reedwater o No loss of AND no challenge 1.) Loss or reedwater verified to a rission product barrier A) Feed flow abnorma l. B) Rx trip on low S/G level' or high PZR press C) S/C level abnormal aji.

• h:

1 i. .w , ~, a, en

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials cven when no release is in progress.

m,. g- -(0449M) Revision 5 August, 1988: m___ . _. __. _=_ -

np

ff.'9 q. 2 i. jp, 1..

~ TA8LE 5.1-1 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions' lI ~ NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (Sheet 4 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recove ry Procedure luolemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions Q. Loss of Forced Flow o No loss of AND no challenge 1.) Loss of RCS flow verified to a fission product barrier A) Core A P <10 psid B) RCP J1 P <10 psid C) S/G 21P <10 psid W lf;.. ' .c i. e

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no re: case is in progress.

(0489My Revision 5 August, 1984-5 e o .hawi

..y fI e,t < r gi. f. < TABLE 5.1-1 ~ Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions 'f I NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT c (Sheet 5 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station a Rec *very Procedure teclemented Classification Criteria initiatine Conditions 5. Loss or Secondary o No loss of'AND no challenge

1. )' Loss of secondary coolant

~ Coolant to a fission product barrier verified - A) Pressure in at least one S/G cecreasing i B) RCS pressure de-crea sing l l i 1 l l i U l l ' {, i',', .c I l i 0 l l Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and. tliese recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress. -(0439,5) l - stevisfori 5.- August, 1984 a -nry +-, s.-- --,,.4 4 ,4 w

AJ 2 A s'm. '

p. '

/ - . a. 3 +* - M I 48 59 1 no, it ss s iu s vg e eu r RA dg I I f no n g ar o 'l rl p s d nn e ioi sa ts b ii d d ne e ,rl os f i rea ca f ) / wotc s e g S - co - otei tl s i - n C r tt rl amg b' t g rbi N x e roce oli ao C er a ne s s s. n oar V e h eti n focrl L m l l a e gi h si yP rdt h x ,a o rrnao no c i l n cnt t ut - ee t,oein e uPr en in e ae u d qi n vtm oetsto pnn o dw a r i ii t s em vmcr aeeri oao k ,ani onyn io tn c n r erio ntru nr da A o i0 didm) up cd nif nuhl tc ey eo tt oi b eet d Att sd ne e i f1 fn s mtee am aqseon cttfM uu cw l g t n ni ge densn al harpu uina oh n i fn oo(nt ete l ftaa atr f dl aSr s dn i i d oa ic i u ttvaf onut nrCse eil s ne l d n h t ntn pae e odi ea ahy rbP ,o. i n o nt chosi m rd n ci p metgtt a rmo on e n nt av w o n c o etiam erno n o vs o f e yi eei ia t t p o ie titl toa sa irio n:aehf ll :ttt tl ns n s i a tr ewa 0 t-nal todh eerl ta e t n ao d ve1 ayeo P a/n hicbis l esusa ip al c r T a i armpyt d l a y vm mrr rli y tdia p(r aw r N t t r erein tt tcy rn im a trto e on c emSn ng pi i c. o E S a eg rasfa nn ant oado n i bi faoat lae rei p et l same n o sC ym ci ni en C V sn i ilb h E g t ad att a y au r or ho eagr sdr rr ,iic testl r ti r ti O pd gl ru neue uaorsa sc npt nu do n L n ) i eacec asjt tzd p bngass ) A ) t I ) 3b nzteme roni aaarnm uanli n laq e ,i s U 6 a a 0( II odes T pi s Nhnooe SmiPDI Pr at ro e se yp 1 L S r ( - A U f e bi a E N o n s ss 1 ) ) ) ) ) ( U e ) eT rf s 'r 5 6 G s F 2 3 4 5 6 ao coe 1 E O t r l es L e e a so ni B v N e T L I S le r nt v A e O h a ee o sr c i gi ie ie T ( u r nr td p n A N e aa su o C t lera dm tS i I e i lb n n - t F d r a ee et s c I r C ht mr vf A T e cc ma ei O V n u o h y N o od cs eS c o i no en s n l t r ro ee e a a Dp i hh g P e ic N nt tt r An f o oa id fd m i ri tn on E s os ce a s s am g e a si m n1 l l sr eo i - p C o vc d3 m a ie a l a tr r5 x oo c g ~

• E Nt ee ipc ts i

t ( oe b o rh fa l l Pt IT e s et h t e htli c n t tfbs a e i r aa c T ev s darmn i E n d nccmo nn h a ee a ra ou t o rrh

ii) im i

rout a e ar. tm i w r o/j ni c ao t T dnm e(,rt mc e a nnio m ooe r c e o h ioa rl osd of n r r dfa

ndac, fos a

tde t ernie n m m t T c aetli harxs ite r tsaap pzooa nt os a y ronus atte R o pi d o lh l des fO e t emy nC i pxmih a ,,e dss oL r seav rr ehr as c n e u nrtia ueks ren c o r c aend thaas gso ne N i e rvono atura esi op ) F S Tocit Noqcg Dat NS M 98 4 6 A 8 C D E T 0 ( s t .~ ,\\ l ,Ilt r!l !l' l!ll lil'

t[(l[!lilj'st l

fll 1I i1

fM .[g 4 TABLE 5.1-2 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions f AtrRT (Sheet 1 of 9) Pa lo Ve rde Nuc l ea r Gene ra t i ng Sta t ion - Cecove ry Procedure implemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions

• Licensee Action Guidance 1.

Reactor Trip o One fission product barrier 1.) Rx Trip verified o inform NRC, State and County challenged OR lost authorities of Alert status / ~~ A) Rx power decreasing cause; any releases are ex-lI pected to be limited to small B) Rx trip phase current fractions or EPA / PAG exposure indicators off levels at the site bounda ry unless further degradation or AND safety systems occur 2.) A) Cap activity in pri-mary coolant verified o Recommend to the State that the by chemistry Public be appraised of the situation and stay tuned to OR EDS/KTAR radio station B) Failure of RPS to initiate and complete o Augment resources by activating a scram placing the STSC, TSC, OSC, eor, JENC, CHIC reactor in a sub-and CEC. critical condition; manual scram suc-o Dispatch (onsite/orrsite) l# cessful (AIWS). Field Monitoring Teams with associa ted communications fg equpment i OR C) Deg raded. sys tem pe r-o Provide meteorologica l assess-formance wt.sch could monts to orrsite authorities; result in loss or a and if releases are occurring, critical safety func-dose estimates for actual tion or barrier rail-releases ure within a given time period unless o Terminate by verbal summa ry to

'i[s succesful corrective offsite authorities followed actions are imple-by written summary within 8

mented, hours OB OR D) Radioactivity release o Escalate to a higher classi-in excess or Technical rication Specification limits.

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite officials even when no release is in progress.

(0489M) Revision 5 e August, 1984 o e

k l-

"It - 's in TABLE 5.1-2 + Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions fI ALERT (Sheet 2 of 9) Palo Verde Nucicar Generating Station Decovery P rocedu re implemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions 2. Excessive Steam Demand o One fission product barrier lt 1.) Excessive steam demand challenged OR lost. J verified A) S/G press low prior to MSIS B) PZR level low C) PZR press low D) SIAS El MSIS AJ 2.) A) Cap activity in primary coolant verified by chemistry 9R D) AlWS OR C) Degraded system perfor-mance which could re-suit in loss or critical sarcty function or bar-rier railure within a 9iven time period unless d successrui corrective 'i-actions are implemented, f 1~ OR D) hadioactivity release in excess or Technical Specification limits.

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to offsite officials even when no release is in progress.

(0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984

1. c, ig TABLE 5.1-2 Example Emergency A.ction Levels (EALs) ar Corresponding Actions ALERT

q (Sheet 3 or 9)

Palo Verde II$ clear Generating Station e' recovery Procedure teolemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions 3. Loss or feedwater-o one tission product barrier 1.) Loss or reedwater verified challenged OR lost A) Feed flow abnormal B) Rx trap on low S/G Ievel or high PZR press C) S/C level decreasing Y E 2.) A) RCS pressure controlling k on PZR safeties DB i

8) Cap activity in primary coolant verified by Chemistry og C) AlWS 1

OR l D) RCS Pressure > 2750 psia OR i E) iEgraded system perfor-l mance which could result in loss or critical d safety function or bar- -i~ rier railure within a - given time period unless stecess ful corrective actions are implemented, t CR F) Radioactivity release in .4*~ excess or Technical Spec. 1 ification limits.

• Protective act.on recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and tiese ree-amc.vations are made to offsite officials even when no release is in progress.

(0409pt) llevision 5 August, 1984 ar . _, ~. _ _. -,. ..n._ .y-. .r._.,. y

'i i,,,.,.c TABLE 5.1-2 1 Example Emergency Action Levels (Eats) & Corresponding Actions [ AtrRT (Sheet 4 or 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recovery Proccoure implemented Classification Cri*eria Initiating Conditions D. Loss of rorced ricw o One rission product barrier 1.) Loss of RCS flow verirled challenged OR lost A) Cored P <10 psid B) RCP A P <10 psid C) S/C d P <10 psid 23 2.) A) Cap ackivity in primary i coolant veriried by chemistry OR 1 ~ B) ATWS l OR C) DJgraded systems perror-mance which could result in loss of a critical sarcty runction or bar-rier failure within a given time period unless successrut corrective actions are implemented 1 08 D) Budi.a:tivity release d 1 in eseess or Technical Specification limits i l

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orts. o orricials even when no release is in progress.

l l l l (0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 L

7-t _lf - t '.? ' i g-TABLE 5.1-2 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actihns I f I. 3 At.fRT (Shcot'5 or 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Rec *ve ry Procedure' implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions ~ 5. Loss of Seconda ry o One fission product barrier 1.) Loss or seconda ry coolant. Coolant challenged Q3 lost dec rea s i ng B) RCS pressure decreasing AN_l) 2.) A)

1. Containment pressure

> 50 psig-OR ' ap activity in prim-D) G ary coolant verified by. chemistry OR C) S/G tube leak concurrent with an unisolabic steam leak outsido containment 9B D) A1WS 98 E) Degraded system perfor-e mance which could result in loss or a critical -,j sarcty function or bar-f6 rier rai ture within a

7 +

given time period unless successful co rrec t ive. actions a rc impicmented. 98 r) Radioactivity release in excess or Technical Spec-ll irication limits.

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite africials even when no release is in progress.

( 08a89M) Revision 5 August, 1984

% v; *_ lV.,

TABLE 5.1-2 Example Emergency Action Levcis (EALs) de Corresponding Actions } / 6L(RT-(Sheet 6 or 9) Falo Verde Nuclear Generating Station' Eccovery Procedure Implemented Classification Criteria Initiatina Conditions 6. Small LOCA o One fission product barrier 1.) Small LOCA verirled challenged 93 lost RCS leakage > 50 gpm l i e... 'i e 9 't 1 d s

• Protective action recommendations arc based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite officials even when no release is in progress, s. i k0isS9M)

~- Revision 5 [ August, 19884 b

c O g w TABLE 5.1-2 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions [# + ALERT (Sheet 7 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recove ry Procedure implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 7. LOCA o One fission product barrier

1. ) ' LOCA verified challenged OB lost 1.

RCS press low 2. SIAS/CIAS actuated 3. CTMT sump levels, temp, press,, humidity increas-eng ljk'{ r-t 4

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and those recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

!(0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 a

Ni > :. o !LL TABLE 5.1-2 g Example Emergency Action t.evels (EALs) & Corresponding Actiont / I .. ~ 2 All RT (Sheet 8 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station . Hec *very Procedu re imolemented Classification Criteria Initiatinn Conditions 8. SG Tube Rupture o One fission product barrier 1.) S/G tube rupture verirled, ~ challenged QR lost RCS leakage > 50 gpm 1. SIAS 2. PZR press low 3. PZR level low hhkj' r I, e? 5 q e;'

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made td orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

3.(0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 h a

'U

c y; o

TABLE 5.1-2 Exampie Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding ctions fI ALERT (Sheet 9 or 9)- Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recovery P rocedu re Implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 9. Blackout o one fission product barrier 1.) Blackout verirled challenged 93 lost r 2. Generator trip 3. No orrsite AC power 4. Failure to diesel gen-eratort to supply class IE buses i .; 8f, i,. o. + J i a

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

I s a ~ f<(0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 f

E* <) jA e TABLE 5.1-3 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions fI-SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Shcot 1 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recove ry Procedure implemented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions'

• Licensee Action Guidance 3.

Loss of Feedwa ter o Two fission product barriers 1.) Loss or feedwater verirled o inform NRC, State and County challenged authorities or Site Area Emer-Al Feed flow abnormal gency status /cause; any re-QB lea ses a re. not. expected to - B) Rx trip on lov S/C-exceed EPA / PAC exposure levels-o Two fission product barriers level or high PZR beyond the site boundary unless lost p ress further. dogradation of. sa roty.- systems occur OR AND 2 of the following: 2.) A) Containment pressure o Recommend'to the State that o One rission product barrier > 50 psig consideration or appropriate challenged AND another lost protective actions based on 03 actual or projected data is B) Cap activity in pri-warranted per. the appropriato lg ma ry coolant verified EPIP-I by Chemistry o Augment resources by acti-OB vating STSC, TSC, OSC, EO F, C)- Degraded system per-JENC, CHIC and CEC forternce which could g result in loss of a o Dispatch (onsite/cffsite) I critical sarcty func-Field Monitoring Teams with tion or barrier rail-associated communications if ure within a given equipment time period unless successful corrective o Provide a dedicated individ-l(. actions are imple-val for plant status updates

mented, dates to orrsite authorities.

OR o Provide meteorological data D) RCS pressure > 2750 and dose estimates (for actual psia releases) to orrsite author- .d 4 itles

• b4 OR E) ~-RCS pressure control- 0 Provide release and dose pro-ling on PZR sarctics jcctions based on available plant condition information and 03 foreseeable contingencies.

F) Hadioactivity release in excess or Technical o Terminate (or reduction of) Specification limits emergency class verba l ly a t EOF followed by written .c summa ry within 8 hours OB o Escalate to CENERAL EMERGENCY

• Protective action recommunitations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress 1

(0489M) Revision 5 j g August, 1984

4 " ' i. t c.- :;j ...+ TABLE 5.1-3 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions /I SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Sheet 2 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Concrating Station ' Recovery Procedure imolemented Classification Criteria Initia tino Condit ions 5. Loss or Seconda ry o Two fission product barriers .1. ) Loss or secondary coolant Coolant challenged vo ri rled QR A) Press in at least 1 S/G dec rea s ing o Two fission product barriers B) RCS press decreas;ng. lost EB OhE o One fission product barrier 2.) Two or the following challengcd AP{Q another lost A) Conta inment pressure > 50 psig B) SG tube leak concurrent with an unisolable steam leak outsido containment OR C) Uap activity in prim-a ry coolant veri fied by chemistry 98 D) Degraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or.a critical sa rcty function or ba r-Mi rier rallure within a f i :4 f, 'g, given time period unless successful co rrec t i ve actions are implemented OR E) hiWAS t OR y r) Radioactivity release in excess or Technical Spec-irication limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress

!? (0489M) t Revision 5 S

August, 1984 e W

Ad + c e$ p. ' TABLE 5.1-3 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions /I' SITE AREA EMERCENCY (Sheet'3 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Cenerating Station' '~ R5coverv Procedure ' implemented Classification Criteria initiatina Conditions 6. Small LOCA o Two fission product barriers 1.) -Small LOCA verified challenged i A) RCS pressure decreasing QS 6H2 .o Two fission product barriers lost 2.) Ar.y one of the following: A) Conta inment pressure > 50 psig, oR o One r;ssion product barrier B) Cap activity in primary challenged AND anotiace lost coolant vert ried by chemistry ~ OR C) ATWS OR D) Ecgraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or a critical safety function or ba r-1 rier railure within 7: 3 9iven time period unless. successful corrective actions are impicmented 08

!0 '

E) Radioactivity release in ' 9;'. excess of Technical Spec-irication limits ~ .h; a

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress

'd'(0439M) Revision 5 t -August, 1984

-.,m_.. 4 = ' 5; # 1,,],.f . f? i r e. -TABLE 5.1-3 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions [I SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Sheet 4 or 6) Palo Verde. Nuclear Generating Station-Recovery Procedu re implemented Classification Criteria initiatina Conditions 7. LOCA o Two fission product barriers. 1.) LOCA verified challenged 1. RCS press low . _R, 0 o Two rission product barriers lost 3. -CTMT sump levels, temp, press, humidity increas-OR ing o -one rission product barrier ANQ challenged AND another lost 2.) A) Conta inment pressure > 50 psig og. B) Cap activity in prim-ary coolant verified by chemistry OR C) Ucgraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or a critical sa fety function or ba r- - rier railure within a given time period unless successful co rrect ive actions are implemented 3 0 fa.1 D) Core uncovered RVLMS < 50% (voiding in upper l r plenua) OR E) CET > 700 degrees F OR F) hadioactivity release in excess or Technical Spec-irication limits

• Protective' action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and those recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress "4(0489M).

Revision 5 August, 1984

,, ~ 'W :,a., q;g TABLE 5.1-3 ~ V Example Emergency' Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions. [I SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Sheet 5 or 6) Pa l o Ve rde Nuc l ea r Gene ra t i ng S ta t ion Recove ry Procedu re implemented Classification Criteria initiatinn Conditions 8. ' SG Tube Rupture o Two rission product barriers 1.) S/C tube rupture verirled challenged-O_q 2. PZR press lov o Two fission product barriers lost 3. PZR level lov QB o One fission product barrier 2.) A) Steam release from dam-challenged AND another lost aged S/G to atmosphere 1 S/G safety

2. ADV

3. SBCS to ATM 93 B) Gap activity in primary coolant verified by chemi s t ry OR C) 6cgraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss of a critical sa rety runction or ba r-rice railure within a 1 L.

given time period unless

p.,

"n

f successful co rrect ive k

actions a re implemented OR D) ifadioactivity release'in 8 excess of Technical Spec-irication limits J: i

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress if.*

{/ T (ogg9My Revision 5 August, 1984

1 ^ e: I ef 2 4 y; P TABLE 5.1-3 ~ Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions - fl i SITE ARFA EMERCENCY (Sheet 6 or 6) v' Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recove ry P rocedu re implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 9. Blackout o Two rission product barriers 1.)_ Blackout verified challenged 1. Rx trip pg 2. Conora tor trip o Two fission product barriers lost 3. No orrsite AC power OB . 4. Failure or diesel gener-ators to supply class IE o One fission product barrier buses challenged AND another lost ANQ 2.) A) RCS pressure controlling on PZR sarctics OR B) I5LMS < 50% (voiding in Upper Plenum) OR C) Dip activity in primary coolant confirmed by chemistry OR D) N3dioactivity release.in excess or Technical Spec-irication limits. ,41

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in propress.

' f(C489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 6 o a ~

l' ' 'd \\ TABLE 5.1-4 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions - !' CENERAL EMERCENCY (Sheet 1 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Cenerating Station Recovery Procedure lmn temented Classification Criteria Initiatino Conditions

• Licensee Action Guidance s

5. Loss or Seconda ry o One rission product barrier 1.) Loss or secondary coolant o inform NRC, State and County Coolant challenged Wi th two ba rriers verified authorities of General Emer-lost gency sta tus/cause; any re-A) Pressure.in at least leases can be reasonable 03 one S/G decreasing expected to exceed EPA / PAC expo su re levels orrsite for o Two barrierr challenged with D) RCS pressure decreasing more than the immediate site one barrier lost a rea OR AND 3 of the following: o Recommend to the Sta te that consideration or appropriate o Three fission product bar-2.) A) Conta inment pressure protective actions based on riers challenged > 50 psig actual or projected data is warranted per the. appropriate l/ OR OR EPIP I ~~ B) ASLB in MSSS upstream o Three fission product bar-of NSIV with SCTL Augment resources by activa-ribrs lost ting STSC, TSC, OSC, EOF, JENC, OR CHIC and CEC C) Cap activity in pri-ma ry coolant verified Dispatch (onsite/orrsite) lg by chemistry Field Monitoring Teams with associated communica tions f( OR equipment D) ATWAS o. Provide a dedicated individual OR for plant status updates to E) Degraded system per-orrsite. authorities formance which could result in loss or a o Make senior technical and critical safety func-management starr available for ' i ;' or barrier failure periodic consultation with NRC within a given time and State period unless success-ful corrective actions are implemented OR 'adioactivity release F) H in excess or Technical Specification limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment ' conditions and lI these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

I a. (0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 e a

m l <1 Upy n i m v, .'s l y- .a rw u-atr e 'M e tco l )ye fbh c aah nb o t 4 n d ,t e a ru s ioa n 8 e notn 59 d l oa onte oiaes 1 af dois it tr n iu G ic(e pd e tastu o, t dunr cceio it. gsi n oo uiirh s ss no loes adcf dftw s iu tr e eii 8 e vg oar estd rsry r i eu t rmo sann sobn dg RA c oi abaas r ah i no A eto e l e ol tdh ar tst e ee l spni (cuet p en oc awi s e m roein ey ow nn ) s es te tcgl oi il n ese etbag annl y i e dos dcamn neior ts c idas iel ri i gf f a ii v ee vjiot mre m d i L odli ooafn reiFm ne rnet rrvno emrOu os Pari P pai c TebEs ca e tl [ o o o ae .t er n m o no i in t a c tn A ne s oh g n cw n o dn i i d t ne n av i o n d e p o n t o ns s i a t C al r a l a t o pi o S n c C i or ni g t n a r Y ) C i i do ) t t e s N 6 a se 4 L E r i at n - A C r e 1 E R o n i bi s ( E e er 5 M 2 G rr 's F ao E l t r 8 L e L e a so B v A e e nt A e R h T L E S l o c ie N ( u a td n E N i dm aa i C o r e e n t d t ee g c r mr A e i ma r V C o y cs m c o n en n e l o ro a i g P i nt t r a oa e c E i id m tn f ce e i am s m l s eo p a m l ) ivc e a C d tr x c E 't ee n ts o oe C rh r Pt ( de t t n n a e l m o e o l C p m y i r a e d r n u o d c e e c S o r r P o y s r s e o ) v L M o 9 c 8 e r R 5 o 'g -S

i 1

1 1$ 4 3

N ' >l k l ' 'c. ; ~ TABLE 5.1-4 ~ I Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions / CENERAL EMERGENCY (Sheet 3 of 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station-P.ccove ry P rocedu re implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 6. Small LOCA o One fission product barrier 1.) Small LOCA verified challenged with two barriers lost A) RCS pressure decreas-ing 03 o Two barriers challenged with one barrier Jost 2.) A) Conta inment pressure > 50 psig _Og OR o Three fission product bar-B) dap activity in primary riers challenged coolant verified by chemi s t ry 03 08 o Three fission product bar-C) ATWAS ridrs lost OR D) Ucgraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or a critical sa rety function or ba r-rior rallure within a given time period unless successful corrective actions are implemented OR E) ii9LMS < 50% (voiding - ((f. (voiding in upper plenum) OR F) DET > 700 degrees F OR I C) itadioactivity release in excess of Technical Spec-irication limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

(0489M) + Revision 5 August, 1984 e o L

k.'3.; 2 y, TABLE 5.1-4' Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions f ( CENERAL EMERCENCY (Sheet 4 or 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Bec*ve ry P rocedu r e ' imp l emented Classification Criteria Initiatina Conditions 7. LOCA o One fission product barrier .1.) LOCA verified challenged with two barriers lost 1. RCS press low. 93 2. Sl AS/CI AS actuated O Two barriere challenged with 3. CIMT sump levels, temp, one barrier lost press, humid i ty increas-ing 93 ARQ 2 of the following: o Three fission product bar-riers challenged 2.) A) Conta inment pressure > 50 psig og OR o Three fission product bar-B) Cap activity in prima ry riors lost coolant verified by 4 chemistry 98 C) Core uncovered [RVLMS 50% (voiding in Upper Plenum) or CET 700*F] OR DJ Degraded system perfor- ~ mance which could result in loss of a critical sarcty function or bar-ad. rier railure within a "/.9 given time period unless d' I successful corrective actions are implemented ~ OR T' E) Radioactivity release in excess or Technical Spec-M' irication limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on t! ant and containme'nt conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricit,as even when no release is in progress.

i '.s a,,. %1(0489M) Revision 5 August, 1984 5

e. i f[,' .6 P' e TABLE 5.1-4 ~~ f# Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions GENERAL EMERGENCY (Sheet 5 or 6) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Recovery P rocedu re implemented Classification Criteria Initiatina Conditions 8. SG Tube Rupture o One fission product barrier 1.) S/G tube rupture verirled challenged with two barriers 1. SlAS lost 2. Pressurizer pressure Og low Two barriers challenged with - 3. PZR level low o one barrice lost 4. S/G blowdown or condenser OR a i r remova l radia t ion o Three fissi 5 product bar-high a la rms riers challenged AND 2 or the rollowing: OB 2.) A) Steam release f rom damaged o Three fission product bar-S/G to atmosphere. riers lost

1. S/G sarcty

2. ADV

3. SBCS to ATM OR B) dip activity in the prima ry coolant verified by chemistry OR C) Degraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or a critical sarcty function or barrier railure within a given time period unicss successful corrective actions are implemented ql1 -

OB ' ' N '. s l D) HVLMS < 50% (voiding in Upper Plenum) OR E) UET < 700 degrees F i; OR f) iiadioactivity release in excess of Technical Spec-irication limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress 4,(0489M).

Revision 5 August, 1984 t

!t: r.,L 4 i 4 s '

TABLE 5.1-4 .c Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs)' & Corresponding Actions CENERAL EMERCENCY (Sheet 6 of 6) Pa lo. Verde Nuclea r Concrating Station Recovery P rocedu re implemented Classification Criteria initiatino Conditions 9. Blackout o one fission product barrier 1.) Blackout verified challenged with two barriers lost 1. Rx trip 93

• 2.

cenerator trip o Two barriers challenged with 3. No orrsite AC power one barrier lost 4. Failure or diesel gen-98 erators to supply class IE buses o ihree fission product ba r-riers cha l lenged - AND QB 2.) Two ro the following: o Three fission product ba r-A) RCS pressure con-ricrs lost trolling on PZR safeties OR B) UfT > 700 degrees F OR C) NVLMS < 50% (voiding in Upper Plenum) OB

0) Degraded system perfor-mance which could result in loss or a critical

.pj,.. safety function or barrier "L4-. failure within a given time i period unless successful corrective actions are implemented 98 E) Radioactivity release in excess or Technical Spec-irication limits

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress

,(0489M) Revision 5 e 8 August, 1984

.1 'O i; y $,. TABLE 5.2-1 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions fI NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (Shoot 1 or 2) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station ja rety Functions [AL ( Ala rm. Instrument Readino. etc.) APS Actions Slate / County Actions 1 Reactivity Control (1) Any compromise of reactivity 0 Inform NRC, State and o ADES' Duty Orricer control constitutes an upgrado County authorities of sta ffs, State EOC. 3 RCS Hea t Remova l (2) (A) Safety inJcction actuates withlg nature of unusua l con-discha rge to the vessel J 7.dition; no release or o ARRA Duty Orricer radioactive material acqui res follow-up QB [ requiring orrsite re-information from STSC. sponse or monitoring (B) Sustained TC > 568 degrees F is expected unless o County EOC on standby further degradation of and alert fan-out. QB ,. safety systems occur. o Provide offsite assis-(C) Indications of railed fuel (Tech o ' Based on the situation, tance if requi red Spec Section 3/4.4.7): f recommend that no pro-(fire, security, tective action is medical, etc.). necessa ry or to standby for update, o Offsite notification per notification pro-3. RCS inventory and (3) (A) Saroty injection actuates with g o Augment on-shift re-cedures. Pressure Control discha rge to the vessel sources. o Orrsite notification OB o Activate STSC at the per notification pro-discretion of the cedures. (B) Pzr relief actuates Shif t Supervisor o Escalate to a higher QB o Pa rtia lly Activate classification. Clll C. (C) Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Control System such that Tech o. Terminate wi th verba l Specs are violated summa ry to offsite authorities rollowed .d. OB by written report w/in q,> 24 hours. (D) RCS press < 1700 psig OB o Escalate to a higher 4. Containment integrity (A) Loss of containment i n teg ri ty classification, requi ring shutdown by Tech Specs QB (D) CIAS

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and 57 these recommendations arc made to orrsite orricials even when no relcase is in progress.

1(0489M) Revision S August, 1984 6

u- ) I N.! ef,i,1 '. f . TABLE 5.2-1 (Continued) Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs).k Corresponding Actions f I _-f. NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT. (Sheet 2 of 2) Strety Functions FAL ( Ala rm. Inst rument Reading. etc.) 5. Indi rect Radioactivity (5) Radiological effluent Tech Spec limits.ex- ~ Reicase Control -cceded. Projected dose at. site boundary < ImH/hr. Rad ia t ion. leve l s/ Monitor radionuclide concent rations SQN-RU-141 i Cond Vac pump 2 8.9 E-4 uci/cc \\. SQN-RU-145 rucI Bldg. Vent Exhaust 2 3.5 E-4 uci/cc a SQN-RU-143 Plant Vent 2 2.0 E-5 uci/cc SQN-RU-148,149 Cont Area Monitor 2 2 R/hr SQN-RU-150.151 Primary Coolant 2 2 R/hr SQN-RU-139,140 2 10 mR/hr' t Main Steam Linc } Errivent i l SQN-RU-37, 38 l Power Access Purgo 2 2.5 mR/hr ] . :. e > g. 6. Maintenance or Vital (6) LCOs for Engineered Safety features ex-9- Auxiliaries ( Aux feed-i-. cceded per Tech Specs, i ' water. Condensate - T ransfer, Essentia l ' Chil l Wa ter, Essentia l' Cooling Water, Essen-l tial Spray Ponds, y,, AC/DC power sources) 3

• Protec;;ive action recommendations are based on plant and containment' conditions and f

these recommendations are made to orrsite officials even wtien no release is in progress. J. l: tr$ (0469M) Revision 5 U. . August, 19881 6-

%4 TABLE 5.2-2 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions ALERT s (Sheet 1 of 4) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Sareiv Functions [AL (Alarm. Inst rumen t Readino. etc.) APS Actions State / County Actions '1. deactivity Control (1) Failure of RPS to initiate and complete o inform NRC, State and o Activate County EOC. a trip, placing the Rx in a subcri-County authorities of tical condition; manual trip success-ALERT status /cause; o Activate State EOC

fut, any releases a re expec-and TOC.

ted to be limited to 2. RCS Ileat Removal (2) (A) failure of both trains of any small. fractions of EPA / o Partially activate required ASTAS PAG cxposure levels at . REAT - ro rwa rd, the site boundary un-OB less rurther degrada-tion or sarety systems o Provide confirmatory (B) Loss of subcooling margin occur orrsite radiation mon-itoring and calculate QB o ' Recommend to the State cose projections if i that the public be actual releases sub-(C) Indication of RCS void propagat ion appraised of. the situ- .stantially exceed into the core region, ation anr1 stay tuned Technical Specifica-to EBS/KTAR radio tion limits. 95 o Augment resources by o Provide assistance, if -1D) Severe loss or cladding indicated activating STSC, TSC,. requested ( ri re, so-by any of the following: OSC, EOF, JENC, CHIC curity, medical, etc.). and CEC (1) SQN-RU-148, 149 (Containment Dispatch (onsite/orr-P, o implement protective 3 Area Ill Rad Monitor): o actions if needed, site) rictd Monitoring 2 200 R/hr for 0.5 hr Teams with associated o Maintain ALERT status communications equip-U until verbal te rm ina-ment. [ tion. OR o Provide meteorological assessments to orrsite QS > 2000 R/hr' ror 2 min authorities and if o 4 Escalate to a higher

• @S;;

l-releases are occurring classification. Og dose estimates for actual re lea ses (2) SQN-RU-150, 151 ( Prima ry Coolant Activity Monitor): o Terminate by verbal summary to orrsite 2 200 R/hr for 0.5 hr authorities rollowed by written summa ry within 8 hours o ~OR Escalate to a higher classification

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and f

these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no relcase is in progress, Jigog90g) i Revision'5 August, 1984

tr s:) .g g TABLE 5.2-2 (CONTINUED) f-Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions - ALERT s _ (Sheet 2 of 4) Palo Verde Nuclear Concrating Station SOrety Functions [Al. ( A l a rm. I n s t rumen t Readina. etc.) 98 2 2000 R/hr for 2 minutes (3) SQN-RU-37, 38 ( Power Access Purge ' Moni tor): ,>.25 R/hr for 0.5 hr 98 t 2.5 R/hr for 2 minutes (4) Letdown Monitor: > 1% increase in-railed ruct within 30 minutes (5) Prima ry coolant samples with > 300 uci/gm or equivalent 1-131 3. RCS Inventory & (3) lA) Failure or any ESFAS Pressure Control 98 (B) P2r level off scale low or high EH (C) Severe loss of cladding as indicated in item 2(d). 4 Containment integrity (4) CSAS gj,. .py DB I Fa i l u re o r a ny ESFAS e

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and f

d these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no retcaso is in progress. '(0490M) Rovision 5 August, 1984 6 J

r: N

• e. j ? y,.

'a' TABLE 5.2-2 (CONTINUED) ^ ~ ' - _g Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions. l -ALERT s (Sheet 3 of 4) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Safety Functions EAL ( A l a rm. Inst rument Readino. etc. ) 5. indirect Radioactivity (5) Radiological effluents greater than 10 times L Release Control Tech Spec instantaneous limits; high radia-tion levels or high airborne contamination levels (1000 times above background) due to-challenge / loss or RCS heat removal, RCS inventory & pressure control, and/or con-tainment integ ri sy. Projected dose at. site bounda ry approximately 1 mR/hr. Radiation Levels / Monitor radionuclide concentrations SQN-RU-141 Cond Vac pump 2 8.9 E-3 ucl/cc SQN-RU-145 fuel Bldg Vent Exhaust 2 3.5 E-3 uci/cc SQN-RU-143 Plant vent 2 2.0 E-4 uci/cc SQN-RU-148,149 2 200 R/hr for 0.5 hr QS Cont Area Monitor 2 2000 R/hr for 2 min SQN-RU-150,151 2 200 R/hr for 0.5 hr QR Prima ry Coolant 2 2000 R/hr,ror 2 min SQN-RU-139,140 21 R/hr for 0.5 hr QR Main Steam Line 210 R/hr for.2 min Erriuent

,g.

SQN-RU-37, 38 2 25 R/hr for 0.5 hr QB 9 55, y. Power Access Purge. 2 2.5 R/hr for 2 min b 1 A l

• . Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and J'

these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress,

(0490M) l Revision 5 August, 1984.

t o

7

l-s

+ 6.- ., = .fe k< l .d' i ' 4 8 8 59 1 I no, it ss s iu s vg e eu r RA dg no arp snn ioi ts ii d ne os ( cae tl s ne n er o mno i t in c a A tn ne g oh n cw i d dn n ne av o n 3 e p o t s i s, e t e2 ns r t u, lal r a r a pi o S ts c ) C am ni D g ee or E n Ft r U i i do N ) ) t y e I s 4 a tF se T L r eS at N A r e f bi O E o n ao s C ( T e St ) ef ( R 4 G rf s E c ds ao 2 l L t r t es - e A e a e ro so 2 v e e el nt e - h l . e/ o 5 L S c a ne. e i ( u n ige E n N i td gnv aa L o d neo B i e a Elb dm n A t d e T c r R rl a ee a mr A s e ohd V t fce ma y n t ocs c o e sai n en e l m O c a u Cn ro g P r Lis i r nt t a oa e s gg m n nn4 id E I ii tn dtr ce e am l el o m eu/ m eo p r csd ma la xen vc t ie Er a x A tr E c ( ee t s L ) A 6 oe rh - F ( Pt l d a-l e in ) ae l te s tF ans e eies,c i' VxttsEsr uans fAseE ,d u no o(ns ros es,eP s esdErt r n cen eaye o nio,tWaw i arCra ro t na eWgpp c e i .f nS n tl rsli C u nienlllD F ixtaioa/ auarhoiC y MAwTCCtA ) 't M c 0 r 9 a 6 S 40 ( }- i r

+ fn,:[.h g TABLE 5.2-3 Y Emergsncy Acticn Lsysis (EALs) & Corresponding Acticn3 f [.- SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Shect.1 of 5) . t" Palo Verdo Nuclear Concrating Station. _ Safety Functions- [AL l Ala rm. Inst rument Readino. etc. ) APS Actions' State / County Actions - 1 Reactivity Control (1) Manual scram not successful; emergency. .o inform NRC, State and -o County EOC activated, boration in progress: RCS heat removal County authorities of. not degraded. SITE AREA EMERCENCY .o County Response status /cause; any re-: Agencies activa ted, leases are not expected

2. RCS Heat Removal (2) (A) Loss or forced riov and natural to exceed EPA / PAC expo-o. Augment resources by c i rcu l a t ion, sure levels beyond-the activating Stato EOC site boundary unless og rurther degradation or o State and Operations safety systems occur -

Agencies on standby. (B) CET temp > 700 degrees F ' o -Recommend'to.the State o initiate.immediate' OR -~ that consideration of. public notification appropriato protective of SITE. AREA EMER-(C) Degraded core pa rameters: actions based on actual CENCY status;' provide or projected data. is periodic public (1) C5p activity in primary cool- .wa rranted per the. . t -updates. ont (> 300 oci/cc) ' appropriate EPIP o. Resource Agencies 03-o Augment resources by Activated, activating STSC, TSC, (2) Core outlet plenum empty OSC, EOF, JENC, CHIC o Dispatch key emergency as indicated by RVLMS and CEC' personnel, including indicating 0%. monitoring teams with. o Dispatch (onsite/ lI communications equipment. offsite) Field Mon-itoring Teams with associated communi. lf o Alert other personne! to-standby status (eg, cations equipment those needed for t ra r-ric control or evacua-o Provide a dedicated I tion) and dispatch per-' individual for plant sonnel to near-site duty. status updates to stations. offsite authorities o Perform dose calculations o Provide meteorological based on current release - data and dose estimates-rates and implement nece. ( for actua l-releases) - ssa ry protective. actions - to offsite authorities ,;p,, ' h3; o Provido release and 'f-dose projections based on available plant con-dition information and - foreseeable contingen-a cies 1 a o Terminate (or reduction or) emergency class ver - bally at EOF followed by wri tten summa ry within eight hours OR

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and

( o Escalate'to CENERAL containment conditions and these recommendations are mado EMERCENCY to offsite of ficials even when no release is in progress. 2 cd (o490M) Rovision 5 August, 1984 o

'E. .e y, TABLE 5.2-3 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions SITE AREA EMERCFNCY 4 (Sheet 2 or 5) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Safety functions F AL _' ( A l a rm. Instrument Readina. etc,J APS Actions State / County Actions

3..RCS Inventory & Pressure (3)

(A). LOCA greater than CVCS capacity: Control o Provide orrsite moni-toring results to APS (1) RCS pressure bounda ry fa l ture and Jointly discuss them. Ay o Continuously assess (2) Imminent clad damage; ir core field i nfo rma t ion f rom melts, containment will be APS and State / County challenged. monitoring teams with 6NQ rega rd to initiating / - modifying public pro-tective action. (3) SQN-RU-148 OR o Provide assistance SQN-RU-149 high a la rm requested. 6NQ o Evaluate data and initiate ingestion (4) Cap activity in containment . pathway protective OS actions as appro-p ri a te. Cap activity in prima ry cool-o Provido press ont briefings. 6NQ o Maintain SITE AREA EMERGENCY status until' (5) SQN-RU-1 termination or reduc-6ND tion of emergency class. SON-RU-143 OR " "lij, OR i o Escalate to CENERAL SQN-RU-144 high a la rm EMERGENCY. OR (B)~ Loss or secondary coolant (1) RCS pressure bounda ry ra ilure

• Protective action recommendations arc based on plant and containment conditions and

' f' these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress. f(0490M) Revision 5 August. 1984

.-g ' Th ;, G. 3 TABLE 5.2-3 f. Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions n,. SITE AREA EMrRCENCY' (Sheet 3 of 5) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Safety runctions-EAL f Ala rm. I ns t rument Readino. etc.)

3. RCS Inventory & Pressure (3) (B) (continued) 6ED

'(2) Imminent' clad damage; ir core melts, containment will be challenged. SEE (3) SQN-RU-4, 5 (S/c blowdown) high alarm E8 SQN-RU-141 (Condenser Vacuum Pump Gland Scal) high a l a rm. bN_Q ~ (4) SQD-RU-1 (Conta inment a tmosphero Monitor) high ala rm dEE (5) Very high prima ry coolant activity (> 300 uci/gm or 1-131 doso equivalent) 93 Letdown monitor indicating > 1% increase in. ruel railure within ,g 30 minutes , ;. t Iy +

4. Containment I nteg ri ty (4) Inability to manually isolato containment with high containment activity.

f 93 ' Containment Pressure exceeds design basis ~ with loss of C.S.

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containmont conditions and t'

tliese recorumendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress. t. p-(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 S a s

+ L. \\. ~

\\'

p., ..? q

( :e.

s

1. e-i ;

TABLE 5.2-3, 4 ~ f. r Example Emergency' Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions g i .fyl <1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY r s s -s-(Sheet 4 or 5) v Oh t Palo Verde Nuclear Cenorating Station T ,a- '(' j Safety functions FAL ( Ala rm. Instrument Readino. etc.) 5. Indi rect Radioactivity ' (5) Erriuent monitors detect levels corres-Release Control ponding to 2 50 mR/hr at si te bounda ry; high readings on ARMS /PRMs due to 3 challenge / loss of RCS heat removal, RCS inventory and pressure control,. and/or containment integrity. Radiation Levels / Monitor radionuclide concentrations SQN-RU-141*t i Cond Vac pump 2 9.7 E-1 uci/cc SQN-RU-145 1 0u01 D..idg Vent Exhaust. 2 1.43 E-1 uci/cc SQN-RU-143 Plant Vent 2 1 E-2 oci/cc 4 SQN-RU-i48, 149 2 2.1 E+5 R/hr for 0.5 hr 5, Cont Area Moni tor OR 2 2.1 E+6 R/hr for 2 min SQN-Tsu-150,151 Primary Coolant ( To be determined)** SQN-RU-139, 140 Main Steam Line Errivent (To be determined)** SQN-RU-37, 38 ,f Power Access Purge 2 3.9 E-1 uci/cc g,; .r. 't t

3-Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and J"

these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no reicase is in progress.

• • To be provided later.

(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 1

i t. s[g i TABLE 5.2-3 .*J f. Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions i SITE AREA EMERCENCY ( (Sheet 5 or 5) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station \\ l l. Sa fe ty Functions [AL ( Ala rm. Ins t rument Readino. etc.) I 6. Maintenance of-Vital (6) Exceeding LCOs for Engineered Safety Features f Auxiliaries ( Aux Feed-resulting in a challenge / loss to SF items, 2, 3, I wa te r, Condensa te and/or 4 as cited above. T rans re r, Essential Chill Water, Essential - Cool ing Water, Essen-tial Spray Ponds, AC/DC power sources). l l-r l l .:l(c e. t > l t l l

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and dI these recommendations are made to orrsite officials even when no release is in progress.

L 'g)(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 i i I

s' h ~t,. ,i f TABLE 5.2-14 '~ .f } i Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions 7,- GENERAL EMERGENCY s (Sheet 1 or 9) 3 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station -f? SNety functions' EAL ( Ala rm. Instrument Readino. etc.) APS Actions State / County Actions Manual scram not successful ~ AN_D 1. . Reactivity Control (1) Emergency boration not successful o inform NRC, State and County o initiate immediate Q_R authorities of GENERAL EMER-public notirication of > j-HCS heat remova l degraded leases can be reasonable ex- . tus and provide peri-GENCY status / clause; any re-GENERAL EMERCENCY sta-J ';r pccted to exceed EAP/ PAG expo-odic,public~ updates. 1n sure it vels orrsite for more 2. 'RCS Heat Removal (2) Coro melt situations: than the immediate site o Augment-resources'by 7' activating State EOC (A) Three ba rriers cha llenged, o Recommend to the State t at and activate Op. Group if situation continues, consideration of appropriate Sta rr. likely core melt followed protective action based on ac-by containment falture. tual or projected data i s wa r-o Activate Stato Re-ranted per the appropriate l( sources ' Support Oper-03 EPIP 3 ations Agencies. (D) Two ba rriers cha llenged o Augment resources by activat-o Deploy County Re-with one barrier lost. RCS ing STSC, TSC, OSC, EOF, JENC, sponse Agencies.

• Pressure Boundary railure CillC and CEC

" '1 imminent clad damage: if o. Provide press brier-o Dispatch (onsite/orrsite) { ings. PZR level Inventory Con-Ficid Monitoring Teams with

• ro l compromised or RCS associated communications li ossure bounda ry com-equipment

' o Dispatch key emer- .gency personnel, in-en uised with indica-ciuding monitoring as of LOCA and in-teams with communi-( '., sing radiation ' levels o, Dispatch Field Monitoring Teams cations equipment. indicated on SQN-RU-148, with communications equipment M ? and/or SQN-RU-la,5 o Continue performing o Provide a dedicated individual dose calculations with ./ Loss or cladding results for plant status updates or regard to upgrading / Ij,[ /, in very high radiation levels orrsite authorities modifying protective at all locations where Rx actions. LOm coolant exists. leaks or o Make, senior technical and man-1>- i s processed. agement starr available for o Dispatch other emor-pariodic consultation with NRC gency personnel to Letdown monitor is orr : and State duty stations within scale high a 10 mi radius and AND o Provide meteorological cata alert others to Post accident sampling and dose estimates (for actual standby status, verifies the existence releases) to orrsito authori-or railed fuel, ties via a dedicated individual _Q. R

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and

[ these recommendations are made to ol'rsite orricials even when no rolcase is in progress. '(c490M) Revision 5 August, 1988s b

6 4 I ( TABLE 5.3-4 j Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions CENERAL EMERGENCY i4 (Sheet 2.00 9) Pa l o Ve rde Nuc l ea r Gene ra t i ng S ta t i on Safety functions EAL ( A l a rm. Instrument Readino. etc.) 'APS Actions State / County Actions 2. RCS ifcat Remova l

2) Core melt situations (continued):

C) One barrier challenged with o. Provide release and dose pro-o Provide orrsite moni-two ba rriers lost. Jections based upon available toring results to APS plant condition information and and Jointly' discuss foreseeable contingencies these.i

1) RCS Pressure Boundary and cladding o. Continuously assess,

failed with containment challenged: rield informa tion f rom - a APS and State / County. a) Cap activity in containment o Terminato (or reduction of) monitoring teams with OR emorgency classification by. regard to initiating / Gap activity in primary coolant briering authorities at the EOF. modifying public pro-fol lowed 'by wri t ten summa ry tective actions. AND within eight hours b) SQN-RU-148 or SQN-RU-149 high o Evaluate field and alarm lab ana lysis da ta - ror - Implementation / modi-AND c) SQN-RU-1 high a la rm fication or ingestion' pathway actions. BND o Cons ide r/ implement d) SQN-RU-143 high a la rm protective actions on based on current SQN-RU-144 high a la rm assessment. AND o Provide assistance. ' c) UIgh ARM readings near piping systems conta ining reci rcula-o Maintain CENERAL EMER. ting fluid associated with core CENCY status until cooling termina t ion or, reduc-tion or emergency class ?- ).:Q 4 ~4 a

• Protectivo action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and J

these recommendations are made to orrsito orricials even when no relcaso is in pro 9ross. 4 (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 4

.= n ' kI tl 3 ~Q( 4 7 TABLE 5.2-4

• E Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions l

,3 CENERAL EMERGENCY s (Sheet 3 or 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Safety functions - EAL ( Ala rm. Instrument Readino. etc.l 2. RCS Heat Removal (2).. Core melt situations (continued) bEQ (r) Post accident sampling verirlos the existence or railed fuel. for loss through SC: i SQN-RU-150, 151 high a la rm OB (2) RCS Pressure Bounda ry and containment failure: (a) Aboyc-normal rad ioac t ivo release f rom the plant 6EE (b) liigher radiation Icvels throughout the racility Loss through contain-mont: SQN-RU-37, 38 (Power access purge exhaust monitor) 000 scale high dED pi c. j /, r: SQN-RU-143, 144 (Plant vent monitor) high a la rm: > 2.03 E-1 uci/cc Loss through SC: 4

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and timse recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no rescaso is in progress.

(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 - i ---A

M l ' If: h h's .i 4 8 59 1 no, it ss s iu s vg e eu r RA dgno arp snn oi i ts ii dno 3 os cae tl s ne .n er o m i no t in c a A tn ne g oh n cw i d dn n ne o n av p o e e i t s t ns rr t lal a a o S pi C h R d e ni st c g n ig Ts n d n ytea. r or eCV ah e i u r Y i h hSI c s nr asr s o e r gh do ) C ) t t S ha a esd iv n/ er se s e s N 9 a 0 ,M ce e 4 L E r ) 4 llef* eb l hte t eim S ro at - A C r e d 1 l ar tl s a ,s d e C P bi e ua itaar C s: s 2 E R o n ) e auo r er ose dnee E Ssy er ( E e u f b yd tel aal r1 5 M 4 G c. n 9 m ri g re. rl e t Rl ao Cob rr s E t i 3

da E

l t r e t 1 gee l al n t rt prd> n dl e so edcit ng n h n a d L e L e a n - el r unuen ence geeay d nat nt B v A e e o U (it f u nb e micv ihd r n aia o A e R h T L E S l o c Rm as oo m nd/ hti ,a u c n ( r trp: rBisn tc ie N ( u i ili t l td d 'gni Na s u) o dno aicn fncnn e ned aa n [ N d Ql o V eaor tuua oiuau R itn dm td o G a Sa e e s l :LR srrii nb l hnl o doi n i -tSS nu tv o 1 p n t o pb y dp ee t d R n ssM oshan cy-oii r c r o ri n i sgre rEe iwdee a' lha ma a s mr A e t i exde teit fa h t aht s ct o V n t ieep arhne oi3t asrti s it y e a r l o cP eh l0m icl s e fwn eri c e lom u r gi i hct si cs n u t ehm c o e ro anak dStn sx2o dvgoe e ym i a r i birc nCioo ou r neirh n ern nt g P t s r w u I Rwct La>f Ilhft rai oa s eoat Q E rs e n t el s N) U ot luda m id I l rld E ) nt tn ^_ e honr 1 ) n iun ce 2 3 ee aoo am e m. m TFao ( ( ( rn rBc l r e uo m p oo a r l p S ) m l o D im Q A a A C ao N S A ivc ) e ( x ( ~~ tr E rc A C (- c L ) ee A 2 E t s ) ) oe [ G 3 4 rh ( ( ( Pt eus y s t e s l r ir n a P g o v e i o t t m n c e y n R r i u o t r t t n a n e v le t l e m vl n c no i r S I r a C a t t S R Sn n ) Co o M RC C 0 2 9 4 3 4 0 ( I j ,I ii'l ,1l!! ~

y ^Nr,.ip TABLE 5.2-4 Example Emergency Action Levels-(EALs) & Corresponding Actions CENERAL EMERCENCY i + (Sheet-5 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Safety Functions EAL ( Ala rm. I ns t rumen t Readina. etc.) 4 Containment Integrity (4) (A) (continued) (1) Cap activity in containment or prima ry coolant 6HD (2) SQN-RU-148 or SQN-RU-149 high a la rm OED (3) SQN-RU-1 high a la rm OED (4) SQN-RU-143 or SQN-RU-1*44 high alarm 000 ~ (5) liigh ARM readings near piping systems containing recirculating fluid associated with core cooling 6HE (6) Post accident sampling verifics the existence of failed fuel. For loss through SG: SQN-RU-150, 151 high ala rm .'It-639 Cap activity in S/C blowdown sampic

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and 3

these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress. (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984

c -w,% '[j y 4 %.? .f- ,'g', TABLE 5.2-4 di f*' - Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions ~, - CENERAL EMERCENCY s - (Sheet 6 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclea r Generating _ Station ' Safety Functions [AL f Ala rm. I ns t rtemen t Readino. etc.) 4. Containment integrity (4) (A) (6) (continued) ERD ~ Cap activity in steam 95 (B) (1) Failure of containment and RCS . Pressure Boundary with potential loss of cladding as indicated in Site Area Emergency SF item #3 and Alert SF item #2(d). bh9 (2) Above-no rma l rad ioact ive release from the plant 6HD (3) liigher rad levels throughout the facility Loss 'through conta inment: SQN-RU-37, 38 ( Power access purge exhaust monitor) off-scale high 6NQ ~ ..qj j. SQN-RU-143, 144 .kr (Plant vent monitor) high a la rm: > 2.03 E-1 uci/cc Loss through SC: SQN-RU-139, 140 high alarm Protective action recommendations are based on plant ano containment conditions and JI these recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress. (0490M) Revision 5 r August, 1984

J ' Yllt % TABLE 5.2-4 f ~ Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Cor asponding Actions CENERAL EMERCENCY s (Sheet 7 of 9) I Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station i Safety Functions' FAL ( A l a rm. Ins t rument Readino. etc.) 4. Containment integrity (4) (continued) 06 (C) Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of RCS Pressure Boundary as indicated by: (1) Severely damaged fuel Ofi9 (2) (a) lodino ratio indicates gap activity in primary coolant - 9B (b) CET temperature indicates supe rhea t in RCS 93 (c) Outlet plenum empty as indicated by RVLMS a indicating 0% AND (3) Loss of ECCS Af{Q (4) (a) Status indicates all . Er/ containment ponctrations not valved orr or closed i i

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and -

JP tliese recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no rolcase is in progress. (Ois90M) Rovision 5 August, 1984-1 Am

/ Q i;. l ; TABLE 5.2-4 ' ~, Example Emergency. Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding Actions. _CENERAL EMERCENCY .+ (Sheet 8 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Cencrating Station Safety Functions EAL ( Ala rm. Inst rument Read ino. etc. ) 4. Containment Integrity (4) (C) (continued) QB

r (b) Steam line break between containment and MSIV 98

-( c ) Steam line break downstream or MSIV AN.Q Open-closed indicator shows MSiv malfunction 98 (d) Shif t Supervisor's opinion 5. Indi rect Radioactivity (S) Errluent monitors detect levels corros-Rclease Control ponding to 2 1 rem /hr at si te bounda ry; high ARM /PRM due to challenge / loss of RCS heat removal, RCS inventory and pressure control, and/or containment i nteg ri ty. Radia tion Levels / Monitor radionuclide concent rations SQN-RU-141 Cond Vac pump 2 1.93 E+1 uci/cc 9.5 y SQN-RU-145 Fuel Bldg Vent Exhaust 2 2.86 uci/cc ] SQN-RU-143 Plant Vent 2 2.03 E-1 uci/cc

• Protectivo action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and f~

these recommendations are made to orrt.ite orricials eve:i when no release is in progress. (0490M) =, Ruvision 5 ' August, 1984-

' N. ,.a M g.,- TABLE 5.2-4 Example Emergency Action Levels (EAls) N Corresponding Actions CENERAL EMERGENCY (Sheet 9 of 9) Palo Verde Nuclear Cencrating Station Safety Functions FAL ( Ala rm. Instrument Readino. etc. ) 5. Indirect Radioactivity (5) (continued) Release Control Radiation Levels / Monitor radionuclide concent rations Cont Area Moni tor ~ 2 6.75 E+6 R/hr. ror 0.5 hr OR' SQN-RU-148, 149 2 6.75 E+7 R/hr for 2 min SON-RU-155,151 Primary Coolant (To be determined)** SQN-RU-139, 140 Main Steam Line Errluent (To be determined)** SQN-RU-37, 38 , Power Access Purge 2 7.8 uci/cc 6. Maintenance or Vital (6) Exceeding LCOs for Engineered Sarcty Features Auxiliaries ( Aux Feed-resulting in a challenge / loss to SF. items, 2, 3, water, Condensate and/or 4 as cited above. T ransfer, Essent ia l Chill Water, Essential Cooling Water, Essen-tial Spray Ponds, AC/DC power sources). A ljfl .. f-

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and I

these recommendations are made-to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

• • To be provided la te r.

(0490M) _ Revision 5 August, 19881 .S e

s l 5.3-1 S #UE j ExImple Emergincy Actirn Lavais (EALS) O Corro:pinding Actions > l y' q .~ (Sheet 1 or 10)' -l Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station '~ l-Recovery Procedure implemented Classification Classification Criteria Indication or Barrier Challence/Fa llure - Any event oriented Cene ra l Eme rgency o All 3 barriers either. lost RCS Recove ry Ope ra t i ng or'cnallenged (1) RVLMS < 50% (voiding upper plenum) i Procedure or Func-(2) RCS pressure > 2750 psia tional Recove ry Site Area Emergency o 2 of 3 barriers either lost -(3) RCS pressure controlling on PZR safeties Procedu re or challenged (4) Uncontrolled loss of RCS, inventory > 50 gpm Alert o 1 or 3 barriers either lost CONTAINMENT or challenged ' (1) CI AS required but not completed (2) H2 concentration > 3.5% by volume Unusual Event ' o No barriers lost or. challenged -(3) Containment pressure > 50 psig .(4) Physical breach of containment CLAD .(1).ATWS - (2) Excessive RCS radioactivity (> 300 uCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131) (3) CET.) 700 degrees F VITAL. AUXILIARIES / RADIATION RELEASE (1) Loss of orrsite and onsite AC power (2) Loss or orrsite and onsite AC powcr for longer than 15 minutes .(3) Failure or sarety systems (both trains) to actuate when required (4) > 10 gpm primary /seconda ry leakage concurrent with LOP or, > 10 gpm prima ry/seconda ry leakage concurrent with loss of secondary coolant outside con-tainment (5) violation or Tech Spec LCO or reliance on Tech Spec Section 3.0.3 ror any of the rollowing essential systems: ECCS, CNTMT Spray, Ultimate Heat ' Sink, SP, CST /RMWT, RWT, EC, ESS. CR HVAC, ADV, Aux .f Feedwater

t. -

Ope ra b i l i ty ( i.e., e lect rica l powe r,' ins t ru-Y' mentation, controls and other auxilia ry equip-ment)-shall be maintained on the above systems. l l l

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made to orrsite t'

I orricials even when no release is in progress. (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 i

5.3-1 ,g" ~ ' Exuple Emergincy Acticn Levnts (EALs) Or Carrasponding ccticns (Shast 2 or 10) Non RX Trip Events: Classification is based on the level or barrier / safety function degradation; however, classification for radio-activity release is based on a dose rate at the Site Doundary - i.e., a total by RP in accordance with their alarm setpoint procedure for Tech Spec limits.** site release rate for effluent monitors is: determined, Examples Conditions per Classification Site Area Indication of Barrier initiatino Event Mi[ Alert Emeroency Cene ra l Classification Criteria

1) Inc rea se in

1) RCS sample 1) RCS sam-1) Rad Protec-1) Rad protec-CENERAL 3 of 3 barriers RCS.

Cha l lence/ Fa i l u re Radiation levels activity re-pie activi-tion confirms tion confirms EMERGENCY Lost or challenged (1) RVLMS ~ < 50% (voiding or radioactive quires shut- > 300 uCi/ tha t effluent that effluent upper plenum) effluent release down per Tech gm doso Tech Spec Tech Spec limit SITE AREA 2 of 3 barriers (2) RCS pressure > 2750 psia rate or situa-Spec Sec equivalent limit has .-has been EMERGENCY Lost or.cha!Ienged (3) RCS pressure controlling tion in which 3.4.7 l-131 been exceeded exceeded contamination on PZR sarcties corres-corresponding ALERT 1 of 3 barriers (4) Uncontrolled loss of RCS will be t rans-

2) Rad Pro-

2) facility ponding to >

to > 1 rem /h r Lost or challenged inventory > 50 gpm ported from the tection con-a rea ra d i a-50 mR/h r WB a t WB, 5 rem /hr site firms that Lion read-site bounda ry thyroid at the UNUSUAL No barriers lost CONTAINMENT cffluent 1cch ings in-site boundary EVENT or challenged (1) CI AS required but not ' Spec limits crease X

2) Steam line completed have been ex-1000 b rea k w i th >

(2) 112 concentration > 3.5% ceeded (Sec. 50 gpm primary / by volume 3/4.11) cor-

3. Rad Pro-seconda ry lea k-(3) Containment pressure >

responding tection age and indi-50 psig to < 1 mR/hr confirms cation or - (4) Physical breah of con-WB a t the that er-railed fuel tainment site boundary fluent Tech Spec limit

3. Major dam-CLAD

3. Rad moni-has been age to spent (1) ATWS toring sys-exceeded fuel (2) Excessive RCS radio-tem /g rab sam-ten rold l

plc indicates correspon-activity (> 300 uCi/gm t > 0.1% ruel ding to dose equivalent 1-131) raiture with-ImR/hr WB (3) CET > 700 degrees F in 30 minutes at site bounda ry. VITAL AUXILIARIES / RADIATION 4. T ra n spo r-REtrASE g tation or a

4. SCTL >

' (1) Loss or orrsite and on-contaminated 50 gpm with s i te AC powe r ~ (2) Loss or orrsite and on-person to an loss or off-orrsite med-site power site AC power ror longer ical racility than 15 min.

5. Rad mon -

(3) Failure of sarcty system a itoring sys-(both trains) to actuatej ' tem /g rab sam-when requi red. N pie indicates (4) > 10 gpm primary /secon. ' > 1% railed da ry leakago concurrent with loss or seconda ry ruel within 30 min or % coolant outside contain-mont. 7 total l'Uc t ra i lu re 1

6. Fuel dam-age accident wi th radio-i activity re-lease

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and those recommendations are made to orrsite g

orricials even when no release is in progress.

• • See Table of Alarm Setpoints on Pages 6, 7 and 8.

(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 4

5.3-1 Ex%ple EsergIncy Actico LcvsIs (EALs) ac Carr'a p;nding cetign3 [ - e (Sheet 3 of 10) - *~ Non RX Trip Events: Classification is based on the level of barricr/ safety function degradation; however, classification for radioactivity release is based on a dose rate at the Si te Bounda ry - i.e., a total site release rate for effluent monitors is determined by RP in accordance with their alarm sei. point proceduro for Tech Spec limits fxarnples Conditions ner Classification Site Area Indication of Barrier Initfatino Event M Alert Eme roency Cene ra l Classi ficat ion Criteria ' Cha t lence/Fa i f ure

2) Noncompliance 1) Tech Spec 1) RCS leak 1) > 50 gpm

1) None

5. Violation of Tech Spec.

with a Technical LCO noncom-rate > 50 primary /secon-LCO or reliance on Tech Specification formance that gpm dary leak rate spec Section 3.0.3 for.' such that the requires Rx .with steam any of the following' requirement of shutdown or

2) Rad mon-line break and essential systems:

the LCO and/or prevents re-itoring indication of ECCS, CNIMT Spray, associated ac-turn to oper-system grab failed fuel Ultimate Heat Sink, tion require-ation pending sample in-SP, CST /RMWT, RWT,. ments a re not engineering dicates > 1% EC. ESS. CR HVAC, met within the evaluation failed fuel. ADV, Aux. feedwa te r specified time within 30 ' Operab i l i ty ( i.e., e lec-intervals

2) RCS sample minute of

. trica l power instrumenta-activi ty re-total fuel tion, ' control s and other qui res shut-failuro auxil ia ry equipment) down per Tech shall be maintained on Spec Section the above systems 3. 24. 7

3. RP con-firms that cffluent Tech 1

Spec limits has been ex- ~ ceeded 9 I .di.~ ts 4 + 4 i _ 4 e g.rotective action recommencla tions a re based on plant and contalement conditions. and those recommendations-a ro made to offsite officials even when no rescase is in progress. (0890M) 4 Revision 5 August, i9884 s

M,., /,. 5.3-1 g '~ Exrepia EmergIncy Acticn LSvals (Eats) & Carrasp nding cction3 (Shest 4 or 10) l Non RX Trip Events: Classification is based on the level or barricr/sarcty function degradation; however, classification for radio - Kctivity release is based on a dose rate at the Si te Bounda ry - i.e., a total sito release rate for erfluent monitors is determined, by RP in accordance with their alarm setpoint procedure for Tech Spec limits, fxamples Conditions per Classification Si te Area Indication of Barrier initiation Event NUX Alert Eme rnency Gene al Classification Criteria - Cha l lenne/Fa i lure

3. Deg raded ra - 1) Deg ra ded

1) Loss of 1) Loss or

1) Immin9nt CENERAL 3 of 3 barriers RCS cility control. CR indicator / most or all most or all loss or phy-EMERCENCY Lost or challenged (1) RVLMS < 50% (voiding indicators, and/ alarms or annunciator annunciators sical control upper plenum) or a larms process pa ra-and plant

'of the plant SITE AREA 2 or 3 barriers (2) RCS pressure > 2750 psia meter indi-

2) Evacua-t ra n s ien t ini- (eg: i nt rude rs EMERCENCY Lost or challenged (3) RCS pressure controlling cations such tion of CR tlated or in within vital on PZR safeties that plant required p rog re s s a rea s )

ALERT I or 3 barriers (4) Uncontrolled loss of RCS-shutdown is or antici-Lost or cha llenged inventory > SO gpm required pated

2) Complete loss or any UNUSUAL No barriers lost CONTAINMENT

3. Complete furoion EVENT or challenged

'(1) CI AS required but not loss of any neo. d for completed function plant hot (2) 112 concentration > 3.5% needed for shutdown by volume plant cold (3) Containment pressure > shutdown

3. Evacuation 50 psig of CR with (4) Physical breah or con-fa i l u re to tainment establish lo-cal control of CLAD shutdown sys-(1) ATWS

~ tem within 15 (2) Excessive RCS radio-minutes activity (> 300 uCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131) 4. Potential (3) CET > 7000 F loss or phy-sical control VITAL AUXILIARIES / RADIATION or the plant RELEAS{ (1) Loss or orrsite and on-4. ri re and/or

1) Fire with-1) Fire

1) Fi re com-

1) Imminent site AC power Security com-in the unit potentially promising the loss of physi-(2) Loss or orrsite and on-p romi se la s t i ng mo re errecting ope ra b i l i ty cal control or site AC power for longer than 10 min safety sys-or sarcty sys-the plant (cg:

'than 15 min. tems .tcms intruders with-(3) Failure or safety systemj.

2) Secu ri ty in vital areas)

(both trains) to actuateim th rea t (eg:

2) Ongoing 2) Potential when required bomb threat secu ri ty loss or phy - 2) Any major (4) > 10 gpm prima ry/secon-attempted comp rom i se sical control internal or ex-da ry leakage concurrent entry, at-of the plant tornal events with LOP or, tempted sabo-3. Evacua-which could

> 10 gpm prima ry/secon-tage) tion or CR cause massive da ry leakage concurrent anticipated damage to plant with loss of seconda ry

3. Civil dis-or required systems and coolant outside contain-turbance potentially ment lead :o a re-lease or radio-activity

• Prutective action recommendations are based on plant and containment conditions and those recommendations are made to orrsite orricials even when no release is in progress.

(0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 ~S

5.3-1 Y ^~ Exsmpla Emergency Action Lavals (EALs) O Corre:ponding cations I -e.- (Sh2%t 5 cf 10) Non RX Trip Events: Classification is based on the level or barrier /sarety function degradation; however, classification for ra;dio-Ectivity release is based on a dose rate at the Site Bounda ry - i.e.. a total site release rate for erfluent monitors is determined : by RP in accordance with their alarm setpoint procedure for Tech Spec limits. 4-Examples Conditions per Classification Site Area Indication 'or Ba rrier Initiatino Event NU{ Alert Eme roency Gene ra l Classification Criteria Cha l lenac/ Fa i l ure__

4. Security

4. Plant con-(5) Violation or Tech Spec.

eme rgency ditions exist LCO. or reliance on Tech that warrant Spec Section 3.0.3 'for activation of any of the following Emergency Re-essential. systems: sponse Facil-ECCS, CNTMT Spray, i ties and mon-Ul timate Hea t Sinek. i toring. teams SP, CST /RMWT, RWT, EC, or a precau-ESS. CR HVAC. ADV, Aus tiona ry noti-Feedwater rication of the Ope ra b i l i ty ( i.e.', e l ec-public near the trical power instrumeni-site tation,' controls and - other auxiliary equip-

5. Na tu ra l d i s-

1) Natural

1) Severe nat-

1) Severe 1) Any major in-ment) shall be main-ta s ter/ phys ica l phenomenon ura l phenomena na tu ra l ternal or exter-tained.on the above hazard to fac-beyond usual experienced or phenomena nal events which

systems, ility level experi-projected on-expe ri-could cause mas-ence or pro-site with unit enced or sive damage to jected (eg:

in Modes 5-6 projected, plant systems earthquake, (eg: carthquake onsite P and potentially I flood, torna-greater than with Unit lead to a release do) onsite OBE levels in Mode or radioactivity tornado st ri-1-4 (eg: king facility) ea rthqua ke

2) Other haz-g rea te r a rds experi-2) Other hazard than de-enced or pro-experienced or sign level, jected (eg:

p roj ec ted leg: flood or a i rc ra f t a i rc ra f t c ra sh railure or c ra sh. train racility, ex-p rotect ion de ra i lmen t, plosion damage.or vital explosion, to facility ar-equipment) toxic or recting plant flammable gas operation, tox-2) Other a release near ic gas restric-haza rds ?h: e or on site) ting entry to experienced plant a rea( s)- or projected onsitewithlI !~ Unit Modes 1-4 (eg: impact / fire o r a i rc ra f t i arrecting vital s t ruc-tures, riam-mable / toxic 9as permeating vital a rea s, severe damage to save shut-

• Protective action recommendations are based on plant

( down equipment and containment conditions and these recommendations via missle/ are mado to orrsite orricials even when no release is i cxplosion in progress. 4 (0490M) Revision 5 August,-1984 +

r. .C

• • 4 5,,

5.3-1 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding actions ( (Sheet 6 or 10) Palo. Verde Nuclear Generating Station Plant Vent Monitor Emoroency Alarm Setooints Eme rgency Unusual Site Area Emergency Site Area Emergency Genera l Action Level Even L Alert 30 Min. O EAL 2 Min. @ EAL Eme roency Mon i to r/Channe l RU-143/1 RU-144/1 RU-14 fs/1 RU-144/2 RU-144/2 High Alarm Alert Ala rm High Alarm Alert Ala rm High Ala rm Xc-133 nci equiv. cc 5.20 E-3 4.55 E-2 4.55 E+0 4.55 E+1 , 9.1 E+1 (Monitor) Wash 1400 MFG nci 3.2 E-3 3.45 E-3 3.45 E-1 3.45 Ef0 6.9 E+0 cc (FSAR mix) (Monitor) Monitor ' Count Rate 1.57 Ef5 3.47 E+2 3.47 E+4 419 826 (CPM-DhC) Xc-133 equiv uCi 1.69 E-6 1.49 E-5 1.49 E-3 1.49 E-2 2.98 E-2 cc (Site Bounda ry) Wash 1400 MFC ECi 1.05 E-6 1.13 E-6 1.13 E-4 1.13 E-3 2.26 E-3 cc (FSAR mix) (Site Boundary) Whole Body Camma

<[.

Dose Rate 0.057 0.5 50 500 1000 13 (or/h r) ( Si te. Bounda ry) -r-Assumptions: (1) Process System Maximum Design Flow, 107,000 SCFM (2) X/Q = 6.49 E-6 sec/m3 (3) MFG = Mixed Fission Cases (4) t = 20 min, af ter shutdown (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984

l 'O G sk,, r, l -5.3-1 2 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding actions lI r (Sheet 7 of 10) 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station l Condensor Evacuation Monitor Emergency Ala rm Setoolnts ' l Eme rgency Unusual Site Area Emergency Site Area Emergency Genera l ~ Action level Event Alert 30 Min. O FAL 2 Min. @ EAL Eme roency.. Moni to r/ RU-141 RU-142 RU-142 RU-142 RU-142 Channel High Ala rm - Alert Ala rm Channel 1 Channel 2 . Channel 2 Chan ne/ / liigh Alarm Alert Alarm liigh Ala rm Xe-133 uC1 squiv. cc 1.91 E-1 1,71 E+0 1.71'E+2 1,71 E+3. 3.43 E+3 (Monitor) Wash 1400 MFG EC.i 1.2 E-1 1.3 E-1 1.3 E+1 1.3 E+2 ~'2'.6 E+2 cc (FSAR mix) (Monitor) Monitor 5.9 E+6 1.3 E+4 1.3 E+6 1.56 E+4 3.11 E+4 Count Rate or or (CPM-BAC) Fuii Scale fuli Scale Xc-133 equiv IL i 1.69 E-6 1.49 E-5 1.49 E-3 1.49 E-2 2.98 E-2' C cc (Site Boundary) Wash 1400 MFC pc_i 1.05 E-6 1.13 E-6 1.13 E-4 1.13 E-3 '2.26 E-3 cc (Site Bounda ry) Whole Body Camma Dose Rate 0.057 0.5 50 500 1000 '1 ( er/h r) (Site Boundary) Assumptions: (1) Process System Maximum Design Flow, 2,B40 CFM v (2) X/Q = 6.49 E-6 sec/m3 4.~ (3) MFC = Mixed Fission Cas (4) t = 20 min, af ter shutdown (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 i_

• • ; gr. [ g
• S.

5.3-1 Example Emergency Action Levels (EALs) & Corresponding actions ,I k' (Sheet 8 of 10) . Palo Verde Nuclea r Generating Station '4 Fuel Handlino Buildina Emeroency Alarm Setpoints Eme rgency Unusual Site Area Emergency Si te Area Emergency Gene ra l Action tevel Event Alert 30 Min. O EAL 2 Min. @ EAL Emeroency Moni to r/ RU-145/1 RU-146/1 RU-146/1 RU-146/2 RU-146/2 Channel High Alarm Alert Alarm High Ala rm Alert Ala rm High Ala rm Xc-133 pCl equiv. cc 1,67 E-2 1.47 E-1 '1.47 E+1 1.47 E+2 2.95 E+2 (Monitor) Wash 1400 mfg. nci

1. Ora E-2 1.12 E-1 1.12 E+0 1.12 E+1 2.24 E+1 cc (FSAR mix)

(Monitor) Monitor 5.1 E+5 1.13 E+3 1.13 E+5 1340 2680 Count Rate or or (CPM-BkG) Fuli Seale Ful1-Scale Xc-133 equiv UCl 1.69 E 1.49 E-5 1.49 E-3 1.49 E-2 2.98 E-2 cc (Site Boundary) Wash 1400 mfg yCi 1.05 E-6 1.13 E-6 1.13,E-4 1.13 E-3 2.26 E-3 cc (FSAR mix) (Site Bounda ry) Whole Body Camma ,yj Dose Rate 0.057 0.5 50 500 1000 i-(or/h r) (Site Boundary) ~ Assumptions: (1) Process System Maximum Design Flow, 33,000$CIH 12) X/Q = 6.49 E-6 sec/m3 (3) MFG = Mixed fission Cases (1 ) t = 20 min. arter shutdown 4 (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984

l g,3  : n; gg 't LICENSEE ACTIONS NOTE ' O.' \\ a Actions are for Information only, to be carried out per applicable EPIP .[ (Sheet 9 or.10) l# Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emeroency Gene ra l Eme raency. o Info rm NRC, State & County o inform NRC, State & County o inform NRC, State & County o Inform NRC, State & County-authorities or nature of authorities or Alert status / authorities of Site Area Emer-authori ties of Cencra l Emergen-unusual conditions; no cause; any released a re ex-gency status /cause; any re-cy status /cause; any releases release or radioactive pected to be lirited to small leases are not expected to can be reasonable expected to - material requiring orrsite fractions of EPA / PAG cxposure exceed EPA / PAC exposure levels exceed EPA / PAC exposure Icvols response or monitoring is levels at the site bounda ry exposure levels beyond the orrsite f.or more than the expected unless further unless further degradation or bounda ry unless further degra- . i mmed ia te s i te a rea degradation or safety sarcty systems occur dation of saroty systems occur ~ systems occur o Recommend to the State that o Recommend to the State that o Recommend to the State that O Based on the situation, the Public be appraised of the consideration or appropriate consideration of appropriate recommend that no protective situation and stay tuned to protective actions based on protective actions based on action is necessa ry or to EBS/KTAR radio station actual or projected data is actual projected data is war-l standby for update. Sl warranted per the appropriate A ranted per the appropriate o Augment resources by activa-l EPIP I EPIP o Terminate with verbal summa ry ting STSC, TSC, OSC, EOF, f to orrsite authorities rol-JENC, Cill C, and CEC o(Dispatch (onsite/orrsite) o Augment resources by activating lowed by written report with-Tield Monitoring Teams with STSC, TSC, OSC, EOF, JENC, CillC in 24 hours Sp Dispatch (onsite/orrsite Field Q associated communications and CEC Monitoring Teams with associ-equipment f OR (I ated communications equipment ol Dispatch (onsite/orrsite) r o Escalate to a higher class-ol Provide a dedicated individ-Field Monitoring Teams with irication o-Provide meteorologica l assess-ual for plant sta tus updates. Jj associated communications ments to orrsite authorities to orrsite authorities equipment and ir releases are occurring, dose estimates for actual re-o Provide meteorological data o Provide a dedicated individual leases and dose estimates (for actual for plant status updates of release) to orrsite author-orrsite authorities o Te rmina te by ve rba l summa ry ities to orrsite authorities fol-o Make senior technical and man-loved by written summary with-o Provide release and dose pro-agement staff available for in 8 hours joctions based on available periodic consultation with NRC OR plant condition information and State o Escalate-to a higher class-and foreseeablo contingencies irication o Provide meteorological data and.d J o Terminate (or reduction of) dose estimates (for actual re. emergency class verbally at leases) to offsite authorities EOF followed by written sues-via a dedicated individual mary within eight hours OR o Provide release and dose pro-o Escalate to CENERAL EMERCENCY jections based upon availabic foreseeable contingencies o Terminate (or reduction of) emergency classification by briefing authorities at the EOF followed by written summa ry within eight hours. (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1984 6

5.3-1 M i g. STATE / COUNTY ACTIONS O (Sheet /s or 10) ]/ e, Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emer7ency Cene ra l Eme rgency o ADES Duty Ortscer starr State o Activate County EOC o County occ activated o initiate.immediate public no-4 EOC 6 tirication of CENERAL EMERGENCY o Activate State EOC and TOC o County response agencies acti-status and provide periodic o ARRA Duty Officer acqttires vated public updates follow-up information from o Partially activate REAT for-STSC ward o Augment resources by activa-o Augment resources by activating, ting State EOC State EOC and activate Op. O County EOC on standby and o Provide confirmatory orrsite Group Starr a lert ran-out radiation monitoring and cal-o State and Operations Agency on culate dose projections ir standby o Activate State Resources Sup-o Provide off site assistance actual releases substantially port Operations Agencies ir required (fire, security, exceed Technical Specification o Initiate immediate public no-medical, etc.) limits tirication or SITE AREA EMER-o Deploy County Response Agencies CENCY status; provide periodic o Orrsite notification per o Provide assistance, if re-public updates o Provide press bric."Ings notification procedures quested ( fi re, security, medical, etc.) o Resource Agencies activated o Dispatch key emergeacy person-e Escalate to a higher class-net, including monitoring teams irication o implement-protective actions o Dispatch key emergency person-with communications equipment if needed nel, including monitoring teams with communications equipment o Continue performing dose calcu-o Maintain ALERT status until lations wi th rega rd to upgra-verbal termination o Alert other personnel to ding / modifying protective OR standby status (eg, those actions o Escalate to a higher class-needed for traffic control or irication evacuation) and dispatch per-o Dispatch other emergency per-sonncI to near-site duty sta-sonnel to duty stations within ~ tions a 10 mi radius and alert others to standby status t o Perform dose calculations o Provide orrsite monitoring re-based on current release rotes suit to APS and Jointly discuss and implement necessa ry pro-these Lective DCtions o Continuously assess field in-o Pravide orrsite monitoring formation from APS and State / results to APS and Jointly County monitoring teams with discuss them regard to initiating / modifying public protective actions o Continuously assess field information from APS & State / o Evaluate field and lab analysis. County monitoring teams with for implementation /modificationd.. s regard to initiating / modifying or ingestion pathway actions

• lr public protective action l

o Consider / implement protective o Provide assistance requested actions based on current assessment o Evaluate data and initiate a ingestion pathway protective o Provide assistance protection actions as app rop ria te o Maintain CENERAL EMERCENCY l status until termination or o Provide press briefings reduction or emergency class o Maintain SITE AREA EMERGENCY status until termination or reduction or emergency class OR o Escalate to CENERAL EMERGENCY (0490M) Revision 5 August, 1934 6 ,}}