Text

PRA of Offsite Releases Initiated by Toxic Chemical Release, Final Rept
	ML20094G157
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/30/1984
From:	Calabrese R, Fenstermacher, Hubbard F; PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20094G143	List: ML20094G142; ML20094G157;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PLG-0370, PLG-370, NUDOCS 8408130225
	Download: ML20094G157 (118)
	v • d • e

'

PLG-0370 for General Public Utilities Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Offsite Releases Initiated by a Toxic Chemical Release FINAL REPORT l

by T. Edward Fenstermacher-Frank R. Hubbard Richard Y. Calabrese Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.

120018th Street, N.W., Suite 612 Washington, D.C.

20036 July 30, 1984 O!hhe9 D

PDR

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND SCOPE OF STUDY l-1 lL 2.0-FREQUENCY OF A MAJOR RELEASE 2-1 2.1 Total Rate of Accidents Per Train-Mile ( A )

2-2 t

2.2 Number of Cars of Hazardous Material Per Train (nHM) 2-3 2.3 Fraction of Cars Which Release' Hazardous Materials per Accident (nHMR) 2-3 2.4 Fraction of Tank Car Releases Which are Major (fRHM-M) 2-3 2.5 Summary 2-4 3.0 DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDENCE OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STANDARDS, GIVEN A MAJOR RELEASE, FOR EACH CHEMICAL 3-1 3.1 Evaporation and Dispersion Models 3-1 3.1.1 Evaporation Models 3-2 3.1.1.1 Surface Area of Liquid Spill 3-2 3.1.1.2 Vaporization of Compressed Gases and Low Boiling Point Liquids (Vaporization Class I) 3-3 3.1.1.3 Evaporation of Pure Chemicals which are Liquids at Ambient Conditions (Vaporization Class II) 3-5 3.l~.1.4 Evaporation of Liquid Mixtures (Vaporization Class III) 3-6 3.1.1.4.1 Evaporation of Hydrocarbon Mixtures.

(Vaporization Class III-A) 3-7 3.1.1.4.2 Evaporation of Aqueous Solutions (Yaporization

. Class III-B) 3-8 3.1.1.4.3 Evaporation of-Solutions with Solvents Other Than Water (Vaporation Class III-C) 3-9 3.1.2 Dispersion Models 3-9 3.1.2.1 Instantaneous Puff Model 3-10 3.1.2.2 Continuous Plume Model 3-11 3.1. 2. 3 Plume Rise 3-13 3.1.2.3.1 Vapors Much Lighter Than Air 3-13 3.1.2.3.2 Non-Buoyant Vapors 3-14 3.1.2.4 Plume Meandering 3-15 3.1. 2. 5 Plume-Building Wake Interactions 3-15

-3.1.2.6 Other Considerations 3-17 3.1.3 Modeling of Toxic Gas Concentrations in the Control Room Isolation Zone 3-18 11

P4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.2 Methodology Employed to Find the Conditional Probability of Exceedence 3-24 3.3 Data 3-27 3.4 Results 3-27 4.0-CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF A 10CFR100 RELEASE GIVEN A CONTROL ROOM CONCENTRATION IN EXCESS OF T0XIC LIMITS 4-1 4.1 Total Fraction of the Time When Operator Action is Required to Mitigate Toxic Chemical Release Initiated Scenarios 4-2 4.2 Conditional Probability that the Manual Actions Required to be Made-Can Be (fg) 4-17 4.3 Fraction of Uncovered Cores Which Lead to a 10CFR100 Offsite Dose Rate (fEF) 4-17 5.0 TOTAL RESULTS 5-1

6.0 REFERENCES

6-1 Appendix A Tank Car Accident Frequency (per car-mile)

A-1 4

iii b

LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page 1.1 Chemicals Analyzed in This Report And Sources of Release 1-3 3.1 Properties of Chemicals Considered 3-28

. 3. 2 Vapor Pressures of Pure Substance 3-29 3.3 Components of Coal Tar-Light Oil 3-30 3.4 Partial Pressures of Formaldehyde and Water Over Aqueous Solutions of Formaldehyde 3-31 JOINT FREQUENCY TABLES 3.5

- Number of occurrences of Wind Speed and Direction For Each Stability Class - 1982 Data Below 5'F 3-32 3.6 1982 Data from 5 to 10*F 3-36 3.7 1982 Data from 15 to 25*F 3-40 3.8 1982 Data from 25 to 35*F 3-44 3.9 1982 Data from 35 to 45'F 3-48 3.10 1982 Data from 45 to 55'F 3-52 3.11 1982 Data from 55 to 65*F 3-56 3.12

-1982 Data from 65 to 75'F 3-60

'3.13 1982 Data from 75 to 85'F 3-64 l

3.14 1982 Data from 85 to 95*F 3-68 i

'3.15 July 1976 - June 1977 All Temperatures 3-72 3.16 Fraction of Hour in Each Temperature Range in 1982 Meteorological Data 3-76 3.17 Control Room Flow and Volume Data 3-77 3.18 Conditiohal Probability of Exceedence of Toxic Limits in Control Room, Given a Major Release, Integrated Over Track Within Five Miles 'of TMI-l 3-78 4-1 Number. of Shipments per Year of the Important Hazardous Chemicals (nt) 4-1 4-2 Event Tree Top Events 4-8 g

n 5-1 Table Showing Estimates of the Frequency of l

Scenarios Initiated by a Toxic Chemical Release Which Result in a Radiation Release from TMI Unit 1 in Excess of the Dose Limits of 10CFR100 5-3

' A-1 Threshold Accident Value A-4 p

t 4

iv 7623G072484 l

7

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND SCOPE OF STUDY Pursuant to Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan, an assessmant has been made of the likelihood of core damage and a resulting release of radiation in excess of the limits of 10CFR100 initiated by a toxic

. chemical release. The offsite toxic chemical releases considered in this report consist of either the rupture of a fixed ammonium hydroxide storage tank or the rupture of one tank car on either of two rail lines adjacent to the plant, releasing the entire contents of the car instantaneously. Evaporation and meteorological models were developed and used to evaluate the propagation of the postulated releases from the release point to the TMI-l control room. A list of the chemicals considered in this report is given in Table 1.1.

A probabilistic model was made of the plant consequences of the release reaching the control

)

room. The estimated frequency (per year) of all scenarios with l

consequences exceeding the 10CFR100 offsite dose rate initiated by an offsite hazardous chemical' release can be calculated in the following way:

M N

)

fI A>10CFR100 "

A R-T ji M*#CF (1-1 )

I o

T j

j where T

frequency per year of a major offsite hazardous A

=

i chemical releases of chemical i AT

nj

=

AT frequency of major releases per tank-car-mile

=

number of tank cars shipped per year on either Shocks nj

=

or Roy of chemical i integral over the track length of the conditional f

=

i R-T-i probability of exceeding the toxic limit given a major release of chemical i on either Shocks or Roy total fraction of the time when operator action is f

=

Oj required to mitigate the scenario caused by tank car rupture e

1-1 760lG072584

.~

... -... ~

fM fraction of all such operator actions which are

=

unsuccessful and lead to core uncovery fCF fraction of uncovered cores which lead to a 10CFR100

=

offsite dose rate M

number of chemical-rail line combinations considered

=

N number of mitigating actions possibly required

=

The variables in equation (1-1) are each calculated or discussed in this report as follows AT in Section 2 nj is from Reference 19 f

in Section 3 R-T 9

fg, f,, and fCF in Section 4 The last three of these variables will be calculated in detail in the TMI-1 PRA (TPRA) which is currently in process. The estimates used here are based on the TPRA Phase I results (Ref. 24] and on the MPRA [Ref. 25]

resul ts.

Certain physical phenomena which could be inferred to occur were not included in the model due to the unavailability of the data required to properly evaluate them. The primary example of this is the assumption that a hydrofluoric acid release would simply evaporate, rather than reacting chemically with the surface, whea in fact it is highly reactive. The reason for this line of approach is that there is insufficient data on the composition of the roadbed, the reactions to be expected, the reaction rates, and a variety of other subjects to produce a valid model. Thus, the simplifying assumption was made that no reaction occurs. Since such a reaction would decrease the amount of hydrogen fluoride available for release, it is conservative.

1-2 7601G072584 l

TABLE 1.1 CHEMICALS ANALYZED IN THIS REPORT AND SOURCES OF RELEASE Chemical Sources

Acetic Acid, Glacial Roy, Shocks Acetic Anhydride Roy, Shocks Acrylonitrile Shocks Ammonia, Anhydrous Roy, Shocks Ammonia, 29.4 w/% Aqueous Manly-Regan Bromine Shocks Chlorine Shocks Chromic Fluoride, 20 wt % in HF Roy Coal Tar, Light Oil Shocks Ethyl Acrylate Roy, Shocks Ethylene Oxide Shocks Formaldehyde, 37 wt % Aqueous Shocks Hexane Shocks Hydrochloric Acid, 36 wt % Aqueous Shocks Hydrofluoric Acid, anhydrous Roy, Shocks Phosphorus Oxychloride

\\

Shocks Propylene Oxide Shocks Vinyl Acetate Shocks Vinyl Chloride Roy, Shocks The Roy line runs to the east of the plant. The Shocks lines to the west. The Manly-Regan tank is 4400 m N of the plant.

i

(

1-3 7601G0723842

2.0 FREQUENCY OF A MAJOR RELEASE In this section, the frequency of a toxic chemical release from the accidental rupture of a railroad tank car is calculated. This frequency was calculated from Accident / Incident Bulletins 146 (1977) and 151 (1982)

[Ref. 20, 21]. Other data sources were considered but rejected because they were not sufficiently well defined. For instance, a study performed for the Department of Commerce by Systems Laboratory, Inc. [Ref. 22] and quoted in the Limerick PRA [Ref. 23] insufficiently documented the source of its numbers and, therefore, could not be used.

Reference 24 provides data analyzed by Sandia National Laboratories which uses an accident rate of 1.5 x 10-6 per car-mile.

It is also apparent that the quality of rafiroad tank cars is improving. However, the mix of new and old cars used by CONRAIL for shipments on the Shocks and Roy line is unknown.

Therefore, national averages for track of the same type through 1982 were used. The historic data includes rail cars of all vintages used during that year, including the.new cars. The mix of new and old cars is not expected to be any different on Shocks and Roy than elsewhere in the country. The statistics for 1983 and 1984, when available, are expected to be better as more new cars are brought into service.

i Most track in the-US (80%) is Class IV, therefore without more specific information it was assumed that the portions of Shocks and Roy considered here are also Class IV.

In the Midland PRA [ Appendix H.2 of Ref. 25] the railroad car accidental release rate was estimated on per track-mile-year basis, and the same rate was used for every chemical.

No data was available which specified the rate of shipment of specific chemicals. -In TMI's case, CONRAIL provided GPUN with a-list of shipping frequencies (number of tank cars) for an month period from January 1978 to June 1979 [Ref.19]. The availability of this list made it possible to calculate release frequencies for each chemical considered.

2-1 7620G072504 5

. -....,. - - -, - - -,-.-- ~. _..,- - -.,,,. -- -..- -,,,.., - - -. -.--,-,.. _ --

The frequency of a major release from a tank car rupture was calculated using the following relationship:

-T"At "HMR IRHM-M /"HM (2-1 )

A where t

total rate of accidents per train-mile A

=

gg number of cars of hazardous material per train n

=

number of cars which release some or all of their n

=

HMR contents per accident fRHM-M fraction of such releases which are major

=

2.1 TOTAL RATE OF ACCIDENTS PER TRAIN-MILE (At)

Data from Accident / Incident Bulletins were used to calculate the total rate per train mile of railroad accidents. Some of this data is reproduced in Appendix A.

The latest data, for the years 1977 through 1982 shows a range of from 8 x 10-6 to 13.8 x 10-6 accidents per train mile based-on a range of between 10,362 and 4,589 accidents and 8

8 between 7.3 x 10 and 5.7 x 10 total train miles. These accidents usually (75% of the time) involve derailments and in about 40% of the

~

time are due to track defects.

The data is also divided according to speed on three different track locations: main line, yard, and industry siding / unknown.

In 1982, the fractions attributed to these types were 48%, 43% and 9%, respectively.

Shocks and Roy were assumed to be main line track. For this year of main line data 32% of all accidents occurred when the trains were traveling at 10 miles per hour or less and 52% at 20 miles per hour or less.

During the period from 1968 to 1982 covered by References 20 and 21, the threshold for declarine a rail problem, an " accident," went up by a factor of three, from $750 to $4100. This probably had some effect in 2-2 7620G073084

reducing the frequency of accidents per train mile. As shown in Table A-1, the rate of accidents varied from 9.2 x 10-6 in 1968 to a peak rate of 1.5 x 10-5 in 1978 back down to a rate of 8 x 10-6 in 1982 after the change in reporting criteria.

Based on this data, a mean value of.1 x 10-5 was used for the total frequency of accidents per train-mile.

2.2 NUMBER OF CARS OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PER TRAIN (nHM) i

'The' Accident / Incident Bulletin data excerpted in Appendix A shows that between 504 and 842 trains were involved in accidents during 1975-1982 while carrying hazardous materials.

In these trains were a total of between 2,297 and 4,711 cars containing hazardous material. This produces an average 5 cars per train for this whole period, with a yearly average of between 4.6 and 7.4.

2.3 NUMBER OF CARS WHICH RELEASE HAZARD 0VE MATERIALS PER ACCIDENT (nHMR)

From the 3,884 trains which transported hazardous materials between 1975 and 1982 and were involved in accidents, 850 cars produced releases.

This results in an average over this period of 0.22 cars carrying hazardous materials releasing some or all of their contents per accident.

The yearly. average over.this period varied between 0.18 and 0.23.

I 2.4 FRACTION OF TANK CAR RELEASES WHICH ARE MAJOR (fRHM-M)

Following the technique utilized in Appendix H.2 of the Midland PRA l

[Ref. 25], the fraction of tank car releases which are major was implied from the number which required evacuation of the area around the accident.

From the data given in Reference 14, this ratio ranges from 10% to 26%, with a mean value of 18%. The mean value was used in this calculation.

The fact that a release was major, i.e., requiring evacuation, was used i.

in turn to imply that the tank was not just leaking, it was ruptured and released,its entire contents rapidly.

The release rate from a tank car i

2-3 7620G073084:

i which was sufficient to prompt an evacuation would, of course, depend on the local authorities and on the toxicity of the chemical released.

No site specific data of this type could be obtained for TMI.

2.5

SUMMARY

The numbers discussed in the last four sections are to be inserted into Equation 2-1 as follows:

lAT"At "HMR IRHM-M I"HM (2-1 )

= (1 x 10-5) (0.22) (0.18)/(5)

= 8.0 x 10-8 per (car-mile)

This number will be used in Section 4 to develop the frequency of exceeding the 10CFR100 offsite dose rate.

4 1

1 2-4 7620G073084

l 3.0 DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDENCE OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STANDARDS, GIVEN A MAJOR RELEASE, FOR EACH CHEMICAL

-In this section, the methodology, data, and procedures used to determine the habitability of the control room for various chemical releases and meteorological conditions will be discussed. These methods will then be used to determine the conditional probability that a major release will result in the exceedence of control room habitability standards.

In the case of the fixed storage tank no more needs be done for this part of the calculation; however, for the cases involving rail cars, the conditional probability varies along the track.

In the latter case, therefore, the conditional probability is intograted along the track to complete this phase of the calculation.

3.1 EVAPORATION AND DISPERSION MODELS The evaporation and dispersion of contaminants resulting from a hazardous chemical spill are analyzed using a modification of the methods suggested I

in NUREG-0570 and Reg. Guide 1.78.2 The most significant modifications are:

1.

Plumes resulting from the spill of chemicals whose vapors are much lighter than air are treated as both buoyant and non-buoyant plumes.

4 2.

Enhanced dispersion due to plume meandering during neutral and stable _ low wind speed meteorological conditions is accounted for.

3.

Enhanced dispersion due to interaction of the plume with the reactor building complex is accounted for if tall structures are in the path

[

of the plume as it travels from its source toward the control room air intake vent.

t Y

f 3-1 760lG0723843 1

The various components of the evaporation and dispersion models are presented below. The modifications presented above are discussed in detail.

It is shown that the modified models still provide conservative estimates of control room toxic vapor concentrations.

The model assumes that the entire contents of a single railroad tankcar or stationary storage container is released to the environment instantaneously.

Preliminary analysis showed that this assumption results in a " worst case" scenario in the control room.

3.1.1 Evaporation Models The evaporation model contains the following components:

1.

A model to calculate the time dependent surface area of a liquid spill.

2.

A model to calculate the initial flashing of a compressed gas or pure low boiling point liquid release and the boil-off of the remaining liquid pool (Vaporization Class I).

3.

A model to calculate the evaporation rate of a chemical that is a pure liquid at ambient conditions (Vaporization Class II).

4.

A model to calculate the evaporation rate of the toxic components of a liquid mixture (Vaporization Class III).

3.1.1.1 Surface Area of Liquid Spill The time dependent surface area of the liquid spill is calculated as suggested in NUREG-0570.I The suggested equation is due to Van Ulden.

2+2 gy,

( p t p,)

t 1/2 (3-1 )

~

A(t) = II r

.Hpt 7601G0723844 3-2

where r,

= initial radius of spill, cm 2

g

= acceleration due to gravity = 980 cm/sec 3

V,

= volume of liquid spill, cm 3

pg

= density of liquid, gm/cm 3

p,

= density of air, gm/cm t

= time, sec

'The initial radius of the spill is given by 3

V, = IIr (3-2) g It should be noted that in the case of Yaporization Class I chemicals, V,-is the volume of the liquid that remains after instantaneous flashing to puff has taken place.

The maximum liquid spill area is estimated from the initial liquid volume by assuming a final spill thickness of I cm. This is an extremely conservative assumption.

The spill achieves its final thickness rapidly. Since the evaporation rate is directly proportional to spill i

area, the result is extremely high evaporation rates.

Preliminary calculations showed that, in general, the higher the evaporation rate, the greater the impact of the resulting plume on the control room.

3.1.1. 2 Vaporization of Compressed Gases and Low Boiling Point Liquids (Vaporization Class I)

I According to NUREG-0570, the mass of chemical which is instantaneously flashed to form a puff release is calculated from t

~

760lG0723845

M,

=gCp (T, - T )/H (3-3) y b

y M,

= mass of instantaneously vaporized (flashed) chemical, gm y

M

= total initial mass of spilled chemical, gm T

C

= liquid heat capacity of chemical, cal /gm *C p

T,

= ambient temperature, *C

.T

= n rmal boiling point of chemical, *C b

H

= heat of vaporization of chemical at normal boiling point, cal /gm y

The portion of the release which does not flash to puff will form a liquid pool whose surface area is given by equation (3-1). This liquid (Mt-Nvo) will vaporize by absorption of atmospheric and solar radiation, convection of air and ground conduction. NUREG-0570 gives the following formula for calculating the vaporization (boil-off) rate:

A(t) 1/2 (3-4)

My(t) c (T, - T ) + 197 (TE - T )/t H

9r+h

=

b b

y where My(t) = vaporization rate, gm/sec qr

= solar and atmospheric radiation fluxes, cal /m2-sec hc

= heat transfer coefficient for wind convection, cal /m2-sec *C TE

= ground (earth) temperature, *C Tb

= chemical's normal boiling point

C A(t)

= liquid spill surface area, m2 Hy

= heat of vaporizat. ion, cal /gm t

= time af ter accident, sec 7601G0723846 3-4

b The wind convection heat transfer coefficient is conservatively assumed 2

to equal 1.6 cal /m -sec *C as suggested in NUREG-0570.

Since radiation flux data were not available, q, was conservatively assumed to equal 2

275 cal /m sec for unstable conditions as suggested in NUREG-0570.

qp 2

2 was assumed equal to 200 cal /m -sec and 0 cal /m -sec for neutral and stable conditions, respectively, since the radiation flux for neutral atmosphere is less than that for unstable atmcspheres and since stable conditions occur at night. The values used for h and q do not c

p significantly affect the calculations in most cases since evaporation due to ground conduction (last term in brackets in equation 3-4) far outweighs that due to radiation and wind convection except at extremely long times after release. At these long times the concentration in the control room has usually passed its maximum.

3.1.1. 3 Evaporation of Pure Chemicals which are Liquids at Ambient Conditions (Vaporization Class II)

The evaporation of a Vaporization Class II liquid in an open space with wind or in a confined area with good ventilation is given by Equitions (2.1-18) and (2.1-20) of NUREG-0570:

My(t) hd MwA(t) (Ps - Pa)/R Ta (3-5)

=

where hd

= forced convection mass transfer coefficient, cm/sec Mw

= molecu~ ar weight of chemical, gm/gm mol Ta

= absolute ambient temperature, *K Ps

= saturation partial pressure of chemical's vapor above liquid at temperature Ta, atm Pa

= partial pressure of chemical's vapor in ambient air, atm R

= universal gas constant = 82.05 cm3-atm/gm mol *K 3-6 760lG0723847

For a pure liquid, the saturation partial pressure of its vapor is equal to.its vapor pressure, P.

In this study the concentration of the y

spilled chemical in ambient air was assumed to be negligible. Therefore, P, = 0 resulting in conservative estimates of the evaporation rate.

The forced convection mass transfer coefficient for a turbulent atmosphere is given by:

D 0.8 0.33 h = 0.037 R

S (3-6) d 7,

c where D

= mass diffusivity of chemical in air, cm2 sec

/

L

= characteristic length of liquid spill, cm Re

= (L U pa)/Pa = Reynolds Number, dimensionless Sc

= Ua/(pad) = Schmidt Number, dimensionless U

= mean wind velocity, cm/sec pa

= density of ambient air, gm/cm3 D

= viscosity of amMont air, gm/cm-sec a

The characteristic length of the spill is taken as the spill diameter.

Therefore:

!4A(t))1/2 L(t) =

(3-7) g 3.1.1.4 Evaporation of Liquid Mixtures (Vaporization Class III)

Equations (3-5) to (3-7) also apply to the evaporation of liquid mixtures.

The only difference in their application is that, in a strict sense, these equations must be applied to each mixture component, individually. (andP are then the molecular weight and saturation s

partial pressure, respectively, of a particular component.

The total mixture evaporation rate is the sum of the evaporation rates of the individual components.

Similarly, the total saturation pressure is the sum of the individual component partial pressures.

7601G0723848 3-6

I I

l several difficulties arise in the application of equations (3-5) to (3-7) l to mixtures. Due to the different relative volatilities of the mixture component, each evaporates at a different rate; that is, the more volatile components evaporate initially while the higher boiling point j

components tend to remain in the liquid phase. As time passes, the l

liquid spl11 becomes depleted in its more volatile components and i

enriched in its less volatile components. The component saturation l

partial pressures arv, among other things, a function of the mole i

fraction of the components in the liquid phase. As a result, the partial l

pressures and the total saturation pressure are a complex function of

[

l time.

In general, the individual component partial pressures are a function of l

temperature, composition (mole fraction) and the molecular interactions which occur between the different chemicals in the Ifquid mixture.

It is i

therefore necessary to consider hydrocarbon mixtures, aqueous solutions f

and other solutions, separately.

l 3.1.1.4.1 Evaporation of Hydrocarbon Mixtures (Vaporization Class III-A) l L

Generally, all components of a hydrocarbon mixture are both volatile and toxic. -Hydrocarbon mixtures consist of "similar chemicals", so it may be assumed that they exhibit ideal solution behavior, following Raoult's Law

-for ideal solutions:3 l

Pgg = Xg yg (3-8)

P l

where Xg = mule fraction of component i in liquid t

P,9 =

partial pressure of component i above the liquid mixture,

(

atn i

l The evaporation rate of each component may be found by applying equations l

(3-5) through (3-7). By taking time steps small enough that the i

composition of the mixture does not change appreciable over the time I

step, the remaining mass of each component and hence the mole fractions L

i 3"7 f.

7601G0723849

may be recomputed at each time step. Since each component of the mixture has a different toxicity level and molecular weight, the contribution of each component is normalizea to the reference toxicity and molecular weight with the normalizing factor F, given-by:

9 bl TL1

'F9=

(3-9) where 49

= molecular weight of component i T

= toxic limit of component i g

.The effective evaporation rate (referenced to component 1) is thus NVE (t) =

F Myj(t)

(3-10) 9 i =1 l

where MVE(t) = effective evaporation rate, considered to be component 1.

f l

Myj(t)_ = evaporation rate of component i.

l The onJy chemical considered in this category is Coal Tar-Light Oil.

L 3.1.1. 4. 2 Evaporation of Aqueous Solutions (Vaporization Class III-B) l The aqueous solutions considered in this study are ammonium hydroxide, hydrochloric acid and formaldehyde solutions. The basic method discussed in the previous section is used with two exceptions. First, the

-solutions are not ideal, so actual partial pressure data is used.

Second, only one component is considered toxic.

3-8 l

7601G07238410

In the case of ammonium hydroxide and hydrochloric acid, good, accurate partial pressure data is available." Formaldehyde is shipped either in

' aqueous solution or in solution with both water and methanol. The methanol inhibits polymerization of the formaldehyde with water to form methylene glycol and its polymers.

Although complete data is not available on the ternary solution, it is known that the methanol serves to increase the partial pressure of formaldehyde over the solution.

Also, the toxic limit for methanol is forty times that for formaldehyde, so.it can safely be ignored (except for the increase in formaldehyde partial pressure). Thus, the formaldehyde is treated as an aqueous solution-(for which adequate data does exist) but with the partial pressure of formaldehyde increased by an appropriate factor to account for the presumed presence of methanol.

3.1.1.4.3' Evaporation of Solutions with Solvents Other Than Water (Vaporization Class III-C)

JThe only chemical in this class is Chromic Fluoride solution. The only solvent for. Chromic Fluoride is: Hydrogen Fluoride. Chromic Fluoride is a non-volatile salt which is solid at ambient temperatures. Although part of the hydrogen fluoride solvent will flash at temperatures above its

' boiling point, only about 10% vill 9 ash at the highest temperatures occuring at TMI-1. Any chromi?. fluoride in the fraction which flashes should thus be entrained in the remaining hydrogen fluoride, which would evaporate leaving the chromic fluoride behind. Thus, the chromic fluoride solution is treated as pure hydrogen fluoride, and the chromic fluoride is ignored in the calculation.

3.1.2 Dispersion Models Gaussian plume models are employed in this study to account for the dispersion of the instantaneous puff formed by instantaneous flashing of a Vaporization Class I chemical and the continuous plume formed from boil-off~ evaporation of the liquid spills. The models presented in

-NUREG-0570 are modified to account for plume rise, meandering and plume-building wake interactions.

7601G07238411 tc.

3.1. 2.1 Instantaneous Puff Model In applying the instantaneous puff model, it is assumed that the wind is always blowing from the accident source directly toward the control room air intake vent. The concentration at the air intake vent is given by (NUREG-0570):

N 2

vo X - Ut eXP

-1 0

puff (t) =

C (2H)3/2

(

XI /

XI YI ZI (3-11 )

1 [Z-H )

1 Z + H}2 exp 7 (g

+

exp 7

g gZI j

['2+oAj\\

1/2 2

o 077 =

g g

f 1/2 2,o2 (3-12) 77 =

Oy I

0

[ 2, a 2 1/2 0

o

=,

Y

}!

[

2Myg G

(3-13 )

=

((2H)3/2 y) where puff (t)

= concentration of toxic vapor at the air intake vent at time C

t, gm/m

= standard deviations of the puff concentration in the X' Y' Z along-wind, cross-wind, and vertical directions, respectively, as given in Reg. Guide 1.78,2 meters

= standard deviations adjusted to account for the initial og,oyg, oZI puff dimensions, neters

-10 760lG07238412

X,

= downwind distance from accident source to air intake vent, meters U

= mean wind speed, m/see t

= time after accident, sec Z

= height of air intake vent above grade at the accident source, meters H

= height of puff centerline, meters 3

p

= density of pure toxic vapor at ambient temperature, gm/m y

3.1.2.2 Continuous Plume Model In applying the continuous plume model, it is assumed that the wind is always blowing from the accident source directly toward the air intake vent. The concentration at the air intake vent is given by (NUREG-0570).

M (t-t )

[Z-H(x,t-t)h2

[Z+H(x,t-t))2 y

g j

g 9

)

g g

Cplume(t) =

exp 7

y.

+ exp 7

y (3-14) -

t 2+o (t-t )2

_o

= oy g

and (3-15)

A(t-t )l/2 g

o (t-t )

=

g g

4.3 7601G07238413

where o'Z crosswind' and vertical continuous' plume standard.

=

Y 5

' deviations.as given by Turner evaluated at X,, meters crosswind s'tandard deviation adjusted for the finite size of

. o

=

y the liquid spill, meters op initial value of oy (at chemical spill), meters

=

plume (t) = concentration at air intake vent at time t, gm/m3 C

t

= -time. at which continuous plume initially reaches vent, sec.

g It should be noted that A(t-t ) is interpreted as A evaluated at time o

t-t. A similar interpretation should be given to all variables g

followed by -(t-t ).

H (x, t-t ) means H evaluated at distance o

g o

x, and time t-t.

g The time at which the continuous plume first reaches the vent is given by:

'J>

to = X/[I (3-16)

At time t, the plume source strength at the vent is equal to the spill o

evaporation rate at time zero, that is M (t=o).

Therefore, at any time y

t > t, the source strength of the plume segment in contact with the o.

vent.is given by M (t-t ).

The same line of reasoning applies to the y

o

-adjusted crosswind plume standard deviation, o and the plume y

centerline height. H.

Therefore, all plume parameters are adjusted to account for the finite travel time interval, t, between the accident o

source and the vent as indicated by equations (3-14) and (3-15). Such adjustment is necessary so that the instantaneous puff (if it occurs) and

- the continuous plume equations can be applied simultaneously. Note that the height of the continuous plume centerline may also be a function of travel distance, X, if credit for plume rise is taken.

g 3-12

. 7601G07238414

3.1.2.3 Plume Rise 3.1. 2. 3.1 Vapors Much Lighter Than Air For toxic vapors much lighter than air, such as ammonia, the rise of the continuous plume centerline was calculated using the Briggs plume rise formulae (References 8 to 12). These are:

Neutral and Unstable Atmospheres:

2/3[I j = 1.6 F(t)1/3 Ah y

9 (3-17a) l 2 = 1.6 F(t) !

(3.5x*)2/3g Ah x* = 14 F /8 F < 55 m4 sec3 5

/

x* = 34 F /5 F > 55 m4 sec3 (3-17b)

~

2

/

H(Xc,t) = hs _+ Min (Ah, Ah )

l' 2

Stable Atmospheres l

y 2/3g 3 = 1.6 F(t)1/3 Ah

'I/3 Ah4 = 2.6 F(t)SS)

(3-18)

Ah5 = 4.0 F(t)l/4 S-3/8 Z

'H (Xo,t) = hs.+ Min (Ah3, A h4,- Ah5) 3-13 760lG07238415

where 3

F(t)

= plume buoyancy flux at time t, m4 / sec j hs

= height of release, meters S

= stability parameter, sec-2 30/0Z = gradient of atmospheric potential temperature, *C/m The-plume buoyancy flux is given by M (t) g y

- F(t) = (1 - p /p,)

(3-19) y UPy Equation (3-19) follows logically from the development given in Reference 6.

For all buoyant releases considered in this study, the release height, h, was assumed equal to zero. The gradient of potential temperature s

was assumed equal to.02,.0375 and.05 *C/m for E, F and G stabilities, respectively.,For instantaneous puff releases, the plume centerline height was assumed equal to continuous plume centerline height at time zero. This is a conservative assumption for the cases considered since the instantaneous puff has considerably more buoyant potential than the continuous plume.

It should be noted that no credit was taken for plume meandering or plume-building wake interactions for buoyant plumes which rise above the reactor building complex (to be discussed later).

l 3.1. 2. 3. 2 Non-Buoyant Vapors l

For vapors much heavier than air, the plume centerline was assumed to be at ground level. For vapors whose density does not differ significantly l~

from that of air, the plume centerline height was assumed equal to the air intake vent height. These assumptions are not substantially different l

since the TMI Unit I air intake vent is only about 16 feet above ground level.

l t

i 760lG07238416 l~

r 3.1.2. 4 Plume Meandering There is ample evidence to confirm the existence of plume meandering in the vicinity of the TMI site during stable, low wind speed conditions. A series of SF tracer gas atmospheric diffusion experiments were 6

conducted on Three Mile Island during 1971.

The results of these experiments are reported in Reference 7.

They confirm the existence of plume meandering for releases in open areas and for releases affected by building wake interactions. As a result, the continuous plume dispersion model was modified to account for plume meandering as prescribed in Regulatory Guide 1.145.8 According to Reg. Guide 1.145, o in y

equations (3-14) and (3-15) is replaced by E where y

E

= (M-1) oy800 + "y X > 800 meters (3-20) y o

I,=Mc X < 800 meters y

g _

where o

= value of o at a distance of 800 meters, meters y800 y

a

= value of o at distance X, meters y

f o

M plume meander factor given in Figure 3 of Reg. Guide 1.145 Plume meander factors were not applied to the instantaneous puff model since the effect of meandering on puff dispersion is not presently well l_

understood.

l 3.1. 2. 5 Plume-Building Wake Interactions Figure 3-1, a plan view of the TMI Nuclear Station, gives the locatf or. of l

the Unit I control room air intake vent relative to the reactor building l

complex and natural draft cooling towers.. The figure shows that plumes approaching the vent from the west and south are unobstructed while-plumes approaching from the other directions must pass around or over some 760lG07238417 3-15

portion of the reactor building complex and cooling towers in order to reach the vent. Dispersion in the vicinity of these structures are too complex to model accurately. As a result, a relatively simple but conservative modification was applied to the instantaneous puff and continuous plume dispersion models. The modification involves adjusting the plume standard deviations (sigmas) to reflect interaction with the reactor-building complex. No credit is taken for interaction with the

-cooling towers even though they can significantly enhance plume dilution.

The sigmas are adjusted as follows:

1.

Instantaneous Puff Release CXI remains unchanged cyI = MAX (OyI, W /4.3)

(3-21 )

b ZI = MAX (0ZI, H /2.15) b 2.' Continuous Plume y, W /4.3)

(3-22) y = MAX (O U

b "Z

= MAX ( Z, H /2.15) b l

where Wb projected width of reactor building complex in direction normal

=

f to the wind, meters H

projected height of reactor building complex in direction normal

=

b to the wind, meters It is seen from equation (3-22) that credit can only be taken for plume-building wake interactions or meandering, but not both simultaneously. For buoyant plumes, no building wake credit is taken if the plume centerline height is greater than or equal to H '

b 3-16 760lG07238418

I In applying the dispersion models, credit for plume-building wake interactions can be taken for spills occuring on the East Bank ("Roy")

train line and at stationary storage tanks located onsite and offsite

-north and east of TMI. No credit can be taken for spills occuring on the West Bank.(" Shocks") train line.

3.1.2.6 Other Considerations It is seen that the instantaneous puff dispersion model takes credit for buoyant plume rise or plume-wake interections but not both, simultaneously. The continuous plume dispersion model accounts for aonly one of buoyant plume rise, meandering, or plume-wake interactions. The phenomenon accounted for is the one that results in the greatest plume dilution. No attempt was made to account for interactions of a spill with rain, or Susquehanna river water or for chemical reactions that the spilled chemical may. undergo in the environment.

~

760lG07238419 1

3.1.3 Modeling of Toxic Gas Concentrations in the Control Room Isolation Zone

~ The model for toxic gas concentrations in the control room isolation zone is shown in Figure 3-1.

A variety of possible configurations may be analyzed with the computer code used for this analysis. The code's capabilitie's include the following:

1) Ability to alarm at the source, at the mouth of the intake tunnel, and in the control room.

(2) Ability to activate two separate actions (changes in flow rates or filtration parameters or backflushing the intake tunnel) at specified times after reaching the alarm setpoint.

This is necessary to model automatic action followed by operator response.

(3) Ability to model flow through the intake tunnel including changes in flow rates.

(4) Ability to correct the input centerline atmospheric dilution factors to average values for large intake flow rates.

3-18 760lG073084

s ll!)i l

l L

x' 3t 3

n 3

1 e

0 m) 0 t '2 V

V r

a2 p3

/

m(.

\\

'n o

e o

C' g

i a

t k

a a

r e

t L

n 2

e t~

c 2

n 2

n I

e)

O o

U m"

U V

t6

/

C r

\\

a '8 sa p3

/

G m3 o(

e \\

c C

g i

a x

k o

a T

e L

ro f

m 3

o' 1

l g

o 0

e U

R)

U d

/

V l5

\\

o M

o5 r3 t(.

/

1 n

e\\

o g

3 r

C a

e k

e t

a r

l e

u i

L g

'F i

F na F. e er R

k e U

ap'

^

tm('

na t

ID s

./

ua

. /

xs U' 1 h

8 E

s, x'

. o U

Y' 4

f fllltll

'l l

The first two items entail the use of logic udels which check the concentrations at the three locaticas specified at each time step and, if specified concentration is passed (either increasing or decreasing) setting an initial (automatic) response time equal to the current time plus delays before the actions are completed. When this time is passed, a control card is read (a separate card is specified for each possible alarm source, separately for increasing and decreasing past the limit) which may change flow parameters, filtration or may specify backflushing of the intake tunnel.

Optionally, an operator response may be selected in a similar manner after a delay time specified on the card for the automatic response.

The intake tunnel mooel converts the rate of introduction of the toxic gas (evaporation or leakage in grams per second) into a concentration at the mouth of the intake tunnel at a later time, the delay being equal to the ratio of the distance between the source and the mouth of the intake tunnel to the wind speed.

This concentration is tracked from the mouth of tha tunnel to the intake dreper, moving forward by a volume equal to the product of the length of the time step and the intake flow rate.

If this volume is greater tu n the intake tunnel volume, the appropriate time delay is used instead. At the intake damper, a portion of the flow, U '

B is diverted to the halls and machine shop, while the remainder, U; goes into the control room ventilaticn system.

4 The final modification is used to correct for the fact that the intake tunnel may be drawing air from a volume over which the concentration varies greatly.

If no correction is performed, the amount of toxic gas can, under some circumstances., be overestimated to the point that more gas would be taken in than was actually released.

To alleviate this problem, the conservative approach shown below was used.

It is assumed that a cross-section of the plume taken in the crosswind plane at the intake has a gaussian distribution with standard deviations y in the horizontal direction and a, in the vertical direction e

i traveling at windspeed iF.

Since the plume is reflected by the ground, it will have a dilution factor as a function of horizontal distance y and 4

i vertical distance z of 7601007238422 3-20 l

[y 2 2 }

z x

j (3-23)

Q =,7,y,z (2,y2 + 2'z /

exp -l 2

Isopleths of constant concentration will thus be gf ven by

[y)2

[z}2 2

(3-24) hl Y*)

Bearing in mind that z 2 0, this isopleth is a semiellipse with an area of

}

2 A = h tro o s

yz (3-25)

It is assumed that the intake flow is taken from the area bounded by such an isopleth, thus conservatively maximizing the amount of toxic gas taken in. The required area is U

A=Z (3-26) v where U is the intake flow rate.

Setting the areas in (3-25) and (3-26) equ'al,

2U 2x U 2

g s

=

,, =

(3-27) rvey 9

where X,/Q is the value of (3-23) at y=z=o, the centerline atmospheric dilution factor.

Integrating (3-27) over the area bounded by the isopleth (3-24) and multiplying by the windspeed v yields the fraction R of toxic gas which is introduced into the vent:

2 R _ = 1 - exp (-s /2) = 1 - exp (-x U/Q).

(3-28) g It is seen that, in accordance with physical reality, this fraction varies from zero to one as U increases from zero to infinity.

Dividing R by the uncorrected ficw rate into the tunnel gives the required correction factor 3-21 760lG073084

/

1-exp(-x,U/Q)

F=

(3-29)

E

.c (x U/Q) o which reduces to unity for small flow rates.

The data input by the user consists of the volume (V ) of each 9

compartment, the volumetric flow rate (u ) into that compartment, the g

volumetric. flow rate from that compartment into the recirculation loop (u'j), the intake volumetric flow rate (u ), the filter efficiency g

(n), and the volume of the intake duct (V ).

Other pertinent variables D

are the intake concentration in the intake duct (C (t)) and the g

concentration of the chemical in each compartment as a function of time (C (t)). The concentrations are then governed by the equations 9

dC 3

(3-30) j E

dt j =1 ij 3 (t) + v c (t)

T C

jo where A

= ug/Yg (3-31 )

9 3

I uj (3-32) u

=

R i =1 a

= u /u 9

R u

(3-34)

R U+u g

n 93

= (1-n) S xj aj - Aj ajj (3-35) 7 and vg

= (1-n) (1-#) Aj.

(3-36) 3-22 7601G073084

The set of equations (3-30) has a particular solution and three linearly independent homogeneous solutions.

It is assumed the C,(t) may be adequately represented in some time interval k beginning at t by k

C,(t)= A '*P EAk (t-t )]

tk < t < t +1 (3-37) k k

k The particular solution then has the form Cyg(t) = F exp [Ak (t-t )]

(3-38) j k

Substituting this expression into equation (3-30) at tk yields 3

(Yjj - Ak "ij ) Fj=vAgk (3-39)

This set of linear equations is olved in CRCONI by Gauss-Jordan elimination.

In order to find the homogeneous solution which matches the bounoary conditions (the concentration in each compartment at time t '

k computed in the previous time step), the characteristic equation of the matrix [793] is first solved for the eigenvalues of [793], W, and 3

the corresponding eigenvectors.

Let E be the element of eigenvector 93 j corresponding to compartment 1.

The solution in interval k is then t

given by C (t) = -

E B e j (t-t I

+ F e"k(t-t I (3-40)

~I k

k 9

jj j

j=1

[

Using' the known concentrations at time t, the unknown values B may k

3

(

be found by solving the set of linear equations 3

B-(3-41 )

93 j = C (t ) - F9

.E E

9 k

. j=1 In CRCONI, since the operation is carried.out many times for each matrix E93, the inverse matrix E is found, and the unknowns B) are found in each time step by using 3-23 7601G073084

p 3'

Ek[C(t)-F]

' B). =

I 9 k j

(3-42)

This process is repeated at each time step, yielding the time dependent concentration.

~

3.2 ' METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED TO FIND THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDENCE-The methodology used to determine the conditional probability of exceedence is discussed below.

The maximum concentration of a chemical in the control room atmosphere after a spill is a strong function of four meteorological variables; wind direction, wind speed, stability and temperature. The evaporation rate is a function of temperature and, in many cases, windspeed. The dispersion of the plume is determined by the stability and windspeed, while the plume rise, for chemicals lighter than air, is determined by windspeed; stability and evaporation rate. Finally, the difference in the wind direction and the direction from the spill to the intake, along with the dispersion of.the plume, determise what fraction of the peak concentration is present at the intake. A method has been developed to systematically take these factors into account in determining the conditional probability of exceeding the toxic limits in the control room given a chemical spill of a gisen amount of a given chemical at a given location.

Two methods are used for determining the ambient temperature at the time of the spill. The conservative method assumes that the evaporation takes place at the highest temperature consistant with the stability; 100*F for stability classes A through D, and 80*F for stability classes E through G.

A more realistic method, used only for hydrofluoric acid spills, is to find the control room concentrations as a function of temperature.

For both methods, the peak concentrations are found as a function of windspeed for a fixed atmospheric dilution factor.

4 1

7601G07238426

... ~.

The assessment of the condition probability of exceedence will be considered first for the conservative method. For each combination of wind speed and stability, the peak control room concentration, C,,x, evaluated at an atmospheric dispersion factor of (X/Q)ref, is compared to the_ toxic limit for that chemical, C)$,.

The limiting value of the ato spheric dispersion factor, (X/Q) lim, is found using (X/Q)ref Clim (X/Q)jg,

=

' max Only atmospheric dispersion factors greater than (X/Q)jg, at the vent will result in exceedence of the toxic limit in the control room. Using the meteorological methods in Reference 2, the plume standard deviations y and "z, and the atmospheric dilution factor at the vent height and a

plume centerline, (X/Q)CL are found.

If this value is less than (X/Q)jg,, the plume presents no possibility of exceeding the toxic limit for this stability and windspeed. Otherwise, a further step is required.

The atmospheric dispersion factor, X/Q, has the following function form in the cross-wind direction:

2 X/Q = (X/Q)CL exp [-y /2ay]

(3-44) where y is the lateral distance between the plume centerline and the vent, measured perpendicular to the wind direction at the vent height, and X/Q

.is the atmospheric dilution at that point. Thus the plume only presents a hazard within a band within y 9, of the centerline, where yjg,is the j

solution of (3-2) at (X/Q))$,-

yj g, = a 2 fn [(X/Q)CL (X/Oj g,] I (3-45)

/

y The half-width of the sector of the plume for which exceedences occur is thus A = tan-I (y 4,/x) j (3-46) 3-25 7601G073084

where x is the distance from the spill to the intake. Let the wind direction which would carry the vapor directly toward the vent be B.

The wind directions between B-A and B+A lead to exceedences. Using meteorological data for a, sample year, tabulated in the form of the number of occurrences of a given stability with a given range of windspeeds and a given range of directions, the number of occurances of wind directions between B-A and B+A for the given stability and windspeed are found.

These results are summed over all windspeeds and stabilities and the sum divided by the total number of hours of meteorological data in the sample year, yielding the conditional frequency of exceedence of toxicity limits in the control room, given a spill.

For the more realistic method, the same procedure is followed, except that meteorological data is grouped in to 10*F ranges, and the conditional probability is found for that temperature range. These are multiplied by the probabilities of their respective groups and summed over all temperature groups to give the conditional frequency of exceedence.

For the rail sources (as opposed to the fixed source), the track is broken into segments, with each segment represented by its central point. The conditional probability of exceedence at that point is multiplied by the length of the segments, and the resulting values summed over the length of the rail line considered. The portion of the track considered is that within S miles of the plant.2 The resulting line integral of the conditional probability is multiplied by the frequency of major releases of that chemical per mile per year to find the frequency of exceedence for that chemical.

l l

3-26 7601G073084

m TABLE 3.1 PROPERTIES OF CHEMICALS CONSIDERED a

Toxic Odor Limit Threshold Quantity Shipped. Tons Molecular Chemical Formula (ppm)

(ppm)

Roy Shocks Weight t

Acetic Acid, Glacial CH C00H 20 1.0 73.1 79.9 60.05 3

Acetic Anhydride (CH CO)20 10 0.14 91. 3 79.4 102.1 3

Acrylonitrile CH CHCN 40 65.8 53.06 2

Amonia, Anhydrous NH3 100 46.8 40.9 73.5 17.03 Amonium Hydroxide. U.4 wt % aqueoustl)

Ntf 0H/H O (2)

(2)

(2) 4 2

' Bromine Br2 0.3 3.5 29.6 159.83 Chlorine C12 15 3.5 85.0 70.91

- I Chronic Fluoride, 20 wt 5 in HF CrF /HF (3)

(3) 96.7 (3)

Coal Tar, Light Oil (4)3 (4)

(4) 71.5 (4)

Ethyl Acrylate CH CHC00C H2S 50

.00024 81.7 76.8 100.12 2

Ethylene Oxide -

(CH )20 200 78.6 44.05 2

Formaldehyde HCHO 10 0.8 93.1 30.03 Hexane CH (CH )4CH3 200 73.8 86.17 3 2 Hydrochloric Acid, 36 wt 5 aqueous HCI/H O 100 1-5 92.5 36.47 2

Hydrogen Fluorida, anhydrous HF 6

78.2 84.6 20.01 Phosphorus Oxychloride POC13 0.5 33.5 153.39 Propylene Oxide OCH CHCH3 200 200 68.8 58.08 2

Vinyl Acetate CH C00CHCH2 20 0.12 79.5 86.05 3

Vinyl Chloride CH CHCl 1000 260 39.9 92.6 62.56 2

Boiling Relative Liquid Liquid Heat Heat of Diffusivity Point Vapor Density Capacity Yaporization at 0*C Chemical (1 atm)*C Density -

gm/cm3 cal /gm *C cal /gm cm2/sec Acetic Acid, Glacial 118.1 2.07' 1.05 490 96.75 0.106 Acetic Anhydride 140.

3.52 1.08 0.398 92.2 0.074 Acrylonitrile 77.3 -

1.83 0.806 0.500 173.68 -

0.082 Amonia, Anhydrous

-33.4' O.597 0.674 1.10 327.4 0.169 Amonium %droxide, 29.4 wt 5 aqueous (l) 92.4 (2)

.897 (2)

Bromine 58.73 5.5 2.93 0.107 44.9 0.085 Chlorine

-34.5 2.49 1.57 0.276 68.8 0.114 Chromic Fluoride, 20 wt 5 in HF (3)

(3)

Coal Tar, Light 011 (4)

(4)

(4; (4)

(4)-

Ethyl Acrylate 99.8 3.45 0.941 0.450 20.9 0.070 Ethylene Oxide 10.7 1.52 0.897 0.476 138.5 0.106 Formaldehyde 97.

1.07

- 1.1 0.142 Hexane 68.7 2.97 0.660 0.541 87.5 0.060 Hydrochloric Acid, 36 wt % aqueous

-84.8 1.268 1.179 0.158 Hydrogen Fluoride, anhydrous 19.54' O.69 0.% 7 0.61 80.5 0.167 Dhosphorus Oxychloride 105.1 5.3 1.69 54.63

.072 Propylene Oxide 33.9 2.0 0.830 0.507 111.

0.088 Vinyl Acetate 73.

3.0 0.934 0.433 95.2 0.076

. Vinyl Chloride

-13.4 2.15 0.92 0.38 79.8 0.096 Notes:

(1) 12,000 gallon tank 4400 m North of intake (2) Use values for Ammonia (3) Use values for %drogen Fluoride

(4) See Table 3.3 3-28 7603G072084'

b TABLE 3.2 VAPOR PRESSURES OF PURE SUBSTANCES (Atm)*

CHEMICAL NAME OF.

10 F 20 F 30 F

' 40 F 50 F 60 F 70 F 80 F 90 F 100 F ACETIC ACIO, GLACIAL 0.001260 0.001896 0.002804 0.004081 0.005852 0.008322 0.011711 0.016198 0.022086 0.029886 0.040205 ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 0.000270 0.000435 0.000686 0.001062 0.001616 0.002418 0.003563 0.005175 0.007411 0.010474 0.014594 ACRYLONITRILE 0.015441 0.021729 0.030009 0.040653 0.054426 0.072204 0.094402 0.121956 0.156795 0.200151 0.253278 AMMONIA 2.154480 2.759291 3.497616 4.390771 5.462057 6.736758 8.242136 10.007402 12.063670 14.443903 17.182842 8ENZENE 0.007719 0.012391 0.019282 0.029212 0.042705 0.059767 0.079557 0.104173 0.134999 0.172742 0.219097 BROMINE 0.024285 0.037962 0.056715 0.076822 0.102886 0.136127 0.177227 0.228449 0.291687 0.3690.4 0.463107 CHLORINE 1.961497 2.430244 2.984227 3.633887 4.390228 5.264782 6.269566 7.417034 8.720029 10.191735 11.845625 ETHYL ACRYLATE 0.003366 0.005101 0.007537 0.010817 0.015422 0.021900 0.030306 0.040847 0.054608 0.073782 0.096711 ETHYLENE OXIDE 0.286759 0.375391 0.485931 0.619283 0.779800 0.973083 1.203970 1.477712 -

1.799976 2.176838 2.614781 HEXANE 0.020966 0.029508 0.041016 0.056116 0.075165 0.099420 0.130063 0.167488 0.213614 0.269907 0.336869' HYDROGEN FLUORIDE 0.214830 0.275437 0.354646 0.451944 0.568187 0.703007 0.862720 1.050565 1.270004 1.524720 1.81 8604 INDENE 0.000113 0.000177 0.000270 0.000405 0.000598 0.000870 0.001247 0.001764 0.002463 0.003398 0.004634 NAPHTHALENE 0.000001 0.000002 0.000004 0.000008 0.000015 0.000027 0.000048 0.000082 0.000140 0.000234 0.000383 PHOSPHORUS OXYCHLORIDE 0.003491 0.005172 0.007537 0.010817 0.015301-0.021352 0.029170 0.038791 0.051043 0.066744 0.086364 PROPYLENE OXIDE 0.095184 0.129985 0.172503 0.226154 0.293313 0.376585 0.478870 0.601215 0.746645 0.919974 1.125115 STYRENE 0.000597 0.000904 0.001347 0.001974 0.002850 0.004054 0.005691 0.007829 0.010587 0.014173 0.018825 TOLUENE 0.002591 0.003860 0.005655 0.008173 0.011652 0.016300 0.022445 0.030432 0.040654 0.053731 0.070160 VINYL ACETATE 0.013351 0.019075 0.026837 0.036960 0.050254 0.067588 0.089920 0.118397 0.154501.

0.199828 0.256088 VINYL CHLORIDE 0.841472 1.069301 1.345306 1.676753 2.071519 2.538081 3.085510 3.723452 4.462104 5.312195 6.284951 XYLENE 0.000624 0.000964 0.001463 0.002182 0.003203 0.004631 0.006601 0.009211 0.012695 0.017296 0.023305 4'

Q!

Interpolated and extrapolated from Perry and Chilton, Chemical Engineers Handbook, Tables 3-7 and 3-8.

Values greater than 1 atmosphere may be subject to considerable error, but are not used in the report.

i i

7607G072084 w*

- TABLE 3.3' COMPONENTS OF COAL TAR-LIGHT OIL 9

Toxic-

. Di ffusivity Weight Limit Molecular -

Liquid' at 0*C Chemical

. Formula

. Fractior.

(ppm)

Weight Density cm2 sec

/

1 i

Benzene

.7808 CH 60 78.1

.8794-

.077 66 Indene

.0169 CH 4-1.

08 98 l

Nophthalene

.0132 C H 22.5 128.6 1.162

.0513 10 8 Sturene

.0120 CH 145.

104.14

.9074

.0652 88 Toluene

.1456 CH 235 92.1

.866

.076 78 Xylene

.0315 CH 475 106.2

.87

.0645 8 10 u

k i,

e i

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l 7611G072384

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TABLE 3.4 PARTI /.L PRESSURES OF FORMALDEHYDE AND WATER OVER AQUE0US SOLUTIONS OF FORMALDEHYDE *

- Weight %

Partial Pressure of

. Temperature 'C' Formaldehyde Formaldehyde, mm of hg 0

7.97 0.056 0

15.0 0.102 0

19.4 0.118 0

-28.6 0.157 20 9.25 0.340 20 18.6 0.575 20

'27.2 0.780 20-

-28.6 0.795 20 36.2 1.025 35 1.08 0.166 35 5.10 0.695 35 11.4 1.29 35 18.3 1.80 35 19.7

~1.94 35 28.6 2.48 35 35.6 2.81 45~

10.5 2.30 45 19.4 3.79

'45 27.1 4.72 45'

'35.5 5.60

9% Methanol increases all formaldehyde partial pressures by a factor of 1.56.

Pw is given by Pw = 10 677-2168/Ta 8

where Pw is the partial pressure of water in mm of mercury and Ta is the ambient temperature in degrees kelvin.

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TABLE 3.8 (continued).

STABILITY E SPEED N

NNE NE ENE

-E ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW i

CALM 0

0 0

0-0 0

0 0

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0 1

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2 7

1 5

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2 2

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2 0

1 5

4 4

1 3

5 1

3 2

1 3

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8 1

3 3

3 1

1 2

4 0

0 1

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2 2

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1 0

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1 2

2 5.5 MPH 3

0 1

1 1

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0 0

1 1

3 0

4 1

3 l

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0 0

1 0

0 5

1 0

1 1

3 7.5 MPH 3

0 0

0 1

0 0

3 3

3 0

4 12.5 MPH 0

0 0

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0 0

1 5

2 4

10 2

2 18.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 lw'k STABILITY F SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

0 1.5 MPH 1

1 3

2 2

2 3

2 2

5 0

0 1

1 2

0 2.5 MPH 2

2 4

1 2'

4 6

3 6

3 2

4 2

3 0

1 3.5 MPH 3

1 0

1 4

4 2

2 1

5 0

4 1

1 0

5 4.5 MPH 2

0

.1 1

4 1

0 1

0 0

1 0

2 1

5.5 MPH 1

0 0

1 2

2 0

0 0

0 1

0 2

0 0

3 i

6.5 MPH 2

0 0

1 l

7.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 i

12.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 18.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 I

24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0

24. 6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 7615G072384

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TABLE 3.9 (continued)

STABILITY E SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW-W WNW NW NNW CALM--

0 0

0.

0 0

0 1.5 MPH 1

0 3

-1 2

0

-1 0

3 2

-2 0

1 1

0 0

2.5 MPH 1

2 1

6 4

6-3 1

1 1

2 1

5 2

1 2-3.5 MPH 8

2 4

2 10 6

5 2

4 2

0 3

2 4

-4 7

l 4.5 MPH 3

0 2

2 3

2 1

3 4

0 1

4 7

2 4

7 5.5 MPH 2-4 0

1 5

1 2

1 4

'2 3

4 5:

3

~1 4

6.5 MPH 3

1 3

0 3

3 1

0 3

0 0

0 5

2 1

5 4

7.5 MPH 3

0 0

0 3

2 0

1 1

0 0

1 1

2 2

l' 12.5 MPH 2

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 2

13 10 14 18.5 MPH

.1 0

0 0

0 1

3 5.

24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 j

24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0

'0 0

I i w j g-STABILITY F-1 l

SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

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WNW NW NNW j

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0 0

0 i

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0 3

3 2

4-2 2

0 0

1 0

0 1

{

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4 2

-2 2'

1 4

5 4

6 2

6 3

5 3

3 j

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1 1

4 5

5 2

2 1

2 2

2 3

2 0

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0 0

0 2

3 0

0 0

2 1

0 4

5.5 FH 1

1 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

2 1

1 1

0 6.5 MPH 1

0 0

2 1

0 1

2 4

7.5 W H 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

3 12.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

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0 4

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0 0

0

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0 l

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0 0

0 1

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3-53

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m TABLE 3.10 (continued)

STABILITY E SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW

'W WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

0 1.5 NH 0

1 1

3 2

2 1

1 3

1 0

3 4

1 0

0 2.5 MPH 3

0 1

7 5

4 3

2 3

0 3

0 6

1 3

3 3.5 MPH 3

2 3

1 6

9 2

2 2

2 3

3 1

2 2

6 4.5 MPH 4

0 1

1 2

9 5

7 1

1 0

3 1

1 2

2 5.5 MPH 2

1 0

2 2

13 8

7 1

2 1

2 2

1 3-0 6.5 MPH 4

0 0

1 1

1 7

6 4

2 0

2 1

3 4

6 7.5 MPH 1

0 0

6 8

3 1

2 5

1 6

2 12.5 MPH 2

0 0

0 1

1 3

3 7

1 7

2 16 16 15 3

18.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 0

0 2

0 0

0 10 6

11 1

24.5 MPH 0

0 0

2 0

1 1

1 l

24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 STABILITY F SPEE0 N

NNE NE ENE E

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WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

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0 0

2 2

2 7

2 1

3 2

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0 2.5 MPH 3

2 0

0 4

3 7

6 2

2 4

3 2

1 6

2 3.5 MPH 2

0 0

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5 5

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1 1

1 0

1 1

4 4.5 MPH 3

1 0

0 2

5 3

0 0

0 2

5 5.5 MPH 1

1 0

0 1

4 2

2 0

1 0

0 1

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1 6.5 MPH 3

0 0

2 0

0 0

1 2

0 0

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0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

1 12.5 MPH 3

C 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

2 0

4 18.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

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0 0

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0 0

0 7615G072384

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3-57

TABLE 3.11 (continued) i STABILITY E l

SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

0 l

1,5 MPH 1

4 5

2 2

3 1

7 4

1 2

5 0

1 0

1 2.5 MPH 6

3 7

10 7

12 7

3 6

3 3

7 9

10 2

9 3.5 MPH 3

3 8

11 23 14 9

5 5

7 3

2 8

6 4

3 4.5 MPH 11 5

5 12 25 7

10 7

11 0

2 0

5 9

3 6

5.5 MPH 11 2

3 3

6 13 5

10 3

9 2

2 1

6 4

7 6.5 MPH

-13 2

0 2

1 2

1 5

4 3

2 2

3 1

3 5

7.5 MPH 1

5 1

0 3

4 1

2 4

3 0

1 1

4 3

2 12.5 MPH 8

2 2

2 0

1 0

9 10 6

6 9

9 18 12 8

18.5 MPH 1

0 0

4 2

1 8

4 5

5 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 0

1 1

0 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0

'3' STABILITY F as SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

0 1.5 MPH 1

0 0

0 4

6 8

10 8

7 5

7 3

3 2

3 2.5 MPH 1

2 1

2 5

11 10 6

5 5

9 4

4 4

3 4

3.5 MPH 3

3 0

0 7

12 5

3 5

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6 4.5 MPH 4

1 2

2 9

8 2

3 2

1 0

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0 1

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3 2

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1 3

3 3

5 6.5 MPH 2

0 1

0 0

1 0

0 0

1 1

1 3

2 3

3 7.5 MPH 1

0 0

2 0

0 0

0 1

3 1

3 12.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 1

0 1

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0 0

0

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0 0

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0 0

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0 0

0 7615G072384

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3-61

-i TABLE-3.12~(continued)

STABILITY E SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E --

ESE SE SSE-S SSW SW WSW W

WW NW

'NNW CALM 0-0

-0 0

0 0

0 0-

-0 0

0, 0

0 0-1.5 WH '

1 0

2 0

2 2

2 ~

1 0

2 2

0-2 0

2.5 MPH 5

1 1

'l 7

2 1

5 8

4 4

9 8

2.

4 4

3.5 MH 5

6 3

1 14 9

6 3

15 15 8

13 5

6 3

1 4.5 WH 5

1 3

3 4

9 10 10 11 8

11 3

3 4

'3 7

5.5 MPH 3

4

-1 1-5 5

4 13 11 8

1 1

1 3

4 4

6.5 MPH 4

3 2

1 1

0.

6 8

5 7

3 2

0 4

4 2

7.5 MPH 3

1 0

0 1

1 2

4 4

0 0

0 1

1 7

1 12.5 MPH 6

2 0

0 0'

0 3

3 11 5

2 1

4 7

12 8

18.5 MPH-1 0-0 0

0 0'

-0 0

4 4

0 0

1 0

4 1

24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 u

g STABILITY F SPEED N

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0 0

'O O

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0 2

1 3

3 2

3 7

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2 5

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1 1

0 6

10 8

4 5

5 9

3 6

3 1

3 3.5 MPH 1

1 0

3 4

5 7

3 1

2 2

3 2

1 3

2 4.5 MPH 1

1 1

2 2

4 6

3 1

1 4

3 2

3 5.5 WH

'O 1

0 0

1 1

-3 2

1 0

0 1

1 2

2 2

6.5 MPH 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 2

2 7.5 MPH 4

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

1 1

0 12.5 MPH 0

.0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 2

2 18.5 WH 0

0 0

0 1

0 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 0-0 0

0 0

0 24.6+ MPH'

-0 0

0

.0 0

0 0

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3-65

-TABLE 3.13 (continued)

STABILITY E i

SPEED' N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW i

CALM 0

0 0'

0 0

0 i

-1.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

1 2.5 MPH 4

1 0-2 l-0 0

0 1

1 3

2 2

3 2

2 3

3.5 MPH 0

1 1

0 0

2 2

0 4

4 4

3 0

1 0

1 i

4.5 MPH 0

1-1 0

1 4

4 6

4 3

4 5

3 2

0 0

-5.5 MPH 1

1 1

1 2

3 6

10 2

3 0

2 5

1 6.5 MPH 0

1 1

0 0

0 1

1 4

2 0

1 2

0 1

1 7.5 MPH 0

0 0

~0 2

2 3

7 2

2 1

3 2

1 12.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 5

3 1

1 3

4 4

0 18.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 0

0 1

0 24.5 MPH 0

0

-0 0

0 0

0 2

0 0

24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 Y

STABILITY F g;

SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

0 0

0 1.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 2.5 MPH 0

1 0

0 0

1 1

1 0

2 0

0 0

1 3.5 MPH 0

0 1

1 0

0 1

0 0

1 4

0 1

1 1

0 4.5 MPH 0

0 0

1 1

0 1

1 0

0 4

0 0

0 5.5 MPH 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

0 1

1 i

6.5 MPH 1

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 7.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 12.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1

0 18.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 7615G072384

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3-71

....- -...~.-

1 TABLE 3.15.J0 INT FREQUENCY TABLE - NUMBER OF OCCURANCES OF WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION FOR EACH STABILITY CLASS-JULY 1976-JUNE 1977 ALL TEMPERATURES STABILITY A SPEED'

'N NNE.

NE ENE E-ESE SE SSE S-SSW SW WSW.

W WNW-NW NNW CALM 1

0 1

0 0

0, 1

0-

~0 1

0 0

0 2

1.5 MPH 3

2

'O O

0.

0 3

1 0

1 3

7 3

2 5

8

+

2.5 MPH 10 6

4 0

.0

-1 3

0 2-2 3

5 7

8 11 10

'3.5 MPH 7

7 2

2 5

2 1

-4 1

2 4

6-4 6

5 14 i-4.5 MPH 18 12

.1 2

4 4

3 2

11 17 14 5

7 17 l

5.5 MPH 24 7

3 1

0 2

4 5

4 2

10 8

9 9

13 13 l

6.5 MPH 15 14 5

5 3

2 1

6 2

3 6

13 12 5

14 15-7.5 MPH 13 6

3 1

1 0

0 4

2 3

6 9

9 7

19 18 12.5 MPH-57 17 7

6 4;

3-7 7

7 29 38 26 49 65 86

~79 18.5 MPH 2<4 4

1 0-0' 1

2 5

1 7

13 7

32 40 56 38 24.5 MPH 4

1 0

0 0

0-0 0

0 0

0 6

17 7

t 24.6+ MPH 6

1 0

0-0~

0 0

1 3

5 u>

STABILITY B

! ;g '

1

}

SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE-S SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

~0 0

0 0

.0 0

0 0

0 1.5 MPH 1

2 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 4

2.5 MPH 1-0

'l 1

0 0

1 2

2 0

0 2

3.5 MPH 1

1 0

0 0

0 l

1 2

0 1

1 0

1 4

1 e

4.5 MPH 1-0

.0-0 0

0 2

0 1-1 1

3 2

0 0

3 3.

5.5 MPH 0

2 0

0 0

1 3

1 2

2 0

2 1

0 1

'6.5 MPH 2

0 2

2 0

0 1

1 2

1 0

0 0

3 2

5 7.5 MPH 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

1 0

1 1

1 12.5 MPH 2

0 0

3 1

-0 2

1 1

7 7

4 10 8

10 12 j.

18.5 MPH 3

2 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

2 5

6 9

9 24.5 MPH 1

0-0 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 2

4 5

l 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 1

1 i

7615G072384

t.

TABLE. 3.15, (continued) :

STABILITY C.,

SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

'ESE SE SSE-S SSW.

SW -

WSW.

-W-lWNW

'NW NW CALM 0

0

'O 0

0 0

0 1

1 0'

0

-0 0

0 0

0 l

1.5 MPH 0

0 0

0.

0 0

0' 0

1 1

1 1-

.0 0

1 0

2.5 MPH 0

1 0

0 0

1 1

0 0

0 2

0 1

0 :.

3.5 MPH 0

1-1 0

1 1

0 0

1 1

1 0-0 1

0 1

I 4.5 MPH 1

0 0

1 1

1 3

1 2

0 1

0 5.5 MPH 0

0 1

1 0

1-0

'2 2

2 1

1 0

0 l

6.5 MPH 0

0 0

1

'0 2

0 0

2 1

3 3-0 1

0 1

i 7.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 1-1 0

1 1

3 2

1:

1 1

1 2.

12.5 MPH 4

3 1

1 1

0 2

6 3

0 4

6 8'

4 18.5 MPH 4

0 0

3 2

'O 3

4' 4

4 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 0,

O.

0 0

0.

0 0

2 9

2 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

2 2-0 i

uy STABILITY D 1

i SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S-SSW SW WSW.

W WNW W

-NNW j

CALM 0

0 3

0 1

0

0 0

0 1

0-0 1

0 i

4 l

1.5 MPH 5

6 7

5 5

3' 3

4 4

5 3

3 5_

5 4

5 j

2.5 MPH 5

8 11 14 8

7 3.

7 2

4

.6 41 9

6 8

9 l

3.5 MPH 18 11 7

5 14-13 10-11 8

10 10 13 8

6 12 10 i

4.5 MPH 13 9

8 10 12 15 13 9

16.

16 14.

11 10 10 8

17 i

5.5 MPH 7

12 4

9 14 18 11-16-16 15 14 14 5

9 12 11 l

6.5 MPH 11 9

8 8

13 16 18 14 19 17 13 13 11 12 7

5 7.5 MPH 11 6

5 4

11 14 14 8

14 9

7 10 14 15 14.

10 12.5 MPH 16 9

9 8

18 45 21 18 34 40' 27.

27-63

95 125 55 18.5 MPH 12 3

0 0

1 2

-5

.0 2

12 19 9

27 87 93 46.

=

24.5 MPH 2

1 0

0

.0 0

0 1-0 1

1 0

6 36 48 12

)

24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0' 0

0 0

0

'O.

0 2

13 15-2.

i P

7615G072384

TABLE 3.15 (continued)

STABILITY E SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW

'WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

1 2

1 3

0 1

1 0

1-0 1

2 2

3 1

1.5 MPH 16 8

9 9

10 5

11 5

4 5

10 10 17' 4

'8 9

2.5 MPH 12 11 15 8

11 15 9

11 7

5 10 12 10 13 10 14 3.5 MPH 17 19 15 12 19 18 20 16 18 19 22 21 24 12 18.

21 4.5 MPH 24 15 22 14 23 12 13 25 23 15 19 22 26

-22 19 27 5.5 MPH 19 12 8

8 17 14 21 27 19 19 23 28 46 25 23 30 6.5 MPH 17 11 14 4

12 13 15 10 15 22 21 23 45 21 23 27 7.5 MPH 14 16 7

6 11 13 14 6

24 26 15 20 35 36 18 23 12.5 MPH 27 22 10 6

10 12 19 11 28 60 43 32 73 119 103 73 18.5 MPH 15 3

0 0

1 0

0 1

2 9

5 3

18 54 52 20 24.5 MPH 1

2 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 3

14 9

3 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0' 0

0 0

0 2

0 kl STABILITY F SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

1 4

0 2

2 2

1 1

2 1

1 1

2 2

0 1.5 MPH 5

13 8

9 11 10 8

4 11-10 11 6

15 10 11 4

2.5 MPH 11 1

5 10 12

'9 10 9

5 11 11 12 12 13 17 10 3.5 MPH 7

9 5

7 6

14 11 4

11 9

11 13 17 8

9 16 4.5 MPH 16 8

7 5

5 9

8 9

11 10 22 14 27 8

17 13 5.5 MPH 10 4

8 5

3 2

2 7

1 8

10 7

10 12 8

9 6.5 MPH 3

7 1

1 4

0 3

4 3

7 10 8

12 4

3 11 7.5 MPH 4

1 0

1 3

0 0

1 3

2 2

3 9

8 6

5 12.5 MPH 12 3

0 0

2 3

2 0

2 3

4 8

8 3

4 7

18.5 MPH 1

0 0

1 0

0 0

2 0

1 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 4

- 7615G072384

TABLE 3.15 (continued)

STABILITY G SPEED N

NNE NE ENE E

ESE SE SSE S

SSW SW :

WSW W

WNW NW NNW CALM 0

3 5

0 0

2-1 1

2 0-1 1.

0 2-0 0

1.5 MPH 5

2 8

4 6

4 2

5 9

9 11 6

11 2

6 3-2.5 MPH 5

3 4-3 13 12 8

7 3

5 12 4

7-3 10.

4 3.5 MPH 3

6 8

10 13 11 3

7 9

5-9 12 14

-11 7

8 4.5 MPH 4

7 5

1 2

3 2

5 11 6

8 7 4 110 -

6 5.5 MPH 4

1 1

0 5

3 2

l-1 5

4 2

'4 1

3 9

6.5 MPH 4

0 0

2 0

2 3

5 1

2 1

1 1

3 7.5 MPH 7

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

1 R

1 0

2 3

12.5 MPH 3

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

0 0-2 P

2 0

3' 18.5 MPH 1

0 0

0 t:

0 1

1 24.5 MPH 0

0 0

0

~0 0

0 0

24. 6+ MPH 0

0 0

0

<a i

I I

I 7615G072384 i

l TABLE 3.16 FRACTION OF HOUR IN EACH TEMPERATURE RANGE IN 1982 METEOROLOGICAL DATA Temperature Range,*F Fraction in Range

<5 0.007620 5-15 0.017702 15-25 0.056038 25-35 0.129191 35-45 0.147479 45-55 0.141266 55-65 0.218288 t-65-75 0.185346 75-85 0.088042 85-95 0.009027

> 95 0.000000 L

l l-I' 3-76

'7601G07238431 l

TABLE'3.17. CONTROLLROOM FLOW AND VOLUME DATA

- Flow Rates (cfm) 0 69667 0

UB 25383 Ul 13600 I

UI2 15810 UI3 8074 UO1 0

UO2 0

U03 0

. Compartment Volumes (c'ubic feet)

V1 114900 Y2 70400 V3 70400

- Yolume 1 contains the control room M

3-77 760lG07238432

TABLE 3.18 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDENCE OF T0XIC LIMITS

.IN CONTROL ROOM, GIVEN A MAJOR RELEASE, INTEGRATED OVER TRACK WITHIN FIVE MILES OF TMI-1 Chemical Roy Shocks i -

Acetic Acid, Glacial'

.010934

.002872 Acetic Anhydride

.000679

.000000 Acrylonitrile

.014661 Ammonia, Anhydrous

.026145

.023608 Bromine

.082288

. Chlorine

.078189 Ct.romic Fluoride

.102293 Coal Tar, Light 011

.003605 Ethyl Acrylate

.004377

.000227 Ethylene Oxide

.023453 Formaldehyde-

.000001 Hexane

.000000-Hydrochloric Acid

.002672

. Hydrogen Fluoride, Anhydrous

.102293

.094398

Phosphorus Oxychloride

.079749 Propylene Oxide

.012521

' Vinyl Acetate

.034216 Vinyl Chloride

.015827

.009610 t

3-78

. 7601G072584

(.

h 4.0 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF A 10CFR100 RELEASE GIVEN A CONTROL ROOM LONCENTRATION IN EXCESS OF T0XIC LIMITS Following' the calculation of A and f fr m Equation 0-1) in T

R-T Sections'2 and 3, respectively, the fina[ steps are to calculate the

' conditional probability that a 10CFR100 release will occur. This calculation requires evaluating f,d,f,, and fCF and using n$ values from Reference 19.

The frequency of' shipment of all chemical / rail line combinations that passed the screening test described in Section.3 were multiplied by the-values from Reference 19 divided by 1.5 as shown in Table 4-1.

The 1.5 factor was applied because the data was the total for 18 months. As seen in _ Table 4-1, the frequency of shipment of the chemicals of concern ranged between 26 'and 2900 per year with a total of about 5900 per year.

Table 4-1 NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS PER YEAR OF THE IMPORTANT HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS (nj)

Shipments Chemical Line per Year Acetic Acid Shocks 79.3 Roy 26 L

. Acetic Anhydride Shocks 34.7 Roy 34.7 Acrylonitrile Shocks 134.7 Ammon4, Anhydrous Shocks 180 Roy 46 Bromine Shocks 47.3 Chlorine Shocks 1046 Chromic Flouride Roy 127.3 Coal Tar, Light Oil Shocks 118.7 Ethyl Acrylate Shocks 334.7 Ethylene Oxide Shocks 236.7 Formaldehyde, 37 wt%

Shocks 50.7 Hydrofluoric Acid, Anhydrous Shocks 96 Roy 42.7 Phosporous Oxychloride Shocks 41.3 Propylene Oxide Shocks 236.7 Vinyl Acetate Shocks 32 Vinyl Chloride Shocks 2888.7 Roy 42 t

7618G072484 4-1

4.1 TOTAL FRACTION OF THE TIME WHEN OPERATOR ACTION IS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE T0XIC CHEMICAL RELEASE INITIATED SCENARIOS (I f )

3 In the scenarios considered so far a railroad car ' filled with a toxic chemical has ruptured' and the resulting toxic plume has made it to the control room air intake and has inffitrated the control room in a 4

concentration in excess of the toxic limit value.

In order to be concentrated enough the toxic plume half width will be between 50 and 150 feet. For many of these chemicals, the operator will isolate the control room prior to the TLY being reached-based on smell or skin irritation.

In some cases, however, he will not be aware of the situation in time.

It.was estimated that depending on the chemical the conditional probability of failing to isolate ranges between 1.0 and 0.1; the mean value appears to be approximately 0.3.

For convenience, this factor is considered as part of the failure of the operator to recover as described I

in Section 4.2.

p In' cases where the control room remains unisolated, two situations may evolve from the operator's extreme discomfort at being exposed to the TLV:

1.

most likely the operator will trip the plant because of his apprehension about his ability to perform or_

fi. he will become incapacitated prior to being able to trip the plant.

i If the operator trips the plant, normally operating systems will insert the control rods, trip the turbine, rampback the feedaater, and dump steam thereby leveling off at the steam dump and feed flow rates required to' remove decay heat. No operator action is required.

If the plant.

- continues to run, it will do so until some onsite or effsite disturbance causes the-plant to trip automatically. On the average, this happens 8-10 times per yea, which means that the likelihood per operating hour of

- the plant tripping is about 1.6 x 10-3, not nearly as likely as the 4-2 7618G072484

operator _ tripping manually.

In either case; one of the systems which

.must respond' automatically will need to fail in order for operator response to be required to prevent a 10CFR100 release.

It was assumed that-the operator tripped the plant.

In the process of performing Phase I of the TMI-1 PRA [Ref. 28] an event tree was developed for the case where 'an automatic or manual turbine /

reactor trip occurs.

This event ' tree is shown in Figure 4-1; the top events and their conditional split fractions are defined in Table 4-2.

As _can be seen from comparing Figure 4-1 and Table 4-2; if no systems

-(top events) fail; as in scenario 1; end state "0" (for success) results without operator intervention. Among tha top events in this tree EF+,

EF, TH; BF; RE; CD; HL and DH require manual actuation of important systems. These actions (except for TH ) are only required if some other automatically actuated ' system has failed.

Preliminary estimates

made for Phase I of the 1NI-1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (based on the current plant design) showed that the most likely of these systems to fail would be the main feedwater system failing to rampback in response to a turbine / reactor trip (MF, MF+; see scenarios 15-32 in Figure 4-1).

This _rampback is done under control of the ICS.

If this rampback fails, given the current plant design, operator action will be required to reestablish feedwater flow to a steam generator (EF). This action must be performed within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to prevent core uncovery and the onset of core damage.- Based on the detailed ICS analysis performed for the Midland PRA and used in the TPRA Phase I analysis, the total of likelihood of all automatic actuation failures which could lead to the

[

requirement-for operator response is 0.05.

This number is dominated by i'

failure to rampback feedwater but also includes SD, MF+ and the others.

I l

I

TH was found to be unnecessary unless an excessive cooldown initiating event cccurs.

4-3

' 7618G080284

LEGEND:

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g g

g A0 ALREADY OCCURRED a

9 5

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8 8

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-- w ~

7 STCX 7

8 XFR1 8

g g

9 XFR1 15

W---------

10 XFR1 22 un----------.

11 XFR1 29 g

12 XFR1 36 13 XFR1 43 14 XFR7 50 m-15 STAR 71 16 STBX 72 17 STAP 73 l

18 STB 1 74 19 STC1 75

=-

20 STCX 76 a -

21 STAR 77

[

22 STBX 78 23 STAP 79 I

24 STB 1 80 m-25 STC1 81 I

=-

26 STCX 82 w-27 STBX 83

[

I m-28 STB 1 84 n-29 STC1 85 I

m-30 STCX 86

- = - = - - - - - - -

31 XFR4 87 I

=-m-------

32 XFR5 93 I

33 XFR8 97 n----------------

34 XFR2 139 35 XFR6 165 36 Xm9 193 w_--------.

37 XFR10 329

=-=-=-=-=-==-----------------

38 XFR2 493 m -w -w - -----

39 XFR10 519

= -w w-

, - = -. - - -.

40 XFR3 683

[ [

we -

41 XFR3 689

[

=-

42 STD1 695 g

w-43 STB 3 696

=-

44 STC2 697 I

=-

45 STCY 698 46 XFR11 699

=-

47 XFR12 715

=+--=-.=-w-=-------

48 XFR5 747 m

- = -w -= -

. = -w -w - - - - - - -

49 XFR5 751

=-.

= - =+.- m 50 XFR11 755

[I

..:=-w----------

51 XFR13 7 71

=I

-w---------------

52 XFR14 781 w--w -= -w -= - - - - - - -

53 XFR5 807

= -

-w -= - w -w.- w -*= -w -we - - - - - - -

54 XFR5 811 FIGURE 4-1 GENERAL TRANSIENT EVENT TREE (SHEET 1 Of 4) 4-4

IIGEND:

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w 11 48 11 12 4A 12 g

13 48 13 14 40 14 m

C 17 0 17 ac 18 2C 18

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=

u 22 4D 22

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^:

23 4C 23 I

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w 24 40 24

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25 0 25 I

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e 28 2D 28

=

v 29 2D 29

,m 30 o so I

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32 4D 32 33 xm4 m

r-34 0 43

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I 35 2C 44 g

36 2D 45 a

37 0 46 38 2C 47 39 2D 48 40 0 49 41 4C 50 g

42 40 51 m

=

43 40 52

n 44 4C 53 I

45 m 54

=

46 40 55

=:

47 0 56 I

"I 48 2G 57 I

49 2H 58 50 0 59 51 2G 60 I

52 2H 61

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FIGURE 4-1.

GENERAL SUBTREE STRUCTURE FOR A AND B SUBTREES (Sheet 2 Of 4) 4-5

EGGD:

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5 w o AO ALREADY OCCURRED g

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b b

N b

b

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CS BV C1 C2 F1 Q

CS CD M.

SR DH Ce I

54 0 63 g

55 4G 64 56 4H 65 w

57 4H 66 58 4G 67 g

59 4H 68 60 4H 69 r

^=

61 0 70 AM 62 2G 71 r

63 0 72 g

ac 64 2G 73

=

u1 65 2H 74 66 0 75 g

ac 67 4G 76

N -u 68 4H 77 40--

69 4G 78 g

=

70 4H 79

^=

71 0 80

E 72 2H 81 r

73 0 82 g

74 2H 83

=

75 2H 84 a

r 76 0 85 g

e 77 4H 86 MM 78 4H 87 79 XR4 88 g

r 80 0 98 I

g*

81 2G 99 82 2H 100 m

r 83 0 1 01 g

84 2G 102 g

85 2H 103 i

86 0 104 g

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=

89 4H 107

.=

90 4G 108 g

91 4H 109

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92 4H 11 0

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w 96 2F 114

4 97 2F 115 98 0 116

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=

99 4F 117

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100 4F 11 8 m

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-- 101 4F 119

=r

102 XFR1 120 g

,----------------- 103 XFR2 134 m-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 4 Xm5 152 v:

=r

105 XFR1 165

106 XFR2 179

= C ---------------

107 Xm5 197 w C ---------------

m

=

108 XFR6 210 FIGURE 4-1 (continued)

(Sheet 3 Of 4) l 4-6

NOTES FOR FIGURE 4-1 1.

Because core damage takes place after the BWST is empty, sprays are available and able to pump out of the sump. Sprays did not burn up early. They cannot remove heat from the containment because of DH failure; instead, the fans do it.

2.

.The sump is not available to the sprays, so they fail for the reasons noted in comment (1).

3.

Sprays would be actuated before BWST empties and before containment fails (without sprays containment heat removal would occur at about the same time).

4. - For success, the sprays must keep on working after recirculation switchover.

5.

There is nothing left to take suction off of the sump. The spray-must work in ~ order to do long term containment heat removal.

6.

There is no containment heat removal after core damage here, the fans have failed, and the sump / spray water is not being cooled.

7.

The big hole in containment will prevent containment pressure from reaching 4 psi or 30 psi until core damage.

8.

If containment spray and DH fail, there is not enough containment heat removal when one train of containment fan cooler is down, but scrubbing could still work if at least one train of spray works.

In the first scenario, neither train of sprays works; in the second scenario, one train works.

9.

Since DH has failed, sprays cannot do long term containment heat removal.

10. With such a big hole in the reactor building, the pressure never goes high enough.

11.. Because one train of containment spray has already failed, two out of two trains can never work; therefore, containment heat removal must fail.

FIGURE 4-1 (continued)

(Sheet 4 of 4 )

4-7 0076G050484

TABLE 4-2.

EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS Sheet 1 of 9 Event Tree Conditional Systems Top Event Involved Split Fraction Description Name Name AH Pressurizer Operator regains pressurizer Heaters level and reestablishes subcooling such that core heat removal continues via subcooled natural circulation.

AH-1 e All support systems available.

AH-1(M/3) e Only one train of support available.

BF PORY BF-1 Operator holds open PORY for HPI cooling.

BY BWST BV-1 BWST discharge valves DH-VSA and Discharge DH-V5B remain open, check valves DH-V14A and DH-V14B open on demand, and flow is maintained through them for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

-BW BWST BW-1 Borated water is available from the BWST until recirculation.

Also includes failure of both LPI/BS discharge valves (DH-V5A and DH-V5B and DH-V14A and DH-V14B) to open on demand.

C1/C2 Reactor Isolation of reactor building Building purge supply and exhaust on Isolation demand and remain isolated until the demand is removed.

Cl-1 e All support systems available.

Cl-1(M/M) e Only one train of AC power available.

Cl-1(R/E) e Train A of ESAS is unavailable.

Cl-1(GAGB) e No AC power is available.

Given a failure of C1, the containment opening is small

(< 3 inches).

C2-1 e All suport systems available.

C2-1(E/E) e Only one train of AC power is available.

C2-1(R/E) o Only one train of ESAS is available.

I C2-1(GAGB) e No AC power is available.

C2-1(UT) e Small opening is given.

0076G043084 4-8

[

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 2 of 9 Event Tree

. Top Event Systems Conditional

. Invol ved Split Fraction Description Name Name CD Backup.

Cooldown and depressurization Instrument of the RCS.

Air, ADVs, CD-1 e Using ADVs and pressurizer Pressurizer Spray, Decay spray or holding PORV open given HPI is available. Also Heat Removal includes opening of the DHR Discharge discharge valves (DH-V4A and Valves DH-V4B).

CD-2 e

Using PORV, holding it open (given HPI is available).

Also includes opening of the DHR discharge valves.

CD-3 e Like CD-1 but for SGTR.

CD-4 e Like CD-2 but for SGTR.

CS/C*

Reactor Provides containment energy Building removal function (only asked Spray upon a failure of reactor building; emergency cooling).

CS-1 e One of two trains of reactor building spray actuates automatically and operates for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

CS-1(M/Gli) e One of one train of reactor building spray actuates automatically and operates for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

CS-2 e Two of two trains of reactor building spray actuate automatically and operate for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

CS-3 e One of two trains similar to CS-1 except add SR.

CS-3 (M/GT e Similar to CS-3 except one of one train.

CV Control Provides control building Building ventilation for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Ventilation CV-1 e One of two trains operates.

CV-1('07) e Like CV-1 except offsite power is unavailable.

CV-1(E/Gli) e Like CV-1 (0P) except one diesel is unavailable.

4-9 0076G043084

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 3 of 9 Event Tree-Conditional Top Event-f{yo Split Fraction Description st s eg Name Name DA,DB DC Power, One train of DC power and vital

. Vital AC AC power are available for Power 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

DA/DB-1 e One of two trains is available.

DA/DB-1(UF/U70 e Availability of one train given that the other train has failed.

DH-Decay Decay heat removal manual Heat actuation and operation for Removal 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

DH-1 e One of two trains actuates.

DH-2 e One of two trains actuates in recirculation mode.

DH-1(I3I/TRI) e One of one train actuates.

DH-2(UX'/UF) e One of one train actuates in recirculation mode.

DH-3 e One of two trains actuates in piggyback recirculation mode.

DH-3(U7i/I3T) e One of one train actuates in piggyback recirculation mode.

.DT-Auxiliary DT-1 Operator.must establish auxiliary Spray spray flow to prevent long _ term Line boron concentration effects.

Actions must be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the LORI.

EA/EB ESAS One train of engineered safeguard actuation is available upon demand.

EA/EB-1 e One of two trains _available.

EA/EB-1(N/EK) e Availability of one train given that the other train has failed.

EF+-

Emergency Both trains of EFW are controlled Feedwater to prevent overcooling the primary.

EF+1 e Manual start and control.

EF+2 e Automatic start and control.

4-10 0076G050784-

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 4 of 9

. Event Tree Conditional if Top Event hyg1ved Split Fraction Description tems Name Name EF-Emergency The emergency feedwater system Feedwater is supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from the primary.

EF-1 e Manual initiation (one of

- three pumps required).

EF-2 e Automatic initiation (one of three pumps required).

EF-2(M/E) e Like EF-2 but only one train of support is available.

EF-2(B W) e Like EF-2 but no AC power is available.

EF-3

-e Like EF-2 but requires turbine-driven pump or both motor-driven pumps.

EF-4 e Like EF-3 except manual initiation.

EF-3(M/N) e Like EF-3 but only one train of support is available.

EF-5 e One out of two motor-driven pumps required after turbine-driven pump becomes unavailable (automatic initiation).

EF-5(M/E) e Like EF-5 except only one support train is available.

F1/F2 Reactor Provides containment energy Building removal function (in conjunction Emergency with top event [CS]).

Cooling CF-1 e Requires all three reactor building emergency cooling coils and fan units operating, being supplied cooling water from at least one reactor river water pump (three of three work).

I 4-11 0076G050484

W TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 5 of 9

- Event Tree Conditional i

Top Event '

- f{ygj'),s S

d Split Fraction Description Name Name CF-2 o Requires both remaining emergency cooling coils and fan units operating, being supplied cooling water from at least one reactor river water pump, given that one reactor building emergency i

cooling coil has failed (two of two remaining must operate).

GA/GB

Diesel Availability of power to one Generators, train of Class 1E switchgear All 1E AC from the diesel generators for Switchgear 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following a loss of offsite power.

GA/GB-1 e Availability of a given 1

train (A or B).

GB-1(E70 e Availability of one train given that the other train has failed.

HA/HB Decay Heat One train of cooling water to River. Water, the decay heat closed cycle Decay Heat, cooler is available for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

- Closed Cycle -

HA/HB-1 e One of two trains available.

Cooling HB-1(HA')

e-~ Availability of one train given that the other. train has failed.

. HL-Decay-Heat Operator action to line up the Removal DHR system for various modes of of operation.-

HL-1 e Open three of three dropline -

valves from control room and one of two manual valves locally. Valves must open on demand and remain open for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (includes long term water supply).

HL-2 e,0 pen both trains of piggyback valves (DH-V7A.and DH-V7B).

' t 4-12 LOO 76G043084

+

w,w'-

y tw ey cw

+me-=

-w,

.,--r ev-

--+-w-yc-g-s-a, m-y-_*w,ww.--------eus-,

rr--e-yt-,,-e-gr-+-w--e--,

y 4

t-

-,-=c-.,-w-f

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 6 of 9 Event Tree Conditional Top Event hy01ed split Fraction Description st s Name Name HP High Initiation of high pressure Pressure injection and continued operation Injection for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

HP-1 e Automatic initiation of one of two trains through one injection path.

HP-1IN e Automatic initiation of one of one train injecting through one injection path with only one train of support available.

HP-2 e Automatic initiation of one of two trains injecting through two injection paths.

HP-2XS e Like HP-2 except only one train of support is available.

HP-3 e Like HP-1 except manual initiation.

HP-3I5 e Like HP-3 but only one train of support is available.

HP-4 e Automatic initiation of two of two trains.

HP-5 e Like HP-4 except manual initiation.

ID Control Room ID-1 Operator identifies a steam Instrumentation generator tube rupture as such; otherwise, operator is assumed to take it for a very small LORI.

LP Low Pressure LP-1 One of two trains of LPI actuates Injection automatically and injects for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

LP-1I5 e Like LP-1 except only one train of support is available.

LT Makeup to LT-1 Operator provides a long term BWST/MUT water source for injection by either refilling the BWST or makeup tank within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

LT-2 e Like LT-1 but at least one -

PSV must be open for decay heat removal.

4-13 0076G043084

1" TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 7 of 9 Event Tree Conditional Top Event f{y01ed Split Fraction Description ste s Name Name MF+1 Main MF+1 Both trains of main feedwater Feedwater ramp back to the correct rate to prevent overcooling of the Core.

MF-Main MF-1 Main faedwater ramps back to Feedwater no less than the proper flow on at least one steam generator to assure adequate heat removal from the primary.

MF-2 Operator action to reestablish'.

main feedwater flow after isolation by the steam line rupture detection system.

NS Nuclear Sufficient cooling to nuclear River services closed cycle cooling

Water, system loads for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Nuclear NS-1 e One of two trains.

Services NS-1(UF) e One of two trains start and Closed Cycle run after a loss of offsite Cooling power.

10P Offsite OP-1 Availability of offsite power Power following a turbine trip.

P0 PORY PORY operation on demand for RCS pressure relief or RCS cooling, stays open until demand is removed.

P0-1 e Automatic opening, passes steam.

'PO-2 e Automatic opening, passes water.

PY PSys PSVs open on demand and remain open until demand is removed.

PV-1 e One of two PSVs opens,

~~

passes steam.

PV-2 e Two of two PSVs open, pass steam.

PV-3 e Like PV-1 but passes water.

PV-4 e Like PV-2 but pass water.

4-14 0076G050484

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 8 of 9 Event Tree Conditional fnv01ed Split Fraction Description Top Event Name Name RC PSVs, PORV Both PSVs close after demand is removed.

RC-1 e After passing steam.

RC-2 e After passing water.

-RC-3 e After passing water and HPI is throttled.

PORV closes after demand is removed.

RC-4 e After passing steam.

RC-5 e After passing water.

RC-6 e After passing water and HPI is throttled.

All PORV/PSVs close after demand is removed.

RC-7 e After passing steam.

RC-8 e After passing water.

RC-9 e After passing water and HPI is throttled.

RE River Water RE-1 Recover HPI flow after RCP seal and Closed failure but in time to prevent Cycle Cooling core damage.

Water Intermediate Operation of RCP thermal barrier RE-2 Closed cooling to prevent RCP seal Cooling Water leakage.

e All support systems available.

One train of all support e

systems failed.

RT Reactor RT-1 All control rod assemblies Protection except one insert into the core on demand.

RT-1(UF)

Like RT-1 except offsite power is lost.

SD MSSVs Suffir P m FG' s on each steam genet.st., ?n noen on demand and re.ain opea antil the demand is removed.

SD-1 e One of nine MSSVs per steam generator.

50-2 e Two of nine MSSVs per steam generator.

o 4

4-15 0076G043084

TABLE 4-2 (continued)

Sheet 9 of 9 Event Tree Conditional Top Event fY Split Fraction Description Name nvo ed Name SE RCP Seals SE-1 Seal integrity is maintained.

SE-2 Pressure vessel integrity is maintained after an excessive cooldown transient.

SR Reactor Reactor building sump must be Sump SR-1 e

Operator action to open sump isolation valves.

SR-2 e Both sump isolation valves open manually (includes valve hardware failures).

TC MSSVs TC-1 All MSSYs, ADVs, and TBVs must ADVs close upon remeval of demand.

TBVs TC-2 Like TC-1 but includes isolating steam to EFW pump turbine from generator after SGTR.

TH HPI Operator throttles HPI flow before pumping open PORV/PSVs with water.

TH-1 e

lhrottle using MU-V217.

TH-2 e

Throttle using MU-V16A,.

MU-V16B, MU-V16C, and MU-V160.

TT Turbine TT-1 All turbine stop valves or all Stop and turbine control valves close on Control demand.

Valves 4-16 0076G050484

.4.2 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY THAT THE MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED TO BE MADE CAN BE'(f )

M In those situations requiring manual action after the control room

. concentration has exceeded the TLV, the operator may don a Scott-Af rPack and _still be able to act or operators not in the control building may enter it to help out. The plume half widths must be fairly narrow if the concentration is to exceed the TLV in the control room. 'Any operators

^

outside the part of the plume which exceeds the TLY wili not be incapacitated. Since the maximum plume. half width is about 150 feet operators may come from most locations onsite other than the control

- building or from offsite. - These operators would don breathing apparati and/or protective clothing and enter the control building to, for instance, actuate high pressure injection to keep tta core covered.

Based on the time available to act, the distance from which the new operators must come and the stress. involved in the situation an estimate

. of 0.1 for the conditional probability of failing to perform the required manual actuations was made. This number is comparable to the likelihood

. developed in Reference 25 for the operator failing to recover electric power during a station blackout wherein the same amount of time and comparable stress levels exist.

-4.3 FRACTION OF UNC0VERED CORES WHICH LEAD TO A 10CFR100 0FFSITE DOSE RATE (fEF)

If manual actions fail and core is uncovered, it will be damaged, releasing the fission products-from the fuel rods either through the primary safety valves or through the reactor vessel bottom. These fission products will be released to the containment atmosphere. The containment will_ be isolated-and the sprays will scrub fission products from the air and the fan coolers will protect the containment integrity.

,g All _of.this will happen automatically unless an automatic actuation I

fails. The small amount of fission products released will depend on the I

normally allowed containment leakage. Normally allowed containment L

leakage will not result in a 10CFR100 release, because this leak rate is

[

set in order to assure that this does not happen given a design basis accident wherein 100% of the fission products are liberated from the fuel, i

l ~

7618G072484 4-17 l..

l

The likelihood that one of the containment safety features fails or that the coatainment fails from being overstressed is much less than 10-2 as shown in Reference 25 and 28. This nu.nber will probably be limited by the failure of the containment building sprays or fan coolers or by the loss of control building ventilation which will fail both, i

k 4-18 7618G072484

5.0 TOTAL'RESULTS All of the data described in Sections 2-4 were combined using Equation 1-1 to form the results shown in Table 5-1.

The table also

. sums these scenario results and subtracts out the frequency of scenarios involving chlorine releases. The chlorine gas monitor planned for installation in the control room air intake will isolate the control room before concentrations in excess of the TLV can be reached. The total frequency of al1~ scenarios which might lead to offsite doses in excess of

-10 10CFR100 limits is 3.3 x 10 per year.

This means that on the average once in 3. billion years such an accident might occur.

It is very likely that other scenarios, with higher frequency, will dominate the risk from operating TMI Unit 1.

The highest frequency such scenarios are expected' to be between 1 x 10-7 and 3 x 10-7 per year, a full' three orders of magnitude higher.

The Standard Review Plan 3.2.2 suggests that NRC reviewers use 10-6 per' year to judge the acceptability of the frenuency of scenarios such as these. This is a case where the " expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines of approximately 10-6 per year is acceptable if... the realistic probability can be shown to be lower." In this case, the realistic probability would indeed be lower because:

l a.

Lack of an accurate and detailed ground absorption model has forced the use of a 1 cm. deep puddle for evaporation of any

[

spill.

b.

Lack of detailed information from CONRAIL about car types and current shipment frequencies have forced the use of 1982 data on car mixes and 1978-1979 data on shipment frequencies.

Railcars j

have been improved somewhat in design and railroad shipping rates have been in steady decline since 1980 because of the general economic downturn.

l l

5-1 7621G080284

c.

Not all releases requiring evacuation necessarily involve the release of the entire contents of a tank car as assumed here.

However, no data exists to further discriminate such cases, d.

GPUN has committed to changing the emergency feedwater (EFW) actuation system such that if the main feedwater ramps back too much (NE-), EFW will be automatically actuated. This will make it even more unlikely that operator intervention is required after a turbine / reactor trip.

5-2 7621G080284

C

+

, Table 5-1 Table showing Estimates of.the Frequency of Scenarios Initiated by a-Toxic Chemical Release which Result in a

Radiation Release from TMI Unit 1 in Excess of the Dose Limits of 10CFR100 -

Frequency of Exceedence, Per Year Chemical Roy Shocks Total Acetic Acid,. Glacial 1.15 x 10-12 9.23 x 10-13 2.07 x 10-12 Acetic Anhydride 0

0 0

Acrylonitile 8.00 x 10-12 8.00 x 10-12 Ammonia, Anhydrous 4.87 x 10-12 1.72 x 10-11 2.21 x 10-11 Bromine 1.58 x 10-11 1.58 x 10-11 Chlorine 3.34 x 10-10 3.34 x 10-10 Chromic Fluoride 5.28 x 10-11 5.28 x 10-11 Coal-Tar, Light Oil 1.46 x 10-12 1.46 x 10-12 Ethyl Acrylate 3.66 x 10-13 3.08 x 10-13 6.74 x 10-13 2.25 x 10-11 2.25 x 10-11 Ethylene Oxide Formaldehyde,- 37 wt %-

2.05 x 16 2.05 x 10 -

Hexane 0

0 liydrochloric Acid 36 wt %

8.44 x 10-13 8.44 x 10-13 Hydrofluoric Acid, Anhydrous 1.71 x 10-11

-3.67 x 1011 5.38 x 1011 11' 11 Phosphorous Oxychloride 1.33 x 10-1.33 x 10-Propylene Oxide 1.31 x 10-11 1.31 x 10-11 Vinyl Acetate 4.43 x 10-12 4,43 x 10-12 Vinyl Chloride.

2.69 x 10-12 1.12 x 10-10 1.15 x 10-10 Totals 7.90 x 10-11 5.81 x 10-10 6.60 x 10-10 Without Chlorine 7.90 x 10-11 2.47 x 10-10 3.26 x 10-10

~ Key: -- Indicates no such shipments occur on the indicated line.

O Indicates shipments made, but not in sufficient amounts per tank car to exceed the TLV in the control room from the rail line indicated, n

i I

I 5-3 i

7621G073084

6.0 REFERENCES

- 1.

NUREG-0570, " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Release," USNRC, June 1979.

2.

Regulatcry Guide No.1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," USAEC, June 1974.

3.

Smith, J.M. and H.C. Van Ness, Introduction to Chemical Engineering Thermodynamics, 3rd Ed., McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1975.

4.

Perry, R.H. and C.H. Chilton, editors, Chemical Engineers' Handbook, 5th Ed., McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1973.

5.

Turner, D.B.,

" Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates," USHEW, Public Health Scryice Pub. No. 999-AP-26,1969.

6.

Briggs, G.A., Plume Rise, USAEC Critical Review Series, Pub. No.

TID-25075,1969.

7.

" Atmospheric Diffusion Experiments with SF6 Tracer Gas at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Under Low Wind Speed Inversion Conditions," prepared by Pickard, Lowe and Associates, Inc., The Research Corporation of New England, and General Public Utilities Corporation, January 1972.

8.

Regulatory Guide 1.145, " Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Coasequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," USNRC, August 1979.

9.

Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 42nd Ed., Chemical Rubber Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1960-1961.

10. Reid, R.C., PrausMtz, J.M., and T.K. Sherwood, The Properties of Gases and Liquids, 3rd Ed., McGraw-Hill Book, Co., New York,1977, 11.

Iaternational Critical Tables of Numerical Data: Physics, Chemistry and Technology, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1933.

l 12.

International Critical Tables, Vol. I to Vol. VIII, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York.

13. Faith, W.L., Keyes, D.B., and R.L. Clark, Industrial Chemicals, John Wiley and Sons, New York,1957.

L

'14.

Lowry, H.H., editor, Chemistry of Coal Utilization, Supplementary Volume, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1963.

15. Sax, N.I., Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 5th Ed., Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, New York,1979.

6-1 7601G072484

. i REFERENCES - (continued) 116.. Walker, Frederick. Formaldehyde, Reinhold, New York,1944.

17. Gilbert Associates, Drawing C-302-842, Rev. 30.

L18.

" Final-Safety Analysis Report, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station -

4 Unit 1," Metropolitan Edison Company, March,1970.

~

i

19. CONRAIL, " Hazardous Material Node Report Produced for Metropolitan Edison -:TMI", September 29, 1980.

i

20. ' Accident / Incident Bulletin 146 (1977).

g 21. Accident / Incident Bulletin 151 (1982) i 22... Special Routing of Spent Fuel Elements, Systems Technology Lab.-

4 Inc., Arlington, Va., Department of Commerce Report PB83-105015.

4

'23.

Limerick Generating Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Revision 5, Philadelphia Electric Co., OctoDer 1952.

4

24. Final Environmental Statement 'on the Transportation of Radioactive Mater 1al by A1r and Other Modes, NUREG-l/U, DecemDer 19//.

25. Midland' Nuclear Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Consumers Power Company, May 1984.

26.

" Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of the Federal Railroad Administration's Hazardous Materials and Track' Safety Programs,"

National Transportation Safety Board, March 8,1979.

27. O'Driscoll, J. J., " Handling Derailment Accidents Involving Ammonia,"

Ammonia Plant Safety, Volume 17, 1975.

e 28.

Three Mile Island Unit 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Phase I Report, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation,- April 1984.

i?

l i

i.

t l'

4 6-2 760lG073084

.., -.. -, - ~. ~,

--._,.~....-._

___m.-

APPENDIX A Tank Car Accident Frequency (per car-mile)

OBJECTIVE: Determine site-specific distribution for A, the frequency T

of tank car accidents / car-mile.

NOTES 1.

Used 3.2 x 10-4/ track mile-year in Midland (for frequency of release). Obtained from range of 346-1500 releases (1971-1977),

325,500-334,932 miles. For one particular company, there were 7 major releases over 10,454 miles (1973).

Ratio of evacuations to releases ~0.10 to 0.26 (mean = 0.18).

2.

Accident / Incident Bulletin Data Accidents due to Accidents /

Derailments /

Track Defaults /

100 100 106 Year Train-Miles Train-Miles Train-Miles Train-Miles

1977 13.82 (10,362) 10.76 5.78 (4,337) 7.50 x.108 1978-15.00 (11,277) 11.66 6.38 (4,797) 7.52 x 108 1979 12.76 ( 9,740) 9.80 5.31 (4,050) 7.63 x 108 1980 11.78 ( 8,451) 9.93 4.87 (3,492) 7.18 x 108 1981 8.55 ( 5,781) 6.46 3.36 (2,273) 6.76 x 108 1982 8.00 ( 4,589) 5.90 3.09 (1,769) 5.73 x 108

Includes motor-train miles, yard-switching miles and' locomotive-miles.

Accidents on Main Line Track Speed

. Total No.

Deraf1ments Track-Caused Unknown 43 18 42 3

7 1-10 705 587 83 330 47 11-20 449 359 80 150 33 21 -30 424 340 80 170 40 I

31-40 277.

195' 70 63 23 41-50 199 129 65 27 14 51 -60 84 61 73 26 31 61 -70 19 6

32 2

11 71 -80 8

1 13 1

13 81-90 3

1 33 1

33

> 91 2

1 50 b

2213 1697 77 774 A5 A-1 7602G072484

Accidents on Yard Track Speed Total No.

Derailments

][

Track-Caused j[

Unknown 76 28 37 6

8 1-10 1784 1259 71 752 42 11-20 84 47 56 21 25 21 -30 8

2 25 1

13 31 -40 4

2 50 1

25 41 -50 2

2 100 1

j@Q 1958 1340 68 762 39 Accidents on Industry, Siding, or Unknown Track Type Speed Total No.-

Derailments j[

Track-Caused j[

Unknown 11 2

18 1

9

.1-10 355 305 86 193 54 11-20 42 34 81 17 40 21 -30 4

2 50 31-40 5

3 60 2

40 41 -50 1

418 346 83 21 3 51 Accidents by Track Class Speed Total No.

j[

Derailments j[

Track-Caused j[

Unknown 305 7

212 70 128 42 1

2172 47 1623 75 963 44 2

740 16 570 77 327 44 3'

763 17 556 73 235 31 4

537 12 374 70 106 20 5

66 1

46 70 9

14 6

6 0.1 2

33 1

17 4589 3383 74 1769 39 Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials Continuing Damaged Releasing Consists In Hazardous Hazardous Hazardous People Year Carrying Consist Material Material Material Evacuated 1982 504 35,268 2,297 671 137 7,226 1981 601 41,197 2,770 773 109 18,720 1980 842 59,697 4,139 989 173 25,713 A-2 7602G072484

3.

Special Routing of Spent Fuel Elements, Systems Technology Lab.' Inc.,

Arlington, VA,1982.

(Performed for U.S. Department of Commerce, PBB3-101015).

References a report on tanker releases per car-mile as a function of track class:

"The Geographical Distribution of Risk Due to Hazardous Materials Tank Car Transportation in the U.S.":

Class, Release Probability 1

9.13 x 10-6 2

6.6 x 10-7 3

5.4 x 10-7 4

1.3 x 10-7 (80% of U.S. track is Class 4) 5 1.3 x 10-7 6

3.31 x 10-6 4.

Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170, Dec.1977.

Based on Sandia data, uses accident rate of 1.5 x 10-6 per car-mile.

PROCEDURE Note 3 gives the desired result, but the source is not sufficiently defined. As a check, let I

AT At R

where At=

total rate of accidents / train-mile fR= conditional frequency of hazardous material release, given that a train carry H-M's is in an accident.

A-3 7602G072484

y; -

s Table A-1 THRESHOLD ACCIDENT YALUE 6

-x10 Source: Accident / Incident Bulletins

{t Year Threshold 151 (1982 and 146 (1977) 9.2 1968

$ 750 9.9 1969 750 9.7 1970 750 9.3 1971 750

9. 6 -

1972 750

'11.7 1973 750 12.8 1974 750 10.7 1975 1750 13.2 1976 1750 13.8 1977 2300.

.15.0 1978 2600 12.8 1979 2600 11.8 1980 3200 8.6 1981 8.0 1982 4100 For our purposes, a "mean" value of ~1.0 x 10-5 is good enough, fR " DHMR / RHM where ngg number of cars of hazardous material per hazardous material

=

train nHMR number of cars carrying hazardous materials which release

=

some or all of their contents per' accident Cars Cars Cars in Containing Releasing Year Consists Consist Hazardous Matls.

Hazardous Matls.

1982 504 35,268 2,297 137 1981 601 41,197 2,770 109 1980 842 59,697 4,139 173 1977 673 50,007 3,118 153 1976 627 45,363 2,642 152 1975 637 48,669 4,711 126 3,884 280,201 19,677 850 A-4 7602G072784

r: -

Thus, Year bM 5MR 1982 4.6 0.27 1981 4.6 0.18 1980 4.9 0.21 1977 4.6 0.23 1976 4.2 0.24 1975 7.4 0.20 Using global averages, WHM =

5, nHMR = 0.22 4.5 x 10-7/ car-mile AT=

I

(

l I

u F

A-5 7602G072784

e l

ATTACENENT 2 I

l Miniaua Time for Chemical to Esech Intake Structure in Concentretipo Sufficient to Cause Exceedence, Minutes l

l Roy Line i Shocke Line l l

CHEMICAL (sin) l (sin) i TLv ops l

I I

l l Acetic Acid, Glacial l

2.32 I

8.76 l

20 l

l 10 l

l Acetic Anhydride l

3.33 l

l 6.18 l

40 l

l Acrylonitrile l

l Ammonia, Anhydrous l

2.32 l

6. 7.3 1

100 l

l 5.94 1

0.3 l

Bromios l

6.18 l

15 l

> Chlorina 1

l 6 as RF l

l Chronic Fluoride in MF l

2.43 l

l 8.76 l

60 (Lensene) l l Coal Ter, Light 011 l

l Ethyl Acrylate l

2.32 I

8.76 I

50 l

l 8.76 l

200 l

Ethylene Oxide l

311.52 l

10 l

Formaldehyda I

l 200 l

l l Hexane l

8.76 100 l

) Hydrochloric Acid

,l 2.43 1

6.35 i

6 l

l Eyd. Fluoride, Anhydrous l

6.18 I

0.5 l

l Phosphorne Oxychloride l

8.76 l

200 l

l Propylene oxide l

6.18 l

20 l

Vinyl Acetate l

Vinyl Chloride l

3.9L l

8.76 l

1000 l

I i

1

(

l l

l 1

I I

I l

l l

Frequency of Exceedence of the Toxic Limit in the TMI-1 Control Room Frequency of Exceedence Per Year Chemical Roy Shocks Total Acetic Acid 2.30 x 10-8 1.85 x 10-8 4.15 x 10-8 Acetic Anhydride 1.79 x 10-9 0

1.79 x 10-9 Acrylonitrile 1.60 x 10-7 1.60 x 10-7 Ammonia 9.74 x 10-8 3.44 x 10-7 4.42 x 10-7 Bromine 3.15 x 10-7 3.15 x 10-7 Chlorine 6.69 x 10-F 6.69 x 10-6 Chromic Fluoride 1.06 x 10-6 1.06 x 10-6 Coal Tar, Light 011 2.92 x 10-8 2.92 x 10-8 Ethyl Acrylate 7.33 x 10-9 6.15 x 10-9 1.35 x 10-8 Ethylene Oxide 4.50 x 10-7 4.50 x 10-7 Formaldehyde 4.10 x 10-12 4.10 x 10-12 Hexane 0

0 Kydrochloric Acid 1.69 x 10-8 1.69 x 10-8 hdrofluoric Acid Anhydrous 3.42 x 10-7 7.34 x 10-7 1.08 x 10-6 Phosphorous 0Aychforide 2.67 x 10-7 2.67 x 10-7 l

Propylene 0xide 2.62 x 10-7 2.62 x 10-7 Vinyl Acetate 8.87 x 10-8 8.87 x 10-8 Vinyl Chloride 5.38 x 10-8 2.25 x 10'8 2.30 x 10-6 Total 1.58 x 10-6 1.16 x 10-5 1.32 x 104I Without Chlorine 1.58 x 10-6 4.94 x 10-6 6.52 x 10-6

=_

i 9

e 7626G073084

.

ML20094G157

Contents

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

6.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

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6.0 REFERENCES

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ML20094G157

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

6.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

=

6.0 REFERENCES

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