ML20094C229
| ML20094C229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1984 |
| From: | Morley R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19273A408 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-10170-APC-S1-R, WCAP-10170-APC-S1-R0, WCAP-10170-APPC, NUDOCS 8408070419 | |
| Download: ML20094C229 (11) | |
Text
WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 WCAP-10170 App. C-Sl-NP Revision 0 Key Safety Parameter Selection for the Beaver Valley Units 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
By:
R. C. Morley Approved: [
[4 E.
. Rahe, Manager
. uclear Safety Department Westinghouse Water Reactors Division July 30, 1984 1
f w %
8400070419 840001 PDR ADOCK 05000412 F
PDR 5971Q:1D/071084 1
WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 TABLE OF-CONTENIS Section Title Page Introduction 1
C.0 Beaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS Key Safety Parameters i
59710:1D/071084
l WESTINCIDUSE CLASS 3 LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page C.1 Beaver Valley Unit 2 Top Level (Narrow Range) SPDS Variables 4
Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREC-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Activation Step in the Counting Process of Deletion C.2 Beaver Valley Unit 2 Top Level (Wide Range) SPDS Variables 5
Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Activation Step in the Cognitive Process of Detection C.3 Westinghouse PWR Systems Appearing in the Beaver Valley 6
Unit 2 SPDS Happed into NRC Safety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Identification of System State Step in the Cognitive Process of Detection C.4 Beaver Valley Units 2 SPDS Safety Concern Variables Mapped 8
into NRC Saf ety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) 11 5971Q:lD/071084
.,,....-m,
~f.
N.
t WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 INTRODUCTION
' This document is a plant specific version of the generic Westinghouse SPDS Key s
Safety Parameters listed in WCAP 10170 Appendix C.
The f ollowing variables are on the Westinghouse Generic SPDS but are not
' included in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS.
The contaissent sump discharge liquid radiation and RCS sample liquid radiation are available to the control room operating staf f via information from the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).
RCS drain tank discharge radiation is available to the control room operating staff via inf ormation f rom the routine nuclear sampling
_ procedure.
' The ' site boundary area radiatior and hydrogen recombiner status is available to the control room operating staf f via other instrumentation
' display in the control room.
TSC area radiation is ocly available in Technical Support Center (TSC).
Radweste Vent Collection Discharge Gaseous Rad,iation is available to the control room operating staf f via information f rom the airborne radioactivity effluent release assessment system.
5971Q1D/071084 1
E_:.! _ _
~ _ _, '
)
WESTING 10USE CLASS 3 C.0 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 SPD3 KEY SAFETY PARAMETERS The goal of a safety parameter display system is to decrease the potential f or operator cognitive errors by aiding operators in detecting deviations f rom saf e plant conditions. An understanding of the task of detection is required in order to design an eff ective SPDS. From a simplistic view point detection usually ref ers to the initial detection of a plant abnormality. In terms of operator detection needs, detection also refers to the subsequent detections, in the sense of feedback, i.e.,
verification that operator actions are achieving safety goals and intended operator actions are successfully executed. In the sense of multiple f ailure emergencies detection also means detecting a second, third, etc., f ailure af ter initial detection of the first.
The detection process can be broken into stages:
Activation - the operators detemine that some abnormal condition exists that demands f urther investigation.
Observation / data collection - data are collected, f rom control room instruments or other sources, to help investigate the nature of the abnormal condition.
Recognition - recognize plant state in terms of a f amiliar pattern; usually leads directly to selection of a sequence of actions.
Identification of system state - the data previously collected are abstracted into a coherent representation of the current sate of the plant; at this point, the crew will identify what is wrong, but not why or how the abnormal conditions developed.
These stages cover the operators detection process f rom the initial activation that an abnormal condition exists to his resulting knowledge of what is wrong in terms of his understanding of the state of the plant.
In other words the role of concept-driven observation must be recognized in the detection process. This means that, once activated, observation is a guided 2
5971Q:1D/071084
WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 process -- looking f or something. The quality of operator observations then depends on his recognition or identification of plant state.
The result is that to support the operator's ability to detect departures f rom saf e plant conditions, an SPDS should support: (a) subsequent as well as initial detections of abnormal conditions; (b) feedback to the operator on the success of actions both in terms of successf ul action execution and in goal achievement; (c) observation, recognition and identification of plant state; and (d) guidance to the operator for f urther data collection activities (concept-driven observation).
The two top level displays (the Narrow Range iconic and the Wide Range Iconic) are intended to aid the operator in the activation step of the detection process by making the operator aware that some abnormal condition exists that demands f urther investigation. The parameters used on these two top level displays are placed in the five safety f unctions itemized in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 in Tables C-1 and C-2, respectively.
The second level display aids the operator in the observation / data collection and recognition stages of the detection process and f ocuses his data collection activities into the approprite plant system so that he might accomplish the identification of system state step in this detection process. These steps in the detection process ef fectively translate the abstract issues of saf ety functions and the awareness that some abnormal conditions exists into the practical language of plant operations, i.e., f rom safety f unctions to pressures, temperatures, levels, etc. This display provides more detailed inf ormation on the entire plant.
The identification of system state step is accomplished by the use of the individual system displays. The systems that are depicted in these displays are mapped into the safety f unctions itemized in NUREC-0737, Supplement 1 in Table C-3.
To complete the mapping, the parameters that appear in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS are individually mapped into the NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 safety functions in Table C-4.
3 5971Qt1D/071084
WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 TABLE C.1 Beaver Valley Unit 2 Top Level (P' arrow Range) SPDS Variables Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Activation Step in the Counting Process of Deletion Reactivity Control Power Mismatch (Nuclear-Turbine)
Reactor Core Cooling & Heat Removal From the Primary System Pressurizer Pressure RCS Tavg Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range)
Reactor Coolant System Integrity Pressurizer Level Net Charging Flow Radiation Monitoring Containment Monitoring Radioactivity Control Radiation Monitoring Containment Condition Containment Monitoring (Temperature, Pressure, Sump Level)
Radiation Monitoring 4
$971Q:1D/071084
WESTINCHOUSE CLASS 3
~
TABLE C.2 Beaver Valley..,_ r 2 Top Level (Wide Range) SPDS Variables Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREC-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Activation Step in the Cognitive Process of Detection Reactivity Control Start-Up Rate Reactor Core Cooling & Heat Removal f rom the Primary System RCS Pressure Core Exit Temperature Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)
Reactor Coolant System Integrity Pressurizer Level Reactor Vessel Level Containment Pressure Radiation Monitoring Radioactivity Control Radiation Monitoring Containment Conditions Containment Pressure Radiation Monitoring 5
5971Q1D/071084
WESTINCHOUSE CLASS 3 TABLE C.3 Westinghouse PWR Systems Appearing in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Identification of Systen State Step in the Cognitive Process of Detection Reactivity Control Rod Control Nuclear Instrumentation Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control Rod Position Indication
. Main Steam (Nuclear)
Steam Dump (Atmospheric and Condenser)
Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal f rom the Primary System Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control Residual Heat Removal Main Steam (Nuclear)
Main Feedwater (Nuclear)
Steam Dump Aux. Feedwater Rod Control Rod Position Indication Nuclear Instrumentation Safety injection Core Ruit Theruccouples Loop RTD's 6
$971Q:1D/071084
l WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 TABLE C.3 (Cont.)
Westinghouse PWR Systems Appearing in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) to Aid the Identification of System State Step in the Cognitive Process of Detection Reactor Coolant Integrity Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control Residual Heat Removal i
Safety Injection Containment Monitoring Radiation Monitoring Rydtonctivity Radiation Monitoring Containment Isolation Containment Conditions Containment Monitoring Containment Spray Containment Fan Coolers Hydrogen Concentration Radiation Monitoring 7
5971Q:1D/071084
WESTINCIDUSE CLASS 3 TABLE C.4 heaver Valley Unit 2 SPDS Safety Concern Variables Mapped into NRC Safety Functions (NUREC-0737 Supplement 1)
(b.c)
~
k e
mme 8 To 74